NOTES

Chapter Six

Significance of Newman’s Notion of Faith for Catholic Theology Today

An examination of Catholic theology today reveals that there are two main approaches to defining the notion of faith. One approach, the intellectual model, defines faith as an intellectual assent to divinely revealed truths as they are formulated in the teachings of the Catholic Church. The other approach, the personalist model, describes faith as a total personal commitment, made within the context of the Catholic community of faith, to the love of God revealed in Jesus Christ. Both approaches accept Scripture, tradition, and the magisterium, but they differ in emphasis. The intellectual model stresses the cognitive quality of revelation and faith. The personalist model highlights the more personal aspects of revelation and faith. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it is possible to combine both. Whether one views faith from the point of view of the intellectual model or the personalist model, the reality of faith is always defined according to its two main elements, the object of faith and the act of faith.

What distinguishes the intellectual and the personalist models is the way in which each describes both the object of faith and the act of faith. According to the intellectual model, the object of faith is described as the manifestation of divinely revealed truths, and the act of faith is described as the intellectual assent to those truths. In this approach, the goal of faith is the reception of a new and higher form of knowledge, a participation in the knowledge of God. In contrast, the personalist model describes the content of faith as God’s personal manifestation of love in Jesus Christ, and the act of faith as a total personal acceptance of God’s offer of love. In this approach, the goal of faith is to lead the believer to a personal self-transforming experience of God’s unconditional love.

The classical Catholic formulation of the intellectual approach is found in the theology of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 A.D.).¹ The Roman theology of the mid-nineteenth century, the theology that Newman encountered when he became a Catholic, defined faith according to the intellectual model. This is also the approach of Catholic neo-scholastic theology that is found in the theological manuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.² The First Vatican Council, in its document on faith, Dei Filius (Son of God), defines faith according to the intellectual model.³

The personalist model is the approach of Scripture. Although Scripture does not define faith in terms of the classical distinction between the object of faith and the act of faith, the Old Testament and the New Testament tend to describe faith in more concrete and personalist terms. The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) also emphasizes the personalist approach in its descriptions of faith. In its document on revelation, The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Vatican II defines revelation as God’s self disclosure in the person of Jesus Christ.⁴ The act of faith is described as a response of the whole person and not just an act of the intellect.⁵

Both models are still very much a part of the Catholic Church’s living tradition today. However, Dermot Lane points out that there has been a shift in emphasis in Catholic theology between Vatican Council I and Vatican Council II. Vatican I emphasized the intellectual approach in its definition of faith; Vatican II has opted for a more personalist approach in its descriptions of the notion of faith.⁶ Contemporary Catholic theology has taken up the challenge of Vatican II and has made significant progress toward defining the Catholic understanding of faith according to the personalist model.

THE PERSONAL NATURE OF NEWMAN’S NOTION OF FAITH

Newman’s mature understanding of Catholic faith is an example of the personalist model. He presents a description of faith that is personal in its emphasis but, at the same time, stresses the necessity and importance of the role of doctrines and dogmas in faith. The personalist nature of Newman’s definition of faith is illustrated in his descriptions of both the act of faith and the object of faith.

According to Newman, the act of faith, at its deepest level, is a real assent to the realities of revelation and not just a notional assent to the abstract propositional statements of faith. The act of faith is a response that is derived through a highly personal process of reasoning that includes informal reason and the illative sense. It is a free response of the person in which the will is engaged in the process of both arriving at and confirming the act of Catholic faith. Personal elements, such as presumptions, antecedent considerations, antecedent reasons, and moral dispositions, are all operative in the response of faith. It is God’s personal Word through grace that leads the believer to respond in the act of faith. Newman’s notion of “implicit faith” stresses the importance of allowing Catholics to personally appropriate the dogmas and doctrines of faith, rather that forcing them to notionally accept all the truths of faith at once. Finally, it has been suggested that Newman’s mature notion of the act of faith can be described as a “centered act,” a response in which all the elements that are operative in the act of faith converge in a total personal response.

Newman also describes the object of faith in personal terms. The ultimate object of faith for Newman is the personal God revealed in Jesus Christ, not the propositional statements of faith. Jesus, Newman says, is the central image of faith. In his book Only Life Gives Life, Thomas J. Norris maintains that Newman adopted a personalist understanding of revelation similar to that contained in the Second Vatican Council’s document The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation.⁷ The personal God of the Trinity, Norris says, is the ultimate object of faith for Newman. As Norris puts it, Christianity, for Newman, is the “presence of persons.”⁸ Also, for Newman, this personal God always remains shrouded in mystery and beyond our ability to completely and personally experience in a total way. As Newman says, we only know God in shadows. One cannot have a real apprehension of the Trinity as a whole because of the mystery of God.

In his analysis of the object of faith, Newman insists on the importance and necessity of doctrine and dogma. His lifelong commitment to dogma goes back to his 1816 conversion experience as an Anglican. From this point on, he remained committed to the dogmatic principle. One of his main objectives throughout his life was the struggle against liberalism, which Newman defined as the antidogmatic principle. Equally essential to Newman’s Catholic notion of faith was his acceptance of the normative teaching role of the magisterium of the church in the process of communicating God’s personal revelation. Yet, his respect for dogma did not deteriorate into dogmatism. He gives a priority to the reality, the thing revealed, over the proposition that expresses the revealed reality. As such, Newman distinguishes between a primary object of faith, the personal God as the reality of revelation, and a secondary object, the doctrines and dogmas that express that revelation. Important as they are, the doctrinal and dogmatic teachings of the church are not ends in themselves. They are the means to an end. Their purpose is to lead the believer to a personal experience of the personal God (a real assent).

Faith and Praxis

The personal nature of Newman’s notion of faith can be seen also in his understanding of the relationship between faith and praxis. Faith, for Newman, is by its very nature oriented toward praxis. Since the act of faith engages the whole person, Catholic faith includes in its very definition a commitment to live the life of faith. Part of the basis for this orientation toward praxis is found in the understanding of the act of faith as a real assent. According to Newman, the encounter with the object of faith through real assent awakens the imperative to act. In the act of real assent, the imagination presents the object of faith to the believer. As such, the concrete images experienced through real assent stimulate the affections and the passions and indirectly lead to action. ⁹ The imagination plays a key role in this process. Newman says that strictly speaking, it is not the imagination that causes action, but what it does for us is “to find a means of stimulating those motive powers; and it does so by providing a supply of objects strong enough to stimulate them.”¹⁰ The imagination has the means of “stimulating those powers of the mind from which action proceeds.”¹¹ But, adding a caution, Newman states that the practical effect “is not invariable, nor to be relied on; for given images may have no tendency to affect given minds, or to excite them to action.”¹² Therefore, even though real assent can lead indirectly to action, it does not immediately and automatically result in action. Real assent is not “intrinsically operative.” ¹³

Newman summarizes his position on the practical effect of both notional and real assent by stating that it would be wrong to say that “acts of Notional Assent ... do not affect our conduct, and acts of ... Real Assent do (not necessarily, but do) affect it.”¹⁴ Real assent can lead to the imperative to act, but in the act of faith, the motivation to actually act includes the will and the influence of God’s grace. For Newman, both are integral parts of the personal response of the act of faith.

