Selected Writings
And as this vision is greatly hindered by those fancies which are originated by the carnal sense, and are retained and modified by the imagination, let us abhor this heresy which has been left by faith in its fancies to represent the divine substance as extended and diffused through space, even though infinite space, and to cut short one side so as to make room for evil — not being able to perceive that evil is no nature, but against nature; and to beautify this very evil with such visible appearance and forms and consistency of parts prevailing in its several natures, not being able to conceive of any nature without those good things, that the evils found fault with in it are buried under a countless abundance of good things. Chapter 43 (49)
2. The Free Choice of the Will, Book I
EVODIUS. Tell me, I ask, whether God is the author of evil?
AUGUSTINE. If you make it clear about what evil you are inquiring I will tell you. For we speak of evil with a twofold meaning — one when we say that someone has done badly, the other when one suffers some evil.
E. I want to know about both (kinds of evil). A. But, if you know or if you believe that God is good, and it is not right to believe otherwise, then God does no evil. Again, if we acknowledge that God is just, for to deny that is wrong too, then by consequence He rewards the good as He punishes the wicked. These punishments surely are bad for those who suffer them. Wherefore, if no one endures penalties unjustly, which we must believe because we believe that this universe is ruled by divine providence, it follows that God is in no way the author of that former kind of evil. Of this second kind He is the author.
Good and Evil
E. Is there then another, the author of this evil, of which God is found not to be the author?
A. There is assuredly. For without an author evil could not exist. But if you ask who that one is, it can not be stated, because it is not some one individual. For anyone who is bad is the author of his own evil doing. If you are not sure on this point, then mark what was said above — that evil deeds are punished by God's justice. Indeed they would not be punished justly unless there were the will to do them.
E. I know not whether any one can sin who has not learned to sin. But if this be true, then who is that from whom we have learned to sin, I ask?
A. Do you esteem learning to be something good? E. Who can dare to say that learning is something bad? A. What if it is neither good nor bad? E. To me it seems good. A. Well, indeed; that is, if knowledge is given by learning, or if knowledge is awakened; and truly no one learns anything but by learning, or think you not so?
E. I think that by learning, good things only are learned. A. See, therefore, whether evil things are not learned: for learning has its origin from the verb to learn.
E. Whence, therefore, are evil things done by men, if they are not learned?
A. Perhaps it is from this that man turns himself away from learning, that is, estranges himself from the fact of learning. But whether this or something else be true, this surely is evident — that learning is good, and because it is derived from the verb to learn, evil things can not be learned. For, if they are learned, they are contained in learning, and consequently learning will be not good: but learning, as you grant, is good, therefore evil things are not learned; and it is to no purpose that you ask who that is from whom we learn to do badly. Or, if evil things are learned, then they are learned to be avoided, not to be done. Whence it follows that to do evil is nothing other than to wander away from learning.
E. I think strongly that teachings are two; one by which we learn to do right, another by which we learn to do wrong. But when you were asking whether learning is a good thing, the love of good itself took my attention, so that I looked at that learning which is of well doing, whence I answered that it is good. But now I am reminded that there is another learning, which beyond doubt I affirm to be evil, and it is for the author of that that I inquire.
A. Do you think, at any rate, that intelligence is a good thing?
E. So surely do I think intelligence to be good, that I can not see what in man is more excellent: and I would not say in any way that any understanding can be bad.
A. How then, if one does not understand when he is taught, can he seem to you to have learned?
E. No, not at all. A. If, therefore, all understanding is good, and no one learns who understands not, everyone who learns does well: for everyone who learns understands; and everyone who understands does well. Therefore whosoever inquires for the author by whom we learn anything, inquires surely for the author by whom we do well. Wherefore, make an end now to your wanting to investigate some unknown evil teacher. For, if he is evil, he is not a teacher: if he is a teacher, he is not evil. Chapter 1
E. Go ahead, now, since you force me to acknowledge that we learn not to do evil, tell me whence do we evil?
A. You touch upon that question now which stirred me strongly when I was a growing youth, which drove me, tired out, to associate with heretics [Manicheans] and threw me down. By which fall I was so hurt and buried by the piling up of silly fables, that, if the love of finding the truth had not obtained for me divine aid, I would have been unable to come out and to breathe the very first freedom of inquiry. And because action was taken with me perseveringly to free me from this question, I take action with you, following the same order by which I escaped. For God will be with us and He will make us understand what we have believed. For we are conscious truly that we hold the step prescribed by the prophet, who says: "Unless you believe you shall not understand." We believe then that all things that are, are from one God; and yet that God is not the author of sin. But it unsettles the soul that if sins come from the souls which God has created, and these souls are from God how to explain that sin is not borne back upon God.
E. Now you have stated clearly what is painful for me to think. You have stated just what has forced me and drawn me to this study.
A. Have a manful mind, and believe what you believe. For nothing better is believed, even though the reason why it is may be not evident. Indeed to have the very highest esteem of God is most truly the beginning of piety. And any one who believes Him not almighty and not absolutely changeless, does not esteem Him to be supreme: The Creator also of all good things, which He more excellent transcends; the Ruler also most just of all things that He has made — and made unaided by any nature in creating, as if He Himself v/ere not sufficient. Whence it follows that He created out of nothing. He did not however create from Himself, but conceived what is equal to Himself, Him whom we call the only Son of God, whom, when we endeavor to pronounce more clearly, we name the Power of God and the Wisdom of God by which He made out of nothing all things that are made. These things being established, God helping us, let us work for the understanding of that objective for which you are inquiring in this manner. Chapter 2
You ask definitely whence we do evil. We must discuss first what evil-doing is. On which point you now state what this appears to you to be. But if you can not express this altogether briefly in words, then, by recounting evil deeds in particular, make your judgment known to me.
E. Adultery, homicide, sacrilege, to omit other things for the recounting of which time and memory are wanting — what man is there to whom these things will not be seen to be evil deeds?
