NOTES

Chapter Five

Faith and Reason in Newman’s Mature Notion of Catholic Faith

As has been seen, the question of the relationship between faith and reason is a major theme that runs through Newman’s theology of faith throughout his whole life. In the University Sermons, his main concern is to find a way to explain the relationship between faith and reason that would, at one and the same time, preserve the autonomy and distinctiveness of faith as well as its basic compatibility with reason. The main objective of A Grammar of Assent is to present a rational justification for the certitude of Catholic faith. Consequently, a comprehensive understanding of Newman’s Catholic notion of faith requires an examination of his understanding of the relationship between faith and reason in his mature notion of Catholic faith.

A close examination of Newman’s treatment of the relationship between faith and reason reveals that there are three major moments in which faith and reason converge in the act of faith. The first moment is the moment of the process of coming to faith and the role that reason plays in this process, the discussion of the rational evidences for faith. Logically, this moment is before faith and is not yet faith. Yet, psychologically, this moment is the rational preparation for faith and is thereby an integral element in the total personal response of faith. The second moment focuses on the role that reason plays in the actual response of faith itself. This is the actual moment of faith when all the elements in the act of faith converge and the believer personally accepts the realities and truths of the Christian revelation. The third moment is the moment of the exercise of rational criticism within the actual response of faith. The focus of this moment is after faith and during faith and analyzes what forms of rational criticism are contemporaneously compatible with the actual response of faith.

For Newman the response of faith is an act of certitude that involves an unconditional assent to the realities and truths of revelation. At the same time, the response of faith is compatible with various forms of rational criticism. The assent of faith is not a narrow, dogmatic assent that is closed to all forms of rational criticism. The relationship between faith and reason in the second moment, the role that reason plays in the actual response of faith, was discussed in chapter 4. This chapter focuses on the analysis of Newman’s mature Catholic understanding of the relationship between faith and reason in the first moment, the evidences for faith, and the third moment, the role of rational criticism within the response of faith.

THE EVIDENCES FOR FAITH

When Newman discusses the evidences for faith in the University Sermons, he expresses suspicions and raises reservations about the value of the rational scientific arguments for faith that are derived from explicit (formal) reason. In doing so, he expresses a preference for the more personal reasons that are based on implicit (informal) reason. In his early Catholic years, Newman adopted the language of Roman theology and made an effort to integrate some of the logical and scientific arguments of this school into his own approach to the evidences for faith. He made an effort to integrate terms such as revelatio (the truths as revealed), res revelata (the matter revealed), the speculative judgment of credibility, the practical judgment of credibility, pia affectio (holy disposition), and voluntas credendi (will to believe) into his theology of faith. Accepting the distinction between the rational investigation of the evidences (human faith) and divine faith, he tried to determine how far reason could go, when reason ended, and when the supernatural act of divine faith began. As we have seen, he encountered some difficulties in his endeavor to correlate his own views on faith and reason with those of Roman theology.

When Newman discusses the evidences for faith in A Grammar of Assent, he returns to the approach of the University Sermons and develops it more fully. Once again, he expresses suspicions about the scientific arguments of formal reason and indicates a preference for the more personal evidences for faith. In the process, he chooses not to adopt the approach of Roman theology and does not make an effort to integrate it into his treatment of the evidences in A Grammar of Assent.

In A Grammar of Assent, Newman begins his discussion of the evidences for Christian faith by clearly stating that what he is presenting is his own view on the subject. He does not claim that his approach has universal acceptance or any scientific approval. However, he adds that his view has added weight based on the testimony of those who agree with him.¹ Newman says that his purpose is to apply the principles set down in A Grammar of Assent to the proof of the divine origin of Christianity.² More specifically, he states that his objective is to demonstrate the truth of the Christian revelation by showing that “the Gospel Revelation is divine, and that it carries with it the evidences of its divinity.”³ Christianity, Newman states, is a religion in addition to nature, which means that it is “over and above nature, or supernatural.”⁴ Since Christianity is a supernatural religion, it must have evidence that is capable of demonstrating its divine origin. Or, as Newman puts it, Christianity must “bring with it valid testimonials of its right to demand our homage.”⁵

At the outset, Newman indicates that he would prefer not to have his approach labeled as “scientific.” His approach to the evidences does not involve using rational demonstrations to prove logically and rationally the existence of God or attempting to scientifically (through formal reason) demonstrate the fact of revelation. At the same time, he does not altogether deny the validity of the scientific approaches. He says that we should let those who have a gift for scientific demonstrations do them.⁶ However, he makes it clear that these scientific approaches are not the ones that he will choose in order to demonstrate the divine origin of Christianity.

An illustration of Newman’s suspicion of the scientific demonstrations can be found in his analysis of William Paley’s approach to the evidences of Christianity. Newman writes that he thinks that Paley’s argument “is clear, clever, and powerful; and there is something which looks like charity in going out into the highways and hedges, and compelling men to come in.”⁷ But, as for himself, he states that he does not choose to follow Paley’s approach. Newman gives his reasons: “If I am asked to use Paley’s argument for my own conversion, I say plainly I do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism; if I am asked to convert others by it, I say plainly I do not care to overcome their reason without touching their hearts.”⁸ Another reason Newman gives for not using this approach to convert people to Christianity is because he thinks that some exertion on the part of the person to be converted is a condition of true conversion.⁹

Newman’s approach also differs from Paley’s on the use of miracles in demonstrating the divine origin of Christianity. According to Newman, Paley argues that the evidences (credentials) of Christian revelation are “necessarily in their nature miraculous.”¹⁰ While admitting that Christian revelation is attended “with the profession of miracles,”¹¹ Newman says that the evidences that he is going to draw upon in demonstrating the divine origin of Christianity are “not in themselves miraculous.”¹² Elaborating on his approach, he writes, “I think, then, that the circumstances under which a professed revelation comes to us, may be such as to impress both our reason and our imagination with a sense of its truth, even though no appeal be made to strictly miraculous intervention.”¹³ Newman does not deny that there was miraculous intervention in the origin of Christianity. His point, however, seems to be that he does not use miracles as scientific demonstrations of the truth of Christianity. According to Newman, this miraculous intervention addresses Christians today in the form of “coincidences,” which are indications to the illative sense that God has supernaturally presented God’s self to our apprehension.¹⁴

