5. The Doctrine of Predestination

5. The Doctrine of Predestination

5. The Doctrine of Predestination

1. What parts, in succession, come up for discussion concerning this doctrine?

a)   The grounds why we assign it a separate place in the doctrine of the decrees.

b)   The scriptural terms that are important for predestination and election.

c)   The systematic development of the doctrine of election in connection with other areas of doctrine.

d)   The major deviating opinions and our criticism of them.

2. Why in Reformed dogmatics is the doctrine of election treated separately after the doctrine of the decrees?

In order to show the importance of this doctrine in the entire system. Also, as the doctrine of salvation follows consideration of creation and providence, so here the particular decree of predestination follows the general decree of God.

3. Did Lutheran dogmatics also usually put predestination toward the beginning in its treatment?

Yes; certainly initially. Melanchthon began his Loci Communes with its treatment. Later, it was different. The doctrine of election was now placed at the beginning of soteriology. This came about because Lutheran theology had undergone a total change.

4. At what points is the doctrine of predestination or election related to the rest of Reformed doctrine as a whole?

a)   It is a direct consequence of the Reformed concept of God’s sovereignty, as that has been shaped based on Scripture. In the century of the Reformation one arrived at the doctrine of election along a twofold path. Luther came to predestination from man and his salvation. Zwingli and Calvin did so from God. Zwingli deduced predestination directly from providence (the decrees) and comes close to pantheism. Calvin expressed himself more soberly. But he, too, postulated that God is everything and the creature is nothing, that the creature, even in its highest importance, remains subordinate to God and must serve Him. Whoever gives up the doctrine of predestination must therefore also drop the doctrine of the sovereignty of God and subsequently falsify biblical teaching at numerous places.

b)   The doctrine of human inability after the fall is inseparably connected with predestination, so that one must maintain them both together or drop them both together. One of the two; it depends on God or it depends on man who will be saved. If one chooses the first, then one has accepted predestination. If one chooses the second, then this is possible only under two presuppositions. Either one must be Pelagian and say man has not become lacking in ability through his fall; then he is able to decide for himself. Or one must say man was at first lacking in ability, but God does something to man, in fact to all men without distinction, whereby they again become able to make a decision. But then A, who is saved, must have something good that B, who is not saved, does not have. And A must have this good of himself because he received precisely the same grace as B. In any case, here the inability of man is denied, whether one propounds that denial in a Pelagian or a semi-Pelagian fashion.

Luther arrived at election by reasoning back to it from man’s inability (Concerning the Bondage of the Will, against Erasmus). Later Lutheran theology had to give up absolute predestination. To the same extent that it did this, however, it had to diminish the inability of man. According to it, man has the ability to resist supernatural grace.

c)   Predestination or election is related to mystical union and the body of Christ. The elect form a body. In a body the members must be fitted to each other and are intended for each other. If this body of Christ originated accidentally by the free-will choice of individual men, then there would be no guarantee that it would become a properly proportioned body. God must decide in advance how many ought to belong to it, who those many shall be, and when they should be fitted into it. Predestination is nothing other than the decision of God concerning these matters.

d)   Predestination is no less related to the doctrine of the merits of Christ. This, too, cannot remain the same if one denies election. If we ask what Christ earned for us, the answer is:

1.   Satisfaction of our debt of guilt by His passive obedience.

2.   Eternal life by His active obedience. According to Scripture, however, to eternal office belongs the application of the merits of the Mediator in its entirety. To that application belongs the Holy Spirit, who works regeneration, faith, conversion. If now man himself decides by not believing or believing of himself, then faith is a work of man and no longer a fruit of the merits of Christ. Christ cannot have merited for us what we ourselves provide. And so it is, not only with faith but with all other parts of the application of salvation. Denial of predestination includes, so viewed, a denial of the actual merits of the Mediator.

e)   Predestination also relates to the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints. Four possibilities exist:

1.   God lets both coming into the state of grace and remaining in the state of grace depend on the free will of man.

2.   God, by sovereign election, decides both coming into the state of grace and the persevering of those who have once come into it.

3.   God leaves it to man in his free will the decision whether he will come into the state of grace, but decides sovereignly that whoever is once in that state cannot fall from it again.

4.   God sovereignly determines that certain persons will come into the state of grace, but for the rest leaves it to their free decision whether they will again fall from it or persevere in it.

One sees immediately how absurd the third conception is. Sinful man in his entirety is said to be able to decide, but not the regenerate man. Nor is the fourth conception tenable. Once God’s sovereignty is at play, man can no longer thwart it subsequently. Conception 1 is completely Pelagian. So then, what remains is the conception mentioned under 2, and this is precisely the Reformed opinion.

5. What is the first term to be treated here, which is used by Scripture in connection with the doctrine of predestination?

The Hebrew, יָדַע; Greek, γιγνώσκειν, προγιγνσώκειν, “to know,” “to foreknow”; πρόγνωσις, “foreknowledge.” In Romans 8:29–30, προέγνω, “those He has foreknown,” stands at the beginning.

6. In order to understand this term correctly, what must be decided first?

Whether it is meant and used in its Classical Greek meaning or its Hebrew-Hellenistic meaning. “Knowing” for the Jew is an entirely different concept than for the Greek mind. The question now is simply: How does God’s word understand it?

7. Where would the Classical Greek meaning lead us?

To a Remonstrant understanding of election. In Classical Greek usage, “to know” is “to become acquainted with something” or “to acquire knowledge regarding something.” In this sense Arminian theology has always insisted that God’s “foreknowledge” is an awareness in advance of one or another quality in sinners, which then guided Him in His election. For example, God knew the elect beforehand as believers who would persevere in good works. This is why He chose them.

8. Is the concept “foreknowing” in this sense completely absent in the New Testament?

It appears, but nowhere in relation to election as having for its object foreseen faith and good works. See 2 Peter 3:17: “You … knowing this beforehand, take care lest you are led astray by the seduction of heinous men”; Acts 26:5: “As they have previously known me for a long time.”

9. From what at the outset does it appear that the concept cannot have such a meaning in the places it is used for election?

From the fact that nowhere is added what God had known in advance in man. If we had to do with foreknowledge in this sense, such an addition would be essential. If I know something beforehand, then everything depends on what I know or sense beforehand.

Now, “foreknowing” and “foreknowledge” occur for election (in Rom 8:29; 11:2; 1 Pet 1:2, 20). “Knowing” in its special meaning is used (in Matt 7:23; 1 Cor 8:3; Gal 4:9; 2 Tim 2:19). Nowhere here is it mentioned that God has foreknown or known in persons. Compare that with the two texts mentioned in the answer to question 8, where something is mentioned.

10. Prove that in Romans 8:28–29, God’s “foreknowledge” cannot mean foreseeing.

The context as a whole and the aim of the apostle’s argument as a whole make that impossible here. The apostle intends to show that for those who love God, all things work together for good. He reasons as follows: Love for God is a consequence of the calling of God, that is, of that omnipotent act by which God has made alive those who are His.

This calling of God as an act in time does not stand alone. It had a reverse side in eternity. Believers are called according to the purpose of God. Again, however, this purpose did not stand alone as a cold determination of will, but something lay behind it that the apostle calls “foreknowledge.”

Here the ascent backward from link to link ceases: calling—purpose—foreknowledge, and the descent begins from foreknowledge. The foreknowledge was such that a predestinating to the form of son resulted: “Those whom He has known beforehand, He has also ordained beforehand to be conformed to the image of His Son, in order that He might be the firstborn among many brothers.” Hereby the sense of “foreknowledge” is already decided in principle. It is something like what a father feels toward his son, his future son. It is a knowing of love. Since behind God’s purpose such a fatherly love functioned with respect to the elect, it ordained the form of son for all those who were the objects of its free choice. Given the fatherly and free character of this love, it is absolutely excluded for the apostle that this fatherly love can be blocked by anything in the realization of its being decreed. With divine certainty and with irresistible power this love aims at its highest goal, the complete glorification of the children in the image of likeness to Christ. It must carry through step by step in its working: “Those whom He knew, those He also called; those whom He called, those He also justified; those whom He justified, those He also glorified.” That is the sense of the sequence. Everything follows with infallible certainty from the unique character of the foreknowledge of God.

Now one may wonder whether anything still remains of this beautiful argument and this natural tie, if one is forced to give “foreknowledge” the meaning of “foreseeing.” Then everything becomes unintelligible and artificial. The divine act that stands at the beginning of the entire sequence then becomes something dependent and is no longer fit to be the basis, firm in itself, of the rest. We have a root that must draw its sap from the trunk and branches and at the same time must still also guarantee that trunk and branches will not wither—a contradiction.

Further, it may be noted that the likeness to the image of the Son to which believers are predestined refers to His glory as Mediator, not to the divine glory that He possessed from eternity. Only of the former will the elect obtain a likeness (though at a far distance).

11. Prove that in Romans 11:2, as well, “foreknowledge” must have a similar meaning and cannot be “foreseeing.”

Here the apostle intends to show how impossible, indeed, how absurd it would be that God would reject Israel, His people. “Rejecting” and “knowing in advance” therefore exclude each other according to the thinking of the apostle. In the midst of Israel’s apostasy and disobedience, he maintains its future salvation, for God, having once foreknown His people, cannot again reject them. One need only attempt to insert the concept of “obtaining knowledge beforehand” and the argument immediately becomes nonsense. In the face of Israel’s actual apostasy how can it ever serve as an argument for its future restoration that God has still foreseen something good in Israel? It is completely the reverse: Precisely because in His free choice God took into account not what Israel would be in itself but exclusively His own good pleasure, precisely because the covenant relationship did not originate with Israel but with Him, precisely because of that, He cannot reject them.

12. May something be deduced from 1 Peter 1:2 concerning the nature of God’s foreknowledge?

No, but certainly from 1 Peter 1:20. Here Christ is the object of foreknowledge. And then, of course, according to His human nature. Now by the nature of the case it makes no sense to say that the Father knew something beforehand in the human nature of the Mediator, for that human nature was entirely the result of God’s election itself. Without election the Son would not have assumed a human nature. What is a result cannot at the same time be a ground or source. Therefore, it is certain that here this foreknowledge cannot be considered foresight of something that already existed for God outside His counsel.

13. What is the meaning of the word “know” in Matthew 7:23?

Here the word does not refer to “election” in the strict sense but is nonetheless used in a way that can shed light on its meaning elsewhere. Christ says that on the day of judgment He will say to many, “I never knew you.” This cannot mean, “I did not know anything of or about you, … you worker of iniquity.” A knowing in the sense of “having knowledge of” is thus certainly present, but not a knowing in the other sense. Christ means to say, “I have not entered into a personal relationship with you.” On the day of judgment the lost, as it were, will insist forcefully on the knowledge Christ has by saying: “Did we not prophesy in your name?” However, He says to them, “I never knew you!” On His side had been lacking just that knowing love, that friendship, to which from their side they now appeal.

14. What about 1 Corinthians 8:3?

Here Paul contrasts with the pride of those who think they know something love for God as that in which the inner worth of Christian character lies. That worth must not be sought in knowledge that puffs up. That it lies in love is shown by Paul from this, that all who love God are known by God, as Calvin says, are valued, highly esteemed. Here there is a fine play on words in the contrast between the knowledge of man in his confusion and being known by God that truly settles everything.

15. How about Galatians 4:9?

First, the fact that the Galatians know God is advanced by the apostle as the ground why they must not turn back again to the weak and impoverished elementary principles of the world. But according to the apostle, there is something else that weighs even more heavily. God has known them. That is, He has placed Himself to them in a relationship of love, as a father to His children. If now, knowing this, they turn back to the weak and impoverished elementary principles of the world, they make themselves guilty of ingratitude to the worst degree. All this shows that being known by God must be something still greater and more glorious than knowing God. That rules out the explanation that foreseeing is in view.

16. What is the case in 2 Timothy 2:19?

Here, too, the words, “The Lord knows those who are His,” must not be taken as an intellectual knowledge. It means that God stands in the closest relationship to His children. The apostasy of those who had occupied a prominent place in the congregation is spoken of, and that from their apostasy one could despair of his own perseverance, especially since the pernicious doctrine of these erring spirits was spreading like gangrene. It is of no comfort in the face of that to consider that God indeed knows who are His and who will remain faithful to Him. But it is certainly a comfort in such circumstances to be able to remember that the Lord stands in the closest relationship of love to His own and therefore cannot allow them to fall away. Compare in John 10:27–28 the bond there is between the shepherd’s knowing and the sheep’s not perishing.