Newman also sees a mutual interdependence between faith as praxis and faith as knowledge. When distinguishing between religion and theology, he states that religion is more dependent on theology for its maintenance than is theology on religion. But, as it is clear from the context of this discussion, Newman is not supporting a separation between theology and religion. He is simply stating that such a separation is possible. His point is that appropriate Christian action should flow from an adequate understanding of the faith. This is an application of the dogmatic principle to the life of faith.

However, not only does praxis have to be based on an adequate understanding of the Christian revelation, but an adequate understanding of the Christian message also depends on a living praxis. To truly understand the dogmas of faith, one must be able to apprehend them through the imagination and give a real assent to the realities they manifest. The truths of faith are not fully understood if they are simply objects of notional assent. The believer does not fully understand them until one’s affections and passions are aroused and one is brought to the imperative to act. Notional understanding brings clarity, but it does not produce profound religious understanding that commits one to act. It is this mutual interdependence between faith and praxis that leads Norris to comment on the pastoral nature of Newman’s understanding of faith. Norris says that the pastoral concern for the appropriation of faith is “a subject that engages Newman’s brilliance at great and laborious lengths.”¹⁵ In fact, Norris adds that concern for the pastoral implications of faith “guided Newman’s work, directed his reading and writing, and stimulated some of his most original insights.”¹⁶

One area in which Newman’s personalist approach to faith might be further developed is in the relationship between faith and love. In developing his mature notion of Catholic faith, he does not explicitly discuss the role of love in the act of faith. A Grammar of Assent is surprisingly silent on the notion of love. In it Newman does not include any of the views on the role of love that are found in the University Sermons. It is true that in A Grammar of Assent, informal reason and the illative sense replace love as the sanctions of faith. However, some of his descriptions of the role of love in the University Sermons are relevant for his mature notion of Catholic faith. His description of love as the “eye of faith” and his insistence that faith be informed by love are ideas that would have been quite consistent with his mature definition of Catholic faith. The inclusion of some of these University Sermons insights on the role of love in faith would have not only been compatible with the personal notion of Catholic faith that he presents in A Grammar of Assent but would have greatly enhanced it.

NEWMAN AND THE MAGISTERIUM

One aspect of Newman’s efforts to live out his vision of Catholic faith that has particular significance for Catholics today, particularly Catholic theologians, is his ambiguous relationship with the magisterium. On the one hand, Newman always respected the magisterium and remained faithful to it. On the other hand, during his life as a Catholic, he all too often found himself involved in a struggle with the official teaching authority of the church. As a convert, he had to face the challenge of demonstrating that his theology was compatible with Roman theology, the official theology of the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century. Growing up in the Anglican tradition, he was not trained in scholastic philosophy and theology, so many of his philosophical presuppositions were different from those of Roman theology. His efforts to meet this challenge met with both successes and failures.

Catholic theologians today are faced with a similar challenge from Rome. Today, the official Catholic Church appears determined to erect a new Roman theology. Based on an intellectual model, this theology presents a view of faith that insists that Catholics and Catholic theologians should hold and teach only the formulations of faith approved by the official church. This view of Catholic faith does not allow for dissent in any sense. Today the official church is demanding a faith of absolute obedience and is defending this position in its official documents, adding threats of punishment for those who disagree with the church. Two recent documents of the Catholic Church that illustrate this approach are the apostolic letter of John Paul II, Ad Tuendam Fidem (Toward Holding the Faith) and the Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the Professio Fidei (Profession of Faith), written by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. A more recent illustration can be found in the U.S. bishops’ implementation of the Roman requirement that all Catholic university professors of theology receive a mandatum (mandate) from the local bishop to teach theology in a Catholic university.

Since Newman in the nineteenth century experienced similar pressures from the magisterium, perhaps it is possible for Catholic theologians today to learn from his struggles with the magisterium. Although Newman never wrote a systematic treatise on the magisterium, nevertheless, based on his own life experiences, he was aware of the problems that the magisterium can present for the theologian. In his private correspondence, he frequently commented on his encounters with the magisterium.

Our analysis of Newman’s encounters with the magisterium will focus on three periods of his life. The first will be his early Catholic years, 1846-1847, when he was studying in Rome and attempting to find his place in the Catholic Church. The second will be the Rambler incident that occurred between the years 1858 and 1860, and the third will be the years from 1874 to 1875 when he wrote the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk. After a brief summary of these three encounters, some suggestions will be made regarding the significance of Newman’s attitude toward the magisterium for contemporary Catholic theologians, as well as for all Catholics today.

Newman’s Encounters with the Magisterium

The negative reception that Newman’s theology of faith received from Roman theology immediately after he became a Catholic has already been treated in chapter 1. As a result of the encounter with Roman theology, Newman was forced to give up his idea of establishing a school of theology in England.

The Rambler incident that occurred between 1859 and 1860 provides another illustration of Newman’s struggles with the magisterium. The Rambler, a Catholic periodical founded by the Oxford convert J. M. Capes in 1848, was established as a literary magazine for educated Catholics. In 1858, the journal came under the suspicion of the English bishops because of an article in it criticizing the bishops’ educational policy. The bishops issued an ultimatum demanding that the editor, Richard Simpson, resign or they would censure the journal in their pastoral letters.¹⁷ At the request of his bishop, William Ullathorne, Newman communicated the English bishops’ dissatisfaction with the Rambler to Simpson, and Simpson agreed to resign. To meet the concerns of all involved, Newman reluctantly agreed to take over the editorship for a brief period.

In the very first issue of the Rambler published under Newman’s editorship, the May 1859 issue, Newman made a remark that resulted in his theology being brought under suspicion once again. In a reference to the judgment of the English bishops on the Royal Commission on education, Newman made the following remark:

[W]e do unfeignedly believe ... that their Lordships really desire to know the opinion of the laity on subjects in which the laity are especially concerned. If even in the preparation of a dogmatic definition the faithful are consulted, as lately in the instance of the Immaculate Conception, it is at least as natural to anticipate such an act of kind feeling and sympathy in great practical questions. ¹⁸

John Gillow, a professor of theology at Ushaw, raised questions about the validity of this remark. Bishop Ullathorne was also not very pleased with Newman’s statement. When Ullathorne and Newman met on May 22, 1859, both agreed that Newman would resign after the July issue.¹⁹

Still, Newman’s troubles were not over. He decided that he must defend the doctrine that he held about the place of the laity in the church. As a result, he wrote his famous article “On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine,” which was published in the July issue of the Rambler. In this article, Newman maintains that the laity do have a right to be consulted in matters of doctrine, “because the body of the faithful is one of the witnesses to the fact of the tradition of revealed doctrine, and because their consensus (agreement) through Christendom is the voice of the infallible Church.”²⁰ In attempting to illustrate this principle, he cites the Arian controversy in the fourth century. According to Newman, in the Arian crisis, the “divine tradition committed to the infallible Church was proclaimed and maintained far more by the faithful than by the Episcopate.”²¹ The Nicene dogma of the belief in the divinity of Jesus, Newman states, was maintained during the greater part of the fourth century,

1. not by the unswerving firmness of the Holy See, Councils, or Bishops, but 2. by the “consensus fidelium” [consent of the faithful]. I. On the one hand, then, I say, that there was a temporary suspense of the functions of the “Ecclesia docens” [teaching authority of the Church]. The body of Bishops failed in their confession of the faith.²²

