V. The Principium Cognoscendi Internum
QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY: How do Roman Catholics defend the authority of tradition alongside of that of Scripture? Why do they attach so much importance to apostolic tradition? Is it right to limit the normative authority of Scripture to those parts which teach the doctrine of salvation? Has Scripture any authority in matters of science and art? Does the Bible in any way testify to its necessity? How does modern liberal theology judge of this? Do not the many contradictory interpretations of Scripture disprove its perspicuity? How do the oral law of the Jews and the oral tradition of the Roman Catholics compare? Is the appeal of the Mystics to 2 Cor.
3:6 to disprove the sufficiency of Scripture, tenable?
REFERENCES: Bavinck, Geref. Dogm. I, pp. 476–527; Kuyper, Dict.
Dogm., De Sacra Scriptura II, pp. 190–241; Ladd, The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture II, pp. 514–610; Cunningham, Theol. Lectures, pp.
459–516; D. S. Schaff, Our Fathers' Faith and Ours, pp. 147–170; Wilmers, Handbook of the Chr. Rel., pp. 120–151; Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. Kirche, pp. 9–31; id., Dogm. des deutschen Protestantismus im zechzehnten Jahrhundert I, pp. 211–257; Mead, Supernatural
Revelation, pp. 318–355; Schmid, Doct. Theol. of the Ev. Luth.
Church, pp. 61–101; Gravemeijer, Leesboek over de Geref.
Geloofsleer I, pp. 244–267; Burgess, The Protestant Faith, pp. 59– 94.
V. The Principium Cognoscendi Internum The knowledge of God presupposes, not only that God has revealed
Himself, but also that man is capable, either constitutionally or by virtue of a gracious work of renewal, of receiving and appropriating this revelation. If man did not have that ability, the divine revelation, while existing objectively, would forever remain foreign to him and
exercise no influence on his life. All knowledge, and consequently also all science, requires a certain correspondence between subject and object. This means that alongside of the principium cognoscendi externum there must also be a principium cognoscendi internum, a principium in man which enables him to discern and to appropriate
God's special revelation. Naturally, the absolute Idealist would not subscribe to this position, for according to him knowledge not only calls for a correspondence between subject and object, but for the identity of the two. Even the Theology of Crisis feels constrained to put the matter in a different form. It recognizes no objectively existing revelation; nor does it believe in a point of contact in the life of man for special revelation. Revelation simply is not revelation until it is brought home to the heart of man in faith. But this faith is not a permanent receptivity in man for an objectively existing revelation, but is given in and with the revelation itself whenever
God reveals Himself. This means that on this point the distinction between the subjective and the objective is really cancelled.
Reformed theology, however, recognizes the existence of a principium cognoscendi internum, and the question naturally arises.
What is the nature of this principium? In the course of history several answers have been given to that question. The organ by which man judges and appropriates the revelation of God was sought successively: (A) in the human understanding, (B) in speculative reason, (C) in devout feeling, and (D) in the moral consciousness. We shall consider these successively.
A. The Human Understanding Some sought the principium cognoscendi internum in the human understanding in general, as distinguished from what is more specifically called the speculative reason. It was their persistent attempt to establish the truth on historico-apologetical grounds.
1. HISTORICAL STATEMENT OF THIS POSITION.
a. Up to the time of the Reformation. In view of the fact that the revelation of God in Christ does not minister to the pride of man but rather humbles him, it naturally met with a great deal of opposition and was repeatedly in need of defense. This was necessary even in the apostolic age, so that the Bible itself contains apologetical elements. In the second century the Apologetes defended the truth of Christianity over against Jews and Gentiles, and gave an account of the grounds on which it rests. They did not take their starting point in doubt or in any so-called neutrality, but in an unwavering faith and called attention to the superior excellency of Christianity, to the redemptive message of special revelation, to the antiquity and unity, the simplicity and sublimity, the fulness and many-sidedness of Scripture, to prophecies and miracles, and to the testimony of the Church and the blessings of the gospel. These arguments were repeated in the writings of the anti Gnostic fathers and in later theology, though they were sometimes treated in other connections and did not always assume the same character.
Scholasticism also took its starting point in faith, but by its attempt to change religious truths into concepts of reason effected a separation of natural and supernatural truths that was detrimental to both. According to them the former could be proved by reason, but the latter could only be accepted on authority. In the former scientific certainty was possible, but in the latter it was not possible to rise above the level of faith. The order which they usually followed, though with several variations, was the following: first they sought to demonstrate by rational argumentation the truths of natural revelation; then they proved in a similar way the possibility, necessity, and reality of special revelation; and finally they urged reason, on the mere ground of the existence of a special revelation, to accept its contents blindly in faith. The motives that were adduced for belief in a special revelation were generally called motiva credibilitatis. The argument that Scripture as a divine revelation rests on the testimony of the Church was developed by the Roman
Catholics especially after the Reformation. All such arguments, however, though they may demonstrate the reasonableness of
accepting Scripture as the Word of God, can only produce a fides humana and never a fides divina. Even among the Roman Catholics some are willing to admit this, though on the whole they have a high opinion of Apologetics. The general Roman Catholic representation as to the way in which man arrives at the knowledge of God's revelation is the following: (1) Supernatural revelation rises on the basis of natural revelation, and can only be appropriated successively by degrees. (2) By various proofs man in his natural state is first led to the natural theology, which constitutes the preamble of faith. At this point even science is possible, since the proofs are demonstrative. Ordinarily we cannot yet speak of faith at this stage.
