III. The Idea of Dogmatic Theology
Dogmas I, pp. 1–4; Meyrick, Is Dogma a Necessity?; Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, pp. 11–15, 284, 304 ff.; The Word of God and the Word of Man, 229.
III. The Idea of Dogmatic Theology A. The Relation of Dogmas to Dogmatics THE discussion of dogmas naturally leads on to an inquiry as to the relation in which they stand to Dogmatics. The very name
'Dogmatics' suggests a very close relation. It is derived from the singular 'dogma' rather than from the plural 'dogmata,' and as such points to the fact that it deals not merely with certain separate dogmas, but with the dogma of the Church as a whole. The exact relation between dogma and Dogmatics has not always been conceived of in the same way. The most common view is that dogma forms the subject-matter of Dogmatics, so that the latter might be called the science of Christian dogma. Thus it may be said that Dogmatics deals with the doctrinal truth of Scripture in a systematic way, and more particularly with that truth as it is confessed by the Church. It studies the doctrine of the Church as a whole, and considers each article of faith in its relation to the whole. As such it is not only Scriptural, though it must be this first of all, but also bears an ecclesiastical imprint. Schleiermacher's conception of dogma differs from that of the Protestant Church in general, since he does not acknowledge its derivation from Scripture, but agrees with it in its representation of dogma as the subject-matter of Dogmatics.
According to him dogmatic theology is the science of the doctrine professed by a Christian Church at a given moment of its historical development. The Ritschlian view of the relation between dogma and Dogmatics does not differ from that just indicated. Kaftan says: "Die
Dogmatik hat es demnach mit einem gegebenen object zu thun, mit der christlichen Wahrheit, die die Kirche auf grund der goettlichen
Offenbarung glaubt und bekennt." Harnack claims, however, that the Church has not been altogether honest in its representation of the relation between dogmas and Dogmatics. According to him history teaches that dogmas are the product of theology. The Church, however, obscured their real origin, declared them to be revealed truths, and as such made them basic for theology.2 According to Forsyth dogma is "final revelation in germinal statement. It is God's act put as truth," and is therefore a part of God's revelation.
"Doctrine is truth about dogma, dogma expanded … It is secondary theology, or the Church's grasp—as in the creeds. Theology is doctrine in the making. It is tertiary and tentative theology or the Church's reach—as in 1 Pet. 1:18, 19, 20." Dogma is for him the marrow of the gospel, the vital core of revelation, and is therefore found in Scripture. It is the root, out of which doctrine develops through the theological study of the Church. "Theology is tentative doctrine; doctrine is selected theology." This is rather strikingly similar to the view of Barth. Defining dogma (singular) as Church proclamation, so far as it is in real agreement with the Word of God,
Barth regards Dogmatics as the science, not of dogmas, but of dogma, which inquires into the agreement of dogma with the revelation attested in Scripture. It therefore serves to test dogma. He does not believe that dogmas (plural) form the subject-matter of Dogmatics, though their understanding and formulation may be greatly promoted by Dogmatics. Forsyth looks upon dogma as a part, and in fact the vital core, of God's revelation, and Barth comes very close to the same evaluation; so close in fact that he too, like Forsyth, regards dogma as the object of faith. They further agree in denying that dogmas or doctrines should be regarded as objects of faith, and insist on it that these are mere expressions of the faith of the Church.
Both are also of the opinion that the prevalent conception of dogma is that of Protestant Scholasticism, and not that of the Reformers. In the discussion of the historical conception of the Protestant Churches respecting the relation between dogmas and dogmatics attention must be called to several propositions.
1. DOGMAS ARISE OUT OF THE NECESSITIES OF THE
BELIEVING COMMUNITY. Seeberg says in opposition to Harnack:
"Although the form of dogma is the work of theology, its content is derived from the common faith of the Christian Church." This is a welcome correction of Harnack's view that dogmas are the product of theology, but can hardly be considered as a correct designation of the source from which dogmas are derived. It is more in harmony with the Ritschlian position. Rainy is more Reformed in his thinking, when he first points out that doctrines (dogmas) are derived from Scripture, and then says: "I do not think that it is the scientific interest which primarily calls out Christian doctrine; nor is it an obligation to comply with the formal conditions of science, which this activity properly obeys; nor do I think that the scientific impulse has been, historically, the creative force in this department.…
Doctrine is maintained to arise not primarily in obedience to the scientific interest or impulse, but out of the necessities of the believing mind."3
Dogmas cannot be made to order. They cannot be produced by individual theologians, nor by scientific theology in general, and then imposed upon the community of believers from without. Chances are that dogmas so constructed and proposed would not really express the faith of the Church, would not strike a responsive chord in the communal life of believers, and consequently would not be recognized as authoritative. They are formed only in periods of intense spiritual life, of wide-spread and earnest reflection on the truth, and of deep religious experience. It is only when the Church thinks deeply on the truths of Scripture, when under the stress of religious controversies she has learned to see the truth sharply and clearly, and when definite convictions have gradually become the common property of the religious community, and thus a communis opinio is formed,—it is only then that she will be ready to confess, and will feel within herself an irresistible urge to give expression to her faith. Only the truth so confessed really constitutes a confession of faith, is rooted in the life and experience of the Church, and therefore also has a grip on the Church. Only the dogmas that spring
from this living soil can be called in the words of Rainy "the human echo to the divine voice," or "the human response to the divine message."