But, once again, Newman’s attempt to explain himself was meet with suspicion and condemnation. On August 28, 1859, Gillow wrote to Newman and rejected Newman’s claim that there could be a suspension of the functions of the Ecclesia docens.²³ But, more significantly, on October 3, 1859, Bishop Brown, the bishop of Newport, a Benedictine from Downside and an Old Catholic, delates Newman’s article to Rome and urges Propaganda to condemn Newman’s teaching in the article as heretical.²⁴ At the request of Cardinal Barnabo, the prefect of Propaganda, Bishop Ullathorne met with Newman on January 13, 1860, and informed him of Bishop Brown’s delation. At that meeting, Newman responded by saying that he would comply with the requirements of Propaganda.²⁵ On January 19, 1860, Newman wrote to Cardinal Nicholas Wiseman, who was in Rome at the time, asking for a list of the objections made against him by Propaganda and indicating that he was willing to accept whatever dogmas he was supposed to have called into question. ²⁶ Propaganda drew up a list of objections and sent them to Cardinal Wiseman, but Wiseman never sent the list to Newman,²⁷ nor did he send Newman’s letter to Propaganda.²⁸ This incident was not finally resolved until 1867 when Ambrose St. John, meeting with Cardinal Barnabo on another matter, informed the cardinal that Newman had been willing to respond but never received Propaganda’s objections. Cardinal Barnabo, unaware of this, had thought that Newman was unwilling to reply.²⁹ When all of these facts became known, the matter was settled to Rome’s satisfaction.³⁰

Another example of the magisterium’s suspicions about Newman’s orthodoxy can be found in the reaction of Propaganda to his 1875 Letter to the Duke of Norfolk. Although, as Ian Ker points out, Catholics in England received the letter with general enthusiasm,³¹ Rome was not pleased and denounced the letter as censurable.³² Cardinal Franchi, the prefect of Propaganda, wrote to Cardinal Manning on February 3, 1875, stating that the first part of the letter was triumphant and that the second part contained propositions calculated to do great harm to the minds of the faithful. In his reply to Propaganda, Manning supported Newman and pointed out that the letter had a wholesome effect on Catholics in England and that Newman had defended the prerogatives and infallible magisterium of the Roman pontiff. Manning goes on to warn that any censure of Newman’s letter would have disastrous consequences.³³

Cardinal Franchi also wrote to Bishop Ullathorne on October 22,1875, and included in his letter a list of eleven censurable propositions. In his letter, Franchi urged Ullathorne to speak to Newman, as if he were speaking on his own and not on instructions from Rome, and to point out how dangerous these propositions may be to others. One remark of Newman’s that was particularly offensive was the following: “the Rock of St. Peter on its summit enjoys a pure and serene atmosphere, but there is a great deal of Roman malaria at the foot of it.”³⁴ In Rome, this remark was taken to refer to the Roman Curia and the counselors of Pius IX. Bishop Ullathorne replied to Cardinal Franchi by stating that Newman had always said that he wanted Rome to deal with him directly and not through intermediaries and secretly. Therefore, if Rome wanted action, it should act itself.³⁵ In the words of Charles Dessain, “That seems to have been the end of the matter.”³⁶

These three incidents illustrate some of Newman’s conflicts with the magisterium. The ways in which Newman responded in these conflictual situations can perhaps provide some direction for Catholics, particularly Catholic theologians, in their encounters with the magisterium today. Newman’s significance for Catholics today will be examined from the point of view of the following aspects: his fidelity to the magisterium, his openness to theological dialogue, his courage in the defense of his own views, his criticisms of the magisterium, and his hope and vision for change in the church.

Newman’s Fidelity to the Magisterium

One aspect of Newman’s encounters with the magisterium that Catholic theologians, and all Catholics, should emulate is his steadfast fidelity to the magisterium in spite of all his conflicts with it. One of the constants in Newman’s dealings with the magisterium is that he always accepted the legitimate role of the magisterium and showed respect for the teaching authority of the church. In his initial encounter with Roman theology, he summarized his attitude toward the authority of the church in a letter he wrote to Dalgairns in 1847. Newman writes that he always has had the “inward habitual intention” to submit “what I say to the judgement of the Church.”³⁷ One of the things that stands out in the Rambler incident is Newman’s willingness to cooperate with his ecclesiastical superiors, particularly his own bishop. It was solely at the request of Bishop Ullathorne that Newman met with Richard Simpson and persuaded him to resign as editor of the Rambler. Newman agreed to accept the editorship of the magazine for a limited time, because he thought that he was doing what Cardinal Wiseman and Bishop Ullathorne wanted him to do. When he eventually resigned as editor of the Rambler, Newman did so at the request of his bishop. In speaking of his resignation, Newman writes, “It is impossible, with the principles and feelings on which I have acted all through life, that I could not have acted otherwise, I never have resisted, nor can resist, the voice of a lawful Superior, speaking in his own province.”³⁸ In a letter to Dollinger on June 25, 1859, Newman states that it has always been his rule in life never to take a public act in opposition to legitimate authority. ³⁹ Newman’s cooperation with ecclesiastical superiors is also demonstrated by his willingness to respond to Propaganda’s objections to his article “On Consulting the Faithful” and his willingness to accept whatever dogmas he was supposed to have called into question.

In the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, Newman comes to the defense of the legitimate authority of the pope. He both explains and defends the meaning of the church’s teaching on the infallibility of the church and the pope as defined at the First Vatican Council in 1870. Newman’s respect for the pope can be seen in his attitude toward Pius IX during the early years of Pius IX’s papacy. During these years, Newman was very enthusiastic about Pius IX and liked him very much. In July 1846, Pius IX, shortly after he was elected, sent Newman his blessing.⁴⁰ Referring to the political problems and turmoil in Italy, Newman wrote in December 1847, “how it would pierce my heart, if any thing happened to him [the pope].”⁴¹ In June 1848, Newman wrote, “The Pope needs all our prayers, we continually think of him, and have no fears that he is divinely guided in all he does.”⁴² When in Rome in the winter of 1855-1856 to deal with a dispute with the London Oratory, Newman said that it was the pope who remained his friend and “smashed the whole intrigue.”⁴³ In a reference to this incident, Newman wrote, “The Pope treated us as if we were the only people in the world he had to care for. He is a most wonderful Pope.”⁴⁴

Openness to Theological Dialogue

Another quality that emerges from Newman’s encounter with the magisterium that is significant for Catholics today is his openness and willingness to discuss his theological views. In an effort to counter the Roman suspicions against his view on faith and reason in the University Sermons, Newman enters into a theological discussion with one of the Roman theologians. On February 24, 1847, in a letter to Dalgairns, Newman mentions that he intends to “scrape acquaintance” with Giovanni Perrone, one of the leading Roman theologians on faith and reason, and that he will “put before him [Perrone] as clearly as I can my opinions about Faith and Reason.”⁴⁵ Following through on this, Newman sent Perrone a list of formal propositions summarizing his own view on faith and reason.⁴⁶ For his part, Newman writes in his letters that he was very much pleased with Perrone’s opinions on dogmatics.⁴⁷ Perrone at first seems to have been suspicious of Newman’s views on faith and reason, but, eventually, he came to appreciate the value of Newman’s views, and the two became friends.⁴⁸

When Gillow questioned Newman’s statements on the role of the laity in matters of doctrine, Newman entered into a dialogue with Gillow and discussed the matter openly with him. Also, the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk demonstrates Newman’s readiness to enter into dialogue with Prime Minister Gladstone on the issue of English Catholics’ loyalty to the British government.