(3) He who has reached this point is now, through the motives of credibility, of which the Church is the most important, put in a position to see and admit the trustworthiness of God's revelation and the reasonableness of faith. (4) After man has thus been led to the fides humana (human faith) he is raised by an infused grace to the supernatural order and prepares himself by good works for the vision of God. b. After the Reformation. The Protestants took a different position, but did not always consistently maintain it. The Reformers did not take their starting point in human reason, but in the Christian faith, and stressed the fact that this faith rests only on divine authority and is wrought by the Holy Spirit. Protestant theologians did not always remain true to this principle, but frequently returned to the doctrine of a natural theology, and to the historical proofs for the truth of revelation. Under the influence of Cartesius, who took his starting point in doubt, Rationalism gradually found its way into the Churches, and the historico-apologetical method came into vogue. It clearly came to the foreground in Supranaturalism. In the application of this method the purpose was to prove that God has revealed Himself in a supernatural way rather than to exhibit the reasonableness of revelation. And in order to prove this, attention was called to the miracles of Scripture, to the fulfilment of prophecies, often of a very special character, to the striking correspondence of the various parts of Scripture, to the moral
influence of the gospel, and so on. The purpose was to lead men to faith by such intellectual considerations. It cannot be denied that some who followed this method did it with the best intentions. Some of their works are even now mentioned with honor in Christian
Apologetics, though the method now followed and the arguments adduced are quite different. Yet this method was bound to lead to Rationalism. Even Butler could pen a sentence like the following:
"For though natural religion is the foundation and principal part of Christianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it." Reason is accorded the right to examine and explain the credentials of revelation, and is thus placed above Scripture. For that reason this method stands condemned from a theological point of view.
Moreover, its untenableness clearly appeared from the history of Supranaturalism itself, and from the sharp criticism of Rousseau and Lessing, of Kant and Schleiermacher. For a long time even Reformed authors continued to speak of natural theology as fundamental theology, but in many Reformed circles it is entirely discredited at present.
2. EVALUATION OF THIS POSITION. As intimated in the preceding, the historico-apologetical method does not meet with approval from a theological point of view, because it underrates both religious truth and faith. Religious truth is not like some theorem of science, and faith is not purely intellectual insight into some result of scientific investigation. Baillie calls attention to the fact that this whole method of reasoning is called in question today. It also does scant justice to the Christian religion. The Word of God presupposes the darkness and error of the natural man, and would therefore contradict itself, if it submitted itself to the judgment of that man. It would thereby acknowledge one as judge whom it had first disqualified. Finally, this method does not lead to the desired result.
In the beginning of the previous century miracles and prophecies could serve as proofs, but in the present day they themselves require proof.
This does not mean, however, that Apologetics is devoid of all real value. It may undoubtedly serve a useful purpose in some respects, but cannot, without forfeiting its theological character, precede faith nor prove the truth of revelation a priorily. It presupposes in its votaries a believing acceptance of the truth. A threefold value may be ascribed to it: (a) It compels theology to give an account of its contents and of the grounds on which it rests, and thus promotes theological self-consciousness, (b) It makes the Christian conscious of the fact that he need not feel embarrassed in the presence of the enemy, but finds support in nature and history, in science and art, and in the heart and conscience of every man. (c) Though it cannot of itself bring any man to the acknowledgment of the truth by compelling proofs, it may, like the ministry of the Word, give him a profound impression of the truth, which he cannot easily shake off.
In actual practice, however. Apologetics has often moved in the wrong direction, (a) It has divorced itself from faith, assuming a place outside of above, and preceding theology, and has thereby laid claim to an authority to which it is not entitled, (b) It has separated faith and knowledge in such a way as to cause religious truth to rest wholly or in part on purely intellectual grounds, something that is entirely contrary to the nature of that truth. (c) The result was that it cherished exaggerated expectations with reference to its scientific labors, as if it could change the heart through the intellect, and by means of sound reasoning could cultivate piety.
B. Speculative Reason The position of those who regarded speculative reason as the organ by which to discern, and judge, and appropriate religious truth, did not differ essentially from those who ascribed these functions to the human understanding in general. The one as well as the other made human reason the arbiter of the truth as well as its appropriating organ. Both belong to that broader category generally known as Rationalism. And one of the fundamental assumptions of Rationalism, says Paterson is, "that the mind has been restricted to
the use of its natural powers in the discovery and appropriation of religious and moral truth. The notion is rejected that at any stage of the process the mind has been aided by an immediate action upon it of the Divine Spirit, as the result of which it is enabled to take possession of truth that would otherwise lie beyond its ken and grasp." At the same time they who exalted speculative reason to the place of honor presented a system that was far more profound and comprehensive than that of vulgar Rationalism, that is, the Rationalism of the Wolffian type. They made speculative reason not only the norm and the necessary faculty for the reception of the truth, but even regarded it as the source of the truth, and by so doing broke the more effectively with the idea of a special divine revelation.
1. HISTORICAL STATEMENT OF THIS POSITION. The vulgar Rationalism of the eighteenth century, represented by Deism and the Wolffian school of philosophy, finally yielded to the critical onslaughts of Rousseau and Lessing, of Kant and Schleiermacher.
The superficial structure which it reared was swept from its foundation. With Kant and Schleiermacher the autonomy of the subject began. At first the reaction went so far as to discount the objective world. According to Kant man cannot know noumena or the essence of things, but knows merely phenomena, and even these only in the forms which the thinking subject imposes on them. The subject thus produces the form of the phenomenal world. Fichte went a step farther and denied the existence of an objective world, in distinction from the subject. In his opinion the world of external things exists only in the one universal mind and is the product of this mind. At first Schleiermacher also assumed this standpoint. In course of time it was felt, however, that there must be something that has objective reality and therefore normative value. That consideration led to the so-called restauration, in which the attempt was made to get back to the objective, while retaining the same subjective starting point. Hegel was the great representative of this tendency. He raised the subjective, ethical Idealism of Fichte to an objective, logical Idealism, and substituted for the idea of being that of becoming. In his system of thought the whole world became a
process, a development of the logical idea, in which all being is simply represented as thought. In that evolution religion also has its place. It, too, is pure thought or knowledge, namely, the knowledge which the Absolute has of itself in forms of the imagination. It is clothed in forms and symbols, or pictorial representations, of which only speculative reason can fathom the deep significance. According to Hegel it is the task of philosophy to rid the dogmas of religion of their historical forms, which are after all mere husks, and to discover and elucidate the idea, which is the precious hidden kernel. Thus the great truths of Christianity, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, of the incarnation, of the atonement, and others, not only became objects of philosophical speculation, but in their essential nature and ideal form really became the fruits of this speculation. Apart from Scripture and every other authority, these truths were represented as necessary thoughts of reason, and were therefore shown to be highly reasonable. The real proof for the truths of religion was found in the fact that they presented themselves to the mind as necessary thoughts. This was in harmony with the fundamental principle of Hegel: "All that is rational is real." Whatever one thought with logical necessity and proved to be a coherent part of the whole system of truth, was regarded as true. Logical necessity of thought or coherence was thus made the standard of truth in matters of religion.
