5. Our Experience of Consciousness
Chapter Five
OUR EXPERIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Are We More Than Matter?
I was the first detective to arrive at the murder scene. The responding patrol officers carefully guided me through the Gelder residence, pointing out the location of bullet casings and important items of evidence. Approximately ninety minutes prior to my arrival, neighbors heard gunshots and called the police.
When the first officers made it to the residence, the front door was ajar and Ryan Gelder’s lifeless body could be seen in the entry hall of the modest house. Ryan was six years old and today was his birthday. His father, Ted Gelder, shot Ryan in the forehead after murdering Ryan’s grandmother and shooting Ryan’s mother, Teresa, in the arm. Ted then shot himself in the head. The murder-suicide resulted in four victims, with only one surviving.
Ted was estranged from Teresa and upset he wasn’t allowed to see Ryan on his birthday. Based on their custodial arrangement, Teresa was not obligated to share Ryan with Ted on this special day, and Ted grew more and more upset with Teresa as the afternoon progressed. He called several times, interrupting Teresa’s efforts to bake Ryan’s birthday cake. Every year she baked a cake from scratch, and she had just finished frosting this year’s version when Ted burst into the house in a rage.
Ted killed his son and his mother-in-law, then shot Teresa in the arm. Ted blamed Teresa for the state of their marriage and the miserable nature of his own life following their separation. He then killed himself in front of her.
As the other detectives and investigative personnel began to arrive at the murder scene, I prepared myself for their reaction. I knew the case would be difficult for some of them. It’s not every day you see a victim this young murdered in such a brutal way—and by his own father. I observed three separate reactions from the investigators who stood over Ryan’s body.
One of them, Cynthia Moulton, was a relatively new officer, recently assigned to the crime scene investigation detail. It was her responsibility to photograph the scene and carefully collect the pertinent pieces of physical evidence. She had a five-year-old boy of her own and reacted emotionally the moment she saw Ryan. She did her best to perform her duties, but eventually she retreated from the house and told her sergeant to call for a replacement. She couldn’t bear the sight of Ryan’s body nor understand how a parent could do such a thing. She grieved the fact Ryan had died so young.
As Cynthia walked back to her CSI vehicle, several of the seasoned detectives began to joke about her reaction. In fact, many of these older detectives started to jest about Ted’s accuracy (given the small target Ryan presented) and made a number of inappropriate jokes while standing beside the murder victims.
I’d seen this kind of reaction at other murder scenes; for many people, dark humor of this nature is a survival mechanism. Those who take these scenes too seriously will ultimately drive themselves crazy; those who learn to brush them aside with some form of humor—even inappropriately dark humor—typically do better. I wasn’t comfortable with either approach.
As a theist, I embraced a third response, grounded in my conclusions as a Christian. I rejected the idea Ryan’s life had been terminated completely by his father. If, as humans, we are nothing more than physical bodies and brains, Ryan’s murder necessitated the kinds of coping responses I observed: some who grieve, some who joke. If, on the other hand, we are more than purely physical creatures—a combination of brain and mind, body and soul—we might find a way to respond to Ryan’s physical death differently.
This particular crime scene was difficult to navigate, particularly as I tried to interview Teresa, the one surviving victim who had lost her mother and child in a moment of terror. I did my best to make sure my composure toward Teresa was not compromised by the horrific nature of this crime scene. I recognized the difference between the material and nonmaterial Ryan, and I was confident Ryan, as a nonmaterial soul, was still alive.
The nonphysical identity of Ryan, if it truly exists, is impossible to explain from within the physical limits of the material universe. If we stay “in the room” of the universe to create Ryan from scratch, the only ingredients available to us are matter, space, and time. The only instruments available are the laws of physics and chemistry and the steady influence of environmental conditions.
As a result, we would expect Ryan to be nothing more than a physical, material being. Just like Ryan’s birthday cake, made from scratch with the ingredients available to Teresa in her kitchen, Ryan is simply the product of the ingredients and processes available in the universe: matter, chemistry, and physics.
Ryan, along with the rest of us, seem to be more than this, however. Humans have material brains, but we also appear to have nonmaterial minds. We are conscious beings, and our minds (and potentially our nonmaterial identities) are difficult to explain from the purely physical processes available “inside the room.”