A. Tell me then first, think you that adultery is wrong because the law forbids it?
E. No, surely, it is not wrong because it is forbidden by law; but therefore is it forbidden by law because it is wrong.
A. What if someone were to oppose us, insisting upon the self-indulgence of adultery, and demanding why we judge this to be an evil worthy of condemnation? Think you that men eager not only to believe but also to understand must take refuge in the authority of the law? I believe indeed with you, and I believe most firmly, and I proclaim that it ought to be believed by all peoples and nations that adultery is evil. But we are endeavoring now to know also and to hold most firmly by understanding that which we have taken on trust. Think therefore as much as you can and tell me for what reason you know adultery to be wrong.
E. I know it to be evil because I would be unwilling to have it a fact verified in [the case of] my own wife. But whosoever does to another what he would not have done to himself, does evil.
A. What if the pleasure of someone is such that he offers his wife to another, and does this willingly, and is eager also to have the same license in regard to the wife of the other- — does such one seem to you to do no evil?
E. Aye, he does the worst. A. But by that rule he offends not, for he does not that which he would be unwilling to experience [from another]. Wherefore you must find another criterion by which to prove that adultery is bad.
E. To me it appears to be bad because I have seen men frequently convicted of this crime.
A. Why, have you not often seen men condemned for things rightly done? Not to send you afar to other books, look into history, recent now — that very history which excels by divine authority — how badly we must think of the apostles and of all the martyrs, if we are content to accept as a standard that condemnation is a sure proof of guilt, since they all were adjudged worthy of condemnation because of their confession — if, therefore, whatsoever is condemned is bad, it was bad at the time to believe in Christ and to confess the Faith itself. But if everything that is condemned is not bad, find some other reason by which you can show that adultery is bad.
E. I find no way to answer you. A. Perhaps therefore the desire in adultery is bad; but because you are searching for evil in the external act which can be seen, you experience difficulty. But in order that you may understand that the desire in adultery is evil, if it were verified that some one had not the opportunity of sinning with the wife of another, and yet it were made evident in some way that he desired to sin, and, if it were in his power, he would: he is not less guilty than if he were taken in the deed itself.
E. Nothing is more evident, and now I see that there is no need for a long explanation that I may be convinced about homicide and sacrilege and all sins whatsoever. For it is clear now that desire is dominant in every kind of evil doing. Chapter 3
A. Do you know what this desire is called by another name — yearning?
E. Yes, 1 know. A. Now, between this (yearning) and fear is there no difference, or think you that there is some difference?
E. Indeed, I judge that there is a very great difference between the two.
A. I believe that you so think for this reason, that yearning seeks for, fear flies from [its object]. E. So it is as you say. A. What if someone were to kill a man, therefore, not for the desire of acquiring something, but because he feared that some evil come to him, will that one not be a homicide?
E. He will, yes; but that deed is not therefore without the dominant factor of desire. For he who, fearing, kills a man desires certainly to live without fear.
A. And do you think that living without fear is a small good?
E. It is a great good. But by no means can it come to that murderer by this deed.
A. I am not asking what may come to him, but what he desires: For surely he who desires life free from fear desires a good; therefore that desiring is not to be blamed, otherwise we shall blame all lovers of good. By conser quence we must confess that there is the killing of a man in which that dominant note of a wrong desire is not found; and thus it will be untrue that in all sins the will must be dominant to make them bad: Either that, or there will be some killing of a man that may not be bad.
E. If the killing of a man is homicide, then that can be sometimes without sin. For when a soldier slays an enemy or, when a judge or the official of a judge puts a man to death; again, when a weapon comes from a hand with no will or purpose to kill, they seem to me not to sin when they kill a man.
A. I am agreed; but these are not usually called homicides. Answer, therefore, whether, when he who kills a master from whom he fears heavy punishments, you think such a one is to be classed among those who kill men so that they merit not the name of homicides.
E. I see a great difference here. For they either act according to law or they do nothing against the laws. But the deed of this latter no law approves.
A. Again you bring me back to authority. But you must remember that this problem is taken up by us now so that we may understand what we take on trust; but the laws we take on trust. This point, therefore, we must endeavor to understand, if, by any means, we can — whether the law which punishes such a deed, may not punish wrongly.
E. It does in no way punish wrongly, for it punishes him who knowing and willing slays a master, which none of the others does.
A. Do you not, then, remember that you said just a little time ago that in every evil deed the desire dominates, and by that it is evil?
E. I do remember surely. A. How, did you not grant also that he who desires to live without fear has not a wrong desire?
E. I remember that too. A. Since therefore the master is slain by the servant under such a desire, he is not slain by reason of that blameful desire. Wherefore we have not yet found why that deed is evil. For it is agreed between us that all evildoing is evil for this reason only that the desire is wrong, that is, the choosing is blameworthy.
E. This one seems to me now to be wrongly condemned, which indeed I would not dare to say if I had aught else to say.
A. Did you then prove to yourself only that this deed ought not to be punished before you considered whether this servant chose to be freed from the fear of his master in order to satisfy his own desires? The desire to live without fear is common indeed to all men, to good and to bad. But the difference is that good men direct their aims by turning their affections away from things which cannot be possessed without the fear of losing them: but the wrongminded, in order to rest with security on the enjoying of such things, endeavor to remove impediments, and therefore they live a life that is guilty and criminal, and rather to be called death than life.
E. I come back to sense; and I am very glad that now I understand clearly what that guilty yearning is, which is called Libido, which now appears to be the love of those things which one can lose notwithstanding his own will. Chapter 4
Well, let us therefore study now, if you will, to understand whether Libido dominates also in those things which we see too often done by way of superstition.
A. See whether this is not hurrying. For me the point to be considered first is whether an onrushing enemy or an assassin lying in wait may be killed with no wrongheaded desire (for the saving) of one's life, or for liberty or for purity.