17. What is the main objection to the conception of God’s foreknowledge maintained here?

That it does not indicate what it is that God could have foreknown in the objects of His choice.

a)   Some answer, faith. That is the old Remonstrant answer, but it is simply inconsistent with the teaching of Scripture that calls faith a gift of God and in particular, with the Pauline contrast between faith and works that does not permit that one make of the former a kind of work of man, an evangelical obedience.

b)   Others say, love. This conflicts even more with the antithesis just mentioned, which would then have to say that man is saved not by external works but by internal works of the law.

c)   There is no place for something that God would have been able to foresee or to know beforehand in man. However subtly one may also sublimate the little He must have seen in man by speaking of a kind of receptivity that must be the opposite of all doing and working, it is still always a receptivity that man himself has rendered and to that extent an activity must correspond to it so that again it is “of those who work” and not of the God who shows mercy.

18. What is the development of the idea of foreknowledge?

The Hebrew יָדַע, “to know,” is as good as the same in meaning as בָּחַר, “to choose,” “to know.” It takes on that meaning as follows: To take note of something closely, to be interested in it, to penetrate to its essence, to care about it—it is in all cases a sign of loving interest that wants to be most closely united with its object. We say, “To understand someone in some matter,” or, “He has not understood me in this.” Accordingly, divine knowing includes the following:

a)   God was first in this act of predestination. The relationship between Him and the objects of His choice originated entirely from Him. Only because He willed to know them and in fact did know them did they become something for Him. That is the element of sovereignty. As an earthly sovereign, if he is pleased with his knowledge of someone or takes note of him, only through this knowledge makes him something of significance, so it is with the knowing of God.

b)   This knowledge or foreknowledge of God is not an act of cold arbitrariness but an act of love in which the Lord, as it were, has been absorbed in knowing and contemplating His beloved from eternity.

c)   It does not stand on its own but carries in itself the impulse for a range of divine acts of salvation. The knowing of God is fruitful; it brings forth grace and glory.

19. Can you show this by some citations from the Old Testament?

Yes, in Hosea 13:4–5, just where Israel’s sin and declensions are spoken of, “But I am the LORD your God from the land of Egypt … I knew you in the wilderness, in the land of great drought”; in Amos 3:2, where Israel’s unfaithfulness is no less in the foreground, it is said, “You only of all the families of the earth have I known; therefore I will afflict you for your unrighteousness.” In Psalm 144:3 the question is raised: “O LORD, what is man that you know him, or the son of man that you consider him?” (cf. also Psa 8:4). By means of the Septuagint the Hebrew meaning was then transferred to the Greek word.

20. What does the preposition προ mean in the compound verb προγιγνώσκειν?

a)   From Romans 8:29 it appears that προ is placed precisely with those acts of God that do not take place in time, namely, with foreknowledge, foreordination, purpose; not, on the other hand, with those acts that do take place in time, namely, calling, justification, and glorification. From this the conclusion may rightly be drawn that προ indicates the eternity of these acts.

b)   At the same time there is included here that the acts are done while their objects did not yet exist, whereby God is first in every respect. When God calls, justifies, and glorifies a person, then that person already exists. When, on the other hand, He foreknows, foreordains him, then that person does not yet exist. One must not therefore view the προ exclusively as a “before” in time but also as a “before” in order.

21. What is the second word that Scripture uses in connection with this doctrine?

Ἐκλέγεσθαι. In biblical Greek this verb occurs only in the middle voice. It corresponds with the Hebrew בָּחַר. The meaning of the Greek word contains the following elements:

a)   Giving preference to a certain object in distinction from other objects that could also have come into consideration.

b)   Choosing accompanied by good pleasure, that is, with an inclination of the will.

c)   Setting apart for a certain relationship in which the chosen object must become mutually related to the one who chooses.

22. How do you prove that the first element, distinction from others, is in fact in this word?

It is in the preposition “out,” “to choose out of.” The Hebrew verb also sometimes expressly indicates this by having מִן follow it. In the Greek ἐκ is sometimes repeated. In Deuteronomy 18:5, Levi is chosen out of all the tribes of Israel; John 15:9, “I have chosen you out of the world”; Luke 6:13, “And chose from them twelve.” Sometimes this concept of being chosen out of can recede into the background because the emphasis falls more on one of the other two elements mentioned above, but it is never entirely absent; Isaiah 58:5, “Is that a fast that I have chosen?” (= that, especially in distinction from other ways of fasting, meets my approval).

23. How do you prove that the second element mentioned above is also in “election”?

In itself it need not be in ἐκλέγεσθαι. One can choose without good pleasure, for example, the most evil out of evils. But generally all choosing is accompanied by an inclination to a preference. One may compare the connection between the Latin verbs diligere and delectari, which are both connected with “to pick,” “to pick out” (λέγειν); Genesis 6:2, “And they took wives from all whom they chose”; Psalm 78:68, “He chose the tribe of Judah, Mount Zion, which He loved.”

24. Does this then mean that in the objects of His election God saw something good, something well-pleasing, in which He could delight Himself?

No, that is not at all what is meant. In fact, in back of “election” lay “foreknowledge.” One may compare with each other Deuteronomy 7:7–8, where it is emphatically stated that no good quality of Israel contributed to Israel’s election, and Genesis 6:2, where the situation is quite different.

25. Where in the word “election” is the third element mentioned above?

In the use of the middle voice. We should actually have to translate it, “to choose for himself.” In the Hebrew that is seen even more clearly (for example, in Num 16:7 and 2 Chr 7:16, where it is said of the person or thing chosen that it is holy, set apart for the Lord; (Pss 105:26; 33:12; 135:4).

26. Is the word “election” always used in the specific sense of election to salvation?

No, it is evident from what has been noted above that it often occurs with another sense. This, however, does not eliminate that it also has this specific sense.

27. Must one add “to salvation” to “election”?

No, that is not its primary meaning. It is for another word that this meaning must be added. To “election” one must add “to a special relationship of belonging to God.” This relationship is such that eternal salvation is connected to it, but one should not shift the biblical point of view. God chooses for Himself a possession. He predestines to eternal salvation. And both continually accompany each other.

28. What is your proof for this?

One may compare the meaning of the word in the middle voice in Deuteronomy 14:2 and texts like Ephesians 1:4, “that we should be holy and blameless before Him in love.”

29. What is the third word mentioned here?

Προορίζειν, which we find used in Romans 8:29, where it immediately follows “foreknow.” It means “to predestine.” It is distinguished from both preceding terms because it requires an addition. To say that someone is foreknown or elect provides, at least in the language of Scripture, a complete thought. To say that someone is predestined immediately elicits the question, “To what?” Ὁρίζειν means “to establish boundaries,” “to make a determination, a reckoning.” Furthermore, it is a completely neutral word, that is, it can be used for good as well as for evil. Election and foreknowledge have only a good sense; predestination also has a bad sense. Compare Acts 2:23, where the ὡρισμένῃ βουλῇ … τοῦ θεοῦ, “the determined counsel of God,” occurs as that by which Christ was handed over (cf. also 4:28).

Besides in Romans 8:29, the more specific meaning of “predestined” appears in Ephesians 1:5, 11, “Who has predestined us for adoption as sons,” and, “in Him we have obtained an inheritance, we who were predestined according to the purpose of Him who works all things according to the counsel of His will.”

The purpose of election is a certain relationship; the purpose of predestination is a certain status, a condition, an image, a destiny. Compare “those whom He has also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son.” Thus, here it is a likeness, conformity to Christ, which is the object of predestination. In this connection one should think of His glory as Mediator, as was noted above.

30. Are the two concepts of “election” and “predestination” always so sharply differentiated?

No, sometimes the former can also be used for the latter; for example, in James 2:5, “Has not God chosen the poor of this world to be rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom?”

31. Is there still another word in use for election?

Yes, namely the word “purpose,” for example in Romans 8:28, “who are called according to His purpose.”

Purpose, πρόθεσις from προτιθέναι. The word differs from προορίζειν by the emphasis falling more on the willing side of God’s decree of predestination. In all God’s decree there is an act of the mind and an act of the will; so also in the decree of predestination. By the former the idea is formed, its destiny delineated, by the latter God with a resolute will establishes what He has thus determined for Himself in order to bring about its reality.

Sometimes “purpose” can also be understood in a more comprehensive sense, so that it includes “foreknowledge” and “election”; 2 Timothy 1:9, “Who has saved us and called us to a holy calling … in His own purpose and grace, which He gave us in Christ Jesus before times eternal.”

Romans 9:11 speaks of a “purpose according to election.” By this the apostle means that God’s purpose was an electing, approving purpose, a purpose that makes distinctions. It was a purpose of choice.

32. Does Scripture use as many words for reprobation as it does for election?

No, we hardly find a single word that can be juxtaposed with the words mentioned above as their opposite. That is certainly to be ascribed in part to the slight degree of practical interest that the congregation has for the darker side of this comforting doctrine.

33. What is the opposite of the word בָּחַר (to choose)?

The Hebrew מָאַס, “to reject.” But nowhere in the Old Testament does this word have the meaning, “not to choose.” It always speaks of rejecting again what was first chosen (Jer 33:24, “Has the LORD rejected the two clans that He chose?”; Psa 78:67–68, “But He rejected the tent of Joseph, He did not choose the tribe of Ephraim; but He chose the tribe of Judah, Mount Zion, which He loved”; cf. Exod 32:32 ff.). Hence Isaiah 14:1 speaks of a repeated election of Israel, “The LORD will have compassion on Jacob and will again choose Israel.” Only in Isaiah 41:9 does the contrast appear to be clearly antithetical; “I have you chosen and not rejected.”

34. May we deduce from this that there is no reprobation alongside of election?

This would be very rash. The “out” in “to choose out” already shows that alongside of election there is something else.

35. What is the Greek word for מאס?

Ἀπωθεῖν, “to reject,” “to cast off” (Rom 11:2).

36. May we deduce from the meaning of these words “reject” and “cast off” that God’s predestination is not immutable?

No, this conclusion, too, is not permissible. Predestination has two senses. There is a foreordination that can end, but predestination in the proper sense, about which we are concerned here, will prove to be irrevocable.

37. Have the different meanings that the word election or foreordination can have sometimes been used to refute the doctrine of predestination?

Yes, it has been claimed that where Scripture speaks of election only a national election is meant. That God chooses means only that He establishes the administration of His covenant of grace amongst one or other nation to the exclusion of other nations. Also, it is maintained, now election only concerns the question in which century one or other pagan nation will be reached by Christian missions. Such predestination will still certainly be called absolute because it is independent of the condition of its objects and of the attitude they adopt. But otherwise one may not speak of an absolute predestination. Whether among such a nation or tribe there will be those who will be born again and converted and receive salvation depends, it is thought, not on God’s sovereign decree, but lies in the use that men themselves make of their freedom of choice.

38. What must be observed against such a view?

a)   That we in no way deny the existence of such a national election. God’s decree is not exclusively concerned with individuals but also comprises nations and establishes the bond between generations. The destiny of a nation is weighed by Him, as is the destiny of a person. There is not the slightest interest, indeed it is completely impossible on Reformed grounds, to deny national election or whatever it may be called.

b)   It must be pointed out that such national election leads directly to personal reprobation. It is firmly established that without the knowledge of God’s word there is no salvation. When, therefore, God sovereignly decrees that certain nations will live on for a long time without the knowledge of the truth, this obviously includes that all the individuals who belong to such nations are lost. Election of a nation or predestination to the enjoyment of the presence of the means of grace is thus simply unthinkable without personal reprobation. And once personal reprobation is admitted then there is no reason for seeing why objections against a personal election can be maintained. If one will not recognize this, then one must posit three classes of men:

1.   Those who have reprobated themselves.

2.   Those who are reprobated by God.

3.   Those who have elected themselves.

This view, however, is highly unacceptable.

39. In theological parlance what is the distinction between predestination and election?

We will note here provisionally that these words differ in significance.

a)   Predestination is a predetermination to a certain destiny. It therefore has the end of the state of affairs in view. Election is the appointment or determination of certain persons for one or other matter; it thus has persons in view.

b)   Predestination is wider in scope than election. The former is usually seen as comprised of two parts: (1) election (Electio) and (2) reprobation (Reprobatio). So understood, election therefore becomes a part of predestination. Election then becomes “ordaining to eternal bliss.”

c)   Election only has reference to specific persons, in order to place them in a specific relationship. Predestination also comprises, with the goal toward which ordaining takes place, the means leading to that goal. When in Romans 8:29 the apostle says that the children of God are foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, he evidently means that this predestinating also ordains the means and the ways that lead to this reality. Hence there follows, “And those whom He predestined, those He has also called, and those whom He has called, those He has also justified, and those He has justified, those He has also glorified.”

