Chapter 6 Divine Simplicity as an Anti-Monarchian Principle of Differentiation between the Father and the Son

Chapter 6 Divine Simplicity as an Anti-Monarchian Principle of Differentiation between the Father and the Son

CHAPTER 6

Divine Simplicity as an Anti-Monarchian Principle of Differentiation between the Father and the Son

In this chapter I examine the first significant way Origen’s commitment to divine simplicity shapes his thinking on the Father-Son relation. Origen draws on divine simplicity to differentiate the Father from the Son. It is the Father alone who is simple; the Son, as Christ and Savior, admits multiplicity in a sense that the Father does not. This scheme is set out in a crucial passage in Origen’s Commentary on John:

God, therefore, is altogether one and simple. Our Saviour, however, because of the many things, since God set him forth as a propitiation and firstfruits of all creation, becomes many things, or perhaps even all these things, as the whole creation which can be made free needs him.

ὁ θεὸς μὲν πάντη ἕν ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν. ὁ δὲ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν διὰ τὰ πολλά, ἐπεὶ προέθετο αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς ἱλαστήριον καὶ ἀπαρχὴν πάσης τῆς κτίσεως, πολλὰ γίνεται ἢ καὶ τάχα πάντα ταῦτα, καθὰ χρῄζει αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐλευθεροῦσθαι δυναμένη πᾶσα κτίσις.¹

The idea of ordering two divine principles based on the simplicity/multiplicity contrast is commonplace in Origen’s period among philosophers.² Numenius, for instance, taught that “the first god . . . is simple, and being together with himself throughout can never be divided. The second . . . god, however, is one. He comes into contact with matter, but it is dyadic and, although he unifies it, he is divided by it.”³ Inspired probably by a reading of the first and second hypotheses in Plato’s Parmenides, Numenius differentiates between the first principle (a simple unity) and the second principle (a complex unity that is not purely simple). Similarly, Clement of Alexandria thought that “God is the One (Str. 5.12.81 et passim) and . . . beyond the world of ideas (Str. 5.6.38). The Logos is also one, a complex unity into which the believer is united (Str. 4.25.156f). The Father is simple, and purely single reality; and the Son is complex, a single reality in multiplicity.”⁴ In a similar way, Origen in the above passage uses simplicity to articulate a “fairly pronounced difference in status” between the Father and the Son.⁵ Divine simplicity, then, leads Origen to what might be termed a hierarchical account of the Father-Son distinction.

It is tempting to approach Origen’s hierarchical understanding retrospectively in light of later controversies in the fourth century. Ever since Epiphanius of Salamis, questions have been raised regarding the orthodoxy of Origen’s Trinitarian theology in a retrospective vein: was Origen a “proto-Arian” or “subordinationist”?⁶ This possible reading of Origen, in turn, triggers reactions from scholars who, wishing to defend Origen, undertake the opposite yet equally retrospective approach to portray the Alexandrian as a precursor of Nicene Trinitarian theology.⁷ But Origen’s hierarchical account of the Father and the Son may also be read primarily in light of his own third-century polemical context.⁸ This context is made clear by Origen’s heresiological reports:

Many people who wish to be pious are troubled because they are afraid that they may proclaim two Gods and, for this reason, they fall into false and impious beliefs. They either (1) deny that the individual property [ἰδότητα] of the Son is other than [ἑτέραν] that of the Father by confessing him to be God whom they refer to as “Son” [υἱὸν] in name at least [μέχρι ὀνόματος], or (2) they deny the divinity of the Son and make his individual property [τὴν ἰδιότητα] and determinate essence to be different from the Father [τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν . . . ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρός].⁹ Moreover, not without danger may those be associated with the Church’s membership who say that (2) the Lord Jesus was a man, foreknown and predestined, who before his coming in the flesh had no substantial and proper existence [qui ante aduentum carnalem substantialiter et proprie non extiterit], but that, because he was born human, he possessed only the deity of the Father within him [Patris solam in se habuerit deitatem]. The same applies to those . . . (1) wishing to avoid the appearance of saying that there are two Gods, and yet having no intention of denying the deity of the Saviour, [who] claim that the Father and the Son have one and the same substance [unam eandemque subsistentiam Patris et Filii adseuerant]. That is to say, they indeed say that the deity receives two names according to the diversity of causes [duo quidem nomina secundum diuersitatem causarum recipientem], yet there exists a single ὑπόστασις [hypostasis], that is, one underlying person with two names [unam personam duobus nominibus subiacentem].¹⁰

There are, for example, all the heretics who certainly announce the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; but they do not announce well or faithfully. For either (2) they wrongly separate the Son from the Father, when they say that the Father is of one nature and the Son is of another nature, or (1) they wrongly confuse them, when they imagine . . . that he [God] is merely referred to by three names.¹¹

Taken together, these reports outhne the primary errors regarding the Father-Son relation available in Origen’s time.¹² On the one side, labeled (1) above, some have overstressed the unity between the Father and the Son so as to dissolve the proper distinction between them. This group, likely to be Monarchians, have sacrificed the individual personality of the Son for the sake of monotheism. On the other side, labeled (2) above, others have instead overemphasized the distinction between the Father and the Son. This group, likely to be psilanthropists, have postulated that the Son is a mere man, thus different in essence (or nature) from the Father.¹³ While the two groups have emphasized opposite tendencies, Origen puts them together because he recognizes that both deny the pre-existence of the divine Son of God.¹⁴ Origen’s own heresiological catalogue, then, reveals Monarchianism to be one of the major theological currents in his third-century context that preoccupied his Trinitarian thinking.

In this chapter I suggest that what has frequently been called Origen’s “subordinationism,” namely, his hierarchical understanding of the Father-Son distinction, is better understood as his anti-Monarchianism.¹⁵ Origen’s tendency to stress the transcendence of the Father over the Son is more aptly seen, in his third-century context, as an attempt to counter the Monarchian identification of Father and Son. In light of the wider context, my central thesis is that Origen’s use of divine simplicity as a principle of differentiation between Father and Son constitutes an anti-Monarchian theme. Hence, my primary goal in this chapter is to set out a case for situating Origen’s hierarchical account of the Father-Son relation in his own third-century theological context in order to better highlight the intelligibility of his use of simplicity to distinguish the Father from the Son as an anti-Monarchian emphasis.¹⁶

OR IGEN’S CR ITIQUE OF MONARCHIANISM

Determining the precise nature of Origen’s anti-Monarchianism is not straightforward. This is because, as an exegete, he criticizes the Monarchians only in passing, that is, as part of the task of Scriptural interpretation. Origen therefore does not set out a systematic case against Monarchianism as such. As a result, he rarely elaborates on the terms of his critique. But Origen’s critical remarks on Monarchianism scattered across his corpus possess one striking feature. In his description of Monarchian theology he utilizes several technical terms related to Trinitarian theology. He claims that the Monarchians reject the following kinds of distinctions between the Father and the Son:

a. Distinction with respect to hypostasis (καθ’ ὑπόστασιν)

b. Distinction with respect to personal property (κατ’ ἰδιότητα)

c. Distinction with respect to substrate (καθ’ ὑποκείμενον)

d. Distinction with respect to essence (κατ’ οὐσίαν)

In this first section I shall set out Origen’s anti-Monarchianism by analyzing the content of his critique of Monarchianism in terms of these four types of distinctions.¹⁷

The clearest aspect of Origen’s anti-Monarchianism is found at the level of ὑπόστασις. In CCels. VIII.12 Celsus objects to the Christian practice of worshiping Jesus as another alongside the one supreme God. In reply, Origen cites John 14:11 and 10:30 to show that Christians do not worship two gods because the Father and the Son are one God. But immediately Origen feels the need to clarify himself with respect to the Monarchian undertones in his response. He turns to reject the Monarchian interpretations of John 14:11 and 10:30 to safeguard his reply to Celsus from being misinterpreted in a Monarchian fashion:

“For the Father,” he [Jesus] says, “is in me and I in the Father” (John 14:11; 17:21). If, however, anyone is perturbed by these words lest we should be going over to the view of those who deny that there are two hypostases, Father and Son, let him pay attention to the text “And all those who believed were of one heart and soul” (Acts 4:32), that he may see the meaning of “I and my Father are one” (John 10:30). Accordingly we worship but one God, the Father and the Son, and we still have a valid argument against the others. . . . Therefore we worship the Father of the truth and the Son who is the truth; they are two distinct hypostatic realities [δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει πράγματα], but one in mental unity, in agreement, and in identity of will [ἓν δὲ τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ ταὐτότητι τοῦ βουλήματος].

