Chapter XVI
DISCIPLINE
1. Revision of the Book
a. Need of Revision
[Book of Discipline, chap. vii., sec. iii., especially par's. viii. and xvii. —Comp. Digest of 1873, pp. 564, 592, &c.]
SOME eight or ten cases of this kind were presented to the Judicial Committee, but by the skill and wisdom of that body matters were so managed that all but three were arranged without being brought before the house. No. 1 was the complaint of the Church of Stillwater against the Synod of New Jersey.
The session of the Stillwater Church suspended one of their ruling elders. The ruling elder appealed to the presbytery, and the presbytery directed the session to restore him to office; the session then complained to synod, and the synod sustained the presbytery. It was against the action of the synod the session now complains.
After a great deal of discussion, extending over parts of six days, Dr. Thornwell said he thought the whole question was one of technicalities, and moved that the complaint be sustained pro forma, and the session be directed to give Mr. Shafer (the suspended elder) a new trial. This motion was carried almost unanimously.
This is another lesson teaching what the Church seems slow to learn; that a body consisting of upwards of two hundred members is not a
very suitable court of appeal. Lawyers tell us that the apparently anomalous plan of making the upper house of the Legislature the ultimate court of appeal in civil matters answered very well, because the house uniformly deferred to the judicial members, except in cases where those members differed among themselves, and then the instinct of the lay members generally inclined them to take part with the right side. Such is not the constitution of our Assembly. It would be more of a parallel case if the appeal in civil matters were from the bench to the whole bar of a state assembled as a court, or if the House of Representatives of the United States were the supreme court of the Union. We believe the necessity for the appointment of a commission is forcing itself more and more on the conviction of the leading minds of our Church.
Another infelicity in our mode of conducting judicial cases was made very manifest on this occasion. This case was introduced on the fourth day of the sessions of the Assembly and decided on the tenth. When the case had been partly heard, other matters were taken up, and the whole subject driven from the minds of the members, and then it was resumed. This was done over and over again. It is obvious the case would have occupied much less time and been much better understood, could it have been heard continuously.
There is another point worthy of remark. It is impossible for any reader of the Minutes of the Assembly, or of the debates, to have the least idea of the merits of the case. The complaint is not given, neither the action of the presbytery nor of the synod is so stated that the reader can understand either the grounds or the justice of their decision. The only insight he can get is from the conflicting statements of the debaters.
We will venture still further to urge the necessity of the revision of our Book of Discipline. It is unintelligible, inconsistent, and in some of its parts unreasonable. This is proved beyond dispute from the fact that so much diversity of opinion exists as to its interpretation. We never knew of a judicial case brought before the Assembly where the mode of procedure did not create debate and confusion. Who are the original parties? is the question almost certain to be started, and just as certain to receive conflicting answers. In the present case, the moderator decided the session and the synod were the original parties.
But what can the word original then mean? The original parties must mean the parties concerned in the origin of the dispute; which in this case, were the elder and the session—another difficulty is, that in the great majority of cases there are no parties, in the sense of plaintiff and defendant. It seems unreasonable and anomalous to make the lower court a party. In civil matters, a lower tribunal does not appear at the bar of a higher, as a party to be tried. Its decision is reviewed— but the original litigants are the only parties, no matter how many steps there may be before the ultimate tribunal is reached. Would it not simplify matters if we adopted the same course? Our plan is first to try the synod as a culprit, then the presbytery, then the session, and at last we get down to the original offender. No wonder we never fail to get into confusion.
The simple and natural course when a case is brought from a lower to a higher court is, to try the cause, and not the court. The thing to be done is to administer justice, that is, for example, to decide whether a member has been rightfully suspended. Why not do this directly, instead of indirectly? Why must we get at the ultimate point by first having the synod arraigned, accused by one party and defended by another, and then turned out of the house as a culprit,
and when all is done, we have to see how the presbytery acted, and at last we get to the session. In the state, if a man brings a cause before a lower court, and it goes against him, he appeals to the superior court; if not satisfied, he takes it up to the Supreme Court, and, if still aggrieved, he goes to the Court of Errors. In every step he takes simply his cause; he does not drag all the courts with him. The case is reheard at every step, and if injustice was done in the original decision, or in any of the subsequent ones, the matter is set right. The cause goes up with all the records in the case, and is decided on its merits. We cannot see why we should not adopt the same course. If a man is suspended unjustly, in his judgment, by a session, let him take the case to the presbytery, and have the case (not the session) tried over again. If not satisfied with the decision, let him go to the synod, and have the case (not the presbytery and session) re-heard; and, if still aggrieved, let him take the case to the Assembly, and have it (and not the synod, the presbytery and session) tried again. This, we are persuaded, would save a great deal of time and trouble, and deliver us from that labyrinth in which our higher courts never fail to get bewildered.
It is a natural consequence of making inferior courts parties, to put them out of the house, and deny them any voice in the ultimate decision of the case. What justice is there in this? If it is a question of fact or morals, or of doctrine, or of constitutional interpretation, they have as much right to be heard in the last resort as others. Suppose a Synod consists of three presbyteries, one with fifty members, another with twenty, and the third with ten, and that the first should unanimously pronounce a given doctrine heretical, then, in case of an appeal, sixteen members might set aside the judgment of fifty. Is there any sense or reason in this? Is it a personal matter with the presbytery any more than with the synod? Is a circuit judge excluded from his seat in the Supreme Court when his judgment is appealed
from? This making lower courts parties, and denying them a voice in the final judgment, and, to cap the climax, turning them literally out of the house, does appear to us a monstrous perversion of judicial principles.
