To the Reader
making all divines and churches of Christ, since the apostles' days, so far as I am able to discern by my small reading, or by reports, to be
Pelagians. I never heard of any that thought so basely of the highest measure of that grace which is not proper to the saints as this man doth. If it no whit lead to God, how is it grace? If this doctor dare warrant his hearers that they shall all be saved that have the least faith, or love, or inclination to God, I dare not imitate him. Except they love him above all, I dare not tell them that they are true disciples. Nor do I think that nature itself is averted from God in the highest degree, nor all the wicked of one degree of sinfulness, nor yet as bad as they shall be in hell. Our divines that tell us how far hypocrites may go, do not talk in the strain of this doctor.
Well, but how far are we yet disagreed even in terms? Why, I said, that it is not a natural, but a moral, specific difference, and so doth he. Page 109, he saith, "But against whom, I pray, do you dispute then? &c. I dare be bold to say there is not one that affirms a natural or physical difference, as you call it, between acts of common and saving grace in this your sense." And is not it a pity that this doctor, that is so well agreed with me for sense and terms, should be put to the trouble of so tedious a digression? Forsooth, I did unhappily express myself, because I used not his term "appretiative," which though I neglected, I think, on sufficient reason, yet, to please him, I will use it when I think on it, and have no better. And so we had best part while we are friends.
TO THE READER
READER, I AM so loth to leave thee under any mistake of my meaning in this point, that I shall yet make some further attempt for the explaining of it. And whereas I understand that some readers say that this nice
distinguishing doth but puzzle men; and others still fear not falsely to give out, that I make common grace and special to differ only gradually, and not specifically, in despite of my express asserting of the contrary, I entreat the first sort to tear that leaf out of the book which speaks of this subject, that it may not trouble them; or to be patient while we speak a few words to others that understand that which they are but puzzled with. And I desire the second sort once more to remember, 1. That I still affirm, that common grace and special do differ by a moral specific difference, and not a gradual only. 2. But that this moral specific difference doth materially consist in a physical, gradual difference. 3. And it being a moral subject that we have in hand, our terms must be accordingly used and understood; and therefore it is most proper, when we speak of any unsanctified man, to say, that he is not a believer, he hath no faith, he hath no love to God, &c., because we are supposed to speak only of a true christian saving faith, love, &c. 4. But yet, when it is known that we speak of another faith and love, we may well say that an unsanctified man hath these; and when we inquire of the difference, we must be as exact as possible, in showing wherein it lieth, lest we delude the hypocrite, and trouble the regenerate. That the faith, and love, and sanctity of the ungodly are but equivocally, or analogically, so called, in respect to the faith and love of the saints, I have proved in my Fifth Disputation of Right of Sacraments.
That which I shall now add to make my sense as plain as I can, shall be these following distinctions and propositions.
We must distinguish between, 1. Those gracious acts that are about our end, and those that are about their means. 2. Between God considered generally as God, and considered in his several properties and attributes distinctly. And Christ considered personally, and considered fully in the parts of his office, whether the essential or integral parts. 3. Between the goodness of God in himself considered, and as suitable unto us. 4. Between the simple act of the intellect, and the comparing act. 5. Between the simple velleity of the will, and the choice that followeth the comparate act of the intellect. 6.
Between the speculative and practical act of the intellect. 7. And between the acts of the will that answer these two. 8. Between an end that is ultimate, but not principal and prevalent, and an end that is ultimate and chief also.
Prop. 1. An unsanctified man may love him that is the true God, and believe in that person who is Jesus Christ, the Redeemer. This is past controversy among us.
Prop. 2. An ungodly man may love God as the cause of his prosperity in the world.
Prop. 3. He may know that his everlasting happiness is at the disposal of God, and may believe him to be merciful, and ready to do good, and that to him; and consequently may have some love to him as thus gracious and merciful.
Prop. 4. He may by a simple apprehension know that God is good in himself, and goodness itself, and preach this to others; and consequently may have in his will a consent or willingness hereof, that God be what he is, even infinite goodness.
Prop. 5. He may have a simple apprehension that God should be glorified, and honoured by the creatures: and so may have a simple velleity that he may be glorified.
Prop. 6. He may have a general dim apprehension, that everlasting happiness consists in the sight of the glory of God, and in his love, and favour, and heavenly kingdom, and so may have some love to him as thus apprehended.
Prop. 7. He may compare God and the creature together, and have a speculative or superficial knowledge that God is better than the creature, and better to him; and may write and preach this to others: and so may have an answerable, superficial, ineffectual velleity or love to him, even as thus considered.
Prop. 8. One and the same man may have two contrary ultimate ends of his particular actions; even the pleasing of God, and the pleasing of his flesh: proved.