“Those who deny that there are two hypostases,” no doubt, refers to Monarchians, who affirmed a single divine ὑπόστασις due to their commitment to monotheism. Hence they refused distinct individual existence to divine persons, thereby denying the distinction between the Father and the Son καθ’ ὑπόστασιν. Here, at the level of hypostasis, we know exactly what alternative Origen had in mind, namely, that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three distinct divine ὑποστάσεις.¹⁸ Thus, at the level of ὑπόστασις, the content of Origen’s critique of Monarchianism can be determined with precision.

Next, we turn to ἰδίοτης. According to the first of the heresiological reports quoted at the beginning of this chapter (ComJn II.16), Monarchians also denied that the Son possesses an individual property (ἰδίοτης) that distinguishes him from the Father. Monarchians likely argued that if (a) the Father and the Son are both divine and (b) each possesses individual property, then we will end up with two beings, each of whom personally possesses divine properties. Hence, the attribution of distinctive ἰδίοτης to the Son leads to ditheism. Against this view, Origen criticizes the Monarchians for maintaining a merely nominal distinction between the Father and the Son: If the Son does not possess his own individual property, then he could be differentiated from the Father only as one divine name is distinguished from another name.¹⁹ But why is it problematic to deny the Son’s possession of individual properties that distinguish him from the Father?

We gain further precision as to Origen’s critique from his comments on the opposite error in this passage. As we have seen, Origen frequently pits the Monarchian position against an opposite, equally problematic, psilanthropist position that overemphasizes the distinction between the Father and the Son. Origen’s description of this second position in ComJn II.16 prima facie raises an interpretative issue.²⁰ On the one hand, he accuses the Monarchians of rejecting the Son’s possession of ἰδίοτης. But on the other hand, he accuses the psilanthropists of affirming the Son’s possession of individual property. On first reading, Origen seems to end up with a contradiction here: how could both the rejection and the acceptance of the Son’s possession of individual property be wrong? This issue can be resolved only if we read the passage more carefully. It seems that in his critique of the second position, Origen is rejecting the combination of two conditions that make this position an overemphasis of the Father-Son distinction. Not only does the second position hold that the Father and the Son are distinct κατ’ ἰδιότητα. The problematic claim is that the Son’s distinct property and individual essence are radically other than those of the Father. For psilanthropists, the Son, possessing distinct human existence (including human properties), has no share of divine property in himself (hence psilanthropos, that is, merely human). Origen’s critique of the psilanthropists does not contradict his critique of Monarchianism but rather further clarifies it. The psilanthropists’ error is that while they affirm the Son’s possession of his distinctive individual properties, they refuse to recognize that he possesses any divine properties. This clarifies that when Origen frames the Monarchian error as a denial of the Father-Son distinction κατ’ ἰδιότητα, he is simply referring to the Monarchian refusal to affirm that the Son possesses divine properties in a substantive rather than nominal manner. At the level of ἰδίοτης, we can infer that Origen is willing to affirm that the Father and the Son each possesses divine properties individually.

Next we turn to οὐσία. It seems that Monarchians argued for their position based on the observation that both Father and Son are called “light” in Scripture. If Scripture calls both by the same term, then do the Father and the Son share the same essence? If two horses are both “horses” because they share one common essence (οὐσία), then did Scripture teach by the same logic that there is no distinction between the Father and the Son with respect to essence (κατ’ οὐσίαν)? In response, Origen writes:

Now since the Savior here is “light” in general, and in the catholic epistle of the same John, God is said to be light, one thinks it is confirmed from that source too that the Father is not distinct from the son in essence [τῇ οὐσίᾳ μὴ διεστηκέναι]. But another who has observed more accurately and speaks more soundly will say that the light which shines in the darkness and is not overcome by it, and the light in which there is no darkness at all are not the same [οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι].²¹

As is clear from this passage, Origen even accuses Monarchians of rejecting the Father-Son distinction in essence (τῇ οὐσίᾳ). Origen does not explain the significance of his use of οὐσία language here, nor does he clarify what alternative he had in mind. Orbe suggests that here Origen is affirming the opposite thesis, namely, that the Father is distinct from the Son in essence (τῇ οὐσίᾳ).²² Does Origen’s anti-Monarchianism here imply that the Father and the Son are two οὐσίαι? On the basis of this passage alone, it is unclear whether Origen affirms the opposite. What is clear is that for Monarchians, the fact that the same Scriptural term, “light,” is applied to both the Father and the Son implies that they are one in οὐσία. If this is indeed an accurate representation of Monarchianism, then Origen’s anti-Monarchianism amounts to his rejection of this move. For Origen, the fact that both the Father and the Son are called “light” in Scripture need not imply that there is only one light. If we observe the use of “light” in Scripture carefully, we must indeed distinguish two lights.²³ In making this move, Origen is simply repeating the strategy commonly found among anti-Monarchians, namely, to show that on the basis of close grammatical reading, the wider narrative of Scripture could make sense only if we postulate two divine subjects. But from this passage it is difficult to gain further precision as to whether Origen uses the term οὐσία in the same way as the Monarchians, if indeed the latter used οὐσία as a technical term in formulating their position.

Further clarity on the implication of Origen’s anti-Monarchianism on Trinitarian terminologies, however, is found in a passage that largely recapitulates what we have seen so far. Moreover, this passage also introduces the last technical term, ὑποκείμενον. In ComJn X.246 Origen provides testimony that Monarchians draw on John 2:19 in combination with other New Testament passages to argue that their position can be deduced from reading Scriptural data about Jesus’s resurrection as a coherent whole:

Those, however, who are confused on the subject of the Father and the Son bring together the statement, “And we are also found false witnesses of God, because we have testified against God that he raised up Christ, whom he did not raise” (1 Cor. 15:15) and words like these which show him who raises to be different [ἕτερον] from him who has been raised, and the statement, “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up” (John 2:19). They think that these statements prove that the Son does not differ from the Father in number [μὴ διαφέρειν τῷ ἀριθμῷ], but that both being one, not only in essence, but also in the underlying substance [ἓν οὐ μόνον οὐσίᾳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ], they are said to be Father and Son in relation to certain differing aspects [κατά τινας ἐπινοίας], not in relation to their reality [οὐ κατὰ ὑπόστασιν λέγεσθαι].²⁴

In John 2:19 the Son teaches that he will raise himself up, whereas in 1 Cor. 15:15 Paul teaches that it is God—the Father—who raised Christ up after his crucifixion. For Monarchians, the only coherent reading of these two passages is to say that the one who has raised himself up in the Son is indeed the Father himself. Orbe has taken this passage as revealing something about Origen’s global account of how various Trinitarian terms relate to each other.²⁵ This seems plausible, since in the above passage Origen’s critique of the Monarchians is precise: the Monarchians fall into error by affirming that the Father and the Son are one in οὐσία and ὑποκείμενον and that “Father” and “Son” signify simply two ἐπίνοιαι and not ὑπόστασεις.²⁶ It is possible, then, to infer from this that Origen wishes to signal his preference for an anti-Monarchian alternative based on these terms: the Father and the Son are two οὐσίαι, ὑποκείμενα and ὑπόστασεις. Our textual evidence, however, clearly supports only the conclusion in relation to ὑπόστασις, where an alternative is explicitly developed by Origen in a Trinitarian context. A less speculative interpretation, however, is that the use of multiple terms in this passage arises as the result of Origen’s desire to accentuate the severity of the potential threats contained in Monarchianism. This passage nonetheless cements the centrality of Monarchianism in Origen’s understanding of key Trinitarian terms in relation to the distinction between Father and Son. In Origen’s mind, the Monarchian position may be described with reference to the denial of the distinction between Father and Son with respect to all four key terms relevant to Trinitarian theology: ὑπόστασις, ἰδίοτης, οὐσία, and ὑποκείμενον.²⁷ Furthermore, Origen clearly formulates the alternative, anti-Monarchian, position in terms of the language of the Father and the Son as two ὑποστάσεις.

This brief survey confirms Origen’s anti-Monarchian credentials. Monarchianism is rejected due to its affirmation of monotheism at the expanse of the distinction between Father and Son. Apart from ὑπόστασις, I have suggested that the precise content of Origen’s anti-Monarchian alternative is far from clear. What remains to be clarified, then, is the kind of Father-Son distinction Origen proposes to counter Monarchianism. One approach is to attempt a reconstruction of Origen’s philosophical understanding of Trinitarian terminologies.²⁸ The result of such investigations is illuminating but inevitably speculative. In what follows I shall offer a slightly less speculative approach. Without postulating the philosophical meaning attributed by Origen to ὑπόστασις, ἰδίοτης, οὐσία, and ὑποκείμενον, another promising approach is to reconstruct Origen’s account of the Father-Son distinction by reading his theory of Scriptural titles in its anti-Monarchian context. As I shall argue, given that Origen’s theory emerges from an anti-Monarchian context, it is possible to infer from this theory the desirable sense in which the Son should be distinguished from the Father in an anti-Monarchian manner.

