43. Hastings. Dictionary of the Apostolic Church
Edited by James Hastings, D.D. Vol. I: Aaron—Lystra. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.
1916. 1 ith this "Dictionary of the Apostolic Church" presumably the W series of Biblical Encyclopædias which was begun by Dr. Hastings'
"Dictionary of the Bible" will be brought to completion. The first volume of the "Dictionary of the Bible" was issued in 1898; the last volume of this
"Dictionary of the Apostolic Church," the first of which is now before us, will scarcely be issued much before the middle of 1917. Twenty years, or thereabouts, will have been consumed, therefore, in the preparation and publication of the series. The intermediately published "Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels" was supposed to have been keyed to a little more popular note than the general "Dictionary of the Bible." It apparently was therefore found by a larger public of more practical value; and a call was made for another work which should do for the rest of the New Testament
what that Dictionary had done for the Gospels. The present work is the answer to this call. It should be noted, however, that it is not precisely a Dictionary of the rest of the New Testament. There are circles in which the New Testament is losing its uniqueness, and the editors of this Dictionary live within those circles. They think in terms not of the delivery of the revelation of God, and its assimilation, but of periods of the developing
Church. They present us with a Dictionary, therefore, not of the Apostolicum, as the ancients would have called it, dividing the New
Testament into "the Gospels and the Apostles," but of "the history of the Church as far as the end of the first century." Here the Epistles of Clement of Rome, Barnabas, Ignatius, the Shepherd of Hermas, the Didache— although it is not pretended that all of these fall within the first century— are set ostentatiously by the side of the Epistles of Paul, the Acts of the Apostles, and the Apocalypse of John; the Apocryphal Gospels and Acts and Apocalypses are added; and we are invited to contemplate the first
Christian century in the total mass of the literature to which it gave birth.
This has hardly been done in the practical interests of ministers of the Word, requiring help in preparation for their ministrations in the sanctuary.
As is his wont, Dr. Hastings has gathered to his aid in the preparation of this Dictionary a large company of competent scholars. About a hundred writers take part in it. Among them there are seven Continental scholars (P. Batiffol, E. von Dobschütz, H. Jordan, O. E. Moe, A. von
Schlatter, A. Thumb, J. de Zwaan)—four of whom, it will be observed, are Germans: these contribute in all thirteen articles, none of which, however, except Schlatter's stimulating article on the Holy Spirit, lies at the center of things. Besides five scholars who reside in Canada, eight of the writers are
Americans. These are C. A. Beckwith, S. J. Case, J. A. Faulkner, S.
Mathews, A. T. Robertson, G. L. Robinson, A. C. Zenos—and our own Dr. Vos, who contributes the articles on Brotherly Love, Goodness, Joy,
Kindness, Longsuffering, Love. The American writers contribute some twenty-six articles in all, but again none of these lies at the center of things.
Dr. A. T. Robertson might have made his articles on such topics as Bond, Debt, Deliverer, Destruction important, but he has chosen rather to work formally and briefly.
There are naturally included in the scope of this Dictionary general articles on the several books of the New Testament, from Acts to Revelation. A general article on "Gospels" has been added, supplemented by isagogical material in the article on Luke (the person). These, along with such ancillary material as that supplied by such articles as those on Epistle,
Letter, Dates, provide a tolerably complete Introduction to the New Testament Books. The general tone of this Introduction is sufficiently
"Liberal," although many "Conservative" opinons are mixed in. Take the question of the dates of the Synoptic Gospels, for instance. W. C. Allen, who writes the article "Gospels," is inclined to very early dates—Mark in the neighborhood of 45, Matthew about 50, and Luke between 47 and 60.
Similarly A. C. Zenos seems not disinclined to assign Mark to about 60, Luke to about 61, and Matthew to about 68. Even Kirsopp Lake (p. 20) does not seem quite sure that Luke was written later than 70, and this would carry with it an earlier date for at least Mark. The Book of Acts, Lake would still date in the decennium 90–100; he speaks of Harnack's argument for its early date as one-sided and expects a reaction from it; and he is still inclined to represent Acts as dependent on Josephus (pp. 20, 721).
With respect to this last point it is a satisfaction to be able to point to the excellent article on Josephus, by E. von Dobschütz, whose solid refutation of the dependence in question reads almost as if it had been written with direct reference to Lake's argument for its likelihood. We note in passing that von Dobschütz opposes the recent tendency to pronounce the famous passages in Josephus which mention Christ to be genuine.
