Chapter XIV
THE PRESBYTERY
1. Quorum of Presbytery
[Form of Gov., chap. x., sec. vii.—Digest of 1873, pp. 139–144, 205,
551.]
IN answer to a question proposed in Overture No. 20, the committee reported the following resolution:
Resolved, That any three ministers of a presbytery, being regularly convened, are a quorum competent to the transaction of all business, agreeably to the provision contained in the Form of Government, ch. x. 7. This resolution was adopted, yeas 83, nays 35.
We have seen no report of the debate on this motion, but from the protest presented by Messrs. Breckinridge and Junkin, for themselves and twenty other members, we gather that the leading objections to the ground taken by the Assembly were substantially as follows: 1. It was said to be in opposition to the letter and spirit of the constitution, which declares a presbytery to consist of all the ministers and one ruling elder, from each congregation within a certain district. As a presbytery is said to consist of ministers and elders, these form its constituent elements; and the body cannot be formed of only one of its constituent elements. The section which says that three members regularly convened, and as many elders as may be present, constitute a quorum of presbytery, shows that at least one elder is indispensable in order to the regular organization of a presbytery.
2. In sec. 10 of ch. x. which provides for the calling of extra meetings of presbytery, it is required that at least two elders should join in the call for such a meeting, and that due notice should be given to the
session of every vacant congregation. This was supposed to prove that the elders are an essential part of the presbytery, and that the constitution designed to guard against any assumption of power by the ministry, to the neglect or exclusion of the eldership.
3. The decision of the Assembly was declared to be opposed to principles essential to the nature and existence of Presbyterianism. It was represented as an essential element of Presbyterianism that God's people govern themselves, and manage their ecclesiastical affairs, in accordance with his word and by their own chosen and ordained representatives. The elders are declared to be the representatives of the people, to exercise discipline and government in connection with the ministers. If this principle be destroyed the whole system is destroyed. Admit the principle that the ministry may, without the presence of any representatives of God's people, transact the business of the people, and you lay our glorious system of representative republicanism in ruins; and over those ruins you may easily pave a highway to prelacy and popery. As every act which a presbytery may perform, affects the interests of the members of Christ's body, they are entitled to be represented; and it was wise in the framers of our constitution to provide that the people's business should never be done, unless the people had at least one representative to see to their interests, and to watch those encroachments of the ministerial order, which had resulted in one papacy and might lead to another.
4. The decision of the Assembly was uncalled for and tends to weaken the importance of the eldership, by representing that their presence in our presbyteries is not necessary and might be undesirable.
5. The impatience of the house prevented a full and fair discussion of the question; and the chief reasons urged in favour of the decision were drawn from extreme cases, not likely to occur, and which were injurious to the eldership as supposing they would be so negligent of their vows as with any frequency to absent themselves from our church courts.
Rev. Messrs. Breckinridge and J. Montgomery subjoined for themselves to this protest an expression of their opinion that the above decision appropriately, and of necessity flowed from the decision previously made, that the constitution does not authorize ruling elders to unite, by the imposition of hands, in the ordination of ministers. Against both of these decisions they desired to protest, striking, as they believed them to do, at the fundamental principles of the constitution.
To these protests the Assembly recorded an answer, with the help of which we construct the following brief reply. The protest seems to proceed on an erroneous idea of the nature of a presbytery; as though it were a creature of our constitution. A presbytery is a number of presbyters regularly convened. Their powers belong to their office; and they are clothed with that office by their ordination. A number of ministers episcopally ordained, might associate themselves together and form a presbytery, and would, according to the doctrine of Presbyterianism, have the right to ordain and to exercise all the powers of discipline and government over their own members, and over the congregations submitting to their watch and care, that belong to any presbytery in the world. It is, therefore, not necessary to the existence of a presbytery that ruling elders should constitute a portion of its members.
If the doctrine which lies at the basis of this protest is true, that ruling elders are "an essential element of a presbytery," indispensable to its nature and existence, then there was no such thing as a presbytery in the world for a long series of ages; then we must deny the validity of the orders, or at least of the early ordinations of all Protestant Churches, for it is certain that their ministers were not ordained by presbyteries of which ruling elders were members. There is nothing in the Scriptures or in our Confession that authorizes such a doctrine.
It may however be said that although ruling elders are not indispensable to the existence of a presbytery, yet under our constitution the presence of one or more ruling elders is necessary to the regular constitution and action of a presbytery in our Church. This is a very different point; yet it would appear that the great reason for the adoption of the particular construction of the constitution presented in the protest is to be found in the doctrine that ruling elders are essential to the existence of any presbytery. Apart from this preconceived idea of the nature of a presbytery, the constitution gives very little colour to the construction put upon it by the protest. When it is said that the presbytery "consists of all the ministers and one ruling elder from each congregation within a certain district," the constitution merely teaches of what materials a presbytery may be composed: it says nothing as to what is necessary to its regular constitution. It does not say that a presbytery must consist of all the ministers, or that there must be an elder from each congregation. It is very rare indeed that a presbytery in point of fact consists of all the ministers and all the elders who have a right to be present. Thus the General Assembly, it is said, shall consist of an equal delegation of bishops and elders from each presbytery. But who has ever seen such a General Assembly? These clauses, therefore, teach nothing as to what is necessary to form a presbytery
competent to proceed to business. But does not the section which says that any three ministers and as many elders as may be present, &c., shall be a quorum, teach that the presence of at least one elder is necessary for that purpose? We do not think this construction would be put upon that clause by any who was not possessed with the idea that there can be no presbytery without ruling elders. If any number of ministers regularly convened is a presbytery, and if our book recognises the right of elders to sit and vote as members of presbytery, then we think the plain sense of the above clause is, That three is the smallest number of ministers that, in our Church, can act as a presbytery, and when regularly convened may proceed to business together with any elders who may be present. The ministers constitute the presbytery; they are the permanent members of the body; in that body each session has a right to be represented by one elder. This we consider the plain meaning of our book. Elders have a right to come, and it is very important they should come, but they are not compelled to come, nor is their presence necessary to the constitution of the body.
Had the framers of our constitution intended to introduce the novel idea that there could be no presbytery, without ruling elders, they would doubtless have said, Three ministers and at least one ruling elder, shall be necessary to form a quorum. But as they have not said this, or anything equivalent to it, we have no reason to suppose they intended to lay down any such rule.