40. Where does Paul speak explicitly about predestination?

In Romans 9 and the following chapters.

41. Does this passage speak of an external election that has reference to certain nationalities?

No; that was already asserted long ago, and in modern times opponents of the Reformed doctrine of election repeatedly advance that assertion. That it is wrong appears from the following:

a)   From the entire course of the apostle’s reasoning. Here his discussion of predestination has a very specific immediate cause. The greater part of Israel in his time did not believe in Christ, and the Gentiles had obtained the privileges that were brought to maturity under Israel by its centuries-long development. That caused Paul deep sorrow. He sums up all the glorious things that Israel had possessed earlier (vv. 4–5). Among those things, the “covenants” and the “promises of the covenant” also belong. But he was not ignorant that the promises of the covenant applied to the offspring as well as the fathers. How then could the fathers have had the promises of the covenant and yet their offspring be lost?

Has not then the word of God failed (v. 6)? “No” is the apostle’s answer, for those promises did not hold good, strictly speaking, for all the offspring; they had in view the children of the promise. And if one takes it in this way, he means to say, there is no contradiction between the promises of the covenant made to Abraham and God’s free foreordination. Now it certainly goes without saying that spoken of here is personal, not national predestination. Or, to express it with complete accuracy: personal election but national rejection. The promise of God continues, but not by incorporating Israel as a whole into the New Testament church but rather by joining together individuals out of Israel and the Gentiles to be the true seed of the promise to which the covenant promise made with Abraham pointed.

b)   In so many words we are told to what this foreordination pointed. It is an ordaining to being God’s children, to being the true spiritual children of Abraham (vv. 7–8), to which, consequently, the full glorification of God’s children is tied (v. 23). In contrast to this there is a foreordaining to dishonor (v. 21), to wrath (v. 22), to destruction (v. 22). God has called individuals out of Israel and out of the Gentiles (v. 24). And these who are called are the same of which it was just said that they were vessels of mercy prepared beforehand for glory.

Examples of persons are produced, both of election and hardening (Moses, v. 15; Pharaoh, v. 17). It is not out of a principle of usefulness that God temporarily prefers one and passes by the other, but He does it for the glory of His virtues (vv. 17, 22). From v. 14 on everything is strictly individual.

42. Is it not true then that before v. 14 national matters are discussed?

In a certain sense that must be admitted. “In Isaac shall your offspring be named” certainly means in the first place that Isaac is the son from whom the covenant people will originate, while Israel will be placed outside the administration of the covenant. The thought is certainly not: Isaac is elected to eternal salvation (although we would naturally not deny that). Isaac’s election is therefore still something other than an election to salvation. Likewise v. 9 speaks of the birth of Isaac from Sarah, not of his regeneration as a consequence of his election. Verse 12 is even clearer, where it is seen that the relationship prophesied to Rebekah does not have in view the salvation of Esau and Jacob but the national relationship of both peoples that would originate from them. The older will serve the younger. Likewise, v. 13 (a quote from Mal 1:2–3) is to be understood of a love that had as a result national, theocratic advantages for Esau and Jacob. All this is not subject to any doubt. But anyone who derives from it that here Paul in no way teaches a personal predestination to an eternal destiny is reasoning very superficially and completely bypasses the deep sense of his argument. It is a settled conclusion that he is dealing with the personal unbelief of his brothers according to the flesh, takes his point of departure from that (vv. 1–2) and comes back to it (v. 24). The question therefore becomes how Paul can deduce from national matters a conclusion that he then maintains for personal matters. How can he conclude from the election of Isaac and Jacob the election of all who believe and of their being destined to eternal glory?

The answer is as follows: Paul has seen in what happened with Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Esau, a type for what takes place in a spiritual respect with all who live under the dispensation of the Gospel. Also, that the spiritual promises do not necessarily have in view every fleshly descendant but that God in His election and in making good on His covenant promises remains free—that is clear from the fact that God had already said to Abraham, “I will not produce a son and posterity for you in a natural way, but in a miraculous way” (v. 7). That is (i.e., “that is to be understood typologically”), the birth stemming from the promise accomplishes everything. That was already true in the case of Isaac regarding the origin of the covenant people, Israel. And it is still also true now regarding entrance into glory. Therefore, the conclusion is drawn in v. 8, “the children of the promise are counted as offspring.” Thus, it is entirely a typological argument that the apostle makes use of here, but his theme remains, before as after, the election of individuals out of Jews and paganism.

43. Does the apostle also teach that this election or foreordination of God is completely free, independent of something in man by which he would deserve preference?

Yes, this is taught as emphatically as possible, so that all Remonstrant views are cut off at the root. One might still have been able to say for Isaac and Ishmael that the one, the elect, was born of the free woman, the other, the reprobate, of the slave woman. No wonder then that God made a distinction (Gal 4:22). But Paul has anticipated that objection. And therefore he is not satisfied with referring to the example of Isaac and Ishmael. At the same time he pointed to another example that by the nature of the case does not permit this objection. For Isaac and Ishmael the mothers differed, but for Jacob and Esau there was no trace of such a difference. Not only did they each have a mother equal in status, not only did they have the same mother, not only did they have one mother and one father, but they were children born as twins from the same conception. Rebekah, too, is a proof of this when she was impregnated by one man, namely Isaac our father, for when the children were not yet born neither had done anything either good or bad, so that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not by works but by Him who calls (vv. 10–12). There was nothing outstanding whatsoever in Jacob that would have been a cause to move God to make him a ruler and Esau his servant. The word that determined their destiny already went out before they had done anything either good or bad. And this word was intentionally proclaimed well in advance so that later when the distinction came to light, one would not think it was for the better qualities of Jacob that he was given preference. Rather, it must be seen that the destiny of these two, and the nations that would descend from them, depended on the free will of the One who called. For that reason their destinies were different, and in this way it was seen in all its clarity that it was not by works. God of Himself had determined that He would have only the one for the work that He does in His covenant people. If that work had only been revealed later to Jacob and not to Esau, the possibility existed that one would have attributed the honor for this to Jacob himself, to his better qualities. That must not be. It must become clear: not of works, but of the One who calls. And in order to prevent this, God proclaimed well in advance, already before their birth, what will occur when the children grow up.

This happened in this way so that it would be clear how the God who calls is the fountain of all grace by which people are distinguished. But the same thing is also expressed still differently. It also had for its goal “so that the purpose of election (purpose of choice) might stand.” Here we are presented with a work in an area where otherwise the works of Scripture are so sparse. A motive is spoken of by which God is guided in His sovereign and mysterious election. The purpose of choice and the “not of works, but of the One who calls” here stand beside each other as matters of identical content and of identical purport. The apostle thus evidently intends to teach that God makes a distinction between man and man in His predestination, because in that way it emerges into the clearest light that the elect have everything from His sovereignly working (= calling) grace. Where God from persons completely alike takes the one and leaves the other, there it is indisputable that He is the source of grace. This indication must be received by us thankfully. And what Paul teaches us is entirely in accord with Scripture. Sovereign election and free grace, then, are always in connection with each other. Whoever deprives us of election deprives us of free grace. That holds for election in general, but according to these words of the apostle it also holds for election in the specific sense, for the choosing, discriminating element in predestination. Whoever teaches a general salvation that includes everyone in its end results still certainly need not fail to do justice to the reality of free grace. But he necessarily fails to do justice to the revelation of free grace. And for this Paul has an eye here.

44. How do some attempt to negate this teaching of Paul on predestination?

By pointing to its other side, which is discussed in Romans 9:30–10:21.

Both of the following are settled for the apostle:

a)   The free, sovereign ordination of God, which does not derive its grounds from the activity of man.

b)   The full responsibility of man toward his Creator.

He then discusses both in succession. The apostle has not made an attempt to reconcile these two with each other logically. Nor may we make such an attempt. But it is even more impermissible to bend and distort the contents of Romans 9 up to v. 30, so that in one way or another it conforms to what follows. Both sides must remain next to each other, unreconciled for our thinking but each in its full right. To want to explain Romans 9 by Romans 9 is rationalistic exegesis.

45. What does Paul teach concerning the national election related to Israel?

In Romans 9 and following he discusses this in detail.

He asks: “Has God rejected His people?” And the answer is: “By no means! God has not rejected His people whom He has foreknown” (11:1–2).

a)   A nation once foreknown cannot be rejected entirely so that nothing of it would remain; no seed would be saved out of it.

Paul therefore points to himself as an example that God is fulfilling the promises made to the fathers. He himself is a Jew. Also in Elijah’s days 7,000 men were left. Israel’s election, as a national election too, is thus first of all irrevocable in the sense that there always remains a remnant according to election (v. 5).

b)   There is another way in which this national election is carried out. Although it is true that there is a remnant, nevertheless the great mass is rejected. In 11:15 there is also talk of “their rejection,” which parallels “their decrease” in v. 12. God has indeed rejected Israel as a whole, as a nation; the majority of the people is placed outside the administration of the covenant. But if one looks away from the present and does not consider the near future, then it remains the case that also this nation as an organism, this totality, is elect and once again will be placed into the dispensation of the covenant. The fullness of the Gentiles will enter and all Israel will be saved. So also can it be maintained that the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance (v. 29).

c)   From this then is to be inferred how verses 17 and 19 must be understood when they speak of broken off and engrafted branches. This has frequently been viewed as proof of the relativity and changeability of election, and it is pointed out that at the end of v. 23 the Gentile Christians are threatened with being cut off in case they do not continue in the kindness of God. But wrongly. Already the image of engrafting should have restrained such an explanation. This image is nowhere and never used of the implanting of an individual Christian into the mystical body of Christ by regeneration. Rather, it signifies the reception of a racial line or national line into the dispensation of the covenant or their exclusion from it. This reception of course occurs by faith in the preached word, and to that extent, with this engrafting of a race or a nation, there is also connected the implanting of individuals into the body of Christ. The cutting off, of course, occurs by unbelief: not, however, by the unbelief of persons who first believed, but solely by the remaining in unbelief of those who, by virtue of their belonging to the racial line, should have believed and were reckoned as believers. So, a rejection (= multiple rejection) of an elect race is possible, without it being connected to a reprobation of elect believers. Certainly, however, the rejection of a race or nation involves at the same time the personal reprobation of a sequence of people. Nearly all the Israelites who are born and die between the rejection of Israel as a nation and the reception of Israel at the end times appear to belong to those reprobated. And the threat of v. 22 is not directed to the Gentile Christians as individual believers but to them considered racially.

46. How does the reasoning of the apostle in Romans 9 oppose election by foreseen faith and good works?

It rules out this Remonstrant understanding decisively. It is said of Esau and Jacob that their destiny was decided and that decision was announced before they had done anything, good or bad. But the whole argument is also overthrown if one must accept that even the slightest good is foreseen in man. The question of v. 14, “What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God?” becomes completely inexplicable if Paul considered the difference between belief and unbelief as the reason for the distinction between elect and reprobate. Then even the slightest appearance of injustice would be absent, and it would occur to no one to bring such a charge against God’s doing.

That was not so for Jacob and Esau. But now there are a large number of people, even a majority, whose destiny is decided while they are still just like Jacob and Esau, not yet having reached the age of discretion. There is no speaking of faith as an act for children before their use of their minds. Therefore, the Remonstrant conception is not applicable to them. Now one can of course easily say that all children who die before they use their minds are elect. But the question is whether anyone would dare to apply this to the children who live outside the administration of the covenant of grace. If one does not venture to do so, and Scripture certainly does not give grounds for this, then it appears that for children election and reprobation takes place according to a different rule than foreseen faith and good works.

Furthermore, faith and good works always appear elsewhere in Scripture not as the occasion for God’s election but as the fruit and result of election (John 6:44; Eph 1:4; 2:8–10; Acts 13:48; Phil 1:29; 1 Thess 1:2–4).

Already Augustine said, “A wheel does not run well in order to become round, but it runs well because it is round.”

