7. Law and Order
Chapter Seven
Law and Order
Is Morality More Than an Opinion?
Jesse Valdez was sweating profusely and breathing hard. I was sitting on his back, ratcheting the second handcuff to his left wrist after a short struggle. There wasn’t much fight left in the young man, and being fifteen years his senior, I was relieved he was out of gas. I rolled him over and helped him to his feet.
Jesse was known as “Smiley” to his fellow gang members, but today he wasn’t smiling. As a member of one of the largest street gangs in Los Angeles County—with membership exceeding ten thousand—he was used to being chased by the police. Today, however, would likely be the last time he would run from the authorities. We were arresting Jesse for the murder of a rival gang member who’d made a sexually suggestive remark to Jesse’s sister a week earlier.
I’d been working the gang detail for over a year, and I’d spent two days searching for Jesse in this neighborhood. He was my second suspect in this case. (Our early investigation had eliminated a prior candidate.) While Jesse was not a resident of our community, his victim was.
According to an informant, Jesse drove into our town, found the rival gangster who had made the suggestive remark to his sister, and beat him brutally and methodically until he died from his injuries. Along the way, Jesse gleefully tortured his victim. Jesse’s sister had been offended by the victim’s words, and she was happy when Jesse told her about his retribution. They enjoyed the crime; it was more than payback. It was an act of entertainment.
I was a committed atheist at the time of Jesse’s arrest, but the episode caused me to consider the moral status of Jesse’s crimes. Was Jesse morally justified in torturing the man who had offended his sister? Jesse’s fellow gang members certainly thought so, and Jesse later confessed he had enjoyed committing the assault. This form of “street justice” was common between these two sets of rivals. They obeyed a moral code all their own.
Jesse’s gang recognized the immorality of their rival’s comments but denied the immorality of the gruesome, sadistic murder. Why? Were their judgments simply the result of their cultural perspective? Are all moral truths (even those we accept as law-abiding citizens) simply the product of cultural perspective or subjective preference?
Cold-Case Approach:
If so, which segment of the culture—and which set of individuals—gets to decide what’s morally acceptable?
Jesse’s gang was one of a number of gangs in the city of Los Angeles. There is a large criminal subculture in this part of the county, and Jesse’s specific culture has a set of moral decrees. But they live in a city with its own municipal codes and laws. If one member of the gang is parked illegally (in violation of a city ordinance), he’s going to get a ticket even if his gang thinks it was okay to park there. The municipal code trumps the gang decree.
In addition, Los Angeles is part of the state of California, which has its own state penal code. The criminal laws of the state, should they conflict with the city municipal codes, would trump those of the city of Los Angeles. California is obviously part of the United States of America, however, and there are many overarching federal laws governing criminal behavior within our country. These federal laws, should they conflict with the state penal code, would trump the laws of California.
Organizations such as the United Nations appeal to international law when adjudicating the behavior of nations such as the United States. They believe these laws represent overarching principles affecting all citizens on the planet and, as a result, should have precedence over the laws of individual countries.
Where does all this end? How high does the moral hierarchy extend?
While examining this pyramid of moral claims and judicial law, you may have noticed three important truths:
1. The higher the authority in the hierarchy, the more overarching and applicable the law.
2. The higher the authority in the hierarchy, the more universal the nature of the legal obligation.
3. All of these laws, regardless of their location in the hierarchy, represent obligations between persons. Those at the highest level of authority advocate for laws they believe apply to all of us, no matter who we are, where we are on the planet, or when we’ve lived in history. We are responsible to one another as persons possessing inherent dignity.
But do such objective moral truths and obligations really exist? Most of us think they do.