Courage in Defense of His Own Views

Yet, along with his openness to dialogue Newman displays a strong confidence and trust that his theology is authentically Catholic, and he defends it when it is appropriate, sometimes rather strongly. Writing to Dalgairns on February 14, 1847, about the University Sermons, he states, “And now after reading these Sermons I must say I think they are, as a whole, the best things I have written, and I cannot believe that they are not Catholic, and will not be useful.”⁴⁹ In defending his views, Newman was not above pointing out the inadequacies of his opponents. Commenting on the state of theology in Rome, Newman writes, “They [Roman theologians] have no philosophy.” Aristotle and Aquinas are not read. “Facts are great things and nothing else.... All this show how little they [Roman theologians] have of a view.”⁵⁰

In the Rambler incident, when reflecting on Bishop Brown’s delation of his article on consulting the faithful to Rome, Newman wonders about what would be the best way to respond to Propaganda. In a memorandum on the delation written on January 14, 1860, Newman states that he does not think that it would be a good policy to be too eager to put himself into the hands of Propaganda. On the other hand, he says, it would be an “extremely wrong policy to seem to shuffle.”⁵¹ In the same memorandum, Newman talks about the necessity of guarding against getting angry and indignant about the delation. He says that reason would lead him to be quiet and composed, but it is difficult at times to go by reason. Then, Newman seems to indulge in a little self-pity. He speaks of himself as a scapegoat. After recalling some of the past incidents in his life, both as an Anglican and as a Catholic, in which he has been under suspicion, he writes, “others, when they do wrong or act from infirmity, escape—I have always been smitten.”⁵² In a similar tone, he writes to Cardinal Wiseman on January 19, 1860:

I marvel, but I do not complain, that after many years of patient and self-denying labour in the cause of Catholicity, the one appropriate acknowledgement in my old age should be considered to consist in taking advantage of me of what is at worst a slip of the pen in an anonymous un-theological paper. But, I suppose it is the law of the world, that those who toil much and say little, are little thought of.⁵³

In reflecting on the whole Rambler affair, Newman says, “I suppose saints have been more roughly treated at Rome than any one else.”⁵⁴ John Coulson points out that one of the lessons Newman learned from the Rambler incident is that the English Catholic Church would never be able to achieve spiritual and intellectual vitality as long as it was under the immediate domain of Propaganda. ⁵⁵

Newman’s Criticisms of the Magisterium

Newman’s encounters with the magisterium also show us that criticisms of the magisterium are at times appropriate and can be signs of one’s faithfulness and commitment to the Catholic Church. In a letter to John Acton in July 1859, in the context of the Rambler controversy, Newman makes the following critique of the Roman Curia:

There will necessarily always be round about the Pope second-rate people, who are not subjects of that supernatural guidance which is his prerogative. For myself, certainly I have found myself in a different atmosphere, when I have left the Curia for the Pope himself.⁵⁶

Four years later, after the delation of his article on consulting the faithful and the condemnation of the Rambler, Newman’s criticism of the Roman Curia is even harsher.

This country [England] is under Propaganda, and Propaganda is too shallow to have the wish to use such as me ... no one can have been more loyal to the Holy See than I am. I love the Pope personally into the bargain. But Propaganda is a quasi-military power, extraordinary, for missionary countries, rough and ready. It does not understand an intellectual movement. It likes quick results ... scalps from beaten foes by the hundred.⁵⁷

Suggesting that there might be some advantages if the pope loss temporal power over the papal states, Newman makes the following remark about the Roman congregations.

It puts in a striking light the miseries which the Roman Congregations would suffer if a secular sovereign had sway over them. But there is no evil without its alleviation—it would cut off a great deal of unprofitable gossip sent to Rome from the orbis terrarium, and of crude answers sent back from Rome by men who seem to have authority, but have none—and it would throw power into the hands of the local bishop everywhere.⁵⁸

After Pius IX surrendered Rome to the Italians on September 20,1870, Newman wrote, “a new system must supersede the old: and one better suitable to modern times.”⁵⁹

But Newman’s criticisms of the magisterium were not restricted to the Roman Curia. As the years went by, Newman’s disillusionment with the Curia spread to the pope himself. Ian Ker points out that, although much could be blamed on subordinates, the ultimate responsibility for extreme Ultramontanism, for the agitation for maintaining the temporal power of the papacy, for the definition of Papal Infallibility at Vatican I, and for the Syllabus of Errors lay with Pius IX.⁶⁰ It seems that after 1870 Newman’s enthusiasm for the papacy became more cautious and guarded. Ker states that increasingly Newman began to view the papacy in a more or less negative light, as an institution whose nature and purpose was to be conservative.⁶¹ The papacy, Newman remarks, has not really manifested a gift for originating anything but instead has tended to act according to routine, “the routine of 1000 years.”⁶² His disillusionment with Pius IX can be seen in the following remark made in November 1870: “The present Pope cannot live long—he has lived too long—but, did he live Methuselah’s age, he could not in his acts go beyond the limit which God has assigned to him—nor has he, though he wished it.”⁶³ This disillusionment seemed to reach a climax in the following statement: “We have come to a climax of tyranny. It is not good for a Pope to live 20 years. It is an anomaly and bears no good fruit; he becomes a god, has no one to contradict him, does not know facts, and does cruel things without meaning it.”⁶⁴

Newman’s Hope and Vision for Change

Although Newman became disillusioned with some of the actions of the Roman Curia and Pius IX, his encounters with the magisterium show that he never gave up hope in the vitality of the institutional church and its innate capacity to renew itself. In spite of all the challenges to his theology, his personal setbacks, and sufferings, Newman never gave up hope. He writes, “Let us have faith, and a new Pope, and a re-assembled Council may trim the boat.”⁶⁵ His imagination inspires him to consider possible reforms within the church. He wonders if the new political situation of the pope (the loss of control over the papal states) might introduce some changes in the church, such as “throwing open St. Peter’s Chair to all nations” or “to an ‘extension’ of the College of Cardinals.”⁶⁶ Although Newman himself did not live to see any institutional reforms of the Roman Curia, some of his hopes did bear fruit in his lifetime. He lived to see a new pope, Leo XIII, who made Newman a cardinal partly in order to show that a new era of openness had arrived in the church.⁶⁷

What enables Newman to maintain this hope in the face of all obstacles is his personalist understanding of faith. His personalist vision of faith enables him to remain faithful to the realities of God’s revelation even when the institutional church fails him. Without this personal element of hope, faith would degenerate into despair or rejection of the church. In fact, Newman’s vision of faith is such that fidelity to the realities of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ requires that the church be open to change its concrete formulations and institutional structures. By renewing itself, the church more fully becomes itself. When, as an Anglican, Newman described his view of holiness, he wrote, “Growth [is] the only evidence of life.”⁶⁸ Later on in 1845, while contemplating the move from Anglicanism to Catholicism, Newman wrote, “here below, to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often.”⁶⁹ Newman’s principle of the development of doctrine maintains that one of the reasons the Catholic Church has been able to remain faithful to the apostolic church is because it has changed often.