E. How can I think that they act with no inordinate desire who fight for that which they can lose without desiring to lose it; or, if they cannot why go so far as the death of a man for that end?
A. Therefore the law is not just which grants the power to a wayfarer to kill a highway robber, so that he may not be killed (by the robber); or which grants to anyone, a man or woman to slay an assailant attacking, if he can, before he or she is harmed. The soldier also is commanded by law to slay the enemy, for which slaying, if he objects, he will pay the penalty by imperial order. Shall we then dare to say that these laws are unjust, or more, that they are not laws? For to me a law that is not just appears to be no law.
E. I see that the law is secured well enough from such a charge. Indeed the law grants leave for lesser evils among the people whom it governs, so that greater evils may not be done. For that he be slain who lays plans to take the life of another is less hard than the death of him who is defending his own life. And acting against the chaste life of a man in opposition to his own will is much more evidently wrong than the taking of the life of him who so does violence by that one against whom the violence is done. Then again the soldier in slaying the enemy is the agent of the law, wherefore he does his duty easily with no wrong aim or purpose. Moreover the law itself which is made for the purpose of protecting the people can be convicted of no wrong will. Because he who passed the law, if he passed it by God's order, that is, if it is what eternal justice commands, could so do free of all wrong-headed purpose. If, however, he made the statute with some wrong aim, it does not follow that obeying such a law must be qualified as wrongwilled: because a law can be made also by one who is not himself good. [Thus, if some one, for example, possessed of tyrannical law-making power, were to take money from one to whose advantage it is, to pass a statute that is lawful for one to take a woman by force, not even for marriage, it follows not that such a law is bad because he who made the law is unjust and bought out by money.] That law therefore, which for the protection of citizens orders foreign force to be repulsed by the same force, can be obeyed without a wrong desire: and this same can be said of all officials who by right and by order are subject to any powers. But I see not how these men, while not held guilty by law, can be without fault: for the law does not force them to kill, but leaves it in their power. It is free therefore for them to kill no one for those things which they can lose against their own will, which things therefore they ought not to love.
Concerning life indeed perhaps there may be a question as to whether life can by any means be taken away from the soul when this body is slain; but, if it can be taken, it must be of little worth; if it can not be taken then there is nothing to be feared.
Concerning chaste life then who doubts that chastity is fixed in the soul itself, for chastity is a virtue? Hence it can be taken away by no violent assailant. Whatsoever therefore that one who is slain was going to take away is not all in our power; wherefore I understand not how it is to be called our own. Wherefore again I do not blame the law which permits such aggressors to be slain: but by what reason I can defend those who slay them I do not see.
A. Much less can I see why you seek a defense for men whom no law holds to be guilty.
E. No law perhaps: but, that is, of laws which are apparent and which are read by men. But I know not whether they be held by some stronger and unseen law, that is, if there is nothing that is not governed by divine Providence. How indeed are they free of sin before Providence, who for those things which ought to be held of less worth are defiled by the killing of a man? It appears to me therefore that both that law which is written to rule the people permits these things rightly and that divine providence is vindicated. For this law of the people takes up those things to be sanctioned which are enough to maintain peace among men who are not trained in the laws, and so far as they can be controlled by man. But these faults have other fitting sanctions, from which it seems to me that Wisdom alone can exempt.
A. This, your distinction, though it be initial only and imperfect, yet searching things high, I approve and praise. This law indeed, which is made to govern citizens is seen by you as yielding many points and leaving them unpunished, which points yet are taken care of by divine
Providence, and rightly so. And the things which it does are not therefore to be covered with reproach, because it has left some things undone. Chapter 5
But let us examine, if you will, how far evildoing is to be punished by the law which governs people in this life. Then (we shall find) what remains to be punished by divine Providence, by order inevitable and not known by man.
E. I am willing if only we can reach the limits of a problem so hard, for I think that this is unlimited.
A. [Aye — attend, then, with all your mind and trusting in piety enter upon the way of reasoning. For nothing is so hard and difficult as not to be made, by God's assistance, very plain and clear. Depending upon Him, therefore and praying for help from Him, let us study what we have begun.] First, then, tell me whether this law promulgated in written form is helpful to men living this life?
E. It is evident that it is helpful, for of men peoples and city-states are built up.
A. What, then, are men and peoples of the same kind as things, that cannot pass away or be changed, but remain everlasting altogether; or are they subject to change and to time?
E. Who can doubt that this kind is changeable and subject to time?
A. Therefore if the people are well ordered and thoughtful, and if they are very watchful of the common weal, in which everyone values private interest as less worth than the common good, is not the law made rightly by which it is permitted to the people to establish civil officials by whom their own welfare, that is, the public welfare is carried on?
E. Yes, surely. A. If, furthermore, this same people, gradually spoiled, prefers private wealth to the public welfare, and holds voting for sale; and, bought over by those who love honors, were to hand over their own government into the hands of dishonored and shameless men: would it not be right again if some man of honor, who had the power were to take away from this people the power of conferring honors in order to bring them back to the right judgment of a few men of honor or even of one?
E. That too would be right. A. Since therefore these two laws appear so to be opposed to each other that one gives the power of granting honors to the people, the other takes away that power; and since this second is so constituted that both can by no means be in force simultaneously in the same state, shall we say that one of them is iniquitous and should never have been made?
E. By no means. A. Shall we therefore call that law temporary, which, though it is just, may yet be changed justly in the course o\ time?
E. So we may call it. A. How then — that law which is named supreme reason, which must always be obeyed, bv which bad men merit an unhappy, good men merit a happy life, by which, moreover, that law which we have called temporary is rightly made and is rightlv changed — can that law be seen to anyone understanding it, not to be changeless and eternal? Or can it be wrong at any time that the bad be unhappy, the good be happy; or that a well ordered and decent people organize a government for itself (fitting its own character), that a dissolute and wicked people should not have that power (to turn license into statute law)?