The Evidence “In the Room”:
TRANSCENDENT, OBJECTIVE MORAL TRUTHS; OBLIGATIONS; AND HUMAN DIGNITY
Even the most skeptical among us believe moral truth is more than simply a matter of cultural or personal opinion. In a recent poll of professional philosophers and philosophy students, most denied the existence of God—yet acknowledged (or were inclined to accept) the existence of objective moral truth.1
For many of us, the transcendent, objective nature of moral truth seems rather self-evident.2 To “supersize” the point, all of us would agree it’s never morally acceptable to torture babies for the fun of it. For that matter, it’s never morally acceptable to torture anyone for the fun of it (including the man who offended Jesse’s sister). This is a transcendent, objective moral truth claim; it applies to all of us, regardless of who we are, where we are on the planet, or when we’ve lived in history.
Expert Witness Profile:
There are many similar transcendent, objective moral truths, even though groups often try to justify their seemingly immoral behaviors. In California, for example, there are several legal justifications for homicide. Police officers can use whatever force necessary—including deadly force—to overcome lethal resistance or to apprehend certain kinds of felons. Citizens can use whatever force is necessary—including deadly force—to stop a life-threatening attack or to protect the life of an innocent person. These are considered justified homicides (as opposed to unjustified homicides known as murders).3
But it’s never been legal (nor morally acceptable) to kill someone for the fun of it. In fact, if you simply add the clarifying condition “for the fun of it” to any questionable moral behavior, you’ll discover yet another transcendent, objective moral principle: it’s never morally acceptable to lie for the fun of it, to cheat for the fun of it, or to steal for the fun of it. While you might offer some appropriate defense for engaging in these behaviors, their justification will require more than your personal enjoyment. Humans throughout history have recognized the universal, transcendent, objective nature of a variety of moral codes, even though some behaviors can be defended under certain circumstances.4
A Tool for the Call-Out Bag:
In a similar way, there are a number of transcendent, objective moral virtues accepted by humans throughout history, even though these are also sometimes nuanced by circumstances.5 As Oxford scholar C. S. Lewis said, “Men have differed as regards what people you ought to be unselfish to—whether it was only your own family, or your fellow countrymen, or every one. But they have always agreed that you ought not to put yourself first. Selfishness has never been admired.”6
In fact, the transcendent, objective virtue of selflessness and virtuous reciprocity finds representation in nearly every historic theological or philosophical system, usually expressed in some form of the Golden Rule.7 Moral truths, guidelines, and obligations assume the inherent dignity of human beings. We expect more from one another than we do from other species, and we recognize our obligation to treat other humans with dignity and respect.
We don’t hold our pets morally responsible, but we do hold one another morally responsible. Crimes against animals are one kind of moral violation, but crimes against people are far more serious.
As I completed the booking paperwork for Jesse, I began to talk to him about his life and his perspective as an active gang member. We differed dramatically in a number of areas, especially when it came to making moral decisions. Were either of us truly right or wrong in our beliefs related to the dignity of humans and the immorality of torture? Was it appropriate for me to take Jesse to jail for what I thought was immoral, even if he disagreed? If transcendent moral truths such as “It’s never morally permissible to torture people for the fun of it” actually do exist “inside the room” of the natural universe, what is their source?8 How are such moral truths grounded?
Either we can account for transcendent, objective moral truths from what we find in the universe—space, time, matter, and the laws of physics and chemistry—or we can’t. If objective moral truths cannot emerge from the elements and forces “inside the room,” an external cause should be considered.
Staying “Inside the Room” for an Explanation:
CAN NATURALISM EXPLAIN THE EXISTENCE OF OBJECTIVE MORAL TRUTHS AND OBLIGATIONS?
Is it possible to account for obligatory moral truths from “inside the room” of the physical universe? Some philosophical naturalists think so. Their strategies are similar to those used to explain the existence of free will, however. Are these explanations supported by the evidence? Do they erroneously redefine key concepts? Do they suffer from logical contradictions? Let’s find out.
ARE MORAL TRUTHS AN ILLUSION?
Nihilists (derived from the Latin word nihil, meaning “nothing”) reject the idea any moral claim could be either true or false. Some nihilists believe moral statements don’t actually describe what the universe is like but instead describe how humans feel about things in the universe. According to “logical positivists,” if a statement can’t be verified or falsified on the basis of observation or perception, it can’t be claimed true or false. This approach eliminates the need to account for moral truth by simply eliminating our ability to talk about it.