Newman’s critical fidelity to the magisterium and his optimistic hopes for continual renewal in the church can provide the inspiration and incentive for Catholics today to work for the continual renewal of the church and its institutions in this new millennium. Newman’s vision of hope allows Catholics like Thomas Reese to imagine how the Catholic Church might look in the future. In his book Inside the Vatican, Reese suggests that the church in this millennium will require a new style of leadership, one that will be able to deal with an educated faithful who are used to asking questions and exercising freedom. This new leadership will recognize that commands to obey are not sufficient, but the teachings of the church should be explained to believers, and the magisterium should make an effort to persuade believers of the truth of its teachings. It will be a style of leadership that will be comfortable with mass communications, a variety of views, group discussion, dialogue, and consensus building in a setting of diversity.⁷⁰

Reese also envisions a reform of the Roman Curia. He sees a scaled down decentralized curia, one that is more of a clearinghouse than a policymaking body. He suggests that perhaps there could be five offices, one for each continent (Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, and Latin America).⁷¹ He goes on to suggest that members of the Roman Curia and the papal diplomatic corps would no longer be made bishops or cardinals. Membership in the college of bishops and the college of cardinals would be restricted to those who head local churches. As a result, the role of the college of bishops, as rulers of the church together with the pope, would be strengthened and would be given priority over the Roman Curia. Reducing secrecy and encouraging honest debate would enhance the role of the synod of bishops, and local bishops could be given a greater role in overseeing the Curia. Reese suggests that having an ecumenical council at least once every twenty-five years would further strengthen the college of bishops. Also, national conferences of bishops could be given more decision-making discretion, and restrictions on their freedom by the Roman Curia would be curtailed. In addition, Reese suggests that local churches could be given a greater role in choosing their own bishops. ⁷²

Reese’s hopes are presented as examples of how the church might change in the future. They are not presented as absolutes or a final blueprint. Also, there are not any signs at the moment that the Catholic Church will adopt the types of reforms suggested by Reese. Yet, following Newman’s example of faith, Catholics today should never give up hope.

FAITH AND RATIONAL CRITICISM

As noted earlier, Newman’s insistence on the unconditional nature of the certitude of Catholic faith does not mean that faith is immune to rational criticism. For Newman, the act of faith is not a blind act of obedience, nor is it an uncritical acceptance of the truths of faith. His insistence on the compatibility of the act of faith and rational criticism most certainly has significance for contemporary Catholicism.

In his treatment of infallibility, Newman points out its limitations. The infallibility of the pope is limited by God’s revelation to the whole church; it is to be exercised in the service of God’s revelation, not as an end in itself. Newman’s accurate and balanced description of infallibility serves as a caution against any attempt to overextend the claims of infallibility. His approach to this topic could certainly serve as a model for both the magisterium and theologians in our contemporary age of “creeping infallibility.”

On the matter of the noninfallible teachings of the church, Newman defends the general principle that Catholics have a responsibility to accept these teachings. However, if there is a conflict between conscience and a noninfallible teaching, he insists that conscience must be followed, even if it means disobeying the pope. What Newman has reminded us of here is that the priority of conscience is a fundamental Catholic principle that needs to be respected today by all in the Catholic Church. The personal nature of the act of faith makes it imperative that the magisterium today has to find a way in its teachings and procedures to respect this priority of conscience. Demands to obey so-called definitive noninfallible teachings, which is a problematic category, do not indicate that such a respect is always present in the magisterium today.

Newman’s approach to interpreting the texts of the magisterium was a critical one. This critical approach is rooted in his personalist understanding of faith. In discussing the object of faith, Newman makes a distinction between the reality of revelation and the concrete propositional statements of revelation. Although both are necessary for the fullness of God’s revelation, the two are not completely identical according to Newman. In the Catholic Church today, the magisterium often gives the impression that its statements are above the canons of historical and textual criticism. As a result, they sometimes encourage the type of dogmatic fundamentalism that Newman warned us against.

Newman’s distinction between the pope and the Roman Curia is also important for understanding how the magisterium works today. All too often we see members of the Roman Curia going off on their own making claims that certain teachings of the church are infallible. Newman’s distinction reminds us that the authority of the Roman Curia is not an intrinsic and essential part of the church’s magisterium. As the Second Vatican Council clearly points out, it is the pope together with the bishops throughout the world who make up the magisterium. The Roman Curia has no de jure (from the [divine] law) commission from Christ. In today’s situation, there are grounds for suggesting that Newman’s healthy suspicion and critique of some of the methods of the Roman Curia might be necessary and quite appropriate for the development of the Catholic understanding of faith.

Newman also was a strong advocate of freedom of thought within the church. If Newman’s trust in the power of truth and his belief in the enduring presence of the Holy Spirit in the church were motivating forces in the Catholic Church today, there would be much less fear of error. Juridical mandates, banning discussion of certain issues, and calls for punishment of those who do not agree with the official statements of the church do not encourage the freedom of thought that Newman envisioned.

From what we have seen, it is evident that Newman’s mature notion of Catholic faith has a great deal of significance for Catholics today. However, as significant and relevant as Newman’s theology of faith is, it is limited by its nineteenth-century historical context. As a result, some aspects of Newman’s notion of faith are not sufficiently developed from the point of view of Catholic theology in the new millennium. Five of these areas will be examined: the relationship between faith and doubt, the dimension of social justice, cultural diversity, ecumenism, and interreligious dialogue.

FAITH AND DOUBT

One aspect of Newman’s understanding of the role of rational criticism in faith that might be considered for further development is his view on the incompatibility of faith and doubt. Some post-Vatican II Catholic theologians such as Gregory Baum,⁷³ Avery Dulles,⁷⁴ and Oliver A. Rabut⁷⁵ speak about the compatibility of faith and doubt. From the perspective of these views, Newman’s position on the incompatibility of faith and doubt appears somewhat inadequate.

When Newman admits that investigation is compatible with faith, he does so because he says that investigation excludes doubt. Yet, one might ask, can not a doubt sometimes be the impetus for a process of investigation? When my students are presented with Newman’s understanding of the relationship between investigation and doubt, they find it difficult to comprehend an investigation that excludes doubt. Newman himself admits that a Catholic can dissent from the noninfallible teachings of the church. There are occasions when, as an Anglican, Newman spoke about the compatibility of faith and doubt. The understanding of doubt in contemporary theology goes beyond Newman’s limited understanding of doubt as suspension of assent. Given these observations, is it not possible that Newman’s personalist notion of Catholic faith could be developed so as to include the acceptance of some forms of doubt? From the perspective of the language of contemporary Catholic theology, are not some of Newman’s difficulties really doubts?

THE DIMENSION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

From the perspective of contemporary Catholic theology, another area in which Newman’s mature notion of Catholic faith appears inadequate is on the issue of social justice. As a result of the influence of liberation theology and a heightened sense of the significance of Catholic social teaching, an effective theology of faith today has to include an implicit statement on the social implications of the act of Christian praxis. Newman is surprisingly reticent on the social implications of the act of faith, and the attempt to try to clarify his position on this issue is met with ambiguity.

