There are some who think that the Christian religion ought
Faith and Reason
4. On Faith in Things Unseen
There are some who think that the Christian religion ought to be ridiculed rather than upheld. The reason for this is that in it, not the thing which may be seen is set forth, but faith in things which are not seen is imposed upon men. For the sake of refuting those who, prudent in their own opinion, seem to be opposed to believing what they cannot see, we surely have not the power to present to the eyes of men the divine truths which we believe. Yet, we do show the minds of men that even those things which are not seen ought to be believed. Now, as regards those whom folly has made so servile to the eyes of the body that they do not think they ought to believe anything which they do not perceive through those eyes, they ought, in the first place, to be reminded of how many things there are which cannot be seen with such eyes — things which they not only believe, but also actually know.
These things are innumerable in our mind itself, whose nature is invisible — to say nothing of other things, like the very faith by which we believe, or the thought process by which we know either that we believe something or that we do not believe it, although it may be entirely outside the realm of those eyes. What is there so bare, so clear, what so certain to the interior vision of our minds? How, therefore, must we not believe what we do not see with our bodily eyes, when we perceive beyond any doubt either that we believe or do not believe where we cannot employ the eyes of the body?
But, they say, we have no need to learn through the eyes of the body those things which are in the mind, since by the mind itself we can perceive them. Moreover, what you say we should believe you neither show us exteriorly, that we may acquire knowledge of them through our bodily eyes, nor are they within the mind, that we may perceive them by thought. It is, they say, just as if a man were ordered to believe, if only he could see the object of belief presented before him. Therefore, surely we ought to believe some temporal things also, which we do not see, that we may also deserve to see the eternal things which we believe.
But, whoever you are who will not believe except what you see, with your bodily eyes you surely see bodies present to you; your affections and thoughts present to you, because they are in your own mind, you see with that mind.
Tell me, I ask you, with what eyes do you see your friend's will toward you? For, no will can be seen with bodily eyes. Or, indeed, do you also see in your mind that which is taking place in the mind of another? But, if you do not see it, how do you, on your part, requite his loving kindness, if you do not believe what you cannot see? Or, perhaps you will say that you see the will of another through his deeds? Then you will see acts and hear words, but of your friend's will you will believe that which cannot be seen or heard. The will is not color or figure that may be impressed upon the eyes; nor is it a sound or formula that may strike upon the ears; nor, indeed, is it yours to be felt by the affection of your heart. It follows, therefore, that, although it is not seen or heard or grasped inwardly by you, it is believed. Otherwise, your life would be left barren of any friendship, or love bestowed upon you would not be paid back by you in turn.
What, then, becomes of that statement of yours that you ought to believe only what you see either exteriorly with the body or interiorly with the mind? Lo, verily, out of your heart you believe in a heart that is not yours, and you place faith where you do not focus the glance of either your body or your mind. You discern your friend's countenance by means of your body; you discern your faith by means of your mind; but your friend's faith is not appreciated by you, unless there is in you a reciprocating faith, by which you may believe what you do not see in him. It certainly is possible, too, for a man to deceive by feigning kindness and by cloaking malice. He even may not plan to do harm — still, by expecting some advantage from you, he simulates love because he does not possess it.
But, you say that you believe in a friend whose heart you cannot see because you have tested him in your trials and learned of what mind he was toward you in your dangers when he did not fail you. Does it seem to you, then, that we ought to desire affliction so that the love of our friends toward us may be proved? For, no one will be happy with the surest of friends unless through adversity he has been unhappy; so that, indeed, he may not enjoy the love of another by experience unless he is tortured with grief and fear. And how is it possible, then, for the sake of having true friends, to desire such happiness, which only unhappiness can prove, and not, rather, to fear it? It is true that we can have a friend even in prosperity, but he is proved more surely in adversity. Chapter 1
But, surelv, to prove your friend you would not submit yourself to your dangers if you did not believe. And since you thus submit yourself that you may prove him, you believe before you prove. Certainly, if we ought not to believe in things not seen, we still believe in the hearts of friends though these hearts be not yet truly tried; when we have proved them as good by our misfortunes, we still believe their kindness toward us rather than see it. It is only because our faith is so great that we decide, not inconsistently, that we see with its eyes, as it were, what we believe, since we ought to believe for this reason that we cannot see.
If this faith in human affairs is removed, who will not mark how great will be their disorder and what dreadful confusion will follow? For, who will be cherished by anyone in mutual charity, since love itself is invisible, if what I do not see I ought not to believe? Friendship, then, will wholly perish, since it rests upon nothing more than mutual love. What of this will one be able to receive from another, if it shall be believed that nothing of it can be shown? Furthermore, when friendship perishes, neither the bonds of marriage nor of relationship and affinity will be retained in the mind, because in these, also, there surely is a friendly spirit of harmony. Then a husband and wife will not be able to have mutual affection, since they do not believe that there is any love, inasmuch as love cannot be seen. Nor will they desire to have children, for they do not believe that the children will return their love. And, if the children should be born and grow up, the parents themselves will love their own much less, and they will not see love for themselves in their children's hearts because love is invisible — if things unseen are believed, not by praiseworthy faith but by blameworthy rashness.
What shall I say, now, of the other relationships — of brothers, sisters, sons-in-law, fathers-in-law, and of those joined by any sort of blood-relationship or affinity — if charity is uncertain and good will suspected; both the will of parents by their children and the children's feelings, likewise, by their parents; and if due kindness is not rendered, because it is not thought to be due, since that which is not seen in another is believed not to exist? Furthermore, this caution is not appropriate, but rather odious, when we do not believe that we are loved because we do not see the love of those who love us, and when we, on our part, do not return love to others because we think we do not owe them mutual love. To such a degree are human affairs disturbed, if we should not believe what we do not see, that they would be completely overturned if we should refuse belief to all the inner dispositions of men which we cannot see with certainty.
I will not mention how much those, who rebuke us for believing what we do not see, themselves believe of rumor, or history, or about places where they themselves have never been; nor how in these instances they do not say: "We do not believe because we have not seen." Because, if they say this, they are compelled to admit that they are uncertain about their own parents. For, even on this point they have believed by reports of others— who, in turn, are unable to demonstrate the fact because the event is already in the past. Men retain no consciousness of that time, and yet, without any hesitation they give agreement to what others say about it. Yet, if this should not be done, a faith-