E. I see that that law is eternal and changeless. A. I judge that you see also by consequence that there is nothing in this temporary law just and lawful that men have not derived from this eternal law. For if this people at one time granted honors in accord with justice, at another time also in accord with justice granted them not, this change is derived from that everlasting law, by which it is right for a well ordered people to grant honors; for a fickle populace not to grant them, or do you see it otherwise?
E. I am agreed. A. In order, therefore, that I may explain briefly, so far as I can by means of words, a notion of the eternal law which is impressed upon us — it is that law by which it is just that all things be most perfectly in order. If you think otherwise, speak out.
E. I have nothing to say against you speaking things true.
A. Since therefore this law is one, from which all temporary laws to rule men are made various, can it (the eternal law) be in any way made to vary?
E. I understand that it can not at all be changed. Indeed not any force nor any chance nor fault of things could ever be the cause so that it would not be just in the highest degree that all things be in order most perfect. Chapter 6
A. Let us see then how man himself, in himself, is in order most perfect — for a people is made up of men united under one law: which law, as has been said, is temporary. Tell me now whether you are very sure that you are living.
E. What more certain? — I would answer. A. How, then — can you know this, that to live is one thing, to know that one lives is another thing?
E. I know indeed that no one but one living knows that he lives. But whether every one living knows that he lives I do not know.
A. How I would wish that, as you believe, so also you could know that brute animals are without reason; quickly then could our conversation pass on from this question. But, because you say that you do not know, you enter upon a long explanation. And of such a quality is this point, so close the connection of reason, as I perceive the need of it to be, that we are not permitted, passing over this point, to go on to reach the things which we want to prove. Tell me then, since we have often seen animals tamed by men, that is, not the body of the beast only, but the soul too so subject to man that it serves his will by a certain sense and habit; whether it seems to you possible at all that any beast, great in its beastliness or in body, or even in a sense very shrewd, could try in turn to make a man subordinate to itself, since many beasts have the power by strength or by stealthy attack to destroy the body of the man.
E. By no means do I perceive how that can be done. A. Well, truly. But tell me also, since it is evident that man is easily outdone by many of the brute animals in point of strength and other energies of the body, what thing is it in which man excels, so that no one of the beasts has command over him, while he has command over many of them? Is it perhaps that which we are wont to call reason or intelligence?
E. I find not other. For that by reason of which we are ranked ahead of brute animals is in the soul. If the animals were soulless then I might say that we are more excellent because we have a soul. But now, since they are animated, what better than reason can I name, that is not inherent in them, by reason of which they are subordinate to us; and which in us is inherent, so that we rank above them. . . what other more rightly can I name than reason?
A. See how easily, God helping, that is done which men think to be very difficult. For I confess to you this question is solved as I understand it, which I had thought would hold us as long perhaps as all the points discussed from the beginning of our disputation. Wherefore take now (this point) so that reasons following may be connected — for I believe that you are not ignorant of the fact that that which we say we know is not other than what we have perceived by reason.
E. So it is.
A. He, therefore, who knows that he lives, is not without reason.
E. That is logical. A. But the brute animals live: and as has been seen, they have no reason.
E. That is evident.
A. See that you know, therefore, what you had answered that you do not know — whether everything that lives knows that it lives; though everything that knows itself to be living must by consequence live.
E. There is no doubt to me now (on this point). Go on now to the point that you are proving: For I have learned well enough that it is one thing to live, quite another to know that one is living.
A. Which, then, of these two appears to you to be the more excellent?
E. Which think you, but the knowing of life? A. Is the knowing of life seen to you as being better than life itself? Or do you understand perhaps that a certain higher and a more true life is knowing, which no one can know but he who understands? What then is understanding, but to live in a manner more enlightened and more perfect by the light of the mind itself? Wherefore, if I am not wrong, you have set forth, not something other than life, but a nobler life (that is proper to) a certain kind of life.
E. Very well indeed have you understood and explained my judgment: if that is knowledge, then (knowing) can never be evil.
A. By no means, I judge (can knowing be evil), unless in a figurative use, we speak of knowing as experience. For to experience is not always good, as to experience punishment: But how can that which is properly and distinctly named knowing be bad because it is acquired by reason and by intelligence?
E. I hold that difference too. Proceed to the other points. Chapter 7
A. This is what I wish to say: Whatever that is by which man ranks before the brute animals, whether it is called mind or spirit, or more rightly both (for we find both in the Sacred Scriptures), if by reason of that man is lord and ruler over other things, then is it established (by that same reason) that he is in the most fittingly man. For we see that we have many points in common, not only with brute animals but with trees and growing plants. Indeed we see that it is given to the trees also to assimilate nourishments of the body, to grow, to generate, to be strong — trees which are counted on the lowest plane of life. But the brute animals, we perceive and know, can see and hear; and in smell and taste and touch they have organic faculties generally more keen than we have. Add strength and the force and firmness of limbs, swiftness and great ease in the movement of the body, in all which things we are superior to some of them, to some we are equal, by some others we are outdone.
This kind of qualities yet surely is common to us with the beasts. Indeed to seek the delights of the body, to avoid what is hurtful is the whole action of brute animal life. Other certain things there are which seem not to belong to brute animals, and even in man they are not the highest points, as to joke and to laugh. Which point (of jesting and laughing) whosoever judges rightly of human nature, judges indeed that it is properly human, but on a very low plane. Then again the love of praise and display and the show of mastery, which things though not proper to brute animals, are yet not things by the desire of which we are to be judged superior to the brutes. For this desire, when it is not subordinate to reason, makes men unhappy. But no one has thought that he is to be ranked ahead of any one by reason of unhappiness. When reason is master in these movements of the soul therefore a man is to be said to be well ordered. For, where things higher are subordinate to things lower, there right order is not to be named, or even there is no order at all: or is that not clear to you?