ORIGEN’S HIERARCHICAL FATHER-SON DISTINCTION AS AN ANTI-MONARCHIAN EMPHASIS

In his Commentary on John Origen sets out a detailed analysis of Scriptural titles. Three types of Scriptural titles can be found in this discussion: (1) titles the Father possesses absolutely and the Son derivatively, (2) titles the Father possesses in the Son and the Son possesses absolutely, and (3) titles the Father does not possess and the Son possesses contingently. This scheme enables Origen to differentiate the Father from the Son in a hierarchical manner in various ways. The aim of this section is to show how Origen’s use of divine simplicity to differentiate between the Father and the Son is intelligible only in light of his account of patrological and Christological titles.

Absolute Patrological Titles

In the first group we have titles for which the Father is the sole source and form. The classical examples frequently discussed by Origen are goodness, divinity, and immortality. With respect to these terms, the Father’s essence (οὐσία) is essentially identical to them. This is usually expressed linguistically in Greek by the presence of the prefix αὐτο- or the definite article. The implication of this first group of titles is not restricted to the Father but extends to the Son as well. According to Origen, the Son possesses this group of titles only derivatively. In other words, the Son participates in the Father in order to acquire these titles. The first group of titles thus fills out in a crucial manner how the Father-Son distinction is a hierarchical one for Origen: with respect to this group, the Father is essentially what the Son is only by participation. This is why I call these titles absolute patrological titles.

In Origen’s mind, the hierarchical nature of the Father-Son relation with respect to this group is grounded on a tightly connected Scriptural logic, drawing particularly on the following passages: (a) John 1:1–2, (b) John 14:28, (c) John 17:3, (d) Mark 10:18, (e) 1 Tim. 6:16, and (f) 1 John 1:5. This Scriptural logic lies at the heart of what is unique to Origen’s scheme in comparison with other Middle Platonic or Neo-Platonic differentiations between the “first” and the “second” god. Thus, if we want to fully grasp Origen’s scheme, we need to pay close attention to how he treats this tightly connected network of passages.

The Basic Intuition: John 14:28 and Mark 10:18

We begin by establishing the core intuition: the Father is greater than the Son. For Origen, the radical transcendence of the Father is grounded in two key passages: John 14:28 and Mark 10:18. From these, taken together, Origen infers that there must be a radical contrast between the Father and the Son in order to make sense of these words issued by the Savior. In ComJn XIII.151, we have the clearest articulation of this inference made by Origen from these two verses:

We are obedient to the Saviour who says, “The Father who sent me is greater than I” (John 14:28) and who, for this reason, did not permit himself to accept the title “good” (Mark 10:18) when it was offered to him, although it was perfectly legitimate and true. Instead, he graciously offered it up to the Father, and rebuked the one who wished to praise the Son excessively. This is why we say the Saviour and the Holy Spirit transcend all created beings, not by comparison, but by their exceeding pre-eminence. The Father exceeds the Saviour as much as (or even more than) the Saviour himself and the Holy Spirit exceed the rest (πάντων μὲν τῶν γενητῶν ὑπερέχειν οὐ συγκρίσει ἀλλ’ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ὑπεροχῇ φαμὲν τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ὑπερεχόμενον τοσοῦτον ἢ καὶ πλέον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅσῳ ὑπερέχει αὐτὸς καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τῶν λοιπῶν).²⁹

For Origen, John 14:28 and Mark 10:18 clearly indicate that it is possible to praise the Son “excessively” so that one regards him as greater than the Father in an inappropriate manner. These two passages suggest that the Son did not want anyone to mistakenly elevate him to the level comparable with that of the Father. To do so would violate monotheism. This point is explicitly developed further, in relation to John 14:28, in CCels. VIII.14. According to Celsus, Christians are merely paying lip service when they say that they worship God alone. Celsus thinks Christians endorse Jesus as the Son of God, implying that they exalt Jesus to the same level as that of God the Father. In response, Origen directly rebukes some Christian believers for the view they might have deviated to, namely, that “the Saviour is the greatest and supreme God.”³⁰ This view is incorrect, however, because it contradicts Jesus’s teaching in John 14:28. This verse is read by Origen as clearly ruling out the possibility of treating the Son of God as greater—that is, more worthy of worship—than the Father. Here Origen is not entirely clear about whether, based on John 14:28, he would also rule out the possibility of treating the Son as co-equal with the Father, as the greatest and supreme God. But from the context it is safe to assume that he interprets John 14:28 as meaning nothing less than that the Father alone is the greatest and supreme God. As a result, against Celsus, Origen argues that Christians do in fact “pay great reverence” to the Father and worship him alone.

There seems to be a slight hesitation on Origen’s part regarding whether the transcendence of the Father over the Son is either similar to, or even greater than, the Son’s transcendence over creation. On this point, for instance in ComJn XIII.151-53, he does not specify which view he thinks is more correct. Elsewhere Origen seems to assert the opposite view, namely, that with respect to goodness the Son exceeds the rest of creation more than the Father exceeds the Son.³¹ This ambiguity notwithstanding, what is clear is that Origen thinks that John 14:28 and Mark 10:18 teach that the Father’s greatness over the Son must be preserved: “He [the Son] is not to be comparable with the Father in any way (οὐ συγκρίνεται κατ’ οὐδὲν τῷ πατρί).”³²

Developing the Intuition: 1 Timothy 6:16, 1 John 1:5, and John 1:3

John 14:28 and Mark 10:18 set the exegetical foundation for the basic intuition that there must be a sense in which the Father is greater than the Son. This intuition is then supported by a few verses that, while not as explicit as John 14:28 and Mark 10:18, nonetheless give further evidence of the Father’s radical transcendence over the Son. Moreover, this group of verses further clarify the sense in which the Father is greater than the Son: the Father possesses a specific group of Scriptural titles that are absent in references to the Son.

First, in ComJn II.123–25 Origen combines Num. 14:28 and 1 Tim. 6:16 to argue that it is the Father who alone possesses life as absolute immortality. The Son, in contrast, does not possess life in this manner. According to Origen, Num. 14:28 (“As I live, says the Lord”) teaches that “living in the proper sense . . . occurs with God alone.”³³ This “living in the proper sense” is what 1 Tim. 6:16 is teaching about God, “who alone has immortality.” Origen argues that the sole privilege of possessing immortality in this verse must be attributed to the Father alone. This is because even the Son does not possess such immortality since he died for the sake of all who need salvation.³⁴ If the Son has immortality that is “absolutely unchangeable and immutable,” how can he be said to have “tasted death for all”? Origen concludes from 1 Tim. 6:16 that it is the Father who possesses life absolutely because immortality in the absolute sense is absent from the Son. Consequently, Origen differentiates the Father’s absolute immortality from the sense in which the Son is said to be “life.”³⁵

Further Scriptural support for the transcendence of the Father over the Son is also found in 1 John 1:5, which states that “God is light; in him there is no darkness at all.” Once again, Origen asks: to whom should we attribute this statement? He argues that it is not possible to say that there is no darkness in the Son because of his involvement in the salvific economy:

We shall now more daringly add further to those words that if “him who knew no sin he made sin on behalf of us” (2 Cor. 5:21), that is the Christ, it could not be said of him, “There is no darkness in him.” For if Jesus condemned sin “in the likeness of sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3) by taking up the likeness of sinful flesh, it will no longer be completely accurate to say of him, “There is no darkness in him.”³⁶

This daring interpretation of 1 John 1:5 reflects that Origen finds it not possible to present a clear-cut division between the Son apart from the salvific economy and the Son who is involved in the salvific economy. Since the Son is involved in taking on our sins, infirmities, and even death for our benefit, he cannot be said to be “without darkness.” Hence, only the Father could be the subject of the statement “There is no darkness in him.” The Father, then, is pure light, in contradistinction with the Son, who is the “light of men” (John 1:4), “true light” (John 1:9), and the “light of the world” (John 8:12)—a light pursued by darkness.³⁷ So 1 John 1:5, when read in conjunction with John 1:3, supplies the Scriptural evidence that the Father is light in an absolute sense that is absent from the Son. This amounts to yet another way Origen draws on Scripture to defend the transcendence of the Father over the Son.