There are several other points in which the obscurity of our book was manifested. What is meant by the synod, as a party, being fully heard? Dr. Rice said, it means hearing all that the members appointed by the synod to defend its judgment, had to say. The moderator decided it means hearing all that any member of the synod, present at the synodical decision, might wish to say. Again, it was disputed whether the complaint brought up the merits of the case; some said it did, others, with the moderator, said it did not; and yet it was so impossible to get on without bringing up the merits, that the moderator was forced to admit that "it seemed necessary that some little reference to the history of the case should be made!" Is not this pitiable? We do not blame our excellent moderator, whom everybody respects and loves; we blame the system. The whole process is disreputable. The session suspended an elder, no one knows why; no one knows whether it was done justly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly. The presbytery ordered the elder restored to office—no one knows why. The synod confirms the action of the presbytery, and the session complains to the Assembly—of what? we have not the slightest idea, and no one else can have, from the record. If the proceedings of a civil court, or of a court-martial, were so conducted, and so reported, what would the public think? Instead of being behind and below all other tribunals in the mode of administering justice, the Church courts should present a model for all other courts. This can never be done until we have a complete revision of our system.
b. Effective Methods for Revision
The Rev. Dr. Beatty moved that the Assembly take up the consideration of the Revised Book of Discipline, commenced in the last Assembly, and by it referred to this body. He proposed the adoption of the eighth chapter of the new book, with a view to its being sent down to the presbyteries. The Rev. Dr. Rice moved that the consideration of the subject be referred to the next Assembly. This motion was warmly seconded by Dr. Musgrave, and sustained by Drs. Elliott, Junkin, Nevin, and Messrs. Haskell, Kempshall, Miller, and others. It was opposed by Dr. Beatty, who urged that as the work had already been seven years on hand, it ought to be finally disposed of. Drs. Krebs, Lowrie, and Backus took the same view, but Dr. Rice's motion to postpone was adopted by a large majority. We do not know that any surprise need be felt at this decision. In the first place, the General Assembly is a large body. Its vis inerticœ is great. It requires a great and continued force to set it in motion.
In the second place, in every such body, and in every community, there is a party opposed to all change. They are wedded to old ways, and cannot be persuaded that anything new is good. The old naval officers of England and America opposed the introduction of steam into the navy. It is not surprising therefore, when a man has trod the quarter deck as long as Dr. Musgrave has done, that he is disposed to pitch any new sailing orders into the sea without even looking at them. He has sailed in all weathers, and always got into port; he is therefore satisfied with things as they are. This class of men are very respectable, very strong, and very confident. With them, seeing is believing. It is no use to tell them that steam is surer and better than wind as a motive power. They have sailed too long to believe that a ship can go ahead against wind or tide, no matter how large "a tea kettle," (as an English Admiral called a steam engine,) she may have on board. These good men can be moved only by a vis a tergo. But move they must. Still for the time being they keep things steady. In
the third place, not one in ten of the General Assembly knew anything of the new book. They had, therefore, no ground for judging of its merits. More effective than any other consideration was no doubt the desire to get rid of business. There is so much more to be done by every Assembly than can be done deliberately, that every item is stricken from the docket which can with any show of propriety be got rid of. There is also a latent consciousness that the General Assembly is not a fit body to frame a Book of Discipline, or to discuss its several provisions. Its members change year by year. Every question comes up new to every mind. It must decide on the first impression, or not at all. Congress might as well be expected, in the midst of the pressure of all other business, to frame a constitution, as the General Assembly wisely to frame a new Book of Discipline.
There are only two ways, as it seems to us, that this work can be well done. The one is, to have a convention called for the purpose, to sit two or three weeks; and when they have settled everything to their satisfaction, send it down to the presbyteries to be ratified or rejected. Thus our national constitution was framed. The other method is, for the presbyteries to take the Revised Book and carefully consider, amend. or reject it; and then for the Assembly to act definitively under their guidance. The work of deliberation must be done either in a convention, or in the presbyteries. It cannot be done in the Assembly; and the plan of having it done by a committee of eight or ten, experience shows will not answer. The reasons for the alterations are presented to too few minds. The mass of those who are called to judge and decide have not considered the several points to be determined, and they cannot be expected to act blindly. That something must be done, we are fully persuaded. Our present book is confused, contradictory, and impracticable. It cannot be acted upon, without a consumption of time that is intolerable. In every Assembly
where judicial business is to be transacted, there are confusion, and disorder,—decisions which shock and offend, first one party and then another, all because the book itself is what it is. It is no answer to this to say that our present book was framed by great and good men. So was the constitution of England the work of great men. But it must be altered or overthrown to suit the change in men and things. And our old book, we are persuaded, must be altered, or our whole system will utterly break down. That a Church of three thousand ministers shall be occupied, as it may be for days, or even weeks, in its General Assembly, in determining the merits of a petty slander case, in any village in the Union, is a solecism not to be longer endured.
2. Citation of Judicatories
[Book of Discipline, chap. vii., sec. i., par's. v. and vi.—Digest of 1873,
p. 541; Comp. chap. v., sec. ix.—Digest of 1873, p. 525.]
On Thursday, May 25, Mr. Plummer, from the committee on the Pittsburg memorial, made a final report, recommending that the Assembly take up and decide upon the items in the memorial relating to Church order and discipline. The report was accepted. In pursuance of this plan, he subsequently moved the adoption of the following resolutions, viz.
1. That the proper steps be now taken to cite to the bar of the next Assembly such inferior judicatories as are charged by common fame with irregularities.
2. That a special committee be appointed to ascertain what inferior judicatories are thus charged by common fame; to prepare charges and specifications against them; and to digest a suitable plan of
procedure in the matter, and that said committee be requested to report as soon as practicable.
3. That as citation, on the foregoing plan, is the commencement of process involving the right of membership in the Assembly, therefore,
Resolved, That agreeably to a principle laid down, chap. v. sec. 9, of the Form of Government, the members of the said judicatories be excluded from a seat in the next General Assembly until their case shall be decided.
The adoption of these resolutions was opposed by Messrs. Jessup, White, Beman, Dickinson, Peters, and M'Auley; and advocated by Messrs. Plumer, Breckinridge, and Baxter. After a debate occupying most of the time on Thursday afternoon and Friday morning and afternoon, the question was taken and decided in the affirmative, yeas 128, nays 122.
The resolutions were opposed on various grounds. 1. It was denied that the Assembly possessed original jurisdiction such as it is now proposed to exercise. The fifth paragraph of sec. 1, in the chapter on Review and Control, is the strong hold of those who contend that the resolutions are constitutional. But what is the case contemplated in that article? It is, that there has already been some irregularity, in the proceedings of the lower judicatory, either apparent in the records, or proclaimed by common fame. This undoubtedly refers to a case of judical action, or erroneous or defective record, or a case adjudicated in such a manner that the trumpet of common fame proclaims it wrong, and such that it can plainly be proved to be wrong before the superior judicatory. In the circumstances specified in the constitution, it would be right for you to cite a synod to appear before you and answer and show what they have done in relation to the
matter in question, in a case that has been before them. And after hearing their answer, you are to send the case back to them, with directions to do what the constitution and justice require. The words are "After which," that is, after the citation and answer, not after a trial, for the rule says nothing about a trial; but supposes that the case is sent back for trial to the judicatory which is cited. We cannot try and punish here. Suppose we were to cite the Synod of Virginia, for heresy, in maintaining, in the face of all the former decisions of the General Assembly, that slavery is consistent with the Scriptures and the institutions of the Presbyterian Church. Well, our committee, we will suppose, have cited that synod. Then they must send down all the budget of charges they have collected, to tell the synod they must stay these irregular proceedings, on penalty of exclusion from the Church. Every one knows that this cannot be the correct interpretation of the rule. Otherwise, it will make you a court of original jurisdiction, with power to cut off ministers, directly contrary to every provision of the book.
