Chapter XIX
THE LAW
§ 1. Preliminary Principles
The Personality of God involved in the Idea of Law; and, therefore, all Morality is founded on Religion
The principal meanings of the word law are, (1.) An established order in the sequence of events. A law, in this sense, is a mere fact. That the planets are distant from the sun according to a determined proportion; that the leaves of a plant are arranged in a regular spiral around the stem; and that one idea by association suggests another, are simple facts. Yet they are properly called laws, in the sense of established orders of sequence or relation. So also what are called the laws of light, of sound, and of chemical affinity, are, for the most part, mere facts. (2.) A uniformly acting force which determines the regular sequence of events. In this sense the physical forces which we see in operation around us, are called the laws of nature. Gravitation, light, heat, electricity, and magnetism, are such forces. The fact that they act uniformly gives them the character of laws. Thus the Apostle speaks also of a law of sin in his members which wars against the law of the mind. (3.) Law is that which binds the conscience. It imposes the obligation of conformity to its demands upon all rational creatures. This is true of the moral law in its widest sense. It is also true of human laws within the sphere of their legitimate operation.
In all these senses of the word, law implies a law-giver; that is, an intelligence acting voluntarily for the attainment of an end. The irregular, or unregulated action of physical forces produces chaos; their ordered action produces the cosmos. But ordered action is action preëstablished, sustained, and directed for the accomplishment of a purpose.
This is still more obviously true with regard to moral laws. The slightest analysis of our feelings is sufficient to show that moral obligation is the obligation to conform our character and conduct to the will of an infinitely perfect Being, who has the authority to make his will imperative, and who has the power and the right to punish disobedience. The sense of guilt especially resolves itself into a consciousness of being amenable to a moral governor. The moral law, therefore, is in its nature the revelation of the will of God so far as that will concerns the conduct of his creatures. It has no other authority and no other sanction than that which it derives from Him.
The same is true with regard to the laws of men. They have no power or authority unless they have a moral foundation. And if they have a moral basis, so that they bind the conscience, that basis must be the divine will. The authority of civil rulers, the rights of property, of marriage, and all other civil rights, do not rest on abstractions, nor on general principles of expediency. They might be disregarded without guilt, were they not sustained by the authority of God. All moral obligation, therefore, resolves itself into the obligation of conformity to the will of God. And all human rights are founded on the ordinance of God. So that theism is the basis of jurisprudence as well as of morality. This doctrine is taught by Stahl, perhaps the greatest living authority on the philosophy of law. "Every philosophical science," he says, "must begin with the first principle of all things, that is, with the Absolute. It must, therefore, decide between Theism and Pantheism, between the doctrine that the first cause or principle is the personal, extramundane, self-revealing God, and the doctrine that the first principle is an impersonal power immanent in the world." It is not pantheism, but fetichism to make all things God. The real question is, Whether the Absolute has personality and self-consciousness or not? Stahl had previously said to the same effect, that every philosophy, and every religion, and especially the Christian, must proceed on a theory of the universe (a Weltanschauung). It is the Christian doctrine of God and of his relation to the world, that he makes the foundation of legal and political science (of Rechtsund Staatslehre).2 He therefore calls his
system "theological" in so far as it makes the nature and will of God the foundation of all duties and the source of all rights.
He recognizes, however, the distinction between morality and religion. "Morality," he says, "is the perfection (Vollendung) of man in himself (so far as the will is concerned); or the revelation of the divine being in man. Man is the image of God, and therefore in his nature is like God, perfect or complete in himself; and conformity to the divine image is for him the goal and command. (Matt. 5:45.) Religion, on the other hand, is the bond between man and God, or what binds men to God, so that we should know and will only in Him, refer everything to Him,—entire consecration, the personal union with God. Thus, love of our neighbour, courage, spirituality (the opposite of sensuality), may be simply moral virtues; whereas faith and the love of God are purely religious. The courage of Napoleon's guard was a moral virtue (a state of the will); the courage of Luther was religious (a power derived from his relation to God)."
Religion and morality, although thus different, are not independent. They are but different phases of our relation to God. Stahl, therefore, controverts the doctrine of Grotius, that there would be a jus naturale if there were no God; which is really equivalent to saying that there would be an obligation to goodness if there were no such thing as goodness. Moral excellence is of the very essence of God. He is concrete goodness; infinite reason, excellence, knowledge, and power in a personal form; so that there can be no obligation to virtue which does not involve obligation to God. Wolf carried out the doctrine of Grotius to the length of saying that an Atheist, if consistent, would act just as the Christian acts. This principle of Grotius, says Stahl, contained the germ of separation from religion, which unfolded itself with Kant into an ignoring, and, with those who followed him, into the denial of God.
"The primary idea of goodness, is the essential, not the creative, will of God. The divine will in its essence is infinite love, mercy, patience, truth, faithfulness, rectitude, spirituality, and all that is included in
holiness, which constitutes the inmost nature of God. The holiness of God, therefore, neither precedes his will ('sanctitas antecedens voluntatem' of the Schoolmen), nor follows it, but is his will itself. The good is not a law for the divine will (so that God wills it because it is good); neither is it a creation of his will (so that it becomes good because He wills it); but it is the nature (das Urwollen) of God from everlasting to everlasting." Again it is said, "Hence it follows that moral goodness is concrete, specific, … absolute, original, as little determined by logical laws as by a relation to external ends.… This is not the doctrine of modern ethics. According to the eudaimonistic view adopted by the English philosophers, by Thomasius, and others, the good is good because it tends to produce happiness. According to the rationalists, the good is conformity with the laws of thought (Denkrichtigkeit).… This was the real doctrine of Wolf, who made morality to consist in order (Regelmässigkeit); still more decidedly was it the doctrine of Kant, with whom the moral law is a consequence of the laws of thought. He says, expressly, that the idea of moral good must be derived from preceding law, that is, the law of reason.
These two principles, then, are to be taken for granted; first, that moral good is good in its own nature, and not because of its tendencies, or because of its conformity to the laws of reason; and, second, that all law has its foundation in the nature and will of God. These principles are very comprehensive. They are of special importance in the exposition of the law in its aspect as the revealed will of God designed to regulate human character and conduct.
Protestant Principles limiting Obedience to Human Laws
There is another principle regarded as fundamental by all Protestants, and that is, that the Bible contains the whole rule of duty for men in their present state of existence. Nothing can legitimately bind the conscience that is not commanded or forbidden by the Word of God. This principle is the safeguard of that liberty wherewith Christ has made his people free. If it be renounced, we are
at the mercy of the external Church, of the State, or of public opinion. This is simply the principle that it is right to obey God rather than man. Our obligation to render obedience to human enactments in any form, rests upon our obligation to obey God; and, therefore, whenever human laws are in conflict with the law of God we are bound to disobey them. When heathen emperors commanded Christians to worship idols, the martyrs refused. When popes and councils commanded Protestants to worship the Virgin Mary, and to acknowledge the supremacy of the bishop of Rome, the Protestant martyrs refused. When the Presbyterians of Scotland were required by their rulers in Church and State to submit themselves to the authority of prelatical bishops, they refused. When the Puritans of England were called upon to recognize the doctrine of "passive obedience," they again refused. And it is to the stand thus taken by those martyrs and confessors that the world is indebted for all of the religious and civil liberty it now enjoys.