For those committed to staying “inside the room” of the natural universe, “there is, in short, no such thing as non-material substance, or soul, or spirit, nor any aspect of human nature which, in principal, elude explanation in purely physical terms. The mind is, paradoxical as it may sound, entirely material.”1
THE POWER OF REASONABLE INFERENCES
Cold-Case Approach:
When detectives are searching for a suspect in a crime, we often employ a process called abductive reasoning, also known as “inferring to the most reasonable explanation.” We begin this process by establishing two E lists: a list of the evidences in the room and a list of possible explanations for these evidences.
We then examine the explanatory strength of each explanation to see which one best accounts for the evidence we are trying to explain. One explanation will emerge as the most reasonable, given its feasibility, simplicity, depth, logical consistency, and explanatory superiority. (I’ve written more about this in Cold-Case Christianity.)
Some suspects or explanations are simply unreasonable compared to others, and as we investigate the strengths and weaknesses of each suspect or explanation, we eventually arrive at the most reasonable conclusion. This same process of reasoning can be employed as we examine the evidence of human consciousness and the best explanation for its existence. We’ll need to begin by filling out our first E list: the list of evidences related to the existence and nature of the mind.
The Evidence “In the Room”:
OUR COMMON-SENSE EXPERIENCE OF “MIND”
A Tool for the Call-Out Bag:
As you read this book, you’re probably aware of your own thoughts related to its contents—your feelings, sensations, ideas, and desires resulting from what you’ve read so far. You are having a conscious experience.
Consciousness poses one of the most difficult conundrums for philosophers and scientists. As philosopher David Chalmers lamented, “Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is far from clear how to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from lumpy gray matter?”2
While we are certainly aware of our mental lives as humans, scientists and philosophers have been unable to reconcile the precise relationship between our nonmaterial minds and our physical brains. Are they one and the same? What is the causal relationship between the two? If we acknowledge the distinct existence of nonmaterial minds, how do we account for this dual nonphysical reality? How can we get a nonmaterial mind from physical matter?
A simple law of logic, known as the law of identity, can help us answer the most important question in this series of questions: “Are our minds identical to our brains?” The law of identity is rather simple: if two things share every attribute, they are the same thing, as described in this simple equation:
A = A
In this type of equation, the object on one side of the equal sign is identical to the object on the other side of the equation if they have the exact same qualities or properties. If this is true, we can say they have an identity relationship.
Sometimes this is obvious. Let’s consider, for example, Ted Gelder, the suspect in Ryan’s murder. Begin with this simple identity equation:
This equation seems rather self-evident. But Ted has been accused of killing Ryan. A new equation is now under consideration as we examine the identity of Ryan’s killer:
An important question will be asked at the criminal trial: Is Ted Gelder guilty of Ryan Gelder’s murder (is the object on one side of the equation identical to the object on the other side of the equation)?
If Ted is Ryan’s killer, this equation will demonstrate an identity relationship. All the qualities and properties of Ted Gelder (his physical appearance, relationship to the victim, behaviors prior to and throughout the commission of the crime, etc.) will be identical to the qualities and properties of Ryan Gelder’s killer.
When considering whether we have nonmaterial minds (as well as physical brains), a similar equation must be examined. Many who give an explanation for consciousness from “inside the room” deny the existence of the nonmaterial and conclude our minds are identical to our physical brains:
If this is true, all the properties and qualities on one side of the equation should be identical to all the properties on the other side of the equation. And if this is the case, our nonmaterial perception of mind is illusory; we are, in fact, nothing more than physical beings. If the mind is identical to the brain, what we commonly perceive as nonmaterial consciousness is simply the activity of our physical brains.
In order to see if this is the case (if the physical ingredients “in the room” of the universe could produce our nonmaterial minds), we’ll have to investigate the evidence related to the properties and characteristics of our minds and our brains.3 While we may not be trained scientists or philosophers, our common sense and common experience will be more than sufficient as we begin to examine the nature of our thoughts:4
EVIDENCE #1: PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE
If I asked you to close your eyes and think of an imaginary car and encouraged you to envision anything you could imagine related to that car, the resulting vehicle would exist solely in your mind. If you are sufficiently creative, your imaginary vehicle would be like no other car on the planet, and only you would know precisely how it looks. Without referencing a physical car external to your body, you imagined the shape, color, and textures of the vehicle; it exists only in your conscious thoughts.
