Hume’s fi rst purported parallel concerns the cures of Vespasian.
had no diffi culty showing that the fi rst suppressed premise of Hume’s inexplicit argument was undermined by his own one-sided scholarship, selective reporting, and the occasional outright bluff.
Hume’s fi rst purported parallel concerns the cures of Vespasian.
One of the best attested miracles in all profane history, is that which Tacitus reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind man in Alexandria, by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot; in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to have recourse to the Emperor, for these miraculous cures. The story may be seen in that fi ne historian; where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony, and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence, if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition. The gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, through the whole course of his life, conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers, and never affected those extraordinary airs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The historian, a cotemporary writer, noted for candour and veracity, and withal, the greatest and most penetrating genius, perhaps, of all antiquity; and so free from any tendency to credulity, that he even lies under the contrary imputation, of atheism and profaneness: The persons, from whose authority he related the miracle, of established character for judgement and veracity, as we may well presume; eye-witnesses of the fact, and confi rming their testimony, after the Flavian family was despoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any reward, as the price of a lie. Utrumque, qui interfuere, nunc quoque memorant, postquam nullum mendacio pretium. To which if we add the public nature of the facts, as related, it will appear, that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a falsehood. (Hume 1748, p. 92)
Hume’s presentation here is so careless that it struck his opponents as disingenuous.
The “candour and veracity” of the historian are beside the point, since the manner in which Tacitus introduces the story indicates plainly that he disbelieved it. Hume’s characterization of the persons on whose authority Tacitus relied in relating the miracle as “of established character for judgement and veracity, as we may presume” drew special scorn from Campbell, for Tacitus says nothing of the sort (Campbell 1839, p. 98).
The entire affair bears on its face the marks of obvious imposture. It was conducted in Alexandria, the fi rst major city to declare in favor of Vespasian’s imperial aspirations, and it was done in honor both of the emperor, for whom a divine sign would be most convenient, and of the local deity. At Vespasian’s request, physicians examined the two men who claimed to have received visions in the night telling them to appeal to Vespasian to be cured; the physicians reported that the blind man was not totally blind, nor the lame man totally lame, and added that any glory for a successful cure would redound to Vespasian himself, while any blame for a failure would fall back upon the two supplicants for having fraudulently represented the oracle of Serapis. The Egyptian populace, whom Tacitus describes in this context as “a people addicted to superstition,” were hardly apt to be critical. “Where, then,” asks Adams,
is the wonder that two men should be instructed to act the part of lame and blind, when they were sure of succeeding in the fraud, and of being well rewarded ( as we may well suppose) for their pains? (Adams 1767, p. 78)
As for Tacitus’s reference to living witnesses, there is no mystery here. If the fraud was perpetrated publicly as described, there were doubtless many people who saw the two
656 TIMOTHY MCGREW AND LYDIA MCGREW
men leap up and claim to have been healed. There is no need to suggest that the witnesses were liars; it suffi ces that they were at most somewhat credulous. There was no need for them to inquire too closely since – unlike the apostles – they had absolutely nothing to lose in maintaining their account of what they had seen. “No evidence,” Douglas concludes drily, inverting Hume’s claim, “can well be supposed weaker” (Douglas 1757, p. 99).
At every point, the case of Vespasian differs critically from that of the resurrection.
Indeed, from a Bayesian point of view, the wonder would be if, under the circumstances, some story of a miraculous demonstration in favor of Vespasian were not forthcoming.
Given our background knowledge, the Bayes factor for the testimony is so close to 1 as to give us virtually no epistemic traction: the report was almost as strongly to be expected if the two men had been parties to the deceit as if they had genuinely been healed. It is absurd to suggest that the evidence for these miracles bears comparison with the evidence for the resurrection.
We might well leave the story of Vespasian here, were it not for one more curious point.
For the two cures mentioned seem to have been suggested by two reported in the Gospel of Mark; in particular, the use of spittle to anoint the eyes of a blind man bears a striking resemblance to the cure at Bethsaida recounted in Mark 8:23. If so, the whole affair supports the ancient tradition, found in Eusebius, Epiphanius, and Jerome, that Mark published copies of his Gospel at Alexandria. The publication would have had to be at least a few years prior to Vespasian’s arrival there ca. ad 69. Thus Hume’s example turns under his hand in a way that he could not have anticipated. The very similarity between the cures attributed to Vespasian and those of Christ lends additional support to the claim that the Gospel accounts were published much earlier than skeptical biblical scholarship would like to allow.