On the one hand, Newman seems to be hesitant to get involved in political and social issues. Henry Tristram writes that Newman “held aloof from public affairs whether political or ecclesiastical.”⁷⁶ Newman himself appears to support this position when he writes, “It has never been my line to take up political or social questions, unless they came close to me as matters of personal duty.”⁷⁷ Jay Newman questions whether Newman had a social conscience.⁷⁸ This position is also supported by Terence Kenny, who says that, although he found much to admire in Newman’s personality, Newman did not have much by way of a social conscience.⁷⁹ Kenny cites Newman’s preference for the education of the upper class and his apparent hostility to the education of the Catholic poor as an illustration of this attitude.⁸⁰ Jay Newman adds that Newman could not understand why people like Cardinal Manning, Marx, and Bentham spent so much time worrying about the economic condition of the poor.⁸¹

On the other hand, there are occasions when Newman does get involved in political and social issues. Even Jay Newman admits that Newman’s concern for the factory girls of Birmingham was genuine and that Newman actually did some social work in the Edgbaston area.⁸² In 1850, Newman publicly spoke out against the anti-Catholicism in Protestant England and the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill. Newman went so far as to contemplate civil disobedience as a Catholic response to the bill.⁸³ In the end, however, Newman settled for education as the answer. Since prejudice and bigotry were the cause of Protestant anti-Catholicism, Newman argued that, if Protestants truly understood Catholicism, they would come to see that the bases of their anti-Catholicism were false.⁸⁴ What is interesting is that Newman never calls for a reform of the laws and structures of English society that were also the causes of this anti-Catholicism. Even though Newman realized that institutional reforms in England had aided the position of Catholics in England in the past, he does not urge the laity to get politically involved or to struggle against their oppression. On the contrary, he urges them not to be rude or offensive or to cultivate a “controversial temper.”⁸⁵ Writing to J. M. Capes in February 1851, Newman says that he does not support a popular crusade against the establishment. ⁸⁶ In this instance, Newman does not choose to be a reformer.

Another example of Newman’s expression of social concern is found in his notes for a sermon to be preached on October 11, 1857. In these notes, Newman speaks out against the atrocities committed by British soldiers in their efforts to put down uprisings in India. He speaks about the sins of the soldiers and says that, by the admission of their own officers, they are becoming demons.⁸⁷ Newman suggests that there is a collective responsibility for such actions since we all share a common human nature with the soldiers who committed these acts.⁸⁸ He cautions his audience against sharing the feelings of vengeance of the soldiers who are perpetrating these actions. He asks, “How do we make matters better by sharing and propagating the savageness of human nature?”⁸⁹

Newman appeals to the incarnation as the theological basis for this position. Because Christ assumed a human nature that could have sinned (but actually did not), the sins of all humans weighed on him and were, in one sense, his.⁹⁰ Newman says that Jesus was in solidum (in solidarity) with the sins of all humans.⁹¹ In dying on the cross, Jesus took on this burden of human sin and did not condemn his torturers but “felt a tenderness to that fallen nature which was showing itself so awfully devilish in His persecutors, for it was His own.”⁹²

In these sermon notes, Newman goes on to list several other similar atrocities and injustices that have been committed throughout history. One of these is Cromwell’s slaughter of the inhabitants of Drogheda in Ireland after the citizens of the town had accepted the quarter that he had offered.⁹³ In his letters and diaries, Newman has more to say about the injustices of the English against the Irish. In a letter to Gerard Manley Hopkins, Newman urges him to moderate his feelings about Irish nationalism that accused the British of oppression against freedom. He reminds Hopkins that the Irish had never accepted British rule and thus were not rebels against legitimate authority. Newman writes, “Irish patriots hold that they never have yielded themselves to the sway of England and therefore never have been under her laws and never have been rebels.” And then he adds, “If I were an Irishman, I should be at heart a rebel.”⁹⁴

Several reasons have been proposed to explain Newman’s ambiguity on the issue of political and social involvement. Terence Kenny suggests that Newman was more interested in intellectual than social problems. He states that Newman was “absolutely engrossed in the intellectual problems of recommending Christianity to an increasingly scientific and irreligious age.”⁹⁵ Jay Newman thinks that Newman was more concerned with souls than with bodies. ⁹⁶ According to Edward Norman, Newman thought that the injustices of society were caused by spiritual and moral breakdowns, rather than social and political problems. As Norman puts it, “The sickness of human society was spiritual; his [Newman’s] preoccupation was with the error in men’s heart rather than with the circumstances of their material lives.”⁹⁷ Another possible reason for Newman’s reticence on issues of social justice is that, both religiously and politically, he was conservative by nature.⁹⁸

Whatever the reasons for Newman’s hesitancy in this area, he fails to fully integrate the dimension of social justice into his mature notion of Catholic faith. Yet, as withdrawn and conservative as he might have been, there were occasions when he did accept the responsibility to get involved in social and political issues. In his own limited way, Newman was sensitive to these issues. Also, Newman’s in solidum notion of the incarnation could provide a theological starting point for showing how his ideas on the social implications of faith might be more fully developed.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Another area in which Newman’s theology of faith might appear to be inadequate from the perspective of contemporary Catholic theology is that of cultural diversity. A Catholic theology of faith today cannot ignore this dimension. Although Newman is very much aware of the historical and occasional character of all theological writings, including his own, he does not explicitly integrate the elements of cultural diversity into his mature notion of Catholic faith. Yet there are elements in his understanding of the process of arriving at certitude that suggest that Newman might be open to some of the contemporary contributions that cultural studies have made in the field of theology.

When Newman speaks of antecedent considerations, he maintains that the starting point of the process of arriving at certitude is the person’s awareness of one’s contextual self, the acknowledgment of one’s particular concrete standpoint and situation. Although the step to extend antecedent considerations to include the dimension of cultural diversity is not an automatic one, it would be a logical one. But, if one adds to this Newman’s acceptance of the historical and contextual nature of all theological statements, it seems reasonable to suggest that Newman might have been open to acknowledging the significance of cultural diversity for faith and theological reflection.

Although Newman himself does not make this application, I would like to give one illustration of how Newman’s thought might be developed along these lines. Since Newman was open to antecedent considerations, moral dispositions, history, and development as elements to be considered in the process of faith and theological reflection, one cannot help but think that he might have been equally open to such cultural elements as background theories, retroductive warrants, and philosophical and religious pluralism. Based on such an observation, it is quite possible that Newman might have been open to something like Francis Schüssler Fiorenza’s understanding of systematic theology as paradigmatic reconstruction. Fiorenza describes the theological process of the development of tradition as a process of paradigmatic reconstruction. Tradition “develops and changes in a way that constantly reconstructs what it considers to be paradigmatic, what it considers to be its vision or ‘essence.’”⁹⁹ One can still speak of an essence of the Gospel, but, because of the dynamic quality of God’s revelation, the essence itself is constantly evolving.

Admittedly, Newman never used this kind of language, but such an understanding of development seems compatible with his understanding of revelation as a living idea and with his understanding of the dynamic elements present in his theory of development. Although Newman did hold that there could be no new revelation that would surpass the “idea” revealed in Jesus Christ, he did seem open to the possibility of real developments in revelation. True development had to be faithful to the original idea, but, for Newman, development of doctrine was not simply a matter of making implicit what was already explicitly there. Development could generate something new. For Newman, the process of theology required a critical dialogue between the living idea of Christian Revelation and the elements of the contemporary situation. Only then could the true message be reconstructed for a new age.