This particular car is not the result of optical input from your eyes. Your brain isn’t referencing optical data from an object in the room. Neurophysiologists cannot open your physical brain and locate the car, its shape, or its properties. These characteristics cannot be accessed by surgeons sifting through the gray matter of your brain, and even though neurologists may be able to pinpoint a location within the brain where neurological activity correlates with a thought or sensation, this only confirms a causal relationship between two separate things and fails to identify one as the other.
While physical states can be publicly known, mental states are only privately known. This characteristic of the mind is not shared with the brain; the properties of the brain and the mind are not identical.
EVIDENCE #2: “IS-NESS” VERSUS “ABOUT-NESS”
One aspect of mental states stands above others in distinguishing them from physical states. Philosophers refer to this as intentionality. Most mental states are directed; they are about something other than themselves. We often experience thoughts or concerns about the world around us. We worry about our jobs or our families.
Expert Witness Profile:
When we possess a mental state (a worry, concern, fear, or hope), we are typically thinking about something. These mental states are not self-existent. They depend on the existence of something else. Let’s say, for example, I hear a noise outside my home and I am worried there might be a burglar. My thoughts are about the burglar and whether my door is locked. My mental state is dependent on the physical state of the burglar and the door.
This directedness and dependency is not true of physical entities. A door is not about anything else; it simply is (a door). Yet our nonmaterial concerns about the door (the “about-ness” of our mental states) rely on the door’s material self-existence (its “is-ness”). Physical objects (such as brains) can be in relationship with other physical objects (your brain can be in your skull or next to the person sitting on your right), but they are never about another physical object. Physical entities are undirected and self-existent. This property of your mind (the dependent “about-ness” of your thoughts) is different from the self-existent “is-ness” of your brain.5
EVIDENCE #3: INCORRECT VERSUS INDISPUTABLE
There are times when we are mistaken about something we are considering. I may be mistaken, for example, about the existence of a burglar in the next room. There may be no burglar at all (I may simply be incorrect). In spite of this, however, I cannot be mistaken about my belief in the burglar. This belief (whether true or not) is indisputable. The first type of claim is about a physical object: the burglar. The second type of claim is about a mental state within my mind: the thought about the existence of the burglar. While the existence of the burglar can be challenged (“Hey, there’s no burglar in the next room!”), the existence of my beliefs cannot (it would be ludicrous to say, “Hey, there’s no thought of a burglar in your mind!”).
We’ve uncovered yet another difference between physical entities (such as burglars and brains) and mental entities (such as thoughts). You can be incorrect about physical entities, but you have immediate access to your thoughts, and as a result, what you believe about your beliefs is indisputable.
EVIDENCE #4: IMPERSONAL VERSUS PERSONAL
The subjective nature of our conscious experiences is difficult to explain from a purely physical perspective. Philosophers have tried to articulate this difficulty with knowledge argument illustrations.6
Imagine, for example, you are a trained police officer undergoing an extensive education in the mechanics and consequences of discharging a handgun in a life-threatening altercation with an armed suspect. You’ve been educated thoroughly about the physics of the firearm, the physical characteristics of the ammunition, etc.
A Tool for the Call-Out Bag:
In addition, you’ve also been trained exhaustively in the biology of the human body and the resulting physical impact a round from your pistol will have on an attacker. You’ve been extensively trained in what to anticipate throughout the shooting event—what you can expect to experience, see, and hear. Imagine, for sake of illustration, you are now entirely knowledgeable of every physical (impersonal) aspect of the event, from start to finish. Do you really know everything there is to know? No, something is still missing: the experience of being in a real shooting. As much as you may try to prepare, and even if you could know every physical, material truth or fact about such an event, you would still add new knowledge at the point of the shooting. Your subjective, personal experience and feelings would be real; but all the sounds, colors, thoughts, pains, traumas, desires, etc., could only be described subjectively. Our common sense repeatedly confirms this truth: physical entities and states can be described objectively and impersonally, but the exclusively personal, subjective nature of mental states distinguishes them from anything physical.7
EVIDENCE #5: MEASURABLE VERSUS MEASURELESS
If humans are simply the product of ingredients and processes from “inside the room” of the universe, we are nothing more than physical beings, and as such, every part of our existence ought to be subject to physical laws and processes, including processes used to measure and predict the behavior of our physical components.
Our brains, as physical entities, can be weighed, measured for length or width, and calculated for mass. Our brains and central nervous systems, as physical entities, can be described thoroughly using terms from chemistry or physics. This is not possible for mental entities such as desires, sensations, emotions, or wills, however. These entities cannot be measured or analyzed using the processes appropriate for physical objects.