47. What is the meaning of the question in Romans 9:14?

It appears from the words with which it is introduced here that it is an objection that Paul anticipated. The objection is directed to the biased, discriminating element in election. Justice is one of God’s virtues, and that would appear to have to include strict impartiality. Thus, one who is not elect would be able to object that God has not dealt with him justly. Paul gives the answer to this objection in a quote from the Old Testament. It is taken from Exodus 33:19 according to the Septuagint. There God speaks to Moses, “I will make all my goodness pass before you and will proclaim the name of the Lord before you. But I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious and will show mercy to whom I will show mercy.” Here the Lord ascribes it to His free mercy that He grants Moses this vision and expresses this as a general proposition. He will (in fact) show in the future His grace and mercy to those whom He has now sovereignly decreed in his grace and mercy.

With this the objection is not refuted, but with an appeal to God’s own declaration it is declared inadmissible. God Himself declares in Scripture that He reserves for Himself this so-called biased and unjust action and this way of acting against which men murmur. The apostle simply ascertains the fact without going further into its explanation and draws directly from his quotation the conclusion, “So then it is not of the one who wills or of the one who runs, but of the merciful God.” These words are to be understood in a wholly general sense, without an allusion to certain facts having to be sought in them—for example, the willing of Abraham with respect to Ishmael or the running of Esau for the venison. Willing is simply human desiring, running is the strenuous attempting of man.

By appealing to this axiom Paul has naturally not wanted to suggest that there was no other explanation. It is certainly necessary to pay attention to how such an explanation is obvious. Partiality and impartiality, justness and injustice are opposites that presuppose particular relationships. If a dispute exists between two people over the right of ownership to a certain sum of money, and I am called in as arbiter and in distributing the sum give more to the one, less to the other than is due them, then I certainly show partiality and injustice. Here there was an original right violated by my choice. Where there is a right there can be injustice. But, conversely, where a right is lacking, that is not the case. If I decide to distribute a certain sum among the poor and I decide to be more generous to the one than to the other, then it is absurd to speak of injustice and partiality. None of those poor can claim any right to his gift. I act in a discriminating fashion, but am beyond all partiality, provided there are no parties involved. I remain beyond all injustice, provided there are none with rights. Now the apostle does not intend to say this directly, but it still comes through by implication in his answer. In what is said there is nothing of willing and running, whereby rights would originate, but exclusively of God’s mercy. Mercy is not a judicial function or attribute, but a gift. Giving is a free action not bound by rights. Matthew 20:15, “Am I not permitted to do what I want with what is mine? Or is your eye evil because I am good?”

Of course the vindication of God, if one wants to seek such, is not to be sought in the equal sin of all. Here there is no speaking of a right; hence it can also not be a right forfeited by sin. Further, sin is equal in everyone. From an equal condition one can never justify a discriminating course of action. The only answer must be: Election is an action of God whereby no rights of persons comes into consideration, an act that God performs not as judge but out of the fullness of His sovereignty. He will have mercy on whom He has determined to have mercy.

48. Give an explanation of Romans 9:16–18.

These verses serve to provide the apostle with a conclusive proof for the sovereignty of election. He could have left matters with his argument that according to God’s own express declaration there is no injustice with Him that He grants grace to whom He wills. But with marvelous resoluteness he goes a step further and shows that God is just as free in apportioning evil. That must thus shut the door [to all objections]. For God (= Scripture) says to Pharaoh, etc.

God’s words to Pharaoh are, “Just for this have I raised you up so that in your person I might show my power and so that my name might be fully manifested in all the earth.” This is a quotation from Exodus 9:16, partly according to the Septuagint but with a single apparently intentional change. The Septuagint has διετηρήθης, “You have been preserved alive.” The Hebrew has הֶעֱמַדְתִּיךָ, “I have caused you to stand.” The question here is not in the first place what the Hebrew in Exodus 9:16 means according to the letter. It occurs repeatedly that New Testament Scripture changes the letter of the Old Testament in order to give a better explanation of the purpose and the deeper intention that a word has. This has also happened here.

To begin with, in New Testament Greek ἐγείρειν, “to raise,” consistently has the meaning “to raise up,” “to cause to appear” (Matt 11:11, “Among those born of women there has arisen no one greater,” etc.; Matt 24:11, “Many false prophets will arise”; John 7:52, “No prophet is arisen from Galilee”).

Next, if Paul had wanted to say, “I have preserved your life” or “brought you to the throne” or “raised you up from an illness” or whatever of the like, then the changing of the words from the Septuagint becomes inexplicable.

Third, the Hebrew and what Paul says agree in principle entirely if we translate, “I have raised you up.” The Hebrew simply says, “I have let you stand,” that is, while many others must fall away, you remain. Paul explains that further. This happened, he says, because with the historical appearance of Pharaoh God had His purpose, and Pharaoh may not fall until this purpose was attained. Therefore, he remained standing.

Fourth, with every weakening explanation one blunts the point of Paul’s reasoning if thereby the conclusion no longer follows logically that the apostle himself draws in v. 18, “So then He hardens whom He wills.” That God has put Pharaoh on the throne, has kept him alive, or has raised him from his sick bed, that at the same time supplies a conclusion, that He has raised him up in his entire personality.

This is also the exegesis of Calvin, “… from which it follows that one now disputes with Him in vain, as if He were bound to give an account of Himself, since He of Himself proceeds to remove this objection, saying that the reprobate come out of the hidden treasure of His providence, in which He will have His name praised.” So also Beza, Piscator, Bengel, Olshausen, Rüchert, Beck, Tholuck, Philippi, and many others.

If one wants to lessen something of the harshness of these words, then it must happen along a different path. One, one choosing this course, can say that this producing of Pharaoh’s personality did not happen from abstract, still indeterminate humanity, but from sinful humanity. It has in view mediate creation. Of course, no one can object to that, although it cannot be proven that Paul had thought specifically of that. In any case, Pharaoh was raised to be an example of God’s power. He was created for that. And that was the main purpose of “just for this end.”

49. Give an explanation of v. 18.

The emphasis falls on the initial words, “On whom He wills He shows mercy, whom He wills He hardens.” The apostle intends to say there is no other reason for the different assignments of destiny than the absolute will of God. And this is true both for the destiny of misery as well as for the destiny of blessedness.

Concerning the term “harden” (σκληρύνειν), here, too, there are many ready who think they are obliged to help the apostle by giving his words the blandest possible sense, so that he would not be ascribing anything preposterous to God. Calvin says, “Moreover, the word ‘harden,’ when it is attributed to God in Scripture, not only means permission, as some who insipidly mitigate wish, but also the activity of divine wrath,” as Solomon also teaches that the perdition of the wicked has not merely been foreseen but that the wicked themselves are created with the purpose that they perish (Prov 16:4).

50. What does v. 19 contain?

An objection that Paul takes from the mouth of the opponents of predestination. This time it is not an objection against the partiality of God but against the fairness of God when He complains about the evil of sinners. It is within God’s decree that sinners are like this; His sovereignty has predestined them to everything they are. Thus, they are in their entire appearance the result (not the product) of God’s foreordination. But how then can God complain about them? Who has resisted His will—that is, who has ever successfully resisted His omnipotent will? The answer, no one! Thus we, too, have not been able to resist successfully. And we have to let ourselves become what God will have us to be. Therefore, God may not complain.

This is the objection. And now, the answer. In order to understand it well one will have to recall how Paul has answered the objection of v. 14. Not by removing the objection by reasoning and subtle distinctions, but simply by setting over against it God’s emphatic declaration itself and then, with a bold turn, by placing alongside it a still more impressive example of God’s sovereignty: You complain that God shows mercy to one and not to the other? I will answer you with what God Himself declares concerning this. He says to Moses, etc. But I will still tell you something else. He is not only free to withhold mercy. He also is free to harden and to bring about hardening. For he says to Pharaoh, etc. Do you complain that then nobody can resist His will and that the wicked must necessarily become as they are in their hardening? I will still tell you something else. Who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Does not the potter have power over the clay, etc.?

Such is the large-scale course of the apostle’s reasoning. From it is evident how one misunderstands it totally if one advances all sorts of restrictions in order to tone it down. Undoubtedly, the apostle has also known about these restrictions and in fact he has himself used them on other occasions. He was just as much at home as we are with teaching on human responsibility and on the subjective development of human sin. He certainly knew that God is strictly just as well as sovereign. But he has intentionally left that to the side here and viewed the matter from the side of sovereignty. Why? Would he not have stopped the mouths of these blasphemers with more effect by pointing out to them that, although rejected by God, they are lost because of their own guilt? Did he now not expose himself to the danger that one goes on to say, Paul has no answer to our counter argument? The answer: It appeared to Paul in this connection to be beneath God’s dignity to conduct a defense of His justice against these blasphemers. One does not convince such people; one stops their mouth. Furthermore, what Paul could and may have brought forward for the vindication of this sovereign way of proceeding by God would have been so difficult to understand that it probably would still have missed its mark. Here lie depths we can never fathom, difficulties that we will see solved by no one. The reasoning to which Paul has kept himself is in this case in fact the most effective.

Now comes the image of the potter and the clay. In order to explain it one needs to remember for what purpose an image or a parable is intended. It is not to be applied point for point. Whoever does that with the ordinary images and parables of Scripture will end up with the greatest absurdities. Every image has a tertium comparationis, the main point about which the comparison turns, about which it deals. All the rest is accessory. Applying this rule here, we ask: What is the main point of the comparison used here?

a)   It is not the condition of the material from which the potter forms vessels. This can be coarse clay or fine clay meant for the most delicate porcelain. But that makes no difference in the relationship of the potter to the lump. So too here. The purpose of the image is absolutely not to show us whether the lump of humanity was pure or impure, refined or unrefined. In itself both can have been the case. Suppose the lump was sinful, impure. Is thereby God’s sovereignty toward the lump less? If so, then one must consider the idea of the impurity of the lump as having been included.

b)   It is also not the manner of working the clay followed by the potter that constitutes the point of comparison. One potter works with coarse, another with fine tools, one artistically and with nimble fingers, another tastelessly and without feeling for beauty. They all handle the lump of clay mechanically as lifeless material that they knead and form according to their heart’s desire without the lump reacting to their working. All this cannot be carried over to God’s treatment of man. He does not work on us as lifeless material but as living spirits. We are not dead and inanimate in His fingers. He does not deal with us mechanically. All such considerations lie outside the scope of the comparison. The image teaches us absolutely nothing concerning the mystery of how the formation of man takes place in God’s decree. Whether that happens by mere permission or by withdrawing grace or by positive unfathomable acts, nothing about that is told us here. The one as well as the other is entirely within the terms of the image.

c)   The tertium comparationis evidently consists of two things:

1.   The allotment of a certain quality.

2.   In connection with that, the assignment of a certain destiny.

These are surely the two things the potter does with respect to his vessels. He determines first of all for what they will serve, and then he determines how they must be made in order to serve this purpose. And in both cases He has authority over the clay. One should note that here “authority” is spoken of, not “power” (Greek ἐξουσία, not δύναμις). “Power” is a physical concept; “authority” is a moral concept. No one will deny that God has power over His creatures as the potter possesses power to work the clay. But that God possesses the authority for that, the authorization, the critics of divine predestination deny. But, Paul says to these critics, the relationship of God to you is like the relationship of potter to vessel. God can rightly, without in any sense detracting from His virtues, deal with you in the two respects mentioned above, as a potter deals with the clay. When He does that, He acts with the authorization that belongs to Him as God. And concerning that authorization, which conforms to God’s perfect holiness, the creature is not free to pass judgment. That fact is contained in the question, “Who are you, O man, who answers back to God?” As man, as creature, the elect or the reprobate is not in a position to pass judgment about whether the actions of the Most High are just or not. The creature has no absolute standard of justice in himself that he could apply to God to evaluate His acts. This is not in the least denying that there is such a standard. God bears it in Himself, in His holy nature. In this point, too, we cannot extend the comparison between the potter and God. For concerning the potter in forming his vessels no ethical issues at all come into consideration. He does not need to respect any ethical laws toward his clay. The clay has no ethical qualities. It is a purely physical lump. But also when God orders the destiny of man in His eternal foreordination, He thereby acts according to ethical principles and from ethical motives. Only, the apostle intends to say, the creature has just as little right to pass judgment on these moral principles and motives as a clay vessel has a right to make a judgment about the intentions and thoughts of its maker. And a vessel has no right in this respect, indeed cannot have such a right.