But this redefinition of truth presumes the only kinds of facts we can examine are facts related to physical objects or events. We clearly have access to our own thoughts, however, and these thoughts are every bit as real as the book on which these words are printed. Surely we can’t limit the kinds of truth we accept to claims about physical objects.
ARE MORAL TRUTHS SIMPLY BRUTE FACTS ABOUT THE UNIVERSE?
Some philosophers recognize the existence of objective, transcendent moral truths but simply account for them by describing them as “fixed features” of the universe (like math facts or the laws of logic). But this approach fails to explain the personal nature of moral obligations.
Moral truths are unique in this regard; they don’t simply describe “how things work” between abstract objects or ideas (like math facts or the laws of logic) but instead describe “how things ought to work” between persons. As a police officer, I am morally obligated to my partner, my department, and the community I serve, but I am not morally obligated to my police car or my departmentally issued flashlight. If transcendent moral truths exist in our universe, who is the transcendent person (or transcendent persons) to whom we are obligated?
ARE MORAL TRUTHS A PRODUCT OF INDIVIDUAL BELIEF?
Some philosophers believe all moral truth is subjective rather than objective. In other words, subjects (people) are the ultimate source of what is right or wrong. According to this view (termed “moral subjectivism”), morality varies from person to person. Moral truths are simply personal opinions or feelings, and if there are no transcendent moral truths, there is no need for a transcendent moral truth source.
But why should we trust our own opinions or feelings in the first place? We’ve all known people like Jesse whose feelings about moral issues seem unreasonable and even dangerous. Worse yet, if moral subjectivism were true, people who disagree about the moral status of an act—as Jesse and I disagreed about the moral status of torture—would be logically unable to argue for the “rightness” of their positions.
On what grounds can I say Jesse is wrong, if Jesse’s personal opinion is the basis for his moral compass? If moral truth is subjective, nothing distinguishes what one person considers morally virtuous from what another considers morally vile. Mother Teresa was entitled to her opinion; Hitler to his. Neither could be said to hold a superior position if there is no transcendent standard by which we could measure either of them.
A Tool for the Call-Out Bag:
ARE MORAL TRUTHS A PRODUCT OF CULTURE?
If moral subjectivism fails to adequately explain moral truths from “inside the room” of the natural universe, perhaps these truths can be attributed to societies and cultures. Philosophers who accept this view are called “moral relativists.” They believe people groups create their own moral codes rather than discover them.
But if moral truth is determined by societies and cultures, how can any one group logically argue for the “rightness” of a moral position over another? How do we decide which culture is correct? Is it a matter of size? A matter of strength? Does Jesse’s gang subculture qualify as a legitimate source of moral truth?
More importantly, if moral truth is determined by people groups, how many people in the group have to agree? Must everyone agree? Is a simple majority enough? Once the majority decides on a moral truth claim, wouldn’t the opposing group be considered immoral by definition? Moral relativism denies the “immoral” minority the chance to argue logically against a “moral” majority, if there is no standard transcending the majority to whom the minority could appeal.
Expert Witness Profile:
ARE MORAL TRUTHS HUMAN-SPECIFIC BIOLOGICAL FACTS?
Some philosophers, such as Sam Harris, believe “questions about values—about meaning, morality, and life’s larger purpose—are really questions about the well-being of conscious creatures.”9 Well-being (also described as human “flourishing”) is, according to Harris, the purpose of our existence as human beings. Since human biology transcends human culture, moral truths (if they are rooted in human biology) would also transcend culture. If people like Harris are correct and the well-being of the human species is the goal of human existence, “good and bad” behaviors could be determined by their ability to achieve this well-being.10
But what is Harris’s definition of well-being in the first place? Is it merely survival, or is it a particular kind of survival? Even philosophers who hold this view readily admit some behaviors (such as subjugating slaves and stealing the resources of opposing groups) can actually aid in the survival of a people group. But these same thinkers simultaneously believe these kinds of behaviors are detrimental to the group’s well-being. This implies, however, there’s a right way to survive and a wrong way. Did you spot the logical inconsistency here? Those who believe the pursuit of human well-being is the origin of moral truth begin with a definition of well-being already infused with moral truth. Who gets to determine the right or wrong way to survive or flourish? This approach to moral truth argues for something more than mere biological survival of the fittest. It argues for a kind of moral survival (described as “well-being”) before it has adequately explained the source for moral truth.