Hume’s second example is another account of a cure worked among the faithful, but for his third he takes a case where the reported miracles were unwelcome to a powerful and infl uential party. Hume tacitly suggests that these reported miracles meet a standard of evidence similar to that of the resurrection – namely, that the reports could not be refuted by contemporaries with a motive for challenging them. His attempt to force the Christian apologist to take all or leave all is particularly evident here:
There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person, than those, which were lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbé Paris, the famous Jansenist, with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were every where talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre. But what is more extraordinary; many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and distinction, in a learned age, and on the most eminent theatre that is now in the world.
Nor is this all: A relation of them was published and dispersed every where; nor were the Jesuits, though a learned body, supported by the civil magistrate, and determined enemies to those opinions, in whose favour the miracles were said to have been wrought, ever able distinctly to refute or detect them. Where shall we fi nd such a number of circumstances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a suffi cient refutation.
(Hume 1748, pp. 93–4)
Part of what Hume says here is true. The Jansenists, a large Catholic splinter group who had fallen sharply out of favor with Rome in the decades leading up to the death of the
T H E A RG U M E N T F RO M M I R AC L E S 657
Abbé Paris in 1727, were in desperate need of a sign from heaven of the rightness of their cause against the Jesuits; accordingly, numerous cures – and even more numerous convul-sions – were reported to have taken place at the tomb of the Abbé. But the claim that the reports were not refuted is demonstrably false, and its presence in the fi rst edition is excusable only on the assumption that Hume, who was working chiefl y from a book by Louis Basile Carré de Montgeron, was unaware of the fact that many of Montgeron’s claims had been refuted in the pastoral letter of the Archbishop of Sens.
If ignorance was the cause of Hume’s error, he soon had the means to put it right, for his antagonists took the trouble to consult the literature on the controversy and provided a full account of multiple frauds perpetrated in the name of the Abbé. The “miraculous”
cure of the Sieur le Doulx, for example, was detected by the recovered patient himself, who in a letter to the Bishop of Laon explained that the Jansenist convent of St. Hilaire had pressed a confessor and the sacraments upon him when he was in bed with the fever, which gave an unwarranted air of gravity to his condition. The widow de Lorme, who was ostensibly smitten with palsy for having gone to the tomb of the Abbé with intent to ridicule, confessed herself that it was a contrivance (Douglas 1757, p. 129). Anne le Franc, who was said to have been cured, inter alia, of a disorder in her eyes, turned out never to have had anything wrong with them; fi ve notarized certifi cates to her cure were testifi ed, by the signatories themselves, to have been tampered with after the signing (Adams 1767, pp. 85–6).
Montgeron celebrates the recovery of Don Alphonso, whose eye had been infl amed. But the certifi cates collected by Montgeron himself show that, just prior to his trip to the tomb of the Abbé, the young man had begun using a medicine prescribed by the eminent oculist Dr. St. Yves (Douglas 1757, pp. 141–3). Examples of this sort, all detected by the Archbishop of Sens, can be multiplied ad nauseam.
Had the love of truth overpowered Hume’s love of literary fame, he might have with-drawn the example in subsequent editions of his work or at least mentioned the contrary evidence provided by the Archbishop of Sens. But he did neither. Instead, he inserted a lengthy footnote into the second edition claiming that many of the miracles were “proved immediately by witnesses before the offi ciality or bishop’s court at Paris, under the eye of Cardinal Noailles, whose character for integrity and capacity was never challenged, even by his enemies” (Hume 1748, p. 94). This reference to the character and capacity of the Cardinal is another piece of misdirection. The only signatories to the petition were the 22
curés who presented it to Cardinal Noailles, and the Cardinal rejected the petition on the grounds of palpable falsehoods proved upon the witnesses par des informations juridiques (Adams 1767, p. 89). In the same footnote Hume claims that the successor to Cardinal Noailles, though pressed by 22 curés of Paris to examine the miracles, “wisely forbore”
(Hume 1748, p. 94). This was yet another blunder: Charles-Gaspard de Ventimille, who succeeded Cardinal Noailles as Archbishop of Paris, ordered a public judicial inquest into the miracles and published the results on November 8, 1735, in what Adams describes as
“an ordonnance” containing “convincing proofs, that the miracles, so strongly warranted by these curés, were forged and counterfeited” (Adams 1767, pp. 88–9).