Whether any enactment of the Church or State conflicts with the truth or law of God, is a question which every man must decide for himself. On him individually rests the responsibility, and therefore to him, as an individual, belongs the right of judgment.
Although these principles, when stated in thesi, are universally recognized among Protestants, they are nevertheless very frequently disregarded. This is true not only of the past when the Church and State both openly claimed the right to make laws to bind the conscience. It is true at the present time. Men still insist on the right of making that sin which God does not forbid; and that obligatory which God has not commanded. They prescribe rules of conduct and terms of church fellowship, which have no sanction in the Word of God. It is just as much a duty for the people of God to resist such usurpations, as it was for the early Christians to resist the authority of the Roman Emperors in matters of religion, or for the early Protestants to refuse to recognize the right of the Pope to determine for them what they were to believe, and what they were to do. The essence of infidelity consists in a man's putting his own convictions
on matters of truth and duty above the Bible. This may be done by fanatics in the cause of benevolence, as well as by fanatics in any other cause. It is infidelity in either case. And as such it should be denounced and resisted unless we are willing to renounce our allegiance to God, and make ourselves the servants of men.
Christian Liberty in Matters of Indifference
It is perfectly consistent with the principle above stated, that a thing may be right or wrong according to circumstances, and, therefore, it may often be wrong for a man to do what the Bible does not condemn. Paul himself circumcised Timothy; yet he told the Galatians that if they allowed themselves to be circumcised, Christ would profit them nothing. Eating meat offered in sacrifice to idols was a matter of indifference. Yet the Apostle said, "If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend."
There are two important principles involved in these Scriptural facts. The first is, that a thing indifferent in itself may become even fatally wrong if done with a wrong intention. Circumcision was nothing, and uncircumcision was nothing. It mattered little whether a man was circumcised or not. But if any one submitted to circumcision as an act of legal obedience, and as the necessary condition of his justification before God, he thereby rejected the Gospel, or, as the Apostle expressed it, he fell from grace. He renounced the gratuitous method of justification, and Christ became of no effect to him. In like manner, eating meat which had been offered in sacrifice to an idol, was a matter of indifference. "Meat," says Paul, "commendeth us not to God: for neither, if we eat, are we the better; neither, if we eat not, are we the worse." Yet if a man ate such meat as an act of reverence to the idol, or under circumstances which implied that it was an act of worship, he was guilty of idolatry. And, therefore, the Apostle taught that participation in feasts held within the precincts of an idol's temple, was idolatry.
The other principle is that, no matter what our intention may be, we sin against Christ when we make such use of our liberty, in matters of indifference, as causes others to offend. In the first of these cases the sin was not in being circumcised, but in making circumcision a condition of our justification. In the second case, the idolatry consisted not in eating meat offered in sacrifice to idols, but in eating it as an act of worship to the idol. And in the third case, the sin was not in asserting our liberty in matters of indifference, but in causing others to offend.
The rules which the Scriptures clearly lay down on this subject are: (1.) That no man or body of men has the right to pronounce that to be sinful which God does not forbid. There was no sin in being circumcised, or in eating meat, or in keeping the sacred days of the Hebrews. (2.) That it is a violation of the law of love, and therefore a sin against Christ, to make such use of our liberty as to cause others to sin. "Take heed," says the Apostle, "lest by any means this liberty of yours become a stumbling block to them that are weak." "When ye sin so against the brethren, and wound their weak conscience, ye sin against Christ." (1 Cor. 8:9, 12.) "It is good (i.e., morally obligatory) neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak." "All things indeed are pure, but it is evil for that man who eateth with offence." (Rom. 14:21, 20.) (3). Nothing in itself indifferent can be made the ground of permanent and universal obligation. Because it was wrong in Galatia to submit to circumcision, it does not follow that it was wrong in Paul to circumcise Timothy. Because it was wrong in Corinth to eat meat, it does not follow that it is wrong always and everywhere. An obligation arising out of circumstances must vary with circumstances. (4.) When it is obligatory to abstain from the use of things indifferent, is a matter of private judgment. No man has the right to decide that question for other men. No bishop, priest, or church court has the right to decide it. Otherwise it would not be a matter of liberty. Paul constantly recognized the right (ἐξουσία) of Christians to judge in such cases for themselves. He does this not by implication only, but he also expressly asserts it, and condemns
those who would call it in question. "Let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not; and let not him which eateth not judge him that eateth: for God hath received him. Who art thou that judgest another man's servant? to his own master he standeth or falleth." "One man esteemeth one day above another: another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind." (Rom. 14:3, 4, 5.) It is a common saying that every man has a pope in his own bosom. That is, the disposition to lord it over God's heritage is almost universal. Men wish to have their opinions on moral questions made into laws to bind the consciences of their brethren. This is just as much a usurpation of a divine prerogative when done by a private Christian or by a church court, as when done by the Bishop of Rome. We are as much bound to resist it in the one case as in the other. (5.) It is involved in what has been said that the use which a man makes of his Christian liberty can never be legitimately made the ground of church censure, or a term of Christian communion.
Scriptural Usage of the Word Law
The Scriptures uniformly understand by law a manifestation of the will of God. All the operations of nature are ordered by laws of his appointment. And his will is represented as the ultimate foundation of moral obligation. In Hebrew it is called ּתֹוָרה, instruction, because it is, as the Apostle says, "the form of knowledge and of the truth." It is the standard of right and wrong. In Greek it is called νόμος, custom, and then, as custom or usage regulates the conduct of men, whatever has that authority, or does in fact control action, is called νόμος. In the New Testament it is constantly used in this wide sense. It is sometimes applied to a rule of conduct however revealed; sometimes to the Scriptures as the supernaturally revealed will of God, as the rule of faith and practice; sometimes to the Pentateuch or Law of Moses; and sometimes specifically to the moral law. It is here to be taken to mean that revelation of the will of God which is designed to bind the conscience and to regulate the conduct of men.