2. THEOLOGY MAY AND HAS FREQUENTLY SERVED AS AN
AUXILIARY IN THE FORMATION OF DOGMAS. While denying that dogmas are merely the product of theology, we need not close our eyes to the fact that, for their final formulation, the Church was often greatly indebted to theology. It need hardly be said that in the reflective activity of the Christian community some would be far more influential than others; and that, if all other things were equal, those who had special religious training would form the vanguard. As the spiritual leaders of the people, and as the interpreters, the historians, and the systematicians of the Church, they would naturally point the way in the careful formulation of dogmas. And it was but natural that, when the science of theology developed, this should also be pressed into service and become a powerful auxiliary in the process. This could not be otherwise, because it has, in its own field, the special task of reflecting on the truth as it is revealed in the Word of God, and of reproducing this truth in systematic form. Yet it should be borne in mind that the work of theology in this sphere is of a purely formal nature. It does not furnish the subject-matter of the dogmas, but merely helps the Church in forming and defining her dogmas. Naturally, in the measure in which theology took a hand in the formation of dogmas, these assumed a more systematic form than they would otherwise have had.
3. DOGMATIC THEOLOGY FINDS THE NUCLEUS OF ITS
SUBJECT-MATTER IN THE DOGMAS OF THE CHURCH. Though
theology may serve as an auxiliary in the formation of dogmas, this is not its main concern with the dogmas of the Church. These form the nucleus of the material with which it must build and which it must rear into a systematic structure, and will therefore naturally have a determining influence on the texture and the complexion of the system as a whole. They will occupy a very important place in it and lend it a distinctive character. The dogmatician takes his stand in the
confessional teachings of the Church to which he belongs; these form his bias, if you will. It may be objected that this naturally endangers his intellectual liberty, but this is not necessarily the case. As long as he remains a member of that particular Church, it may be assumed that he does this from conviction. And if this is the case, he will naturally regard the dogmas of his Church more as friendly guides, acquainting him with the direction in which he should move, than as hateful fetters that impinge on his liberty. Moreover, it is well to remember that no one is ever entirely unbiased in his scientific work; and that the dogmatician who refuses to be biased by the dogmas of his Church should not pose as its dogmatician. To do so would be ethically reprehensible. We repeat that these dogmas constitute the most important part of the materials which he must use in the construction of his system, and will so enter into the structure of it as to form its nucleus and core, and also its unifying element.
But the theologian cannot limit himself to the dogmas that are contained in the Confession of the Church, for this is by no means an exhaustive expression of its faith. He must utilize all the doctrinal truths that are revealed in the Word of God, and doing that, of course, also draw upon the fruits of other studies, such as Exegesis,
Biblical Theology, History of Doctrines, and others. He may find it profitable to levy contributions from individuals and groups. But whatever elements he incorporates in his system, he must present, not merely as historical data, but as component parts of the structure which he is rearing, and which he regards not merely as an expression of his own belief but as absolutely valid truth. Moreover, he cannot consider these doctrines as bare abstract intellectual formula, and as so many isolated truths, but will have to study and present them as living plants, which have come to development in the course of the centuries and strike their roots deep down into Scriptural soil, and must view them in their grand unity.
Naturally, modern theology, under the influence of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, has a somewhat different conception of the relation between dogmas and dogmatics. Litchtenberger states the position of
Schleiermacher in a single sentence, when he says that, according to the father of modern theology, "Dogmatics describes not doctrines nor facts which have been revealed in a super-natural manner, but experiences of the human soul, or the feelings which the religious soul experiences in its relations with Jesus the Savior." Lobstein represents the Ritschlian position. Says he: "Like dogma, like dogmatics. There obtains between the notion of dogma and the role of dogmatics a necessary and direct relation.… It is clear that a return to the vital principle of the Reformation and the corresponding transformation of the idea of dogma in the evangelical Church involves a parallel modification of the task entrusted to the dogmatician. Dogmatics … is the scientific exposition of the Protestant faith.… Dogmatics creates nothing; it merely formulates the problems whose elements are given to it by the religious experience of the Christian in the presence of the living realities of the gospel. Dogmatics is an experimental and positive science, but it receives its material from faith; rather its material is faith itself with the divine content of faith."2
Is. Van Dijk, a representative of the Ethical Movement in the Netherlands, which reminds one somewhat of both Schleiermacher and Ritschl but seems to owe its greatest debt to Vinet, puts it as follows: "Het dogme is de vrucht der poging om een bepaald moment, een bepaalde relatie van het leven der gemeente in de taal des verstands om te zetten, terwijl de dogmatiek dan is de beschrijving, de omzetting in begrippen van dat leven in zijn geheel."
The objection that this obliterates the distinction between dogmatics and ethics, is met by the remark that, though both describe life, they do not contemplate life in the same sense: … "de dogmatiek beschrijft den grond en den inhoud, deethiek de openbaring en het ideaal van het leven."
B. The Object of Dogmatic Theology. (Its Definition) The question of the object of theology, and therefore also of dogmatic theology, can be considered very appropriately in connection with its
definition. Theology has not always been defined in the same way. A brief consideration of the most important definitions that have been suggested in course of time may be helpful in determining what has been and should be considered as the object of theology.