From the fact that many of the cures were shown upon examination to be frauds, it does not follow that no one recovered from an illness after a visit to the Abbé’s tomb. But as Adams points out, some recoveries are not particularly surprising:
[T]he same, I dare pronounce, would happen, if a thousand people, taken at a venture, were at any time removed from their sick chambers in London to St. Paul’s Churchyard or the Park,
658 TIMOTHY MCGREW AND LYDIA MCGREW
especially if they went with any strong hope of a cure: in such a number, some are always upon the point of recovery – many only want to fancy themselves well – others may be fl attered for a time into this belief, while they are ill – and many more, by fresh air and motion, and especially by forbearing the use of other means, will fi nd a change for the better: but, that the blind received their sight, or the deaf were restored to hearing, by these visits, I deny that we have any competent or tolerable evidence. (Adams 1767, pp. 83–4)
Had the cures reported at the tomb of the Abbé Paris lived up to the characterization Hume gives of them, there would indeed be reason to believe that they had taken place.
But they do not; and Hume never acknowledged, in any of the successive editions of his essay published in his lifetime, the numerous factual errors that critics like Adams, Douglas, and Campbell had pointed out in his presentation.
Throughout part two of his essay, Hume unintentionally illustrates the truth of his own observation:
[E]loquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or refl ection; but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their understanding. (Hume 1748, p. 89)
Certainly Hume’s own eloquence has had that effect on many of his readers who, perhaps because they fi nd his conclusions congenial, have accepted and recounted his accounts of the cures of Vespasian and the transactions at the tomb of the Abbe Paris without making even a modest attempt to verify his claims. What is worse, Hume seems to have forgotten his own sensible observation from the end of the Enquiry that “there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner” (Hume 1748, p. 120).
The trouble with the arguments in the second part of Hume’s essay is not merely that they are unoriginal, nor is it simply that part two is, soberly considered, a very superfi cial treatment of issues that had already been addressed in vastly greater detail by the defenders of Christianity. It is above all that Hume resolutely refuses to come to grips with the historical evidence for the resurrection, despite the fact that this is the one miracle claim he absolutely must undermine if his essay is to be a signifi cant contribution to the discussion.
To substitute an examination of reports of other miracles, and to insinuate without argument that these others are as well attested as the central miracle of Christianity, is mere clever misdirection; to misrepresent the facts in the attempt to improve the parallel is irresponsible – or worse. Such substitutes for argument do not constitute a serious challenge to the credibility either of the resurrection or of Christianity itself.
Conclusion
Although we have offered a cumulative case for the resurrection, we make no pretense to have offered the whole of the case, much less the whole of the case for Christianity. We have focused on those facts we consider most salient, but the argument can be elaborated in numerous ways: buttressing assumptions, defl ating or defl ecting criticisms, and taking additional facts into account. Ultimately, it can be embedded in a comprehensive argument that marshals all the resources of natural theology.
T H E A RG U M E N T F RO M M I R AC L E S 659
Yet as Butler points out in the Analogy of Religion, the argument from miracles is one of the direct and fundamental proofs; no competent presentation of the evidence for theism can afford to omit it or to treat Hume’s essay as the fi nal word on the subject. Hume could not himself be bothered to descend into the fray and discuss the argument in detail.
But philosophers who wish to evaluate the evidence provided by testimony to the miraculous must move beyond this shallow treatment and come to terms with the argument in its most plausible and persuasive form, following Bacon’s wise advice “to examine things to the bottom; and not to receive upon credit, or reject upon improbabilities, until there hath passed a due examination” (Bacon 1862, p. 124).43
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a-theory of time, 113 n. 13, 114, 115, 116, 118
goods of the afterlife, 473–4
n. 17, 121, 124, 183–6, 187, 191
moral argument, xii
abstract objects, 11, 107, 179, 188 n. 94, 193
mystical perception and sense perception,
actual infi nite; see also, kalam cosmological
273, 502–3, 504, 512, 520, 530, 531
argument
defense treatment of evil, xii, 473–5
dichotomy paradoxes, 119
Anscombe, Elizabeth, xii, 344, 353, 361–2; see
existence of, 106–15
also, argument from reason
formalist defenders of, 105, 183
ambiguity of Lewis’ sense of “explanation”,
formation of, 117–24
357–8
impossibility of, 103–6
explanation-types, 356–8, 376
infi nite regress of events and, 115–16
irrational vs. nonrational causes, 353–4
infi nite series, 118, 119, 120, 121, 145 n. 44,
paradigm case argument, 354–6
195, 331
unlimited explanatory compatibilism,
infi nite set, 104, 105, 109, 111, 112, 115, 120,
358–60
125, 250
Anselm, St., 1, 16, 553 see also ontological
modality of, 105–6, 293
argument
potential infi nite, 103–4, 112, 113, 114, 115,
cosmological argument and, 101
116, 118, 144
modal argument, 572–4, 580–1
successive addition and, 117–20, 124–5
Monologion and Proslogium, 554, 558
Stadium paradoxes, 119
ontological argument, 554–65
temporal regress of events, 101, 103, 106,
Anthropic Principle objection, 276–7; see also
115, 116, 117
teleological argument
Tristram Shandy, 120–1
apologetics, 18, 394, 606, 627, 639; see also
Zeno’s paradoxes, 119, 120, 124, 144
natural theology; worldview
Adams, Marilyn, xii, 468, 485
Aquinas, Thomas; see also Anselm; natural
Adams, Robert, xi, xii, 295–6, 414, 479
theology
agnosticism, 20–1, 28, 33, 91, 250–1, 336–7,
cosmological argument and, 101, 102
501, 597, 640, 648, 650; see also theism.
