CHAPTER VIII – The partiality of men's judgment in their own cases
that is hanged, but thinks he has hard measure; because it is against himself.
2. Nay, it is not only penalties, but words, that men are very sensible of, if they be but against themselves. An angry or disgraceful speech, or any contempt or disrespect, does seem a great matter against them; and they have aggravations enough to lay upon it. So tender are they of themselves, that you may see how little they deny themselves.
3. Yea, God's own corrections seem so heavy to them, that they murmur and are impatient under them. A little loss or cross to self lies as a mountain on them. Poverty, or sickness, or disgrace, or troubles, make them complain as if they were almost quite undone. And all this shows how little they have learned to deny themselves.
CHAPTER VIII.
The partiality of men's practical judgment in their own case.
5. Another discovering instance of the dominion of self is the strange partiality of men's practical judgments when the case is their own, and the equity of their judgments when the case is another man's.
For particular instances of this, you may take up those that were mentioned before. I will give you but a few.
1. Take but a dull and backward minister (for I know you will expect I begin next home), and he that is most averse to particular instruction, and discipline, and self-denying duties, will be content that another man should perform them, and will commend and extol him for a worthy man—except he perceive that another's diligence disgraces his selfishness and negligence, and then indeed he may possibly repine at it.
2. A man that will not come near us to be instructed or catechized, will yet let his children or servants come. Why—what's the matter? Does he more regard their salvation than his own? Or has he not a soul to save or lose as well as they? And has he not need of teaching? Yes: but they are not himself. If they learn a catechism, it is no trouble to him. If their ignorance be opened, he takes it to be less dishonor to him than if he show his own. He can yield to their submission without self-denial, but not to his own.
3. Take a common glutton or drunkard, that cannot forbear but must needs have that which the flesh desires, and they can be content that another man be temperate and sober: and if a neighbor should have the cup before him, as they have, or a provocation to their appetite, they could be content that they let it alone; yea, they can tell them that it is the best way, and give them good counsel. And yet when the case is their own, it is otherwise. I have known drunkards that would persuade their children to take heed of it; and swearers that would whip their
children for swearing; and persons that will not read or pray, that would be content to have their children do it. And why is all this? Why—that which goes by their own throats must cost them self-denial in the displeasing of their greedy appetites; but that which goes by the throat of another costs them nothing. Self is not so much against their children's abstinence and reformation as against their own.
4. The same magistrate that will not trouble himself and displease his neighbors by suppressing alehouses and punishing vice, will perhaps be content if it were done by another—so that self might have none of the trouble and ill will.
5. Some men that will not instruct their families nor pray with them morning and night, will confess it is well done of others that do it. Yea, some that will not be persuaded to a holy, heavenly life, will confess it is the best and wisest course, and approve of it in others, and wish they might but die in such men's case. And yet they will not themselves be brought to practice it. They will commend Peter, and Paul, and the Fathers, and the Martyrs for a holy life, and, as I said, keep holy-days for them, and yet will not be persuaded to imitate them. And why so? Why—it costs them nothing to commend holiness in others; but to practice it themselves must cost them self-denial.
6. If another man be so ingenuous as to forsake an old selfespoused opinion, which their reputation seems to lie upon, and this upon their arguing, or in conformity to their minds, they will commend his great self-denial and sincerity. But yet they
will not do so themselves, where the case is perhaps more clear and necessary.
7. Take a man that is never so worldly and unmerciful, that gives not to the poor any considerable part of his estate, nor does anything worth the mentioning for the Church; and yet this man will consent that another shall be as bountiful and charitable as he will. When you can hardly screw a groat out of his purse, he will be content if another will give a hundred. And he will commend the liberal, and speak well of them, when he will not imitate them. And why is this? Why—it costs him nothing for another to be liberal; and therefore he can advise it, or consent to it, without self-denial: but self is against it when he should do it himself.
8. Take the most selfish unsanctified man, that cannot love an enemy, nor forgive a debt or a wrong, and he will yet commend it in another, and advise them to it, and speak well of those that will do so by him. And why is this? Why—it costs him nothing to have another man love an enemy, or forgive a debt or wrong; but he cannot himself do it without self-denial.
9. Those men that love not to be touched themselves by the minister's application, can yet endure well enough that others be dealt as sharply with as may be. And they are glad to hear any sharply reproved whose sins they dislike. The covetous man loves to hear us reprove the drunkard; and the drunkard is content to have the covetous reprehended.
Erroneous professors, dividers, and hypocrites hate the minister that reprehends their own sin, and can scarcely endure to hear him,
but say, He is bitter, or a persecutor, or raileth at the godly (alas that wickedness should have so impudent a plea!). But they can freely give us leave to deal as plainly as we will with the openly profane. Scarce any sect can endure you to speak against their own mistakes; but you may speak as freely against the contrary-minded as you please. How easily can Papists endure one to speak against Protestants? Or Anabaptists endure one to speak against infant baptism? And the openly profane can well enough endure to have sects and schismatics and heretics reproved. And why is all this, but from the dominion of self, and the scarcity of self-denial in the world? To have another rebuked toucheth not self, and therefore may be borne.
The poor man loves to hear us preach against the vices of the rich, and to reprehend the luxury of gentlemen and the cruelty of oppressors. The subject too often loves to hear the rulers' faults laid open. The countryman loves to hear the courtiers', the ministers', but especially the lawyers' faults laid open. Here you may speak freely: but self must be let alone, upon pain of their displeasure and many a reproach.