2. It is further argued that the decision is hostile to what is declared to be a principle essential to the very nature and existence of Presbyterianism, viz., that God's people should govern themselves, and manage their own ecclesiastical affairs, in accordance with his word and by their own chosen and ordained representatives. The first remark to be made on this argument is, that the decision
protested against, has no special hostility to that principle. Ministers are just as much the representatives of the people as elders are. Both are chosen by the people to their stations in the Church; neither have any authority over any congregation, not voluntarily subject to their watch and care; and at the same time neither derives his authority from the people, nor is either responsible to them. Both classes stand, as far as this point is concerned, in precisely the same relation to the people; and a presbytery composed entirely of ministers, is no more hostile to the principle that "God's people govern themselves," than a presbytery composed entirely of ruling elders.
But, secondly, we demur to the principle itself. It is no part of our Presbyterianism that God's people govern themselves, any more than that a family governs itself. In other words, in the Christian Church, as in a Christian family, the power and authority of the rulers do not come from the people, but from Christ. He committed the power to teach and rule to certain officers; and directed them to communicate the same authority to others. All the power they have comes from him; the power goes with the commission, which is received in each case from the officers and not from the members of the Church. This is just as true in the case of ruling elders as of ministers. The authority to exercise the power inherent in their respective offices over any congregation depends on the will of that congregation, but not the power itself. If I am ordained a minister of the gospel, I have all the rights and privileges attached by Christ to that office; but I have no authority over any congregation that does not choose me as their pastor, or that does not voluntarily subject itself to the presbytery of which I am a member. Whether this is republicanism or not, we do not know, and are not careful to inquire, seeing we are persuaded it is the order which Christ has established in his own house for edification and not for destruction. We are persuaded also, that no man can show philosophically, that such power, or such a
theory of the Church, is peculiarly liable to abuse; or historically, that it has ever led to any serious or lasting evils. As in the case of a family, the authority of the parent, derived from God, and independent of the will of the children, is in general restrained within proper bounds by natural affection; so in the Presbyterian Church the authority of its officers, though derived from Christ, is effectually restrained by two important limitations. The one is, that it neither extends over the conscience, nor is armed with any power to inflict civil pains or penalties. It is simply ministerial and spiritual. If Presbyterian ministers or elders inflict any censure contrary to God's word, it is, by their own doctrine, innoxious and nugatory. They pretend to no power, but to declare and execute the commands of Christ; and any man, who sees that their acts are not authorized by those commands, feels himself unhurt by any thing they can do to him. The other limitation is, that the submission of the people even to this ministerial and spiritual authority, is voluntary, enforced by no other than moral considerations, which submission is a matter of duty only when the rules of the word of God are adhered to. When we say that the subjection of the people to the legitimate authority of their spiritual rulers, is voluntary, we do not mean that they are under no moral obligation to unite themselves with the Church, and to submit to its discipline; but that this is a voluntary and rational subjection. It is free for them to decide with what Church they will connect themselves, and how long that connection shall continue, subject only to their responsibility to God. If the people wish more liberty than this they must go where the Bible is unknown. There is no tendency therefore in the decision of the Assembly to foster tyranny in the Church, or to introduce popery; and we presume the protesters themselves feel very little uneasiness on that point. They cannot but know that the source of priestly power is false doctrine. So long as the people have unimpeded access to Jesus Christ, and are not taught that it is only through the hands of their ministers, that
they can obtain pardon and salvation, their liberties are secure. The truth makes and will ever keep men free.
3. The only other ground of protest is that the decision in question, tends to disparage the eldership and to discourage their attendance on our presbyteries. We cannot see the force of this objection. Does the clause declaring that only three ministers are required to form a quorum, tend to disparage the other members of the body, as though they were of so little account, that the presbytery can dispense with their attendance, and would be glad to have as few of them as possible? The complaint that the eldership are undervalued and denied their just influence in the Church, is one of the most unfounded that can be made. The influence of a man in our judicatories depends far more on his personal qualifications than on his station. It is not to be expected that a weak and ignorant man, be he elder or minister, can have the weight with his brethren which a man of talent and learning, whether minister or elder, possesses. The protestants must have observed that there were elders on the floor of the last Assembly, who were listened to with a deference manifested towards few ministers, and whose judgments had a weight of which few clerical members of the house could boast. As far as we have observed, it is always the case, that, other things being equal, the influence of elders in our public bodies is greater than that of ministers. And what is much to their credit, they have sense enough to see and acknowledge it. These complaints of their being undervalued, are almost always from ministers; and are to the elders themselves matters of surprise and sometimes of amusement. The true influence of any set of men depends in a great measure in their acting in their appropriate sphere. The influence of the clergy is not to be increased, by their acting as laymen; nor that of laymen by their acting as clergymen. The value of the office of ruling elder, we hold to be inestimable; but it depends upon his being a ruling elder, with
rights, duties, and privileges distinct from those of the minister; on his being, in the ordinary sense of the word, a layman and not a clergyman.
2. Ordination by less than Three Ministers
[Form of Gov., chap. x., sec. viii.—Comp. Digest of 1873, pp. 145–
149.]
The Rev. Mr. Hughes, of the committee on the Minutes of the Synod of West Tennessee, recommended that the Records be approved, with the exception, that the Synod sanctioned the action of the Holstein Presbytery in ordaining a licentiate, when but two ministers were present. The committee recommended that the Assembly express their strong disapprobation of this measure, and declare that the Synod should not have countenanced the proceedings of the Holstein Presbytery.
Mr. Walter Lowrie moved that the exception be stricken out from this Report.
The Rev. Dr. Doak, (one of the fathers of Presbyterianism in the West,) remembered all the circumstances of this case. At that very session there was a quorum present, by whom all the trials and preliminary exercises were approved, and the candidate was actually on his knees, and the hands of the two ministers were on the candidate's head, when they discovered the third brother had absented himself. They consulted as to what should be done, and concluded that as everything else had been done in so orderly a manner, the want of a third minister's hand was not indispensable, and they therefore proceeded to ordain him. It seems hard that one
single member of a presbytery should arrest the proceeding of a presbytery in such solemn circumstances, and before a large congregation. They admitted there was the appearance of wrong. He did not know whether the third brother had gone out of the house or not.
Rev. Dr. Murray said, the question is a very simple one between irregularity and invalidity. The ordination here is irregular, as the Synod state; but they refuse to say that the ordination was invalid, and this the committee wish the Assembly to censure. He was persuaded the Assembly would not concur in this censure, and thereby pronounce this ordination invalid.
Rev. Dr. Rice. The Presbyterian Church is regulated by the Bible, as the great and highest resort, and the Confession of Faith as its exponent. Whilst the Confession of Faith requires three ministers in order to ordination, it no where declares that without three, there can be no ordination. Nor does the Bible any where specify "three" as the number necessary to ordain. It simply requires plurality. When we wish to determine what is regular, we go to our Form of Government; if to ascertain what is valid, we resort to the Bible. If two ministers are present, we cannot say that the Bible does not sanction the ordination. The number specified in our book is merely for prudential reasons.