How the Law is revealed
This law is revealed in the constitution of our nature, and more fully and clearly in the written Word of God. That there is a binding revelation of the law, independently of any supernatural external revelation, is expressly taught in the Bible. Paul says of the heathen that they are a law unto themselves. They have the law written on their hearts. This is proved, he tells us, because they do, φύσει, by nature, i.e., in virtue of the constitution of their nature, the things of the law. The same moral acts which the written law prescribes, the conduct of the heathen shows that they know to be obligatory. Hence their conscience approves or disapproves, as they obey or disobey this inwardly revealed law. What is thus taught in Scripture is confirmed by consciousness and experience. Every man is conscious of a knowledge of right and wrong, and of a sense of obligation, which are independent of all external revelation. He may be unable to determine whence that knowledge comes. He knows, however, that it has been in him coeval with the dawn of reason, and has enlarged and strengthened just as his reason unfolded. His consciousness tells him that the rule is within, and would be there though no positive or external revelation of duty existed. In other words, we do not refer the sense of moral obligation to an externally revealed law, as its source, but to the constitution of our nature. This is not the experience of any class of men exclusively, but the common experience of the race. Wherever there are men, there is the sense of moral obligation, and a knowledge of right and wrong.
It is frequently objected to this doctrine that men differ widely in their moral judgments. What men of one age or country regard as virtues, men of other ages or countries denounce as crimes. But this very diversity proves the existence of the moral sense. Men could not differ in judgments about beauty, if the æsthetic element did not belong to their nature. Neither could they differ on questions of morality unless the sense of right and wrong were innate and universal. The diversity in question is not greater than in regard to rational truths. That men differ in their judgments as to what is true, is no proof that reason is not a natural and essential element of their constitution. As there are certain truths of the reason which are
intuitive and perceived by all men, so there are moral truths so simple that they are universally recognized. As beyond these narrow limits there is diversity of knowledge, so there must be diversity of judgment. But this is not inconsistent with the Scriptural doctrine that even the most degraded heathen are a law unto themselves, and show the work of the law written on their hearts. As the revelation which God has made of his eternal power and Godhead in his works is true and trustworthy, and sufficient to render ignorance or denial of his existence inexcusable, while it does not supersede the necessity of a clearer revelation in his word; so there is an imperfect revelation of the law made in the very constitution of our nature, by which those who have no other revelation are to be judged, but which does not render unnecessary the clearer teachings of the Scriptures.
Different Kinds of Laws
In looking into the Bible as containing a revelation of the will of God, the first thing which arrests attention is the great diversity of precepts therein contained. This difference concerns the nature of the precepts, and the ground on which they rest, or the reason why they are obligatory.
1. There are laws which are founded on the nature of God. To this class belong the command to love God supremely, to be just, merciful, and kind. Love must everywhere and always be obligatory. Pride, envy, and malice must everywhere and always be evil. Such laws bind all rational creatures, angels as well as men. The criterion of these laws is that they are absolutely immutable and indispensable. Any change in them would imply, not merely a change in the relations of men, but in the very nature of God.
2. A second class of laws includes those which are founded on the permanent relations of men in their present state of existence. Such are the moral, as opposed to mere statute laws, concerning property, marriage, and the duties of parents and children, or superiors and inferiors. Such laws concern men only in their present state of being.
They are, however, permanent so long as the relations which they contemplate continue. Some of these laws bind men as men; others husbands as husbands, wives as wives, and parents and children as such, and consequently they bind all men who sustain these several relations. They are founded on the nature of things, as it is called; that is, upon the constitution which God has seen fit to ordain. This constitution might have been different, and then these laws would have had no place. The right of property need not have existed. God might have made all things as common as sun-light or air. Men might have been as angels, neither marrying nor giving in marriage. Under such a constitution there would be no room for a multitude of laws which are now of universal and necessary obligation.
3. A third class of laws have their foundation in certain temporary relations of men, or conditions of society, and are enforced by the authority of God. To this class belong many of the judicial or civil laws of the ancient theocracy; laws regulating the distribution of property, the duties of husbands and wives, the punishment of crimes, etc. These laws were the application of general principles of justice and right to the peculiar circumstances of the Hebrew people. Such enactments bind only those who are in the circumstances contemplated, and cease to be obligatory when those circumstances change. It is always and everywhere right that crime should be punished, but the kind or degree of punishment may vary with the varying condition of society. It is always right that the poor should be supported, but one mode of discharging that duty may be proper in one age and country, and another preferable in other times and places. All those laws, therefore, in the Old Testament, which had their foundation in the peculiar circumstances of the Hebrews, ceased to be binding when the old dispensation passed away.
It is often difficult to determine to which of the last two classes certain laws of the Old Testament belong; and therefore, to decide whether they are still obligatory or not. Deplorable evils have flowed from mistakes as to this point. The theories of the union of Church and State, of the right of the magistrate to interfere authoritatively in
matters of religion, and of the duty of persecution, so far as Scriptural authority is concerned, rest on the transfer of laws founded on the temporary relations of the Hebrews to the altered relations of Christians. Because the Hebrew kings were the guardians of both tables of the Law, and were required to suppress idolatry and all false religion, it was inferred that such is still the duty of the Christian magistrate. Because Samuel hewed Agag to pieces, it was inferred to be right to deal in like manner with heretics. No one can read the history of the Church without being impressed with the dreadful evils which have flowed from this mistake. On the other hand, there are some of the judicial laws of the Old Testament which were really founded on the permanent relations of men, and therefore, were intended to be of perpetual obligation, which many have repudiated as peculiar to the old dispensation. Such are some of the laws relating to marriage, and to the infliction of capital punishment for the crime of murder. If it be asked, How are we to determine whether any judicial law of the Old Testament is still in force? the answer is first, When the continued authority of such law is recognized in the New Testament. That for Christians is decisive. And secondly, If the reason or ground for a given law is permanent, the law itself is permanent.
4. The fourth class of laws are those called positive, which derive all their authority from the explicit command of God. Such are external rites and ceremonies, as circumcision, sacrifices, and the distinction between clean and unclean meats, and between months, days, and years. The criterion of such laws is that they would not be binding unless positively enacted; and that they bind those only to whom they are given, and only so long as they continue in force by the appointment of God. Such laws may have answered important ends, and valid reasons doubtless existed why they were imposed; still they are specifically different from those commands which are in their own nature morally obligatory. The obligation to obey such laws does not arise from their fitness for the end for which they have been given, but solely from the divine command.
How far may the Laws contained in the Bible be dispensed with?