If we stay “inside the room” of the natural universe to explain the existence of objective moral truths, we’re going to have to deny their existence; argue they’re a brute fact of the universe; or attribute them to human individuals, culture, or biology.
These attempts to explain objective moral truth from “inside the room” fail for a variety of reasons. Moral obligations exist between persons, but why do we think human persons are innately worthy of such obligation? Any attempt to explain objective moral truth from “inside the room” of the natural universe will also have to explain why humans are worthy of obligation.
Staying “Inside the Room” for an Explanation:
CAN NATURALISM ACCOUNT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND VALUE?
Why did Jesse feel a moral obligation to avenge his sister? Why would any human feel obligated toward another human when we don’t recognize moral obligations toward other forms of life on the planet? We seldom hesitate to exterminate the rodents and insects in our homes, and we feel no moral obligation toward the weeds growing in our garden. What, from a naturalistic perspective, gives us the right to consider humans differently?
Can we stay “inside the room” of the universe to explain why humans ought to be honored with dignity and value when we don’t afford these considerations to other species or forms of life?
If humans are simply the product of blind physical and chemical laws, there is no reason to believe we are anything more than the accidental consequence of an evolutionary process. If this is the case, there’s nothing special about us when compared to other species or forms of life in our environment.11
A Tool for the Call-Out Bag:
To make matters worse, humans often behave badly (as Jesse and his rivals did).12 Yet we treat humans as though we are somehow different from other species and worthy of moral obligation. We hold humans to a higher standard than we hold other species, and we view the actions of other animals without moral condemnation. Ethicist Richard Taylor observed, “A hawk that seizes a fish from the sea kills it, but does not murder it; and another hawk that seizes that fish from the talons of the first takes it, but does not steal it—for none of these things is forbidden.”13 If humans are just like other animals (the unintended result of blind physical processes), why do we consider our actions differently than the actions of the hawks in Taylor’s example? As William Lane Craig noted, “To think that human beings are special is to be guilty of speciesism, an unjustified bias toward one’s own species.”14
Growing up, I was a fan of Star Trek. Imagine an episode in which a superior race of aliens from another planet invades Earth with the goal of enslaving humans for their own selfish purposes—not an unusual Star Trek story line. In a scenario such as this, would we (as humans) have a right to complain? After all, we have a history of using horses, hunting dogs, oxen, and a variety of other species in a similar way. How could we argue against such treatment by a species as superior to us as we are to other forms of life on this planet?
Those who stay “inside the room” of the universe to account for intrinsic human dignity and inherent human value simply cannot justify their prejudice toward humans.
Searching “Outside the Room” for an Explanation:
ARE TRANSCENDENT MORAL TRUTHS ROOTED IN A TRANSCENDENT MORAL TRUTH GIVER?
As David Baggett and Jerry Walls observed, “Persons with intrinsic value and dignity seem much less likely to emerge from valueless impersonal stuff than from the intentional hand of a personal Creator.”15
A Tool for the Call-Out Bag:
If humans were created in the image of this Creator, our position “inside the room” would indeed be worthy of moral obligation, and a Creator such as this could also provide a proper explanation for moral truth. Moral obligations exist between persons; if moral laws are transcendent, it seems reasonable for us to look for the transcendent person to whom we are ultimately obligated.