This method was applied in theology by Daub, Marheineke, Strauss, Vatke, Weisse, Biedermann, and others, though not always to the same degree, nor with the same result. It also found some favor among the followers of Schleiermacher, the father of modern theology, who shared the subjective starting point of Hegel, though he took position in the affections rather than in reason.
2. EVALUATION OF THIS POSITION. They who regard speculative reason as the criterion of religious truth are wedded to the speculative method in appropriating and judging this truth. This method undoubtedly has an advantage over the historicoapologetical method. Supranaturalism pretended to be able to demonstrate the dogmas of religion so clearly as to silence all objections. It made a determined effort to give a definite and clear
representation of the truth, so that the reasonableness of it could at once be seen. But its sharp distinctions led to an intellectualism in which truth was divorced from life. The speculative method broke with this demand for clearness, and recognized the deep sense of the dogmata, and the mysterious elements in religion. Moreover, it emphasized the fact that religion occupies a unique place in human life, and therefore demands a corresponding organ in human nature.
Hegel found this in speculative reason, and Schleiermacher, in the feelings. Both were mistaken, but nevertheless called attention to an important matter, when they stressed the necessity of a proper organ for religion, a matter that is of the greatest importance for the study of theology, and is therefore entitled to grateful recognition.
But the speculative method did not stop at the thought that thinking and being necessarily correspond to each other; it proceeded to the identification of the two. This is the fundamental error of speculative philosophy. The great question is, Do we think a thing because it exists, or does it exist because we necessarily think it. Speculative philosophy claims the latter, but without any warrant. At this point
Hegel took an impossible leap. The existence of a thing does not follow from the fact that we think it, for existence is not an emanation of thought, but rests on an act of power. It is true that God thought things eternally, but He brought the things which existed ideally into real existence only by a creative act. We can only reflect on what God thought long before and has creatively brought to our consciousness in the existing world of reality. If we reject all that comes to us from without, we retain only a vague principle without any content, from which nothing can be derived.
Notwithstanding its high pretensions and its, ostensibly, good intentions, the speculative method did not succeed in changing the despised doctrines of the Christian religion into a philosophical system of universal truth, quite acceptable to the world. The word of the cross remained foolishness to them that perish. It broke away from the objective basis of God's revelation, and therefore could not succeed in constructing a real system of theology.
C. Devout Feeling or Religious Intuition A third position with respect to the principium cognoscendi internum of theology, is that of those who find the organ by which religious truth is acquired and discerned in devout feeling or religious intuition. Schleiermacher is generally recognized as the father of this view. This conception of the internal or subjective principle of knowledge in theology has this in common with that of Hegel, that it does not involve any preliminary assumption as to the derivation of the subject-matter from revelation. But in distinction from those who championed the speculative method and virtually changed theology into philosophy, the advocates of this method are inclined to banish all philosophy from theology. They are like the speculative philosophers and theologians, however, in their failure to distinguish between the norm or criterion and the source of religious truth. Since they recognize their own subjective feelings as the source of this truth, the question for them is not so much a question of the appropriation, as of the appraisal, of religious truth or, to express it in a different way, a question of recognizing it as religious truth.
Their special characteristic is that they seek religious certitude in a religious-empirical way. Devout feeling is the criterion of religious truth, and the test applied to it is the test of experience.
1. HISTORICAL STATEMENT OF THE POSITION. When both of the preceding methods led to no result, many theologians took refuge in religious experience and sought support in it for the certainty and truth of Christianity. It is particularly in the application of this method that the influence of Schleiermacher is felt. He and his followers had the laudable desire to restore theology to honor again, and they attempted to accomplish this by taking position in the believing consciousness. In answer to the question, What prompts us to accept the truths of Christianity? the advocates of this method do not appeal to historical or rational proofs, nor to the authority of Scripture or of the Church, but to the experience of salvation in the heart of the sinner. Schleiermacher wants the theologian to start with the data given in the confession of a particular Church, and by these
data he means, not so much the doctrines that are formulated in the Creeds, as the living and effectual beliefs, which are voiced in the preaching and teaching of the Church. Then these doctrines or beliefs must be traced to their original source, which is not found in Scripture, but in the devout feeling which results from the relation of the soul to Jesus Christ. And, finally, they must be reproduced in a systematized form in the light of the fact that they are the reflex of distinctly pious feelings. This means that the doctrines are derived from pious or religious feelings, and also find in these the ground of their certitude. It is only in the light of such feelings that their truly religious character stands out.
Frank, one of the outstanding theologians of the Erlangen school of theology, is also one of the most representative advocates of this theory. His system already marks a real advance upon that of Schleiermacher, since he does not start from a general state of feeling, but from the specific experience of regeneration. In his work on The System of the Christian Certainty he seeks the answer to this question: What leads man to depend on the objective factors of salvation, such as God, Christ, Scripture, and others, and to accept
Scripture as the Word of God? And his answer is that this is not due to historical or rational proofs, nor to the authority of Scripture, of the Church, or of tradition, but only to the experience of regeneration. The Christian certainty of which he speaks is not the assurance of salvation, but the assurance respecting the reality of the truth. Christian certitude, in the sense of certainty respecting the truth, finds its basis, according to Frank, in the Christian life, that is, in the believer's moral and spiritual experience. The Christian knows that a mighty change has taken place in his life, and from this experience of regeneration he infers the whole content of Christian truth. This truth arranges itself in three groups around the experience of regeneration. (a) There are truths which are immediately involved in that experience, such as the reality of sin, of judgment, and of future perfection (immanent and central truths) (b)
Then there are truths which must be assumed, in order to explain the new condition, such as the reality of a personal God, the existence of
God as triune, and the redemption wrought by the God-man (transcendent truths). (c) Finally, these lead right on to the means by which the preceding agents work, such as the Church, the Word of God, the sacraments, miracles, revelation, and inspiration (transeunt truths). This answer of Frank undoubtedly contains an important truth, since regeneration is indeed necessary, in order to see the Kingdom of God. But the manner in which he elaborates his thought is very dubious, and this is probably the necessary result of his subjective standpoint. He does not consistently work out a single thought, but constantly confuses the manner in which religious truths are derived, and the manner in which certainty respecting these is obtained. Since his work is entitled The System of the Christian Certainty, it raises the expectation that the author simply desires to show how the believer reaches Christian certitude. But in that case he should have limited himself to the task of elucidating the origin and nature of Christian certainty, and should not in addition have discussed the contents of the religious consciousness. Then he would not have given us a system of the objects to which this certainty pertains; and yet this is exactly what he does, when he derives all religious truths from the experience of regeneration.