When we turn to the theological side of the Dictionary our attention is naturally attracted first to the great articles on God, Christ, and the Holy
Spirit. The article on God is written by Dr. A. J. Maclean, a Bishop of the Scottish Episcopal Church, to whom we owe quite a number of other theological articles. It is conceived in excellent spirit and is written with clearness and force. It is valuable in this Dictionary, among other things, for its correction of many details in the article on "Christ, Christology," where that article shows overdeference to modern "critical opinions." For, as is natural, its strength is given to the doctrine of the Trinity and that involves discussion of, say, the deity of Christ and the passages in which it is expressed. Perhaps we should say that there is a slight uncertainty of touch exhibited here and there, as, for example, with reference to the idea of "Subordination," which is too easily accepted from the language of the traditional formularies and not independently grappled with. It is odd that the appended "Literature" does not mention a single work on the specific subject of the article, that is, the apostolic doctrine of God. We could wish that the purely empirical fact that the term "God" appears in the pages of some of the Epistles of the New Testament as the personal name of the Father, in contrast to "Lord" and "Spirit" as the personal names of the other persons of the Trinity, had been expressed in some other way than in the sentence: "It must be borne in mind that, when the name 'God' is used absolutely, without pronoun or epithet, it is never, with one possible exception, applied explicitly to the Son as such or to the Spirit as such" (p.
460). A careless reader may easily take out of this sentence more than the facts stated in it warrant.
The article on the Holy Spirit is written by Prof. A. Schlatter, who employs in it a reconstructive method of expounding the apostle's doctrine.
This inevitably introduces a speculative element into the exposition, which makes it very stimulating but does not always command assent. The
presuppositions of Schlatter intrude and it becomes the task of the reader to untangle the two threads of the Biblical teaching and the theologian's own thought. As is Schlatter's habit, he says many very searching things in the progress of his exposition, and numerous detached passages may be cited from the article in which important truths are given exceptionally exact and pungent statement. The paragraph on the effect of the operation of the Spirit on the body (p. 576) is an instance in point—but it is too long to quote here. Take instead this brief statement of the Spirit's action in saving men—which constitutes an excellent description of what the old theologians call "Effectual Calling": "The Spirit gives man the power of choice, makes his volition effective, and induces him to bring his will into subjection to the Divine Law" (p. 575). Or take this pregnant criticism on Perfectionism: "As the perfectionist finds complete satisfaction in the communion with God bestowed upon him by the Spirit, his hope for the future dies away (1 Cor. 15:12, 2 Tim. 2:18); for naturally such a religious attitude could have no final ideal standing supreme above present attainment. It thus tended to arrest that forward process into which Saint
Paul had brought his churches (Phil. 3)" (p. 581).
We regret that we cannot speak with satisfaction of Prof. C. Anderson Scott's article on "Christ, Christology" (twenty-two pages)—which should be the central article of the volume. Dr. Scott's critical harness clanks about him dreadfully as he moves, and he does grave injustice to the writers he is expounding by what seems to be sheer inability to enter sympathetically into their thought. The result is that he forces them not only into inconsistency with one another but also into inconsistency with themselves; and, having wrought his will upon it, holds their thought up before us in shreds. Paul, according to him (p. 195), "held with equal conviction and emphasis two propositions which seem contradictory:
'There is one God and Father of all, who is above all and through all, and in
you all'; and 'Christ is God for me.' " He adds: "perhaps they find their synthesis in that saying which is at once the simplest and profoundest account of the whole matter: 'God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself' (2 Cor. 5:19)"—which involves, of course, a wrong understanding of 2 Cor. 5:19, as of much else besides. And this is what he says of John: "It is in this document where the human nature of the Son and His dependence on the Father are asserted with the strongest emphasis that His Divinity is for the first time expressly acknowledged (1:1; 20:28). If John thus leaves an unsolved problem for posterity to attack it is better to recognize that it is so" (p. 199). But, that Johannes Weiss says so, is really no good reason for asserting that John left an unsolved problem for posterity to attack. Why should we deny to the apostolic writers the synthesis which is essential to give the harmony to their thought in which it evidently serenely moved, merely because our own halting minds, poisoned with carping criticisms, the very reason of existence for which is to break in upon their serene harmony, fail to see it with their clarity of vision?
Dr. Scott tells us, it is true, that "St. Paul had no doctrine of the Trinity." But he tells us this only because he is endeavoring at the moment to show that Paul had no doctrine of a hypostatically distinct Spirit. Paul, according to him, identified Christ and the Spirit, and "the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit, was for him (apart from the identification with the Risen
Christ) the energy of the Divine nature" (p. 189). We congratulate the readers of this Dictionary that they only have to turn over to Schlatter's article on the Holy Spirit to learn better (p. 574b: "3. The Spirit sent by Christ"), and have only to turn to Allen's remarks on the Trinitarian formula in Matt. 28:19 (p. 475a) to be set right on the main matter. We revert for a moment, however, to the citations we have just made from Dr.