In his own approach to the evidences, Newman prefers to use the tools of informal reason and the illative sense. It is more congenial in his judgment to attempt to prove Christianity in the same informal way in which we can prove for certain that we have been born and that we will die someday.¹⁵ According to Newman, certitude on the matter of the divine origin of Christianity can be reached through the accumulation of probabilities, informal reason, and the illative sense. In describing his approach, Newman says that the mind can construct legitimate proof for certitude through the accumulation of probabilities. ¹⁶ Also, he states that the validity of the proof is not determined by any scientific test but by the illative sense.¹⁷

We have already seen how the informal process of reasoning always involves the acceptance of certain assumptions. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that Newman’s informal demonstration of the divine origin of Christianity requires that the inquirer accept certain presuppositions. To begin with, Newman says that his demonstration is addressed to a specific audience—namely, only to those who accept the principles and beliefs of natural religion. He states his position as follows:

Relying then on these authorities, human and Divine, I have no scruple in beginning the review I shall take of Christianity by professing to consult for those only whose minds are properly prepared for it; and by being prepared, I mean to denote those who are imbued with the religious opinions and sentiments which I have identified with Natural Religion.¹⁸

Putting it more simply, Newman states, “belief in revealed truths depends on belief in natural.”¹⁹ This also means that those to whom Newman is addressing his argument have to accept some starting principles. In demonstrating the truth of Christianity, he states that everyone must start from the same principles, and those principles are of a personal nature.²⁰

Newman mentions some of the principles that must be accepted before one can enter into a discussion of the evidences of Christianity. They include, among others, a belief and a perception of the Divine Presence, a recognition of God’s attributes, a conviction of the worth of the soul, an insight into our guilt and misery, and an eager hope of reconciliation.²¹ Newman states that his argument is not addressed to those who hold principles that are contrary to the vision of natural religion. Again, he mentions some of these principles; examples include holding that sin is a bugbear, not a reality; that miracles are impossible; that prayer is a superstition; that fear of God is unmanly; that sorrow for sin is slavish; that if we do our duties in this life, we may take our chances in the next.²² These opinions, for Newman, are part of a “system of opinion” that is simply false. And, as he says, he will not argue about Christianity with those who hold these views, “because it is plainly absurd to attempt to prove a second proposition to those who do not admit the first.”²³ By his own admission, his arguments for the divine origin of Christianity would have no appeal to agnostics and unbelievers.

Newman’s demonstration of the evidences for faith is rooted in his understanding of the relationship between natural religion and revealed religion. By “natural religion” he means “the Knowledge of God, of His Will, and of our duties toward Him.”²⁴ Some of the truths of natural religion are the existence of God, the attributes of God, our responsibility to God, our dependence on God, the prospect of reward and punishment, the doctrine of atonement, and the doctrine of meritorious intercession.²⁵ Although the truths of natural religion come independently of revealed religion,²⁶ they are not solely the result of a rational analysis of the world. They are not the result of human effort alone. For Newman, the truths of natural religion are founded on some idea of an “express revelation” that comes from some “unseen religion.”²⁷ In answering the objection that Oriental religions are older than Christianity, he states that Christianity is only the continuation and conclusion of an earlier revelation, which “may be traced back into prehistoric times, till it is lost in the darkness that hangs over them.”²⁸ To this he adds, “As far as we know, there never was a time when that revelation was not, a revelation continuous and systematic, with distinct representatives and an orderly succession.”²⁹

But the revelation of natural religion is limited and incomplete. For one thing, it is a revelation without credentials, which means that it does not come with adequate evidence of its divine origin.³⁰ Furthermore, by itself natural religion is a failure; it is deficient and incomplete. “The Religion of Nature is a mere inchoation, and needs a complement.”³¹ It creates an anticipation of a further revelation.³² Natural religion prepares the person to receive revealed religion by creating in the mind an “anticipation” that a further revelation will be given. The very desire for a revelation leads almost automatically to the expectation of a revelation. Once our attention is aroused and we begin to meditate on it, the more probable it becomes that a further revelation “has or will be given to us.”³³

Since it is incomplete, natural religion needs fulfillment, and it finds that fulfillment in revealed religion. Revealed religion is the Judeo-Christian revelation, which is centered in Jesus Christ and finds its expression in the realities and truths of Catholic faith. In The Arians of the Fourth Century, Newman gives a fuller definition of revealed religion. There he defines it as “the doctrine taught in the Mosaic and Christian dispensations, and contained in the holy Scriptures, and is from God in a sense in which no other doctrine can be said to be from Him.”³⁴ He states that natural religion can “have but one complement, and that very complement is Christianity.”³⁵ The remedy for the disease that afflicts humanity is found in the “central doctrine of Revelation, the Mediation of Christ.”³⁶ Summarizing this view, Newman states, “Revelation begins where Natural Religion fails.”³⁷ Christianity fulfills and completes natural religion by providing the revelation that natural religion anticipates. Since it finds its fulfillment in revealed religion, natural religion is also seen as a preparation for God’s revelation in Jesus Christ.³⁸

A couple of examples of the evidences that Newman presents in A Grammar of Assent will illustrate his approach to demonstrating the divine origin of the Christian revelation. One of the strongest evidences for Newman is the fact that Christianity can be demonstrated to be the fulfillment of the prophecies that God made to the Hebrew people in the Old Testament. In his analysis, he discusses how the Christian revelation both fulfills and goes beyond the Jewish prophecies.³⁹ He points to the universality of the Christian revelation as another example of the evidence for the divine origin of Christianity. Jesus, Newman maintains, intended to found a universal religion “directed to the benefit of the whole human race,”⁴⁰ whereas other religions—Islam, for instance—do not.⁴¹

Another example of the evidence for Christianity is found in the historical rise and establishment of Christianity. Newman analyzes Gibbon’s five historical causes for the rise and establishment of Christianity and concludes by stating that none of these historical causes are sufficient to explain the rise of Christianity. ⁴² The only satisfactory explanation is a supernatural one—namely, the image of Jesus. Newman states that it is the image of Jesus Christ that creates faith.⁴³ The image of Christ is the principle of conversion and fellowship.⁴⁴ In his Letters and Diaries, he speaks of the extraordinary conversion of the Roman Empire as “the most supernatural event in the history of Christianity”⁴⁵ and as “our main proof of the divinity of the gospel now.”⁴⁶ He also cites the witness of the early Christian martyrs as evidence for Christianity. In a remarkable and expertly written treatment, Newman recounts the history of those early Christian women and men who suffered and died for the faith.⁴⁷

For Newman, these are examples of the proofs that might be presented to demonstrate the divine origin of Christianity. As he puts it, they are “specimens, among the many which might be given, of the arguments adducible for Christianity.”⁴⁸ These types of evidence address the minds of persons both through the intellect and through the imagination, “creating a certitude of its truth by arguments too various for direct enumeration, too personal and deep for words, too powerful and concurrent for refutation.”⁴⁹ In this process, Newman says, reason does not have to come first and faith second, though, he adds, this is the logical order.⁵⁰ Serving as both object and proof, the Christian revelation elicits one complex act of both inference and assent. The personal nature of this informal process of reasoning is evident. He states that the Christian revelation “speaks to us one by one, and is received by us one by one, as the counterpart, so to say, of ourselves, and is real as we are real.”⁵¹ The examination of the evidences through the informal reasoning process elicits a personal act of certitude that accepts Christian revelation as (1) coming from God, (2) being divine in origin, but (3) being a divine revelation that brings with it the credentials of its divine origin.