The exceptions in the report were stricken out, and the Synod was not censured for approving the conduct of the presbytery in this ordination.
In this decision we presume the great body of the Church will concur. As the brethren, whose remarks are quoted above, state, there is the greatest possible difference between irregular and invalid. Rules are laid down for security, and to be faithfully observed in ordinary
circumstances. But the neglect or violation of the rules prescribing how a thing ought to be done, does not vitiate the thing done. In many countries and Churches there are rules regulating the celebration of marriage, but how monstrous would it be that the disregard of such municipal regulations should make the marriage void. That this is sometimes done, as in Great Britain, is justly regarded as a grievous injustice. Some years ago it was decided that a marriage in Ireland, solemnized by a Presbyterian minister, where one of the parties was an Episcopalian, was no marriage. It would be a decision of like, though of less enormity, to affirm that an ordination by less than three ministers was no ordination. * * * * We recognize the validity of orders in the Episcopal Church, and all classes of Presbyterians have always done so, with what consistency, then, can we maintain that three, or even a plurality of ordainers is absolutely necessary? A plurality may be desirable in all possible cases; the precise number, three, may be the safest minimum that could be fixed on as the general rule, but there is nothing in the nature of ordination, and nothing in the laws of Christ which makes that number essential. We have derived the rule from the old canon law, as laid down in the earliest councils of the Christian Church, which required the co-operation of three bishops in the ordination or consecration of another bishop. This became the universal law of the Church, and of all Churches, and was from its obvious wisdom adopted by the different classes of Protestants at the Reformation. But it has ever been regarded as a prudential municipal arrangement, necessary to the safety of the Church, but not to the validity of the service. In our own Church the same principle has been acted on. In the early part of our history, it was customary to ordain by a committee of presbytery, as well as by the presbytery itself. The Rev. Dr. Leland indeed, is reported to have said, "Installation can be performed by a committee of two ministers, but the power of ordination cannot be delegated." If this means simply
that under our present constitution such is the rule, it may be correct. But if, as we suppose was intended, the sentence quoted means that according to the principles of Presbyterianism "the power of ordination cannot be delegated," it is obviously contradicted by the practice of our own Church, by the express enactments of the Westminster Directory, and the history of the Church, in all its Presbyterian branches.
The fact that a single minister ordains elders not merely in the midst of his session, or parochial presbytery, but when acting as an evangelist and organizing churches, shows, at least to those who make ruling elders to be bishops, that according even to our present constitution a single bishop may ordain others to the episcopate. This, however, is not our argument. The real question is, what is ordination? and what is essential to the transmission of the ministerial office? All admit that under our constitution, which accords in this matter with the general law of the Church, three ministers should be present and co-operate in the ordination services. Any departure from this rule is an irregularity, to be justified only in cases of emergency. But the departure, even when not justifiable, is to be censured as disorderly, but not considered as rendering the ordination void.
3. Presbytery judges the Qualifications of its Members
[Form of Gov., chap. x., sec. viii.—Digest of 1873, pp. 150–161.]
The memorial presented to the Assembly by the members of the Pittsburg convention, in their individual capacity as ministers and elders of the Presbyterian Church, was referred to Drs. Miller, Hoge,
Edgar, Messrs. Elliot, Stonestreet, and Banks. This committee made a report consisting of a preamble and eleven resolutions. The first resolution asserts the right of every presbytery to be satisfied with the soundness and good character of those ministers who apply for admission into the presbytery, and, if they see cause, to examine them, although they have testimonials of good standing from some other presbytery.
This resolution was opposed on the following grounds:
1. That it was inconsistent with the unity of the Presbyterian Church. The radical principle of our system is, that the several congregations of believers constitute one Church in Christ; but this resolution declares that the Church is not one, that there is no uniform system of action and government in the Presbyterian Church. To allow the presbyteries to determine the terms of membership within their own bounds, is to create separate churches; it is to make ourselves Congregationalists, or independent Presbyterians. The constitution declares what are the qualifications for the ministry; and if any Presbytery enacts a different rule, (making, for example, the knowledge of German or Sanscrit necessary,) it puts itself, quoad hoc, out of the pale of the Presbyterian Church, and declares itself a different body In like manner, if any Church session should undertake to prescribe new terms of communion, it would violate the constitution. The qualifications for the ministry and terms of communion are prescribed in the constitution, and are uniform throughout the Church, and binding alike upon all the presbyteries and all the churches. These terms cannot be altered by individual presbyteries or sessions. If they can add to them, they can subtract from them; but to allow this, would be to declare that the presbyteries were without government in this essential particular. When the Cumberland Presbyterians undertook to dispense with
some of the requisites prescribed in the Form of Government, they were justly separated from the Church.
2. It is inconsistent with the respect and confidence due from one presbytery to another. To subject a man, who has been declared qualified for the ministry by one presbytery, to an examination before another, is to say that we doubt the fidelity or competence of the body by which he was ordained. This is incompatible not only with proper confidence, but also with the rule that declares that the decisions of one court are to be received by another. It thus arrays the presbyteries against each other. One presbytery pronounces a man sound, another declares him to be unsound; this destroys the connection between the presbyteries; it is a complete ecclesiastical revolution, the destruction of Presbyterianism, and the establishment of independency.
3. The rule established by the resolution is unjust toward the applicant. He may have the confidence of the presbytery to which he belongs and their testimonials of his good standing, and yet be rejected by a presbytery where he is not known, and without any fair and adequate trial. This could not be done without injustice and injury. It is admitted, that if the presbytery has reasonable ground to doubt of the soundness or good character of the applicant, this is a sufficient reason for not receiving him, but not for examining him. His own presbytery should be informed of these reasons—but a body to which he does not belong, and to which he is not amenable, has no right to put him on his trial. The assumption of this right is not only unjust to the individual, but it produces a clashing jurisdiction. A jurisdiction is assumed by one body, while that of a co-ordinate body still remains.
4. The resolution is inconsistent with the nature of ordination in our Church. A man is not ordained as a minister within the bounds of one presbytery, but within the whole Presbyterian Church. If qualified constitutionally for the bounds of one presbytery, he is equally qualified for all presbyteries. If one presbytery is to rejudge the judgment of another presbytery, with regard to a man's standing in the ministry, the idea of our belonging to one Presbyterian Church is all a farce.
5. This resolution being directly opposed to one passed by the last General Assembly, its passage would tend to destroy the authority of the Assembly. It would be better to have no court of final appeal, if its decisions are to be thus treated.