1. THE CONCEPTION OF THE OBJECT OF DOGMATIC
THEOLOGY IN EARLY PROTESTANT THEOLOGY. Previous to the Reformation there were various ideas respecting the object of Dogmatic Theology. According to Augustine it deals with God, the world, man, and the sacraments. Peter the Lombard shared this view. Others (Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura) regarded the mystical body of Christ, that is, the Church, and still others (Hugo of St. Victor), the redemptive work of God, as the object of Dogmatic
Theology. Thomas Aquinas expressed himself as follows: "Theologia a Deo docetur, Deum docet, et ad Deum ducit" ("Theology is taught by God. teaches God, and leads unto God"). This is more in harmony wth the etymology of the word in so far as it represents God as the object of theology. A considerable number of both Lutheran and Reformed theologians of the post-Reformation period defined theology as the knowledge or science of (concerning) God. Some objected to this on the ground that it is not possible for us to have a perfect knowledge of God on earth. But the men who used this definition were generally quite careful to point out that they did not have in mind the knowledge which God has of Himself (archetypal knowledge), but the knowledge which man has of God in virtue of His Self-revelation, (ectypal knowledge.) They considered such knowledge of God possible, because He revealed Himself. The desire to stress the practical nature, of this science prompted some seventeenth century theologians to define it with reference to its end or purpose rather than with a view to its object. They conceived of it as teaching man the true religion unto salvation, the life for God in Christ, or the service of God that is well-pleasing to Him. These and other, somewhat similar, descriptions are found in the works of Hollaz, Quenstedt, Gerhard. Amesius, Mastricht, and à Marck. In general it may be said, however, that Reformed theologians conceived of theology as the science of (concerning) God. However,
this simple definition frequently received certain complementary additions. It often assumed some such form as the following:
Theology is the science of God and of divine things; or … of God and His relations to the universe; or … of God as He is in Himself and as He is related to all His creatures.
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW CONCEPTION IN MODERN
SUBJECTIVE THEOLOGY. The phenomenalism of Kant had a rather revolutionary effect on the common conception of theology. It limited all theoretical knowledge, scientific or otherwise, to the phenomenal world. This means that according to it man can have no theoretical knowledge of that which transcends human experience, and therefore theology as the science of God is an impossibility. The practical reason is the only reliable guide in religion, and its propositions are not susceptible of rational proof, but must be accepted by faith. God is highly exalted above our observation and experience. We can accept Him and the relations in which He stands to His creatures only by faith, and what is so accepted cannot be constructed into a scientific system. God is an object of faith, and not of science.
The epistemological principles of Kant paved the way for that subjectivism in religion, of which Schleiermacher became the great spokesman. He defined Dogmatics as "the science of the Christian faith," that is, of the contents of the Christian faith. This content does not consist in truths or facts supernaturally revealed, but in religious experiences, primarily under the inspiration of the personality of Jesus, by which man becomes conscious of the super-natural and eternal. The intellectual expressions of the devout feeling, or of Christian experience, which are current in the preaching and teaching of a particular Church, constitute the raw material of theology. And an inquiry into the cause of this experience will naturally lead the mind to God. Ritschlians also define Dogmatics as "the scientific exposition of the Protestant faith." Yet they do not agree with Schleiermacher's conception of the object of Dogmatics, for with respect to his work Lobstein says: "The classical work of the
great theologian is not, to tell the truth, a systematic exposition of the Protestant faith; it is composed of reflections upon the soul of the Christian, upon the different modifications of the religious consciousness of the subject." Ritschlians generally claim greater objectivity, and it sounds somewhat more objective, when the author just quoted says: "Dogmatics … receives its material from faith; rather its material is faith itself with the divine content of faith, that is, the gospel." Yet in the end the Ritschlian view turns out to be just as subjective as that of Schleiermacher, as we shall show in one of the following chapters.
This subjective tendency in course of time gave rise to the definition, so popular in our day, according to which theology is defined as "the science of religion" or, more specifically, as "the science of the Christian religion." In this definition, as it is generally used in modern theology, the word 'religion' is used in the subjective sense, to denote religion as a phenomenon of human life. Moreover, this religion is often conceived of in a very one-sided and unsatisfactory way, and is sometimes represented in a purely naturalistic fashion.
Thus that aspect of human life, which is indicative of man's relation to a divine Being, became the object of theology. This view resulted in an increased emphasis on the study of the history of religion, of the philosophy of religion, and of the psychology of religion.
There are, of course, serious objections to this conception of theology: (a) it divorces theology from its objective foundation in the Word of God, and bases it entirely on subjective experiences which have no normative value; (b) it robs theology of its positive character and reduces it to a purely descriptive science, describing historical and psychological phenomena instead of aiming at absolute truth; and (c) it involuntarily leads to a representation of the Christian religion as merely one of the many religions of the world, differing from them indeed in degree, but not in essence.
Attention should be called to the fact, however, that the definition of theology as the science of religion is sometimes found in the works of
the older Reformed theologians, and is still found in the theological writings of such men of a previous generation as Thornwell, A. A.
Hodge, and Girardeau. But when these men so define theology, they use the term 'religion' in an objective sense, that is, as denoting the divine revelation, which is the standard for the true service of God, the rule of man's religious life, devotion, and worship. So understood, the definition is not exposed to the criticism that was offered. At the same time it is ambiguous, and therefore does not deserve commendation.