Transcendent moral laws require a transcendent moral law source, and an all-powerful, nonmaterial, nonspatial, atemporal, purposeful, personal Creator would certainly qualify. If such a Being exists, moral truths would not simply be His creation or opinion; they would instead be a reflection of His nature as an all-powerful, perfect Being (more on this in the Secondary Investigation section).
Jesse wasn’t the first suspect in the murder case for which he was ultimately arrested. In fact, I worked another suspect for several days prior to learning about Jesse from an informant. My first suspect, a man seen in the area by witnesses, was eventually eliminated based on two disqualifying realities: I could find no reasonable motive for the killing, and there was no evidence at the scene connecting him to the murder. When two separate areas of investigation lead to the same conclusion, it’s reasonable to infer the conclusion is true.
Naturalism fails to explain two attributes of the universe related to objective moral truth. It cannot adequately explain the existence of objective moral truths, and it cannot explain objective, transcendent personal obligations. Naturalism, like my first suspect in the murder of Jesse’s rival, can be reasonably eliminated because it fails on two counts.
“Inside the Room” or “Outside the Room”?
WHAT’S THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY IN THE MORAL HIERARCHY?
After Jesse was convicted of murder, his attorney filed an appeal to the Second District Court of Appeal. His attorney understood the California Superior Court in Los Angeles wasn’t necessarily the final authority in deciding Jesse’s fate; an appeal could be made to the appellate court in our district. Here in the United States, the Supreme Court is the highest court in the land, with authority even greater than the authority granted our state appellate courts. But is this the ultimate authority to which we can appeal or to which we must answer?
There are good reasons to believe the highest authority in the moral hierarchy isn’t located in the Los Angeles County courtrooms; the Second District Court of Appeal, also located in Los Angeles; or in Washington, DC, where the Supreme Court convenes every October. In fact, it’s reasonable to believe the highest authority in the moral hierarchy transcends these locations along with every other location “inside the room” of the universe.
By examining legal hierarchies to determine the source of ultimate authority, separating evidence from what belongs at the “crime scene,” recognizing the value of nonphysical evidence, and using multiple lines of evidence to point us to the truth, we investigated the existence of transcendent, objective moral truths. Moral realities of this nature cannot be summarily dismissed as illusions or brute facts about the universe. They also can’t be explained from “inside the room” by appealing to some form of moral subjectivism or moral relativism.
And, as we have demonstrated, objective moral truths are not simply facts of biology determined by the goal of “well-being” or “human flourishing.” The objective moral laws of the universe are overarching and universally applicable. They bind us in obligation to do what is right, good, and loving, and they are ultimately tied to a personal authority located “outside the room.”
The benevolent author of these laws is the same first cause of the universe responsible for its beginning, the appearance of fine-tuning, the origin of life, the appearance of design in biology, the existence of mind, and the experience of free will. Our suspect description has grown. Examine the profile closely. Crime scenes tell us a lot about suspects, and the “crime scene” of the universe provides us with important details.
Our “suspect” is external to the universe, nonspatial, atemporal, nonmaterial, and uncaused. The “suspect” is powerful enough to create everything we see in the universe and purposeful enough to fine-tune the universe for life. The “suspect” is intelligent, communicative, creative, and resourceful. As a conscious Mind, our “suspect” is the personal source of moral truth and obligation. The evidence in the “crime scene” demonstrates the existence of an intelligent intruder outside of space, time, and matter; a Divine Intruder responsible for the evidence we cannot explain from “inside the room.”
Our Emerging “Suspect” Profile:
While everything we’ve investigated seems to point to a personal, Divine Creator, there is still one more piece of evidence we must investigate before we can be sure, and this final piece of evidence may change our minds entirely. Had there been evidence at the murder scene disqualifying Jesse as the killer (someone else’s bloody fingerprints or DNA, for example), I would not have been able to arrest Jesse as the suspect in my case. Does the last piece of evidence in the universe similarly disqualify a Divine Creator from consideration? Before we can conclude this “crime scene” is, in fact, God’s “crime scene,” we’ll have to learn about the power and importance of exculpatory evidence.