2. But admitting that, under certain circumstances, you have the authority to cite a synod, how do you get the right to cite a presbytery? The rule says, "the next superior judicatory," which limits it to the one immediately above. This provision is in the chapter on Review and Control, and it can give authority only by the express meaning of the words. The session is under review and control of the presbytery, the presbytery of the synod, and the synod of the General Assembly; because they only have the legal right to inspect their records. The General Assembly is, therefore, constitutionally restricted to action on the synods. Unless you can show, by some new ecclesiastical multiplication table, that the General Assembly is next above a presbytery or session or individual member, you have no right to issue a citation to them, and it would be an act of usurpation in you to do it. The General Assembly has
indeed power to reprove. But can we not reprove without citation and conviction? We can reprove immorality in the South and in the North, on mere report, without alleging that any individual is guilty, and so without conviction. The power to cite presbyteries and Church sessions is not the same with warning and reproving; and is in terms given to another body, to the next superior judicatory. If you cite a presbytery to appear here, they will file their plea in bar, that you have no authority, and they will not answer. We have no right thus to take away the constitutional rights of synods, or to strike out, by a mere vote of the Assembly, an important word from the constitution. If we can interfere with presbyteries, by the same argument we may interfere with the sessions.
3. A third objection, is the mode of proceeding. If these charges were against individuals, we should know how to proceed. But that this great court of errors should leave its proper judicial business to hunt up criminals, is most extraordinary. You appoint a committee to find out offences, and then to find out the offenders. Are this committee to be clothed with the plenary powers of a Presbyterian inquisition, to cite and try whom they please, and on what ground they please? Are they to report to you every rumour which the blast of the trumpet of common fame may blow over the land in any direction? Or by what rule are they to discriminate? We wish to know, and the churches ought to know, whether this committee are to be clothed with preliminary judicial powers. If so, in what do they differ from the prerogatives of an inquisition, except that the civil arm withholds its power? Or what better is a Protestant than a Roman Catholic inquisition? Our judicatories are, in fact, to be tried by this committee, without opportunity of defence; to be first adjudged delinquent, and then deprived of their seats; while it is perfectly understood by the commissioners from certain other judicatories, concerning whose irregularities common fame is at least equally
loud, that if they will support this measure, no reports shall be entertained concerning them by the committee, and no words of reproof administered by the Assembly.
The whole mode of procedure is moreover unnecessary. Our constitution has made ample provision for the correction of all errors and disorders. Our system is very complete. Cast your eye down to the source of power in our Church, the body of the people, and see an organized succession of Church courts, guarding the interests of truth, and securing order and purity up to the General Assembly. Then look the other way, and see a system of control and supervision, going down in regular gradations, from the General Assembly to the synods, from synods to presbyteries, from presbyteries to individual ministers and Church sessions, and from sessions to every individual member of the Presbyterian Church. What can be more complete than this system? Why do we want nullification here? What interest is not guarded? What exigency is not provided for? There never was a government that had a provision for every case, like our government. For a case like the present, where an occasional majority, a mere factitious majority, are determined to perpetuate the power of the Church in their own hands, and conscious that unless they do it now, Providence will never give them another opportunity, we grant the constitution has not provided.
The proposition to exclude from the next General Assembly the commissioners of all those judicatories which your committee may think proper to cite, is still more obviously an outrage upon the constitution. Chap. v, sect. 9, to which the resolution refers, gives no warrant for such a proceeding. That whole chapter relates to a specific subject, to process against a minister. Is the process, which you are about to issue, against any member of the next Assembly? No
man is a member of the Assembly, until he is commissioned as such by his presbytery. And when a man comes here with his commission from a presbytery, he comes with authority paramount to all the authority which one General Assembly can have over another. Your committee of commissions are bound by them, and not by the votes of former Assemblies. In chap. iv. the provision authorizing a Church session to suspend a member, under process, from communion, tallies exactly with that respecting the trial of a minister. Here is, in each case, an express authority for laying persons charged under a disability during trial. Where is the authority for laying a judicatory under disability? What has this General Assembly to do in the case at any rate? We have not to try them. When the next General Assembly come up, if they find themselves in such a position that it would be a disgrace to religion to allow the membership of such and such persons, they might possibly pass a vote of exclusion. But what have we to do with the regulations of the next General Assembly? This is not a perpetual body like a synod or presbytery. The members of the next Assembly will come up with their commission from the presbyteries, and how can your committee of commissions exclude them from their seats? Besides, why should we punish presbyteries? This suspension of the right of representation is a real punishment. Why punish the presbyteries when only the synod is cited? Or are we to have a new measure wedge so beveled as to split only on one side, and so as to save such presbyteries in the synods cited as are of a fair, orthodox complexion, and let them remain in good standing? If that is the plan, we should like to see the warrant for it in the book. To illustrate the character of this high-handed and overbearing measure —a measure hitherto unparalleled in the history of legislative or judicial proceedings—suppose that one of these United States should come into collision with the national government, on some point, what would be said if the government should propose, as a first step, to cite a sovereign state to appear at the bar of congress, and then
appoint a committee to act as the scavengers of common fame, and bring into congress an ass-load of such matters as common fame deals in, for trial; and to crown the whole, propose during the pendency of the process, to deprive the representatives of that state from their seat in the next congress? Why, the next congress would puff at such a resolution, just as the next General Assembly will puff your vote to deprive its commissioners of their seats. They will look at the commissions of the presbyteries, and will run over the puny and ineffectual legislation of this Assembly, just as a railroad car, impelled by a powerful locomotive, runs over a rye straw that may lie across its track.