This is a question much discussed between Protestants and Romanists. Protestants contended that the Church had not the power claimed by Romanists, to relieve men from the obligation of an oath, and to render marriages lawful which without the sanction of the Church would be invalid. The Church has neither the authority to set aside any law of God, nor to decide the circumstances under which a divine law ceases to be obligatory, so that it continues in force until the Church declares the parties free from its obligation. On this subject it is plain, (1.) That none but God can free men from the obligation of any divine law, which He has imposed upon them. (2.) That with regard to the positive laws of the Old Testament, and such judicial enactments as were designed exclusively for the Hebrews living under the theocracy, they were all abolished by the introduction of the new dispensation. We are no longer under obligation to circumcise our children, to keep the Passover, or feast of tabernacles, or to go up three times in the year to Jerusalem, or to exact an eye for an eye, or a tooth for a tooth. (3.) With regard to those laws which are founded on the permanent relations of men, such as the laws of property, of marriage, and of obedience to parents, they can be set aside by the authority of God. It was not wrong for the Hebrews to spoil the Egyptians or to dispossess the Canaanites, because He whose is the earth and the fulness thereof, authorized those acts. He had a right to take the property of one people and give it to another. The extermination of the idolatrous inhabitants of the promised land at the command of Joshua, was as much an act of God as though it had been effected by pestilence or famine. It was a judicial execution by the Supreme Ruler. In like manner, although marriage as instituted by God was and is an indissoluble covenant between one man and one woman, yet He saw fit to allow, under the Mosaic Law, within certain limitations, both polygamy and divorce. While that permission continued, those things were lawful; when it was withdrawn, they ceased to be allowable.
When one Divine Law is superseded by another
The above classification of the divine laws, which is the one usually adopted, shows that they differ in their relative dignity and importance. Hence when they come into conflict the lower must yield to the higher. This we are taught when God says, "I will have mercy, and not sacrifice." And our Lord also says, "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath," and, therefore, the Sabbath might be violated when the duties of mercy rendered it necessary. Throughout the Scriptures we find positive laws subordinated to those of moral obligation. Christ approved of the lawyer who said that to love God with all the heart, and our neighbour as ourselves, "is more than all whole burnt-offerings and sacrifices."
Perfection of the Law
The perfection of the moral law as revealed in the Scriptures, includes the points already considered,—(1.) That everything that the Bible pronounces to be wrong, is wrong; that everything which it declares to be right, is right. (2.) That nothing is sinful which the Bible does not condemn; and nothing is obligatory on the conscience which it does not enjoin. (3.) That the Scriptures are a complete rule of duty, not only in the sense just stated, but also in the sense that there is and can be no higher standard of moral excellence. Romanists, on the contrary, teach that a man can do more than the law requires. There are certain things which are commanded, and therefore absolutely obligatory; and others which are recommended, but not enjoined, such as voluntary poverty, celibacy, and monastic obedience. These are held to be virtues of a higher grade than obedience to explicit commands. This doctrine is founded on the erroneous views of the Church of Rome on the nature of sin, and the grounds of moral obligation. If nothing is sinful but voluntary, i.e., deliberate transgression of known law; and if the law is satisfied by voluntary action in this sense of the terms, then it is conceivable that a man may in this life render perfect obedience to the law, and even go beyond its demands. This is also connected with the distinction
which Romanists make between mortal and venial sins. The former are those which forfeit baptismal grace, and reduce the soul to its original state of spiritual death and condemnation. The latter are sins which have not this deadly effect, but can be fully atoned for by confession and penance. But if the law of God be spiritual, extending to the thoughts and feelings whether impulsive or cherished; and if it demands all kinds and degrees of moral excellence, or complete congeniality with God, and conformity to his image, then there is no room for these distinctions, and no higher rule of moral conduct. The law of the Lord, therefore, is perfect in every sense of the word.
The Decalogue
The question whether the decalogue is a perfect rule of duty is, in one sense, to be answered in the affirmative. (1.) Because it enjoins love to God and man, which, our Saviour teaches, includes every other duty. (2.) Because our Lord held it up as a perfect code, when he said to the young man in the Gospel, "This do and thou shalt live." (3.) Every specific command elsewhere recorded may be referred to some one of its several commands. So that perfect obedience to the decalogue in its spirit, would be perfect obedience to the law. Nevertheless, there are many things obligatory on us, which without a further revelation of the will of God than is contained in the decalogue, we never should have known to be obligatory. The great duty of men under the Gospel, is faith in Christ. This our Lord teaches when He says, "This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent." This comprehends or produces all that is required of us either as to faith or practice. Hence he that believeth shall be saved.
Rules of Interpretation
Theologians are accustomed to lay down numerous rules for the proper interpretation of the divine law, such as that negative precepts are to be understood as including positive, and positive, negative; that, in forbidding an act, everything which naturally leads
to it is comprehended; that, in condemning one offence, all others of a like kind are forbidden, and the like. All such rules resolve themselves into one. The decalogue is not to be interpreted as the laws of men, which take cognizance only of external acts, but as the law of God, which extends to the thoughts and intents of the heart. In all cases it will be found that the several commandments contain some comprehensive principle of duty, under which a multitude of subordinate specific duties are included.
§ 2. Division of the Contents of the Decalogue
As the law given on Sinai and written on two tables of stone, is repeatedly called in the Scriptures "The Ten Words," or, as it is in the English version of Exodus 34:28, "The Ten Commandments," there is no doubt that the contents of that law are to be divided into ten distinct precepts. (See Deut. 4:13, and 10:4.) This summary of moral duties is also called in Scripture "The Covenant," as containing the fundamental principles of the solemn contract between God and his chosen people. Still more frequently it is called "The Testimony," as the attestation of the will of God concerning human character and conduct.
The decalogue appears in two forms which differ slightly from each other. The original form is found in Exodus the twentieth chapter; the other in Deuteronomy 5:6–21. The principal differences between them are, first, that the command respecting the Sabbath is in Exodus enforced by a reference to God's resting on the seventh day, after the work of creation; whereas in Deuteronomy it is enforced by a reference to God's delivering his people out of Egypt. Secondly, in the command respecting coveting, in Exodus, it is said, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife," etc. In both clauses the word is ָח ַמד. In Deuteronomy it is, "Neither shalt thou desire (ָח ַמד) thy neighbour's wife; neither shalt thou covet (ָאָוה) thy neighbour's house," etc. This latter difference has been magnified into a matter of importance.
The Scriptures themselves determine the number of the commandments, but not in all cases what they are. They are not numbered off as first, second, third, etc. The consequence is that different modes of division have been adopted. The Jews from an early period adopted the arrangement which is still recognized by them. They regard the words in Exodus 20:2, as constituting the first commandment, "I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage." The command is that the people should recognize Jehovah as their God; and the special ground of this recognition is made to be, that He delivered them from the tyranny of the Egyptians. These words, however, are not in the form of a command. They constitute the preface or introduction to the solemn injunctions which follow. In making the preface one of the commandments it became necessary to preserve the number ten, by uniting the first and second, as they are commonly arranged. The command, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me," and "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image," being regarded as substantially the same; the latter being merely an amplification of the former. An idol was a false god; worshipping idols was therefore having other gods than Jehovah.