2. EVALUATION OF THIS POSITION. There are many objections to this starting point and method. (a) Regeneration and all other experiences of the Christian are always connected with the objective factors of the Church, the Scriptures, and so on, while Frank divorces the two. (b) In his second work, The System of the Christian Truth, he himself gives precedence to these objective factors, and thus recognizes their priority. For that very reason he should have maintained this order throughout his system. (c) The method in which he derives the objective dogmata from the certainty of the Christian, is one that does not fit in theology. It is borrowed from speculative philosophy, which derives religious truth from the necessity of logical coherence. (d) This method goes contrary to all religious experience. No Christian ever obtained certainty respecting objective truths in the manner described by Frank. Scarcely anyone has adopted his method. And even among those who have adopted it
in a modified form there is a difference of opinion as to the significance of experience for the principia of theology. The application of this method carries with it a threefold danger. (a) It easily leads into the danger of forming a wrong conception of religious experience, and of expecting from it what it cannot yield.
While it is possible to experience certain emotions, such as those of penitence, fear, hope, and so on, it is not possible to experience historical facts. (b) It really makes it impossible for uneducated
Christians to obtain knowledge and certainty respecting the historical facts of Christianity, since these can only be deduced from experience by an elaborate process of reasoning. (c) It is apt to rob historical Christianity ever increasingly of its real significance.
Experience is loaded down with a burden which it cannot bear. The truth of Christianity cannot rest on it as a final ground. And the consciousness of this may easily lead to a reduction of the burden by divorcing the contents of faith from all historical facts and limiting it to religious and ethical experiences.
D. The Moral Consciousness Finally, there is still another view of the norm of religious truth, and of the manner in which we come to recognize and acknowledge it as such, a view that is somewhat akin to the preceding, but which, in distinction from the preceding, with its emotional appeal, stresses the ethical element in religion. It is a view that finds its roots in the moralism of Kant, and that became popular in theology through the influence of the Neo-Kantianism of Ritschl and his followers. It makes the moral consciousness the real judge of religious truth. The real emphasis in this view is not on emotional experience, but on ethical self-maintenance. The great and determinative question is, whether a certain truth satisfies the moral requirements of the heart or the conscience, and thus answers to a real practical need. Hence the method applied by its advocates is called ethical-psychological or ethical-practical.
1. HISTORICAL STATEMENT OF THE POSITION. If the
immediately preceding method connects up with Schleiermacher, this method finds its main support in Kant. For its adherents
Christianity in general is not so much a doctrine that must be demonstrated and accepted as true, nor a historical fact that calls for proof, but a religious and ethical power that addresses itself to the heart and the conscience of man. According to them Christianity cannot be made acceptable to all men without distinction, but only to those who have a proper moral disposition, a feeling of dissatisfaction, a sense of the good, a desire for redemption, and so on. When Christianity comes in contact with such men, it commends itself to their hearts and consciences as divine truth without any reasoning or further proof. It satisfies their religious needs, answers to their higher aspirations, reconciles them with themselves, brings them peace, comfort, and salvation, and thus proves itself to be the consolation and the wisdom of God.
This kind of argumentation did not begin with Kant. Tertullian already appealed to the testimony which the soul involuntarily gives to Christ. The Apologetes pointed out that the heathen religions of their day were not able to satisfy the religious needs of man, nor to foster a truly ethical life. Duns Scotus called attention to the moral influence of God's revelation and to its sufficiency in enabling man to reach his destiny. Both Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians sought to prove the truth of the Christian religion by pointing to its operation and influence on the intellectual, moral, social, and political life of individuals and nations. Pascal and Vinet especially brought this method to honor, but did not yet place it in opposition to historical argumentation. The former even admitted the great value of historical proofs, though he did not assign to them their usual place; and the latter did not despise them, though he regarded them as inferior to the moral and religious proof. In later years this method was adopted by Astie, Pressencé, Secretan, de la Saussaye, and others, who generally neglected and sometimes even disdained historical proofs.
However, the influence of Kant was of great significance for this method. According to him the theoretical reason necessarily yields three ideas, namely, those of God, freedom, and immortality. These three are therefore general. It does not assure us, however, that there are corresponding realities, nor enlighten us as to the nature of these realities. The corresponding realities are demanded, however, by the practical reason with its categorical imperative. This clearly testifies to the existence of a moral order, and demands that this order shall finally triumph over the natural order. This being so, it naturally follows that man must be free, that there must be a future life in which the moral will be really triumphant, and that there must be a highest Judge to punish vice and reward virtue. Only that view of the world is true that answers to our inner life and satisfies our moral needs.