3. RECOGNITION OF THE OBJECTIVE CHARACTER OF
DOGMATIC THEOLOGY IN RECENT TIMES. Though some conservative scholars adapted themselves more or less to the use of the new definition, and spoke of theology as the science of religion or of the Christian faith (McPherson), they did not at all mean to indicate thereby that they too regarded man's subjective religion or faith as the object of theology. Some of them evidently chose this definition as an indication of the fact that theology was not limited to the study of just one object, namely, God, but included the study of all the doctrines of religion or of the Christian faith. This means that in their definitions the terms 'religion' and 'faith' did not have a subjective, but an objective connotation.
The greater number of conservative scholars, however, continued to conceive of theology as the science of God, though frequently with the distinct understanding that they did not regard God apart from His creation as the object of theology, but God as related to His creatures. Thus Shedd says: "Theology is a science that is concerned with both the Infinite and the Finite, with both God and the Universe." And A. H. Strong gives the following definition: "Theology is the science of God and of the relations between God and the universe."2 Other well-known theologians, who regard God as the object of theology, and therefore speak of theology, as the science of God, are Hill, Dick, Heppe, Schmid, Dabney, Boyce, Hastie, Orr, and Warfield.
The preceding paragraph makes no mention of Dutch theologians.
This does not mean, however, that their stand differs materially from that of the men just mentioned. They are named separately merely because some of them varied their definition somewhat, just as Charles Hodge did in our own country. This change was, at least in part, prompted by the desire to obviate the difficulty suggested by the consideration that we cannot make God the direct object of our scientific study. Hodge finds the object of theology in the "truths" and "facts" of Scripture, which the theologian must "collect, authenticate, arrange, and exhibit in their natural relation to each other." In Kuyper's estimation this definition is "in the main not incorrect," but both he and Bavinck rightly object to the idea that the theologian must "authenticate" the truths and the facts of Scripture, because this virtually destroys the concept of the ectypal theology, and logically brings the theologian once more under the dominion of a naturalistic science.
Kuyper proceeds on the assumption that God cannot be the direct object of scientific study. In such a study the subject rises superior to the object, and has the power to examine and to comprehend it. But the thinking man is not so related to God, 1 Cor. 2:11. According to Kuyper it is quite essential to distinguish between two kinds of theology, namely: (a) theology as the knowledge of God, of which God is the object, and (b) theology as a science, which finds its object in the divine Self-revelation. The former is the ectypal knowledge of God, contained in Scripture, and adapted to the cognitive faculties of man; while the latter is defined as "that science which has the revealed knowledge of God as the object of its investigation and raises it to sunesis (insight)." By means of this distinction he seeks to establish an organic connection between theology and science in general. Now the question arises, whether this position is equivalent to a denial of the fact that God is the object of theology. On the one hand it certainly seems so, and as a matter of fact Kuyper clearly says that the revealed knowledge of God, and it only, is the object of theology as a science.4 This point even became the subject of a theological debate in the Netherlands. At the same time he also says
that this science would not yet be entitled to the name theology, if it did not deepen our insight in the ectypal knowledge of God. The question arises, whether Kuyper's way of putting things is not merely another way of saying that God is the object of theology as a science only in so far as He has revealed Himself in His Word. Or, to put it in other words, that God is not the direct, though He is the ultimate object of theology; that He is not the immediate object, but the object as mediated through His divine Self-revelation. After all, on his view, theology as a science deals with the Knowledge of God, seeks to appropriate and assimilate its various data, to represent them in their grand unity, and to cast them into a form that satisfies the human consciousness, and can be called theology only in so far as it deepens insight into the knowledge of God. Moreover, it deserves attention (a) that Kuyper asserts that the science of theology admits of no other motive than "to know God or to learn to know Him"; (b) that his denial that God can be the object of human science simply means that we cannot of ourselves attain to a scientific knowledge of God, but are bound to His Self-revelation; (c) that he regards it as a very precarious phenomenon that in theology "no more the reality
God, but the reality religion is the object of investigation.
This view of the matter finds corroboration in the fact that Bavinck considers God as the object of theology, and yet defines Dogmatics as "the scientific system of the knowledge of God"; that Hepp, one of Kuyper's disciples and successors says that Dogmatics "is that part of science that has God for its object, as He can be known through His revelation, or to express it more briefly, that has Scripture for its object";5 and that Honig, one of the earliest disciples of Kuyper, also maintains that both definitions, namely, that theology is the science of God, and that it is the science of the knowledge of God, are good, and that the dispute about this was largely a dispute about words.