Augustine, and after him the Latin and Lutheran churches, agreed with the Jews in uniting the first and second commandments; but differed from them in dividing the tenth. There is, however, a difference as to the mode of division. Augustine followed the text as given in Deuteronomy, and made the words, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife;" the ninth, and the words, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house," etc., the tenth commandment. This division was necessitated by the union of the first and second, and justified by Augustine on the ground that the "cupido impuræ voluptatis" is a distinct offence from the "cupido impuri lucri." The Romish Church, however, adheres to the text as given in Exodus, and makes the clause, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house," the ninth, and what follows, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, nor his man servant, nor his maid servant," etc., the tenth commandment.
The third method of arrangement is that adopted by Josephus, Philo, and Origen, and accepted by the Greek Church, and also by the Latin until the time of Augustine. At the Reformation it was adopted by the Reformed, and has the sanction of almost all modern theologians. According to this arrangement, the first commandment forbids the worship of false gods; the second, the use of idols in divine worship. The command, "Thou shalt not covet," is taken as one commandment.
It is universally admitted that there are two tables of the decalogue; the one containing the precepts concerning our duties to God, and the other those which concern our duties to our fellowmen. Philo referred five commands to each table, as he regarded reverence to parents, enjoined in the fifth, as a religious rather than a moral duty. Those who unite the first and second, and divide the tenth, refer three commandments to the first table and seven to the second. According to the third arrangement mentioned above, there are four in the first, and six in the second. The only objection urged against this is founded on the symbolism of numbers. Three and seven among the Jews are sacred and significant; four and six are not.
Arguments for the Arrangement adopted by the Reformed
There are two questions to be determined. First, should the commandments concerning idolatry be united or separated? In favour of considering them two distinct commandments, it may be urged, (1.) That all the way through the decalogue, a new command is introduced by a positive injunction or prohibition: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain;" "Thou shalt not steal;" "Thou shalt not kill," etc. This is the way in which new commands are introduced. The fact, therefore, that the command, "Thou shalt have no other gods," is distinguished by the repetition of the injunction, "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image," is an indication that they were intended as different commands. The tenth commandment is indeed an exception to this rule, but the principle holds good in every other case. (2.) The things forbidden are in their
nature distinct. Worshipping false gods is one thing; using images in divine worship is another. They therefore called for separate prohibitions. (3.) These offences are not only different in their own nature, but they differed also in the apprehension of the Jews. The Jews regarded worshipping false gods, and using images in the worship of the true God, as very different things. They were severely punished for both offences. Both external and internal considerations, therefore, are in favour of retaining the division which has been so long and so extensively adopted in the Church.
The second question concerns the division of the tenth commandment. It is admitted that there are ten commandments. If, therefore, the two commands, "Thou shalt have no other gods," and "Thou shalt not make any graven image," are distinct, there is no room for the question whether the command against coveting should be divided. There is, moreover, no pretext for such division, unless we follow the order given in Deuteronomy, which puts the words, "Neither shalt thou desire thy neighbour's wife," before the words, "Neither shalt thou covet thy neighbour's house, his field," etc., etc. As coveting a man's wife is a different offence, or at least a different form of a general offence, from coveting his house or land, if the order given in Deuteronomy be considered authoritative, there might be some reason for the separation. But if the order given in Exodus be adhered to, no such reason exists. The thing forbidden is cupidity, whatever be its object. That the order given in Exodus is authoritative may be argued, (1.) Because the law as there given was not only the first chronologically, but also was solemnly announced from Mount Sinai. (2.) The recension given in Deuteronomy differs from the other in many unimportant particulars. If the order in which the objects of cupidity are mentioned be a matter of indifference, then the diversity is a matter of no consequence. But if it be made a matter of importance, controlling the order and interpretation of the commandments, then it is hard to account for it. There is, therefore, every reason for regarding it as one of those diversities which were not intended to be significant. (3.) The distinction is nowhere else recognized in Scripture. On the contrary,
the command, "Thou shalt not covet," is elsewhere given as one command. Paul, in Romans 7:7, says: "I had not known sin but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." And in Romans 13:9, in enumerating the laws forbidding sins against our neighbour, Paul gives as one command, "Thou shalt not covet." (4.) Our Lord refers the sin of "coveting a man's wife" to the seventh commandment. If included under that, it would be incongruous and out of harmony with the context, to make it a distinct commandment by itself.
§ 3. Preface to the Ten Commandments
"I am Jehovah thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before me." Theism and Monotheism, the foundation of all religion, are taught in these words. The first clause is the preface or introduction to the decalogue. It presents the ground of obligation and the special motive by which obedience is enforced. It is because the commandments which follow are the words of God that they bind the conscience of all those to whom they are addressed. It is because they are the words of the covenant God and Redeemer of his people that we are specially bound to render them obedience.
History seems to prove that the question whether the Infinite is a person cannot be satisfactorily answered by the unassisted reason of man. The historical fact is, that the great majority of those who have sought the solution of that question on philosophical principles have answered it in the negative. It is impossible, therefore, duly to estimate the importance of the truth involved in the use of the pronoun "I" in these words. It is a person who is here presented. Of that person it is affirmed, first, that He is Jehovah; and secondly, that He is the covenant God of his people.
In the first place, in calling himself Jehovah, God reveals that He is the person known to his people by that name, and that He is in his nature all that that name imports. The etymology and signification of
the name Jehovah seem to be given by God Himself in Exodus 3:13, 14, where it is written, "Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them, and God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you."
Jehovah, therefore, is the I AM; a person always existing and always the same. Self-existence, eternity, and immutability are included in the signification of the word. This being the case, the name Jehovah is presented as the ground of confidence to the people of God; as in Deuteronomy 32:40, and Isaiah 40:28, "Hast thou not known? hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God, Jehovah, the Creator of the ends of the earth, fainteth not, neither is weary? there is no searching of his understanding." These natural attributes, however, would be no ground of confidence if not associated with moral excellence. He who as Jehovah is declared to be infinite, eternal, and immutable in his being, is no less infinite, eternal, and immutable in his knowledge, wisdom, holiness, goodness, and truth. Such is the Person whose commands are recorded in the decalogue.
In the second place, it is not only the nature of the Being who speaks, but the relation in which He stands to his people that is here revealed. "I am Jehovah thy God." The word God has a definite meaning from which we are not at liberty to depart. We may not substitute for the idea which the word in Scripture and in ordinary language is intended to express, any arbitrary philosophical notion of our own. God is the Being, who, because He is all that the word Jehovah implies, is the proper object of worship, that is, of all the religious affections, and of their appropriate expression. He is, therefore, the only appropriate object of supreme love, adoration, gratitude, confidence, and submission. Him we are bound to trust and to obey.