E. It is clear. A. When this reason, therefore, or this mind, or spirit, rules the unreasonable motions of the soul, then is that master in man, to which mastery is due by that law which we found to be eternal.
E. I understand and I follow. Chapter 8
A. When therefore a man is so constituted and so ordered, does he not appear to you to be wise?
E. I know not what other man can be seen to me to be wise, if this one is not so seen.
A. I believe that you know this too, that men generally are unwise.
E. That too is established well enough. A. But if the unwise man is the opposite to wise, since we have found the wise man, you understand now logically also who is unwise.
E. To whom is it not evident that it is that one in whom mind does not have (exercise) power in the highest degree?
A. What, therefore, are we to say when a man is so qualified, that mind is wanting to him, or, though the mind be there, that it wants mastery?
E. That rather which you said last. A. I would like very much to hear from you by what evidences you hold it proved that mind inherent in man does not exercise its dominion.
E. I would that you had the will to do those parts. For it is not easy for me to bear up what you are bringing out.
A. This at least is easy for you, to remember what you said a little time ago: how animals are tamed by men and serve them: which, in turn, men might suffer from the animals, as reason showed, if, in something, men were not of a higher order. But this something we found not in the body: since it appeared, then, to be in the soul we found not anything that it could be called other than reason, which we found later to be called also mind and spirit. But, if reason is one thing, mind another, it is evident surely that only mind can use reason; from which this is proved — that he who has reason can not be without a mind.
E. These things I remember well and hold them. A. How, then. Do you believe this — that the masters of brute animals can be other than wise? For I call them wise whom truth orders so to be called, that is, those who have laid the risings of lust by the reign of the mind.
E. It is amusing to think those men such, whom commonly men call caretakers of animals, or even shepherds or herdsmen or horsemen, to whom all we see the animal subject, and by whose industry, untamed, it is made subject. A. You, have, therefore, a very strong proof by which it is made clear that mind is inherent to man without (Complete) control. It is inherent in men because they do things such as cannot be done without mind. Yet mind reigns not (absolutely), for they are unwise; and it has been acknowledged before that the reign of the mind can belong only to the wise.
E. It is puzzling how this was established by us in earlier arguments, and yet it did not come to mind to me how to answer. Chapter 9
But let us now connect other points. It is proved indeed that the reign of the human mind is human wisdom; and also that it does not always reign.
A. Do you think that there is a desire stronger than that mind, to which, we acknowledge it, it was given by the eternal law to rule over desires? I indeed think not so at all. And it would not be in perfect order that powers less strong have command over the stronger. Wherefore, I think it must follow that mind is more powerful than desire from the very fact that it rules over desire rightly and justly.
E. I think so too.
A. Why, then, do we hesitate to prefer every virtue to every vice, so that virtue, as it is more noble and higher, may be also more firm and unconquered?
E. Who would hesitate? A. Therefore no vicious soul overcomes a soul armed by virtue.
E. Very true. A. I think, now, that you will not deny that any soul whatsoever is more noble and more powerful than every body.
E. No one denies that, who sees (which is easy) that a substance living is to be preferred to the non-living; or that what gives life (is preferred) to that which receives it.
A. Much less, therefore, does a body, of what quality soever it is, overcome a soul endowed by virtue.
E. That is very evident. A. How this, now: Can a soul that is just and a mind that keeps its own empire, ever force from its citadel and subordinate to its own desire another mind, ruled by reason of equal equity and equal virtue?
E. Not at all: and that, not only because the excellence in each is the same, but also because the former (aggressor) will fall from justice, and will become a vicious mind from the very fact that it endeavors to make the other fall, and it (the aggressor) will be, by consequence, less strong.
A. You understand well. Wherefore this remains for you to answer, if you can, whether it appears to you that there is anything more noble than a rational and wise mind.
E. Nothing, I think, but God. A. That too is my judgment. But, because the problem is hard and it is not now asked pointedly so that it may come to understanding, though it is held by firmest faith, let us make a careful and accurate study of the whole question. Chapter 10
For the present, then, we can be certain that whatever that nature is, which by right excels superior to the mind that is strong in virtue, it can in no way be unjust. Wherefore, even though it have the power, it will not force the mind to be subservient to desire.
E. There is no one surely that will not acknowledge that without hesitancy.
A. It follows, then, that it is on account of justice, that that thing, which is either equal to, or superior to a mind, whatever it is, does not make the mind subservient to desire: but what is inferior can not do so on account of weakness. Now, from the points which we agreed upon before, it follows that no other thing can make the mind to be a companion of desire but its own will and free choice.
E. I see that nothing follows more logically. A. It remains to be made clear to you that it is in accordance with justice that it (the will) pays penalties for a sin so great.
E. I cannot oppose. A. How then — is that penalty to be considered light where cupidity is made dominant, where it drags down the mind spoiled of its wealth of virtue, poor and needy, drawn in different ways, now approving as true things unreal, now even defending them; again rejecting what it had approved, and let rushing in upon other things not less untrue; now refusing assent and fearful generally of the clearest reasonings, again despairing of a complete finding of the truth and clinging closely to the obscurities of (some) folly: now struggling for the light of understanding and again falling back in defeat — while in the meantime that tyrannic reign of cupidity holds sway, and, by fear on the one hand, desire on the other, keeps the soul of man and his whole life tossed restless in varying and contradictory moods, here by anxiety, there by empty and unreal delights: here by the dread of losing something that is loved, there by eagerness of acquiring what is not possessed, here by the pain of some injury done, there by the urge of a wrong to be avenged: on every side the greed to gather in, extravagance to waste, ambition to promise, pride to puff up, envy to annoy, sloth to cover over, wilfulness to wrangle, submissiveness to wrong, and what things else soever that are (the subject) of common experience in this reign of cupidity — can I believe then that this is not a penalty, which, as you see, all who cling not to wisdom, must endure?