Argument 1. If the same heart may be partly sanctified, and partly unsanctified (that is, in some degree) then it may have two contrary ends; or, if the same man may have flesh and spirit, then he may have two contrary ultimate ends. But the antecedent is certain; therefore, so far as man is carnal and unsanctified, flesh-pleasing and carnal self is his end.
Argument 2. If the same man might not have two contrary ultimate ends, then the godly should never sin but in the mischoosing of the means, or abating the degrees of love to God: but the consequent is false, and against experience; therefore, Peter did not only mischoose a means to God's glory when he denied his Master. A godly man, when he is drawn to eat or drink too much, doth it not only as a mistaken means to glorify God, but ultimately to please his flesh.
Either David, in adultery did desire flesh-pleasing for itself, or for some other end. If for itself, then it was his ultimate end in that act: if for somewhat else, as his end; for what? No one will say his end was
God's glory: and there is nothing else to be it.
Prop. 9. There is a continual striving between these two contrary ends where they are; one drawing one way, and the other the other way; and sometimes one, sometimes the other, prevailing in particular acts.
Prop. 10. But yet, every man hath one only prevalent ultimate end, which is to be called finis hominis, or is the chief ultimate end of the habitual predominant inclination or disposition of his soul, and of the tenor or bent of his course of life. And that which goes against his habitual bent, is said to be the act, not of him, but of something in him, that is, not of that predominant disposition which should denominate the man to be godly or ungodly, but of some subdued disposition that, by accident, hath got some advantage.
Prop. 11. As godly men have God for their end, as to the predominant habit of their souls and bent of their lives, so all wicked men in the world have the creature and carnal self for their end, as to the predominant habit of their hearts and bent of their lives; so that this is simply to be called their several end which is the ruling end, and hath the greatest interest in them; but yet, as carnal self is a subdued, resisting end in the godly, prevailing in some particular actions, as is too sure, so God and salvation may be a stifled, abused, subjected end of the ungodly that have but common grace, and may prevail against the flesh in some particular outward actions.
This is evident in the foregoing propositions. If a man by common grace may have such a simple and superficial apprehension of God as is before mentioned, knowing him to be good in himself; yea, best, and good and best to him, when yet, at the same time, he hath a more deep, predominant, habitual apprehension that the creature is best for him, then certainly he may have a subdued love to God as best in himself, and to him, that is answerable to this superficial knowledge, and consisteth with a predominant, habitual love to the creature and carnal self. I would desire every divine to beware that he tell not the unsanctified, that whoever hath the least degree of love to God for himself, and not as a means to carnal ends, shall certainly be saved; for he would certainly deceive many thousand miserable souls that should persuade them of this. He that believeth that there is a God, believeth that he is the chief Good, and best for him if he could see his glory, and fully enjoy his love for ever: and many a wicked man doth preach all this, and thinks as he speaks. But it is all but with a superficial, opinionative belief, which is mastered by more strong apprehensions of a contrary good; and so they love but with a superficial love, that is answerable to a mere opinionative belief, and is conquered by a more potent love to the contrary. So that, strictly, if you denominate not that single act, nor the person as thus disposed, but the bent of his affections, or the person, according to what indeed he is in the predominant habit of his soul, so it is fittest to say, that the godly loveth not the world, nor the things of the world, and the wicked loveth not God, nor the things of God, as such.
Prop. 12. The sincere intending of the end doth concur to constitute a sincere choice of the means. And therefore the schoolmen say, that charity, or love to God, informeth all other graces: not being the form of them as such or such acts or habits, but as gracious means. As the means are essentially as means for the end, and so animated by it, so the mediate acts of grace, as mediate, are essentially animated by the love of the end, and participate of it. In this sense their doctrine of the informing of other graces by love, is not only true, but of very great weight, and giveth light to many other points. And thus, as men of common grace have only an abused, subdued will or love to God as their end, that is conquered by the contrary, so they have but an unanswerable faith in Christ as the way to God the Father, and an unanswerable use of all other means, which will never bring them to attain the end that is so superficially and ineffectually apprehended and intended. I desire the learned reader to peruse well the first disputation of Rada for Scotus on this question.
Prop. 13. The acts of love or faith are considerable, 1. Physically. 1. In general, as faith and love. 2. In special, as this faith and love about this object, the Father and Son. And thus, by common grace men may have true faith and love; that is, such as is physically a true or real act. 2. They are considerable morally; and that, 1. Either as duty answering a precept, "Believe and love God;" and thus they have an analogical, defective morality in them, and so are thus far sincere or true; but not that same true love or faith, in specie morali, which the command requireth. For it commandeth us to love God above all, &c.