Jehovah is not only God, but He says to his people collectively and individually, "I am thy God." That is, not only the God whom his people are to acknowledge and worship, but who has entered into covenant with them; promising to be their God, to be all that God can be to his creatures and children, on condition that they consent to be his people. The special covenant which God formed with Abraham, and which was solemnly renewed at Mount Sinai, was that He would give to the children of Abraham the land of Palestine as their possession and bless them in that inheritance on condition that they kept the laws delivered to them by his servant Moses. And the covenant which He has made with the spiritual children of Abraham, is that He will be their God for time and eternity on condition that they acknowledge, receive, and trust his only begotten Son, the promised seed of Abraham, in whom all the nations of the earth are to be blessed. And as in this passage the redemption of the Hebrews from their bondage in Egypt is referred to as the pledge of God's fidelity to his promise to Abraham, and the special ground of the obligation of the Hebrews to acknowledge Jehovah as their God; so the mission of the Eternal Son for the redemption of the world is at once the pledge of God's fidelity to the promise made to our first parents after their fall, and the special ground of our allegiance to our covenant God and Father.
§ 4. The First Commandment
The first commandment is, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." I, that is, the person whose name, and nature, and whose relation to his people are given in the preceding words, and I only, shall be recognized by you as God.
This command, therefore, includes, first, the injunction to recognize Jehovah as the true God. As this recognition must be intelligent and sincere, it includes,—
1. Knowledge. We must know who, or what Jehovah is. This implies a knowledge of his attributes, of his relation to the world as its creator,
preserver, and governor, and especially his relation to his rational creatures and to his own chosen people. This of course involves a knowledge of our relation to Him as dependent and responsible creatures and as the objects of his redeeming love.
2. Faith. We must believe that God is, and that He is what He declares Himself to be; and that we are his creatures and his children.
3. Confession. It is not enough that we secretly in our hearts recognize Jehovah as the true God; we must openly and under all circumstances and despite of all opposition, whether from magistrates or from philosophers, avow our faith in Him as the only living and true God. This confession must be made, not only by the avowal of the lips as when we repeat the Creed, but by all appropriate acts of worship in public and private, by praise, prayer, and thanksgiving.
4. As the law is spiritual, not only as bearing the impress of the Spirit, and, therefore, holy, just, and good, but also as taking cognizance of the inward as well as of the outward life, of the thoughts and feelings as well as of external acts, this recognition of Jehovah as our God includes the exercise towards Him of all the religious affections; of love, fear, reverence, gratitude, submission, and devotion. And as this is not an occasional duty to be performed at certain times and places, but one of perpetual obligation, a habitual state of mind is the thing required. The recognition of Jehovah as our God involves a constant sense of his presence, of his majesty, of his goodness, and of his providence, and of our dependence, responsibility, and obligation. We are to have God always before our eyes; to walk and live with Him, having a constant reference to his will in the conduct of our inward and outward life; recognizing continually his hand in everything that befalls us, submitting to all his chastisements and grateful for all his mercies.
The second or negative aspect of the command is the condemnation of the failure to recognize Jehovah as the true God; failing to believe in his existence and attributes, in his government and authority; failing to confess him before men; and failing to render him the inward reverence and the outward homage which are his due, that is, the first commandment forbids Atheism whether theoretical or practical. It moreover forbids the recognition of any other than Jehovah as God. This includes the prohibition of ascribing to any other being divine attributes; rendering to any creature the homage or obedience due to God alone; or exercising towards any other person or object those feelings of love, confidence, and submission which belong of right only to God.
It is, therefore, a violation of this commandment either to fail in the full and sincere recognition of God as God, or to give to any creature the place in our confidence and love due to God alone.
This the Chief of all the Commandments
The duty enjoined in this commandment is the highest duty of man. It is proved to be so in the estimation of God by the express declaration of Christ. When asked, "Which is the great commandment in the law," He answered, "Thou shalt love the LORD thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment." (Matt. 22:37, 38.) It is so also in the sight of reason. That infinite excellence should be reverenced; that He who is the author of our being and giver of all our mercies; on whom we are absolutely dependent; to whom we are responsible; who is the rightful possessor of our souls and bodies; and whose will is the highest rule of duty, should be duly recognized by his creatures, from the nature of the case must be the highest duty of all rational beings. It is, moreover, the first and greatest of the commandments if measured by the influence which obedience to its injunction has upon the soul itself. It places the creature in its proper relation to its Creator on which its own excellence and well-being depend. It purifies, ennobles, and exalts the soul. It calls into
exercise all the higher and nobler attributes of our nature; and assimilates man to the angels who surround the throne of God in heaven. The preëminence of this commandment is further evident from the fact that religion, or the duty we owe to God, is the foundation of morality. Without the former, the latter cannot exist. This is plain, (1.) From the nature of the case. Morality is the conformity of an agent's character and conduct to the moral law. But the moral law is the revealed will of God. If there be no God, there is no moral law; and if a man does not acknowledge or recognize God, there is no higher law than his own reason to which he can feel any obligation to be conformed. (2.) It is a principle of our nature that if a man disregard a higher obligation, he will not be controlled by a lower. This principle was recognized by our Lord when He said, "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much; and he that is unjust in the least, is unjust also in much." (Luke 16:10.) This involves the converse: He that is unfaithful in much, is unfaithful in that which is least. (3.) It is the testimony of experience that where religion has lost its hold on the minds of the people, there the moral law is trampled under foot. The criminal and dangerous class in every community consists of those who have no fear of God before their eyes. (4.) It is the secret conviction of every man that his duty to God is his highest duty, as is evinced by the fact that the charge of atheism is one from which the human soul instinctively recoils. It is felt to be a charge of the utter degradation, or of the deadness of all that is highest and noblest in the nature of man. (5.) The most decisive and solemn evidence of this truth, however, is to be found in the revealed purpose of God to forsake those who forsake Him; to give up to the unconstrained control of their evil passions, those who cast off their allegiance to Him. The Apostle says of the heathen world that it was "Because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, … God gave them up unto vile affections." (Rom. 1:21, 26.) And again in ver. 28, "As they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient; being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit,
malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful." Such are the natural, the actual, the inevitable, and the judicially ordained effects of men's refusing to retain God in their knowledge.
Notwithstanding all this we see multitudes of men of whom it may be said that God is not in all their thoughts. They never think of Him. They do not recognize his providence. They do not refer to his will as a rule of conduct. They do not feel their responsibility to Him for what they think or do. They do not worship Him; nor thank Him for their mercies. They are without God in the world. Yet they think well of themselves. They are not aware of the dreadful guilt involved in thus forgetting God, in habitually failing to discharge the first and highest duty that rests on rational creatures. Self-respect or regard to public opinion often renders such men decorous in their lives. But they are really dead while they live; and they have no security against the powers of darkness. It is painful also to see that scientific men and philosophers so often endeavour to invalidate the arguments for the existence of God, and advance opinions inconsistent with Theism; arguing, as they in many cases do, to prove either that there is no evidence of the existence of any power in the universe other than of physical force, or that no knowledge, consciousness, or voluntary action can be predicated of an infinite Being. This is done in apparent unconsciousness that they are undermining the foundations of all religion and morality; or that they are exhibiting a state of mind which the Scriptures pronounce worthy of reprobation.