Newman’s choice not to employ the scientific demonstrations and to present a more personal approach means that he decided in A Grammar of Assent not to adopt the approach of Roman theology as his own. The Roman School used miracles and other signs to scientifically demonstrate the fact of a divine revelation. It spoke about motives of credibility and motives of cre-dendity. In the process of coming to faith, this approach attempted to determine precisely when reason ended and faith began. Newman no longer seems to be concerned with any of these things. He correctly recognizes that there can be more than one Catholic approach to the evidences for Christian faith. He does not reject the validity of the approach of the Roman School of theology. Rather, he prefers to present an approach to the evidences for Christianity that employs a more informal and personalist form of reasoning.

THE ROLE OF RATIONAL CRITICISM

When Newman employs the language and dynamics of human certitude to describe the response of faith, it is important to remember that he is using an analogy. This means that, in some ways, the response of Catholic faith is similar to the act of human certitude, but it also means that, in other ways, the response of Catholic faith is different from that of human certitude. As a result, on the one hand, the commitment of the act of Catholic faith is immune to certain forms of rational criticism. The act of faith includes an unconditional acceptance of and commitment to the realities and truths of revelation. As a certitude, faith possesses the assurance that one knows that what one assents to is true. Furthermore, as a response based on the grace of God, the assent of Catholic faith involves an affirmation that is distinct from the assent of human certitude. On the other hand, the assent of Catholic faith is a rational act that operates according to the processes of evidence and informal reason. In order to be fully human and rational, the assent of faith must be open to certain forms of rational criticism. The focus of the question of the role of rational criticism in faith becomes one of delineating in what areas faith is immune to rational criticism and in what areas it is susceptible to rational criticism.

In describing the certitude of Catholic faith, Newman does, at times, speak about the preeminence of the assent of faith. He often describes the certitude of Catholic faith as greater and superior to all human certitudes. The assent of faith requires an affirmation over and above the affirmation involved in human certitude. In the discourse on “Faith and Doubt,” he describes the certainty of Catholic faith as greater than any other certainty.⁵² He says that the certitude of faith has the highest degree of certainty, one that excludes fear as well as doubt.⁵³ In the “Thesis de Fide,” Newman describes the certitude of Catholic faith as an “absolute and perfect” certitude.⁵⁴

Newman bases this position on the unique and distinctive role that grace plays in the certitude of Catholic faith. Although the certitude of Catholic faith follows the process of informal reason, it is not based exclusively on the results of the rational process. Ultimately, the certitude of Catholic faith is based “solely on the fact that God, the Eternal Truth who cannot deceive nor be deceived, has spoken.”⁵⁵ What enables the believer to accept the realities and truths of revelation with absolute certitude is none other than the fact that they have the guarantee that they have been revealed by the infallible Word of God. It is evident that, for Newman, Catholic faith is supernatural and cannot exist without its formal object, the authority of the Word of God revealing. ⁵⁶ The assent of Catholic faith is not a “mere act of our own which we are free to exert when we will,” but it is “quite distinct from an exercise of reason” and is “wrought in the mind by the grace of God, and by it alone.”⁵⁷

Perhaps Newman’s most definitive statement on the preeminence of the certitude of Catholic faith is found in A Grammar of Assent. Here he states that Catholic faith is superior to human faith not merely in degree of assent but in nature and kind, so that the two do not admit of being compared to one another.⁵⁸ To this he adds, “[I]n the assent which follows on a divine announcement, and is vivified by a divine grace, there is, from the nature of the case, a transcendent adhesion of mind, intellectual and moral, and a special self-protection, beyond the operation of the ordinary laws of thought.”⁵⁹

M. Jamie Ferreira rejects this analysis of Newman’s position on the preeminence of the certitude of Catholic faith. She does not think that the affirmation of divine faith requires an affirmation over and above the affirmation of human certitude. According to Ferreira, the adherence involved in divine faith is basically the same (“not significantly different from,”⁶⁰ “significantly similar to in relevant aspects”⁶¹) as the adherence involved in human faith. She thinks that the distinctiveness of divine faith can be explained on the grounds that it is an affirmation made through grace, the Word of God revealing, and human faith is not. The operation of grace explains the distinctiveness of Catholic faith without maintaining that Catholic faith requires an affirmation over and above the affirmation of human faith.⁶² Based on this interpretation, Ferreira maintains that the type of rational criticism involved in human faith and divine faith are coextensive.⁶³ Ferreira’s position is based on her interpretation of Newman’s understanding of the relationship between human faith and divine faith. Ferreira maintains that human faith and divine faith have the same material object and are distinct only on the basis of their formal objects. However, the inadequacies of this view were pointed out in chapter 2, where it was demonstrated that Newman distinguishes human faith and divine faith on the basis of both their material and formal objects.

Ferreira’s misinterpretation of Newman’s understanding of the relationship between human faith and divine faith and his own strong statements on the preeminence of divine faith suggests that Newman did maintain that the affirmation of Catholic faith involved an affirmation over and above the affirmation of human certitude. Consequently, one cannot conclude that Newman thought that all the forms of rational criticism that are compatible with human certitude are also compatible with Catholic faith. According to Newman, some forms of rational criticism are incompatible with the assent of Catholic faith, and some forms are compatible with it.

FORMS OF RATIONAL CRITICISM INCOMPATIBLE WITH FAITH

Faith and Doubt

The assent of Catholic faith, like all certitudes, is incompatible with doubt. The doubt that is incompatible with faith is the doubt that Newman defines in A Grammar of Assent as the suspension of the mind. Again, as he states in A Grammar of Assent, he is not ruling out the possibility of doubt. His position is that an actual doubt is not compatible with the assent of Catholic faith. A believer cannot at one and the same time make an assent of certitude to the doctrine of the Trinity and doubt the truth of that doctrine.