dualism, 301, 315 n. 5, 383
al-Ghazali, 101–2; see also kalam cosmological
essence and existence, 274
argument
Five Ways, 25
Albert, David, 222
Gap Problem, 93–4, 98
Albrecht, Andreas, 217 n. 13, 265–71
infi nite regress of past events, 115, 116,
Alston, William; see also moral argument,
331–2
argument from religious experience
scholastic axiom, 94–5
doxastic practice approach to epistemology,
simplicity and perfection, 93–6
502, 528–9
The Third Way of, 582–5
The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology Edited William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. ISBN: 978-1-405-17657-6
argument from design, see teleological
Calvinism and, 457
argument from the fi ne-tuning of the
contemporary philosophical orthodoxy and,
universe
449–52
arguments for the existence of God, xi, 1, 91;
defenders vs. theodicists, 453–5, 456, 457,
see also natural theology
470–6, 478, 484, 485, 492, 493, 494
argument from evolutionary naturalism
divine intervention, 480–1
(AEN), 394
Euthyphro dilemma, 460, 462
argument from religious experience, 502
evil intended vs. evil foreseen, 476–8
begs the question and the ontological
evidential vs. logical problem, 453–4, 472,
argument, 561–2
481, 650
cumulative, vii, 19, 283, 408, 498, 510, 595,
free will, and it as a defense, 451–2, 455–6,
617–20, 630–7
457, 465, 469–70, 473, 474, 476–7, 478–9,
fi ne-tuning and, 202, 209
482, 483, 484, 485, 492, 493, 650
metamodel for philosophical arguments, 346
God’s permission of evil, 455, 457, 469, 470
moral argument, 392
n. 12, 472, 474, 475, 477 n. 18, 478 n. 19,
parodies, 563–5
483 n. 25, 484, 486, 494
argument from consciousness (AC), xi, 283,
hell, 470 n. 12, 471, 475, 487–9
294, 295–6, 297, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303,
horrendous vs. nonhorrendous evil, 456, 457,
304, 307, 308–9, 315, 317, 318, 329–30,
467–8, 482, 485–9
333–4, 336, 337, 339; see also, causation,
immortality, 463, 464–5, 473 n. 17
consciousness, dualism, materialism,
irreducible teleological explanation and, 452
naturalism, physicalism
life plan, 465, 466–7, 479, 480, 488–9
agent causation (AGC), 285, 312–13, 314–18,
materialism and, 450–1, 452
319, 324–7, 333
middle knowledge and evil, 478 n. 19
arguments against consciousness as
moral evil, 455–8, 469–84, 487, 490, 492–3,
emergent, 322–4
577
causal necessitation, 293, 300, 302–8, 314,
“mysterian” view of consciousness compared
318, 319–20, 321–2, 324, 328, 335
to, 374–5
deductive form of, 295–9
natural evil, 255, 484, 486, 487
emergent properties, 284, 285, 286, 287,
pain and pleasure, 449–51, 452, 453, 455,
288–90, 292–4, 297, 299, 300, 301, 302,
458–9, 462, 464, 468–9, 471, 472 n. 15,
303, 304, 305, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312,
475–6, 478 n. 19, 479, 481, 484, 488, 490,
313, 314, 315–24, 325, 335, 340
491, 492–3, 494
emergent necessitation and contingency,
Plantinga’s contribution to, 453 n. 2–4,
319–22
455–7, 489–92, 470, 472–3, 478 n. 19, 484,
falsifi cation of naturalism, 303–4, 452
489–92
irreducible consciousness, 282, 301, 302, 324,
practical problem, 453
435, 436–7, 443, 449, 452
problem of pain, 449–50
Mackie on Locke’s thinking matter, 308–9, 315
purpose of life and perfect happiness, xii,
mysterian “naturalism”, 328–30, 336–9, 374,
392, 455, 457–84, 486–94
387, 437–8
retributive justice, 469, 488–9
panpsychism, xi, 298, 315, 316, 318–19, 328,
self-forming choice (SFC), 465–7, 469, 472,
329, 337
473, 475, 479–80, 481, 482, 483 n. 24, 25,
prephilosophical intuitions, 15, 319, 322,
484, 486–7, 489
324–8
