An Addition to the Eleventh Chapter of the Third Part of the Saint's Rest
AN ADDITION
THE ELEVENTH CHAPTER OF THE THIRD PART
OF THE
SAINT'S REST
IT hath seemed meet to Mr. K. to second Mr. Crandon, by an impetuous opposition of my poor labours; and having in his first volume against Mr. G. assaulted my Aphorisms; in the second, to fall upon my 'Method for Peace of Conscience,' and my book of 'Rest;' against the twelfth chapter (misprinted the eleventh) of the Third
Part, he hath a copious digression, which I will now not characterise, either as to the intellectuals or morals, the judgment or honesty appearing in it; having reserved that to a second and plain admonition to himself. But because I intended these writings for ordinary capacities, I would have nothing remain in them which may be an occasion of their stumbling: for the sake therefore of such readers as would neither err, nor be puzzled with contentious janglings about mere words, I shall give them this brief advertisement following. It is so far from my desire to teach men to build the peace of their consciences upon any nice philosophical controversies, much less on any errors or singular opinions of mine, that I desire nothing more than to lead them to, and leave them on, the plain, infallible word of God. My own judgment concerning that sincere, saving grace, which we may safely try our estates by, I have as plainly as I could laid down in that chapter, and my 'Directions for Peace;' and in sect. 39, to sect. 53, of my 'Reply to Mr. Blake:' from whence I must desire the reader to fetch it, and not from the interpretations of Mr. K., which so seldom hath the hap to be acquainted with the truth, and who professeth himself that he doth not understand me: whether it be long of me or himself I determine not. To these I shall now add only these few words.
The everlasting enjoyment of God in glory by perfected man, is the felicity which all should desire and seek. This is propounded to us by God in his word, and the necessary mean thereto prescribed; even
Jesus Christ, and faith in him, and obedience to him, and to God in and by him. The distempered, sensual appetite, and depraved will of man, do incline to inferior sensual delights. God hath resolved that these shall not be their felicity, and that they shall never be happy in the enjoyment of him, except they take him for their chief good, and so far forsake inferior good which would draw the heart from him: and except also they give up themselves to his Son Jesus Christ, and to his Spirit, to be recovered unto him. Though all men by nature desire to be happy; yet all do not desire God as their happiness. Nor do the regenerate themselves yet perfectly desire him, or perfectly forsake that inferior good; which was their supposed happiness before they were renewed. The understanding is commonly acknowledged to have three kinds of acts: 1. A simple apprehension of the mere entity of a thing, or of a simple term; 2. Judgment, or the conception of a complex term; 3. Discourse. The first alone moves not the will, because it concludes not of the goodness or evil of the tiling apprehended. The second, judgment, is either about the end or the means: and either absolute or comparative. Several things are commonly called man's end, how properly I now inquire not. 1.
Felicity in general; 2. Himself the subject, commonly called the finis cui; 3. The natural and moral perfection of his person; 4. The act of fruition, or perfect complacency in the blessed object upon a full vision; commonly called, our formal felicity: 5. The object itself, that is, the blessed God, commonly called our objective felicity, and our finis qui, or cujus, whether fitly, we shall better know hereafter. The two first nature hath tied us to; but not to the object, nor to the perfection of the soul in a spiritual suitableness thereto. The first absolute judgment produceth in the will a simple complacency or displacency; this is the first motion of the will. The comparative judgment, where it is necessary, produceth intention and election, or else refusal, and resolves the fluctuating will. Where there is but one good propounded, either one objective end, or one means of absolute necessity, or wherever there is omnimoda ratio boni, nothing but
good apparent in the object, there is no work for consultation, or the comparative act of judgment, and consequently for election: but the absolute judgment would proceed to the practical, and carry out the will to intention and prosecution: were not man's soul blinded and depraved, there should be no deliberation about his end, and so no choosing of God as our end, but an absolute intending him, as having no competitor: and it cannot be without great sin for the judgment to make any question or comparison, and so to deliberate, Whether
God or the creature be our felicity; and, Whether God or our carnal selves should be our end? But seeing our depraved judgment and will, and vitiated senses, and the tempter's setting the creature in competition with God, do necessitate a comparative judgment and deliberation, even about our end itself; therefore there is a kind of election of God as before the creature, or a consent or resolution so to prefer him, that is necessary, before or with a right intention and prosecution of that end: besides, the election of the new means, that is necessary; seeing Satan and our flesh are so ready to propound wrong means, in competition with the means of God's prescribing.