In two of the discourses in the work Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations, Newman describes Catholic faith as an assent that excludes all doubt. In the discourse “Faith and Private Judgement,” he asserts that in the assent of Catholic faith, a person “has no doubt at all.”⁶⁴ The whole purpose of the second discourse, “Faith and Doubt,” is to demonstrate that the assent of Catholic faith is incompatible with doubt.⁶⁵ It is clear that in this discourse he understands doubt as the suspension of assent and that doubt is excluded from the assent of Catholic faith on the same grounds that it is excluded in all human certitudes. However, the focus of his rejection of doubt is that he sees it as a form of disbelief. If a believer were allowed to doubt, that would be like allowing the believer to disbelieve what one holds to be an eternal truth. To have a doubt about a truth of faith is not to believe it, and, therefore, when one is in the state of doubt, one does not have faith.⁶⁶ According to Newman, in this discourse, doubt is equivalent to the loss of faith.⁶⁷

The exclusion of doubt in Catholic faith is also supported by the fact that the doctrines of Catholic faith are guaranteed to be true on the basis of the infallible teaching of the Catholic Church. Newman writes in the discourse “Faith and Private Judgement,” “No one can doubt whether a word spoken by God is to be believed.”⁶⁸ In the discourse “Faith and Doubt,” Newman argues that, given the prerogatives stated earlier (the authority of the Word of God and the infallible church), there should be no wonder that the Catholic Church does not allow its believers to doubt.⁶⁹ The real wonder is how a Catholic could actually doubt. Newman states in this same discourse that faith for a Catholic is easy; the difficult thing is for a Catholic to doubt. This is because the Catholic has received a gift that makes faith easy; therefore, a Catholic does violence to one’s mind not by believing but by withholding faith.⁷⁰

Although Newman does exclude doubt from faith in his mature understanding of Catholic faith, as an Anglican he sometimes spoke as if he believed that faith and doubt could be compatible. In the 1837 edition of the Via Media, he writes that “doubt in some way or measure may even be said to be implied in a Christian’s faith.”⁷¹ Again in the Via Media, he writes, “We, for our part, have been taught to consider that in its degree faith, as well as conduct, must be guided by probabilities, and that doubt is ever our portion in this life.”⁷² In the 1839 university sermon “The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason,” Newman states, “we are given absolute certainty in nothing,”⁷³ adding that “we must in all things choose between doubt and inactivity.”⁷⁴

Do such statements mean that Newman changed his mind on the relationship between faith and doubt when he became a Catholic? Philip Flanagan, who maintains that Newman as an Anglican during the Via Media period considered faith to be compatible with doubt, seems to think that he did.⁷⁵ M. Jamie Ferreira also seems to support this view when she writes that Newman “clearly saw a need at the later date for a different understanding, or at least a different formulation, of the relationship between faith and doubt.”⁷⁶ However, Newman himself does not think that he changed his mind. When, as a Catholic, he published new editions of the Via Media (1877) and the University Sermons (1871), he added emendations with the purpose of demonstrating that his earlier Anglican statements on faith and doubt were really compatible with his mature Catholic understanding.⁷⁷

Even though Newman says that he did not change his mind, his Anglican statements, when read without the later emendations, certainly have a different tone and emphasis than his Catholic statements on faith and doubt. As an Anglican, he is more willing to discuss the dark side of faith, its obscurity, its uncertainty, its need to venture. As a Catholic, he places more emphasis on the certitude of faith and the firmness and security of its assent. To some extent, this is demonstrated in his own life. Newman’s Anglican notion of faith did not prevent him from doubting the status of the Anglican Church. In the Apologia, he describes himself as being “in a state of doubt” during his last two years as an Anglican.⁷⁸ However, on becoming a Catholic, it appears that Newman saw himself as being released from doubts. Again in the Apologia, he states that since becoming a Catholic, “I never have had one doubt.”⁷⁹

In addition, there is evidence that Newman saw the exclusion of doubt and fear as a unique characteristic of Catholic faith. In “Papers of 1853 on the Certainty of Faith,” Newman contrasts Catholic faith with Protestant faith. What distinguishes the two is that Catholic faith is an assent of certitude that excludes doubt and fear, whereas Protestants say “that no religious truth or fact can have a certainty of this kind.”⁸⁰

Whatever the final resolution of the issue on whether Newman changed his mind on his position on faith and doubt, it is clear that, as a Catholic, he placed much more emphasis on the certitude of faith and the steadfastness of faith in the face of doubts and fears. Sometimes Newman’s Catholic protestations against doubt seem a little exaggerated. Perhaps some of this strong rhetoric is a reflection of his efforts to demonstrate that his view of faith is compatible with that of Roman theology.

Inquiry

Another form of rational criticism that is incompatible with the assent of Catholic faith is what Newman calls inquiry. Inquiry is the reasoning process involved in the search for truth. It is the mental state of suspending assent to a given proposition, while one is engaged in the process of reasoning, in order to determine whether the proposition is true or false. Consequently, when one is inquiring, one has actually suspended assent and is in the state of doubt. “He who inquires has not found; he is in doubt where the truth lies, and wishes his present profession either proved or disproved.”⁸¹ As a state of doubt, inquiry is incompatible with both simple assent and the complex, reflex assent of certitude.

Since it is a certitude, the assent of Catholic faith is incompatible with inquiry. In A Grammar of Assent, Newman states that a Catholic cannot be allowed to inquire into the truth of the creed, for if one did, then one would no longer be a believer.⁸² As soon as one begins to inquire, one has ceased to be a Catholic. Newman also discusses inquiry in the discourse on “Faith and Doubt.” Here, he bases the Catholic Church’s prohibition against inquiry on the church’s claim to be infallible. In fact, only the Catholic Church can forbid its members further inquiry, since it alone makes the claim to be infallible. No other religious body has the right to make the demand of forbidding inquiry because no other church claims to be infallible.⁸³ According to Newman, the sects even go so far as to call on their followers to inquire and doubt freely about the merits of their own religion.⁸⁴ From statements such as these, it appears that Newman also sees the prohibition against inquiry as one of the distinctive features of Catholic faith.