sin or vice, 457 n. 7, 465, 472, 484, 489,
Searle’s contingent correlations and
490–2
biological naturalism, 299–300, 301–2,
theoretical problem of, 453
304, 307, 309–11
via negativa theodicy, 470–1
theistic dualism and, 329, 330–6, 337
argument from miracles for the resurrection of
theory acceptance and, 294–5
Jesus of Nazareth, see also argument from
argument from evil, 346, 351, 352, 374, 375,
religious experience; Jesus of Nazareth
453, 454, 472, 484; see also moral argument
Christianity and, 593–5, 616, 618, 635,
animal pain, 492–4
644–8, 650, 658
I N D E X 665
collective force of the salient facts (W, D, P),
inadequacy objection, 350, 375, 386–8
630–7
indeterminacy, 366, 368–9, 372, 374, 379, 401
concept of a miracle, 596, 637–8
intentionality and, 344, 345, 350, 356,
conspiracy hypothesis, 619, 622, 623
363–74, 377, 378, 379, 385, 386, 387
conversion of Paul (P), 595, 615–16, 619,
irrational vs. nonrational causes, 353–4
628–30, 631
logicoconceptual gap, 383, 385
death and burial of Jesus of Nazareth, 604–6,
mental causation, xii, 344, 351, 363, 373,
611, 619, 621
375–9
deists and, 593, 604, 651, 653
mystery and materialism, 374–5, 387
eyewitness testimony of women at the tomb
natural theology and, 347, 384
(W), 595, 597, 606, 607–8, 619, 620–2,
paradigm case argument, 354–5, 356
623, 632, 638, 643
problem of interaction, 373, 382–3
goal and scope of, 594–6, 658–9
psychological relevance of logical laws, xii,
hallucination hypothesis, 619, 620, 621,
344, 363, 379–81
625–6, 627, 628, 629–30, 636–7, 643
rational inference, 351–2, 353–4, 355–6,
Hume against miracles, xiii, 637–44, 651–8
357–8, 360–1, 363, 363, 364–5, 368, 374,
independence assumption of each line of
375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 386
argument, 631–7
reasons-explanations vs. causal explanations,
martyrdom, 610, 611–15, 624, 629, 634–5
357, 358–9, 360, 376
historical argument and apologetics, 593,
summary of the nature and scope, 344–6,
597, 598, 604, 627, 631, 640 n. 38, 639–40,
362–3
644–6, 648 n. 41, 650–2
transcendental impact of, xii, 344, 351, 356
objective vision theory, 626–8, 635, 637
argument from religious experience (ARE), xii,
Plantinga’s Principle of Dwindling
11, 498, 501–3, 507, 509, 510, 512, 525,
Probabilities (PDP), 644–50
534, 536 n. 17, 537, 547, 548–9; see also
probabilistic cumulative case arguments and,
argument from miracles; God; Jesus of
617–20, 630–7
Nazareth
resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, 594–6, 607,
basic source of justifi cation (BSJ), 508–9,
617–20, 622, 623, 626, 628, 630, 631,
524, 533, 534, 535
632–7, 641–3
confl icting claims objection, 536–8, 539–42,
testimony and transformation of disciples
547
(D), 608–15, 619–20, 622–8, 630–3, 635,
contributes to cumulative case, xiii, 498
641, 645, 646 n. 39
computer skeptical hypothesis (CSH), 531–2
textual assumption about historical Jesus,
critical trust approach (CTA), 508, 509, 515
597–604, 622, 630
n. 7, 524–8, 531, 541, 543, 546, 547, 548
theft hypothesis, 622–3
description of, 498
theism and, 593–5, 645–8, 649, 650, 659
disanalogy objection, 534–6, 547
argument from reason, xi–xii, 344, 346, 347–8,
evidence confi rmation and sensory
351, 352–3, 354–6, 358, 360, 361–3, 374,
perception, 498 n. 2, 524
375, 381, 386; see also argument from
gullibilism objection, 548
consciousness; materialism; naturalism
impartiality argument and, 528, 529–34, 548
Anscombe’s objections, xii, 344, 353–8,
impossibility of individuation objection, 547
359–60, 361–2, 376
intracoherence, 511–12, 523–4, 527, 540,
argument from computers objection, 381–2