Evidently Dr. Warfield too feels that these two do not conflict. He defines theology as "the science which treats of God and of the relations between God and the universe," but also says: "Now the object of theology, as Dr. Kuyper has often justly insisted, is the ectypal knowledge of God." For him this is not equivalent to saying
that the Scriptures constitute the object of theology, for he explicitly says that "The Scriptures, after all, are not the object of theology, but only its source."7
In Germany a reaction arose in recent years against the subjectivism that was introduced into theology by Schleiermacher and resulted in placing man rather than God in the center. There are those who emphasize anew the fact that God is the proper object of theological study. This new tendency finds expression in the two-volume work of Schaeder. This author begins his second volume with these significant words: "Mit Gott hat es die Theologie zu tun; immer und ueberal mit Gott. Jede Frage der Theologie, auch wenn sie sich auf die Welt in Natur und Geschichte oder auf den Menschen und sein
Leben richtet, ist nur unter der Bedingung eine wirklich theologische, dass sie sich im letzten Grunde um Gott dreht." The theology of crisis differs considerably from Schaeder's theocentric theology, and that among other things in breaking more completely and radically with the method of Schleiermacher. While Schaeder makes the Word of God more prominent in his theology than
Schleiermacher, he does not rise superior to the subjectivism of the latter. The theology of crisis on the other hand places the Word of God, that is, God's super-natural revelation, prominently in the foreground, and is therefore also called "the theology of the Word of God." Barth defines the task of Dogmatics as follows: "As a theological discipline, dogmatics is the scientific test to which the Church puts herself regarding the language about God which is peculiar to her." In Credo he expresses himself as follows:
"Dogmatics endeavors to take what is first said to it in the revelation of God's reality, and to think it over again in human thoughts and to say it over again in human speech. To that end dogmatics unfolds and displays those truths in which the truth of God concretely meets us." It deals therefore with the doctrinal material which the Church has derived from God's revelation.
There is really no good reason why we should not continue to speak of theology as the science of (concerning) God. It is, of course,
possible to consider the ectypal knowledge of God as the immediate object of theology, and under certain circumstances it may be desirable to represent it as such; but on the whole it would seem to be preferable to speak of Him, as He has revealed Himself in His
Word, as the real object of theology. This does not imply that the thinking subject can place itself above God as the object, and can of itself elicit from Him knowledge of the divine Being; nor that the human subject can comprehend God and thus attain to a perfect knowledge of Him. In employing the old definition it is assumed: (a) that God has revealed Himself and thus conveyed true knowledge of Himself to man; (b) that man, created in the image of God, is capable of appropriating and apprehending this divine truth; and (c) that man has an urge within him to systematize this knowledge with a view to a better understanding of God and of His relations to His creatures. With Bavinck we may define Dogmatics as "the scientific system of the knowledge of God."
C. Theology as a Science
1. THE SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF THEOLOGY DENIED.
a. The ground for this denial. Theology was once generally recognized as the queen of the sciences, but does not enjoy that distinction today. Duns Scotus already held that theology was not a science in the strict sense of the word, but simply a practical discipline. This view was rather exceptional, however, and did not meet with a great deal of favor. The Scholastics in general stressed the scientific character of theology and treated it as such; and in the theological works of the Reformation and post-Reformation periods it is also fully recognized. It is especially since the end of the eighteenth century that the right of theology to be called a science was called in question, and was even positively denied. This was due in part to Kant's criticism of the faculty of knowledge, according to which it is impossible to obtain any theoretical knowledge of God and of the supersensible in general; and in part to the pretentious
claim of the natural sciences to be the only sciences worthy of the name. This negative attitude was greatly strengthened by Positivism with its notion that each branch of knowledge passes, successively, through three different stages: the theological or fictitious stage, the metaphysical or abstract stage, and the scientific or positive stage.
The man who has reached the final stage has left theology far behind.
Herbert Spencer, the great agnostic, also invariably proceeded on the assumption that theology is outside of the domain of science.
The greatest objection to the scientific status of theology was especially twofold. In the first place theology is devoted to the study of an object that lies beyond the ken of human theoretical knowledge, since it cannot be observed nor subjected to experimental tests. And in the second place it finds its ground of certitude in an authoritative revelation rather than in human reason, the only authority recognized in science. In our day it is quite common to find scientists smiling significantly, when they hear people speak of the science of theology. Harry Elmer Barnes even declares the theologian utterly incompetent to deal with the subjectmatter of his own chosen field of study. Says he: "The new view of matters makes it very evident that the clergyman can no longer pretend to be a competent expert in the way of discovering the nature, will and operations of the new cosmic God. If undertaken and solved at all, this is a problem for the coöperative endeavors of the natural scientist and the cosmic philosopher of the Dewey tradition.
The theologian at best can be only a competent second—or third— hand interpreter of the facts and implications gathered about the cosmos and its laws by specialists in science and philosophy.… But now, when God must be sought, if at all, in terms of the findings of the test-tube, the compound microscope, the interferometer, the radium tube and Einstein's equations, the convential clergyman is rather hopelessly out of place in the premises." There is more than a mere grain of truth in the following words of Macintosh: "Among the empirical sciences theology can find none so poor as to recognize her, much less do her reverence. Moreover, even the world at large,
including hosts of persons who still think of themselves as religious, is coming to share in the contempt of the scientists for theology."2 b. Reaction of theologians to this denial. This widespread denial of scientists and philosophers, re-echoed by large numbers of lesser lights, who popularize the prevailing opinion, did not fail to affect the attitude of theologians and of religious people in general. The reaction on the part of those theologians who accepted the dictum of the scientists, has been especially twofold. Some simply relinquish the claim of theology to the high honor of being scientific, and appear perfectly willing to assign to it a lesser position. Says Macintosh: "Of late, under the stress of much hostile criticism, there has been a strategic retreat, and the definitions generally favored are modest statements to the effect that theology is the intellectual expression of religion."