The advocates of the resolutions argued substantially thus. The main question relates of course to the power of the Assembly. Has it the right to act in the manner proposed, viz., to summon inferior judicatories to its bar, and to institute and issue process against them? We maintain that it has both in virtue of specific provisions of the constitution, and of the general nature of our system. As to the first point, it is very plain. It has been said, on the other side, that the Assembly is a mere court of errors, and possesses no original jurisdiction. This, however, is not the fact. It is a court of general review and control. It can direct its eye over the whole Church, and wherever it sees evils to be corrected, it can correct them. The mode in which it is to be informed of such evils, and the mode of correction are definitely prescribed. The ordinary means of conveying such information are the complaints, appeals and references of lower judicatories, or of their members, or the review of records. But there may be cases which none of these reach; an express provision is made to meet such cases. "Inferior judicatories," says the Book of Discipline, chap. 7, sec. i., 5, "may sometimes entirely neglect to perform their duty; by which neglect, heretical opinions or corrupt practices may be allowed to gain ground, or offenders of a very gross
character may be suffered to escape; or some circumstances in their proceedings, of very great irregularity, may not be distinctly recorded by them; in any of which cases their records will by no means exhibit to the superior judicatory a full view of their proceedings. If, therefore, the superior judicatory be well advised by common fame, that such irregularities or neglects have occurred on the part of the inferior judicatory, it is incumbent on them to take cognizance of the same, and to examine, deliberate and judge in the whole matter as completely as if it had been recorded, and thus brought up by the review of the records." Here is not merely the authority, but the command to do precisely what these resolutions propose. When common fame, says the rule, informs the superior judicatory of the existence of error or disorder, it is incumbent on that judicatory to take cognizance thereof, and to examine, deliberate and judge in the whole matter. Common fame has informed this Assembly of the existence of irregularities of a very serious nature. Not vague, uncertain rumour, but definite statements, which, we are morally sure, are correct. We know that there are many synods embracing churches not regularly organized, ministers and elders who never have adopted our Confession of Faith. We know that these and other evils have been long continued and widely extended, and we propose to act in relation to them precisely as the Book of Discipline directs. The first step, says the rule, to be taken is, "to cite the judicatory alleged to have offended to appear at a specified time and place." Well, sir, is not this precisely what we propose to do?
It is objected, however, that this whole rule refers to a case of judicial action in the court below, a special case improperly adjudicated, the knowledge of which is brought to the superior court, which is then authorized to examine into it and order it to be rectified. There is, however, no such limitation; and it would be preposterous that there should be. The rule specifies any "neglect or irregularity," which
covers the whole ground, and does not confine the power of the superior court to specific cases of improper or irregular decisions. If it were known that Socinianism was allowed to be openly professed by the members of some of our presbyteries, may such presbyteries escape all interference or control by simply doing nothing, by neglecting all notice of such departures from the truth and all record on their minutes? Would not the superior court, under the rule which directs that when, from the neglect of a judicatory to perform its duty, heretical opinions or corrupt practices are allowed to gain ground, it is incumbent on the superior judicatory to take cognizance of the same, and to examine and judge in the whole matter, have a right to cite such negligent judicatory and examine into the case? This is the precise case for which the rule was made.
But again it is asked, "What can you do, if you do cite? you can only remit the charges and tell the inferior judicatory they must correct their irregularities. You cannot try and punish here." Suppose this to be true, what has it to do with the question? The objection has reference to the mode of issuing the case, and not to the right, or to the mode of commencing the process. The resolution on the very face of it, professes to be the first step in the process. When the judicatories cited appear at your bar, the first question to be decided will be, are the charges sustained? and the second, how is the cause to be disposed of? It will be time enough then to decide, whether the Assembly shall "deliberate and judge in the whole matter," or send the case down to the implicated judicatories with an injunction to correct the evils complained of. The objection, to say the least of it, is premature. It would be absurd however that a court should have the power to decide, and then be obliged to leave the execution of their decision to the option of the court below. The superior judicatory has undoubtedly the right to see that its decisions are carried into effect.
This however is not now the point. The simple question is about citation.
The perfect regularity of the course proposed is so plain that it is in various ways admitted by the brethren on the other side, as far as synods are concerned; the grand objection is that the right of citation is confined to the judicatory next above, and consequently that the General Assembly has no authority to cite a presbytery. To this objection it would be a sufficient answer to say that the resolutions make no mention of presbyteries. They simply recommend the appointment of a committee to ascertain whether there are sufficient grounds to cite any inferior judicatories to your bar. If that committee should, in their report, go beyond synods, and recommend the citation of presbyteries, it would be time enough to object to the adoption of such recommendation, that the Assembly had no immediate jurisdiction over the presbyteries; that they could be reached only through the synods. But, if in the ascending series of our system of Church courts, so highly praised by the eloquent gentleman on the other side, a synod may be omitted in case of appeal, complaint, or reference, and the cause be brought directly from the presbytery to the Assembly, as is constantly allowed, can any good reason be assigned, why, in the descending series, a synod may not in like manner be passed over, and the Assembly act immediately on the presbytery? It is indeed proper and expedient, in the great majority of cases, that both in ascending and descending the cause should go regularly up or down through the several courts, but this is not always the case. There are occasions when it is just as necessary, for the sake of speedy justice, that the highest court should act on a remotely inferior one, as that an appeal should come directly from the latter to the former. The book renders it incumbent on the next superior judicatory to take cognizance of the neglect of the court below, but this does not forbid the highest court from
interfering when any special emergency renders it necessary or desirable. If, while the Assembly was actually in session, a presbytery should decide that they would depose any of their ministers who should preach the doctrine of the trinity, we suspect few men on this floor would think it necessary to wait for the synod to interfere, especially if they had reason to believe the synod would sustain the decision.