Indefectibility

Catholic faith possesses the quality of indefectibility that provides the believer with the assurance that one’s assent to the essential truths of faith will endure. This implies that faith is immune to those forms of rational criticism that weaken the permanency of the certitude of Catholic faith. That Newman wants to ascribe the characteristic of indefectibility to Catholic faith is clear. However, the precise meaning of this characteristic is complicated by the ambiguity of Newman’s description of indefectibility. On the one hand, indefectibility guarantees that the certitudes (like faith) will persist and endure. It describes the permanent aspect of certitudes pointing out that they are irreversible and cannot fail or be lost. On the other hand, Newman states that indefectibility is a general rule, not an absolute. He goes on to admit that sometimes certitudes do fail and we change our beliefs.

In reflecting on this ambiguity, Ferreira offers four possible ways of resolving the apparent inconsistencies in Newman’s analysis of indefectibility. One possibility would be to simply note the contradiction and leave it at that, claiming that it is impossible to decide between the two conflicting positions. Second, it is possible to argue that, in spite of his vacillation, Newman is for other reasons committed to the indefectibility of certitude. Third, one could argue that Newman’s continual qualifications of indefectibility effectively dissolve the claim altogether.⁸⁵ Finally, Ferreira offers her own interpretation. She thinks that there are two conflicting strands in Newman’s writings, one on the indefectibility of certitude and one on the defectibility of certitude.⁸⁶ According to Ferreira, the characteristic of indefectibility means that certitudes are beyond rational criticism. She believes that Newman’s acceptance of the defectibility of certitudes is necessary if certitudes are to be subject to rational criticism.⁸⁷

However, it is not necessary to postulate the existence of a defectibility strand in Newman’s thought in order to admit that certitudes are subject to some forms of rational criticism. Although it is true that indefectibility does mean that certitudes are immune to certain forms of rational criticism, like inquiry, it does not mean that they are immune to all types of criticism, like investigation. If this is the case, it is possible to hold that, in spite of his vacillations, Newman remained committed to the indefectibility of certitude for important reasons (a position similar to Ferreira’s second possibility). According to his definition of certitude, all certitudes ought to be indefectible because they bring us knowledge that is objectively true. However, Newman was honest enough to admit that, since in matters of human knowledge we have no absolute criteria for determining objective truth, some human certitudes do fail. Yet, in spite of this admission, in A Grammar of Assent, Newman makes an effort to answer many of the objections that are raised against the indefectibility of certitude.⁸⁸ Newman himself seems to think that he adequately answers the objections to the indefectibility of certitude. He writes, “Still, I have gone a good way, as I think, to remove the objections to the doctrine of the indefectibility of certitude in matters of religion, though I cannot assign to it an infallible token.”⁸⁹ Statements such as this confirm Newman’s commitment to the indefectibility of certitude, particularly in matters of religion, such as the certitude of the assent of Catholic faith.

In spite of the limits of indefectibility in human certitude, Newman does intend to include it as one of the characteristics of Catholic faith. In fact, one of the reasons Newman wants to preserve the characteristic of indefectibility is because he views it as necessary and important for the religious certitude of Christian faith. “Certitude is then essential to the Christian; and if he is to persevere to the end, his certitude must include in it a principle of persistence.” ⁹⁰ According to Newman, indefectibility is a necessary condition for a vital Christian faith. If one is to lead a life totally devoted and committed to the truths of Christian faith, then one must have the assurance of knowing that the truths of revelation are true and the conviction that one’s certitude will endure and last. If the believer feels that faith can be lost at any moment, then he or she will not be able to make the total commitment that is necessary for living Christian faith.⁹¹ Newman goes on to state that the Christian believer has an indefectible certitude in primary truths and that these primary truths are found in the Catholic Church, even though its claim to possess them is not universally acknowledged.⁹²

Because of the preeminence of the certitude of Catholic faith, it has even a stronger claim to indefectibility than human certitude. In human certitude, there is no objective test that enables one to distinguish between true and false certitudes. Catholic faith contains within itself the guarantee that the truths of faith are objectively true because they have been revealed by the Word of God in and through the infallible teaching authority of the Catholic Church. In Catholic faith, the believer has an absolute assurance that the truths of faith are objectively true. Therefore, for Newman the certitude of Catholic faith is analogous to those human certitudes that do not fail rather than to those that do fail. Yet, it still must be remembered that Newman does not equate indefectibility with infallibility. The indefectibility of certitude of Catholic faith does not mean that the believer possesses a personal infallibility.⁹³

FORMS OF RATIONAL CRITICISM COMPATIBLE WITH FAITH

Given the preeminence of the certitude of Catholic faith, its immunity to the forms of criticism included in doubt and inquiry, and its quality of indefectibility, it might appear that Catholic faith is actually beyond rational criticism and is a form of dogmatism that requires a rebellion against reason in order to maintain itself. One of the main elements that contributes to this impression is the Catholic belief that the church possesses an infallible teaching authority. If an infallible teaching authority that speaks the Word of God guarantees the truths of Catholic faith, then is there really any room for rational criticism in the assent of Catholic faith?

In the Development of Doctrine, Newman clearly affirms that infallibility does not destroy rational criticism, free will, or responsibility.⁹⁴ He also raises the question of whether infallibility destroys the independence of the mind or the energy of the Catholic intellect in the Apologia. In answering this question, he responds with an emphatic no and goes on to argue that his negative answer is supported by the whole history of theology, as well as by the whole history of the church.⁹⁵ Infallibility does not reduce Christianity to a form of religious absolutism but allows for private judgment so that authority and private judgment are held in balance, “alternately advancing and retreating as the ebb and flow of the tide.”⁹⁶ So, the doctrine of infallibility does not close off faith to all forms of rational criticism. A further examination of Newman’s understanding of infallibility will show that he does maintain that some forms of rational criticism are compatible with the certitude of Catholic faith.

Infallibility

Although before the First Vatican Council Newman had opposed the definition of infallibility as unnecessary and inexpedient, in the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, he supports the definition of infallibility that was promulgated at that council in 1870. In this letter, he discusses infallibility in terms of its context, conditions, and limitations. He also makes a distinction between the infallible and noninfallible teachings of the church and the nature of the assent commanded by each.