When the insufficiency of the speculative method appeared, there was a tendency to go back to Kant. In theology Kantianism was reintroduced especially by Ritschl and Lipsius, though these men differed from Kant in several particulars. It is especially in the school of Ritschl that the ethico-psychological method is brought into prominence. This school regards Christianity as a historical phenomenon, but especially as a religious and ethical power of the greatest significance for the heart and conscience of man. Ritschl finds in religion especially two elements: on the one hand that of dependence on God, and on the other, that of spiritual freedom or supremacy over nature, which, in the estimation of Ritschl, is its main element. The Christian religion gives answer to the question, how man as a free moral being, who is yet hemmed in by nature and in many ways dependent on it, can maintain his freedom and rise superior to nature. And the answer is that man can gain the mastery over nature through communion with God in Christ and by making
God's end his own, that is, by seeking the Kingdom of God in a life for God, motivated by love. In this practical power of Christianity
Ritschl finds the real proof for the truth of the revelation of God in Christ and of the Christian religion. It is not a theoretical, but a practical proof. Like Schleiermacher, he too would banish all
metaphysics from theology. In science theoretical proofs apply, but in religion only judgments of value. As a matter of fact, however, neither one of the two succeeded in excluding philosophy. Moreover,
Kaftan, one of the most prominent and one of the ablest followers of Ritschl, stressed the fact that judgments of value cannot be divorced from theoretical judgments of being.
2. EVALUATION OF THIS POSITION. This and the immediately preceding method undoubtedly deserve to be preferred above the historical and speculative methods. The method now under consideration does not regard religion merely as a doctrine to be proved, nor as a condition of the subject to be analyzed intellectually, as the first two methods do respectively. It looks upon the Christian religion as a historical, objective power that answers to the moral needs of man, and finds in this its proof and justification.
Nevertheless, there are serious objections to this method. (a) Though a religion that does not satisfy the religious and ethical life, that offers no comfort in sorrow and death, and does not give strength unto the battles of life, is not worthy of the name of religion; yet the fact that the Christian religion does do this, is no absolute proof of its truth, since there are other religions which also give a certain degree of satisfaction in this respect. (b) It is dangerous to make the truth of Christianity dependent on judgments of value. There would be no great objection, if it were only intended to stress the fact that a dogma must always have religious and ethical value, or that intellectual reasoning can never give us perfect certainty respecting religious truths, while this can be obtained by experiencing the religious values expressed by the dogmas. In that case the subjective evaluation would presuppose the objective reality of the religious truths and would only serve as a means to obtain certainty respecting that reality. Then the value of a thing would not be represented as the ground of its existence, but would simply enable us to acknowledge it subjectively. In the system of Ritschl it is quite different, however, since the judgments of value are divorced from all metaphysics. (c) Moreover, in this way we can never reach objectivity. The needs that find satisfaction in the Christian faith are
virtually created by that same faith through the work of the ministry.
Hence the question arises, whether those needs are real in the life of man, or have merely been awakened artificially and are therefore purely imaginary. In other words, the question of the truth of the Christian religion remains.
QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY: What is the difference between a fides humana and a fides divina? Can we be satisfied with historical certainty in theology? How can the transition from the historico-apologetical, to the speculative, method be explained? Is subjectivism, which makes the human reason or human experience the source of Christian truth, compatible with absolute certainty?
Can absolute Idealism ever lead to a satisfying Christian certitude? Is the test of experience and the pragmatic test ever applied to the truth in Scripture? What makes these tests so popular in the present day?
What more objective test does Troeltsch recommend? How should we judge of the psychological approach to religion, as exhibited in Horton's A Psychological Approach to Theology? Does the position taken by Baillie in his Our Knowledge of God differ materially from that of Schleiermacher?
REFERENCES: Bavinck, Geref. Dogm. I, pp. 528–602; Miley, Syst.
Theol., I, pp. 34–47; Macintosh, Theol. as an Emp. Science, pp. 7– 26; Dorner, System of Chr. Doct., I, pp. 58–168; Girardeau,
Discussions of Theol. Questions, pp. 73–125; Paterson, The Rule of Faith, pp. 92–173; Kaftan, The Truth of the Chr. Rel., I. pp. 230–316;
Frank, The System of the Chr. Certainty; Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion, pp. 174–339; Heffern, Apology and Polemic in the N. T.;
Wenley, Contemporary Theology and Theism, pp. 11–124; Schaeder, Theozentrische Theologie, Vol. I and II, pp. 1–55; Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology; Baillie, Our Knowledge of God;
Dickey, Revelation and Response; Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology.
E. Faith, the Proper Principium Internum
Under the influence of Schleiermacher most theologians have come to the conclusion that religion is a unique phenomenon in human life, and can only be understood in a manner corresponding to its nature. By assuming this position theology takes its starting point in the subject, but should not, simply for that reason, be accused of subjectivism. No science has another starting point, since the objective world exists for us only as it is reflected in our consciousness. There must always be a principium internum that answers to the principium externum. Moreover, Christian theology from the very beginning took its starting point in the believing subject, was born of faith, and was guided and controlled by the rule: per fidem ad intellectum. And this is also entirely in harmony with Scripture, which speaks not only of a revelation of God outside of us, but also of an inner illumination of the Holy Spirit. If the accusation of subjectivism could be lodged against this starting point with any degree of justice, it could also be urged against all science, against theology as a whole, and even against Scripture itself. Such an accusation is warranted only, however, when the subjective condition absolutely necessary for the knowledge of a thing is made the source of that knowledge. An organ by which we take cognizance of the objective world round about us, is not the source from which that world proceeds.
1. THE NAME OF THE PRINCIPIUM COGNOSCENDI INTERNUM.
The principium internum is usually called faith in Scripture. Other terms are also used, such as regeneration, John 3:3; 1 Cor. 2:12, 14, purity of heart, Matt. 5:8, love to the will of God, John 7:17, and the Spirit of God, 1 Cor. 2:13. For several reasons, however, the term faith deserves preference. (a) It is the term that stands out prominently in Scripture. (b) It directs attention at once to the conscious life, and thus involves a recognition of the fact that all the knowledge of man is mediated by his consciousness. And (c) it indicates better than any other name the close connection between religious knowledge and all other knowledge of man. In general it may be said that we obtain knowledge in no other way in religion than we do in the other sciences. We should remember that faith is
not a new organ of science. Men sometimes speak of believing and knowing as opposites, but in such cases they use the word 'believe' in the weak sense of having an opinion for which the proper evidence is lacking. The word 'faith' has a far more profound meaning, however.
