Chapter 3 Irenaeus’s Critique of Valentinian Emission and the Proto-Trinitarian Problematic
CHAPTER 3
Irenaeus’s Critique of Valentinian Emission and the Proto-Trinitarian Problematic
So far, I have been sketching out the philosophical meaning of divine simplicity available by the time of the early Christian era. The remaining chapters will have a narrower focus. The following two chapters will turn to early Christian sources in the late second to early third centuries and narrate what I shall denote the “ante-Nicene Trinitarian problematic.” The term “Trinitarian,” though, needs to be qualified when used in the present context. These chapters are chiefly concerned with how divine simplicity became central in the development of early Christian speech about the nature of the Father-Son relation. Hence the problematic that will form the heart of the following two chapters is “Trinitarian” only insofar as it is one that forms a crucial component of what might be called “fully Trinitarian” theologies.
The central question underlying the ante-Nicene Trinitarian problematic can be summed up thus: if God is simple, what is the consequence for understanding the language of the Father-Son relation emerging out of Scripture? It turns out that ante-Nicene developments on this question were shaped during two interrelated doctrinal-polemical controversies in the late second to the early third century. This chapter examines the first episode integral to the formation of the ante-Nicene problematic, the anti-Valentinian polemic of Irenaeus of Lyons in his work Adversus Haereses. Irenaeus is often identified as one of the earliest theologians who held the doctrine of divine simplicity.1 Further, it is commonly stressed that Irenaeus’s specific presentation of the doctrine seems to commit him to the “identity thesis” as an implication of divine simplicity. To recall, this is the claim that if God is simple, then God’s attributes are identical to each other and, further, identical to God-self.2 The presence of this thesis in Irenaeus is justified by the language found in Book 2 of Adversus Haereses. But what is less often emphasized is that Irenaeus’s language of divine simplicity forms the heart of an argument against a specific theological idea in the second century, namely, the “Valentinian emission” (Latin: prolatio / Greek: προβολή).3 The Valentinians were engaged in speculative protology, a task common in the Neo-Pythagorean philosophy of the time.4 They sought to provide an account of the origin of multiplicity in the cosmos from a single first principle. To do so, Irenaeus reports that they conceived of creation as coming into being through orderly emissions of many entities called aeons. The aeons served as intermediaries between God and the world. These aeons were emitted in a spiritual realm called Pleroma. Based on this framework, the Valentinians imagined a mythological account of the emissions of multiple aeons in the Pleroma in order to present creation as the result of a drama in the spiritual realm. In mounting a critique of the Valentinian myth, Irenaeus brings out God’s simplicity as a theological weapon against the notion of emission central to the myth. The task undertaken in this chapter, then, is to situate Irenaeus’s use of divine simplicity in the central chapters of Book 2 of Adversus Haereses, where his critique of Valentinian emission unfolds. I shall argue that when Irenaeus’s affirmation of divine simplicity is read as an integral part of his wider critique of Valentinian emission, the significance of his discussion for the development of theological speech on the Father-Son relation emerges with clarity. As we shall see, Irenaeus, in line with the ancient sources we have examined so far, establishes divine simplicity as a pattern for theological speech for his polemical discourse. In doing so, in his critique of Valentinian emission Irenaeus actually opens the possibility for divine simplicity to become an important factor that shapes theological discourse on the nature of the Son’s generation from the Father.