Origen’s interpretation of 1 Tim. 6:16 and 1 John 1:5 as evidence of the Father’s transcendence over the Son depends on an account of the Son in relation to his involvement in the salvific economy. Inevitably, the divine titles contained in these verses can be most appropriately applied to the Father alone. Origen is clearly aware of the potential objection to this procedure: is it not problematic to say that the Son does not possess, as the Father does, absolute immortality and freedom from darkness? In response, Origen writes:

In the sense that the Father “alone has immortality,” because our Lord, on account of his love for man, took up death on behalf of us, in the same sense the Father alone has the quality expressed in the statement, “There is no darkness in him,” since the Christ, because of the benefit which follows for men, took our darkness upon himself that by his power he might destroy our death, and completely destroy the darkness in our soul.³⁸

This passage illustrates why Origen has no problem with interpreting 1 Tim. 6:16 and 1 John 1:5 as suggesting that the Father is in some way greater than the Son. According to Origen, the Son’s worthiness for human worship rests primarily on his willingness to take on sin and death for mankind—not, therefore, on the basis of equality with the Father by nature. In fact, as we shall see, Origen sees the Son as teaching exactly the opposite—that he should not be treated as equal with the Father. It is then solely the Father whose worthiness of worship is grounded in his absolute immortality and purity as light. Consequently, Origen interprets 1 Tim. 6:16 and 1 John 1:5 as unequivocally lending further weight to his hierarchical understanding of the Father-Son relation, in which qualities such as “life” and “light” are possessed absolutely by the Father alone.

The Formalized Scheme: John 1:1–2 and John 17:3

We can now sketch out Origen’s formalized scheme that captures what we have seen so far. In ComJn II.12–18 the basic intuition that the Father is greater than the Son in divinity finds a more definitive statement on the basis of John 1:1–2 and John 17:3. According to Origen, the triad of propositions in John 1:1–2 contains a unique ordering that indicates something profound about the nature of the Son’s divinity.³⁹ Since we find the proposition “and the Word was with God” in the second place before the proposition “and the Word was God,” Origen postulates that “the ordering of the propositions could be so for the purpose that we might understand that the Word has become God because he is “with God” (ἵνα δυνηθῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ὁ λόγος νοηθῆναι γινόμενος θεός).⁴⁰ In other words, the content of the second proposition (that the Word was “with God”) provides the basis for the validity of the third proposition (that the Word was God). It is in clarifying this logic that Origen elaborates a formalized statement of his hierarchical understanding of the Father-Son relation. He observes that in John 1:1–2 John used the Greek article in one place but not in another. We have “the Word” but only “God,” without the article.⁴¹ John is not ambivalent about the rules of the Greek article; rather, he is making a substantial theological point: “For he [John] adds the article when the noun ‘God’ stands for the uncreated cause of the universe, but he omits it when the Word is referred to as ‘God.’ And as ‘The God’ and ‘God’ differ in these places, so, perhaps, ‘the Word’ and ‘Word’ differ.”⁴² In this reading, the difference between “The God” and “God” is that with the article, one names the source (ἡ πηγὴ) for something.⁴³ “The God” who is “over all” (ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς) is the source of divinity. He is ὁ θεός, because the article is used for the “first” (τῷ πρώτῳ) that serves as the source of that thing of which it is the first. But the Word should not be called “The God” because he is God in virtue of being “with God,” as the ordering of the second and third propositions in John 1:1–2 indicates.⁴⁴ Rather, the Word has “drawn divinity into himself” through participation in the Father’s divinity.⁴⁵ The implication, then, is that the Word could not be regarded as the source of divinity himself. The structure of John 1:1–2, as well as the absence of the article attributed to the Son in these verses, thus indicates for Origen that John is teaching a differentiation between “The God,” in whom divinity is grounded on himself and thus greater, and “God” (the Son) in whom divinity is grounded on participating in “The God” and thus lesser. Here, then, we have a more formalized account of the transcendence of the Father over the Son in Johannine terms.⁴⁶

Origen draws on further Johannine inspiration to explain this formalized statement of the intuition already found in John 14:28. According to Origen, the Son’s prayer to the Father in John 17:3 clearly indicates the language that “The God” is also called the “true God” or “very God.” In ComJn II.17 he writes:

We must say to them that at one time God, with the article, is very God (αὐτόθεος), wherefore also the Savior says in his prayer to the Father, “That they may know you the only true God” [μόνον ἀληθινὸν θεόν] (John 17:3). On the other hand, everything besides the very God, which is made God by participation in his divinity, would more properly not be said to be “The God,” but “God” [πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος μετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος θεοποιούμενον οὐχ ὁ θεὸς ἀλλὰ θεὸς κυριώτερον ἂν λέγοιτο].

This passage further clarifies how the Origenian scheme works. On the one hand, in John 17:3 “The God” refers to the “true God” to whom the Savior prayed. A simple inference implies that “The God” is the Father of the Son. This God is “very God” (αὐτόθεος) in the sense that his divinity serves as the source of divinity for himself as well as for any other who is called “god.” On the other hand, the “many gods” mentioned by Scripture are made God by participation in the divinity of “The God.”⁴⁷ These gods who obtained their divinity in such a manner are said to be “besides the very God” (παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος). By combining John 1:1–2 and John 17:3, Origen concludes that the Word is God in the latter sense: since the Son participates in the Father (“The God” and “true God”), he is said to be divine. The language of “The God,” “true God,” and “very God” therefore offers a way to formalize the basic intuition found in John 14:28 and Mark 10:18, namely, that the divinity of the Father must be greater than, and differentiated from, the divinity of the Son.

The formalized scheme serves as the framework for the whole group of Scriptural titles that indicate a hierarchical understanding of the FatherSon relation. So the Father is the source and form with respect to goodness (Mark 10:18), divinity (John 1:1–2, 17:3), immortality (1 Tim. 6:16), and light (1 John 1:5).⁴⁸ These titles are attributed to the Father absolutely. The Son possesses these titles only derivatively, in virtue of his participation in (being “with”) the Father. As a result, this group of titles indicates a precise sense of how the Father is greater than the Son (John 14:28), as I shall turn to elaborating in a moment.

Christological Titles

In the second place, we have a group of titles that occupies probably the most complex place in Origen’s thought. Classic examples in this group are σοφία, λόγος, and ἀλήθεια. The Father’s relation with this group is complex and somewhat undeveloped by Origen. As Orbe has speculated, Origen might have understood this group of titles as attributed to the Father only potentially and to the Son actually.⁴⁹ The Father, then, possesses this group of titles in the Son. That is to say, with respect to this group, the Son is the Father’s perfections subsisting in actuality. The Son, in turn, is the one who possesses these titles absolutely. This is why I refer to this group as absolute sonship titles. With respect to these titles, the Son takes on the role of source and form. This is analogous to the role assumed by the Father with respect to the absolute patrological titles.⁵⁰ This point is usually expressed by Origen linguistically by the use of the Greek definite article for these titles whenever they are applied to the Son. The absolute sonship titles further clarify the sense in which the Father and the Son are distinct: whereas the Father does not possess this group of perfections save in the Son, the Son is the source and form of these titles.

But there is another reason why this group is called absolute sonship titles. This is in relation to the fact that the status of Christological titles in Origen cannot be understood with reference to the Father-Son relation alone apart from the Son-creation relation. According to Origen, Scripture attributes many titles to Jesus Christ, but they do not all possess the same significance. It is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of attributions.⁵¹ Titles that indicate an essential aspect of Christ are attributed to him in an unqualified manner (ἁπλῶς). Titles that belong to Christ only with respect to his role in the salvation of fallen souls are attributed to him “for us” (ἡμῖν), in a qualified manner. Methodologically, Origen does not provide any straightforward ways to determine the exact nature of each Christological title. Typically, he investigates all the Scriptural data in order to draw his own conclusion for each title. His investigations reveal many possibilities. Some titles are attributed to Christ both absolutely and “for us”; others are attributed to Christ only “for us.”⁵² This complexity notwithstanding, in the Commentary on John two distinct groupings of Christological titles emerge. Origen identifies one group of titles attributed to Christ both absolutely and economically. It is in this group that we find the absolute sonship titles—wisdom, Logos, power, justice, and truth. This group of titles is attributed to Christ absolutely in that they reveal something about Christ apart from his role in the salvific economy. This, then, is a second sense in which titles such as wisdom, Word, and truth are referred to as absolute sonship titles. Since Christ is the source and form of these attributes, he also holds these titles “for us” whenever these attributes are sometimes also said to be found in other created beings in Scripture. The absolute sonship titles, then, are attributed to Christ both absolutely and economically.