E. A great penalty indeed do I judge this to be and very just, if one established on the high plane of wisdom should choose to descend from it to serve a (lower) desire. But whether anyone can be found who would so will (to descend), or does so will is not proved. For, though I believe that man was constituted by God so perfect, and placed in a state of happy life, that he fell by his own will to the hardships of (this) mortal life; yet while I hold this in firmest faith, I am not yet established in the understanding of it. On which point, if you think that a diligent study is for the present to be put off, you do so against my will. Chapter 11
But what puzzles me most of all is why we suffer these very severe penalties, we, who surely are unwise, who never have been wise, so that we may not be said to have surrendered the stronghold of virtue to choose the servitude of desires, and therefore suffer these things — this I am not willing to have put off for another time, if you have the ability by reasoning to clear the obscurity.
A. You say this as though you had it clearly proved that we never were wise. You mark the time indeed since we were born into this life. But because wisdom belongs to the soul there is a question of importance whether the soul, before its union with the body, may have lived another kind of life, or whether at any time it lived wisely. That is an unsolved problem, and must be studied in its own proper place. Yet that which we have in hand is not out of the way therefore, so that it may be cleared up so far as is possible.
I ask you then: Have we any will? E. I do not know. A. Do you want to know? E. That too I know not. A. Then ask me nothing more. E. Why? A. Because I ought not to give an answer, unless you have the will to know what you ask. Then again, unless you have a will to arrive at knowing, speaking to you about such things is out of order. Finally, unless you have a will that it be well with me, you cannot be my friend. Again surely, in reference to yourself, you must have seen that there is a will to be happy.
E. I confess: It can not be denied that we have a will. Go ahead now, let us see what you can make of it.
A. I will: but, again, tell me whether you think that you have a good will.
E. What is a good will? A. A will by which we aim to live rightly and honestly, and thus come to supreme wisdom. See now whether you aim not to have a right and honest life. Either will strongly not to know, or dare to deny (therefore) that, when we will these things, we have not a good will.
E. I deny nothing of these, and therefore I confess not only that I have a will, but that I have a good will.
A. At what worth, I ask, do you prize this will? Do you judge, from any side, that wealth or honors or the delights of the body, or these all together are to be compared to it?
E. God forbid such wrong-minded madness. A. Ought it not therefore to be a subject of joy not a little that we have in the soul something, that very good will, I say, in comparison with which the things we have named are worthless — things for the acquiring of which we see many men refusing no labors, no perils (of life)?
E. It is a subject of joy, and very great joy. A. How: They who experience not this joy, think you that they suffer a small loss of so great a good?
E. Aye — they suffer a very great loss. A. You see therefore, as I think, that it is fixed in our will that we may either enjoy or we may want this one good so great and so real. For what is so fixed in the will as the will itself so ordered? Which, he who has (his will) so rightly ordered, has that surely which is to be ranked before all earthly rule and all the delights of the body. But who has not this right ordered will has not, by consequence, that one thing, which, higher than all others within our power, the will alone by itself can give. While therefore one may think himself to be very unhappy if he lose a fair name, great wealth and goods of the body; will you not hold him to be most unhappy, who, even though he abound in such things; which, while he clings to them, he may yet easily lose, and which he has not at the command of his will, yet wants a good will — the will which can not be acquired by these (material) means, the will which is a great good, which needs only to be willed in order to possess it?
E. Very true. A. Rightly, therefore, and justly are men unwise, even though they never were wise (for that point is still uncertain and unproved), affected by this unhappiness. E. I am agreed. Chapter 12
A. Consider now whether Prudence appears to you to be a knowledge of things to be sought and things to be avoided.
E. It appears so. A. How — is fortitude not that quality of soul by reason of which we bear hardships and all the losses of things not subject to our control?
E. So I think.
A. Moreover temperance is the (efficient) quality that checks and controls the impulse for those things that are wrongly sought — or think you otherwise?
E. Indeed, you speak just so as I think. A. Now, what shall we say that Justice is, but a virtue by which all things are returned to their own?
E. To me there is no other notion of Justice. A. Whoever, therefore, having a good will, about the excellence of which we are talking now a long time, must in affection embrace this sole (Justice), than which he holds nothing more excellent, in this he must find pleasure, in this, finally, must be his delight and joy — considering this (Justice) and discerning its grandeur, and how it can not, against his own will, be forced or stolen from him, can we doubt that such a man is opposed to all things that are inimical to this one good (justice)?
E. It must follow logically that he is so opposed. A. Shall we not hold him to be guided by prudence who sees that this good is to be sought and that things not consonant with it are to be shunned?
E. No one, it appears to me, can do this without prudence.
A. Right — but why not attribute to him fortitude also? For he may not love and esteem of very high worth all those things which are not within range of our power.
(Such things) indeed are held dear by a wrong will, which wrong will he must resist as being hostile to his highest good. But because he loves not these things the loss of them grieves him not, and very truly he spurns them; for which, it has been said and granted, fortitude is necessary.
E. Let us grant (fortitude) then surely: for I see not how I can more truly call one strong than that one who bears in tranquil and self-controlled spirit the lack of those things, to acquire which or to hold which there is not in us the power fixed (by nature), which it is found that he must have.
A. See now whether we can take away from him temperance, since that is the virtue which controls desires. What indeed is so inconsistent with a good will as (uncontrolled) desire? From which you understand that logically this lover of his own good will, by all means, resists and controls desires, and therefore that he is rightly called temperate.
E. Go ahead — I am agreed. A. There remains justice, which, as I see, can not be wanting to this man (of good will). For he who has a good will and loves it, and, as has been seen, stands against those things which are harmful to a good will, can have ill will to no one. It follows therefore that he does injury to no one; which he only can do who gives to each one his, her, or its own. But that, I would say, belongs to Justice, as I think you recall, you have proved.