VALENTINIAN PROTOLOGY
We must begin by setting out the target of Irenaeus’s critique. Valentinian protology refers not to a single system but rather to multiple systems that were devised in an attempt to provide a mythological account of creation based on number symbolism. 5 Even within Adversus Haereses, where we find one of the few extant reports of Valentinian protologies, Irenaeus presents a number of variations that combine similar themes and ideas. Thus, strictly speaking, we should speak of Valentinian protologies in the plural. But given that my purpose here is to examine Irenaeus’s critique of Valentinian emission based on divine simplicity, only one particular presentation of the Valentinian system is required. In the opening chapters of Book 1 of Adversus Haereses, Irenaeus presents the details of the Valentinian myth, which he criticizes in Book 2 on the basis of divine simplicity.6 For our purposes, we shall restrict our attention to the so-called grande notice and the necessary details criticized by Irenaeus in Book 2.7
According to Irenaeus, the Valentinians proposed that in the beginning was the perfect God called First Beginning, First Father, or Profundity. This perfect God is invisible and incomprehensible, eternal and ingenerate. The First Father had existed in quiet throughout the ages along with Thought, which is also named Grace and Silence. Everything came forth from Profundity, who decided to emit a seed that would be the beginning of all things. The method for this emission, characteristic of the rest of the Valentinian account, is expressed using human sexual imagery. Profundity deposited the beginning of all things as a seed in the womb of Silence, who co-exists with him. The beginning of all things, then, came from the conjugal union of the first couple, First Father and Silence.8
Valentinian protology is divided into three stages. The first two stages account for the emission within the spiritual realm, the Pleroma (Fullness). The third stage accounts for the emission of everything outside the Pleroma, namely, nonspiritual realities.9 In the first stage we have the formation, alongside First Father and Silence in the Primary Ogdoad, of the remaining six aeons: Mind, Truth, Word, Life, Man, and Church. The Primary Ogdoad is divided into the Tetrad, which the Valentinians regarded as the root of all things.10 This Tetrad consists of First Father, Thought, Mind, and Truth. In this Tetrad, Mind (also called Only Begotten, Father, and Beginning of all things) and Truth were generated as a result of the impregnation of Thought by the seed of Profundity. Subsequently, the second couple—Mind and Truth—combined to emit Word and Life. Word and Life, in turn, combined to emit Man and Church. So apart from Profundity and Thought, the remaining aeons in the Primary Ogdoad were generated as a result of conjugal unions in which one pair of aeons emitted another pair.
From the first Ogdoad arose a second stage of emissions of other aeons based on the conjugal unions between aeons of the second Tetrad: Word, Life, Man, and Church. Wishing to glorify the First Father, Word and Life together emitted ten other aeons, whereas Man and Church together emitted twelve aeons. Together with the Primary Ogdoad, all the emissions form the thirty aeons central to the Valentinian notion of spiritual reality, the Pleroma.
Finally, in the third stage Valentinian protology provides a myth of the Fall that leads to the creation of the rest of reality outside the Pleroma. According to this myth, only Mind, the third aeon in the Primary Ogdoad, knows the First Father. The First Father is incomprehensible to all the other aeons because Thought wished the other aeons to have the desire to seek after the First Father. As a result, the other aeons grew in their desire to know and see the First Father. Beginning from Mind and Truth, the passion to know the incomprehensible Father spread across all the aeons until it reached the last and youngest of all aeons, namely, Wisdom. Due to this passion, the material-soulish universe was created outside of the Pleroma. It was, then, the passion of Wisdom that was responsible for everything that exists besides the Pleroma. Valentinian protology, therefore, accounts for the generation of nonspiritual reality from spiritual reality through the passion arising within the latter. This point will become important for Irenaeus’s critique.
This brief description of the three stages of Valentinian protology suffices for making sense of Irenaeus’s critique. The key aspects criticized by Irenaeus on the basis of divine simplicity are (1) the creation of the Primary Ogdoad, (2) the subsequent emission of the aeons from the Primary Ogdoad, (3) the possibility of passion and ignorance arising in the Pleroma. I have included as figure 3.1 Joel Kalvesmaki’s helpful representation of the Valentinian system summarized in Irenaeus’s grande notice for the sake of clarity.
Figure 3.1. The Valentinian Pleroma, According to Irenaeus, Against Heresies 1.1–9. Male aeons are assigned (arbitrarily) triangles, females circles. Hollow triangles and circles represent the original thirty aeons. Arrows indicate lines of projection. The large hexagon represents Limit, who is assigned six names and is said to be hexagonal. Illustration by Joel Kalvesmaki, “Formation of the Early Christian Theology of Arithmetic Number Symbolism in the Late Second and Early Third Century,” PhD dissertation, Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, 2006, 17.
DIVINE SIMPLICITY AND IRENAEUS’S ANTI-VALENTINIAN GRAMMAR OF GENERATION
Valentinian protology rests on the idea of emissions that account for the process that mediates between God and creation. In two chapters of Adversus Haereses, Book 2, Irenaeus criticizes the idea of emissions on the basis of divine simplicity. In unfolding his critique, he develops in passing a set of conditions that must be satisfied by any accounts of generation involving the simple God as the generator. In other words, divine simplicity is to serve as a pattern for theological speech that regulates how one should (or should not) speak about generations from God.11 I put these conditions under the heading “principle of unity” because they stress the unity, required by God’s simplicity, between the generator (the simple God) and the generated. Upon these conditions Irenaeus builds his case against Valentinian emissions as creating theologically inappropriate divisions between God and what is generated by him, leading to a materialistic and anthropomorphic notion of God.