Newman begins his discussion of infallibility by pointing out that the pope has the same infallibility as the church.⁹⁷ This means that the infallibility of the pope must be understood as an exercise of the infallibility that is given to the church as a whole. As a result, there are certain limitations placed on the infallibility of the pope. Newman summarizes the four conditions that are necessary for the exercise of papal infallibility as set forth by the council: The pope must speak, first, as the “Universal Teacher”; second, in the name and with the authority of the apostles; third, on a point of faith and morals; and fourth, with the purpose of binding every member of the church to accept and believe his decision.⁹⁸

In discussing the limitations of infallibility Newman points out that infallibility, either that of the church as a whole or that of the pope, is exercised principally and solely in two channels—namely, in direct statements of truth and in the condemnation of error.⁹⁹ Quoting the Roman theologian Billuart, he says that the pope is not infallible in conversation, in discussion, in consulting, in interpreting Scripture or the early Christian writers, in giving reasons for the point that he has defined, in private deliberations, or in setting forth his own opinion.¹⁰⁰ In fact, Newman points out that exercises of infallibility, by either a pope or a council, are rare occurrences.“[A]nd this is confessed by all sober theologians,” he adds.¹⁰¹ Newman also warns against extending infallibility to statements that are not infallible. He writes, “What is the use of dragging in the infallibility in connexion [sic] with Papal acts with which it has nothing to do.”¹⁰²

Newman also cautions against identifying the teaching authority of the pope with the authority of those in the Roman Curia who assist the pope. In the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, he maintains that the Syllabus of Errors was not an infallible document, because it did not come directly from the pope but was compiled by some unknown member of the Roman Curia.¹⁰³ Gladstone, in his expostulation, had connected the Syllabus of Errors with Pius IX’s encyclical Quanta Cura (How Much Care) and claimed that the errors listed in the Syllabus of Errors came under the infallible teaching authority of the pope. Newman responded by calling this an “untenable assertion” and pointed out that the Syllabus was simply an index of the pope’s condemnations. ¹⁰⁴ Therefore, he states, “we can no more accept it as de fide [a matter of faith], as a dogmatic document, than other index or table of contents.”¹⁰⁵ He goes on to distinguish between the teaching authority of the pope and those around him. He says that he would accept the Syllabus of Errors if the pope bade him to do so, but the pope has not done so, “and he cannot delegate his Magisterium to another.”¹⁰⁶ To this he adds, “I assent to that which the Pope propounds in faith and morals, but it must be he speaking officially, personally, and immediately and not any one else, who has hold over me.”¹⁰⁷ Newman goes on to warn against the excessive claims about the teaching authority of the pope that are often made by “those near, or with access, to the Holy Father.”¹⁰⁸ As a result, the pope’s acts and his words on doctrinal subjects “must be carefully scrutinized and weighed, before we can be sure what really he has said.”¹⁰⁹ Claims of infallibility do not always turn out to be what they are said to be.¹¹⁰

Newman also realized that even though statements of religious truths, including infallible ones, were true, they were only partial expressions of a truth. Edward Jeremy Miller refers to this as Newman’s “principle of disproportion.” ¹¹¹ Infallibility only guarantees that the aspect of a religious truth that is explicitly defined is free from error. Newman says that infallibility extends only to the direct answer to the question that is being considered¹¹² and not to the prefaces or the introductions to the definitions.¹¹³ In a letter to Alfred Plummer on April 3, 1871, he writes that a doctrine can be infallible even if “the grounds suggested for it in the definition, the texts, the patristic authorities, the historical passages, are all mistakes.”¹¹⁴ As a result, there are many elements of an infallibly defined religious truth, which are open to debate and in which there is legitimate freedom for speculation.

Another aspect of Newman’s view of infallibility that is significant for the role of rational criticism in Catholic faith is that Newman holds that the exercise of infallibility, by either a council or the pope, must be subordinate to revelation as contained in the deposit of faith. In the Apologia, he insists that infallibility must be guided by Scripture and tradition.¹¹⁵ When discussing the limitations of infallibility in the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, he argues that an infallible proposition has no claim on the Catholic believer unless it is referable to the Apostolic depositum (deposit of faith), through the channel of either Scripture or tradition.¹¹⁶ Toward the end of the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, Newman cites a quotation from a pastoral letter of the Swiss bishops (a pastoral that has received the pope’s approbation, according to Newman) on the limitation of the power of the papacy.

He [the pope] is tied up and limited to the divine revelation, and to the truths which that revelation contains. He is tied up and limited by the Creeds, already in existence, and by preceding definitions of the Church. He is tied up and limited by the divine law, and by the constitution of the Church.¹¹⁷

What this statement suggests is that Newman made a distinction between revelation (the deposit of faith) and the church’s authoritative, even infallible, expressions of that revelation. The church is the infallible oracle of God’s revelation, but the church is not completely identified with the Word of God. The consequences of such a distinction for the place of rational criticism within Catholic faith is immensely significant. For if one makes such a distinction, it cannot be claimed that one owes the same type of assent to the teachings of the church, including infallible ones, that one owes to the Word of God. The distinction provides a whole range of areas in which rational criticism can be applied to the concrete teachings of the church, whether they are infallible or not.

Noninfallible Teachings

In the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, Newman also discusses the noninfallible teachings of the church. As a general rule, Newman says, Catholics do have a responsibility to accept the noninfallible doctrines of the church, and he defends this statement on the grounds of the believer’s duty to give obedience to the church.¹¹⁸ However, he argues that this obedience does not make Catholics slaves to the pope.¹¹⁹ When conflicts occur between the church and the state, Newman says that in some cases Catholics should obey the pope and disobey the state, but, in other cases, Catholics should obey the state, even if it means disobeying the pope.¹²⁰ Neither the pope nor the queen can demand absolute obedience. To do so, he states, would be a transgression of the laws of human nature and human society. “I give an absolute obedience to neither.”¹²¹

In the next section of the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, which contains a discussion on conscience, Newman draws out more clearly the implications of these remarks. He writes, “It seems, then, that there are extreme cases in which Conscience may come into collision with the word of a Pope, and is to be followed in spite of that word.”¹²² Newman makes it clear that he is applying this principle only to the noninfallible teachings of the pope. Conscience cannot come into direct conflict with the church’s or the pope’s infallibility. ¹²³ If the pope were to speak against conscience, in the true sense of the word, Newman writes, he would be committing a suicidal act.¹²⁴ On the other hand, if a believer acts against his or her conscience, he or she is in danger of losing one’s soul.¹²⁵ Newman concludes this discussion with his celebrated toast: “Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts, ... I shall drink to the Pope, if you please, still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards.”¹²⁶

What this analysis shows is that, in his understanding of the Catholic believer’s response to the statements of the teaching authority of the church, the magisterium, Newman combines the respectful obedience of faith with a critical consciousness. Infallible statements have a special role to play in the transmission of the Christian message. They are expressions of revealed truths that are guaranteed by the Word of God and the teaching authority of the Catholic Church. The believer also has a responsibility in faith to accept the noninfallible teachings of the church. Yet, if there is a conflict between conscience and a noninfallible teaching, Newman gives the priority to conscience.