So it comes down to the two elements in the image mentioned above. This cannot be difficult. The first, the allotment of a quality, is contained in the question of the thing formed: “Why have you made me like this?” From this it appears convincing that here in fact the determining of quality is spoken of. The thing formed knows, as it were, that its condition and its destiny cohere, that its destiny is given with its condition. Therefore it says: “Why like this?” Further, this first element is present in the name that God bears here, “The One who forms” (πλάσας). Forming is not merely the assigning of a destiny, but also the allotting, the granting of certain characteristics. We repeat here: Concerning the way that forming took place, the text tells us nothing. But that it took place is certainly evident in the text, and an unbiased exegesis will have to grant this.

The second element mentioned, the assignment of a destiny, is present in v. 21, where it is said of the potter that he makes one vessel “for honor,” the other “for dishonor.” That has in view the destiny that the vessels have. The one has a noble use, the other a shameful one. Likewise, people are destined for a noble or for an ignoble use. The apostle has transferred these traits to people insofar as they are the objects of God’s predestination. He says that some people are “vessels of wrath, prepared for destruction.” Others are “vessels of mercy, prepared for glory.”

It is clear that in these expressions the two concepts, “destruction” and “glory,” correspond to “honor” and “dishonor” in the image of the potter. As the potter predestines to dishonor, so God predestines to destruction; as the potter predestines to honor, so God predestines to glory. And from that it follows almost of itself that the two other concepts, “wrath” and “mercy,” must agree with the qualitative element in the image. Calvin says, “They are vessels prepared for destruction, that is, given up and ordained to destruction. At the same time they are also vessels of wrath, that is, made to be demonstrations of God’s punishment and anger.” Wrath and destruction correspond to one another, the one demands the other. And likewise one must not take “vessels of mercy” to be vessels that were objects of mercy. Then all correspondence with the image is lost. They are vessels intended to serve for showing mercy. The genitive is a genitive that describes destiny. Calvin, “So then we believers are quite rightly called vessels of mercy, whom the Lord uses as instruments for manifesting his mercy; and the reprobate are rightly called vessels of wrath because they serve to demonstrate the judgments of God.”

51. How is v. 22 to be understood?

Many who thus far agree with the exegesis just given think that a turn in the apostle’s argument occurs here. They find this indicated by the particle δέ, “but if.” They think that the sense is, “I insist that this is the absolute right of God and that He can and may act in this way. But what if He has not made use of this right?” But it has been quite rightly pointed out that such a contrast demands a much stronger word than the simple δέ. The sentence is to be paraphrased as follows: “If now, however, God when He had determined to reveal his wrath and to make known His power in certain persons (the reprobate), instead of immediately implementing this decision, bore these vessels prepared for destruction with much patience, with the intention that thereby it would be possible for Him to show the riches of His glory through vessels of mercy prepared for glory, must not then there be silence and must not one acknowledge that God in this particular implementation of His absolutely sovereign decree is no less right than if He had implemented it immediately?” The answer to this must naturally be in the affirmative.

We add the following for clarification. God could have immediately carried out His decree with regard to the reprobate. As soon as they became vessels of wrath by their willful sin, He could have given them up to destruction. But He did not do that. He bore them in much patience, that is, by postponing and delaying their punishment. He did this with a certain purpose, as is indicated by “so that.” This purpose lay in the determination that He had made concerning the elect. He willed to show the richness of His glory concerning the vessels of mercy, and those vessels of mercy were included in the organism of the world. Therefore, had the Lord immediately abandoned the vessels of wrath to destruction, then the organism of the world would have been disrupted and the revelation of mercy could not have taken place in a gradual manner.

A point has been made of κατηρτισμένα είς ἀπώλειαν, “fitted for destruction,” in antithesis to ἃ προητοίμασεν, “that He had prepared beforehand” (v. 23). Supposedly this would indicate a distinction between the vessels of mercy being prepared by God and the vessels of wrath preparing themselves. Nothing is against this view in itself. Everyone would agree that God in His governance of all things lets people go to destruction by their sin in a different way than He leads others to glory by His grace. The one is active, the other permissive, although not inactive. But it may be rightly doubted whether the apostle meant to express that by his words here. Actually, Paul is not at all speaking here about the effecting of God’s counsel but about that counsel itself. One can certainly also posit a distinction in this counsel between the ordinary decree and the permissive decree. But even that is not expressed by the word κατηρτισμένα. Calvin writes, “So it is nonetheless without doubt that both these preparations are located in the secret counsel of God. Otherwise Paul would have said that the reprobate proceed or cast themselves into destruction. But now he means that before they are born, they are ordained to and left in their condition.”

That in the one instance is “prepared” (passive), in the other, “that He had prepared beforehand” (active) will have no other ground than aiming at variation in expression. Besides, Calvin is certainly right when he thinks that here preparing and making ready do not refer to the actual leading and governing of men in the execution of God’s decree, but to the forming and preparing of the destiny of men in God’s decree itself. That is clearly reflected in “prepared beforehand for glory.” In His long-suffering God spares the reprobate, not only for those elect who have already been prepared in reality but also for those who do not yet exist in reality but nevertheless are prepared in God’s counsel. Concerning those whose life and fate He has already made a determination, such is thus the apostle’s reasoning in this significant pericope.

We do not have to occupy ourselves at length here about whether this reasoning is infralapsarian or supralapsarian. However, if our explanation is correct, then an infralapsarian explanation will not do justice to the words of the apostle. The question of the vessel would then have never read, “Why have you made me thus?” but at the most, “Why when I already was as I was did you ordain me to this end?” But the question now is, “Why have you made me thus?” We believe therefore that also included in predestination here is God’s foreordination of everything by which man becomes everything he becomes. And since the fall of our first parents is a prominent part of that, we also include this. By no means are we saying, on the other hand, that the apostle presents God here as the cause of sin. How God’s decree, which comprehends all this, is executed does not at all come into consideration for the apostle. It was a permissive decree with respect to sin, and in its execution God remains entirely free of evil. God did not drive or incite man to sin. Man sinned entirely of himself. The image of the potter does not intend to teach us that by virtue of His predestination God makes man a sinner. But there is certainly involved, we think, that in His decree regarding the destiny of creatures, God includes the sin that men themselves commit, and that the concern of His decree with sin occupies a place in His predestination of what men will be and to what end they will serve.

52. Is election also discussed in the other letters of the apostle?

Yes, in the letters from the first imprisonment the wisdom of the decree of election comes to the fore, while in the Letter to the Romans the point is more the sovereignty of God. Ephesians 1:4 teaches that believers are chosen in Christ, that it happened before the foundation of the world, and that it had as its purpose that God’s children be holy and blameless before Him in love.

The first of these points means:

a)   Not that Christ was the basis or meriting cause of election, as if the reconciling love of the Father could only have been active because of the surety of Christ. Scripture teaches us above all that Christ with His incarnation, His mediatorship and everything connected with it must be regarded as a gift of God’s electing love. Thus one must not say that God’s love cannot rest on the elect except in Christ. For Christ Himself as Mediator was already a gift of that love.

b)   It also does not mean that Christ was elected first and then believers, so that in the election of Him as head the election of the members as decreed would have been included. That also cannot be, for then one comes to the conclusion that believers exist just as well for the sake of Christ as Christ does for believers. Scripture teaches the opposite. He has been given to us by the Father.

c)   The right meaning is that the children of God are chosen in order to be in Christ for the purpose that in Christ they would be included as members of His body. Compare Galatians 1:6: “Who has called you in the grace of Christ”; that is, “so that you would be in the grace of Christ.” Thus contained in the election of God is the determination that believers would form a unity with Christ and that only in fellowship with Christ would they share in all the saving benefits intended for them. They are blessed with all spiritual blessings in heaven in Christ. Certainly, Christ thus duly enters into the decree of election but, one must note, as object. Of course we are speaking here of Christ in His quality as Mediator and not as eternal Logos in the abstract. Christ as Mediator was object and means in the decree of predestination.

By “before the foundation of the world” (πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου), election is delineated as an eternal act, an important point against many who maintain that for Paul election was a temporal act, like calling and justification. The purpose of election is holiness and blamelessness before God. That is, it is aimed in the first place at the glory of God. When God chooses something, He sets it apart for Himself that it be holy.

The plan of salvation is repeatedly portrayed in these letters as a creation of the wisdom of the Lord, who is worthy of the admiration of angels and men. The elect congregation is by preference called a body (Eph 4:4; Col 3:15).

It also coheres with this, then, when here the entire history of the world is placed under the viewpoint of being a single great outworking of this counsel of God. The purpose of God is called a πρόθεσις τῶν αἰώνων, “a purpose of the ages” (Eph 3:11). It is made “before the foundation of the world.” That, therefore, is to say that the Lord who made it is the same God who created all things through Christ Jesus (Eph 3:9, 10).

Likewise, enough is made of a certain relationship of Christ in this counsel of God to the angels. It was the good pleasure of the Father in Christ to reconcile to Himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven. Among the things in heaven here the angel will certainly have to be understood (cf. Eph 1:10–11; Col 1:20).

53. For the doctrinal exposition of the doctrine of predestination what subjects must be discussed in succession?

a)   The subject of predestination, the predestinating God.

b)   The point of departure of predestination, divine foreknowledge.

c)   The distinguishing element of predestination, divine election.

d)   The effective and formative element of predestination, foreordination.

e)   The objects of predestination, angels, men, the Mediator.

f)   The quality in which the objects of predestination appear; expressed differently, the scope of predestination.

54. To whom is predestination generally ascribed in Scripture?

To God the Father. In 1 Peter 1:2 believers are therefore called “elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father.” In Ephesians 1 emphasis is placed on the fact that the love of election is a fatherly love. Election bears the marks of a fatherly act. Insofar as it governs the fate and destiny of creatures, it has in a certain sense a creative character. It is the Father who in order first forms the idea of election, although, of course, as an ad extra act the entire Trinity must be involved. However, nowhere in Scripture is election ascribed to the Son or the Holy Spirit. When in John 6:70; 13:18; 15:16, 19; Acts 1:2, 24 the word “chosen” is used of Christ, eternal election to salvation is not meant, but temporal choice and ordaining to an office.

55. What is included when we ascribe election to the Father within the divine economy?

That the so-called “counsel of peace” does not precede election but follows it in order. The former must be viewed as the first step in the implementation of the idea of election. The counsel of peace comprises the eternal suretyship of Christ, on which all God’s gracious treatment of sinners in time depends. If now that surety is particular, that is, is not entered into for the human race in general but very specifically for the elect and for the elect only, then it follows that there must already have been a determining of the elect, an establishing of their persons, before the undertaking between the Father and the Son concerning suretyship began (this “before” and this “began” are not to be understood temporally). The opposite view, it occurs to us, must lead to a doctrine of universal atonement. In that case Christ was given for all and has accepted the suretyship, without limitation, for all, and only later in order has there entered into God’s counsel the limitation by which the suretyship of Christ is put in force and made effective only for certain persons. That would come close to resembling the Amyraldian scheme, about which we will still speak later and which also begins with the universal in order to end with the particular. God’s intention and love is initially all-embracing and later reduces to individual persons. This cannot be. We may think of a particular love of God provided it is there from the beginning.

56. What was the starting point of predestination with respect to believers?

Scripture teaches us that it is to be found in God’s eternal love. To begin with, that is present in the word “foreknowledge” as we have developed its meaning above. This foreknowledge is a free sovereign love. And “foreknowledge” is put first by the apostle in the series of acts that form the foundation of the salvation of the sinner (Rom 8:29). Furthermore, this love of God is characterized for us by foreknowledge as a personal love. God did not merely love a part, a kernel, a remnant of humanity. God, we must say, loved particular people, a John, a Paul, etc. It was a knowing by name, a personal knowing, something moreover already included in the term “knowing” itself. A love other than personal is in itself not possible. Love is in its nature something personal. Finally, we must hold that for us nothing lies in back of this love. One may not even put mercy in back of it. And certainly not for the following reasons: Mere mercy is not something personal. Anyone who is in misery has as such a claim to our mercy. Mercy distinguishes itself just by this natural, general character from love. Thus, if in election one wishes to make mercy the starting point, one abandons a personal starting point. It would then have to be said: God saw us in our sin and by this, our miserable condition, was moved to compassion to save us in Christ. And that compassion then set God’s love into motion. But then one could rightly ask whether all sinners did not stand equally miserable before God and whether equal misery should not have produced equal mercy for all. If one answers “no,” then one concedes that besides mercy there was still something else that caused it to remain specifically with certain specific persons. And this something else can only lie in the love of God. It was there before mercy. And by it mercy was awakened and actuated. Only so is it also true that the ground of election does not in any respect lie in us, not even in our miserable lost condition. God loved us and saved us not because but despite our being miserable. Scripture considers this from the same point of view: “God who is rich in mercy on account of His great love with which He has loved us …” (Eph 2:4). Here mercy is clearly derived from love and not the reverse.