The general shape of Irenaeus’s arguments set out in Haer. II.13 and II.17 is the same.12 At the heart of both arguments is the set of disjunctions presented in Haer. II.17.2. According to Irenaeus, there are two ways to interpret the nature of emission in the Valentinian myth. Either the aeons are emitted in a manner appropriate for a simple God or they are emitted in a way that violates God’s simplicity. In Haer. II.17.2 Irenaeus presents the two options in more precise terms:
So, we ask this question: how were the other aeons emitted? Did they (1) remain united to the one who emitted them, as the rays to the sun; or were they (2) [emitted] as a distinct and separated work, so that each of them would exist separately and have its own form, just as human beings have their source from human beings, and cattle have their source from cattle? Or was it by sprouting, like branches from a tree? And were they (1) of the same substance as those from whom they were emitted, or did they (2) have substance from some other substance? And were they emitted (1) at the same time so that they would be contemporary to some order, [or] that (2) some would be older and others younger? And were they (1) simple and of one form, and in every way equal and similar, just as air and light are emitted; or were they (2) composite and of different form, dissimilar to their fellow members?
Quaeretur igitur, quemadmodum emissi sunt reliqui Aeones? (1) Vtrum uniti ei qui emiserit, quemadmodum a sole radii, an (2) efficabiliter et partiliter, uti sit unusquisque eorum separatim et suam figurationem habens, quemadmodum ab homine homo et a pecude pecus, aut secundum germinationem, quemadmodum ab arbore rami? Et (1) utrum eiusdem substantiae exsistebant his qui se emiserunt, an (2) ex altera quadam substantia substantiam habentes? Et (1) utrum in eodem emissi sunt, ut eiusdem temporis essent sibi, an (2) secundum ordinem quendam, ita ut antiquiores quidam ipsorum, alii uero iuueniores essent? Et (1) utrum simplices quidam et uniformes et undique sibi aequales et similes, quemadmodum spiritus et lumina emissa sunt, an (2) compositi et differentes, dissimiles membris suis?
The use of utrum . . . an throughout this passage confirms that Irenaeus is presenting pairs of options regarding the nature of the aeons’ emissions. I have indicated the pairs presented in each sentence by 1 and 2. This structure is consistently present above, with one oddity presented by aut secundum germinationem, quemadmodum ab arbore rami in the middle. As I shall highlight in due course, Irenaeus does not set out an argument when he turns to this language later on except to carry forward his conclusions drawn from the metaphor of rays from the sun. This oddity notwithstanding, it is apparent that all the first options, labeled 1 above, stress the unity between the generator and the generated, whereas all the second options, labeled 2 above, imply discontinuity between the generator and the generated. In light of this structure, we can summarize the above passage by the following four pairs:
i. The generated remains one with the generator vs. the generated has a distinct separate existence from the generator.
ii. The generated is consubstantial with the generator vs. the generated is out of the substance of the generator.
iii. The generated is contemporaneous with the generator vs. the generated is from the generator with a temporal ordering.
iv. The generated and the generator are simple, single in form, and similar to one another vs. the generated and the generator are composite, different in form, and dissimilar.13
The idea of simplicity enters in the last pair as a contrast to composition. The series of contrasting accounts i–iii, concluding in iv, suggests that the descriptions of the first option in each of i–iii are taken to be summed up by simplicity and the descriptions of the second option in each of i–iii by composition. We may thus interpret the above passage as Irenaeus’s attempt to outhne contrasting interpretations of emissions. The first takes the nature of the generator and the generated to be simple; the second takes the generator and the generated to be composite. I will now examine how the disjunctions outhned in i–iii above form the heart of Irenaeus’s argument against Valentinian emissions. As will become clear, Irenaeus takes inseparability, consubstantiality, and contemporaneity to be conditions required in order for any process of generation from God to be compatible with divine simplicity.14
Inseparability
According to Irenaeus, the Valentinians compromise divine simplicity because they conceive of the aeons as generated “distinctly and separately” (efficabiliter et partiliter) from the First Father after their emissions.15 He puts forward two arguments against the possibility that the aeons are generated efficabiliter et partiliter from God. His first argument is straightforward: such a mode of emission resembles animal generations, a typical example of something emitted efficabiliter et partiliter.16 In animal generation, the offspring comes forth from the parent having a separate existence. What Irenaeus means is that there is a non-overlap of the animal’s and its offspring’s spatial location. The animal offspring has a distinct existence in the sense that the spatial form of the offspring is clearly marked off from the spatial form of the parent.17 As a result, animal generation results in the generator’s having two spatially separated existences. For Irenaeus, then, the language of something generated efficabiliter et partiliter always brings up the kind of emission associated with animal generation. Inevitably, this language implies that both the generator and the generated possess corporeal attributes such as spatial location and size. So if the aeons were emitted from God as having separate existences, as Irenaeus thinks Valentinian emissions imply, then God is subjected to an animal-like generation characteristic of corporeal, not spiritual, substance. Given that corporeal existence is characterized by its composite nature,18 the language of something emitted efficabiliter et partiliter violates divine simplicity.19
Irenaeus’s second argument against the aeons’ being generated efficabiliter et partiliter is more complex.20 It is grounded in his analysis of human mental activities.21 He suggests that the Valentinians might have imagined their emissions—specifically the ones within the Primary Ogdoad—in light of human mental activities. In the case of human beings, separate terms such as Thought, Understanding, Intention, and Word are markers of different stages of mental activates. These names do not denote something distinct from the mind itself but rather “particular activities of the mind relating to a determined object and immanent to this mind.”22 The various stages of intellectual activity eventually form the basis for generating an “uttered word” and, as such, they are “co-emitters” of a word. However, Thought, Understanding, and the like remain within the Mind. What Irenaeus had in mind can be summarized as follows:
1. First activity of the Mind: When Mind first fixes itself on an object, its first activity is named Thought (ennoia).
2. Second stage: When Thought develops and takes possession of the soul, it is called Intention (enthymesis).
3. Third stage: When Intention remains fixed on the same object for a long time and grants approval to the object of intellectual activity, then we have Understanding (sensatio).
4. Fourth stage: When Understanding has been maintained for a long time—in other words, when “Intention” has granted approval to a given object for intellectual activity for a long time—then it becomes Counsel (consilium).
5. Final stage: When the activity of Counsel becomes “very extensive,” it becomes Thought (cogitatio). Thought as the result of pursuing intellectual activities for a long period could be properly called a Word (uerbum), “from which the uttered word is emitted (ex quo emissibilis emittitur uerbum).”23
Now Irenaeus argues that in the case of the human mind, Understanding, Intention, Thought, and the like—categories of mental activity—are differentiated due to the progressive development of intellectual activities. The different stages of mental activity acquire different names according to “continuance and development” (secundum perseuerationem et augmentum) of the mind, not because of a change (non secundum immutationem).24 The example of the human body undergoing the aging process illustrates this point. The body constantly undergoes development in time, meaning that it is young at one stage, then becomes mature at another stage. In other words, while the body at different stages of its aging process is given different names (“young” and “old”), nonetheless it is one and the same body that is aging. By aging, our bodies do not become a different substance but remain the same. Likewise, in the case of the Mind, the various names such as Thought, Understanding, and Intention are simply referring to the same Mind in its various stages of development of its activity. So we distinguish between the mental categories not because the mind is changed into something else in each stage of its activity but because the mind’s activity possesses different stages of development. While there are different names for the different stages of development in intellectual activities, these names nonetheless refer to realities that remain within the Mind and are not separated from it. As a result, a sense of unity remains between the Mind, on the one hand, and the various stages of intellectual activities, on the other. In Irenaeus’s own words, “All these activities are one and the same thing (Vnum autem et idem): they have their origin in the mind and get their names because of development.”25
This analysis reveals two errors in Valentinian emissions should these be considered as arising from an analogy with the process of human mental activities. First, the Valentinians have misunderstood how the human mind functions. If the emissions in the Primary Ogdoad are indeed imagined according to human mental activities, then the Valentinians have failed to recognize that the differentiation between Mind, Word, and Thought does not lead to a distinction secundum substantiae demutationem.26 If the Valentinians have attended to how human mental activities function, then they will have discovered that the different stages of mental activities are emitted per radium and so are “one and the same” (Vnum . . . et idem).27 As a result, the aeons could not be conceived as possessing distinct and separate existences from one another. Second, and more significantly, the Valentinians have fallen into anthropomorphism. The mind’s activity unfolds and develops in different stages of development only because humans are composite, made up of soul and body:
You do not understand that in man, who is a composite ensouled being . . . one might speak of such things, namely, of man’s mind and of man’s thought, and that from the mind came thought, and from the thought the intention, and from the intention the word. Really, according to the Greeks, the word is the directing power that develops thought; that is something else from the organ by which the word is uttered. So at times man rests and is silent; at times he speaks and acts. . . . The tongue, being fleshy, is not able to keep up with the speed of the human mind, which is spiritual; hence our word is held back within and is not instantaneously uttered as it was conceived by the mind, but piecemeal, as the tongue can minister to it.28
In other words, the differentiation secundum perseuerationem et augmentum between different activities of the human mind is simply due to the composite nature of human beings. While human mental activities in principle do not suffer delays in their development, the limitations of bodily organs nonetheless introduce these delays. Accordingly, different stages of development of human mental activity are marked off due to the introduction of these delays. God, however, does not admit such developments because his mind differs from human minds.29 It would be absurd to think of God’s mind as embodied, because this would lead to the conception of God as composite like humans. So even if one reads the Valentinians charitably and interprets their emissions as grounded in generation secundum perseuerationem et augmentum, their account still falls into the grave error of anthropomorphism.