However, for Newman, all statements of the magisterium, whether infallible or noninfallible, are open to various forms of rational criticism. He insists that it is within the competence of the Schola Theologorum (schools of theology) to determine the force of conciliar and papal statements, and the exact interpretation of such texts often takes time.¹²⁷ The study of magisterial texts demands willingness to make scientific distinctions and involves the application of the traditional canons of interpretation. Some of the tools of interpretation that Newman mentions include history, Scripture and tradition, the ecclesiastical sense, and a subtle ratiocinative power.¹²⁸ Arthur Burton Calkins points out that in the development of the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, Newman follows such a hermeneutic by first determining the principles to be used in specific cases and then applying them in a rigorous and nuanced manner.¹²⁹

Investigation

One of the specific forms of rational criticism that Newman explicitly maintains is compatible with the assent of Catholic faith is what he calls investigation. Investigation is the rational process of examining the grounds for the truth of a proposition to which we are giving assent. It is the rational act of trying to prove what we already hold to be true.¹³⁰ We are moved to do this for various reasons—to convince someone who disagrees with us on a given point, to ascertain the producible evidence in favor of a proposition, to fulfill what is due to ourselves and to the claims and responsibilities of our own education and social status.¹³¹ What is distinctive about investigation is that throughout the whole process, the believer continues to assent to the proposition he or she is investigating and never doubts its truth.¹³²

In A Grammar of Assent, Newman says that investigation can be compatible with faith, because investigation, unlike inquiry, does not imply doubt.¹³³ Since investigation does not include doubt, the believer can both assent to the realities and truths of revelation and raise questions about them. Catholics, Newman writes, may assent to a doctrine and “without inconsistency investigate its credibility, though they [Catholics] cannot literally inquire about its truth.”¹³⁴ Newman describes investigation as a trial of our intellect and a law of our nature that is necessary for a person’s growth from the childhood to adult stage and for one’s spiritual growth.¹³⁵ He adds that, for educated individuals, investigation into the “argumentative proof of things to which they have given assent, is an obligation, or rather a necessity.”¹³⁶ So, for Newman, investigation is an integral part of the structure of Catholic faith.

Theology

Theology is a form of investigation for Newman. In the Development of Doctrine, he defines theology as the scientific analysis of revealed truth.¹³⁷ Theology is a form of questioning that is compatible with the “fullest and most absolute faith.”¹³⁸ In theology, reason serves faith by handling, examining, explaining, recording, cataloging, and defending the truths of faith. Reason also provides intellectual forms of expression for the truths of faith; elicits what is implicit; compares, measures, and connects revealed truths with one another, forming them into one theological system.¹³⁹ According to Newman, Scripture supports this form of investigation, and Mary provides us with a model of this spirit of inquisitiveness in faith. She “kept these things and pondered them in her heart” (Luke 2:51). Newman adds that Jesus himself does not countenance a blind unthinking faith, what he calls “lightness of mind.”¹⁴⁰ Jesus called on his disciples to use reason and to submit to it.¹⁴¹

Freedom of Thought

Finally, Newman was a strong supporter of one of those elements that is indispensable to the exercise of rational criticism within Catholic faith: freedom of thought. Miller presents a very convincing case for the thesis that Newman was a strong advocate of freedom of thought within the church.¹⁴² One of the factors that enabled Newman to be such a strong advocate of freedom of thought within the church was his trust in the power of truth. He felt that essentially truth could never contradict itself and that, in the apparent conflicts of truth within history, truth would eventually win out.

Newman has a ready formula to handle the apparent conflicts between human truths and the revealed truths of faith. Speaking of the Catholic believer, he writes:

He [the Catholic believer] is sure that nothing shall make him doubt, that if anything seems to be proved by astronomer, or geologist, or chronologist, or antiquarian, or ethnologist, in contradiction to the dogmas of faith, that point will eventually turn out, first, not be proved, or secondly, not contradictory, or thirdly, not contradictory to any thing really revealed, but to something which has been confused with revelation.¹⁴³

Newman’s belief in the power of truth is such that he believes that freedom to pursue the truth should be allowed even if it sometimes results in error. “Error may flourish for a time, but Truth will prevail in the end. The only effect of error ultimately is to promote truth.”¹⁴⁴ He also states that there “is no intellectual triumph of any truth of religion which has not been preceded by a full statement of what can be said against it.”¹⁴⁵ According to Newman, a true faith is secure and confident and does not fear what the other sciences present as truth.

I say, then, he who believes in Revelation which is the prerogative of a Catholic, is not the nervous creature who startles at every sudden sound, and is fluttered by every strange or novel appearance which meets his eyes. He has no sort of apprehension, he laughs at the idea that any thing can be discovered by any other scientific method, which can contradict any of the dogmas of religion.¹⁴⁶

Newman’s faith in the power of truth is such that he can state that the church does not have to put down error by the “arm of force” or the “prohibition of inquiry.”¹⁴⁷ His approach to freedom of thought can be summarized in the often quoted statement “Great minds need elbowroom.... And so indeed do lesser minds, and all minds.”¹⁴⁸

NOTES

GA, 385-86.

GA, 491.

GA, 386. Newman adds here that both attributes need to be united, because it is possible that a “revelation might have been really given, yet given without credentials.”

GA, 388.

GA, 411.

GA, 425.

GA, 427.

GA, 429.

GA, 411. Newman says that his approach is similar to that of Amort, who presented “a new modest, and easy way of demonstrating the Catholic Religion.”

GA, 411.

GA, 413.

GA, 415-16.

GA, 413. Later in A Grammar of Assent, Newman adds, “Christianity is addressed, both as regards its evidences and its contents, to minds which are in the normal condition of human nature, as believing in God and in a future judgment.” GA, 491-92.

GA, 413.

GA, 417-18.

GA, 416.

GA, 389.

GA, 389–408.

GA, 408. In this passage, Newman contrasts the beliefs of natural religion with the term Revelation (capitalized). Here and in a couple of other places in A Grammar of Assent, Newman seems to be using the word Revelation to refer to revealed religion or Christianity. See also GA, 118, 487.

GA, 404.