ECUMENISM AND INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

Pointing out the significance of Newman’s notion of faith for ecumenical and interreligious dialogue indeed appears to be a daunting task. As a Catholic, Newman held that the Catholic Church was the one and only true church. All other Christian churches not in communion with Rome were considered to be either in schism or in heresy.¹⁰⁰ In his book Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans , Newman states that the Catholic Church “is the one ark of salvation” and “that Church in which alone is salvation.”¹⁰¹ Such a view of the church does not seem to leave much room open for ecumenical dialogue. Yet, Avery Dulles finds elements in Newman’s theology that would facilitate the development of an ecumenical attitude. He points out that Newman had a great desire for restoring the unity of all Christian churches.¹⁰² Dulles also mentions that Newman’s view on the freedom of conscience made him sensitive to the religious beliefs of other Christians and that he was on guard against unsetthng them in their faith.¹⁰³ To this Dulles adds that Newman had a “measure of appreciation for the workings of grace in other Christian communions.”¹⁰⁴ Dulles concludes by stating that Newman was a “forerunner, standing on the threshold of a new ecumenical age.”¹⁰⁵ In a similar spirit, John T. Ford writes, “it does not seem inappropriate to recognize Newman as an ecumenist—at least from a contemporary perspective.”¹⁰⁶

The significance of Newman’s theology for interreligious dialogue appears even more problematic. Newman shared the polemical attitude of the early Christian writers toward Judaism. He believed that because the majority of the Jews had rejected Jesus, they ceased to be God’s chosen people. In A Grammar of Assent, he says that the Jews committed a heinous sin when they crucified Jesus and that the curse that resulted from this sin is the cause of their guilt and rejection.¹⁰⁷ Newman is even stronger in his denunciations of Islam, which he regards as a violent opponent of the true faith.¹⁰⁸ In A Grammar of Assent, Newman states that Islam—Mahometanism, as he calls it—“was little more that a rebellion against a living religion.”¹⁰⁹

Yet, along with these negative and intolerant views, there is one element in Newman’s theology that might serve as a basis for a Christian dialogue with other religions. In several of his writings, Newman presents the notion of a universal revelation. As an Anglican, Newman subscribed to the notion of a universal revelation in two of his works, the 1830 University Sermon entitled “The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively” and his 1833 book The Arians of the Fourth Century. According to Francis McGrath, Newman continued to hold the notion of a universal revelation as a Catholic.¹¹⁰ In A Grammar of Assent, Newman describes his idea of universal revelation in the following way: “As far as we know, there never was a time when ... revelation was not a revelation continuous and systematic, with distinct representatives and an orderly succession.”¹¹¹ If this notion of universal revelation can be more fully incorporated into Newman’s notion of Catholic faith, perhaps we have a theological foundation for developing Newman’s attitude toward other religions beyond what he himself was able to do in the atmosphere of nineteenth-century English Catholicism.

CONCLUSION

The inadequacies of Newman’s notion of faith pointed out in this chapter are not intended to be exhaustive. But what they illustrate is that, although Newman himself might not directly address some contemporary issues, there are elements in his theology of Catholic faith that provide guidelines and principles for addressing these issues. Newman’s significance today lies not only in how he himself responded to a particular issue but in his overall balanced and integrated view of Catholic faith. Newman would have recognized that there is more in the living idea of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ than either he or the Catholic Church of his day could have appropriated. The overall direction of his understanding of Catholic faith is one that would have been open to developing the implications of his theological views, even those that he himself did not develop. Catholics and Catholic theologians today can look at Newman as one who stresses the personal elements of faith over the intellectual. By doing so, his vision of faith can inspire the church today to focus on the fundamental core principles and values of the Gospel and to view the intellectual and institutional elements as subservient. Newman’s balanced view of Catholic faith can lead the church to put new wine in old wineskins in order to fulfill its mission of preaching Jesus’ gospel of love.

Furthermore, Newman’s vision of faith is truly Catholic. In replying to Propaganda’s proposed censure of Newman’s Letter to the Duke of Norfolk in 1875, Cardinal Manning wrote, “The heart of the revered Fr. Newman is as right and Catholic as it is possible to be.”¹¹² Yet, Newman’s mature notion of Catholic faith goes beyond the intellectual notion of faith that the magisterium today seems to be insisting on. In fact, we have seen that in his early Catholic years, Newman attempted to integrate his view of faith in the University Sermons with the Roman view of faith. These efforts met with some success and enabled Newman to clarify his Catholic understanding of faith. Yet, when he developed his mature notion of Catholic faith in A Grammar of Assent, he rejected the intellectual-based approach of Roman theology and chose a more personalist approach. In doing so, Newman opens up a way to define faith in a Catholic sense that transcends the traditional Roman and neoscholastic approaches. The point is not that Newman’s view of Catholic faith is perfect or that it answers all contemporary questions, but certainly his view of faith can help Catholics today put the different elements of the experience of faith in their proper perspective. His vision, his Catholic sensibility, and his critical fidelity to the church can provide the impetus for Catholics, especially Catholic theologians, to continue to reflect on the reality of faith and to work to develop Catholic understandings of faith that can serve as models for the church in the new millennium.

NOTES

Aquinas, Summa Theologica II, 2, Q.1, A.1-10, 1055-73. Thomas Aquinas presents an intellectual approach to faith that recognizes both the personalist and critical elements in the act of faith. For Aquinas, the act of faith involves the intellect, the will, and the grace of God, and the assent of faith is compatible with what Aquinas calls cogitatio, thinking. Also, Aquinas’s treatment of fides formata (the faith lived through love) is a personalism expressed through scholastic language. In discussing the object of faith, Aquinas distinguishes between the primary object of faith, God as First Truth, and the secondary, those things related to God as First Truth. As a result, Aquinas does not completely identify the teachings of the church with the Word of God.

These manuals include such works as Camillus Mazzella, Praelectiones Scholastico-Dogmaticae (Romae: S.C. De Propaganda Fide, 1884); Christian Pesch, Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae (Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder, 1924); A. D. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae (Parisus-Tornaci-Romae: Desclee & Socii, 1959); and Van Noort, Dogmatic Theology: The Sources of Revelation, trans. and rev. John J. Castelot and William R. Murphy (Westminster, MD: Newman, 1961). Although based on Aquinas, many of the manualists present an exaggerated, and often distorted, version of the intellectual approach to faith. Their treatment of the exclusion of doubt often gives the impression that all forms of questioning (thinking, cogitatio ) are incompatible with faith. Also, they tend to identify the teaching of the Catholic Church completely with the Word of God. It is this approach that Newman encountered in Roman theology, and it is this intellectual approach that the magisterium of the Catholic Church seems to be intent on reviving today.

Documents of the Church in English Translation, trans. John F. Clarkson, John H. Edwards, William J. Kelly, and John J. Welch (St. Louis: Herder, 1962), #63-66, 28-29. See also Dermot A. Lane, The Experience of God: An Invitation to Do Theology (New York: Paulist, 1981), 55-56.

The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation of Vatican Council II, commentary and trans. George H. Tavard (Glen Rock, NJ: Paulist, 1966), #2-4, 58-60. (Hereafter cited as Dei Verbum.)

Dei Verbum, #5, 60-61.