Others, however, set themselves the task of reconstructing theology in such a manner as to vindicate its time-honored claim to a scientific position. They substituted religious experience, religious faith, or religion in general for God as the object of theology, which means that they turned from the objective to the subjective, from the divine to the human, from the supersensible to certain psychological phenomena, which fall under human observation. They have been seeking ever-increasingly to study and interpret the religious life by the application of the true scientific method, which Macintosh describes as "the method of observation and experiment, of generalization and theoretical explanation." This author adds that, "if theology is to become really scientific, it must be by becoming fundamentally empirical." He does not believe that the methods of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Troeltsch have been successful, but does not on that account abandon all hope. Says he: "Systematic theology is not now and never has been an empirical science. And yet this does not mean that it cannot become a science, and that in the very near future."2 It is rather remarkable that this modern theologian, like Schaeder in Germany, again stresses the fact that not religion but God is the object of theology, but then God as revealed in
religious experience (taking experience in its broadest sense), and in the history of religions.
2. THE POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING THE SCIENTIFIC
CHARACTER OF THEOLOGY.
a. From one point of view it is impossible. In our day many base the right of theology to be called a science on the fact that it is devoted to the study of Christianity or of religion, and therefore deals with historical data or data of experience, which can be studied according to the strictly scientific method of observation and experiment. Since we do not share this conception of theology, we cannot avail ourselves of the ground it affords for maintaining the scientific character of theology. For us the question is, whether it is possible to maintain the scientific status of a theology which aims at the study of God rather than of religion. And the answer one gives to this question will depend on one's conception of science. This means that it will be necessary first of all to come to a clear understanding as to what constitutes a science. Many present day scholars, especially in our country, regard the term 'science' as a proper designation of what are usually called "the natural sciences," and of them only, since they are the only studies that deal with matters that can be observed and that can be tested in the laboratory. The deciding question seems to be, whether a study deals with facts of observation. But the question may be raised, whether this is not a rather arbitrary limitation. Dr.
Harris says that it can be justified only "by reverting to the complete Positivism of Comte, and avowing and maintaining that knowledge is limited to the observation made by the senses." But this is an utterly untenable position, for, says he, "if they do this, they must renounce the important part of their own sciences know by inferences depending for their validity on rational intuitions." They who insist on taking this position will naturally exclude theology from the domain of science, for theology as the science of God does not deal with data given by observation or experience. It does not greatly improve matters to say, as Huxley does: "By science I understand all knowledge which rests upon evidence and reasoning of a like
character to that which claims our ascent to ordinary scientific propositions (italics mine); and if any man is able to make good the assertion that his theology rests upon valid evidence and sound reasoning, then it appears to me that such a theology must take its place as a part of science." Macintosh refers to these words of Huxley on page 25 of his Theology as an Empirical Science, and is inclined to take up the challenge. But from our point of view this would seem to be quite hopeless. We may not lose sight of the fact that the methods of the natural sciences do not apply in the study of theology, nor even in the study of religion. Theology is entitled to its own method, a method determined by the nature of its subject-matter. Dr. Mullins correctly remarks: "It is a false issue when men deal with religion as if it were physics or chemistry or biology, or psychology, or sociology.
There is no necessary conflict between any of these and religion. But when men crave religion and a solution of its problems, then religious criteria must be employed. When modern science offers any other it gives a stone instead of bread, a serpent instead of a fish." b. From another point of view it is possible. The situation is quite different, if 'science' is taken in the sense of the German
'Wissenschaft' or the Dutch 'wetenschap.'
Eisler in his Handwoerterbuch der Philosophie defines Wissenschaft as "systematisiertes Wissen, der Inbegriff zusammengehoeriger. auf ein bestimmtes Gegenstandsgebiet sich bezienhender oder durch den gleichen Gesichtspunkt der Betrachtung verbundener, zu systematischer Einheit methodisch verknupfter, zusammenhaengender Erkenntnisse." According to this definition there is no good reason why we should not regard dogmatic theology as a science. Science is simply systematized knowledge. It is reared on the basis of the common knowledge of mankind. This knowledge may be obtained in various ways, depending on the nature of its object. It may be acquired by observation, by reflection, or by revelation, but must be true knowledge. Experimental tests may and should be applied in the case of the natural sciences, rational tests in the case of the Geisteswissenschaften, and Scriptural tests in the case of theology. The subject-matter of theology can only be given by
revelation, and it is the duty of the theologian to systematize the knowledge so acquired, and to test it rigidly by the analogy of Scripture. If he takes a comprehensive view of the subject-matter, and unifies it, he is dealing with it in a systematic way, and the result of his work is scientific.
Theology has its own distinctive method, but there is after all a great deal which it has in common with the other sciences. If the matter with which theology deals is given by revelation, so is, strictly speaking, also the matter which the other sciences build into a system. Reason cannot be regarded as the source of this matter, but only as the instrument by which it is grasped, analyzed, classified, and systematized. And if the sciences in general employ human reason in the construction of their system of knowledge, so does theology depend on sanctified human reason in its investigation and constructive work. It is true that the element of faith is fundamental in the work of the theologian, but there is not a single scientist who can exclude this from his work altogether. And if theology must leave a great many ultimate questions unsolved, this is true to a large degree also of every other science.