GA, 431.

GA, 386.

GA, 487.

GA, 423.

John Henry Newman, The Arians of the Fourth Century (London: Rivington, 1833), 88.

GA, 487.

GA,487.

GA, 408, 422-23.

GA, 440-56.

GA, 440; see also 450-52.

GA, 440.

GA, 458-62. Newman discusses the five reasons and explains why each is insufficient.

GA, 464.

GA, 465.

LD, XXX:259. Letter to Ulric Charlton on October 2, 1883.

LD, XXX:207, n. 1. Letter to Lord Emly on April 17, 1883.

GA, 476-86.

GA, 491.

GA, 492.

Mixed, 224. See also William R. Fey, Faith and Doubt: The Unfolding of Newman’s Thought on Certainty (Shepherdstown, WV: Patmos, 1976), 185.

Newman, Theological Papers, 4-5.

John Henry Newman, “Cardinal Newman’s Thesis de Fide and His Proposed Introduction to the French Translation of the University Sermons” (1847), ed. Henry Tristram, in Gregorianum, vol. 18 (1927), Thesis #110, 236.

Newman, “Thesis de Fide,” #110, 236.

Newman, Theological Papers, 37-38, 139.

Mixed, 224-25.

GA, 186-87.

GA, 187.

M. Jamie Ferreira, Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman’s Thought (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 141.

Ferreira, Doubt and Religious Commitment, 144.

Ferreira, Doubt and Religious Commitment, 131-32, 134, and 136.

Ferreira, Doubt and Religious Commitment, 141-44.

Mixed, 195.

Mixed, 215-27.

Mixed, 216. In the same passage, Newman points out that even to accept the possibility of future doubts is incompatible with faith.

Mixed, 217.

Mixed, 201.

Mixed, 215, 220, and 227.

Mixed, 222.

John Henry Newman, The Via Media of the Anglican Church, Illustrated in Lectures, Letters, and Tracts Written between 1830 and 1841, 2 vols. (1837, 1883) (London: Longmans, Green, 1901), I:87. (Hereafter abbreviated VM.)

VM, I:108.

US, 215.

Philip Flanagan, Newman, Faith and the Believer (Westminster, MD: Newman Bookshop, 1946), 59.

Ferreira, Doubt and Religious Commitment, 8.

VM, I:87. In the 1877 edition of the Via Media, Newman amends the statement that doubt is an element of a Christian’s faith by adding a footnote that states, “Faith may follow after doubt, and so far is consistent with it; but the two cannot co-exist.” VM, I:87. In this same edition, Newman also adds a footnote to the statement that doubt is ever our portion in this life. The footnote reads, “Here as before, by doubt of a doctrine is meant a recognition of the logical incompleteness of its proof, not a refusal to pronounce it true. Both Catholics and Anglicans doubt more or less in the former sense, neither of them doubt in the later.” VM, I:108. In the 1871 edition of the University Sermons, Newman amends his statement on doubt in a footnote by stating that by doubt he means “not formal doubt, but a state of mind which recognizes the possibility of doubting.” US, 215.

Apo., 181.

Apo., 227.

Newman, Theological Papers, 6.

GA, 191.

GA, 191. “If seeking includes doubting, and doubting excludes believing, then the Catholic who sets about inquiring, thereby declares that he is not a Catholic. He has already lost faith.”

Mixed, 229.

Mixed, 230.

Ferreira, Doubt and Religious Commitment, 105–6.

Ferreira, Doubt and Religious Commitment, 103.

GA, 228-55.

GA, 255.

GA, 220.

GA, 237-39.

GA, 242.

GA, 227.

Dev., 83.

Apo., 251.

Apo., 239.

John Henry Newman, A Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone’s Recent Expostulation, in Newman and Gladstone: The Vatican Decrees, introduction by Alvan S. Ryan (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), 184.

Newman, Norfolk, 187.

Newman, Norfolk, 192.

100

Newman, Norfolk, 187.

101

Newman, Norfolk, 196.

102

Newman, Norfolk, 196-97.

103

Newman, Norfolk, 150-51.

104

Newman, Norfolk, 154.

105

Newman, Norfolk, 155.

106

Newman, Norfolk, 151.

107

Newman, Norfolk, 151.

108

Newman, Norfolk, 152-53.

109

Newman, Norfolk, 153.

110

Newman, Norfolk, 153.

111

Edward Jeremy Miller, John Henry Newman on the Idea of Church (Shepherdstown, WV: Patmos, 1987), 83-84.

112

Newman, Norfolk, 189.

113

Newman, Norfolk, 188.

114

LD, XXV:309.

115

Apo., 240. “It [infallibility] must refer to the particular Apostolic truth which it is enforcing, or (what is called) defining.”

116

Newman, Norfolk, 190.

117

Newman, Norfolk, 197-98.

118

Newman, Norfolk, 111-12.

119

Newman, Norfolk, 112–17.

120

Newman, Norfolk, 120-23.

121

Newman, Norfolk, 125.

122

Newman, Norfolk, 127.

123

Newman, Norfolk, 134.

124

Newman, Norfolk, 132.

125

Newman, Norfolk, 136-37. Here Newman quotes Cardinal Gousset: “He who acts against his conscience loses his soul.”

126

Newman, Norfolk, 138.

127

Newman, Norfolk, 76.

128

Newman, Norfolk, 77, 153, and 177.

129

Arthur Burton Calkins, “John Henry Newman on Conscience and the Magisterium,” Downside Review 87 (October 1969): 360.

130

GA, 190.

131

GA, 190.

132

GA, 190. “Therefore to set about conducting a proposition is not ipso facto to doubt its truth; we may aim at inferring a proposition, while all the time we assent to it.”

133

GA, 191-92. See also Mixed, 226-27.

134

GA, 192.

135

GA, 192.

136

GA, 192.

137

Dev., 336.

138

Dev., 337.

139

Dev., 336.

140

Dev., 337.

141

Dev., 337.

142

Miller, Newman on Church, 81-98.

143

John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated: I, in Nine Discourses Delivered to the Catholics of Dublin, II, in Occasional Lectures and Essays Addressed to the Members of the Catholic University, edited with preface and introduction by Charles Frederick Harrold (London: Longmans, Green, 1947), 342. (Hereafter abbreviated Idea.)

144

Idea, 352-53.

145

Idea, 350.

146

Idea, 342.

147

Idea, 342. In his sense of the terms, Newman would have been more exact if he had used the term investigation here.

148

Idea, 350.

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