It is frequently used to denote the positive knowledge that does not rest on external evidence nor on logical demonstration, but on an immediate and direct insight. In that sense it can ever be said to be fundamental to all the sciences. Intuitive knowledge and immediate insight occupy an important place in human life. There is not a single field of endeavor, nor a single phase of life in which we can get along without it.
2. DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF FAITH. The
correspondence between general and religious knowledge should not cause us to lose sight of the existing difference. There is a very important difference between faith in the sense of immediate certainty and faith in the religious sense. In the Christian religion faith has a unique significance, as the following points will show. (a)
In the New Testament it denotes a religious relation of man to God, and includes not only a certain knowledge, that is, an assured knowledge, but also a heartful trust in God, a complete surrender to Him, and a personal appropriation of the promises of the gospel. (b)
While the faith we exercise in connection with the external world, for instance with respect to the reliability of our senses, the pertinency of the laws of thought, and so on, rests on our own inner observation,
Christian faith is directed to that which is invisible and cannot be observed, Heb. 11:1. (c) Faith in the religious sense is distinguished from that in the sense of immediate certainty in this that it rests on the insight of others rather than on our own. We are made acquainted with the grace of God in Jesus Christ through the testimony of prophets and apostles. (d) Finally, Christian faith differs from faith as immediate certainty also in the fact that it does not arise spontaneously in human nature. While it is perfectly human, and may even be called the restoration of human nature, it grates on the pride of the natural man and arouses hostility in his heart. God is not only its object, but also its author. Barth and Brunner go so far as
to call God, rather than man, the subject of faith. While they also speak of it as man's response to the divine revelation, they really regard it as that in which God completes His revelation. The revelation itself gives birth to the response. As long as it does not do this, there is no revelation.
According to Scripture this faith carries its own certainty with it. It does this, not because it is so firm and certain in itself, but because it rests on the testimony and the promises of God. It makes the invisible blessings of salvation just as certain for man, yea even more certain, than his own insight or any scientific proof can ever make anything. Scripture represents certainty as one of the characteristics of faith. Alongside of the certainty of science we have, therefore, the certainty of faith, practically demonstrated in the believing Church, in its martyrs and steadfast confessors, and theoretically professed and developed in Christian theology. It is a certainty that is unwavering and indestructible. But this faith does not necessarily involve the truth of that which is believed. There is a great difference between subjective certainty and objective truth. In this respect everything depends on the grounds on which faith rests.
F. The Ground of Faith By faith we accept the testimony of God as it is contained in Scripture. But now the question arises, How do we know that that testimony is true, and therefore perfectly reliable? What is the ground on which our faith in the Word of God rests? Or, perhaps better still, By what means is the conviction respecting the truth of the special revelation of God wrought in our hearts? In answer to these questions Reformed theologians point to the testimony of the Holy Spirit. It is this subject that calls for a brief discussion in this concluding chapter.
1. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TESTIMONIUM SPIRITUS SANCTI IN
THE CHURCH. It was admitted from the earliest Christian centuries on that none of the intellectual or historical proofs adduced for the
truth of the Christian religion provide an adequate assurance. While they may lead to a fides humana, divine grace is necessary to engender faith in the heart. Augustine was the first one of the Church
Fathers who clearly saw and taught the absolute necessity of inward grace for the acceptance of Scripture as the Word of God. It is true that he also attached great value to the testimony of the Church as a motivum credibilitatis, but he did not regard this as the last and deepest ground of faith. Theoretically, even the Church of Rome held that only the Holy Spirit can give one absolute certainty respecting the truth of revelation, but in practice there was a tendency to replace the testimony of the Holy Spirit by the testimony of the Church.
The Reformers consciously and deliberately placed testimony of the Holy Spirit in the foreground. They derived their certainty respecting the truth of the divine revelation from the work of the Spirit of God in the hearts of believers. They took position against the Church of Rome with its undue emphasis on the testimony of the Church, and also against the Anabaptists and other Mystics, who revealed a tendency to divorce the testimony of the Holy Spirit from the external testimony contained in Scripture. Calvin was the first one to give a detailed exposition of the doctrine of the testimony of the Holy
Spirit. Since his day this doctrine is quite generally accepted by both Lutheran and Reformed theologians. Of late, however, it has suffered eclipse. This is due in part to the fact that many confuse the testimony of the Holy Spirit with the argument from experience, which is so popular in many circles today, and in part, to the mystical conception which some have of the testimony of the Holy Spirit, in connection with the widespread aversion to the supernatural. It is not unnecessary therefore to indicate precisely what is meant with the testimony of the Holy Spirit.
We should bear in mind, that the particular work of the Holy Spirit described by that name does not stand by itself, but is connected with the whole work of the Holy Spirit in the application of the redemption wrought in Christ. The Spirit renews the sinner, not only
in his being, but also in his consciousness. He removes the spiritual darkness of the understanding and illumines the heart, so that the glory of God in Christ is clearly seen. It is only in virtue of the special operation of the Holy Spirit that man confesses Jesus Christ as Lord,
1 Cor. 12:3. The work of the Holy Spirit enables him to accept the revelation of God in Christ, to appropriate the blessings of salvation, and to attain to the assurance of faith. And the testimony of the Holy
Spirit is merely a special aspect of His more general work in the sphere of redemption. For that reason the two should never be dissociated.