Origen identifies another group of titles attributed to Christ only economically, and as such they are said to “come to be” in Christ only for the purpose of the salvific economy. This second group includes titles such as “firstborn of the dead,” “shepherd,” “door,” “way,” “life,” “light of men,” and many others.⁵³ The important point about this second group is that each title denotes a particular economic role Christ plays in relation to us. Consequently, they communicate to us who Christ is only with reference to the benefits he bestowed upon creatures in the economy. Hence I call these titles relative soteriological titles. I shall now turn to examining the absolute Sonship titles first, then the relative soteriological titles.

Absolute Sonship Titles: The Divine Aspects of Christ

In ComJn XXXII.387 Origen summarizes the primary absolute sonship titles: “To seek Jesus is to seek the Word, and wisdom, and justice, and truth, and the power of God, all of which Christ is.” These five titles are attributed absolutely to Christ throughout the Commentary on John. Origen describes them as belonging to “the divine aspects in Jesus.”⁵⁴ It is with respect to Word, wisdom, justice, truth, and power that Christ is most appropriately regarded as divine. This point is most clearly expressed in Origen’s discussion of the death of Jesus Christ. According to him, the possibility of being killed and dying cannot be ascribed to Christ according to his absolute titles. Only with respect to his humanity can Christ admit the possibility of death.⁵⁵ This illustrates the point that for Origen the absolute sonship titles signify the divinity of Christ.

These titles, however, are attributed not only to Christ but also to other created beings. The five titles mentioned in ComJn XXXII.387 are also attributed to Christ “for us.” Christ serves as the source and form of these attributes, whereas creatures obtain them only through participating in Christ. With respect to the five absolute sonship titles, we find a hierarchical participatory structure also present in the absolute patrological titles. Instead of the Father, the Son is truly the single source and absolute standard vis-à-vis the absolute sonship titles. Consequently, these titles can be attributed to all created things only if they truly participate in Christ. From this participatory structure there is a sense that, with respect to his absolute titles, Christ relates to the rest of creation in a manner analogous to how the Father relates to him.⁵⁶ Just as the Father is the source of Christ’s divinity, so is Christ the source of wisdom, reason, power, justice, and truth for the rest of creation. We shall now turn to specific examples to illustrate this point.

We begin with wisdom, for which Christ serves as source in two senses.⁵⁷ First, it is as wisdom that Christ is said to be the source of all creaturely existence—in other words, as creator. According to Origen, all things were created because of the “creation” of wisdom in Prov. 8:22. Further, in Ps. 103:24 (LXX) we read that “God created all things in wisdom.” Joining Prov. 8:22 with Ps. 103:24 (LXX), Origen concludes that it is because of the creation of wisdom that all created things could exist, “since it has a share in the divine wisdom according to which it has been created.”⁵⁸ So creatures exist because they participate in wisdom, and wisdom serves as the source of their existence. There is a further sense in which wisdom serves as a source. Creatures are said to be “wise” because they participate in Christ, the fullness of wisdom. While each wise person receives wisdom from Christ according to their capacity for wisdom, all receive wisdom through participation in Christ.⁵⁹ Thus for Origen, the absolute sonship title “wisdom” grounds the double fact that (1) all things exist by participating in Christ as wisdom and (2) all wise beings are said to be wise only by participating in Christ.

Origen’s discussion of wisdom invokes the participatory structure familiar to his discussion of divinity, but he does not refer explicitly to the language of source and archetype, which is found in his discussion of Christ’s second absolute title, “Word.”⁶⁰ For Origen, just as “The God” (or the true God) relates to every other “god” as the archetype, so does the Word of God relate to the reason in every other rational being as the archetype. He writes: “As the Father is very God and true God in relation to the image and images of the image (wherefore also men are said to be ‘according to the image,’ not ‘images’), so is the very Word in relation to the reason in each one. For both hold the place of a source (Ἀμφότερα γὰρ πηγῆς ἔχει χώραν); the Father, that of divinity, the Son, that of reason.”⁶¹ As Word, Christ “holds the place of a source.” This language automatically invokes the participatory structure we have seen in Origen’s discussion of wisdom. Every rational creature possesses reason only insofar as they participate in the source of reason, Christ as Word. Once again, each receives reason from Christ according to their capacity. In the first place are the prophets, to whom the Word has “come to be,” who participate in the “Word in the beginning—the Word “with God” and “God the Word.”⁶² The prophets truly possess reason since they have truly grasped the Word in himself. In the second place are believers who participate in the “Word made flesh,” those who know nothing “except Jesus Christ and him crucified.” In Origen’s reading, believers have mistakenly presupposed that “the Word which became flesh was the totality of the Word, who know Christ only according to the flesh.” Presumably, these are those who knew only the “letter” and not the “spirit” of Scripture. In the third place are those who follow the schools of Greek philosophy, who devote themselves to “words” (λόγοι) and participate in some way in “the Word,” supposing that these “words” transcend every word. Finally, there are those who believe in words (λόγοι) that do not participate in “the Word” in any way at all but are altogether corrupt and godless. Origen describes them as those who “do away with providence which is self-evident and more or less perceptible to the senses, and which approve some other goal than the good.”⁶³ Origen thinks this scheme reveals how Christ is “the Word” in a manner analogous to how the Father is “The God”: just as the Father is the single source of divinity from which all other gods receive their divinity, so Christ does as the Word serve as the single source of reason from which all reason in rational creatures is derived.⁶⁴

The participatory structure we have seen with respect to wisdom and Word is also found in Origen’s discussion of Christ as “truth.”⁶⁵ The aporia that forms the context of his discussion concerns the consistency between John 1:17 and John 14:6: is it contradictory to say that Jesus Christ is the truth himself and that truth “came through Jesus Christ”? Origen’s solution turns to the same participatory structure we have seen in the case of “Word”:

For one does not himself come into existence through himself. We must understand, however, that the ultimate truth itself [ἡ αὐτοαλήθεια ἡ οὐσιώδης] and, if I may put it this way, the archetype of the truth in rational souls [πρωτότυπος τῆς ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς ψυχαῖς ἀληθείας], from which images of that truth, as it were, have been impressed on those who understand the truth, did not come through Jesus Christ nor through anyone at all, but came through God. Just as the Word which was in the beginning with God did not come through someone, and wisdom, which “God created as the beginning of his ways” (Prov. 8:22), did not come through someone, so neither did the truth come through someone.⁶⁶

Here Origen differentiates between the archetype of the truth—Christ himself in John 14:6—and truths based on the archetype (as its images). The former did not come through Christ since “one does not himself come into existence through himself.” Rather, it came through God, i.e., the Father. In much the same way that we should consider Word and wisdom, truth came from God and not from someone else. Truths based on the archetype, however, came through Christ because it was on the basis of Christ, the archetypal truth, that many truths—the truths of men—came forth. Further, to be “in the truth” means to participate in Christ. Scripture states that the truth is not in the devil not because he does not hold any true opinion at all but because he does not participate in the truth, namely, Christ. To participate in the truth, then, is to participate in Christ, who said, “I am the truth” (John 14:6).

This participatory structure extends to the other two absolute titles of Christ, namely, justice and power. First, 1 Cor. 1:30 and Ps. 10:7 (LXX) for Origen indicate that the archetypal justice is Christ. The justice of each person is “formed from that justice, so that many justices come into existence in those who are saved” (ἀπ’ ἐκείνης δὲ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἡ ἐν ἑκάστῳ δικαιοσύνη τυποῦται, ὡς γίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς σῳζομένοις πολλὰς δικαιοσύνας).⁶⁷ Second, Phil. 4:13 suggests that Paul derives his power from Christ Jesus, who is the power of God (1 Cor. 1:24).⁶⁸ It follows that all those who are said to possess power derive their power from participating in the archetype and source of power, Christ himself.

As we have seen, with respect to absolute sonship titles, Christ stands as the archetype and source. This implies that there is a sense in which Christ is analogous to the Father as purely one. The Father is one and simple because he is the source and archetype of everything that he is (e.g., goodness, divinity, etc.). Similarly, the Son is one with respect to all that he is absolutely (wisdom, word, justice, etc.). In other words, the move Origen makes between the one true Word and many false words (logoi) that we saw in chapter 5 is also applicable to the relation between the one truth and many truths, one wisdom and many wisdoms, and so on. Origen does not explicitly articulate the oneness of the Son with respect to all five of his absolute titles. But, from what he does say about some of the absolute titles as well as his constant grouping of these titles, it is not unreasonable to infer that Christ’s oneness as source and archetype extends to all five of his absolute titles.