It is clear, then, that both of Irenaeus’s arguments are centered around the commitment to divine simplicity. In the first argument, Irenaeus highlights that spatial and corporeal generation straightforwardly violates God’s simplicity. Hence a simple God cannot be involved in generation that leads to a generator-generated distinction secundum substantiae demutationem or secundum corporis amissionem. In the second argument, Irenaeus adds a further qualification: a simple God also cannot be involved in generation that results in a generator-generated distinction secundum perseuerationem et augmentum. This kind of distinction is present only in the case of embodied minds in composite beings. Hence, if we apply this kind of mental distinction to God, then divine simplicity is once again violated. In offering the two arguments against the possibility that the aeons are generated efficabiliter et partiliter, Irenaeus thus establishes the first significant condition that must be satisfied by processes of generation from God compatible with divine simplicity:
Irenaeus’s principle of unity (negative form)
Divine simplicity implies inseparability: that something cannot be generated efficabiliter et partiliter from God. This rules out generations that result in the following distinctions between generator and the generated:
1. Animal-like: secundum corporis amissionem or secundum substantiae demutationem
2. Composite human mind–like: secundum perseuerationem et augmentum
Generation tanquam a sole radii: Consubstantiality
But is it possible to articulate positively the nature of processes of generation appropriate for a simple God? According to Irenaeus, this is best approached through three metaphors: rays from the sun (a sole radii), lights from a light (a lumine lumina), and branches from a tree (ab arbore rami). These metaphors are apt as they reveal two further conditions on the nature of the generator-generated relation that must hold for processes of generation compatible with divine simplicity. Consubstantiality concerns the nature of the generator-generated relation with respect to substance, contemporaneity with respect to time. Irenaeus discusses the three metaphors in Haer. II.17.4–7. But given that his discussion of the two conditions is based primarily on the metaphor of light alone set out in Haer. II.17.4, I shall mainly focus in this chapter on the following analysis.
What links the three metaphors for Irenaeus seems to be the fact that the generated differs from the generator only by generation (generatione) or size (magnitudine). This is to stress that no differences of substance (substantia) exist between the two because the generated are of the same substance as their generator.30 For example, in the case of rays from the sun, the former are emitted from the latter.31 The sun serves as the source of the rays; hence, the two are differentiated by generation (generatione). Further, the sun’s brightness is much greater than the rays emitted from it; hence the two are differentiated by magnitude (magnitudine). What remains the same between the two, however, is brightness. Both the sun and its rays share the nature of being bright. In this way, the rays and the sun are said to be “of one form, in every way equal and similar” (uniformes et undique sibi aequales et similes). In other words, the sun and its emitted rays are consubstantial. The example of rays from the sun offers an appropriate illustration of generation involving a simple God because the sun itself resembles a simple reality. The sun does not change due to the emission of the rays, always remaining what it is without being diminished in its own brightness. Furthermore, the sun does not emit that which is contrary to its own nature, namely, darkness. So the sun is not composed of contrary parts. Immutable and free from contraries, the sun displays the key characteristics associated with simplicity. This clarifies why, for Irenaeus, the metaphor of rays from the sun serves as an apt analogy to illustrate the conditions imposed by simplicity on the process of generation involving a simple generator. If a simple God is the generator, then what God generates can neither be contrary to God’s nature nor bring about a change that would diminish God’s nature. For Irenaeus, this is summed up by asserting that a simple God must generate that which is consubstantial with himself.
Similar analysis probably also forms the basis for Irenaeus’s understanding of the other two metaphors. In the case of branches from a tree, it is difficult to see how this organic metaphor could serve as an analogy for generation involving a simple God. Irenaeus never clarifies this point. In Haer. II.17.6 he simply glosses over the details and states that consubstantiality follows from the metaphor. In the case of lights from a light, though, Irenaeus offers a brief analysis in Haer. II.17.4. He imagines the exercise of lighting torches from a single source of light. Each time a torch is lit, a new light is generated. However, these lights could be recombined with the original source any time because of the similarity of nature between the two. Hence the generated light and the source share a fundamental unity such that when the two are put back together, it will cause a change in the nature of neither the generator nor the generated. Light, then, like the sun, can be considered a simple reality. Light imagery, then, illustrates the same condition of consubstantiality between the generated and the generator that must be preserved in the case in which the generator is simple.