2. MISTAKEN NOTIONS OF THE TESTIMONIUM SPIRITUS
SANCTI. There are especially two views of the testimony of the Holy Spirit against which we must be on our guard. a. That it brings a new revelation. The Mystics conceived of it as an inner revelation to the effect that the Bible is the Word of God. This was evidently the conception which Strauss had of it, for he maintained that, when Protestants accepted the doctrine of the testimonium Spiritus Sancti, they virtually adopted the principle of Mysticism. He interpreted it as the communication of a new truth, namely, that the Bible is really the Word of God. If this interpretation were correct, his assertion would be justified, for then the Christian would indeed be receiving a new revelation through the testimony of the Holy Spirit, just as the prophets did in the days of old. This revelation would then, of course, call for a new attestation, and so on ad infinitum. Such a conception of the testimony of the Holy Spirit makes our belief in Scripture as the Word of God dependent on this new revelation, and naturally involves a denial of its autopistia. The older Protestant theologians never had such a conception of the testimony of the Holy Spirit. They all stressed the autopistia of Scripture and were strongly opposed to the mysticism of the Anabaptists. Even the somewhat related representation, that we must conceive of the testimony of the Holy Spirit as an influence producing in believers a blind or unfounded conviction that the Bible is the Word of God, proved unacceptable to them. Faith is a
conviction founded on a testimony, which in the absence of proper evidence does not make its appearance. b. That it is identical with the argument from experience. The testimony of the Holy Spirit should not be confused, as is often done, with the testimony of experience. The Holy Spirit does indeed work in believers the experience of salvation in Christ, which cannot be explained apart from Scripture, but is wrought through the instrumentality of the Word, and therefore implicitly testifies to the fact that the Bible is of divine origin. This is an inference, in which we conclude, from an experience which we regard as divine, that the Bible, through which the experience is wrought in us, is the inspired
Word of God. This argument has been elaborated, though not in the same form, by such theologians as Frank, Koestlin, Ihmels, Stearns, and many others. In itself it is perfectly legitimate and is not devoid of evidential value, but it is something quite different from the testimony of the Holy Spirit. They who identify the two do not distinguish properly between the efficient cause of faith and the motives for faith. The testimony of experience may certainly be a motive for faith, but just as certainly cannot be the origin of it, since it already presupposes faith. The testimony of the Holy Spirit, on the other hand, is the causa efficiens of faith. Without it all the motives for faith would have no convincing power. Moreover, the testimony of experience respecting Scripture is no objective testimony of God, but simply the testimony of our own heart respecting the Scriptures.
Finally, it has the character of a mere inference, or may even be said to involve more than one inference, since it concludes from a certain experience to Scripture as its origin, and from the fact that this experience is wrought through to the instrumentality of the revealed
Word to the fact that this revelation is indeed the Word of God. It does not, therefore, have the character of an immediate testimony of the Holy Spirit. And because the testimony of experience is entirely subjective, the faith that is founded on it rests, in the last analysis, on the inner experience of the soul rather than on the objective testimony of God in His Word, which is after all the ground of all
Christian certitude.
3. CORRECT VIEW OF THE TESTIMONIUM SPIRITUS SANCTI.
Calvin absolutely rejects the idea that the authority of Scripture rests on the testimony of the Church, as well as some other erroneous views. He finally says: "Let it therefore be held as fixed, that those who are inwardly taught by the Holy Spirit acquiesce implicitly in Scripture; that Scripture, carrying its own evidence along with it, deigns not to submit to proofs and arguments, but owes the full conviction with which we ought to receive it to the testimony of the Spirit. Enlightened by Him, we no longer believe, either on our own judgment or that of others, that the Scriptures are from God; but, in a way superior to human judgment, feel perfectly assured—as much so as if we beheld the divine image visibly impressed on it—that it came to us, by the instrumentality of men, from the very mouth of God." The Testimony of the Holy Spirit is simply the work of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the sinner, by which he removes the blindness of sin, so that the erstwhile blind man, who had no eyes for the sublime character of the Word of God, now clearly sees and appreciates the marks of its divine nature, and receives immediate certainty respecting the divine origin of Scripture. Just as one who has an eye for the beauties of architecture, in gazing up into the dome of the St. Peter's Church at Rome, at once recognizes it as the production of a great artist, so the believer in the study of Scripture discovers in it at once the earmarks of the divine. The redeemed soul beholds God as the author of Scripture and rests on its testimony with childlike faith, with a fides divina. It is exactly the characteristic mark of such faith that it rests on a testimony of God. while a fides humana merely rests on a human testimony or on rational arguments. Of course, rational arguments may be adduced for the divine origin of Scripture, but these are powerless to convince the unrenewed man. The Christian believes the Bible to be the very Word of God in the last analysis on the testimony which God Himself gives respecting this matter in His Word, and recognizes that Word as divine by means of the testimony of God in his heart. The testimony of the Holy Spirit is therefore, strictly speaking, not so much the final ground of faith, but rather the means of faith. The final ground of faith is Scripture only, or better still, the authority of God which is
impressed upon the believer in the testimony of Scripture. The ground of faith is identical with its contents, and cannot be separated from it. But the testimony of the Holy Spirit is the moving cause of faith. We believe Scripture, not because of, but through the testimony of the Holy Spirit.
QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY: In how many different senses is the word 'faith' used? How do faith and knowledge compare in the estimation of Locke, and in that of Kant? What do the Ritschlians mean when they speak of "faith-knowledge"? Is faith a matter of the intellect, of the will, of the emotions, or of all three combined? How does Calvin work out the doctrine of the testimony of the Holy
Spirit? What is the difference between the testimonium Spiritus Sancti generale and speciale? Does the testimony of the Holy Spirit apply to the different parts of the Bible separately?
REFERENCES: Bavinck, Geref. Dogm. I, pp. 603–670; Kuyper, Enc. der Heil. Godgel., II, pp. 501–511; Hodge, Syst. Theol., II, pp. 69–86;
Wisse, Geloof en Wetenschap, pp. 41–212; Foster, Studies in Theol., Proleg., pp. 74–246; Hall, Dogm. Theol., Introd., pp. 84–141; Frank,
The System of Chr. Certainty; Stearns, The Evidence of Chr.
Experience; Ihmels, Centralfragen der Dogm., pp. 1–21, 134–165; Kaftan, The Truth of the Chr. Rel., II; Hepp, Testimonium Spiritus
Sancti, Generale; C. W. Hodge, Witness of the Holy Spirit, Princeton Review, Vol. II, p. 41 ff.
SELECT LITERATURE
I. General Works on Introduction
Barth, Dogmatik I. Prolegomena, Muenchen, 1927; The Doctrine of the Word of God, New York, 1936.
Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek I., Kampen, 1906.
Foster, Studies in Theology, Prolegomena, Cincinnati, 1891.
Girardeau, Discussions of Theological Questions, Richmond, Va., 1905.
Hall, Dogmatic Theology I., Introduction to Dogmatic Theology, New York, 1907.