543–54
armchair science objection, 383–4
logical gap objection, 503–4, 547
Barefoot’s four corollary argument, 378–9
mystical experience, 513, 519, 538–9, 540–3,
best explanatory argument and, 355
546
Bayesian model and, 346
naturalistic explanation objection, 548
error theories, 350–1, 396
no criteria/uncheckability objection, 547–8
explanation-types and, 356–7
personal vs. impersonal ultimate reality,
general problem of materialism, 344, 348–50
542–3
God of the gaps objection, 384–6
Principle of Credulity (PC), 502–3, 507–8,
history of, 352–62
509
argument from religious experience ( cont’d)
Bayesian; see also explanation
Principle of Critical Trust (PCT), 507, 508,
Explanation, 346, 617
509–12, 525, 526, 527, 528–34, 536, 538,
Factors, 618, 619
541, 548
Theorem, 618
privacy objection, 504, 506–7, 547
Bayne, Peter, 654
religious experience (RE), 498–503, 503, 505,
Bentham, Jeremy; see also moral argument
506, 507, 509, 512–15, 534, 535, 536,
hedonist theory of value, 421
537–8, 540, 541, 545, 548
Mill and, 423–4, 425, 432
superreliability requirement, 524, 548
Principle of Utility, 422
Swinburne’s PC, PCT, RE and ARE, 502–3,
rights, 421–2, 432
507–9, 512, 528, 530
Bergmann, Michael; see also argument from
theistic experience of God (TE), xiii, 498,
evil; moral argument
499–501, 505, 508, 510, 512, 513, 515,
“defender” response to problem of evil, 470
516–18, 519–24, 547–8
n. 13., 471 n. 14, 475–6
theory-ladenness objection, 504–6, 547
experience of pleasure and happiness, 476
token vs. type PCT, 510, 511, 529, 534
possible goods, 475
traditional foundationalism, 503, 507
Berkeley, George, 1, 532
twentieth and twenty-fi rst century
Beversluis, John, 351, 361, see also C. S. Lewis
developments of the ARE, 501–3, 548–9
Bishop, John, 297, 311–12, 325
verifi cationism, 502
Blackmore, Susan, 350, 434
Aristotelianism; see also kalam cosmological
Blaiklock, E. M., 600, 603
argument; Leibnizian cosmological
Block, Ned, 340
argument; Thomas Aquinas
Bohm, David, 183
causal account of modality, 43–5
Bohr, Niels, 211, 213
cosmological argument and, 101
Bojowald, Martin, 149, 169–74
good person, 427
Boltzmann, Ludwig, 205, 266
essentialist account of modality, 39–43
Bonjour, L., 525, 532–3
infi nity, 112
Borde-Vilenkin-Guth (BVG) singularity
ontology and, 39
theorem, 142–3, 147–50, 157, 158 see also
theism, 39
Hawking-Penrose Theorems
Armstrong, D. M., 303–4, 311, 331, 452; see also
Brink, David, 406, 408
naturalism; physicalism
Broad, C.D., 115 n. 14, 501–2
asymptotically static space-time, 147–50, see
Brouwer analogue axiom, 44–5, 66, 72–4
also Borde-Vilenkin-Guth (BVG)
Bultmann, Rudolf, 599
singularity theorem
Butler, Bishop, 420, 618–19, 659
atheism, ix, x n. 3, 20–1, 28, 186, 226, 346, 347,
375, 395, 627, 640, 655; see also God;
Caldwell, Robert R., 219
Christianity; naturalism
Calvinist, 45–6, 273, 297, 457
Augustine, 352, 459, 465–6, 487, 499, 601–2; see
Campbell, George, 617, 639, 654, 655, 658
also Thomas Aquinas
Camus, Albert, 445
Carr, Bernard, 275
B-theory of time, 114–15, 183, 191; see also
Carrier, Richard; see also argument from
a-theory of time
miracles; Jesus of Nazareth; naturalism
Bacon, Francis, 659
Barefoot’s four corollary argument, 378–9
Baergen, Ralph, 505–6
Logical laws and physical laws, 380
Bagger, Matthew 5, 13, 18, 502 see also, David
Reppert’s armchair science and, 383–6
Hume
theft hypothesis and Jesus’ resurrection, 623,
Baier, Kurt, 461–2
627 n. 30
Baker, Lynne, 16, 370
Cartwright, Nancy, 505
Barefoot, Derek, 362, 378–9
causation; see also determinism; libertarian