It is generation tanquam a sole radii, guaranteeing consubstantiality between generator and generated, that will be compatible with divine simplicity. The consubstantiality condition collapses the Valentinians’ protology should they seek to interpret their emissions tanquam a sole radii. As I have highlighted above, the aim of the Valentinian system is to account for the creation of the material world based on a cosmic drama in the spiritual realm (Pleroma). This myth, as we have seen, involves the ignorance of the First Father among the emitted aeons (apart from the Only Begotten). This ignorance, in turn, provokes the rise of passion in Wisdom, which led to her Fall. Now if the aeons are emitted tanquam a sole radii, then it will be impossible to find either ignorance of the First Father or passion in them. Given that the First Father is impassable (which Irenaeus presumes that the Valentinians affirm), he cannot generate something that is opposite in nature to himself, namely, passions. Further, it would be absurd to say that the First Father lacks knowledge of himself. But if he possesses perfect knowledge of himself, then, using similar reasoning, it will be impossible for the First Father to generate something that is ignorant of himself. Irenaeus frequently rehearses both of these arguments on the basis of the consubstantiality condition.32 If Valentinian emissions are to be compatible with divine simplicity, then their protology will simply fall apart.
Generation tanquam a sole radii: Contemporaneity
Alongside consubstantiality, the light metaphor also illustrates a final condition on the nature of generation involving a simple God. According to Irenaeus, if two things are consubstantial, then in the case of one generated from the other, we cannot relate them in a temporal ordering. Returning to the example of lighting torches, Irenaeus writes:
For a torch that is lighted later will not have a different light from that which existed earlier. Wherefore, when the lights of these torches are brought together into one, they regain their original unity, since there results one light that existed even from the beginning. And one cannot tell that one is younger or older by the light itself—for the whole is one light—or by the torches themselves that received the light (for these were contemporaneous in their material substance, since the matter of the torches is one and the same), but only according to the lighting, since one was lit a short while ago, but another just now.
Neque enim quae postea accensa est facula alterum lumen habebit quam illud quod ante eam fuit. Quapropter et lumina ipsorum composita in unum in principalem unitionem recurrunt, cum fiat unum lumen quod fuit et a principio. Quod autem iuuenius est et antiquius neque in ipso lumine intellegi potest—unum enim lumen est totum—neque in ipsis quae perceperunt lumen faculis—etenim ipsae secundum substantiam materiae idem tempus habent: una enim et eadem est facularum materia, sed tantum secundum accensionem, quoniam altera quidem ante pusillum, altera autem nunc accensa est.33
This is a difficult passage because Irenaeus’s point is subtle. Imagine if we bring back together the various torches lit from a single source. The lights will then recombine into a single light. Now what happens to the status of the various generated lights, having been recombined? Irenaeus’s first point is that this recombination results in “the one light that existed even from the beginning” (unum lumen quod fuit et a principio). He suggests that the process of recombination enables one to recover the single source from which the lights on the torches had been generated. He then asks: What is the relative temporal status between the generated lights, now that they are recombined into one light? When the lights are recombined, can we still identify their relative temporal status so that one is earlier than another? Irenaeus’s full answer is complex, but I wish to highlight one aspect of his answer: with respect to the substance of light, we cannot differentiate the relative temporal status among the various generated lights. Irenaeus’s argument is found in the single sentence unum enim lumen est totum. The point is that the light that is lit later is not a different light than one that existed earlier. Rather, qua substance, the two are one and the same since light is a simple substance.34 Consequently, the recombined lights as a whole make one light. Irenaeus, then, is highlighting that consubstantiality has a further implication about the relative temporal status among the lights. Given that the generated lights are consubstantial with each other, when they recombine we are left with the whole light that existed as one in the beginning. This means that after recombination, we cannot tell the relative temporal status among the different generated lights anymore because all the generated lights have no other differentiators among them apart from their previous relative temporal status (i.e., one is lit after or before another). So when the lights recombine, we simply cannot distinguish the one that was generated earlier from the one that was generated later. This suggests that consubstantiality among the different generated lights implies that qua lights (that is, with respect to their substance) they are co-temporal. Qua substance, therefore, one generated light cannot be differentiated from another temporally.35