10. So also in case of personal close reproof: those that cannot endure it themselves, do think it the duty of others to endure it, and expect that others should submit to them. And if any will say, Neighbor, I thank you for your plain and friendly dealing, and having so much compassion on my soul as to help to save me from my sins: I confess I am a vile unworthy sinner; but by the grace of God I will do so no more: or if I be any more overtaken, I pray you tell me of it, and let me not alone in it—I say, if another should answer them thus and thank them for
their reproof, they would think the better of him and take it well.
But yet they will not do so themselves; for it costs self nothing to have another submit and humble himself.
So those that are most backward to the admonishing of others, lest they lose their love, can like to have a minister or another do it: for that does not put them to deny themselves.
12. Nay, take a scandalous professor that is drawn to public confession as a bear to the stake, and if it were another man's case, he would think it but reasonable and meet, and would persuade him to it. If another had committed the same sin against God as he has done, or had slandered or wronged him, and would freely, without urging, confess in the congregation with tears in his eyes, that he has sinfully provoked God, and offended the Church, and wronged his brother, and laid a stumbling block in the way of the ungodly and the weak, and dishonored his holy profession, and is never able to make satisfaction for such heinous sins, and is unworthy any more to be a member of the Church and to have any communion with Christ or them; and should earnestly entreat them to pardon him, and pray for him, and retain him in their communion, and entreat God to pardon him—would not the stander-by think this were well done, and a better way to his recovery than to refuse it? And all is, because self is not touched in another man's case; unless he apprehend it likely to become his own, and then he may be against it, and scorn at this as too precise a course.
13. Take also the extortioner, or any man that has defrauded or injured another, and that will not be persuaded to make
restitution of all that he has got amiss: and let this man hear of the case of Zacchaeus, and he will say, It was well done. Or let another's case be propounded to him, and he can tell them that,
Restitution is the safest way: whatever it cost you, it is fit that every man should have his own. Self will give him free leave to consent to another man's restitution, but not to his own.
14. Moreover, suppose that persecution were afoot, and a man must either knowingly sin against God, or lose his estate, and part with all that he hath in the world, and burn at a stake for the cause of Christ: the selfish unsanctified person will not be persuaded that this is his duty, or at least, he will not be persuaded to submit to it. He cannot suffer nor burn. He will trust God with his soul, rather than men with his body (as such speak that despise God, and reject him, and prefer the world before him, and call this trusting him). But if this were another man's case, they could tell him that it is better to displease men than God, and that it is better to venture a short life than an endless life, and that it is little profit to win all the world and lose his own soul, and that it is the wisest way to make sure work for eternity, and not to venture on endless misery. And they could consent that another should rather suffer than sin. Why else do they commend the martyrs for it?
And what is the reason of this strange partiality? Why—self is the great ruler, and God hath but the name. Self is partial in their own cause, but not in another man's; and therefore they can consent to his suffering without self-denial. And hence comes the difference.
15. Moreover, when offenders murmur at their punishment, ask but the standers-by, and they are of another mind. When the aleseller thinks he is wronged if he be put down, ask but the poor women whose husbands used to be drunk there, and whose children lack meat and drink and clothes, because the alehouse devours that which should buy them, and they will be quite of another judgment, and think you love not God nor the country if you will not suppress them.
16. Also, when you hear men extenuating their sin and excusing it, put but the case as another man's, and let them not understand that it is their own, and you shall hear another judgment. So Nathan came about David, and put but a far lower case as another's—about the robbing of a poor man of his only sheep— and he could presently say and swear, As the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing shall surely die, because he had no pity, and his anger was greatly kindled against the man (2
Sam. 12:5–6). But why was he not as angry with himself for a greater sin? O—self had got the better in that grievous fall, until grace broke his heart by true repentance. So when Judah heard of Tamar's fornication, he commanded, Bring her forth that she may be burnt (Gen. 38:24). But when he understood that it was by himself, the case was altered.
17. Let a man that is provoked by injuries and ill words have as bad by himself done or spoken against another, and he can make but a small matter of them, or think they should be easily put up or pardoned; when yet the same words spoken against him do seem intolerable.
18. Let a man speak with others in poverty, sickness, or any affliction, and what good counsel can he give them to submit to God and take all patiently! But let the suffering be his own, and he cannot take the counsel that he gives.
19. Nay more: men are not only partial for themselves, but for any that are near themselves, or that self is related to. Let another man's son or servant do evil, and you can be content that he be rebuked or corrected. But if it be a son, or kinsman, or servant of your own, the case is altered; it is then a wrong to punish him, because of his relation to you. Let a stranger do amiss, and you can give way to justice. But if the drunkard, or ale-seller, or swearer be your friend, then he must be borne with and forgiven, and the justice must be entreated for him.
Let a scandalous or insufficient Minister or Schoolmaster be offered to any place: if he be a stranger, you can be content that he be rejected; but if he be a kinsman, or child, or friend of yours, what an alteration doth this make in the case! Then he must be borne with, or tried, and you hope he will mend; and his faults are made the least of, and his virtues more than indeed they are.
Nay, any man that doth but love yourselves and honor you, and think highly of you, shall have a more favorable construction for all his words, and actions, and intentions, than one that you imagine is against you, or hath low thoughts of you, or is against your interest or your opinion.
Sirs, I have run into abundance of instances, but not a quarter so many as might be given; and all is to meet with the turnings and windings of this serpent, Self, and to let you see (if light itself can