In ComJn II.37–41 Origen attempts to explain why the prologue of John’s Gospel speaks of “the Word” and not “the Word of God.” Origen thinks this is not trivial but indicates the fact that there is only one Word—the Son, the single source and archetype of reason. According to Origen, if it were written in John 1:1 that “in the beginning was the Word of God,” it would indicate that there are many words: the Word of God, word of men, word of angels, etc. In other words, specifying the Word as the Word of God would have proposed that Jesus Christ is one word among many other words. However, this is absurd because it would lead to the postulate that there are several things that properly possess the title “Word,” that is, as the source and archetype of reason. Origen thinks that consideration of the nature of truth will help establish the absurdity of this: there is only one proper standard of reason because the truth is one. No one would dare to argue, for instance, that the truth of God is one thing and the truth of angels another. Hence, the truth of God, as archetype and source of truths, is one and not many. Elsewhere, in language reminiscent of the ethical sense of one and many discussed in chapter 5, Origen suggests that whoever stands “in the truth” (i.e., in the archetype of truth) is “single and simple,” whereas whoever stands outside the truth is “complex and manifold.”⁶⁹ Now, given that the truth is one, he argues that it is absurd to think that there can be many words that can be identified as the Word or indeed many wisdoms or justices that are identified as the Wisdom and the Justice:

Now if truth is one, it is clear that its elaboration and demonstration, which is wisdom, would reasonably be thought of as one, since everything considered wisdom would not properly be called wisdom if it did not possess the truth [οὐ κρατούσης τῆς ἀληθείας]. And if truth is one and wisdom is one, the Word also, who announces the truth and wisdom simply and openly to those capable of apprehending it, would be one.⁷⁰

The essence of this argument is that if the truth is one, then the wisdom with which we elaborate and demonstrate the truth must also be one if what wisdom demonstrates is indeed truth itself. This is because whatever is in possession of truth is properly so called only if it possesses the same oneness as the truth. Likewise, the Word with which we announce the truth and wisdom must also take hold of this same oneness. Thus, the standard for truth, wisdom, and word (their archetype and source) is one. Put differently, that to which the Greek article can be given must be one and not many. This last point reinforces what we have seen in this section: the Son’s relation to his absolute sonship titles mirrors exactly the Father’s relation to his absolute patrological titles.

Relative Soteriological Titles

The third group of titles are best termed relative soteriological titles since these are titles the Son possesses purely “for us.” According to Origen, this group belongs exclusively to the Son in his role as Savior. Origen contemplates whether this group will remain applicable to the Son if the soteriological purpose of the titles is made redundant in the eschatological age.⁷¹ This is because soteriological titles are understood by Origen as attributed to the Son purely “for us”—in other words, in a purely relative manner. Hence, the soteriological titles do not belong to the Son’s essence; they are perhaps best conceived of as the Son’s contingent properties. It is clear that the Father does not possess any of the titles in this group at all. The soteriological titles, then, will be crucial for further differentiating between the Father and the Son.

According to Origen, Christ acquired many titles that are purely relative to his soteriological role because creatures needed him to have them for their salvation.⁷² Christ became the “light of men” because those who were darkened by evil needed to be illuminated by him in order to return to God. He became “the firstborn from the dead” because of men’s sin and their fall into corruption. Christ became a shepherd because men became like “senseless beasts” who needed someone to lead them back to God. For Origen thinks that each title must be investigated thoroughly because it is possible to come to a false or incomplete picture of the economy if a thorough investigation of the differences between the titles is not carried out. Methodologically, the multiplicity of soteriological titles is crucial for Origen’s approach to understanding the salvific economy revealed in Scripture. The multiple relative titles is attributed to Christ only “for us”—economically—because these titles indicate a unique aspect of Christ in which he is needed in the salvific economy. Origen expresses this point in a bold and striking manner. If men had not fallen into darkness, Christ would not have become the “light of men” since there would be no need for Christ to be a light for them.⁷³ If Adam and Eve had not sinned, and consequently led humanity into corruption and death, there would be no need for Christ to die and to descend into Hades. As a result, he would not be properly given the title “firstborn of the dead.”⁷⁴ Christ would not be a shepherd if men had not become comparable to “senseless beasts.”⁷⁵ Origen thus clearly considers the multitude of titles attributed to Christ as purely due to the need to save the fallen creatures. Consequently, the soteriological titles differ from the absolute titles in that the latter are attributed to Christ’s very nature himself apart from his role in the salvific economy.

A further aspect of this difference between the relative soteriological and the absolute sonship titles is that while the latter belong to Christ absolutely—there is no sense in which they “came to be” in him—this is not true of the former.⁷⁶ As Origen notes, an ordering of Christological titles must be put in place to grasp the theological significance of these titles:

Once we have collected the titles of the Son, therefore, we must test which of them came into existence later, and whether they would have become so numerous if the saints had begun and continued in blessedness. For perhaps wisdom alone would remain, or word, or life, and by all means truth, but surely not also the other titles which he took in addition because of us.⁷⁷

With respect to Christological titles, then, it is crucial not only to investigate whence a particular title came into existence in Christ but also to ask the general question regarding which titles are absolute and which are soteriological so that we can discern which would remain if men had not sinned.⁷⁸ A good example of how Origen carries out his investigation is found in his discussion of the title “life.”⁷⁹ According to Origen, it is clear from John 1:4 that “life” came into existence in Christ. What this means is that there must be an ordering between the title “Word”—which appears in John 1:1–3—and “life,” which appears only in John 1:4. Observing carefully the logic of the Johannine prologue, Origen argues that if “life” was equated with the “light of men,” then it must be the case that the “life that was made” in Christ belongs to him not absolutely but only for us.⁸⁰ Insofar as “life” is concerned as a title, it is a purely soteriological title. As such, “life” “comes into existence after the Word, being inseparable from him after it has come into existence” (τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιγίνεται, ἀχώριστος αὐτοῦ μετὰ τὸ ἐπιγενέσθαι τυγχάνουσα).⁸¹ This example indicates that Origen thinks that in general Christ took on soteriological titles “in addition” to his absolute titles for the purpose of fulfilling his role in the salvific economy. These titles are contingent upon the salvific need of men and should be differentiated from the absolute titles that indicate, as we have seen, the “divine aspects” of the Son. The relative titles thus are best conceived as titles that do not belong to the Son’s essence (οὐσία) but are merely his contingent individual properties (ἰδίοτητες).

The multiplicity that Christ took on—the titles that are purely “for us”—clearly differentiates the Son from the Father in a significant way. For Origen, the multiplicity of soteriological titles captures the fact that Christ has a unique role in the economy, acting as the way that lead the lost back to God.⁸² This role is uniquely played by Christ and not by the Father. Thus the Son’s relative title contains within it a crucial anti-Monarchian emphasis, namely, that the Son is to be distinguished from the Father with respect to his role in the salvific economy, not merely with respect to the fact that the he is lesser than the Father in terms of the absolute patrological titles (goodness, divinity, immortality, etc.). I shall expand on these two aspects of Origen’s account of the Father-Son distinction in the following section.

Origen’s overall account of patrological and Christological titles can now be summarized schematically as in figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1. A Schematic Presentation of Origen’s Account of Patrological and Christological Titles

Source: Expansion of a diagram found in Orbe, Hacia, 1:443.

Note: A = absolute patrological titles; Ba = titles the Son receives from the Father; Bb absolute sonship titles; Bc = relative soteriological titles

Origen’s Anti-Monarchianism

Building on the work of Orbe, figure 6.1 indicates a number of ways Origen’s theory of Scriptural titles fills out the content of the Father-Son distinction.⁸³ By unfolding these possibilities captured in the above diagram, it will be possible to arrive at a more precise determination of the content of Origen’s anti-Monarchianism, his insistence on the distinction between the Father and the Son. It is in the context of Origen’s anti-Monarchianism where one can pinpoint more precisely how divine simplicity differentiates the Father from the Son.

The Transcendence of the Father over the Son as an anti-Monarchian Emphasis: Patrological Titles

The patrological titles reveal the first sense in which Origen distinguishes the Father and the Son in a hierarchical manner. The Father is the single fount and source of goodness, divinity, immortality (A in figure 6.1). In this role he is simple in the sense of The Republic: perfect goodness itself, self-constant, and immutable.⁸⁴ The Son receives these qualities (Bb) derivatively, that is, through participation in the Father. Since the Son is not fount and source—the form—of the absolute patrological titles, he is not simple. This does not imply that the Son is not good and immutable. But it is as the image of the Father that he acquires these qualities.⁸⁵ Origen’s account of the absolute patrological titles thus reveals that it is the Father who is most truly simple in the sense of The Republic.