The substance of the matter seems to be this: Irenaeus is suggesting that given consubstantiality, contemporaneity also follows from the simplicity of the generator. Thus, if a simple source generates something consubstantial with itself, what is generated must be co-temporal with itself. Qua substance, what a simple source generates cannot be differentiated from itself according to their relative temporal status. The immediate polemical value, then, becomes apparent. If two generated lights cannot maintain their relative temporal status qua lights assuming that they were generated tanquam a sole radii, then should the Valentinians conceive their emissions tanquam a sole radii, they will not be able to maintain the distinct ordering of their aeons qua spiritual substances (i.e., qua being part of the Pleroma). As a result, the distinct temporal ordering of the emission of aeons will be incompatible with the claim that all aeons are part of one spiritual Pleroma.36
In addition to consubstantiality, contemporaneity thus constitutes a further condition on the grammar of generation required by divine simplicity. If God is simple, then what he generates qua substance cannot possess a relative temporal ordering with respect to himself. Hence, divine simplicity serving as a pattern for theological speech leads to two further conditions on the nature of the generator-generated relation that for Irenaeus are best illustrated from the metaphor of lights from light:
Irenaeus’s principle of unity (positive form)
Divine simplicity implies that something must be generated tanquam a sole radii. This mode of generation is characterized by the following:
1. Consubstantiality: What is generated is similar to, in the same form as, and equal in every way to its source, with the two differentiated only by generation and size.
2. Contemporaneity: Qua substance, what is generated does not possess a relative temporal ordering with its source.
The “Identity Thesis”
We have seen that, for Irenaeus, divine simplicity imposes certain conditions on the processes of generation that involve God as the generator. This is spelled out negatively as inseparability and positively as consubstantiality and contemporaneity. In this final section, I suggest that it is in light of these conditions that we can make sense of Irenaeus’s distinctive language of God’s simplicity. This exercise, which is somewhat speculative, nevertheless provides further evidence that Irenaeus sees the three conditions sketched out in this chapter as simply unfolding the implication of divine simplicity for processes of generation.
According to Haer. II.13.3, God is “simple and not composite, with all members of a similar nature, being entirely similar and equal to himself. He is all Mind, all Spirit, all Understanding, all Thought, all Word, all Hearing, all Eye, all Light, and the whole Source of all blessings.”37 When read in light of the inseparability condition, this statement will become intelligible. Irenaeus, in making this statement, is perhaps suggesting that one cannot conceive God’s Mind, Spirit, Understanding, and the like as generated “distinctly and separately.” This can be further analyzed with respect to the two ways to avoid anthropomorphism spelled out above. First, God’s attributes—Mind, Word, Wisdom, and the like—cannot relate to him as a human offspring relates to her mother. The reason is straightforward: God is incorporeal and so cannot be divided in a corporeal manner. Second, God’s attributes cannot relate to God-self as though they were different stages of divine mental activities. We have already examined the reason for this: God’s mind is unlike the human mind in that God’s activities are not restricted by the bodily organs. Human mental activities are distinguished into various stages only because they are restricted by bodily conditions. God’s mental activities are totally free from these restrictions because he is not composite. Thus, Haer. II.13.8 affirms that “God is all sight and all hearing—for he sees in the same way that he hears, and he hears in the same way that he sees. . . . God is all Mind and all Word, and . . . as far as he is Mind, he is also Word, and . . . his Word is this Mind.” Irenaeus’s language here, then, simply affirms that God’s mental activities cannot be distinguished into various stages due to simplicity. Taking Haer. II.13.3 and II.13.8 together, Irenaeus’s “identity thesis” may be interpreted as expressing that (1) God is not divisible into parts like bodies and (2) the activities of the divine Mind cannot be divided into distinct stages as human mental activities can.