While your thoughts have propositional content, they obviously don’t have physical weight. Physical entities can be measured using physical measurement instruments and evaluated with the laws and terms of chemistry and physics. Our mental entities, however—our thoughts, wills, desires, and sensations—cannot be measured or evaluated in this way.
Now that we’ve examined some of the characteristics of brains and minds, let’s take another look at our identity equation:
Can Be Publicly Accessed
Is
Disputable
Impersonal/Objective
Measurable
(Described with Physics)
Can Only Be Privately Accessed
Is About
Indisputable
Personal/Subjective
Measureless
(Indescribable with Physics)
We’ve now assembled our first E list: the evidential properties of physical and mental states. The evidence “in the room” begs for explanation, so it’s time to assemble our second E list: the possible explanations for these evidences.
At first blush, there seem to be a number of distinct differences between properties of the mind and properties of the brain. These differences, unless they can be reconciled, prevent us from concluding our brains are identical to our minds. Minds are difficult to explain, however, if we are committed to staying “inside the room” of the physical universe. Materialist physicists typically maintain the universe (and our brains within it) is “causally closed.” If this is the case, nothing outside the physical realm (such as our nonphysical minds) should be capable of causing anything to happen inside the physical realm.
Our nonmaterial minds, therefore, should have no ability to influence our material bodies. Our common personal experiences tell us this is clearly not true, however. So how do those looking for explanations within the material universe resolve the apparent dilemma? They usually describe the mind as illusory or purely physical (material).8
Staying “Inside the Room” for an Explanation:
CAN MATERIALISM EXPLAIN THE EXISTENCE (OR AT LEAST THE APPEARANCE) OF MIND?
A Tool for the Call-Out Bag:
Every criminal trial involves explanations, and most of the time, these explanations are contradictory. The prosecution sees it one way; the defense another. When evaluating explanations, we appraise their strengths and weaknesses. In the end, one explanation will emerge as the most reasonable (possessing the greatest strengths and the fewest liabilities).
As we assemble our list of explanations for the existence of mind, we’ll begin with several efforts to stay “in the room” for an entirely physical (material) description. Remember, each explanation must account for the five evidences we’ve listed in the first E list without redefining critical aspects of the data or suffering from logical contradictions. While philosophers and scientists have proposed a number of materialistic explanations, all of them possess explanatory liabilities in one of those three areas.
ARE MENTAL STATES MERELY BRAIN STATES?
Some scientists and philosophers believe the brain and the mind are one and the same. According to this approach, mental states such as anger or pain are identical to brain states; they are nothing more than physical, neurological activities in the brain.
If this is true, we can account for mind from the materials and processes available in the physical universe. But this ignores the many evidential differences we’ve already described between the mind and the brain, and it generalizes mental states (such as anger or pain) as if these states could be physically observed in precisely the same way in each of us. But this is not, in fact, possible.
Worse yet, if our thoughts are nothing more than physical, material states, none of us would have the freedom to think rationally (more on this in the next chapter). Physical brains are subject to the laws of physics; mental states are subject to the laws of logic. Those who think mental states are entirely physical hold a logically contradictory position. In order to think rationally about their thoughts, they must have the freedom to do so, but this freedom is unavailable if the laws of physics and chemistry are controlling their thoughts. The fact skeptics are free to believe their thoughts are entirely physical is evidence their thoughts are not entirely physical.
ARE MENTAL STATES NOTHING MORE THAN BEHAVIOR?
Another way to account for mind from a purely physical perspective is to simply reduce mental states to expressions of behavior.9 This is called behaviorism. According to this view, when we say someone is angry, we’re talking about the behaviors they are exhibiting rather than the thoughts they are thinking.
This approach once again allows us to stay “inside the room” to explain consciousness, but it does so by redefining our thoughts as merely physical behaviors. Behaviorism ignores the evidence of our own personal experience of consciousness. Most of us recognize our thoughts as the cause of our behavior rather than the behavior itself. More importantly, not all beliefs, feelings, or emotions result in a behavior at all (most of us have learned, for example, how to control our tempers). Behaviorism either fails to account for the evidence of our experience or it seeks to eliminate the problem of consciousness by simply erasing the term from our dictionaries.
ARE MENTAL STATES ONLY FUNCTIONAL STATES?