§ 5. The Invocation of Saints and Angels
Saints and angels, and especially the Virgin Mary, are confessedly objects of worship in the Romish Church. The word "worship," however, means properly to respect or honour. It is used to express both the inward sentiment and its outward manifestation. This old sense of the word is still retained in courts of law in which the judge
is addressed as "Your Worship," or as "worshipful." The Hebrew word ִהּשַּה ַחָוה and the Greek προσκυνέω, often translated in the English version by the word "worship," mean simply to bow down, or prostrate one's self. They are used whether the person to whom the homage is rendered be an equal, an earthly superior, or God Himself. It is not, therefore, from the use of any of these words that the nature of the homage rendered can be determined. Romanists are accustomed to distinguish between the cultus civilis due to earthly superiors; δουλεία due to saints and angels; ὑπερδουλεία due to the Virgin Mary; and λατρεία due to God alone. These distinctions, however, are of little use. They afford no criterion by which to distinguish between δουλεία and ὑπερδουλεία and between ὑπερδουλεία and λατρεία. The important principle is this: Any homage, internal or external, which involves the ascription of divine attributes to its object, if that object be a creature, is idolatrous. Whether the homage paid by Romanists to saints and angels be idolatrous is a question of fact rather than of theory; that is, it is to be determined by the homage actually rendered, and not by that which is prescribed. It is easy to say that the saints are not to be honoured as God is honoured; that He is to be regarded as the original source and giver of all good, and they as mere intercessors, and as channels of divine communications; but this does not alter the case if the homage rendered them assumes that they possess the attributes of God; and if they are to the people the objects of religious affection and confidence.
What the Church of Rome teaches on this subject may be learned from the following passages, from the decisions of the Council of Trent, from the Roman Catechism, and from the writings of the leading theologians of that Church: "Mandat sancta synodus omnibus episcopis … ut … fideles diligenter instruant, docentes eos, sanctos, una cum Christo regnantes, orationes suas pro hominibus Deo offerre; bonum, atque utile esse suppliciter eos invocare; et ob beneficia impetranda a Deo per filium ejus Jesus Christum, Dominum nostrum, qui solus noster redemptor et salvator est, ad eorum orationes, opem auxiliumque confugere: illos vero, qui negant
sanctos, æterna felicitate in cœlo fruentes, invocandos esse; aut qui asserunt, vel illos pro hominibus non orare; vel eorum, ut pro nobis etiam singulis orent, invocationem esse idolatriam; vel pugnare cum verbo Dei; adversarique honori unius mediatoris Dei et hominum Jesu Christi; vel stultum esse in cœlo regnantibus voce, vel mente supplicare; impie sentire." "Et quamvis in honorem et memoriam sanctorum nonnullas interdum missas ecclesia celebrare consueverit; non tamen illis sacrificium offerri docet, sed Deo soli, qui illos coronavit; unde nec sacerdos dicere solet, offero tibi sacrificium Petre, vel Paule; sed Deo de illorum victoriis gratias agens, eorum patrocinia implorat, ut ipsi pro nobis intercedere dignentur in cœlis, quorum memoriam facimus in terris."2
The Roman Catechism teaches the same doctrine.
"Invocandi sunt [angeli eorum]; quod et perpetuo Deum intuentur et patrocinium salutis nostræ, sibi delatum, libentissime suscipiunt." This invocation, it says, does not conflict with the law "de uno Deo colendo."
Thomas Aquinas says: "Quanquam solus Deus sit orandus, ut vel gratiam vel gloriam nobis donet; sanctos nihilominus viros orare expedit. ut illorum precibus et meritis, nostræ orationes sortiantur effectum."
On this subject Bellarmin lays down the following propositions, (1.) "Non licet a sanctis petere, ut nobis tanquam auctores divinorum beneficiorum, gloriam, vel gratiam aliaque ad beatitudinem media concedunt." This, however, he virtually nullifies, when he adds, "Est tamen notandum, cum dicimus, non debere peti à sanctis, nisi ut orent pro nobis, nos non agere de verbis, sed de sensu verborum; nam quantum ad verba, licet dicere, S. Petre miserere mihi, salva me, aperi mihi aditum cœli: item, da mihi sanitatem corporis, da patientiam, da mihi fortitudinem." (2.) "Sancti non sunt immediati intercessores nostri apud Deum, sed quidquid a Deo nobis impetrant, per Christum impetrant." (3.) "Sancti orant pro nobis
saltem in genere, secundum Scripturas." (4.) "Sancti qui regnant cum Christo, pro nobis orant, non solum in genere, sed etiam in particulari." As to the question, How the saints in heaven can know what men on earth desire of them, he says four answers are given. First, some say that the angels, who are constantly ascending to heaven and thence descending to us, communicate to the saints the prayers of the people. Secondly, others say, "Sanctorum animas, sicut etiam angelos, mira quadam celeritate naturæ, quodammodo esse ubique; et per se audire preces supplicantium." Thirdly, others again say, "Sanctos videre in Deo omnia a principio suæ beatitudinis, quæ ad ipsos aliquo modo pertinent, et proinde etiam orationes nostras ad se directas." Fourthly, others say that God reveals to them the prayers of the people. As on earth God revealed the future to the prophets and gives to men at times the power to read the thoughts of others, so He can reveal to the saints in heaven the wants and prayers of those who call upon them. This last solution of the difficulty Bellarmin himself prefers.2
The objections which Protestants are accustomed to urge against this invocation of saints are,—
1. That it is, to say the least, superstitious. It requires faith without evidence. It assumes not only that the dead are in a conscious state of existence in another world; and that departed believers belong to the same living mystical body of Christ, of which their brethren still on earth are members, both of which Protestants, on the authority of God's word, cheerfully admit; but it assumes, without any evidence from Scripture or experience, that the spirits of the dead are accessible to those who are still in the flesh; that they are near us, capable of hearing our prayers, knowing our thoughts, and answering our requests. The Church or the soul is launched on an ocean of fantasies and follies, without a compass, if either suffers itself to believe without evidence; then there is nothing in astrology, alchemy, or demonology which may not be received as true, to perplex, to pervert, or to torment.