6. This question was to be decided upon by men who had prejudged the case, who stood pledged to decide in a certain way.
7. This resolution goes to create an inquisitorial court; it places a man before a court to purge himself from suspicion, and gives to a foreign presbytery a power which even a man's own presbytery does not possess.
8. It was argued that the resolution was inexpedient, because it could not accomplish the design contemplated by it, viz.: to keep out heresy. It would operate the other way. If an unsound presbytery should dismiss a man to a sound one, the latter would have him in their power, and could either reform him or cut him off. Thus they might catch one heretic after another, until the Church was purified. As to Church members, the case was the same. Suppose a member dismissed from one Church to join another; he comes with good testimonials, but is refused. What is he to do? Is he to go back into the world and be refused communion with the Church? If a good man, this would be monstrous; and if a bad one, he should be
disciplined. We should "receive the greatest atheist on certificate, and rejoice in the opportunity of thus detecting and exposing a false professor of religion, and removing the scandal of his bad example."
The resolution was supported by Dr. Hoge, Dr. Miller, Mr. Elliot, Mr. Winchester, and others. The arguments principally relied upon are the following:
1. That the right asserted in the resolution is the right of selfpreservation, inherent in all bodies, and independent of all constitutions. It is, therefore, not a right derived from the constitution—not an acquired, but an original right. Unless there could be adduced decided evidence that this right had been voluntarily relinquished by the presbyteries, it must be assumed as still in existence. The onus probandi, therefore, was entirely on the other side. It should be remembered, that the presbyteries are the true fountain of all ecclesiastical power. They are independent bodies, except so far as they have chosen to unite with other presbyteries, and cede part of their original rights.
2. The right of judging of the qualifications of their own members, the presbyteries have never conceded. No express declaration of concession is to be found in the constitution, nor is any such declaration pretended to exist. It is an argument of induction. It is attempted to be inferred from certain provisions of the constitution, that the right in question has been tacitly relinquished. But this method of reasoning on such a question is very unsatisfactory. The original powers and rights of contracting bodies should not be reasoned away; if they no longer exist, clear evidence of their having been knowingly and voluntarily relinquished, must be produced. It had been argued, that because the Church is one, therefore the several parts or separate presbyteries have no right to judge in this
matter for themselves. This argument, however is invalid, because their union is by compact, and cannot be pressed beyond the terms of that compact. The presbyteries and churches are one, for the purposes and to the extent declared in the constitution, and no farther. To insist that the union was such as to destroy the separate existence and unconceded rights of the constituent parts of the body, is to maintain that the Church is consolidated, and to establish a complete spiritual despotism.
That no such union really exists between the several parts of the Presbyterian Church, is plain, because a member of one presbytery or congregation does not become ipso facto a member of every coordinate body. His admission into one of these associations gives him no rights in others of the same kind, until these rights are voluntarily conceded to him. Accordingly, the member of one presbytery or church never demands admission into another; he asks it; and the question whether his request shall be granted is put to vote. This is a clear recognition of the right asserted in the resolution, for the right of voting on the question of admission is the right of deciding it; it is the right of saying No as well as Yes. It is true, that the presbyteries have agreed on certain qualifications, which they have promised to require for admission into the ministry and into Church membership; and these terms of admission no individual presbytery or church has any right to alter. Should any presbytery, therefore, require the knowledge of Sanscrit, or dispense with the knowledge of Hebrew (?!) in its ministerial members, it would be a violation of the compact. And in like manner it would be unconstitutional to make the mere repetition of the Lord's prayer the test of fitness for Church membership. It is also true, that the decision of one Church court that the qualifications required by the constitution are, in any given case, possessed by any individual, should be respected in all other courts. Clean papers, or regular
testimonials, therefore, are, it is readily admitted prima facie evidence of good standing, but they are not conclusive evidence. They are not such evidence as cannot be questioned or rebutted. They are only a declaration on the part of the body that granted them, that in their judgment, and to the best of their knowledge, the person to whom they are granted has the constitutional qualifications for a member of presbytery, or for a member of a church. But the body to which the application is presented may know better; it may have good reason for doubting the correctness of the judgment of the other court, and it certainly has the right to have those doubts solved. It is out of the question to maintain, that because one Church session thinks a man a Christian and fit to be received into the Church, all other sessions are bound to think so too, whatever evidence they may have to the contrary.
3. The right in question has always been asserted and exercised by our presbyteries and churches. The case of the Rev. Mr. Birch, [*] a foreign minister, is generally remembered. He applied for admission to one of the western presbyteries. They, not being satisfied that he possessed the constitutional qualifications, refused to receive him. He complained to the Assembly, and the Assembly examined him, and declared themselves satisfied. They did not, however, order the western presbytery to receive this gentleman, but simply authorized any presbytery that saw fit to admit him as a member. He was received by the Presbytery of Baltimore, and although he continued to reside in the west, he retained his connection with that presbytery. It was never thought or pretended that because the Presbytery of Baltimore was satisfied, therefore other presbyteries must be; and Mr. Birch did not dream that he had a right, on the ground of a dismission from the former body, to demand admission into every other. The General Assembly has distinctly recognized the right in question. In answer to an overture from the Presbytery of Baltimore,
the Assembly declared, "It is a privilege of every presbytery to judge of the character and situation of those who apply to be admitted into their own body, and, unless they are satisfied, to decline receiving the same. A presbytery, it is true, may make an improper use of this privilege; in which case the rejected applicant may appeal to the synod or General Assembly." Minutes, vol. v., p. 265. [†] Even in the last Assembly, the resolution, as introduced by the chairman (Mr. Leach) of the committee on the Cincinnati memorial, contained an explicit recognition of this right, though he readily accepted of the amendment by which it was stricken out. The member from the Presbytery of Londonderry, in moving that this resolution be sent down to the presbyteries, said, "I am in favor of the principle of the resolution. I have been astonished at the remarks which have been made on the subject, because I always supposed it was competent for the presbyteries to examine, if they thought proper. The old original presbytery which I represent has always acted on this principle." In fact, this seems to have been universally admitted until very recently, when it was called in question in a particular case, which led to its reference to the General Assembly. The right to judge of the qualifications of their own members has been claimed and exercised with equal uniformity by the churches. When members from other churches have applied to be admitted on certificate, they have always felt competent to refuse to receive them if they saw cause.