Ihmels, Centralfragen der Dogmatik in der Gegenwart, Leipzig, 1921.
Kaftan, The Truth of the Christian Religion, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1894.
Lobstein, An Introduction to Protestant Dogmatics, Chicago, 1910.
Mackay, A Preface to Christian Theology, New York, 1941.
Smith, Introduction to Christian Theology, New York, 1882.
Ten Broeke, A Constructive Basis for Theology, London, 1914.
Van Dijk, Begrip en Methode der Dogmatiek, Utrecht, 1877.
Weidner, Introduction to Dogmatic Theology, Chicago, 1895.
II. Dogmas, Creeds, and Authority in Religion Allen, Freedom in the Church, London, 1907.
Dreyer, Undogmatisches Christentum, Berlin, 1901.
Forsyth, Theology in Church and State, London, 1915.
Harris, Creeds or no Creeds, New York, 1927.
Hepp, De Waarde van het Dogma, Kampen, 1920.
Hospers, The Reformed Principles of Authority, Grand Rapids, 1924.
Lamont, The Church and the Creeds, Boston, 1923.
Leckie, Authority in Religion, Edinburgh, 1909.
Meyrick, Is Dogma a Necessity? London, 1883.
Miller, The Utility and Importance of Creeds and Confessions, Philadelphia.
Paterson, The Rule of Faith, London, 1914.
Patton, Fundamental Christianity, New York, 1926.
Sabatier, Religions of Authority, New York, 1904; Outlines of a Philosophy or Religion Stewart, Creeds and Churches, London, 1916.
III. Theology and Theological Encyclopaedias Bavinck, Kenenis en Leven, Kampen, 1922.
Cave, Introduction to Theology and Its Literature, Edinburgh, 1896.
Hagenbach, Encyclopaedie und Methodologie der theologischen Wissenschaften, Leipzig, 1889.
Hastie, Theology as Science, Glasgow, 1899.
Hodge, C. W., The Significance of the Reformed Theology Today, Princeton.
Honig, Dogmatiek en Ethiek, Kampen, 1930.
Kuyper, Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, vol. II, Amsterdam, 1894. Translated by Dr. H. De Vries.
Marshall, Theology and Truth, London, 1906.
Raebiger, Theological Encyclopaedia, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1884.
Ten Broeke, A Constructive Basis for Theology, London, 1914.
Warfield, The Idea of Systematic Theology; and Task and Method of Systematic Theology, in Studies in Theology, New York, 1932.
IV. Religion, Philosophy of Religion, and Apologetics Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion, New York, 1928.
Beattie, Apologetics, Richmond, Va., 1903.
Bruce, Apologetics, New York, 1922.
Caldecott, The Philosophy of Religion, London, 1901.
Edwards, The Philosophy of Religion, New York, 1924.
Galloway, The Philosophy of Religion, New York, 1921.
Hepp, Gereformeerde Apologetiek, Kampen, 1922.
Lidgett, The Christian Religion, London, 1907.
Kellogg, A Handbook of Comparative Religion, Philadelphia, 1899.
Menzies, History of Religion, New York, 1895.
Ormond, The Philosophy of Religion, Princeton, 1922.
Patton, Fundamental Christianity, New York, 1926.
Puenjer, History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion, Edinburgh, 1887.
Sabatier, Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, New York.
Smith, Apologetics, New York, 1882.
Warfield, Apologetics (in Studies in Theology), New York, 1932.
Wright, A Student's Philosophy of Religion, New York, 1925.
V. Revelation and Inspiration Baillie and Martin, Revelation, New York, 1937.
Bannerman, Inspiration of the Scriptures, Edinburgh, 1865.
Bavinck, Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring, Kampen, 1908.
Daubanton, De Theopneustie der Heilige Schrit.
Dickie, Revelation and Response, New York, 1938.
Engelder, Reason or Revelation, St. Louis, 1941.
Ewald, Revelation, Its Nature and Record, Edinburgh, 1884.
Fisher, Nature and Method of Revelation, London, 1890.
Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, New York, 1938.
Girardeau, Discussions of Theological Questions, Richmond, Va., 1905.
Given, Revelation, Inspiration, and the Canon, Edinburgh, 1881.
Honig, Is de Bijbel op Bovennatuurlijke Wijze Geinspireerd? Baarn, 1909.
Kuyper, De Hedendaagsche Schriftcritiek, Amsterdam, 1881.
Ladd, The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture, 2 vols., New York, 1883.
Lee, The Inspiration of Scripture, New York, 1857.
Lewis, A Philosophy of the Christian Religion, New York, 1940.
MacGregor, The Revelation and the Record, Edinburgh, 1893.
M'Intosh, Is Christ Infallible and is the Bible True? Edinburgh, 1901.
Orr, Revelation and Inspiration, New York, 1910.
Warfield, Revelation and Inspiration, New York, 1927.
VI. History of Theological Study Boardman, A History of New England Theology, 1899.
Briggs, History of the Study of Theology, 2 vols., New York, 1916.
Burggraaf, The Rise and Development of Liberal Theology in America, New York, 1928.
Foster, A History of New England Theology, New York, 1907.
Frank, Geschichte und Critik der neucren Theologie, Leipzig, 1898.
Gruetzmacher, Textbuch zur systematischen Theologie, Leipzig, 1923.
Haroutunian, Piety Versus Moralism, New York, 1932.
Heppe, Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus in sechzehnten Jahrhundert, 3 vols., Gotha, 1857.
Lichtenberger, History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century, Edinburgh, 1899.
McGiffert, Protestant Thought Before Kant, New York, 1911; A History of Christian Thought, New York, 1932, 2 vols.
Moore, History of Christian Thought Since Kant, New York, 1922.
Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology in Germany Since Kant, London, 1890.
Randall, The Making of the Modern Mind, New York, 1926.
Scholten, De Leer der Hervornde Kerk, Vol. I, Leiden, 1870.
Schweizer, Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche, Zuerich, 1844, 2 vols.
Storr, The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century, New York, 1913.
Walker, The Theology and Theologians of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1888.
Workman, Christian Thought to the Reformation.
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