2. They are considerable as conditions of the promises and evidences of spiritual life in the soul; and thus wicked men, by common grace, are never made partakers of them. They have not the things themselves. Their faith and love is not the same thing which hath the promises made to them in the Gospel, and so are not true or sincere.
Prop. 14. By common grace men may love God under the notion of the chiefest good and most desirable end, and yet not with that love which the chiefest good must be loved with, and therefore it is not morally sincere or saving.
Prop. 15. There is no notion whatsoever that a true Christian hath of God, and no word that he can speak of him, but an unregenerate man may have some apprehension of that same notion, and speak those words, and know every proposition concerning God and Christ, as Redeemer, which a godly man may know; and so may have some love to God, or faith in Christ in that same notion, though not with such a clear effectual apprehension, and lively powerful love, as the sanctified have.
Object. He cannot love God as his end. Answ. I have proved before that he may with a superficial, ineffectual, subdued love.
Object. He cannot love him as the chief good. Answ. I have proved that he may love him under that notion, though not with that love which the chief good must be loved with.
Object. He cannot believe in Christ, or desire him as a Saviour to free him from every sin. Answ. Not with a prevalent faith or desire, for still he hath more love than averseness to that sin, and therefore more averseness than love to Christ as such; but as in general he may wish to be free from all sin, so in particular he may have effectual wishes to be free from his most beloved sin in several respects.
Object. But not to be free from sin as sin, or as against God. Answ.
Yes; a man by common grace may know that sin as sin is evil, and therefore may have ineffectual wishes to be freed from it as such; but at the same time he hath stronger apprehensions of the pleasure, profit, or credit that it brings him, and this prevaileth. Indeed, men's carnal interest, which in sin they love, is not its opposition to God, nor the formal nature of sin. Doubtless all men that are ungodly, do not therefore love sin because it is sin, and against God; at least this is not so total in them, but that there may be a subdued mind to the contrary, and dislike of sin as against God. Many a common drunkard I have known, that when he hath heard or talked of sin as sin, and as against God, hath cried out against himself, and wept as if he abhorred it, and yet gone on in it, for the pleasure of the flesh.
Object. But where, then, is man's natural enmity to God and holiness? Answ. 1. It is doubtful whether man naturally have an enmity to God and holiness considered simply, or only considered as being against man's carnal interest. 2. But were the former proved, yet common grace abateth that enmity, and gives men more than corrupted nature doth.
Object. But the experience of the godly telleth them that it is another kind of light and love which they have after conversion than before.
Answ. 1. It is not all converts that can judge by experience in this; because all have not had common grace in the highest, or any great observed measure before conversion. 2. It is hard for any to make that experiment, because we know not in our change just when common grace left, and special grace begun. 3. A physical, gradual difference may be as great as that which your experience tells you of.
Have you experience of common light and love before conversion, and of another since which differeth from it more than the greatest flame from a spark, and more than the sunshine at noon from the twilight, when you cannot know a man; or more than the sight of the cured blind man, that saw clearly, from that by which he saw men like trees; or more than the pain of the strappado from the smallest prick of a pin?
Object. But it is not common gifts that are worked up to be special grace. One species is not turned into another. Answ. True: imperfection is not turned materially into perfection. The dawning of the day is not materially turned into the greater light at noon; but a greater light superveneth, and is added to the less. The blind man's seeing men like trees, was not it that was the perfect, following sight, but an additional light was it.
Object. But special grace is the divine nature, the image of God, the new creature, &c., and therefore doth differ more from common.
Answ. I easily yield the antecedent, but deny the consequence. The difference is as admirably great as these terms express, though it be
but a moral specific difference.
Reader, I will trouble thee no more but to entreat thee, if thou be of another mind, to differ from me without breach of charity, as I do from thee, and to remember that I obtrude not my explications on any. And if I have done thee wrong, it is but by telling thee my thoughts, which thou hast liberty to accept or reject as thou seest cause. But again I entreat thee, rather lay this by, or tear it out of the book, than it should be any stumbling-block in the way, or hinder thee from profiting by what thou readest. The Lord increase our light, and life, and love.
Jan. 15, 1657.
-----Copyright © Monergism Books The Saint's Everlasting Rest, by Richard Baxter, Copyright © 2022
All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. By payment of the required fees, you have been granted the non-exclusive, non-transferable right to access and read the text of this e-book on-screen. No part of this text may be reproduced, transmitted, downloaded, decompiled, reverse engineered, or stored in or introduced into any information storage and retrieval system, in any form or by any means, whether electronic or mechanical, now known or hereinafter invented, without the express written permission of Monergism Books. ePub and .mobi Editions May 2022 Requests for information should be addressed to: Monergism, P.O Box 491, West Linn Or, 97068