Besides, it has been generally understood that the brethren opposite entertained different opinions as to the power of the Assembly from those which they now express. It was supposed they believed that this body could stretch its long arm over a synod and reach a presbytery, and even make and unmake it at pleasure. It is not many years since they actually exercised this power, and in known opposition to the wishes of a synod, constituted a new presbytery within its bounds. They were understood then to teach that the Assembly was clothed with plenary powers; that as a synod included presbyteries it possessed their powers in a wider sphere, and that the General Assembly, including both synods and presbyteries, might do all that either could do, within the whole compass of the Church. Can these brethren complain if we should assume this matter as a res adjudicata? Must they cry out the moment their own principles are commended to their acceptance? Do they suppose that the constitution means one thing when they are in the majority, and another when they are in the minority? One brother indeed, (Mr. E. White,) all but avows this principle. He says, "The act of the General Assembly erecting a presbytery in this city was null and void, and, in my view, the Synod of Philadelphia acted right in nullifying the procedure," though he voted to condemn the synod, and to enforce the act he pronounces null and void. Such candour, however, is unusual. Taking then the extreme supposition that the Assembly had not, by the constitution, the right to act directly upon presbyteries,
yet as these brethren have legalized the opposite interpretation, they would have no reason to complain if we should now act upon it. We say this, however, merely on the supposition that the case of citation of a presbytery is parallel to that of creating such a body. This we do not admit, and therefore are not prepared to allow that even those who have hitherto condemned the erection of a presbytery by the General Assembly, are inconsistent in advocating the right of citation.* The constitution is not a donation of powers, it is a limitation of them. The General Assembly does not derive its powers from the constitution, but from the delegation of the presbyteries. It is the presbyteries in Assembly collected. It is therefore an unsound principle that the Assembly has no right to exercise any power not expressly granted. It has the right to do any thing in the discharge of its duties as a supreme judicatory and supervising body of the Church, which the constitution does not forbid. The presbyteries have limited and circumscribed the inherent powers of this body. We have no right to pass those limits. We can do nothing the constitution forbids, but we can do a vast many things which it does not enjoin. This whole discussion, however, is premature. Should the proposed committee recommend the citation of presbyteries, we can then decide whether we have the right to cite them or not.
The principal objection, however, is directed against the resolution which proposes that the members of judicatories cited should be excluded from a seat in the next Assembly. The argument on which this resolution is supported may be very briefly stated. It is readily admitted that there is no express warrant for such a proceeding in the Book of Discipline. The authority for it, however, is not the less clear and satisfactory. The constitution expressly recognizes the right of a superior judicatory to cite and try an inferior one. This is admitted. But the constitution makes no specific directions how the trial is to be conducted. Does it follow that it cannot be conducted at
all? Does the constitution recognize a right, and impose a duty, and then, by mere silence, preclude the possibility of exercising the right, or discharging the duty? Certainly not. If the Assembly has the right of trying, it has the right of ordering the trial, and, in the absence of special limitations or directions, must be guided by the nature of our system, by precedent, and the general principles of law and justice. The constitution of the United States confers on the senate the right of trying public officers when impeached, but it prescribes no mode of procedure. Must the proceedings therefore stop, or be arrested at every step by the demand of an express warrant to collect testimony, to take depositions, or to send for persons and papers? When the right to try is conferred, every thing else is left to be regulated by precedent, the general principles of law, and the necessities of the case. In like manner the constitution recognizes the right of congress to preserve its own authority; but where is the warrant for its committees of investigation, for its power of arrest, its right of expelling its own members? There is no more reasonable and universally recognized principle than that a grant of power implies a grant of all that is requisite for its legitimate exercise. When therefore our constitution recognizes the right of the Assembly to cite and try inferior judicatories, it recognizes the right to conduct such trial. It prescribes minutely the method to be adopted when an individual is on trial before a session or presbytery, but it gives scarcely any directions for the mode of proceeding when a judicatory is on trial. The only course therefore to be taken is to consult the nature of our system, and the general rules of justice and propriety. In our system we find the principle distinctly recognized that when a man is on trial before a judicatory, he ceases to have a right to a seat in that judicatory, until his cause is issued; and still further, that even when the decisions of an inferior court are under review in the superior one, the members of the former are excluded from their seats. These, especially the former, are not merely constitutional
rules, but they are self-evidently just and reasonable. Now by parity of reasoning, when a synod is on trial before this house, its members have no right to a seat in it. The resolution refers to chap. v. sect. 9, of the Book of Discipline, for no other purpose than to show that the constitution recognizes the correctness of the principle upon which the Assembly proposes to act. As to the objection that the judicatories in question are not on trial before this Assembly, and that the next Assembly may disregard our decision, we answer that these judicatories are placed on trial the moment they are cited; the citation is the commencement of a judicial process, and the next Assembly will be as much bound to regard the preliminary decision of this house, as its final decision. When this house decides that there is sufficient ground to cite a particular synod, and to suspend its members from a right to a seat, its decision is as much obligatory, as when it decides in the issue of a case on the final deposition or excommunication of a person or persons regularly on trial. Its decisions may be puffed at; but it will be in violation of the provision of the constitution and of justice, that no judicial decision shall be reversed, except by regular process.
3. Appeals and Complaints
a. Appeals in Cases not Judicial
[Book of Discipline, chap. vii., sec. ii., par. 1, Digest of 1873, p. 548.]
A. D. Metcalf and others complained against the Synod of Virginia, for deciding that appeals may lie in cases not judicial. The decision complained of, the reasons of complaint assigned by the complainants, and the whole record of the synod in the case were read. The two parties, the complainants and the synod, having been heard, the roll was called that each member of the Assembly might
have an opportunity of expressing his opinion. After which the vote was taken and the complaint was sustained. That is, the General Assembly decided that appeals cannot lie except in judicial cases.
We regret that it is not in our power to present such a view of this case, as we have been accustomed to give on similar occasions. We have no statement, in the Minutes, of the nature of the question decided by the Synod of Virginia; nor any report of the arguments for and against sustaining the complaint. We are obliged, therefore, to content ourselves with the following remarks on the principle involved in the above decision of the Assembly.
As this subject has already been discussed at some length in our pages,* it may seem unnecessary to say any more on the subject. As, however, the recent decision has again brought it before the churches, it may not be improper to devote a few pages to its consideration. It is really a matter of importance. It would be a hard case if a party, suffering under a grievous wrong, should be turned away from the bar of our highest judicatory, merely on the ground that he had mistaken the nature of his remedy. The history of this question is a little curious. We have had a superior judicatory in our Church for more than a hundred and twenty years. During about seventy years of this period, our discipline was conducted according to the Westminster Directory. In 1789 our present constitution went into operation; which was submitted to an extensive revision and alteration, as to matters of detail, in 1821. Under these several systems, appeals and complaints were allowed without hindrance or contradiction, from any kind of decision in an inferior judicatory by a person who felt himself aggrieved, until 1834. Then, for the first time in our history, as far as we know, the idea was started that appeals and complaints could be made only in cases strictly judicial.