2. The whole thing is a deceit and illusion. If in fact departed saints are not authorized and not enabled to hear and answer the prayers of suppliants on earth, then the people are in the condition of those who trust in gods who cannot save, who have eyes that see not, and ears that cannot hear. That the saints have no such office as the theory and practice of invocation suppose is plain, because the fact if true cannot be known except by divine revelation. But no such revelation exists. It is a purely superstitious belief, without the support of either Scripture or reason. The conjectural methods suggested by Bellarmin of explaining how the saints may be cognizant of the wants and wishes of men, is a confession that nothing is known or can be known on the subject; and, therefore, that the invocation of the saints has no Scriptural or rational foundation. If this be so, then how dreadfully are the people deluded! How fearful the consequences of turning their eyes and hearts from the one divine mediator between God and man, who ever lives to make intercession for us, and whom the Father heareth always, and causing them to direct their prayers to ears which never hear, and to place their hopes in arms which never save. It is turning from the fountain of living waters, to cisterns which can hold no water.
3. The invocation of saints as practised in the Church of Rome is idolatrous. Even if it be conceded that the theory as expounded by theologians is free from this charge, it remains true that the practice involves all the elements of idolatry. Blessings are sought from the saints which God only can bestow; and attributes are assumed to belong to them which belong to God alone. Every kind of blessing, temporal and spiritual, is sought at their hands, and sought directly from them as the givers. This Bellarmin admits so far as the words employed are concerned. He says it is right to say: "Holy Peter, save me; open to me the gates of heaven; give me repentance, courage," etc. God alone can grant these blessings; the people are told to seek them at the hands of creatures. This is idolatry. Practically it is taken for granted that the saints are everywhere present, that they can hear prayers addressed to them from all parts of the earth at the same time; that they know our thoughts and unexpressed desires. This is
to assume that they possess divine attributes. In fact, therefore, the saints are the gods whom the people worship, whom they trust, and who are the objects of the religious affections.
The polytheism of the Church of Rome is in many respects analogous to that of heathen Rome. In both cases we find gods many and lords many. In both cases either imaginary beings are the objects of worship, or imaginary powers and attributes are ascribed to them. In both cases, also, the homage rendered, the blessings sought, the prerogatives attributed to the objects of worship and the affections exercised toward them, involve the assumption that they are truly divine. In both cases the hearts of the people, their confidence and hopes, are turned from the Creator to the creature. There is indeed, however, this great difference between the two cases. The objects of heathen worship were unholy; the objects of worship in the Church of Rome are regarded as ideals of holiness. This, in one view, makes an immense difference. But the idolatry is in either case the same. For idolatry consists in paying creatures the homage due to God.
Mariolatry
The mother of our Lord is regarded by all Christians as "blessed," as "the most highly favoured of women." No member of the fallen family of man has had such an honour as she received in being the mother of the Saviour of the world. The reverence due to her as one thus highly favoured of God, and as one whose heart was pierced through with many sorrows, led the way to her being regarded as the ideal of all female grace and excellence, and gradually to her being made the object of divine honours, as the Church lost more and more of its spirituality.
The deification of the Virgin Mary in the Church of Rome was a slow process. The first step was the assertion of her perpetual virginity. This was early taken and generally conceded. The second step was the assertion that the birth, as well as the conception of our Lord, was supernatural. The third was the solemn, authoritative decision
by the ecumenical council of Ephesus, A.D. 481, that the Virgin Mary was the "Mother of God." On this decision it may be remarked, (a.) That it was rendered rather as a vindication of the divinity of Christ, than as an exaltation of the glory of the Blessed Virgin. It had its origin in the Nestorian controversy. Nestorius was accused of teaching that the Logos only inhabited the man Jesus, whence it was inferred that he held that the person born of the Virgin was simply human. It was to emphasize the assertion that the "person" thus born was truly divine that the orthodox insisted that the Virgin should be called the Mother of God. (b.) There is a sense in which the designation is proper and according to the analogy of Scripture. The Virgin was the Mother of Christ; Christ is God manifest in the flesh: therefore she was the Mother of God. The infant Saviour was a divine person. Christians do not hesitate to say that God purchased his Church with his own blood. According to the usage of Scripture, the person of Christ may be designated from one nature, when the predicate belongs to the other. He may be called the Son of man when we speak of his filling immensity; and He may be called God when we speak of his being born. (c.) Nevertheless, although the designation be in itself justifiable, in the state of feeling which then pervaded the Church, the decision of the Council tended to increase the superstitious reverence for the Virgin. It was considered by the common people as tantamount to a declaration of divinity. The members of the Council were escorted from their place of meeting by a multitude bearing torches, preceded by women bearing censers filled with burning incense. In combating the assumed Nestorian doctrine of two persons in Christ, there was a strong tendency to the opposite, to the doctrine of Eutyches, who held that there was in our Lord but one nature. According to this view the Virgin might be regarded as the Mother of God in the same sense that any ordinary mother is the parent of her child. However it may be accounted for, the fact is that the decision of the Council of Ephesus marks a distinct epoch in the progress of the deification of the Virgin.
The fourth step soon followed in the dedication to her honour of numerous churches, shrines, and festivals; and in the introduction of
solemn offices designed for public and private worship in which she was solemnly invoked. No limit was placed to the titles of honour by which she was addressed or to the prerogatives and powers which were attributed to her. She was declared to be deificata. She was called the Queen of heaven, Queen of queens; said to be exalted above all principalities and powers; to be seated at the right hand of Christ, to share with Him in the universal and absolute power committed to his hands. All the blessings of salvation were sought at her hands, as well as protection from all enemies, and deliverance from all evils. Prayers, hymns, and doxologies were allowed and prescribed to be addressed to her. The whole Psalter has been transformed into a book of praise and confession to the Mother of Christ. What in the Bible is said to God and of God, is in this book addressed to the Virgin. In the First Psalm, for example, it is said, "Blessed is the man who walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly," etc. In the Psalter of the Virgin it reads, "Blessed is the man who loveth thy name, O Virgin Mary; thy grace shall comfort his soul. As a tree irrigated by fountains of water, he shall bring forth the richest fruits of righteousness." In the second Psalm the prayer is directed to the Virgin: "Protect us with thy right hand, O Mother of God," etc. Ps. 9, "I will confess to Thee, O Lady (Domina); I will declare among the people thy praise and glory. To thee belong glory, thanksgiving, and the voice of praise." Ps. 15, "Preserve me, O Lady, for I have hoped in thee." Ps. 17, "I will love thee O Queen of heaven and earth, and will glorify thy name among the Gentiles." Ps. 18, "The heavens declare thy glory, O Virgin Mary; the fragrance of thy ointments is dispersed among all nations." Ps. 41, "As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul for thy love, O Holy Virgin." And so on to the end. The Virgin is throughout addressed as the Psalmist addressed God; and the blessings which he sought from God, the Romanist is taught to seek from her.