Some philosophers prefer to see the mind as a complex machine of sorts. This is called machine-state functionalism. According to this view, our brains are physical machines programmed with instructions and capable of receiving sensory input like physical computers.
Expert Witness Profile:
In fact, philosophers who accept this view think computers might someday possess conscious minds if they can be designed with a high degree of complex, functional ability. But this explanation for consciousness mistakes an appearance with a reality: Computers sometimes produce specific responses with the appearance of understanding, but they do so without true comprehension. Also, two people can respond (or function) in the same way even though their mental experiences are completely different. This is not the case with physical machines such as computers. Every Windows- or Apple-based operating system processes input and provides output in the same way, based on the common operating systems. But while humans have a common physical “operating system”—the brain—we don’t share common thoughts, feelings, or responses to stimuli.
Once again, the evidence of our own experience fails to support this theory of consciousness.
ARE MENTAL STATES NONEXISTENT?
Some philosophers view mental states as nothing more than a linguistic invention. According to eliminative materialism, when we try to describe the activity in the physical brain, we use the words “mental states.” Eliminative materialists believe this language is simply outdated. By eliminating our antiquated descriptions of mental states, these philosophers hope to stay “inside the room” of the physical universe for an explanation of consciousness.
A Tool for the Call-Out Bag:
But once again, that works only if we ignore what our experience tells us and are determined to redefine our terminology about consciousness. Worse still, the logic contradicts itself. It presupposes the very thing it is trying to eliminate. Eliminativists believe something is true about mental states: their nonexistence. Do you see the contradiction? One attribute of mental states (not shared by physical objects) is the “about-ness” known as “intentionality.” How can eliminativists have a belief about something unless their mental states are something other than physical? The “about-ness” of their theory gives their theory away.
Searching “Outside the Room” for an Explanation:
EXPLORING THE DUALISTIC NATURE OF HUMANS AS REVEALED IN MENTAL STATES
You may have noticed a pattern developing when examining explanations from “inside the room” of the natural, material universe. Internal explanations for the origin and fine-tuning of the universe, the origin of life, and the appearance of design in biological organisms are diverse and contradictory. In a similar way, the explanations for consciousness are also diverse and conflicting. On the other hand, one repeating explanation from “outside the room” continues to unify the evidence we’ve examined so far. The external explanation for mental states seeks to explain mind from something other than matter and physics:
ARE MENTAL STATES SOMETHING OTHER THAN PHYSICAL STATES?
Dualism describes mind and matter as two distinct categories of being. There are mental states, such as conscious thoughts, and there are physical objects, such as brains. They are different and they coexist in the universe.
Unsurprisingly, many philosophical naturalists committed to a material explanation from “inside the room” of the universe are opposed to a nonmaterial explanation from “outside the room.” They typically complain such dualistic explanations (1) fail to explain how nonmaterial thoughts can interact with material brains, (2) seem to be contrary to what we see in patients with brain damage, and (3) offer a nonmaterial explanation rather than waiting until science has offered a successful material account.
But even if we don’t know precisely how the nonmaterial mind causes a response in the material brain, this doesn’t negate the evidence of our common conscious experience. And the apparent loss of mental function resulting from brain damage or dementia doesn’t prove the nonmaterial mind is an illusion. Dualist neurosurgeons accept the existence of both the mind and the brain. They believe there is a causal connection between the two. Loss of memory may simply be related to the damaged brain’s inability to access the undamaged mind. As it turns out, the more we know about the nature of mind and the limits of philosophical and scientific explanations for consciousness, the more acute the problem of explaining consciousness from a purely physical perspective.
ABDUCTIVE REASONING AND THE MOST REASONABLE INFERENCE
We’ve now assembled our two E lists: evidences and explanations. It’s time to use abductive reasoning as we compare these two lists. Which explanation is most reasonable in light of the evidences we’ve collected?
Evidences
Public versus Private
“Is-ness” versus “About-ness”
Incorrect versus Indisputable
Impersonal versus Personal
Measurable versus Measureless
Explanations
Mental States Are Simply Brain States
Mental States Are Simply External Behaviors
Mental States Are Simply Functional States of Organisms
Mental States Are Simply Nonexistent
Mental States Are Something Other Than Physical States
A Tool for the Call-Out Bag:
When considering any list of possible explanations, we must consider their strengths and weaknesses. We’ve examined four “inside the room” explanations of the physical universe and one from “outside the room.” The four competing materialistic theories are diverse and contradictory, and their conflicting explanations expose their weaknesses. Experts in one camp typically argue against the explanations offered by experts in another. The first four explanations, while they provide answers from “inside the room,” fail to adequately address the five evidences we’ve listed.