Irenaeus’s statement can also be read in light of consubstantiality and contemporaneity. God is “identical” to his attributes in the sense that there is perfect consubstantiality between God-self and God’s perfections. What this means is that God and the divine attributes are perfectly one in the manner of the sun and its rays (or light and its source). Just as rays from the sun can ever be only bright, so God’s perfections can ever be only in accordance with the divine nature. We cannot conceive of God and the divine attributes as differing in nature. So by claiming that God is “identical” with the divine attributes, what Irenaeus is affirming is that none of these attributes could turn out to be contrary to the divine nature. Contemporaneity offers a further sense in which God and the divine attributes are “identical.” Given divine simplicity, it is not possible to have a relative temporal ordering among God’s attributes, as well as and between God and his attributes. In Haer. II.13.9 Irenaeus states: “Neither can anyone assert that Mind is more ancient than Life, for Mind itself is Life, or that Life is of later origin than Mind, lest he who is the Understanding of all things—that is, God—should at any time be without Life.”38 If one divine attribute were emitted later than another, and if one attribute were understood as separate and distinct from the others, then we would have to consider how and when one could be in possession of the other. For instance, how could Mind or Word have Life if Life was emitted after Mind or Word, as in the Valentinian account? For Irenaeus, such questions are impossible for the simple God. There is no time in which God is without his attributes because God’s attributes have no relative temporal ordering, nor do God and his attributes: “As a matter of fact, Mind, Word, Life, Incorruptibility, Truth, Wisdom, Goodness, and all other perfections are heard together with God’s name.”39
If the foregoing suggestions are on the right track, then Irenaeus’s distinctive language is used to affirm inseparability, consubstantiality, and contemporaneity as consequences of God’s simplicity. These conditions are what Irenaeus intends to express by the “identity thesis.” This observation has the advantage of clarifying how the language from the pre-Socratic philosopher Xenophanes, widely recognized as the source of Irenaeus’s “identity thesis,” is thoroughly integrated into Irenaeus’s wider polemic against Valentinian emissions. This constitutes a final piece of evidence that inseparability, consubstantiality, and contemporaneity are, for Irenaeus, requirements that simply follow from accepting divine simplicity.
Readers with a clear memory of the previous philosophical chapters will no doubt recognize familiar themes in Irenaeus’s language of divine simplicity: immutability, incorporeality, noncomposition, and so forth. Irenaeus’s distinctive language of God’s “identity” with the divine attributes resembles Alcinous’s similar language in Did. 10. Most notably, Irenaeus’s anti-anthropomorphism concerning the divine operations in the clothing of Xenophanes’s language in Haer. II.13.8—“God is all sight and all hearing, for he sees in the same way that he hears, and he hears in the same way that he sees”—reminds us of similar language in Philo. Hence Irenaeus’s understanding of divine simplicity displays continuities with the Middle Platonic theology examined in chapter 2.40 My central argument, though, has been that the need to refute Valentinian emissions provides Irenaeus the opportunity to spell out the implications of divine simplicity for speaking about processes of generation involving a simple God. The result outhnes a set of conditions for any process of generation deemed compatible with God’s simplicity. In doing so, Irenaeus develops a set of what might be called “proto-Trinitarian” considerations regarding the nature of generation regulated by divine simplicity as the pattern for theological speech in the manner of The Republic.
The potential significance of Irenaeus’s reflections for Trinitarian theology examined in this chapter is obvious. But to call Irenaeus’s considerations “proto-Trinitarian” is perhaps forcing a Trinitarian reading onto the texts. To begin with, Irenaeus does not specifically address the generation of the Son in Book 2 of Adversus Haereses. In fact, he considers the question of the Son’s generation as an incomprehensible mystery.41 Irenaeus develops the principles of unity for the specific task of criticizing the Valentinian emissions of aeons. What he discusses, then, are the generations of divine attributes that appear in Valentinian protology. None of these attributes are explicitly identified as a second divine person or hypostasis by Irenaeus.42 A degree of overlap no doubt exists between the two problems since Valentinian emissions involve key Christological titles (Word, only begotten, truth, wisdom). Irenaeus’s analysis of generation tanquam a sole radii also brings up ideas such as consubstantiality and eternal generation, ideas crucial for later Trinitarian reflections. The path from Irenaeus’s principles to theological reflections on the generation of the Son is then easily conceivable. But Irenaeus’s “grammar of generation,” by stressing the unity between the generator and the generated, seems to leave unclarified the status of the distinction between the generated and the generator. Like Alcinous, in no way does Irenaeus regard the divine attributes generated from the simple God as possessing distinctive reality. Irenaeus’s “grammar of generation” is thus ambiguous regarding the exact status of how the generated is distinct from the generator. As formulated, Irenaeus’s principles, if applied to the Son’s generation, leave open the possibility that if the Son is generated from the Father, then he is identical to the Father in a crucial sense, namely, that the Son could be reunited with the Father as a single divine being, tanquam a lumine lumina.43 Such a position will become the center of controversy later on. Consequently, one should hesitate to read the Irenaean reflections examined here as straightforwardly “Trinitarian.” To arrive at a fuller picture of how the implication of divine simplicity for the Father-Son relation was developed in the ante-Nicene period, what I have called the ante-Nicene problematic, a second episode will need to be examined.