The occasion on which this doctrine was advanced was the following: The Synod of Philadelphia had passed an act by which they first received the Second Presbytery as organized by the Assembly; secondly, united that presbytery with the Presbytery of Philadelphia; and, thirdly, divided this united presbytery by a geographical line. From this act the Assembly's presbytery appealed and complained. When the case came before the Assembly the Rev. Samuel G. Winchester, in an ingenious and eloquent speech, which was afterwards published in various forms, took the ground that "it is only from the decisions of a judicatory sitting as a court, for judicial business, that appeals and complaints can be entertained?" That this novel doctrine was not at that time the doctrine of the synod, which the Rev. gentleman defended, is plain, from the fact, that they had referred for adjudication to that very Assembly "An appeal and complaint of the Fifth Church, Philadelphia, relative to the call of Dr. Beman."† That venerable body therefore, could hardly be surprised that the Assembly overruled Mr. Winchester's plea, and proceeded to exercise a jurisdiction which had been thus explicitly recognised by the very body in whose behalf the plea was urged. Though the synod was thus free from this new doctrine in May 1834, it grew in such sudden favour, that when that body met the following autumn, they decided not merely that appeals and complaints could not lie except in judicial cases, but even that protests were in the same predicament. This is an instructive illustration of the fact that the wisest and best men sometimes allow themselves to be run away with by a plausible idea, though contrary to all their own previous professions and practice. This, however, was a mere temporary delusion. The members of that synod who had signed or allowed protests in all kinds of cases before, still continued to sign or allow them, with equal freedom, their own decision to the contrary notwithstanding. We had fondly hoped that the whole doctrine was quietly forgotten. We had good reason for this hope. We found its
very authors and advocates disregarding it the very next year; acting as though no such doctrine had ever been broached. If they practically abandoned it as untenable, we may be excused for feeling some surprise at its resurrection in a new and distant quarter. It is, however, shorn of its just proportions. The Synod of Philadelphia extended the doctrine to appeals, complaints and protests. Thus putting minorities completely under the feet of majorities, not allowing them even the right of recording their dissent with the reasons for it. Mr. Winchester confined the doctrine to appeals and complaints; these Virginia gentlemen to appeals alone. In this last form it is certainly less objectionable than in either of the others.
In order to understand this matter, we must know precisely what is meant by judicial decisions, to which it is said, appeals and complaints, or appeals alone, are confined. There is a good deal of confusion and error often occasioned by the mere designation of our ecclesiastical bodies as courts or judicatories. They are so called when not sitting in judicial capacity. We find lawyers much troubled to know what we mean by courts; and disposed to run analogies between the different civil tribunals and those found in our Church. This has been a fruitful source of mistakes as to the nature of our form of government.
If our system and nomenclature trouble the lawyers, it is no less true that the lawyers trouble us. They often bring with them into ecclesiastical bodies modes of thinking and reasoning borrowed from their previous pursuits, which are entirely inappropriate to our system. Our good brother, Winchester, will excuse our saying this is precisely his difficulty. His whole printed speech on the subject before us, is distinguished by this lawyer-like kind of reasoning; a strenuous insisting on the precise legal sense of terms, and thence
deriving a rule of construction which makes the constitution speak a language which it was never intended to speak.
Our courts are bodies sui generis; they include within themselves legislative, executive and judicial powers. Yet this division is in a great measure arbitrary. These several powers are but different modes of exercising the general governing authority in the Church; and it is often very difficult to say whether a particular act should be placed under the one or the other of these heads. Still the classification, though not so definite as might be desired, is useful. To the exercise of legislative powers are referred the numerous rules which constitute our Form of Government, which were enacted in a certain prescribed way. To the same head belongs the various standing rules, which, though they form no part of the constitution, are of force until properly repealed; such, for example, as the rules which regulate the reception of foreign ministers, &c. The head of executive powers is the most comprehensive of all, as to it belongs almost every act, except such as concern the exercise of discipline, which is designed to carry into effect the various provisions of our complicated system. Hence the examination, the licensing, ordaining, installing, dismissing ministers; the erection, division, and dissolution of churches, presbyteries and synods, are all executive acts. On the other hand, "the judicial power of the Church," says Principal Hill, of Scotland, "appears in the infliction or removal of those censures which belong to a spiritual society." This passage has been quoted as defining the nature of those acts from which alone complaints and appeals can properly be taken. The class of acts contemplated, therefore, is that which concerns the infliction or removal of ecclesiastical censures. That this is a correct statement of the case, further appears from the nature of the arguments by which this doctrine is sustained. These arguments are derived from the words cause, trial, sentence, parties, &c., which occur in the chapter
which treats of appeals and complaints, and which, it is said, determine the nature of the cases from which an appeal may lie, or against which a complaint may be made.
The definition given above of judicial acts, viz: that they are such as relate to the infliction or removal of ecclesiastical censures, is, however, far from being complete. A Church court often sits in a judicial capacity, without any reference either to the infliction or removal of censure. Take the case before the last Assembly. The Synod of Virginia decided that an appeal could lie in cases not judicial. Mr. A. D. Metcalf, and others complain of this decision. The matter comes before the Assembly. That body, being duly warned by the moderator that it is about to sit in its judicial capacity, hears what the synod has to say in defence of its decision, and what the complain ants had to say against it, and then gave their judgment. The Assembly acted judicially; it sat in judgment on the decision of a lower court. Yet it neither inflicted nor removed any ecclesiastical censure. The Synod of Virginia was no more censured by having its decision reversed, than a district court of the United States is censured when the supreme court reverses its opinion on a point of law. There are, therefore, a multitude of cases in which our courts act judicially, which are not judicial cases, in the sense of the above-cited definition; cases in which there is no offence, no offender, no testimony, and no trial in the ordinary sense of the terms. Besides, a case which is properly executive in one stage, may become judicial in another stage of its progress. Or to speak more correctly, any executive act of a lower court may be made the subject of judicial examination in a higher one. Thus, for example, when the Second Presbytery of Philadelphia, as organized by the Assembly, divided the Fifth Presbyterian Church in that city, contrary to the wishes of the majority of the people, Thomas Bradford, and others of the aggrieved party, brought the matter before the Assembly of 1835.
There the case was regularly adjudicated; both parties were heard, and the decision was reversed. This new doctrine, therefore, rests upon a very unstable basis. It is founded on an imperfect classification of the acts of our judicatories; and assumes that the judicial function has reference to the mere infliction or removal of censures.