E. I recall truly — and I confess that in that man who values his own good will of great worth and loves it, all these four virtues described by you just now (I agreeing with you), are found.
A. What, then, prevents our granting that the life of this one is praiseworthy?
E. Nothing whatever. Even more — all (reasonings) approve, or, still more, compel us to grant this. A. How now — Can you think in any way that an unhappy life is not to be avoided? E. So indeed do I judge consistently, and I think nothing is more to be done.
A. But you think then that a fitting happiness is not to be shunned.
E. Even more, I hold that it is to be sought perseveringly.
A. The life, therefore, that is praiseworthy is not unhappy.
E. That follows, yes. A. It is not difficult for you now, as I think, therefore, to be agreed to what follows — that that life, namely, is happy, which is not unhappy.
E. That is evident.
A. It is agreed then that that man is happy who is a lover of his own good will; and who spurns, as compared to it (the will) whatever else is said to be good, the loss of which can happen, even while the will to hold it remains.
E. Why not be agreed there where the points we granted above necessarily converge?
A. You understand well, but tell me now, is not the fact of loving one's own good will, and of esteeming it of high worth, as has been stated, itself too a good will?
E. You speak true. A. But, if we judge that man (described) above to be happy, do we not judge him rightly to be unhappy who is of an opposite will?
E. Most justly so. A. What is the cause therefore for thinking (even though we never before were wise) that there should be any doubt that it is by will that we live and merit a worthy and happy life, by will we live and deserve a life that is disgraceful and unhappy?
E. I confess that we have reached this point by way of realities (principles) which are certain and not at all to be denied.
A. See again another point: For I believe you hold in memory what we declared to be a good will — that, I think, was said to be a good will, by which we endeavor to live justly and honestly.
E. So I remember. A. If then we love that good will we embrace it also by a good will, and we rank its worth before all things that we can not retain just because we have the will to retain. By consequence, those virtues, as reason taught, dwell in our soul, to have which (virtues) is itself right and honest living. From which it is established that whosoever has the will to live rightly and honestly, if he has the will to will this rather than the will for fleeting goods, he attains a reality so great, with such ease, that having what he has willed is nothing other for him than the fact itself to will.
E. Truly, I declare to you, I hardly restrain myself from shouting in delight by reason of (this) good so great raised up for me suddenly and founded on a fact so easy — (to will).
A. But this joy itself, which springs from the attaining of this good, when it lifts up the soul peacefully, quietly and consistently, is itself said to be happy life; unless you think that living happily is other than rejoicing in goods true and certain.
E. I think so. Chapter 13
A. Rightly — but think you not that every man by all means wills and desires a happy life?
E. Who doubts that every man (so) wills? A. Why then do not all men attain it? For we had stated and it was agreed between us that by the will men merit a happy life, by the will also (they deserve) an unhappy life; and what they so merit that they get (the object willed). But now a conflict (I know not what) has risen, and, unless we watch carefully, it proceeds to unsettle our reasoning above so cautious and so solid. For how does any one suffer an unhappy life by reason of his will, since no one at all wills to live unhappily? Or how does man acquire a happy life by means of will, since so many are unhappy, and all have the will to be happy? Does it perhaps come from this that it is one thing to will rightly, or to will wrongly; quite another thing to merit something by a good will, or a bad will? For they who are happy (who, it follows, must be good) are not therefore happy because they willed to live happily, for that the wicked also willed; but they are happy because they willed to live rightly, which the wicked did not will. Wherefore it is not a wonder that unhappy men. obtain not what they will, that is, a happy life. For they will not that which is concomitant with a happy life, without which no one is worthy of a happy life, without which no one attains it, that is, right living. For this that eternal law, to the study of which it is now time to return, has made firm by changeless stability, so that there is merit in the will, but in happiness and in unhappiness are reward and punishment. Therefore when we say that men are unhappy by reason of will, we say not that they will to be unhappy, but that they are in that will where unhappiness must follow, even though they be unwilling. Wherefore it is not inconsistent with the reasoning above: that all men will to be happy, and yet (some) cannot (be happy) : because they will not live rightly, to which fact alone a happy life is due: unless you have something to say against these points.
E. I indeed have nothing to oppose. Chapter 14
E. But let us see how these points are related to the question above about two laws.
A. Very well — but tell me first whether he who loves to live rightly, and who is so delighted by right living that it is not only right for him, but sweet and delightful — tell me whether that man loves this law and holds it very dear — the law, that is, by which a happy life is given to a good will, unhappiness to a bad will?
E. He loves it surely and strongly; for it is following that law that he so lives.
A. Now, when he loves that law does he love something changeable and temporal, or something constant and everlasting?
E. Something everlasting surely and changeless. A. How this — can they, who persevering in a wrong will, are yet eager to be happy, love that law by which unhappiness is deservedly the return of merit?
E. They do not love it, I think. A. Do they then love nothing else? E. Assuredly, they love many things — those things, namely, in the acquiring and the retaining of which that wrong will perseveres.
A. I judge that you say that material wealth, honors, passing pleasures and the beauty of the body and all such things are what they who desire can fail to attain, or what they can lose, notwithstanding their will to retain.
E. They are the very things. A. Since you see these things subject to the turnings of time, do you think that they are (also) eternal?
E. Who, even completely void of mind, could think that? A. Since therefore it is evident that some men are lovers of things temporal; and it is agreed that there are two laws, one eternal, the other temporal, which of these (classes of men) think you are subordinate to the eternal, which to the temporal law?
E. I think what you ask is clear on the surface: I think indeed that those blessed ones, on account of the love of things eternal, act under the eternal law; but on the unhappy I think the temporal law is imposed. A. You judge rightly, so long as you hold securely proved that which reason has now clearly shown — that they who serve the temporal can not be free from the eternal, from which (the eternal) we say that things that are just and that are justly varied are derived — but they who adhere to the eternal law by a good will (as it is apparent you understand well enough) do not need the temporal.