Lane, Experience of God, 59-60.

Thomas J. Norris, Only Life Gives Life: Revelation, Theology and Christian Living According to Cardinal Newman (Dublin: Columba, 1996), 33.

Norris, Only Life Gives Life, 33.

GA, 89.

GA, 82.

GA, 89.

GA, 90.

Norris, Only Life Gives Life, 51.

Charles Stephen Dessain, John Henry Newman (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961), 112.

John Coulson, “Introduction,” in John Henry Newman, On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1961), 8. Newman had written the passage, but it was left unsigned.

LD, XIX:136-37 and 141.

Newman, On Consulting the Faithful, 63.

Newman, On Consulting the Faithful, 75.

Newman, On Consulting the Faithful, 77.

LD, XIX:204-5.

Coulson, “Introduction,” 38. Coulson points out that Bishop Brown wrote three letters to Propaganda before it decided to take up the case.

LD, XIX:277.

LD, XIX:289.

Sheridan Gilley, Newman and His Age (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1991), 307. Gilley writes, “Wiseman’s negligence can be explained by his illness, the onset of diabetes, and his preoccupation with the Errington affair, as well as by his legendary inefficiency.”

Ian Ker, John Henry Newman: A Biography (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 608.

LD, XIX:276, n. 2.

Coulson, “Introduction,” 42-43. In 1871 in the third edition of The Arians of the Fourth Century, Newman added an appendix in which he included an abbreviated version of the Rambler article and gave a point-by-point refutation of Rome’s objections. Newman also made some significant changes in this version of the article.

Ker, Newman: A Biography, 690.

Dessain, Newman, 146.

Gilley, Newman and His Age, 379-80. A copy of Franchi’s original letter is found in LD, XXVII:401.

Newman, Norfolk, 166.

Gilley, Newman and His Age, 380.

Dessain, Newman, 146.

LD, XII:29.

LD, XIX:150, Letter to Edward Healy Thompson, May 29, 1859.

LD, XIX:159.

LD, XI:212, Letter to Dalgairns, July 21, 1847.

LD, XII: 137, Letter to Mrs. John Mozley, December 21, 1847.

LD, XII:214, Letter to Miss Giberne, June 6, 1848.

LD, XX:390.

LD, XVII:148.

LD, XII:55.

Ker, Newman, 330. Newman also sent Perrone a paper on his theory of development.

LD, XI:293, Letter to W. G. Penny, December 13, 1846. See also LD, XII:21, Letter to Wiseman, January 17, 1847.

LD, XI:352. The notation on Perrone mentions that at various times, notably in 1867, Perrone defended Newman’s theology in Rome.

LD, XII:32.

LD, XI:279-80, Letter to Dalgairns, November 22, 1846.

LD, XIX:280.

LD, XIX:282-83.

LD, XIX:289-90. In this letter to Wiseman, Newman makes a point of the fact that the article on consulting the faithful in the July issue of the Rambler was unsigned; therefore, Propaganda could not, for certain, know that Newman was the author.

LD, XIX:280, January 24, 1860, memorandum.

Coulson, “Introduction,” 43.

LD, XIX:167.

LD, XX:446.

LD, XXII:317.

LD, XXV:213, Letter to John Yeatman, September 26, 1870.

Ian Ker, “Newman and the Papacy,” Downside Review 103 (April 1985): 90.

Ker, “Newman and the Papacy,” 91.

Ker, “Newman and the Papacy,” 137.

LD, XXV:224, Letter to Lady Simeon, November 1, 1870.

LD, XXV:231, Letter to Lady Simeon, November 18, 1870.

LD, XXV:310, Letter to Alfred Plummer, April 3, 1871.

LD, XXV:420, Letter to William Maskell, October 22, 1871.

Ker, “Newman and the Papacy,” 97.

Apo., 26.

Dev., 40.

Thomas J. Reese, Inside the Vatican: The Politics and Organization of the Catholic Church (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 277-78.

Reese, Inside the Vatican, 281.

Reese, Inside the vatican, 279-81.

Gregory Baum, Faith and Doctrine: A Contemporary View (New York: Newman, 1969), 44.

Avery Dulles, The Survival of Dogma (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971), 137-51.

Oliver A. Rabut, Faith and Doubt, trans. Bonnie and William Whitman (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1967), 68-83.

Henry Tristram, “Introduction,” in AW, 16.

LD, XXX:209, Letter to Malcolm Maccoll, April 28, 1883.

Jay Newman, The Mental Philosophy of John Henry Newman (Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), 31.

Terence Kenny, The Political Thought of John Henry Newman (London: Longmans, Green, 1957), 169-73.

Kenny, Political Thought of Newman, 169.

Newman, Mental Philosophy of Newman, 32. Jay Newman adds, “Perhaps his intense hatred of Benthamism had made him somewhat callous; or maybe he was just too much an Oxford-trained ‘élitist’ to be able to relate well to the ungentlemanly masses.”

Newman, Mental Philosophy of Newman, 32.

LD, XIV:213-15, Letter to J. M. Capes, February 18, 1851.

John Henry Newman, Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England (London: Longmans, Green, 1903), 324, 326, 332, and 372-73. (Hereafter abbreviated Prepos.)

Prepos., 373.

LD, XIV:214.

John Henry Newman, Sermon Notes of John Henry Cardinal Newman, 1849-1878, introduction and notes by James Tolhurst (Notre Dame: Gracewing, University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 151. (Hereafter abbreviated SN.)

SN, 150.

SN, 151.

SN, 148.

SN, 149.

SN, 153-54.

LD, XXXI:195, Letter to Hopkins, March 3, 1887.

Kenny, Political Thought of Newman, 168.

Newman, Mental Philosophy of Newman, 32.

Edward Norman, “Newman’s Social and Political Thinking,” in Newman after a Hundred Years, ed. Ian Ker and Alan G. Hill (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 173. Norman’s reasons for this position are questionable. He suggests that Newman held that the political and social order were derived from the order of natural truth and were not elements of revealed truth. This view appears to be at odds with Newman’s understanding of the relationship between the natural and the supernatural. The two are inseparable.

Newman, Mental Philosophy of Newman, 31.

Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin, eds., Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 74.

100

Avery Dulles, Newman, Outstanding Christian Thinkers (London: Continuum, 2002), 116.

101

John Henry Newman, Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching Considered, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1908, 1910), 1:4-5.

102

Dulles, Newman, 129-30.

103

Dulles, Newman, 127.

104

Dulles, Newman, 130.

105

Dulles, Newman, 130.

106

John T. Ford, “Was Newman an Ecumenist?” Josephinum Journal of Theology 9, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2002): 210.

107

GA, 438.

108

Dulles, Newman, 118.

109

GA, 440.

110

Francis McGrath, John Henry Newman: Universal Revelation (Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 1997), 89, 91. McGrath thinks that Newman’s reasons for not giving his notion of universal revelation a more prominent place in A Grammar of Assent are more practical and political than theological. Newman wanted to make sure that his Catholic readers would not be able to question the orthodoxy of A Grammar of Assent and so he employed, as McGrath puts it, “an ironical use of the principle of reserve” and downplayed the idea of a universal revelation.

111

GA, 431.

112

Gilley, Newman and His Age, 379-80. A copy of the letter from Propaganda is found in LD, XXVII:401.

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