All this being so, I further add, that the same will that hath a complacency in a thing as judged simply good, may yet reject and nill it, or refuse to seek or receive it, if it be judged either a lesser good inconsistent with a greater, or any way to have more evil in it than good: and as the understanding doth at once apprehend it as good absolutely, or in some respect; and evil in other respects, and comparatively less good; so doth the will at once continue to love or will it so far as it is apprehended as good; and to nill and reject it as inconsistent with a greater good, or a hinderer of it. But if it fall out that the inconsistency of these is not discerned or believed, or but imperfectly, then may the will, by a practical volition, will them both.
To apply this. The understanding of the ungenerate may know that God is good, and good to them, and that in very many and weighty respects he is desirable. They may know that worldly things will shortly leave them, and then if they have not God's favour they shall perish. But if they have, they shall attain both perfection of body,
(which they may desire,) and perfection of mind, (which they do
desire in general, and may submit to in the particular way of holiness, as more tolerable than hell,) besides some imperfect ineffectual knowledge of a beauty and desirableness in holiness itself, accompanied with an answerable motion of the will: but every unrenewed man hath more prevalent apprehensions of the goodness of the creature, partly by unmastered sense, and partly by perverted reason, and therefore apprehendeth God as evil to him; so far as he would hinder his enjoyment thereof, or would punish him for a sinful adhering to it. So that, 1. His highest practical estimation is of the creature, yet not without some esteem of God: 2. and his prevailing will is to the creature, but not without some will to God. And, ordinarily, such men are so fully convinced of the impossibility of enjoying the creature for ever, and being happy any other way than in God, that, though they could wish an everlasting fulness of the creature, yet, seeing none but fools do intend an end which they know impossible to be attained, they do therefore compound a felicity in their own fancies, of the world for a time, and heaven for everlasting: one part standing in the enjoyment of the delights of the flesh, while they live here, and the other in the deliverance from hell and blessedness in heaven hereafter: hoping that these are not inconsistent, but they may have heaven when they can enjoy the world no longer; because they see that many saints possess abundance of earthly blessings, and persecution is not now so common as it hath been, therefore they suppose they may possess the like: upon which expectation they enjoy what the godly do but use, and so give it the pre-eminence in their hearts: or if they be convinced of the inconsistency of a carnal mind, (in a prevalent degree,) with an interest in the happiness of the life to come, they will either persuade themselves that they are not carnally-minded when they are, or, one way or other, will underprop their hopes of enjoying both: but still their fleshly mind is predominant, and therefore they will cast their salvation upon the adventure of such hopes as have nothing but their own delusions to support them.
On the other side, the regenerate being here imperfect in all their graces, are imperfectly taken off those carnal ends which they
intended in their unsanctified state, and imperfectly inclined to God as their end: so are they also, both in discerning and choosing the fittest means, even Christ himself and obedience to him, so that the best are carnally-minded, in some degree, but not in a prevalent degree, for then they should die. The flesh and world have still some interest in the saints, but not the strongest. As God and the Redeemer may have some interest, though not the chiefest, in the practical judgment and will of the unsanctified. Whether, you will say, that the same man hath two distinct inconsistent ends; one as regenerate, the other so far as he is still carnal; or whether you will give the name of an end only to that good which hath the greatest interest in him, I will not contend about a word. If that only be called our end, which is prevalently intended in the main course of our lives, then it is God only that is our end: but if that may be called a man's end which is intended in his distempers and deviations, then the creature may be called our end so far as we are still carnal; for it is not only as a wrong-chosen means to our right end, that we sinfully adhere to the creature; but it is more as it stands in competition with our right end, and as we will and love our fleshpleasing for itself. It is true, the sensual appetite may desire it for itself, because it belongs not to carry us higher, and to intend an end: but the rational power must subordinate both creatures, and our natural delight in them to God. And I do not think that it is by the mere brutish irrational motion that the godly adhere too much to the creature.