Barfi eld, Owen; see C. S. Lewis
freedom; naturalism
Barrow, John, 123 n. 20, 127, 130, 144,
agent, 91–2, 285–6, 312–13, 314–18, 319,
147 n. 45, 174 n. 75, 214, 223, 266
324–7, 333
I N D E X 667
asymmetry of, 64
epiphenomenal, 288–9, 290, 329, 335, 340,
causing the causing and, 74–7
376, 379, 436
causal necessitation, 293, 302–3, 305–6, 335
error theories, 350–1, 396
circular, 79, 83–4
irreducible, 282, 301, 302, 324, 435, 436–7,
deviant causal chain, 498
443, 449, 452
event, 193, 296, 313, 327
intentionality, xii, 5, 300, 307, 344, 345, 350,
intermediate vs. nonintermediate, 25, 296,
356, 363–74, 377, 385
307, 424
mental causation, xii, 289, 344, 351, 363, 373,
irrefl exive relation, 87–8, 332
375–9, 436, 437
overdetermination, 64–5, 436
modern philosophical orthodoxy and,
power, 39, 43–4, 90, 186, 193–4, 211, 290,
449–52
312, 314, 319–20, 323, 332, 335, 409,
mysterious, 282, 302, 304, 328–39, 374, 386,
577 n. 25
387, 450–1
realist view of, 292–3, 313, 320
phenomenal, 9, 289, 321–3, 328, 340 n. 8,
substantive axioms, 34
350, 385, 409, 450, 493, 522
transitive relation and, 87–8, 331–2
theism and, 8–9, 10, 11
top/down, 287–90, 315, 316, 317, 318
Confucianism, 430, 513
causal principal (CP)
consequentialism, 35, 426; see also moral; moral
Brouwer analogue, 72–4
arguments
causing the causing objection, 74–7
constants of physics, 202, 203
local to nonlocal, 60–3
Copan, Paul, xii, 439–42, 445
modal argument, 63–70
Copp, David, 413 n. 6
PSR and 70, 71
Craig, William, xi, 101 n. 2, 102, 107, 112, 113
states of affairs and, 63
n. 13, 124, 186, 188 n. 94, 95, 189 n. 96,
Chalmers, David, 9, 480 n. 21; see also,
196, 258 n. 42, 278 n. 59, 283, 331, 446,
argument from evil; natural theology
604 n. 12, 605 n. 14, 659 n. 43; see also
Chalmers, Thomas, 631
kalam cosmological argument; argument
Chandler, Samuel, 651–2, 653
from miracles
Chesterton, G. K., 391, 416, 435, 442, 445–6
creatio ex nihilo, 101, 140 n. 38, 189, 190; see
Chignell, Andrew, 473 n. 16, 483 n. 25
also kalam cosmological argument;
Chisholm, Roderick, x n. 3, 291, 293, 299, 331,
Leibnizian cosmological argument;
485, 487 n. 27, 503; see also argument
teleological argument
from consciousness; epistemology;
Crick, Francis, 433, 451, 484
foundationalism
Crisp, Roger, 282, 427
Christianity, 514–15, 593–4, 595, 647–8;
Crossan, John Dominic, 601–2, 605–6; see also,
see also argument from miracles; Jesus of
argument from miracles
Nazareth
Cudworth, Ralph, 2, 16, 310
Churchland, Paul and Patricia, 305, 369–70,
cumulative arguments, 19, 617–20, 630–7; see
371, 387; see also naturalism, physicalism
also explanation
Clarke, Samuel, 94, 95
cyclic universe model, 150–7, 166–9, see also
Closed timelike curves (CTCs), 133–6, see also
Hawking-Penrose Theorems, Quantum
Hawking-Penrose theorems
Cohn-Sherbok, Dan, 479 n. 20
Daniels, Norman , 407–8, 414, 417, 419, 535
Collins, Robin, xi, 202 n. 1, 214, 216 n.12, 223,
Danto, Arthur, 12, 434
225, 244 n. 27, 255 n. 39, 272; see also
Darwin, Charles, 352, 393, 395, 396–7, 403, 408,
teleological argument
409, 413, 442
common-sense realism, see prephilosophical
Darwinian evolution; see also naturalism
intuitions
adaptiveness and truth, 398–9, 404, 408
consciousness, see also argument from
argument from evolutionary naturalism
consciousness, materialism, naturalism
(AEN), 392–404, 407, 408, 415
correlation, xi, 17, 287, 296, 297, 299–300,
atheism, 395
302–5, 307, 308, 310, 328, 329, 333, 336,
counterfactuals, 409–14
372, 383, 387, 437
Darwinian counterfactual, 403
Darwinian evolution; see also naturalism ( cont’d)