It is possible to show explicitly that Origen developed this emphasis on the Father’s transcendence over the Son as an anti-Monarchian emphasis. For ComJn II.12–20, where he develops the formalized account of the Father’s transcendence, clearly possesses an anti-Monarchian context. In this section Origen explicitly addresses the Monarchians twice. First, as we have seen in ComJn II.16, he criticizes the Monarchians explicitly. It is in the next paragraph, beginning with the words Λεκτέον γὰρ αὐτοῖς, that he immediately turns to developing the formalized scheme for distinguishing between “The God” (= the Father) and “God” (= the Son) on the basis of John 17:3. This suggests that he set out the hierarchical scheme directly in response to Monarchian theology. Second, having set out the scheme, in ComJn II.19 Origen explicitly anticipates what resembles an objection from the Monarchians: does the differentiation between “true God” and “God” compromise monotheism? This point arises because Origen’s scheme not only differentiates between the Father and the Son; it actually envisages a more general differentiation between “The God” and everything else that Scripture calls “gods,” including the Son.⁸⁶ This opens up Origen’s scheme to the objection of polytheism. Does the differentiation between “The God” and “God”—thus implicitly affirming the appropriateness of applying the title to more than one being—lead to the degradation of the term “God”? It is worth briefly examining Origen’s response here since it further highlights how Origen’s stress on the Father’s transcendence over the Son emerges as part of his attempt to defend a hierarchical account of the Father-Son relation against Monarchian criticisms.

Origen’s response is to postulate an exegetical case for the existence of a hierarchy of divinity in general. According to Origen, the exegetical starting points for a hierarchy of divinity are Ps. 49:1 (LXX) and Ps. 135:2 (LXX), in which we find the phrase “The God of gods.” For Origen this phrase implies that Scripture teaches the existence of other gods besides “The God” and the Son of God. Other gods must exist in order for “The God” to be God of something existent. Further, we learn in Matt. 22:32 that “he is not God of the dead, but of the living.” Origen reads this verse as indicating that “the gods,” of whom “The God” is God (as described by the Psalmist), are living beings. Last, but not least, the Apostle Paul seems to acknowledge the existent of these “gods” in 1 Cor. 8:5 by saying, “just as there are many gods.” This network of passages led Origen to postulate the existence of “the gods” as a third order (below “The God” and the Son) in the hierarchy of divinity.⁸⁷

So, according to Origen, apart from God the Father, all that are called “god” in Scripture draw their divinity from the Father as their source. The Son, who is God in virtue of being “with The God” in John 1:2, is the first who “has drawn divinity into himself” by receiving the divinity of the Father. In a similar manner, “the gods” obtain their divinity through participating in the divinity of the Father. It is in the mode of reception of divinity that we find the main difference between the Son and “the gods.” The Son, on the one hand, receives his divinity by being “with The God,” whereas “the gods” are deified through the “ministry” of the Son.⁸⁸ Moreover, in Origen’s scheme, “the gods” are further divided into two orders: first, those who are gods by participating in “The God” (through the ministry of the Word), and second, those who are “said to be gods, but are not gods at all.”⁸⁹ The last category refers to those are simply idols and the term “god” is falsely applied to them. We can then summarize Origen’s hierarchy of divinity in table 6.1.

Table 6.1. Origen’s Hierarchy of Divinity

1.

God the Father = “The God,” “true God,” “very God” (source of divinity)

2.

God the Son: “God” in virtue of being “with The God” in the beginning.

3.

Those who are god by participating in “The God” through the ministry of the Son of God (e.g., the heavenly bodies, created human beings)

4.

Those who are said to be god but are not gods at all (e.g., idols)

The line in table 6.1 represents the break between “The God” and “God.” Everything that is called “God” in Scripture obtains divinity by participating in the Father. It is important to remember that the four orders listed here for Origen refer to four senses of how the noun “God” is applied, not four distinct groups of subjects that are properly called divine since, in actual fact, only the first three groups are correctly named “God.” Mindful of the Monarchian critique, Origen argues that this hierarchy of divinity by no means implies polytheism. Scripture indeed testifies to the many gods. But this affirmation by no means compromises monotheism because, in Origen’s understanding, even though there are many gods, there is only a single source of divinity, namely, the Father.⁹⁰ As a result, even though many are called “God” in Scripture, there is only one “true God.”⁹¹ Monotheism, on this account, is entailed by the claim that there is only one true source of divinity. Origen favors this understanding of monotheism as more exegetically accurate, drawing upon 1 Cor. 8:5–6, where Paul affirms that “indeed there are many ‘gods’ . . . yet for us there is one God, the Father.” If this passage is read literally—which Origen did—then it implies that a proper affirmation of Scriptural monotheism may hold the existence of many gods together with the affirmation of one God. It follows, then, that the hierarchy of divinity does not contradict the Scriptural testimony of monotheism; consequently, the Monarchian objection is not fatal to a hierarchical understanding of divinity.⁹²

Origen’s formalized account of the Father’s transcendence over the Son in ComJn II, then, is sandwiched by Monarchian concerns. It is the Monarchian danger that introduces the theme in this section of the Commentary. And it is the Monarchian objection to the theme that gives rise to the response from Origen that follows. At the level of patrological titles, Origen’s “subordinationism” is therefore most appropriately understood as an anti-Monarchian motif.

The Transcendence of the Father over the Son as an Anti-Monarchian Emphasis: Christological Titles

The Father and the Son are further distinguished with respect to the Christological titles. Returning to ComJn I.119 we find that the Father is “one and simple,” whereas the Son “because of the many things . . . becomes many things.” The key issue here, then, is to determine the “many things” that are uniquely attributed to the Son but not to the Father. There are several possibilities to account for how simplicity differentiates the Father from the Son. First, it could be that the Father is simple in the sense that he possesses only one type of property, whereas the Son possesses multiple types of properties. The “many things” in this case would refer to distinct types of properties (Ba + Bb in figure 6.1) in the Son. So the Son would be composite in that this multiplicity is present in his essence (οὐσία).

Second, it could be that the Father is simple in the sense that the only relation he possesses to his properties is as their source and form. In this manner, the Father possesses absolutely the self-sameness required by simplicity. This is due to the familiar logic we have seen previously: if something is a form of “X,” it always remains the same with respect to “X” and there is no possibility for the contrary of “X” to be present in it. Under this construal of simplicity, the Son would be both simple and complex. On the one hand, he possesses simplicity with respect to absolute Sonship titles (Bb). However, on the other hand, with respect to the titles he receives from the Father (Ba) and his relative soteriological titles (Bc), the Son is not their source and form. Rather, the Son stands in a different kind of relation to these properties. The Son, then, would not be purely simple because he would not be a simple source vis-à-vis all his properties. In this case, the “many things” that render the Son multiple would refer to the properties to which he does not stand as source and form, namely, the attributes he receives from the Father (Bb) and his relative soteriological titles (Bc).

Third, it could be that the Father is simple in the sense that he does not possess any attributes that are purely relative to the salvific economy. Relative soteriological titles violate immutability, which is essential for simplicity, because they are contingent on the existence of creation. As we have seen, Origen regards these titles as “coming to be” in Christ. In this third sense, then, the Son is not simple since he acquires many soteriological titles that subject him to such contingency. In this case, the “many things” that render the Son multiple would be specifically his relative soteriological titles (Bc).

Which is the most likely explanation of ComJn I.119? Orbe argues for the first option in his attempt to reconstruct Origen’s anti-Monarchian claim that the Father and the Son are distinct with respect to personal property (κατ’ ἰδιότητα) and to essence (κατ’ οὐσίαν). According to Orbe, whereas in the Father there is only one “simple and polyvalent property,” in the Son we have a composite of several substantial properties (i.e., Ba + Bb).⁹³ In this interpretation, the diagram above outhnes speculatively the precise content of Origen’s anti-Monarchian distinctions. Orbe’s interpretation is not implausible but faces an exegetical problem. In this passage the Son’s lack of simplicity is due to the many things (τὰ πολλά) that he becomes for the sake of creatures since he takes on these things “as the whole creation which can be made free needs him” (καθὰ χρῄζει αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐλευθερούσθαι δυναμένη πᾶσα κτίσις).⁹⁴ It seems odd, then, that the soteriological titles (Bc) are left out, as this passage suggests that they must be a crucial part of the “many things” that render the Son non-simple. Orbe’s failure to account for these titles is understandable since he was preoccupied strictly with determining the content of Origen’s insistence that the Father and the Son are distinct κατ’ οὐσίαν. The soteriological titles are certainly contingent to the Son’s οὐσία, and this explains why Orbe leaves these out in his interpretation of ComJn I.119 as a strict comparison between the Father and the Son at the level of οὐσία. Orbe’s concern with arriving at a strictly ontological characterization of the Father-Son distinction thus unwittingly prevents his interpretation from accounting for the full complexity of ComJn I.119.⁹⁵

It is equally tempting, however, from the soteriological significance of the “many things” in ComJn I.119, to opt for the third option outhned above and conclude that Origen considers the Son to be multiple on the basis of his relative soteriological titles (Bc) alone—in other words, on the basis of his contingent ἰδίοτητες. Prima facie, this makes sense because, as we have seen, the relative titles subject the Son to contingency and thus are said to “come to be” in the Son. Being subjected to such “becoming” would certainly violate immutability and hence account for the Son’s lack of simplicity. But this interpretation is also overly simplistic because what Origen had in mind, as I shall show now, is something like a combination of the second and third options above. This is because the “many things” in ComJn I.119 must include Christ’s absolute sonship titles (Ba), a point clearly indicated by Origen’s interpretation of this phrase in ComJn I.51–62.