Let us examine the nature of the arguments which have been adduced in support of this new doctrine. Our constitution says, "That every kind of decision which is formed in any Church judicatory, except the highest, is subject to the review of a superior judicatory, and may be carried up in one or the other of the four following ways: 1. General review and control; 2. Reference; 3. Appeal; and 4. Complaint." The question is, what is the meaning of this plain declaration? It does not mean, because it does not say, that every individual decision, but every kind of decision may be carried up in either of these four ways. These different forms of redress contemplate different circumstances, and are not all available in every particular case. A reference, for example, must be made by the body itself, and not by an individual member; but the body may refer any kind of case. An appeal supposes an aggrieved party, but he may appeal from any kind of decision which directly affects himself. A complaint supposes some kind of impropriety in the act complained of, but it may be entered against any kind of act alleged to be improper. So that any kind of decision may be regularly brought up in each of the several ways specified above. That this is the true meaning of this article, might be inferred with certainty from the fact that it has always been so understood and acted upon; and that it is almost a literal transcript of the Scottish rule on the same subject, which has always been interpreted and applied in the same way. We are now told, however, that this is not its meaning; that we must lay particular stress on the word or. 'Every kind of decision may be
carried up in one or the other of the four following ways;' one kind in one way and another kind in another way. In the Scotch rule, however, whence ours was taken, there is no or. Principal Hill gives it thus: "Every ecclesiastical business that is transacted in any Church judicatory is subject to the review of its ecclesiastical superiors, and may be brought before the court immediately above in four different ways, by review, by reference, by appeal, and by complaint." If, therefore, the emendators of our book had left out the little word, and said; "Every kind of decision may be carried up in four different ways, review, reference, appeal and complaint;" there would have been an end of the matter; or rather, there never could have been a beginning to the new doctrine. Yet who can doubt that this is precisely what they meant to say, who compares the two rules, and remembers, that our practice, both before and since the emendation, was precisely, as far as the point now in debate is concerned, the same as that of the Scotch Church?
The main dependence of the advocates of the new doctrine, is upon the language employed in directing how an appeal is to be prosecuted. It is argued that where there has been no trial, strictly speaking, in the court below, there can be no appeal, because an appeal, is the removal of a cause already decided, from the inferior to the superior judicatory; secondly, because it is said that all persons who have submitted to a trial have a right to appeal; thirdly, because the grounds of appeal are stated to be such as partiality, the refusal of testimony, haste or injustice in the decision; fourthly, because the book directs that, in hearing an appeal, the following steps are to be taken, viz., to read the sentence, then the reasons, then the records including the testimony, then to hear first the original parties, and afterwards the members of the inferior judicatory. If this argument is valid in relation to appeals, it is no less so in its application to complaints. For if an appeal is the removal of a cause already
decided, so a complaint is "another method by which a cause decided in an inferior judicatory may be carried before a superior." The grounds of complaint contemplate "parties at the bar," injustice of the judgment, &c. The steps also in the prosecution of a complaint are substantially the same as in case of appeal; the sentence is to be read, then the reasons, then the records including the testimony, then the parties are to be heard, &c., &c. The only difference between these modes of redress are the following. First, a complaint does not arrest the operation of a decision against which it is entered; and, secondly, an appeal can be made only by an aggrieved party; whereas a complaint can be made by any member of the court who disapproves of the decision. They do not differ at all as to the kind of decisions against which they are available. The same mode of arguing is equally applicable to the case of references. For a reference is defined to be a judicial representation of a case not yet decided. The superior judicatory, it is said, may remit the cause referred; and the inferior court is directed, in cases of reference, to send up all the testimony, in order that the higher court may consider and decide the case. It is evident, therefore, that we cannot, without the greatest inconsistency, stop half way in this matter. If the use of the words cause, parties, testimony, sentence, &c., under the head of appeals, shows that they must be confined to judicial cases; it proves the same with regard to complaints and references; and our whole system of government is overturned.
The fallacy of the above method of reasoning will appear from the following remarks. In the first place, these technical terms are to be understood, not according to their use in civil courts, but according to our own ecclesiastical usage. Our bodies are called courts; their decisions are called judgments; the matters brought before them are called cases. Are we to infer from this, as has been done by the New School lawyers and brethren, that they have nothing but judicial
powers; that they are mere bodies for the administration of justice? The constitution says, indeed, that they are charged with the government of the churches, yet as civil courts have nothing to do with governing, it is insisted upon that ours can have nothing to do with it. This arguing from technical terms, and giving them a sense foreign to the peculiar nature of our ecclesiastical system, can produce nothing but confusion and embarrassment.
In the second place, our rules were drawn up with special reference to that class of cases which is of most frequent occurrence, and hence the language employed is adapted to such cases. Are we to infer, however, from the fact that the book directs the inferior judicatory, in cases of reference, to send up the testimony, that no case can be referred but one in which there is testimony to be presented? Yet this is the argument upon which so much stress is laid. It is, that because the rules, which relate to appeals, direct that the sentence should be read, and the testimony produced, there can be no appeal where there has not been a judicial sentence, and where there is no testimony. This is exactly the argument made on the floor of the Assembly in 1837 by Dr. Beman, in opposition to the motion to cite certain synods to answer for their irregularities. He insisted that the Assembly should look at the book and abide by it to the letter. But to what part of the constitution did he refer the house? Not to that which contains the radical principles of our system, which enjoins on the higher courts to take effectual care that the constitution is observed, but to the rules of detail. And sure enough, as might have been expected, these rules do contemplate some specific erroneous decision, and consequently direct that the delinquent judicatory should be cited to show what it had done "in the case in question," after which the whole case was to be remitted to the said judicatory to be disposed of in a constitutional manner. It was hence argued that although the power of calling inferior courts to the bar, and
seeing that they conformed to the constitution, was clearly recognized, yet the Church had by these rules of detail, effectually tied her own hands. A specific irregular act might be called up, and sent back for correction, but the synods themselves were beyond the reach of the Assembly. They might cherish what disorders they pleased; recognize what churches or presbyteries they pleased, trample on the constitution as they pleased, the Assembly could do nothing but correct specific acts in detail. This argument is just as good as that which is now urged about appeals or complaints. The argument is, that the rules of process limit the exercise of the right to those particular cases, in which every one of the rules can be applied.
In the third place it is a fallacy running through this argument that there can be no judicial investigation of anything but a judicial act. An appeal or complaint is indeed a judicial process. Hence it is referred to the judicial committee; and the members of the court are warned, when it comes on for decision, that they are about to sit in their judicial capacity. This, however, proves nothing as to the nature of the act appealed from. The higher court is called to sit in judgment on the constitutionality, wisdom, or justice of a particular act of the court below; it matters not whether that act itself were judicial or executive. If anybody was injured by it, he has a right to appeal from it, and have his brethren judge of its propriety. That our constitution contemplated such appeals is evident from the fact that it provides that an appeal shall suspend the operation of the decision appealed from, except it be a sentence of suspension, excommunication, or deposition. This is just as much as to say, except in judicial cases; for suspension, excommunication, and deposition are the only sentences, worth naming, which our courts are competent to pass. If then these are excepted from arrest in their operation by an appeal, all are excepted, unless an appeal may lie from other than strictly
judicial decisions. It is evident, therefore, that such decisions form but one class of those acts from which an appeal can be taken.