4. It was argued, that the right recognized in the resolution could not be safely relinquished. It is the great conservative principle of Presbyterianism. Its denial would subject the whole Church to the domination of any one of its parts, and be attended with incalculable evils. A presbytery might refuse to ordain an individual on grounds perfectly satisfactory to them, and he might apply to another presbytery, and after having received ordination return with clean papers to the former body, and they be bound to receive a man
whom they conscientiously believed to be unfit for the ministry. The right to discipline such members gives no adequate remedy for this evil; for a minister can only be disciplined for offences. Yet there may be abundant and solid reasons, other than indictable offences, for not receiving a man into the ministry. The denial of the right in question would subject all the presbyteries and churches in the country to the judgment, or even want of fidelity, of any one church or presbytery. Even where the ground of objection to an applicant is, in the judgment of a church or presbytery, serious enough to be the ground for a charge and trial, it is put beyond their cognizance by the act of receiving him as in good standing with the knowledge of this ground of objection. This is a bondage to which the presbyteries and churches cannot be expected to submit. One church thinks that slave-holding, slave-dealing, the use and manufacture of ardent spirits, are consistent with a credible profession of Christianity; are those churches which think differently to be bound to receive members on certificate from such a congregation? There have been, and perhaps are, Presbyterian churches in which members are admitted to the communion without any examination as to their knowledge or religious experience. Are all other churches bound to receive such members? Would a southern presbytery be bound to receive an abolitionist who felt it to be his duty to speak and preach on the subject of slavery as many ministers speak and preach in the north? Would it not be competent for a presbytery to say to such applicant, you may be a very good and proper man for the north, but here you would do more harm than good?
5. It has been said that the resolution recognizes the existence of two conflicting jurisdictions, and makes a man subject to two presbyteries at the same time. This is denied, because both presbyteries have not the right to arraign, and try, and punish him. He is subject to his own presbytery alone; but if he voluntarily asks
admission into another, it is the privilege and duty of that other to be satisfied that he has the constitutional qualifications, and that his admission would be for the edification of their churches. The refusal to admit deprives the applicant of no right, it subjects him to no censure, it derogates in no degree from his ministerial standing. It is a simple declaration on the part of the refusing body that the reception of the applicant is inexpedient. It is true, reasons may be assigned for this refusal which implicate the character of the applicant. If these reasons are wantonly assigned it is a just ground of complaint, and should call down the censure of the higher courts on the presbytery or church which thus assigns them. But that a power may be abused is no evidence against its existence.
6. It had been said, that the passage of this resolution contradicting the decision of the last Assembly, must tend to degrade this body and weaken its authority. This is a consideration, however, which should have operated on the last Assembly, as their vote on this subject is inconsistent with the express declaration of previous Assemblies, and with the practice of the churches. When a wrong has been done, the sooner right is done the better and safer for all parties.
7. It had been said that part of the Assembly was already pledged on this subject. But can this interfere with their right to consider and vote upon the question? Are not some pledged against as well as others for the resolution? Was it ever known, in a deliberative body, that a man's having spoken or written in favour of any measure, or his having signed a petition or memorial in relation to it, disqualified him from considering it? Such a principle would throw out the majority of both sides of every such deliberative body on all subjects of general interest.
8. Finally, Whatever may be the difficulties connected with this subject, the question must be decided. The Church cannot be kept together unless the rights of presbyteries and churches in this matter be acknowledged. The Assembly must go back to simple Presbyterianism, both in regard to doctrine and practice. There is no way of saving the Church from disruption but to revert to first principles, and to cast away fanciful desires of improvement, all harsh deductions, all arraying of parties against each other. If we could come to this, the Presbyterian Church would soon become a united body.
The resolution was adopted. Yeas 129—Nays 79.
4. Length of Study before Ordination
[Form of Gov., chap. xiv., sec. vi.—Comp. Digest of 1873, p. 399.]
The Directors of the Western Theological Seminary requested that the General Assembly take measures to prevent, in ordinary cases, the licensure of candidates until the completion of the full course, as prescribed by the General Assembly.
"The Committee recommend, in view of the great importance of a thorough course of theological study, that the Presbyteries exercise great care and prudence in regard to the licensing of candidates, and that, in ordinary cases, this be postponed until the completion of the theological course, that their undivided attention may be given to the prosecution of their studies while in the Seminary." The recommendation was adopted.
This matter rests with the presbyteries, and we fear that this recommendation of the Assembly will not prove more effectual than
others of a similar character. They are too much disposed to yield to the amiable desire to gratify the wishes of impatient young men who are importunate for licensure. There are cases, undoubtedly, in which good reasons exist for the licensure of candidates before the completion of their theological studies. But in the great majority of cases it is a great evil to the young men, to the institutions with which they are connected and to the Church. As a general rule, it is the more superficial, the less serious, and the less prepared class of candidates who are so desirous to assume the responsibilities of preachers. As soon as such men obtain licensure, they cease to be faithful students. Their time is largely devoted to preparing sermons, and their minds intent on seeking settlements. We have known young men to obtain licensure and receive calls before they had even commenced the study of theology proper. We hope the presbyteries may be induced to pay some respect to the repeated expression of the judgment of the Assembly on this subject. With them, however, rests the responsibility, for they have the constitutional right to license any young man, a member of the church, who has been nominally engaged two years in the study of theology, although those years may have been almost exclusively devoted to Church history and Hebrew.
5. Ordination "Sine Titulo"
[Form of Gov., chap. xv., sec. xv.—Comp. Digest of 1873, pp. 146,
413–415.]
The committee appointed on this subject [Hasty Ordination and Unauthorized Demission of the Ministry,] by the last Assembly made a report, which gave rise to a considerable discussion, but was finally as amended unanimously adopted.
The principal points embraced in the discussion were the following: First, when may a candidate for the ministry be properly ordained sine titulo? On the one hand it was contended that such ordinations should never be allowed, unless the candidate intended to make the preaching of the gospel his main work, and to go as an evangelist to frontier or destitute places. But on the other hand, it was said that this principle did not embrace certain cases in which presbyteries had the right and ought to exercise the power to ordain. If the candidate had, in the judgment of the presbytery, a clear call of God to the ministry, and a proper field to exercise its functions, then he had a right to ordination, and it was the presbytery's duty to grant it.