57. In what does the distinguishing element of election lie?

In the word “election” itself: That of itself makes us think of an antithesis and excludes every universalistic conception, every doctrine of a restoration of all things. God elected certain persons with the clear intention that He did not wish to elect others. One must bring these two sides into relationship with each other.

In us attention can so focus on a few things or persons that the remaining things or persons, although belonging to the same rubric, can remain in the background, and we, as it were, do not think of them. Thus one can only say in a relative sense that a decision concerning them has been made by us. It happens despite ourselves, because we neglect to make a decision concerning them. But with an omniscient God something like that is wholly impossible. There are no consequences in His determination that would not be completely clear to Him. His election has reprobation as its reverse side. This must be emphasized in our day because one readily presents the matter differently. Reprobation is described as the absence of any decision. God says otherwise in His Word. He declares that He has made a distinction between Jacob and Esau, Isaac and Ishmael and has done that not because He ignored Ishmael and Esau but because He willed specifically to withhold from them what He gave the others.

58. Was there some reason for this discrimination present in the objects of election themselves?

No; that, too, is denied by Scripture. Election as a discriminating election is at the same time an entirely free election. But free is still something other than arbitrary. Election would not be free if God were led by motives that He had not derived from Himself. Election would have been arbitrary if God had been entirely without any motives, something that cannot be reconciled with His wisdom. For everything the Lord has a most sufficient and wise ground. It is enough for us to know that this ground came from Himself and not from those He elected. They were ordained to form one body with Christ the Mediator. Therefore it could not be a matter of indifference who they would become in the end. But that was not a ground for God, for they were that first by election and not the reverse. Suitability for the purposes of election is not the motivating cause in God but is much more its fruit.

59. May one say that there was only reprobation for the sake of election, that is, so that God’s love and mercy with respect to the elect would appear so much the stronger?

No; this, too, is not presented by Scripture as the only purpose. It teaches us that there are two purposes of God with reprobation.

a)   The one just mentioned—so that by the just rejection of some, the sovereign work of God’s grace would appear so much the better as an exclusive work of God in the others. Therefore it is said, “So that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works but of Him who calls” (Rom 9:11). Esau was rejected so that it might appear how in Jacob everything was God’s promise and God’s work. In the same sense it is said, verses 22–23, that God with much patience has tolerated the vessels of wrath prepared for destruction in order to make known the riches of His glory in the vessels of mercy. Also in this some have found a proof for the proposition that reprobation is exclusively for the sake of election. But this is not the sense of these words. It is only said how enduring with patience the vessels of wrath (which apart from this were already vessels of wrath) stood in connection with the salvation of the elect.

b)   There is still a higher ground in God as to why He also places the reprobate beside the elect. Scripture says He intends to establish vessels of dishonor to show His wrath, to make known His power (Rom 9:22). This is therefore an independent purpose, subordinate next to the purpose in election.

60. What do you understand by the effective and formative element in predestination?

We have already seen how Scripture gives us the acts of predestination in this sequence: foreknowledge, foreordination.

This foreordination emerges from foreknowledge. It determines the destiny and the condition of the elect of God, which they will finally reach when election has reached its goal. According to Romans 8:29, it is an image that is effected by foreordination. But now one must not limit foreordination by restricting it in a one-sided fashion to defining this image. It also comprises, beside this final state, all the means and ways by which this state will be reached. That is meant by the effectual and formative element in predestination. It is often presented in practice as if the means were disconnected from the end. One then posits election as something incomprehensible, above the operation of the grace of God. And it appears as if it is realized in a miraculous fashion apart from the means God had established. This is entirely contrary to Scripture. Paul teaches us that with election all the means and ways are also taken into account by which it must become reality. Therefore, “those He has first foreordained, those He has also called; those He has called, those He has also justified; those He justified, those He has also glorified.” Thus, to extract the means is, humanly speaking, to provide a ground for thinking that one does not belong to the elect. Passively waiting to see whether election will take effect always rests on the mistaken understanding that election can operate outside the means.

This ordaining of means in the predestination of God must be taken in the widest sense. Everything belongs to it that contributes to bring the elect to where God will have them in the end. Included, then, is not only the ministering of grace, the external call, etc., but also preparatory grace in the sense to be defined later. Before God’s children come to Him, the course of their life is not left to arbitrariness and chance. God appoints their destinies and their circumstances exactly in a manner as can be most serviceable for their subsequent place in the body of the elect. This was the case with Paul, who was set apart from his mother’s womb, with Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, and this is also the case with the most insignificant believer. And after the external call this disposition also extends to the slightest detail. In connection with his discussion of election the apostle teaches precisely that all things, for those who are called according to God’s purpose, must work together for good. That shows clearly how all things in God’s counsel are placed under this viewpoint and so ordained that they must lead to this result, the good of God’s children.

61. Who are the objects of predestination?

Scripture mentions angels, men, the Mediator. Thus far we have only spoken about men. We will now first answer the question whether the Mediator can be called predestined and elect. In 1 Peter 1:20 Scripture speaks of Christ, “who was foreknown before the foundation of the world but has been made manifest in these last times for your sake.” In Luke 23:35 He is called “the elect of God”; in 1 Peter 2:4 “a living stone rejected by men but in the sight of God elect and precious.” From the latter two verses it appears that “elect” must be understood as equivalent to “precious” and “beloved.” This points us in the right direction. For Christ we ask how far one can speak:

a)   Of foreknowledge. Foreknowledge means the personal love of God for the objects of His election. Now, the person of the Mediator was the person of God’s Son. Can one speak then of a personal love of the Father for the Son, where the Father already perfectly loves the Son from eternity to eternity, apart from redemption? We think the answer is yes. There is a special love of God the Father that does not rest on Christ as Son but as Mediator, thus extends to His person insofar as He became the surety who willed to assume human nature. When at His baptism at the Jordan it is said so emphatically, “This is my beloved Son, hear Him,” then that is certainly connected with carrying out the work of Mediator. And in this sense we must understand it when Scripture teaches a foreknowledge of Christ. Thus it is the particular pleasure of love that rested on the person of Christ in His capacity as Mediator.

b)   Of election. We have seen above how in the doctrine or in the understanding of election two elements above all are present: (1) making a distinction, and (2) taking pleasure in the one elected.

Now it is self-evident that making a distinction is not applicable to Christ. He was the only one who could act as Mediator. Thus, here there can be no speaking of choosing and electing, but certainly of the second element. That, however, comes down to approximately the same thing as the foreknowledge of Christ as Mediator. And if one considers setting apart for a certain purpose, then the election of the Mediator coincides with His foreordination.

c)   Of foreordination. It is true that it is not said directly that Christ has been foreordained. But on the one hand mention is made of how believers are ordained to be conformed to the image of Christ so that He might be the firstborn among many brothers (Rom 8:29). Indirectly included is that Christ, too, is ordained to this image. For the image, as we saw, we are not to think of moral quality but of mediatorial glory. At a great distance the members of Christ’s body share in this His glory. The foreordination of Christ therefore means that for Him as Mediator a glory is intended by the Father, an image is ordained and delineated.

In agreement with this Christ speaks of the promise of this glory solemnly given to Him by the Father: “I ordain for you the Kingdom, as my Father has ordained it (established it by covenant) for me.” If one can speak of an ordaining in this sense, then with reason an ordaining in the sense of determining must be antecedent. On the other hand, this ordination of Christ certainly encompasses all that is related to His mediatorial work—not only His glory but also His suffering with all its means and ways. God’s plan and hand ordained beforehand what would take place, that toward which Herod and Pilate conspired (Acts 4:28).

62. Must one refer this predestination to Christ as Logos or as Mediator?

Christ can only be predestined as Mediator, and then only as Mediator in the specific soteriological sense. Of an incarnation of Christ apart from sin Scripture knows nothing. It is certainly true that the Logos as the Second Person in the Trinity stands in a certain relationship to all things. But one cannot derive this relationship from predestination, because it follows from the existence mode of the divine being itself and is not the fruit of a free ordaining that could also be otherwise. As all things are created through Christ, so also all things are created for Christ (Col 1:16). Still it is true that this economical relationship, in which Christ stands as Second Person of the Trinity to every creature created by Him, is also extended into His mediatorship. As creation was through Him and for Him, so that is now also true in re-creation.

63. Where does Scripture speak of an election of angels?

In 1 Timothy 5:21, where they are called “the elect angels.” Apparently this is in contrast to non-elect angels. The question now is in what sense that can be understood of the angels.

a)   One could say, the election of angels exists in the fact that those who did not fall were ordained by God, from the moment of their remaining steadfast on, to be forever immutable. And conversely, the reprobation of the rest consisted in this, that those who fell were ordained to remain in their fallen state without redemption. There is, however, an objection to this view. In this way the election of angels is made dependent on something good that was foreseen in them, namely, their remaining steadfast. This conflicts with the entire analogy of Scripture. It would also lead us to think that the man who remained standing in the covenant of works and on that basis was made immutably blessed could for that reason be called elect.

b)   One will therefore have to consider this matter in more depth. Foresight of the steadfastness of angels was not the basis of their election, but on the contrary, election was the basis of their steadfastness. And, conversely, that the non-elect angels did not also manifest steadfastness did not have any other basis of certainty than that they were not elect. Calvin (Institutes, 3.23.4), “The angels who have persevered in their upright state are called “elect” by Paul (1 Tim 5:21); if their steadfastness was grounded in the good pleasure of God, then the apostasy of the other angels shows these were forsaken. For that no other cause can be adduced than reprobation, which is hidden in God’s secret counsel.”

c)   This at the same time involves the conclusion that the election and reprobation of the angels are not to be understood in an infralapsarian but a supralapsarian way. Taking it in an infralapsarian way is equivalent to saying that the good angels’ remaining steadfast fell outside the decree of election. And if that falls outside of the decree of election, then their election, which still depends on the decree, will rest on something in themselves and not on the free good pleasure of God. Now it is certainly true that one may not simply argue from the election of angels to the election of men. It can be that the two cases were not identical. But this much appears undeniable, that for the angels the determination of God concerning the angels falling or not falling must be reckoned as election. This electing is thus in itself not a term that should only be used where sin is already a settled given.

d)   Are the angels elect in Christ? Some have answered, in Christ as Mediator; others, in Christ as head. Those who hold the former views add as a further explanation: in Christ as Mediator of preservation and of confirmation. But the name of Mediator definitely cannot be used here. In Scripture the term always means someone who, as surety, takes upon Himself the obligations of another who cannot fulfill these himself. Further, all proof is lacking:

1.   That the angels could not fulfill their obligation.

2.   That Christ took upon Himself their obligations vicariously.

Therefore, it is better to say that the angels are elect in Christ as their head. In the first place, then, this certainly has in view the Logos, through whom and for whom the angels were also created. In the second place, however, one can also think of the dominion that Christ as exercises over the angels in the service of His congregation. The elect angels are certainly predestined to the end that they would serve in the work of redemption. They are called “ministering spirits” (Heb 1:14); they serve Christ their head and strengthened Him in His suffering. That Christ is already their head by creation entails of itself that He also remains their head and uses them as His servants in re-creation. Only note, however, that here head does not mean head of the body in an organic sense. Head has two meanings:

1.   Ruler over others.

2.   The thinking and governing part of a living body.

In the first sense Christ is the head of the angels; in the second sense Christ is the head only of elect men.

e)   The language of Ephesians 1:10 and Colossians 1:20 has disposed some to find a reconciliation wrought by Christ for the angels there: “In order in the dispensation of the fullness of times to gather together all things as one in Christ, things in heaven and things on earth.” “And that He having made peace through Him by the blood of His cross, through Him, I say, to reconcile to Himself all things, whether things on earth or things in heaven.” But how can one speak of a reconciliation with regard to the angels? Neither can one can speak of a mediator for them. Calvin understands Ephesians 1:10 as sustaining the elect angels in their state, both at the beginning when the non-elect angels fell as well as in its continuation when these angels had fallen. He calls Christ the Mediator insofar as this sustaining was effected in Him (cf. his commentary on this passage). On Colossians 1:20 Calvin says that “reconciliation” can be understood as prevention of apostasy. Peace with God was established and maintained and that is called reconciliation. And at the same time he calls to mind that the righteousness that the angels possessed could not be entirely adequate to satisfy God, with a reference to Job 4:18. Therefore, they needed a kind of grace, a kind of covering and reconciliation before God. Ephesians 1:10 cannot have in view election and the initiation of the ongoing sustaining of angels, for what is mentioned here happens “in the fullness of time,” something that in any case cannot be understood of a time that would precede the coming of the Messiah (cf. Gal 4:4). It seems to us that this passage may be explained appropriately in the following way: Originally heaven and earth as they were created by God were united with each other and united with God. Then by sin a rupture took place. The angels fell in part and men fell. Heaven and earth became divorced. Since God now redeems the elect in Christ and unites them again to Himself, He also restores the true unity between earth and heaven and brings back everything to Himself in a unity. The good angels had not been separated from God but they had been separated from men, and it is now the case that through Christ they, with God, become united in unity with all remaining creatures. Conversely, reprobate angels and reprobate men were banned from the earth and heaven and committed to hell, so that it is entirely true: “all things in heaven and on earth.” One should now note what these words comprise:

1.   All things in heaven and earth were initially one with each other and together were one before God. This is present in “again to gather all things into one” (ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι).