Finally, if it can be shown that all the requisitions of the book may be fully complied with in cases of appeals from executive acts, then there is an end of the argument; as the whole argument rests on the supposed incompatibility of those rules with such appeals. Let us take for illustration either of the appeals presented in 1835 by Thomas Bradford and others. The presbytery had divided the Fifth Church of Philadelphia against its will, erecting two new churches, and giving a name to neither. The church felt itself aggrieved; it believed that not only the spiritual interests of the congregation, but the title to the property was injuriously affected by the decision. They had therefore the right not only to have it reviewed, but arrested. They accordingly appealed. The papers were referred to the judicial committee, and found to be in order. When the case was to be tried, the Assembly was duly warned that it was about to sit in a judicial capacity, to decide on the unconstitutionality and justice of that act of the presbytery. The first step was to read the sentence, or decision appealed from; the second to read the reasons of the appeal. The third to read the record in the case, including the testimony. The testimony in this case was all the evidence presented to the presbytery to prove the opposition of the church to the division. Fourth step was to hear the original parties. The only parties in the case were the presbytery who had done the wrong and the church that suffered it. They were accordingly heard. The fifth step, according to the book, would be to hear the members of the inferior judicatory. This direction was complied with in taking the fourth step, the presbytery being one of the parties. Thus every direction of the book was complied with, in this, as in a hundred similar cases of appeal from executive acts. It would be mere trifling to say that the directions were not all followed, because there were not two original
parties distinct from the presbytery. There never are such parties, even in judicial cases, when the ground of prosecution is common fame. Besides, had this appeal been carried in the first instance to the synod, and there decided against the appellants, then the original parties in this case would have been the church and the presbytery, and the members of the synod, the members of the inferior judicatory whom the book directs to be heard in the fifth step of the trial. Thus the whole rule would have been complied with to the letter.* There is, therefore, no foundation in our constitution for this new doctrine. Every letter of the rules may be, and has been fully complied with in a multitude of cases, where the decision appealed from was merely an executive act.
It may be said, however, that it is very desirable to have appeals confined if possible to strictly judicial cases; that it is unreasonable that the executive acts of a body should be arrested by any dissatisfied member. This objection, however, overlooks the fact that no merely dissatisfied member has a right to appeal. That remedy is expressly confined to a person or persons directly affected by a decision. If a minister is tried before his presbytery for an offence and condemned, if he does not choose to appeal, no dissatisfied member can do it. And if he is acquitted, no member of the court, however he may disapprove of the decision, can appeal; his remedy is to complain. But if a presbytery dismiss a pastor, against his will, from his charge, as he is directly affected by the act, he may appeal from it; or if they divide a church, the church may appeal. The right of appeal is limited, therefore, not to a particular class of decisions, but to a particular class of persons, viz.: to those who are injuriously affected by the decision.
We have, however, acted long enough upon the defensive. We shall proceed to show that this new doctrine, especially if applied to
complaints as well as appeals, (and we have seen that the two cannot in this matter be consistently separated,) is subversive of the fundamental principles of Presbyterianism, and inconsistent with the uniform practice of the Church. It is a radical principle of our system "that a larger part of the Church, or a representation of it, should govern a smaller, or determine matters of controversy which arise therein." It is in virtue of this principle that every man who is aggrieved or injured by a decision of a lower court has the right to seek redress in a higher. He has the right to bring the matter up himself, and is not dependent on the majority of the body, whether it shall come up or not. It is further a fundamental principle of our system that any thing which has been unconstitutionally or injuriously done in a lower court, whether it affect an individual or not, may be corrected by a higher court. This is of the essence of Presbyterianism. It is involved in the declaration that the Church is to be governed not only by congregational and presbyterial, but also by synodical assemblies; and more expressly in the declaration that synods have authority "to redress whatever has been done by presbyteries contrary to order." It is evident that any interpretation of words and phrases occurring in rules regulating details in the administration of discipline, which comes into conflict with these radical principles of our system, must be rejected as false and unwarranted. The new doctrine is liable to this fatal objection. It effectually prevents the exercise of control on the part of the higher courts, and renders the lower judicatories independent as to all their executive acts, which includes the larger and perhaps most important part of their proceedings. A presbytery may trample on the constitution with impunity; it may admit congregationalists to sit as ruling elders; it may receive ministers without requiring them to adopt our standards; it may dismiss a pastor against his own will and that of his people; it may, for party purposes, divide a congregation contrary to its wishes, or instal a pastor over them in spite of their
remonstrances; and for these and a multitude of similar cases there is no redress, if the right to complain and appeal is to be confined to judicial cases. The review of records affords no remedy at all in nine out of ten of such instances. The records contain a bare statement of the facts, that such a man was received, such a pastor dismissed, such an one installed, or such a congregation divided, but whether these acts were constitutionally performed, they give no means of judging. They afford, therefore, nothing on which the higher court can lay hold. Besides, by withholding their records, it would be in the power of the inferior judicatory to prevent all knowledge of their irregularities, even in those few cases in which the Minutes might disclose them.
It may be said that fama clamosa affords ground for calling the offending judicatory to an account. But, in the first place, this is a remedy which applies only in extreme cases. And, in the second, this would be doing by indirection what ought to be done decently and in order. A minority grieved by the unconstitutional or injurious acts of the majority, not having the right to make an orderly representation of the case to the higher court, is driven to make a clamour about it, in order to attract their attention. This surely is not Presbyterianism. And besides, the citation and trial of judicatories on the ground of common fame, is the most invidious, the most cumbrous, and the least effectual of all methods for the correction of abuses. If, therefore, the right of appeal and complaint be taken away, except in judicial cases, there is no remedy for the largest and most important class of unconstitutional or unjust acts of ecclesiastical bodies. Our New School brethren have never brought forward a principle more completely subversive of Presbyterian government than the new doctrine, in its full extent, would certainly be. It would effectually prevent the legitimate operation of our system; it would place the constitution, order, and purity of the Church at the mercy of any one