E. I hold what you say. A. The eternal law therefore orders our love to be turned away from things temporal, and commands it, purified, to turn to things eternal. E. It does so order truly. A. What then think you that the temporal law orders but that men may by right possess those things which can be said to belong to us for time, when men by cupidity cling to them — but that right (that is) by which peace and human fellowship are maintained, so far as can be in such things? But the things (so ordered) are, first, this body and what are called its goods, as unimpaired health, the keenness of the organic senses, strength, beauty, and possibly other things, some necessary for the fine arts, and therefore valued of more worth, some of less value. Then there is liberty, which (when it is) true, indeed, belongs only to the blessed and to those who cling to the eternal law: But I mention here that liberty by reason of which men think themselves free who have no human masters, and which they desire who wish to be freed from human masters. Next then parents, brethren, wife (husband) children, kindred, relatives, friends and whoever are united to us by some link of necessity. After them the city-state which is wont to be held in the place of a parent, honors too and praise, and what is called popular esteem. Finally money, under which one term are comprised all things of which we are the owners, and over which we are seen to have the power of selling and dominion.
Of all these things it is difficult to say and long to explain how that law distributes (giving) to each one his own, and for our purpose it is not at all necessary. For it is enough to see that the power of this law in its exercise does not extend beyond this — that it removes and takes away those things, or any one of those things (temporal goods) from him whom it punishes. By fear therefore it compels, and it bends and forces to the end which is its aim, the spirit of the unhappy men for the government of whom it is adapted.
Indeed while they fear to lose these (temporal goods) they keep a certain measure in using them, a measure fitted to the bond of the State — such a State (the civil order) as can be constituted by men of this quality. But when these things (temporal) are loved the sin is not punished (by civil law). It is punished only when wrongly they are taken away from others (by outward act).
Wherefore see whether we have reached now that point where you thought the argument was incomplete. For we had planned to study how far that law, by which people on earth and States are governed, has the right to be enforced.
E. I see we have reached that point. A. You see this therefore also — that if those things which can be taken away from one against his will were not loved, there would be no penalty, whether by reason of the injury done, or by the sanction of the law imposed by men. E. That I see too. A. Since therefore one uses badly, another rightly, those same things; and he who makes the bad use clings to them by love and is involved, that is, is subject to things which ought to be subordinate to him; thus making for himself goods, for which same goods, by a right ordering and use, he ought to be the good. And he who uses these things rightly can show that they are goods indeed, but, not for him, because they do not make him good, or make him better, but they are by him made (good and of higher worth). And therefore he is not attached to them by love, and he may not make them as members of (informed by) his spirit, which is done by loving them; lest, when they shall begin to be cut off, they may hurt by reason of pain and of weakening. But let him carry himself completely above them, prepared both to have them and to be ruler over them; and yet still more, prepared to love them and not to have them.
Since therefore these things are so, do you think that silver and gold are to be blamed on account of avaricious men, or that food is to be blamed on account of gluttons, or wine on account of drunkards, or the womanly form on account of those who are guilty of fornication and adultery, and, in this way, the other points, particularly when you see that a physician uses fire well (to cauterize), and a poisoner employs bread for the purpose of crime?
E. It is most true that things themselves are not to be blamed, but men who make bad use of them. Chapter 15
A. Rightly — but as we have begun to see now what is the force of the eternal law and how far the temporal law may go in enforcing itself; it is found also that there are two classes of things, eternal and temporal, and two classes of men, those who follow and love things eternal, and those who follow and love things temporal clearly distinct; and that the mind is deposed from the stronghold of mastery and of right order by no other thing but the will: and it is clear that not anything (external) is to be blamed when someone uses it wrongly, but that one himself, who so makes a wrong use.
Since these points are proved — let us get back, if you will, to the question proposed at the beginning of this study, and let us see whether that question is answered. For we had begun to ask what is wrongdoing, and for the answer to that question we have said all that has been said. Wherefore it is in order now to note and to consider whether wrongdoing is aught else than to pursue things temporal and things which are sense-perceived, through the body, the least excellent part of man — to pursue these things as great and marvelous, neglecting things eternal which the mind enjoys by itself, which the mind perceives by itself; and, loving which, it cannot lose. For in this one class all wrongdoing, that is, all sins seem to me to be included. But I wait to know how this appears to you.
E. It is so as you say, and I am agreed that all sins are contained in this one kind: when one is turned away from things divine and truly everlasting, and is turned to things changeful and uncertain. Which things though they are arranged rightly in their own order, and though they complete a certain beauty their own; yet to be made subordinate in pursuing them is the mark of a wrong and disordered mind — that mind, which by divine order and law is superior to them, placed over them to draw them to its own purpose.
And that problem — whence do we wrong? It seems to me is now made clear — the problem which we had begun to study after the question — whence is wrongdoing? For, if I mistake not, reason has shown that we do wrong from a free choice of will. But I ask whether a free choice itself, by which we are proved to have a power to sin, should have been given to us by Him who made us. For it is clear that if we were without free will we would not sin, and in this way it is to be feared that God may be adjudged the author of our evildoing.
A. Fear that not at all. But that we may study this more carefully another time is to be taken. For this exposition wants measure and a limit, where I would have you believe that the door is to be opened for the study of things great and (as yet) not clear. When we shall have begun to come into the depths of these things, God directing us, you shall judge what difference there is between this disputation and the things which follow, how they are more excellent, not only in the keenness of the study of them, but in the majesty of realities and clearness of light. Let only piety be with us, so that, divine providence permitting, we may hold and complete the course which we have begun.
E. I yield to your will, and to your will I join my own in judgment and in desire. Chapter 16
Ill THE TRINITY