2.   “All things” is neuter. Therefore, there is no reason to think exclusively of angels and men. The entire sphere of heaven and that of earth are meant. The split went through all creation, rational and irrational, living and lifeless. And all that creation is brought back into unity.

3.   The gathering into one occurs in Christ as Mediator, who became man (in the fullness of times). By that it is already excluded to speak here of a reconciliation for the angels.

4.   It is a gathering into unity before God whereby everything forms a unity because it is now harmonious in its being unanimously oriented toward God. This is contained in the middle voice of ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι, “to Himself.” Colossians 1:20 is somewhat difficult. It occurs to us, however, that the meaning here is in the main the same as in Ephesians 1:10. “All things were reconciled to God,” when by an effected reconciliation all things were led back to God. For example, “to set all things on fire” does not mean to say that fire has been put to each piece separately but simply that something is done with some pieces by which they all burn. So also here. To reconcile all things does not mean that reconciliation by the blood of Christ took place with respect to them all but only that reconciliation took place with regard to some, by which everything again came into a right relationship to God. Here, too, one should note what is in the text, τὰ πάντα, τὰ επὶ τῆς γῆς, τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. Everything is in the neuter.

64. In which quality did the objects of predestination appear in this matter before God?

With respect to the angels we have already seen that they appeared as they were still able to fall and would fall: the elect angels as still able to fall, the reprobate angels in the twofold circumstance of still being able to fall and as having fallen. Therefore, the predestination of the latter consisted in this: that God decreed to permit their fall and decreed to leave them in this fall and to be glorified by their just punishment. The predestination of the former consists in this: that God decreed to preserve them from the fall and thereafter to endow them with blessedness that could never be lost.

With regard to men at issue is the dispute between supra- and infralapsarians.

This dispute has three aspects: (a) an exegetical aspect; (b) a dogmatic aspect; (c) a historical aspect.

Since the principal sedes [place] for this dispute, Romans 9, has been discussed extensively above, the exegetical aspect of the matter can here be considered as sufficiently treated. We therefore go on immediately to the dogmatic aspect.

65. Indicate beforehand what is not at issue in the difference between the two parties.

a)   The question in the first place is not whether there is a temporal sequence in God’s decrees. With Scripture everyone Reformed confesses the absolute eternity of God’s being. It is an eternity elevated above all temporal duration, in which a thousand years are as yesterday when it has passed and as a watch in the night (Psa 90:4). In this eternity everything is present that is hidden in the depths of the divine mind or has ever passed over from it into time as a work of His creative omnipotence. What will happen at the consummation of the ages is in that respect not sooner than that which took place at the dawn of creation. Every conception as if the differing parts of God’s decree arise by stages of His observation must be rejected as incompatible with this eternity. That there would have first been a decree of creation, then of the fall, and then of predestination, or that these parts would have followed one another in reverse temporal order—both are in conflict with Scripture. It may be impossible for our thinking, bound by time, to grasp this eternity of divine life; nevertheless we must acknowledge it and may maintain nothing that is in conflict with it. To express it as briefly as possible: There are in God not many decrees, but it is one, single, completely present decree.

As a matter of fact, all this is already contained in the names of supra- and infralapsarianism. If it was a matter of a temporal order it should have been called ante- and postlapsarianism. The question would then have to be, “Do you believe in predestination before or after the decree of the fall?” Now, however, not a time but a space image has been chosen, apparently to avoid every trace of a temporal conception in conflict with God’s eternity.

b)   Nor is the question whether creation and the fall of man fall under the decree of God. With respect to creation, nobody doubts that. But whoever would deny that for the fall would become un-Reformed instead of infralapsarian since he would abandon one of most momentous turning points in world history, on which the work of redemption is entirely dependent and with that the course of well nigh all things, to chance. Almost all the Reformed confess unanimously with Calvin, “Man falls according to God’s decree, but he falls by his own guilt.” In His decree God has not only known of and reckoned with the fall, but since all things must have their certainty and fixity in His counsel, if we do not wish to posit a second ground of things beside God, then it also cannot be otherwise for the fearful fact of sin. That, too, must receive its certainty from God’s decree. However great and however insurmountable the difficulties that follow closely on this position, still nothing may diminish it. Whoever begins to doubt here stands on the edge of a bottomless dualism. Only in the beginning, when theological perception was not entirely clear, could one remove the fall from the absolute decree of God. Augustine did this, who thought that for the events following the fall, God’s foreknowledge rested on His decree while, conversely, for the fall the decree was dependent on a foreseeing. This and the other point (the apostasy of the saints) were the two weak points in Augustine’s soteriology. Among truly Reformed theologians, only a few spoke of a foreseeing. Walaeus (Leiden Synopsis, xxiv, 23) says, “God, foreseeing with the infinite light of His knowledge how it would happen that man created after His image stood, together with his entire posterity, to misuse his free will, has deemed that it better accorded with His omnipotent goodness to show beneficence to the wicked, rather than not to allow there would be evil, as Augustine rightly reminds us.”

c)   In the third place it needs to be pointed out that according to the Reformed, supra- as well as infralapsarians, sin stands under a permissive decree. True, some have objected to this because it reminded them too much of the Formula of Concord, article 5, and had a Lutheran ring. Calvin protested against it (Institutes, 3.23.7). After him, Beza and Danaeus. But we cannot do without this expression. It is found in strict supra- as well infralapsarians. Germanus (Opera Omnia, II, p. 28), “Therefore, the creation of men, together with permitting and controlling the fall, are means ordained to the final end of man.” And the same again and again. A permissive decree is naturally not an idle decree, a decree based on foreseeing, a decree simply not to prevent. It is a decree that brings certainty for sin as a fact and yet it is not the cause of the reality of sin. If one says that this sentence is meaningless words and distinctions, we grant that in a certain sense but at the same time point out that we are not able to get beyond them. They are beacons that we place at the edge of the unfathomable depths of mysteries.

d)   The question is not whether sin comes into consideration as a factor in the decree of election and of rejection. On this point much misunderstanding reigns. One frequently hears the claim that those who place election above the fall teach that God has ordained men for eternal bliss and eternal misery only because He willed to do so and without considering their sin. But that is a conclusion that is not present in supralapsarianism and has never been intended by its advocates. With equally good right one could derive a variety of conclusions from infralapsarianism from which everyone must recoil, since they seem to attack the foundations of God’s virtues. We will let Perkins speak here, who himself was disposed to supralapsarianism. He says, “Some accuse us of teaching that God has ordained men to hellish fire, and created them for destruction.… To this I answer in the first place that reprobation, insofar as it pertains to the first act, that is, insofar as it refers to the purpose to abandon the creature and in this to demonstrate justice, is absolute. That we teach and believe.… Sin itself occurs after the abandonment and the just permission of God.… However, reprobation, insofar as it pertains to the second act, that is, the purpose to damn, is not absolute or indefinite but it takes account of sin. For no one perishes other than by his own guilt, and no one is ordained to hell or destruction without regard to anything, but because of his own sin.… Secondly, I answer that God has not created man simply to destroy him, but so that by His just destruction of the sinner He would demonstrate His justice. For it is something quite different to will to punish man insofar as he is a sinner by a just destruction” (Of Predestination and the Grace of God, 1. 770–772).

In the same way Calvin (Institutes, 3.23) reasons by pointing on the one hand to the absolute will of God in permitting sin and emphasizing on the other hand that none of God’s creatures is ordained to destruction except insofar as he is sinful and in view of his sin.

It is therefore entirely false and heinous when one attributes to supralapsarianism the concept of a so-called tyrannical God. If permitting sin is included in predestination, then two things are certainly being affirmed:

1.   That it was not to make God like a tyrant for the destruction of His rational creatures as such, but for the glorification of His own virtues.

2.   That God in permitting evil and in including it in predestination has not acted arbitrarily, but according to perfect justice, although we are not able to judge that justice (cf. here Calvin, Institutes, 3.23.4 and what was observed above concerning Rom 9:21).

e)   Positively we can say that the difference between the two views is:

1.   A difference in the extent of predestination, since supralapsarians draw God’s decree to permit the fall within predestination, the infralapsarians leave it outside. Here we let Trigland speak (Advice Concerning the Concept of Moderation, Second Part). “I say that the teachers of the Reformed Churches, both those who place predestination above the fall as well as those who place it below the fall, certainly agree on the substance of the matter but differ only in various ways of explanation that are made of the same matter. According to Junius … ‘We do not differ from those godly and learned men who state that in predestinating God has contemplated man before he was created. Nor from those who say that man is regarded as created and fallen. For what the latter and the former say in truth, that we devoutly confess, for we say both.… When the latter say that in the predestinating of God man is considered as fallen, they do not actually have in view the cause of election and reprobation, but the order and pattern of causes from which damnation follows.… But when the former say that in predestinating God has considered man as not yet created, they do not exclude God from considering mankind’s fall.’ ” Trigland continues, “Indeed, if one pays careful attention to the matter itself in the writings of Reformed teachers, one will find that it is entirely in accord with Junius’ explanation above. As, for example, can be seen from these words of Beza, ‘Christ is presented to us as Mediator, therefore it is necessary that according to the order of causes, depravity take precedence in God’s purpose, but before depravity, creation in holiness and righteousness, so that a way would be open for God, etc.’ ”

Trigland again, “… so that I cannot see in the latter [infralapsarians] any other difference than that the former [supralapsarians] who, going before the fall, take the word predestination or foreordination somewhat more broadly, namely, for the whole decree of God concerning the entire conduct and order of salvation and damnation of men, and of all the means that are conducive to that end, both of creation as also of the permission of the fall, as well as the raising up again of some and the forsaking of others.… But the latter who remain below the fall take the word predestination somewhat more narrowly, so that they refer the creation of man and the permission and directing of the fall, not to predestination but to God’s general providence. From this it is evident that the difference does not lie in the doctrine itself but in the explanation of the doctrine.”

2.   A difference in connecting the various parts of the divine decree. The older supralapsarianism at least maintained that in God’s decree the permitting of the fall of man together with creation was subordinated to the highest end, the glorification of His justice and mercy. Thus, permitting the fall appears here as a means. Note carefully, not as a means for punishment itself but as a means for revealing God’s justice and mercy. Infralapsarianism did not maintain a connection here between means and end in this sense. It certainly acknowledged that the fall was permitted for God’s glorification, but did not dare to go further than this general proviso. It declared itself unable to explain how the fall was for God’s glorification. It let the various parts of God’s decree stand unconnected beside each other.

3.   A difference in extending the personal-distinguishing character of predestination, especially of election, to include the decree of creation and the fall. The supralapsarian taught that in His decree to create God already had in view the elect as His personal beloved; likewise for the decree to permit the fall, there was not a moment in God’s counsel in which the elect stood outside this personal relationship to God of being beloved. The infralapsarian, on the other hand, thinks that the personal relationship, the distinguishing, only begins after the decrees of creation and of fall, that therefore in these two decrees the elect were included in the general mass of men and did not appear as objects of God’s special love.