Thomas Nagel, a naturalist philosopher eager to find an explanation “inside the room,” reluctantly acknowledged the deficiency of physicalist explanations: “So long as the mental is irreducible to the physical, the appearance of conscious physical organisms is left unexplained by a naturalistic account of the familiar type. On a purely materialist understanding of biology, consciousness would have to be regarded as a tremendous and inexplicable extra brute fact about the world.”10
The “problem of mind” is as much a problem today as it was for ancient thinkers, in spite of tremendous scientific advances over the past century. The more these materialistic theories fail to account for the properties of the mind, the more likely those staying “inside the room” are to offer yet another explanation (even if these explanations continue to contradict one another and possess significant liabilities).
Philosopher John Searle observed the same trend: “Earlier materialists argued that there aren’t any such things as separate mental phenomena, because mental phenomena are identical with brain states. More recent materialists argue that there aren’t any such things as separate mental phenomena because they are not identical with brain states. I find the pattern very revealing, and what it reveals is an urge to get rid of mental phenomena at any cost.”11
Only dualism begins to adequately account for the differences between mind and brain, and its liabilities are far less significant than the liabilities possessed by the other four explanations. Any reluctance to embrace a dualist explanation for mind seems grounded not in the evidence but in a desire to resist answers found “outside the room.”
If we can resist the bias against answers found “outside the room,” dualism accounts for the nature of mind in a much more straightforward manner, providing a more exhaustive, consistent, and reasonable explanation.
“Inside the Room” or “Outside the Room”?
THE MIND “IN HERE” POINTS TO A MIND “OUT THERE”
As the coroner zipped closed the body bag over Ryan’s motionless figure, I had good reason to believe Ryan was more than a collection of physical particles. The existence of Ryan’s nonmaterial mind pointed to something more. If Ryan is a mind (rather than simply a brain), there may be good reason to believe Ryan is a soul (rather than simply a body). While his material brain and body were subject to physical death as a result of the gunshot wound, there was no reason to believe Ryan, as a nonphysical mind and soul, suffered the same fate.
If we are more than simply physical creatures, we might reasonably survive the deaths of our physical bodies. This view of the world and humanity would now guide my response to these horrific crimes and my efforts to incarcerate those who have committed murder. If our universe is a purely physical environment, humans are nothing more than a collection of their material parts governed by natural laws and defined by physical properties.
But if that’s the case, how could I arrest someone for committing a crime when the person’s physical properties were different than they are today? Our bodies change over time. We age and decay. If all we are is a collection of physical parts, we’re not the same people we were years ago. As J. P. Moreland observed, unless there is an essential nonmaterial person surviving the process of physical change over time, “the person who committed a crime, the person brought to trial for the crime and the person serving a jail term for that same crime are all different persons.”12
A dualistic, nonmaterial view of our human nature makes sense of the evidence we’ve examined in this chapter and provides us with a lens through which we can cope with tragedy and seek justice, even when many years have passed and suspects have changed physically. There are good reasons to conclude Ryan was more than simply a physical being, and this conclusion helped me to respond calmly with hope.
We examined the case for dualism by employing abductive reasoning, matching identities forensically, applying our common-sense experience of consciousness, and guarding against bias and presupposition. The case for the mind is strong; it is the most reasonable explanation for the phenomena we commonly experience as conscious creatures. But the mind cannot be explained from “inside the room.” It forces us to look for a nonphysical, nonmaterial explanation “outside the room,” beyond the material limits of the physical universe.
The existence of the nonmaterial mind is yet another piece of evidence pointing to a nonmaterial, external cause of the universe. Unlike the cosmological and biological evidences we’ve examined so far, this piece of evidence is wholly nonmaterial. It is part of a new category of evidences and adds an additional layer of complexity to our “suspect” profile. If we are nonmaterial minds, it is reasonable to infer we may be the result of a nonmaterial Mind, particularly if we bear any similarity to this creative force.
Our Emerging “Suspect” Profile:
We can now add an additional characteristic and description to our profile. Our “force” is looking more like a “suspect” with each passing chapter, but what we are about to learn in the next chapter will change the way we’ve been thinking even more dramatically. If there was any doubt about the personal nature of the uncaused cause of the universe, this doubt is about to vanish.