I did therefore deliver my thoughts on this point thus: that as the act is denominated from the object, and specified by it, so the grace that is saving must, as to the acts, consist not only in the absolute, but comparative judgment, and in that choice or comparative willing that follows thereupon; and though there be forty intricate, philosophical controversies about man's willing the end and means, which stand in their way that would make the most exact discussion of this point, yet every Christian may safely go on these grounds, and conclude that when Christ's interest is predominant, or greatest in the soul, there is saving grace; but where it is not, there is none, though yet he
may have some interest there. Here is a double pre-eminence that Christ must have, or a double prevalency of grace, that it may be saving. 1. The object must be preferred before that which stands in competition with it. 2. The act must be prevalent in degree against its contrary, so far as that the heart and life may be denominated from it. 1. The absolute act of the judgment makes no comparison; therefore in that only the latter must be looked after. Assent to God's word upon his authority, must be prevalent against our dissent; and that will appear in our serious obeying it, &c. 2. In the comparative act of the judgment there must be both. God must be valued and esteemed above all creatures; and our esteem must be prevalent against our slighting and disesteem of him. 3. The main point of trial is in the will, and there must be both these prevalencies beforementioned. God must be willed as better than all creatures; and our willing of him must be in a prevalent degree against our nilling or unwilling. For there is in the best on earth some remainders of averseness to God, which may be called a hating of him, so far as they are carnal, though they are not therefore fitly to be called haters of God, but lovers of him: because they must be denominated from the prevalent part. The like may be said of all the affections, so far as they are of the rational part; for of the sensitive passions there is not so sure a judgment to be made, as I expressed p. 213, and in my
'Method for Peace of Conscience.' In the choice of means all this is clear, if not much more. Christ must be preferred before all competitors, and all rejected for him; and our willingness must be in a degree that is prevalent against our unwillingness, and our faith as prevalent against unbelief, and our subjection must prevail against our rebellion, and our obedience against our disobedience in the course of our lives. He must have the main bent of our hearts and endeavours, though in a particular act the flesh may prevail. This is it that I have asserted, and with a consent to this I am satisfied. As for the point of specification of our acts, I never look to see the schools agreed about it, how confidently soever Mr. K. talks, as if they all conspired with him. Call the difference gradual or specifical, as you please, so we agree in the sense, I am content. I choose to call it a moral, specifical difference, and in that sense do maintain, that the
faith of the best of the unsanctified is not specifically the same with that of the sanctified, and so of love and other graces. As to that saving faith, all other is but analogically called faith, as I have showed in the section before cited against Mr. Blake. But yet I am not of Mr. K.'s opinion about the natural specification of acts, for all his confidence. I yet think that acts are naturally, and not morally, specified from their objects, considered physically; and are morally specified by those objects, as related to the laws that command, forbid, threaten, promise, and so by the laws themselves; which Dr.
Twiss will needs say are no species of acts, though vulgarly so called, 'Vind. Grat.' lib. ii. par. 2. digres. 9. p. 410.
1 now desire no more of the reader than to consent, 1. To the express words of Scripture which I cited in that chap. 11. sect. 15, which I desire him to review; 2. And to that which Mr. K. and I are agreed in.
I hope you will take this for a reasonable motion, it being unlike that the Cretian pen of so bold a man, so self-conceited, and superciliously scornful, should grant me much more than he needs must. Let us examine his concessions for matter and words. 1. For sense, he confesseth, p. 137, thus: "I am of Mr. Baxter's mind, that no sober divine will tell us, that if we love God never so little without dissembling, yet he will accept it, though we love our lusts before him." So oft he yieldeth that all sincere love to God doth prefer him before all other. Where then is our difference? Why, he thinks that no others believe or love God at all but those that love him above all.
I did affirm, that as to that same moral species of faith and love, they do not at all believe and love God, but as to another species they do, and truly do it. How oft doth Scripture say of the unsanctified, that they believe in Christ, at least for a time? But I shall leave it till I speak to Mr. K. himself, to prove that men unrenewed may have faith and love to Christ, though not saving. And whereas, our Doctor, according to the complexion of his conscience, doth prefer me to succeed Pelagius in his chair, for affirming that a carnal man, by the greatest help of common grace, as I opened my meaning, may have weak inclinations to spiritual and superior good, while he hath stronger to inferior, I would have him to review his sobriety, in