Theology, then, does not move in the sphere of the natural sciences, and therefore does not and cannot apply its methods. It would succeed only in destroying itself by the application of the experimental method. It has far more in common with the so-called
Geisteswissenschaften, a term which Baillie renders "sciences of spirit." It should be borne in mind that theology is not merely a descriptive science, which yields only historical knowledge, but very decidedly a normative science which deals with absolute truth, given by revelation and binding on the conscience. Shedd speaks of it as an absolute science, which is true not only for the human intellect but for all rational intelligence. He also calls it a positive science, to indicate that faith yields real and true knowledge of its object, though it must leave many mysteries unexplained. If others occasionally deny that it is a positive science, they usually mean that it is not a positive science in the Comtian sense of the word.
D. The Encyclopaedic Place of Dogmatics Under this general caption we shall consider the question as to the group to which Dogmatics belongs, and more particularly the relation in which it stands to Apologetics and Ethics.
1. THE GROUP OF STUDIES TO WHICH IT BELONGS. There is very little difference of opinion as to the group of theological studies to which Dogmatics belongs. It is almost invariably classed with the Systematic or, as Kuyper calls it, the Dogmatological group, that is, the group which centers about the dogma of the Church. The most important of the other studies which he includes in this group are
Symbolics, the History of Dogma, Ethics, Apologetics, and Polemics.
Schleiermacher departed from the ordinary classification, however, and classified it under Historical Theology. This was due to the fact that he conceived of Dogmatics as the systematic exposition of the Christian faith at a certain stage of its development, and more specifically as the science of the doctrine confessed by a particular
Christian Church at a certain stage of its historical development.
According to him dogma is characterized by change rather than by stability. It is the product of the constantly changing religious experience of a Church, having real value and significance only in so far as it is in agreement with the immediate believing Christian consciousness. In accordance with this conception of dogma, dogmatic theology is represented as "the science of the connected presentation of the doctrine prevailing in a Christian Church association at a given period." As an expression of ever varying religious life, Dogmatics in his estimation is not an expression of absolute truth, and is therefore entirely wanting in permanent authority.
This view of Schleiermacher, however, did not find great favor in the theological world, not even among liberal theologians. Rothe and Dorner are the most notable scholars who followed Schleiermacher in this respect. Raebiger correctly says: "According to the place assigned to it by Schleiermacher, dogmatics must be a history of
doctrine current at the present time." Even George Burman Foster raises objections to it in the following words: "But historical theology is concerned with facts, not with truth; with what was, not with what ought to be. And indeed this limitation of the dogmatic task to historical theology has not been adhered to, even by these evangelical theologians themselves, least of all by Schleiermacher, who is the great champion of the conception."2
2. THE RELATION OF DOGMATICS TO APOLOGETICS. There
never has been and is not now general agreement as to the exact nature of Apologetics, and as a result opinions differ very much with respect to the place which it should occupy in the encyclopaedia of theology. Some have given it a place in the exegetical group of theological studies, and others have incorporated it with Practical
Theology. It has been more customary, however, to regard it as a part of Systematic Theology, either as an introductory study or as something in the nature of an adjunct to Dogmatics.
In this matter also, as in many others, Schleiermacher struck out on an entirely new path, when he declared it to be an introductory discipline, basic to the whole system of theology, which as such should precede even the exegetical group of theological studies. He represents Apologetics as the science that is devoted to the vindication of Christianity as a whole by means of rational argumentation. It was rather inconsistent on the part of Schleiermacher to take this position, since he considered it imperative to exclude philosophy from theology, and yet in this way laid an elaborate philosophical basis for theology. Apologetics became a sort of Fundamentallehr, and has since his day sometimes been called Fundamental Theology.
This view of Schleiermacher was adopted by Ebrard, a Reformed theologian. Beattie also favors it in his work on Apologetics. Says he:
"It may be best, therefore, to give Apologetics a place of its own, and to regard it as an introductory discipline to the whole system of theology.… This, no doubt, is the best view." Dr. Warfield shares this
view of Apologetics. He conceives of it as "the department of theology which establishes the constitutive and regulative principles of theology as a science; and in establishing these it establishes all the details which are derived from them by the succeeding departments, in their sound explication and systematization." He says further that it is the business of Apologetics "to establish the truth of Christianity as the absolute religion directly only as a whole, and its details only indirectly." With a direct appeal to reason for its evidences,
Apologetics is supposed to deal with the great topics of God, religion, revelation, Christianity, and the Bible. The remaining departments of theology can only build on the foundation laid by Apologetics.
According to Bruce it thus becomes a sort of mediator between philosophy and theology and a mediator, in which he does not have the greatest confidence. He himself conceives of Apologetics as "a preparer of the way of faith, an aid to faith against doubts whencesoever arising, especially such as are engendered by philosophy and science."2 This speaking of it as "a preparer of the way of faith" would seem to bring his view of it more or less in line with the conception of Schleiermacher, however different it may be in other respects. The position of Henry B. Smith is expressed in these words: "It is best to regard it as historico-philosophical
Dogmatics. It is the whole contents and substance of the Christian faith, arrayed for defense and for (defensive) assault."
Kuyper, Bavinck, and Hepp have serious objections to the Schleiermacherian conception of Apologetics, and their strictures would seem to be fully warranted. They register especially the following objections: (a) While, as the name indicates, Apologetics is properly a defensive science, it is on this view changed into a constructive science, which aims at the construction of an independent system from philosophical data and by means of purely rational arguments. (b) According to this view Apologetics precedes the four departments of theology as a sort of Prinzipienlehre, and theology must build on a foundation laid by human reason. (c)
Theology is thus robbed of its independent character, and derives its
principles from a system that is the product of pure reason; all of which conflicts with the nature of theology.