Ordination confers the right and imposes the duty of preaching the gospel and of administering the sacraments; but it does not necessarily imply that the discharge of these duties should constitute the main business of the minister. There are many of our missionaries whose time and attention are mainly devoted to the superintendence of schools, or the translation of the Scriptures. Such men were Carey, Morrison, Martyn. While thus employed, however, they had abundant opportunities of preaching the Word. Was this right to be denied them, to satisfy the whim of adhering to rule? Our constitution declares that "the pastoral office is the first in the Church, both for dignity and usefulness." This we have no disposition to dispute; but the Church may see fit to assign some of her probationers to the more humble office of teaching her candidates the a b c of the sacred languages, of superintending their general or professional education; and while this is their main, official business, they may have abundant opportunities to preach the gospel and administer the sacraments. Is there any reason why they should be deprived of this privilege, or shut out of this field of usefulness? We know professors in our colleges who preach every Sabbath, who attend Bible classes among the students, who have
religious meetings every day in the week, often for months together. We know on the other hand, pastors, who, from necessity or choice, are six days in the week engaged in their schools, upon their plantations, or in some other secular or semi-secular employment, and who preach on the Sabbath one or two discourses. Is there any ground for regarding these latter as more in the way of their duty than the former? Has the one class any right to say to the other, Stand by, I am holier than thou?
We know no class of men worthier of more respect than pastors whose congregations are unable or unwilling to give them an adequate support, and who, therefore, after the example of Paul, labour with their own hands night and day, that they may be able to preach the gospel of the grace of God. But it cannot be denied that what is at first undertaken as a means of support, is often prosecuted as a means of wealth, and that the richest ministers are often those who get the smallest salaries. All we wish is that justice should be done; that some of the best and most devoted men in the Church, whom the providence of God and the wishes of their brethren have placed in the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water, who are engaged in our colleges in preparing the children of the Church for the sacred ministry, should not be regarded as themselves intruders into that office, while, in point of fact, their time and strength are devoted to the service of the Church.
6. Reordination
[Form of Gov., chap. x., sec. viii.—Digest of 1873, pp. 147, 148.]
Overture No. 19 was also submitted, which propounds the following question: Is it the duty of Presbyteries, when elders or deacons from the Methodist Episcopal Church apply to become ministers of our
Church, to recognize their ordination as sufficient, or to ordain them, as in the case of other candidates? The committee recommended that this query be answered by reference to the action of the General Assembly on this subject in 1821. This action is to this effect: It is the practice of the Presbyterian Church to regard the ordination of all Protestant Churches as valid. Re-ordination is not, therefore, required; but the same qualifications are expected as are demanded of all other candidates. Adopted.
This is a very pithy paragraph, and might be made the text for a long discourse on ecclesiology. It involves the questions, What is ordination? Who has the right to ordain? What is essential to the validity of orders? When is re-ordination proper, and when is it schismatical? To answer these questions satisfactorily would require more time, logic, and research than some of our brethren seem to think the whole department of Church government calls for. We heartily agree with the decision above quoted, and wish the farreaching principles it involves were fully comprehended. We are persuaded many would feel their Presbyterianism undergoing a most healthful expansion, as these principles exert their appropriate influence.
7. Adoption of the Confession of Faith
[Form of Gov., chap. xv., sec. xii.—Digest of 1873, pp. 54, 57, 411.]
a. In Reply to Certain Strictures
Circumstances have recently awakened public attention to this important subject. It is one on which a marked diversity of opinion exists between the two portions into which our Church has been divided: and as in May last a direct proposition was made on the part
of one branch of the New School body to our General Assembly for a union between them and the Old School, this original point of difference was brought into view. Not only on the floor of the Assembly was this matter referred to, but it has since been the subject of discussion in the public papers, especially at the South. A passing remark made in the last number of this journal, [†] which we supposed expressed a truth which no man could misunderstand or deny, has given rise to strictures which very clearly prove that great obscurity, in many minds, still overhangs the subject. We either differ very much among ourselves, or we have not yet learned to express our meaning in the same terms. It is high time, therefore, that the question should be renewedly discussed. We have nothing new to say on the subject. As long ago as October, 1831, we expressed the views which we still hold, and which in a passing sentence were indicated in our number for July last. Those views have passed unanswered and unheeded, so far as we know, for thirty-six years. How is it that the renewed assertion of them has now called forth almost universal condemnation from the Old School press? They have been censured by men who adopt them, and who in private do not hesitate to admit their correctness. This does not imply any unfairness, or any other form of moral obliquity. It is easily accounted for. The proposition, that the adoption of the Confession of Faith does not imply the adoption of every proposition contained in that Confession, might mean much or little. It might be adopted by the most conservative, and is all that the most radical need claim. Still the proposition is undeniably correct. The fault of the writer, as the Presbyterian of the West sensibly remarked, is not in what is said, but in what was left unsaid. This fault would have been a very grave one had the subject of subscription to the Confession been under discussion, and had the above proposition been put forth as the whole rule in regard to it. The remark, however, was merely incidental and illustrative. To show the impossibility of our agreeing
on a commentary on the whole Bible, we referred to the fact that there are propositions in the Confession of Faith in which we are not agreed. Does any man deny this? If not, where is the harm of saying it? Are we living in a false show? Are we pretending to adopt a principle of subscription, which in fact we neither act on for ourselves, nor dream of enforcing on others? Or are we so little certain of our own ground that we are afraid that our enemies will take advantage of us, and proclaim aloud that we have come over to them? If we really understand ourselves, and are satisfied of the soundness of our principles, the more out-spoken we are the better; better for our own self-respect, and for the respect and confidence of others towards us. If the Christian public, and especially those who have gone out from us, hear us asserting a principle or rule of subscription which they know we do not adopt, it will be hard for them to believe both in our intelligence and sincerity.
The question put to every candidate for ordination in our Church, is in these words: "Do you sincerely receive and adopt the Confession of Faith of this Church, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?" It is plain that a very serious responsibility before God and man is assumed by those who return an affirmative answer to that question. It is something more than ordinary falsehood, if our inward convictions do not correspond with a profession made in presence of the Church, and as the condition of our receiving authority to preach the Gospel. In such a case we lie not only unto man, but unto God; because such professions are of the nature of a vow, that is, a promise or profession made to God.