One will perceive how the question whether in predestination God viewed man as still having to be created and still having to fall (creabilis et labilis), or as created and fallen (creatus et lapsus), is only a short formula for this difference. It would perhaps be better to say creandus [to be created] et lapsurus [to be fallen] for characterizing supralapsarian sentiments. Creabilis et labilis leads to the idea that sin was not at all taken into account. “Will be created” and “will be falling” gives a sense of how sin was certainly taken into account.

66. In what respects do various supralapsarians still differ from one another?

The older supralapsarians taught that from its very outset predestination (election) was personal. God determined to create with these or those particular persons in view as His elect and beloved and likewise to permit the fall with them in view. On the other hand, later supralapsarians understood the decree at its outset less personally. So, for example, Mastricht. He distinguishes:

a)   The purpose of God to reveal the glory of His mercy and His retributive justice. This is impersonal.

b)   The purpose to create all men in one common root and permit them to fall in that one root. This also is impersonal.

c)   The purpose to elect some specific persons and reject some specific persons out of this created and fallen humanity.

d)   The purpose to prepare the means and ways fitting for carrying out the preceding decree. This is supralapsarianism for the two parts of humanity, not for specific persons.

67. In what does the distinctiveness reside of the supralapsarianism taught in “The Examination of the Concept of Tolerance” (Alexander Comrie)?

That sin accidentally becomes a transition point for a double predestination idea that lies above it and is maintained above it. Originally God predestined some to great beatitude, others to a natural state outside that beatitude (not, however, to permit sin). The former would reach that state of supernatural bliss because the Second Person of the Trinity would take on human nature and be most closely united with them in that human nature. The latter would remain outside that union. That was the pinnacle in God’s decree of predestination. Now, however, the decree appears that God will permit sin to lay hold of both these predestined groups. Thereby the predestination of the elect is changed insofar as it becomes a predestination to save from sin and by that salvation to glorify them with Christ. A simple glorification is replaced by a glorification after antecedent redemption. At the same time the predestination of the nonelect is changed in the sense that it now becomes a decree not to leave them in their natural state but to leave them in sin and destruction.

68. What are the objections against this opinion?

a)   It considers predestination as operating initially apart from redemption, while Scripture constantly brings it into connection with redemption. The entire dispensation that flows from election is a dispensation of redemption, “vessels of mercy.”

b)   It necessitates positing an incarnation of Christ even apart from sin. On this point it agrees with many more recent opinions that otherwise have an entirely different origin.

c)   It teaches an addition of something supernatural to nature apart from sin, which in an objectionable way calls to mind the Romish system.

69. What objection is to be made against the opinion of Mastricht?

That it lets predestination originally be impersonal and thus removes its practical and comforting element. Scripture always provides a personal representation. It says that the first act of election is already a personal love (that is, “foreknowledge”).

70. Are the logical objections against supralapsarianism conclusive?

No, because:

a)   There always remain objections in such an abstract matter. We can never explain these things completely.

b)   The objection that for the supralapsarian the object of predestination is a non-ens (a non-entity) rests on a misunderstanding. It is not a non-ens concerning the knowing part of God’s decree but only concerning the willing act. Also, if this reasoning is extended, God could never have made a decree of creation.

71. Does not supralapsarianism suffer from great harshness?

We must acknowledge this. However, one should certainly keep in view that this harshness resides in the doctrine of God’s decree as such, and supralapsarianism merely brings it out clearly. Supralapsarianism teaches, for example, that God has permitted that for the glorification of his justice certain persons, through their own fault, would fall into sin in order not to be redeemed from it. The infralapsarian also says that God permits man to fall into sin for His own glorification. Now, is it so much harsher when the supralapsarian says, for the glorification of His own justice? Does something harsh become harsher by strengthening the splendor of God’s justice?

72. Can we question God’s action in this?

No, we cannot and must not attempt that. This must remain certain as it was for the apostle: It is strictly just and not tyrannically arbitrary. But on the other hand, we have no right to apply the standard of our concept of disinterested love to God’s action, as if He were not the center of all things, the highest good of everything, who can therefore also make all things subordinate to His own glory.

73. How does the Mediator figure in the decree of election?

Logically, only after sin. As Mediator He is surety. A surety presupposes a debt that must be paid. Debt presupposes sin. Christ as Mediator can only appear where sin is present. On this point one must judge as Beza does (see above in the quote of Trigland [65. e) 1.]). This must be so unless one wants to make Christ the Mediator of human nature for its glorification even in its sinless state and thus teach an incarnation apart from sin, as Comrie does. But this peculiar view does not flow from supralapsarianism as such, but from supralapsarianism connected with certain other ideas. A logical connection (nexus causalis) cannot exist between supralapsarianism and other doctrines, already simply because all the other parts of the doctrine of salvation presuppose sin.

74. Give a historical overview of the conflict between infra- and supralapsarianism.

Augustine, who first worked out the doctrine of predestination, was an infralapsarian, since he derived the fall from God’s foreknowledge. Later the doctrine of Augustine was presented in supralapsarian terms. The presbyter Lucidus, who did this, was obliged to recant. In the Middle Ages the monk Gottschalk and Thomas Bradwardine appeared as supralapsarian defenders of predestination.

There has been dispute about Calvin. The truth is that sometimes he expressed himself in one way and at other times in another. But while his infralapsarian-sounding expressions can be explained as partial a posteriori representations, it is impossible to give a minimizing sense to his decidedly supralapsarian statements. One may compare the entire 23rd chapter of book three of his Institutes, where in connection with predestination he speaks very explicitly about the fall and the decree of the fall. Further, there is the following (Opera, IX. p. 713), “Before man was created, in His eternal decree God established what He willed would happen with the entire human race. By this secret decree of God it has happened that Adam fell from the state of his natural rectitude and by his fall drew all his posterity with himself into the guilt of eternal death.” We find more such expressions. Finally, Calvin’s declaration, “God has created us in order to redeem us.”

Among Reformed theologians after Calvin the following were supralapsarians: Beza, Peter Martyr Vermigli, Marlorat, Whitaker, Ferrius, Zanchius, Perkins, Gomarus, Maccovius (in part also, as appears from what was quoted above, Junius).

75. What has the Synod of Dordt declared regarding this issue?

It has maintained an infralapsarian position but without the intention of wanting to condemn supralapsarianism. In general one must keep in mind that an infralapsarian can never claim that what the supralapsarian says cannot be true. Were he to insist on this, he himself would have to give a positive explanation concerning the purpose of God in permitting sin. And he neither wants nor dares to enter precisely into that explanation. Therefore he says, “I keep to below the fall.” But, he does not judge the supralapsarian. At the most he could demand that the supralapsarian also leave the matter as uncertain or pass over it in silence.

That the Synod of Dordt did not wish to condemn supralapsarianism is evident from the following:

a)   Not a few of its members were supralapsarians: the president, Bogerman, Gomarus, Lydius, Voetius, Festus Hommius, in general the delegates from Gelderland and South Holland. These all signed the Canons of Dordt. So, they would have signed their own condemnation if supralapsarianism had been condemned.

b)   Gomarus protested against the recommendation of Polyander, Thysius and Walaeus, but not against the canon [concerning predestination] itself. The first mentioned of these wanted to see infralapsarianism adopted in such a way that supralapsarianism was thereby excluded. On the other hand, Gomarus did not ask that his supralapsarianism be adopted, but that the question remain open. The canon was formulated differently than the recommendation of the professors named above against whom Gomarus protested.

c)   Evidently, the supralapsarians who were at Dordt did not find their complete doctrine of predestination in the canon, but still a part of it was there and they could be resigned to the other part remaining unexpressed. Gomarus had clearly not meant that his position should replace what Walaeus and the others wrote, but only that it must be added if one wished to understand the matter in depth.

d)   Among the charges that were brought against Maccovius was “that he taught that the object of predestination were not fallen man.” The Synod, however, did not wish to condemn him.

e)   Supralapsarianism is later taught by theologians of good repute who were considered in the Netherlands as being orthodox, namely Heidanus, Burmann, Braun, Voetius, Engelhardus, and others.

Speaking against supra- and for infralapsarianism were Polyander, Walaeus, Rivet, Cocceius, Henry Alting, Molinaeus, Fr. Spanheim, Fr.Turretin, Johann Heinrich Heidegger, Picket.

Initially the Westminster Assembly appeared to intend to adopt supralapsarianism. In the end, however, it adopted a formulation with which both views could identify. Its Prolocutor Twisse was a strong supralapsarian.

In the Netherlands Maresius firmly contended for infralapsarianism against Gomarus and Voetius.

76. What is the difference between the infra- and supralapsarians on the doctrine of reprobation?

According to infralapsarians, reprobation has two parts: (a) praeteritio, “passing by,” God’s decree not to grant the grace of salvation to certain persons lying in sin; and (b) praedamnatio, “predamnation,” God’s decree to commit these persons to eternal destruction because of their sin.

According to the supralapsarians, reprobation has three parts: (a) the decree to set apart certain persons for the revelation of God’s retributive justice in the punishment for their sins; (b) permission in God’s decree for the fall of man; (c) the decree not to grant grace to these persons, being once fallen, but to condemn them because of their sin.

Thus, in the latter sense reprobation is God’s sovereign and just decree to ordain certain persons known to Him for the revelation of His punitive righteousness and therefore to permit them to fall into sin by their own fault and thereafter not to grant them grace in Christ.

77. Where must the infralapsarian seek the cause of reprobation?

This can be answered in three ways:

a)   If one asks for the reason why just this or that particular person perishes, then the infralapsarian answers: that flows from God’s sovereign good pleasure. It cannot result from sin, for in God’s decree all Adam’s posterity is also equally subject to sin, without all being reprobate.

b)   If one now asks for the reason for the withholding of grace, then from an infralapsarian standpoint the answer must again be: God’s sovereign good pleasure is the reason for this withholding. He was not obliged to grant His grace to anyone.

c)   If one now asks for the reason why in general—without considering the antithesis with the elect, the reprobate perish—then for the infralapsarian the answer is that the reason did not lie in God’s predestination, but in man’s sin. If one asks further where the ground of certainty for sin lies, then the infralapsarian answers: in God’s decree. If one asks still further what moved God to permit sin, he answers: I want to stay out of that question. Someone perishes because of his sin; the certainty of the sin comes from God’s decree (although not the reality). But that God decreed to permit his sin for glorifying His justice, the infralapsarian dare not say. Therefore he does not include it in predestination.

The supralapsarian says: The legal ground why men perish lies in sin that they deliberately commit within time. Nobody perishes other than because of his own sin. But this sin itself cannot occur apart from the permission of God’s decree. Therefore, this permission, that is, God’s predestination, is the highest ground for the reality of perishing, although not the legal ground. Naturally sin cannot be the ground for God’s decree that sin would occur. It had other grounds that we cannot fathom as far as their justness is concerned but that are nevertheless just.

78. What do we understand concerning the hardening that God causes to come upon man?

Regarding this Scripture teaches the following:

a)   That generally hardening is the consequence of contact with the revelation or the truth of God against which sinful men rebels (so, for Pharaoh, Exod 7:3; Isaiah’s contemporaries, Isa 6; Matt 13:11–16). “An odor of death to death.”

b)   That hardening is also caused by God simultaneously withdrawing the common grace of the Holy Spirit and permitting sin to break out and spread unhindered. Here, then, is a real act of God, but it is an act of withdrawing. God does not cause sin to arise in man but withdraws all influences that work for good. This is called, “given over to a depraved mind,” “to dishonorable passions,” “to the desires of their hearts” (Rom 1:28, 26, 24; Psa 81:13).

c)   That sometimes hardening arises from resistance to extraordinary enlightenment that God has given man, but with no regenerating grace accompanying it. Something like this is indicated in Hebrews 6:4–8.

d)   That becoming hardened by God can at the same time be called the hardening of oneself. That is said of Pharaoh.

79. Is Christ the meriting cause of election?

No, this would imply that the gift of Christ preceded election and so was generally intended for all mankind. One says, God cannot condescend to grant election to a sinful humanity if Christ is not already there as Mediator. We answer, He also cannot condescend to a sinful humanity with the gift of a mediator if the mediator is not already there. And so one never reaches a conclusion.

Turretin says, “The question is not whether Christ is the foundation and the meriting cause of a decreed salvation with respect to its matter but whether Christ is the meriting cause and the foundation of the decree of salvation with respect to God. The first question must be answered affirmatively, the second negatively. Everything that in reality comes to us flows from Christ, but Christ Himself, with all that flows from Him, has been given to us out of the free mercy of God. Scripture speaks this way everywhere (1 Cor 1:30).”

↑ Back to top