Cartesian, 304, 306, 373, 382
emergence of rational inference, 360–1
emergent, 383
moral argument and, 393–404
mind-body, 321, 353, 382, 387, 451
naturalizing content, 368–9
problem of interaction, 373, 382–3
principle of suffi cient reason and, 28–30
property, 300, 301, 333, 436, 437
purposelessness, 348–9
Searle and, 300
“rights” language, 411
science-supporting worldview, 382
Davies, P. 122–3, 130, 215, 220, 251, 266–7
substance, 301, 319–20, 322–3, 325–7, 340
Dawkins, Richard, 2–3, 4, 11–12, 272, 394–5
theism and, 16, 329, 300, 333, 334, 335, 336,
Dennett, Daniel; see also argument from
337
consciousness; naturalism; physicalism
Dupre, Louis, 546
consciousness, 9, 443
Darwinian notion of “rights”, 411, 423, 442
Earman, John, 638–9, 641, 642, 643, 644, 653,
freedom, 451
see also David Hume
“greedy reductionism”, 399
Edwards, Jonathan, 539–40
indeterminate propositional content, 368–9
Edwards, Paul, 80–2, 460
“intentional stance”, 435
Edwards, Rem, 502, 504, 506–7
mind’s relation to the brain, 434
egoism, 391, 420–1, 441–2, see also moral
morality, 403–4
argument
naturalism and, 6
Einstein, Albert, 125, 129, 131, 133–4, 139–40,
psychology, 348–9
148–50, 158, 161, 165, 180, 208, 215–16,
third-person scientifi c explanation, 434
218 n. 14, 219, 240, 249, 263–5, 352, 366,
ultimate explanations, 443
387, 524
unaware of the causes of our choices, 451
ekpyrotic models, see cyclic universe models
Denton, Michael, xi, 225
Elgin, Catherine, 503
deontology, 35, 427
eliminative materialism, 369–71; see also
Descartes, Rene; see also dualism; epistemology;
materialism
foundationalism
Eliot, G, 391–2
argument from our idea of God, 94, 352, 553
emergent properties, 288–9, 290–1, 292–4; see
Caterus and, 570–1
also, argument from consciousness
causation, 33, 78
embodied moral agents, xi, 202, 203, 204, 211,
cosmological argument and, 101
212, 214, 254, 255, 256, 276; see also moral;
“Descartes Revenge”, 304
teleological argument;
dualism, 301
empiricism, 504, 507, 535, 536; see also
existence and essence, 565–6
naturalism; physicalism
foundationalism, 416
epistemic appraisal and justifi cation, 12, 46,
indubitability, 9
293, 295, 299, 319, 416, 498, 525; see also
mind-brain, 434
epistemology
ontological argument and, 553, 565–72, 580
epistemic probability, see also Likelihood
design arguments, see teleological argument
Principle
determinism; see also libertarian freedom
account of, 228–33
causal explanations and, 56
Bayesian conception of probability, 243
causal overdetermination, 64
conditional, 203, 204
external vs. internal, 55, 55 n. 11
confi rmation, 242
Laplacian, 275
degrees of belief, 240
superdeterminism, 275
determining, 233–4
Dodson, Edward, 227
Entailment Principle, 259–61
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 417, 418, 419
episto-logical probability, 229–30
Draper, Paul, 255 n. 38, 359, 515
introspection/intuition, 231, 233
dualism; see also materialism, naturalism,
Keynes (John) and, 226
physicalism
natural variable assumption, 236–9
agency and, 14–15, 188 n. 94
need for, 226–8
Aristotelian-Thomistic, 383
noetic conceptions of, 230
I N D E X 669
Parsons (Keith) and, 226
rational inference and inferential knowledge,
Plantinga’s conditional epistemic probability
351–8, 360–1, 362–5, 368, 374, 375, 376,
(CEP), 230–2
377, 378, 378, 379, 386
Principle of Indifference, xi, 32, 207, 228,
secondary qualities, 309–10, 385, 450, 522
234–6, 238, 239, 241, 245–6, 251–2, 253,
second-order critical principle, 526, 547
256 n. 41, 261 n. 47
skepticism, 41, 148 n. 4, 222, 225, 241 n. 25,