It is no less plain that the candidate has no right to put his own sense upon the words propounded to him. He has no right to select from all possible meanings which the words may bear, that particular sense which suits his purpose, or which, he thinks, will save his
conscience. It is well known that this course has been openly advocated, not only by the Jesuits, but by men of this generation, in this country and in Europe. The "chemistry of thought," it is said, can make all creeds alike. Men have boasted that they could sign any creed. To a man in a balloon the earth appears a plane, all inequalities on its surface being lost in the distance. And here is a philosophic elevation from which all forms of human belief look alike. They are sublimed into general formulas, which include them all and distinguish none. Professor Newman, just before his open apostasy, published a tract in which he defended his right to be in the English Church while holding the doctrines of the Church of Rome. He claimed for himself and others the privilege of signing the Thirtynine articles in a "non-natural sense;" that is, in the sense which he chose to put upon the words. This shocks the common sense and the common honesty of men. There is no need to argue the matter. The turpitude of such a principle is much more clearly seen intuitively than discursively. The two principles which, by the common consent of all honest men, determine the interpretation of oaths and professions of faith, are, first, the plain, historical meaning of the words; and secondly, the animus imponentis, that is, the intention of the party imposing the oath or requiring the profession. The words, therefore, "system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures," are to be taken in their plain, historical sense. A man is not at liberty to understand the words "Holy Scriptures," to mean all books written by holy men, because although that interpretation might consist with the signification of the words, it is inconsistent with the historical meaning of the phrase. Nor can he understand them, as they would be understood by Romanists, as including the Apocrypha, because the words being used by a Protestant Church, must be taken in a Protestant sense. Neither can the candidate say, that he means by "system of doctrine" Christianity as opposed to Mohammedanism, or Protestantism, as opposed to Romanism, or evangelical Christianity,
as distinguished from the theology of the Reformed (i.e. Calvinistic) Churches, because the words being used by a Reformed Church, must be understood in the sense which that Church is known to attach to them. If a man professes to receive the doctrine of the Trinity, the word must be taken in its Christian sense, the candidate cannot substitute for that sense the Sabellian idea of a modal Trinity, nor the philosophical trichotomy of Pantheism. And so of all other expressions which have a fixed historical meaning. Again, by the animus imponentis in the case contemplated, is to be understood not the mind or intention of the ordaining bishop in the Episcopal Church, or of the ordaining presbytery in the Presbyterian Church. It is the mind or intention of the Church, of which the bishop or the presbytery is the organ or agent. Should a Romanizing bishop in the Church of England give "a non-natural" sense to the Thirty-nine articles, that would not acquit the priest, who should sign them in that sense, of the crime of moral perjury; or should a presbytery give an entirely erroneous interpretation to the Westminster Confession, that would not justify a candidate for ordination in adopting it in that sense. The Confession must be adopted in the sense of the Church, into the service of which the minister, in virtue of that adoption, is received. These are simple principles of honesty, and we presume they are universally admitted, at least so far as our Church is concerned.
The question however is, What is the true sense of the phrase, "system of doctrine," in our ordination service? or, What does the Church understand the candidate to profess, when he says that he "receives and adopts the Confession of Faith of this Church as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures"? There are three different answers given to that question. First, it is said by some, that in adopting the "system of doctrine," the candidate is understood to adopt it, not in the form or manner in
which it is presented in the Confession, but only for "substance of doctrine." The obvious objections to this view of the subject are:
1. That such is not the meaning of the words employed. The two expressions or declarations, "I adopt the system of doctrine contained in the Confession of Faith," and, "I adopt that system for substance of doctrine," are not identical. The one therefore cannot be substituted for the other. If there were no other difference between them, it is enough that the one is definite and univocal, the other is both vague and equivocal. The latter expression may have two very different meanings. By substance of doctrine may be meant the substantial doctrines of the Confession; that is, those doctrines which give character to it as a distinctive confession of faith, and which therefore constitute the system of belief therein contained. Or it may mean the substance of the several doctrines taught in the Confession, as distinguished from the form in which they are therein presented. It will be at once perceived that these are very different things. The substance or essence of a system of doctrines is the system itself. In this case, the essence of a thing is the whole thing. The essential doctrines of Pelagianism are Pelagianism, and the essential doctrines of Calvinism are Calvinism. But the substance of a doctrine is not the doctrine, any more than the substance of a man is the man. A man is a given substance in a specific form; and a doctrine is a given truth in a particular form. The substantial truth, included in the doctrine of original sin, is that human nature is deteriorated by the apostasy of Adam. The different forms in which this general truth is presented, make all the difference, as to this point, between Pelagianism, Augustinianism, Romanism, and Arminianism. It is impossible, therefore, in matters of doctrine, to separate the substance from the form. The form is essential to the doctrine, as much as the form of a statue is essential to the statue. In adopting a system of doctrines, therefore, the candidate adopts a
series of doctrines in the specific form in which they are presented in that system. To say that he adopts the substance of those doctrines, leaves it entirely uncertain what he adopts. The first objection then to this view of the meaning of the phrase, "system of doctrine," is, that it is contrary to the simple historical sense of the terms. What a man professes to adopt is, "the system of doctrine," not the substance of the doctrines embraced in that system.
2. Another objection is, that it is contrary to the mind of the Church. The Church, in demanding the adoption of the Confession of Faith as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures, demands something more than the adoption of what the candidate may choose to consider the substance of those doctrines. This is plain from the words used, which, as we have seen, in their plain import, mean something more, and something more specific and intelligible than the phrase "substance of doctrine." The mind of the Church on this point is rendered clear beyond dispute by her repeated official declarations on the subject. The famous adopting act of the original Synod, passed in 1729, is in these words: "Although the Synod do not claim or pretend to any authority of imposing our faith on other men's consciences, but do profess our just dissatisfaction with, and abhorrence of such impositions, and do utterly disclaim all legislative power and authority in the Church, being willing to receive one another as Christ has received us to the glory of God, and admit to fellowship in sacred ordinances, all such as we have grounds to believe Christ will at last admit to the kingdom of heaven, yet we are undoubtedly obliged to take care that the faith once delivered to the saints be kept pure and uncorrupt among us, and so handed down to our posterity; and do therefore agree that all ministers of this Synod, or that shall hereafter be admitted into this Synod, shall declare their agreement in, and approbation of the Confession of Faith, with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the
Assembly of Divines at Westminster, as being, in all the essential and necessary articles, good forms of sound words and systems of Christian doctrine, and do also adopt the said Confession and Catechisms as the confession of our faith. And we do also agree, that all Presbyteries within our bounds shall always take care not to admit any candidate of the ministry into the exercise of the sacred functions, but what declares his agreement in opinion with all the essential and necessary articles of said Confession, either by subscribing the said Confession and Catechisms, or by a verbal declaration of their assent thereto, as such minister or candidate shall think best. And in case any minister of this Synod, or any candidate for the ministry, shall have any scruple with respect to any article or articles of said Confession or Catechisms, he shall at the time of making said declaration, declare his sentiments to the Presbytery or Synod, who shall, notwithstanding, admit him to the exercise of the ministry within our bounds, and to ministerial communion, if the Synod or Presbytery shall judge his scruple or mistake to be only about articles not essential and necessary in doctrine, worship, or government. But if the Synod or Presbytery shall judge such ministers or candidates erroneous in essential and necessary articles of faith, the Synod or Presbytery shall declare them incapable of communion with them. And the Synod do solemnly agree that none of them will traduce or use any opprobrious terms of those who differ from us in extra-essential and not necessary points of doctrine, but treat them with the same friendship, kindness, and brotherly love, as if they did not differ in such sentiment."