In this section Origen discusses the meaning of the phrase “good things,” triggered by the verse “how beautiful are the feet of those who announce good things” (Isa. 52:7 apud Rom. 10:15). Origen defends the claim that the plural phrase “many good things” actually refers to the singular person Jesus Christ himself: “Let no one be surprised if we have understood Jesus to be announced by the plural ‘good things.’ For when we have understood the things of which the names which the Son of God is called are predicated, we will understand how Jesus, whom these whose feet are beautiful preach, is many good things.”⁹⁶ To illustrate this point, Origen lists Scriptural titles according to which one can conceive Jesus as a good thing: life, light, truth, way, resurrection, door, wisdom, power, Word, crucified, righteousness. On this list we find both absolute sonship titles (life, truth, wisdom, power, Word) and relative soteriological titles (light, way, resurrection, door, crucified). Since each of these titles represents one aspect of how Christ brings a particular benefit to us, if they are taken together, the list shows that Jesus Christ is apt to be called “many good things.” This discussion is crucial for understanding ComJn I.119 because in the paragraphs leading up to this passage (ComJn I.112–118) Origen seems to indicate that he is developing his previous comments on Isa. 52:7 earlier in the book.⁹⁷ Hence, the “many things” in ComJn I.119 should be interpreted in light of Origen’s comments on “many good things” in ComJn I.51–62. The absolute sonship titles, therefore, should be included in the “many things” that render the Son multiple and not simple.

How, then, should we understand the Son’s distinction from the Father through the “many things”? A hint is given by ComJn I.62: “It is the same thing, therefore, to say that the apostles preach the Saviour and that they preach good things. For he is the one who received from the good Father that he be good things, in order that each one who received through Jesus the thing or things he is capable of, might engage in good things.” According to this passage, the identification of Christ as “many good things” highlights his unique role assigned by the Father in the economy of salvation. The Father intends the Son to be many good things so that, through the Son, creatures may acquire these qualities. This suggests that the “many things” that render the Son multiple, and hence distinct from the Father’s simplicity, are due to his distinctive role as the mediator between God the Father and creation. This point is further developed in a crucial passage in ComJn VI.107 that is situated as part of a discussion on the phrase “make straight the way of the Lord (John 1:23).” Here Origen is interested in clarifying the meaning of the title “way” attributed to Christ. This “way” leads to “life,” but not for everyone. The majority, who are “carnal,” instead constrict the way, according to Scripture (Matt. 7:13–14). There is a reason that Scripture gives multiple titles to the Son, Origen explains: “The Saviour, who contains all virtue, is multiple in his aspects. For this reason he is the way for the one who has not yet arrived at the goal but is still advancing, but for him who has already put off all that is dead, he is life.” Scripture assigns many things to Christ because not all who need him have the same needs. Christ is both “way” and “life”: for those who are still searching for salvation, Christ is the “way” since they need to be led toward the good Father, but for those who are advancing in the search, Christ is their “life.” Hence, it is due to the distinctive needs of creatures for Christ that he “becomes many things.”⁹⁸

It is safe to conclude, then, that the “many things” refer to titles that the Son possesses “for us.” This interpretation implies that relative soteriological titles are obviously included in the “many things” since they are attributed to the Son purely “for us,” that is, for the purpose of the salvation of creatures. But this interpretation also explains why Origen includes absolute sonship titles such as wisdom, Word, and truth in the “many things” since the Son possesses these titles both absolutely and “for us.”⁹⁹ Thus, this set of titles brings about a true multiplicity in the Son, as is required by the distinctive needs presented by creatures at different stages of spiritual progress. Consequently, it is Christological titles attributed to the Son “for us” that distinguish him from the simplicity of the Father.

We can elaborate this point with greater precision still. Returning to figure 6.1, it is (Ba) and (Bc) that constitute the “many things” that render the Son distinct from the Father in ComJn I.119. While many terms, such as goodness, divinity, and immortality, are attributed to the Father, Origen, like Alcinous conceives the Father as the source and form of all his attributes. The absolute patrological titles, then, are not to be conceived as realities that possess existence independent from the Father. In this sense, the Father is purely one and simple. The Son, in a limited sense, is also one. As we have seen, the Son’s multiple aspects are to be conceived as one.¹⁰⁰ Christological titles are not many in the ethical sense as we saw in the previous chapter since no divisions or conflicts exist between them. But the Son, in Origen’s thought, assumes a unique mediatory role in the economy, assigned by the Father, to distribute the multiple good things that serve the needs of creatures at different stages of spiritual maturity. This role accounts for the need for multiple titles attributed to the Son “for us,” some only in this manner (Bc) and others only partially (Ba). These titles, therefore, are the “many things” that give the Son a multiplicity absent in the simple Father.

At the level of Christological titles, I suggest that Origen’s hierarchical distinction between the Father and the Son also possesses an anti-Monarchian shape. In chapter 4 I highlighted the fact that the Monarchians tend to collapse the salvific economy from a partnership between two acting subjects to an act by a single actor.¹⁰¹ Origen’s account of Christological titles hence accomplishes something that Monarchians have failed to do so, namely, to explain how the Son is to be distinguished from the Father κατ’ οἰκονομίαν. The Father’s role in the economy is not one that would introduce multiplicity in him. Rather, it is the Son’s role to become many for the sake of creatures. Inasmuch as the originator of salvation must be differentiated from the mediator and savior, so must the Son be distinguished from the Father κατ’ οἰκονομίαν.¹⁰² Divine simplicity thus gives content to Origen’s anti-Monarchianism by offering a way to capture the distinctive economic roles assigned to the Father and the Son respectively.

Origen, as we have seen, is a committed anti-Monarchian. His anti-Monarchianism is difficult to pin down. While it is clear that Origen regards it heretical to deny the Father-Son distinction at the level of ὑπόστασις, ἰδίοτης, οὐσία, and ὑποκείμενον, it is difficult to obtain certainty about his own understanding of the distinction between the Father and the Son in these terms (except for ὑπόστασις). In this chapter I have argued that Origen’s anti-Monarchianism can be indirectly understood through his account of Scriptural titles. The result is that Origen’s “subordinationist” motifs, his hierarchical understanding of the Father-Son distinction, reveal themselves as integral parts of his anti-Monarchianism. It is in this context that divine simplicity has acquired a central role in shaping Origen’s hierarchical-anti-Monarchian understanding of the Father-Son distinction. I have offered a plausible reading of the relevant sources that grant a degree of precision regarding how divine simplicity serves as a principle of differentiation between the Father and the Son in ComJn I.119.¹⁰³ Origen’s commitment to divine simplicity, then, has a distinctively anti-Monarchian function. This constitutes the first significant way divine simplicity has given shape to Origen’s thinking about the Father-Son relation.

What is remarkable in Origen’s scheme is the possibility of a positive theological account of multiplicity. As we saw in chapter 5, in line with the Platonic tradition, the simplicity-multiplicity distinction is often used by Origen to signify a contrast between perfect and imperfect reality. But in Origen’s Trinitarian thought, the Son’s lack of simplicity is not due to imperfections in him. Rather, the Son’s multiplicity is grounded on the genuine multiple needs of creatures who are situated at different stages of spiritual progress. The Son’s multiplicity, then, arises from his unique role as a mediator between the Father and the rest of creation—in other words, it is the result of Origen’s anti-Monarchianism. But it ultimately springs from the Son’s concern with leading creatures back to the Father. This insight, it seems to me, captures the originality of Origen’s scheme.

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