These theologians assign to it a place in connection with the study of Dogmatics, and ascribe to it the task of vindicating the Christian system of the truth over against the attacks of false philosophy and science. They try to avoid overrating Apologetics on the one hand, and underrating it on the other hand. They do not want to neglect it, nor to consider it as a study of purely practical significance, but assign to it the modest and yet important task of defending the dogma of the Church against all attacks, and of doing this in a constructive and principial manner, and not merely in an occasional way as determined by current controversies.
3. THE RELATION OF DOGMATICS TO ETHICS. No branch of theological study is so closely related to Dogmatics as Christian or Theological Ethics. Before and during the Reformation many theologians incorporated Christian Ethics in their Dogmatics, and several theologians of the seventeenth century treat it in a second part after Dogmatics. Yet even at that early time some began to discuss it as a separate discipline, in order to do more justice to it than could be done in a week on Dogmatics. According to Geesink,
Daneau was the first to publish a Reformed Ethics in 1577. This separation of Dogmatics and Ethics did not at once become general, though theologians began to make a sharper distinction in their works between the dogmatical and the ethical material, the credenda and the facienda. Gradually, however, the practice of separating the two increased. While this was in itself quite harmless, it did have disastrous results, since Ethics gradually drifted from its religious moorings. Under the influence of the philosophy of the eighteenth century. Christian Ethics was gradually robbed of its theological character. In the philosophy of Kant religion was based on Ethics rather than Ethics on religion. And in the writings of such men as Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Rothe, Herrmann, and Troeltsch morality is divorced from religion and acquires an autonomous character.
Such writers as Dorner, Wuttke, and Luthardt, again linked Ethics up with the Christian religion, but in a rather unsatisfactory way. As a matter of fact there is no principial difference between Dogmatics and Ethics. The principia of the one are also those of the other. It is no wonder therefore that some have again sought a closer connection between the two. In the previous century Raymond included a separate system of Ethics in his Systematic Theology. George
Burman Foster in his Christianity in its Modern Expression did the same thing. And such Reformed theologians as Charles Hodge and Robert L.
Dabney incorporated a discussion of the ten commandments in their works on Systematic Theology. Kuyper considers it desirable to treat Theological Ethics separately, because
(a) ethical truths have come to development in a different way than dogmatical truths; and (b) the study of each of these has its own requirements and methods. Dogmatics discusses the articula fidei. and Ethics the praecepta decalogi. And Geesink says that it is generally admitted that the separation of Dogmatics and Ethics is incorrect, even though their separate treatment is commendable. It is undoubtedly true that the two should always be regarded and studied as standing in the closest relation to each other. The truth revealed in the Word of God calls for a life that is in harmony with it. The two are essentially inseparable.
QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY: Is it correct to speak of dogmas as the fruit of theology? What does history teach as to the function of theology in the formation of dogmas? Is the subjectmatter of Dogmatics limited to what is found in the Creeds? How does Barth conceive of dogma, dogmas, and the Creeds? How do
Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Wobbermin, Troeltsch, Schaeder, and Barth differ in their conception of Dogmatics? What objection is there to making Dogmatics a purely descriptive science? Does it still remain theology, if it consistently makes religion or the Christian faith its object? On what grounds is it denied that theology is a science? How can its scientific character be maintained? Is it important that this should be done? Do Barth and Brunner regard Dogmatics as a science?
REFERENCES: Bavinck, Geref. Dogm. I, pp. 1–41; Kuyper, Enc. der Heil. Godgel, I, pp. 241–283; Hepp, De Waarde van het Dogma; id.,
Geref. Apologetiek; Honig, Dogmatiek en Ethiek; Van Dijk, Begrip en Methode der Dogm., pp. 7–51; Hodge Syst. Theol. I, pp. 1–22; Shedd,
Dogm. Theol. I, pp. 3–58; Strong, Syst. Theol., pp. 1–24; McPherson, Christian Dogm., pp. 1–9, Schmid, Doct. Theol. of the Ev. Luth.
Church, pp. 25–35; Girardeau, Discussions of Theol. Questions, pp.
1–44; Hastie, Theol. as a Science, pp. 1–58; Lobstein, An Introd. to Prot. Dogm., pp. 1–96; H. B. Smith, Introd. to Chr. Theol., pp. 49–
59; Meyrick, Is Dogma a Necessity?; Kaftan, Dogm., pp. 1–9; id., The Truth of the Chr. Ref I; Haering, The Chr. Faith I, pp. 1–31; Hall,
Dogm. Theol., Introduction, pp. 10–32; Warfield, Introd. to Beattie's Apologetics, pp. 19–32; id., The Idea of Syst. Theol. and Apologetics, both in Studies in Theology; C. W. Hodge, The Idea of Dogm. Theol.,
Princeton Review, Jan. 1908, pp. 52–82; Raebiger, Theol. Enc. II, pp. 330–338, 362–367; Beattie, Apologetics, pp. 48–48–67; Barth,
The Doct. of the Word of God, pp. 1–10, 284–335; Geeseink, Geref.
Ethiek I, pp. 149–184.