On the afternoon of the day on which the above act was adopted, the following minute was recorded, viz. "All the ministers of this Synod now present, except one,* that declared himself not prepared, namely, Masters Jedediah Andrews, Thomas Craighead, John Thompson, James Anderson, John Pierson, Samuel Gelston, Joseph
Houston, Gilbert Tenant, Adam Boyd, John Bradner, Alexander Hutchinson, Thomas Evans, Hugh Stevenson, William Tenant, Hugh Conn, George Gillespie, and John Wilson, after proposing all the scruples that any of them had to make against any articles and expressions in the Confession of Faith, and Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster, have unanimously agreed in the solution of those scruples, and in declaring the said Confession and Catechisms to be the confession of their faith, excepting only some clauses in the twentieth and twentythird chapters, concerning which clauses the Synod do unanimously declare, that they do not receive those articles in such sense, as to suppose that the civil magistrate hath a controlling power over Synods, with respect to the exercise of their ministerial authority, or power to persecute any for their religion, or in any sense contrary to the Protestant succession to the throne of Great Britain.
"The Synod observing that unanimity, peace, and unity, which appeared in all their consultations relating to the affair of the Confession, did unanimously agree in giving thanks to God in solemn prayer and praises."
This fundamental act, passed in 1729, has never been either repealed or altered. It has on several occasions been interpreted and reaffirmed, but it has never been abrogated, except so far as it was merged in the readoption of the Confession and Catechisms at the formation of our present Constitution, in the year 1788. This important document teaches, first: That in our Church the terms of Christian communion are competent knowledge, and a creditable profession of faith and repentance. The Synod, say they, "admit to fellowship in sacred ordinances, all such as we have grounds to believe Christ will at last admit to the kingdom of heaven." Second: That the condition of ministerial communion is the adoption of the
system of doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms. This is expressed by saying, "We adopt the said Confession and Catechisms as the confession of our faith." For this is substituted as an equivalent form of expression, "agreement in opinion with all the essential and necessary articles of said Confession." That is, "all the essential and necessary articles" of the system of doctrine contained in the Confession. Third: That the only exceptions allowed to be taken were such as related to matters outside that system of doctrine, and the rejection of which left the system in its integrity. That this is the true meaning and intent of the act is plain, first, because the Synod in 1730 expressly declared, "that they understand those clauses that respect the admission of entrants or candidates, in such sense as to oblige them to receive and adopt the Confession and Catechisms at their admission, in the same manner, and as fully as the members of the Synod did, that were then present. Those members adopted the whole system in its integrity, excepting only to certain clauses relating to the power of the civil magistrate in matters of religion. Again, in 1736, they say, "The Synod have adopted, and still do adhere to the Westminster Confession, Catechisms, and Directory, without the least variation or alteration.… and they further declare, that this was our meaning and true intent in our first adopting of said Confession." In the same minute they say, "We hope and desire that this our Synodical declaration and explication may satisfy all our people, as to our firm attachment to our good old received doctrines contained in said Confession, without the least variation or alteration." This minute was adopted nemine contradicente.* Second: Not only this official and authoritative exposition of the "adopting act," given by its authors, but the subsequent declarations of the several presbyteries composing the Synod, and of the Synod itself, prove that "the system of doctrines" was adopted, and not merely the substance of those doctrines. The common form of adoption may be learned from such
records as the following, from the Presbytery of Philadelphia. Mr. Samuel Blair was licensed after "having given his assent to the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms, as the confession of his faith." David Cowell was ordained "after he had adopted the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms as the confession of his faith." In 1741, the great schism occurred by the exclusion of the New Brunswick Presbytery, which being subsequently joined by the Presbyteries of New York and New Castle, constituted the Synod of New York. This body, composed of the friends of the Whitefieldian revival, say: "We do declare and testify our constitution, order, and discipline, to be in harmony with the established Church of Scotland. The Westminster Confession, Catechisms, and Directory, adopted by them, are in like manner adopted by us." The first article of the terms of union, by which the two Synods were united, in 1758, and which was unanimously adopted, is as follows: "Both Synods having always approved and received the Westminster Confession of Faith, Larger and Shorter Catechisms, as an orthodox and excellent system of doctrine, founded on the word of God; we do still receive the same as the confession of our faith, and also adhere to the plan of worship, government, and discipline, contained in the Westminster Directory; strictly enjoining it on all our ministers and probationers for the ministry, that they preach and teach according to the form of sound words in the said Confession and Catechisms, and avoid and oppose all errors contrary thereto." When the General Assembly was constituted, the Westminster Confession and Catechisms were declared to be parts of the Constitution of the Church, and every candidate for the ministry was required, previous to his ordination, to receive that Confession, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures. From the beginning, therefore, the mind of our Church has been that that "system of doctrine" in its integrity, not the substance of those doctrines, was the term of ministerial communion. For a fuller discussion of this subject we
would refer our readers to Hodge's Constitutional History of the Presbyterian Church, vol. i., chap. 3. It is there shown that no exception to the Confession of Faith, touching any of the doctrines constituting that system, was ever allowed.
3. Not only are the plain meaning of the words, and the animus imponentis opposed to the interpretation of the ordination service now under consideration, but that interpretation is liable to the further objection, that the phrase "substance of doctrine" has no definite assignable meaning. What the substance of any given doctrine is cannot be historically ascertained or authenticated. No one knows what a man professes, who professes to receive only the substance of a doctrine, and, therefore, this mode of subscription vitiates the whole intent and value of a confession. Who can tell what is the substance of the doctrine of sin? Does the substance include all the forms under which the doctrine has been, or can be held, so that whoever holds any one of those forms, holds the substance of the doctrine? If one man says that nothing is sin but the voluntary transgression of known law; another, that men are responsible only for their purposes to the exclusion of their feelings; another, that an act to be voluntary, and therefore sinful, must be deliberate and not impulsive; another, that sin is merely limitation or imperfect development; another, that sin exists only for us and in our consciousness, and not in the sight of God; another, that sin is any want of conformity in state, feeling, or act, to the law of God; do all these hold the substance of the doctrine? What is the substance of the doctrine of redemption? The generic idea of redemption, in the Christian sense of the word, may be said to be the deliverance of men from sin and its consequences by Jesus Christ. Does every man who admits that idea hold the substance of the doctrine as presented in our Confession? If so, then it matters not whether we believe that that deliverance is effected by the example of Christ, or by his