Scott. He declares that "the divinity of Christ is for the first time expressly acknowledged" by John, and yet he declares that Paul held with complete
conviction and asserted with emphasis, "Christ is God for me." The saving clause to enable Dr. Scott to make a synthesis of his own words lies of course in the words "for me." Paul was convinced, it seems, that Christ was
God "for him," but not that He was God for other people. This subjectivizing of Paul's assertions about Christ is thoroughly unjustifiable.
Paul does not tell us what Christ was "for him"; he tells us what in his view Christ was. Dr. Scott tells us, it is true, with the emphasis of formal announcement: "St. Paul never gives to Christ the name or description of 'God' " (p. 194). But he tells us this again only because he cannot see that such a statement could be made consistent with Paul's monotheism, although at the end, we have seen, he has to admit that Paul did hold in conjunction his monotheism and the conviction that Christ was God
—"for him." In point of fact, however, Paul does give to Christ both the name and the description of God. He gives Him the name of God for example in Rom. 9:5, and not the bare name of "God" merely, but the description of "God over all"; he gives Him the name of God in Titus 2:13, and again not merely the name of "God" but the description of "our great
God and Saviour." He describes Him as God in Acts 20:28, in Phil. 2:8 ff., and in Col. 2:13 ff., and in numerous places besides. No doubt Dr. Scott has his own way of explaining away all such descriptions. But this is to be set to the charge of his exegesis: they cannot be explained away. If we are to be permitted to put an artificial meaning on every statement which is inconsistent with a generalization which we wish to foist upon an author, no author's meaning is safe and it becomes a folly to write.
The quality of Dr. Scott's exegesis may be gauged by observing the curious interpretation which he gives of Rom. 1:4. He represents Paul as teaching here that as born of the seed of David Jesus had been "Χριστὸς κατὰ σάρκα and υἱὸς θεοῦ in the Messianic sense"; "but after and in consequence of the Resurrection, He has entered upon the status of Son of
God in an exalted form, set free from 'the likeness of (weak and) sinful flesh' " (p. 189). This should mean, ex vi verborum, that to Paul Christ while on earth was but "the fleshly Christ" and only became the spiritual
Son of God after and in consequence of the Resurrection. The passage certainly does not mean this; and no doubt this is something more than Dr.
Scott would have it mean. Where, however, does Paul speak of Jesus being or being conceived as Χριστὸς κατὰ σάρκα? Not at Rom. 9:5 or 2 Cor. 5:16 where alone the terms are brought together. It is safe to say that it would have been simply impossible for Paul to speak of Jesus as Χριστὸς κατὰς σάρκα. And where does Paul suggest that Christ in His exaltation has been set free from "the likeness of sinful flesh"? That would be to teach that Christ was incarnate only upon earth and ceased to be incarnate in His exaltation. When he comes formally to expound Rom. 8:3, Dr. Scott discards the translation "sinful flesh" in favor of "sin's flesh"; that is, if we understand him, he wishes to take the genitive as genitive of possession rather than of characterizing quality. He explains that this "flesh" is not conceived by Paul as originally or inherently sinful—as Jülicher, for example, will have it, saying "there never was any other kind"—but has become so "historically and experimentally" (p. 192). This is well, so far as it goes: but the point is that "flesh" has thus, according to Dr. Scott, become "an appanage of sin" in all its manifestations. Now Christ took this flesh, flesh as the possession of sin. "The σάρξ which He assumed was truly human flesh; it was, for such it had come to be historically, 'sin's flesh'— flesh that was in the grasp of sin" (p. 193). In being made in the likeness of sin's flesh, therefore, Christ took flesh that was in the grasp of sin, flesh "as it was conditioned by sin, tyrannized and enslaved by it." This would seem to be inconsistent with the term "likeness" here, and flat in the face of such a phrase as meets us, say, in 2 Cor. 5:21. But Dr. Scott does not mean to say that Paul teaches that the flesh which Christ took was actually sinful. He
supposes that he meets the difficulty by saying: "He 'knew no sin' (2 Cor.
5:21), and yet in His case the σάρξ was the medium of sin's assault upon Him." Obviously the conclusion does not match the premises. And what is the use of erecting a problem to be solved in this way?
The difficulty of stating statistical facts with exactness and without misleading implications is proverbial. Dr. Scott does not escape scatheless.
He makes these statements with respect to what he, not altogether exactly, speaks of as Luke's use of Χριστός in the early chapters of Acts, with a view to illustrating the writer's constant consciousness of its official sense. "He never employs it," he says, "as a proper name. His name for our Saviour is either 'Jesus' or 'the Lord'; and Χριστός when it stands alone always means
'Messiah.' This is specially significant in passages where 'Christ' and 'Jesus' occur together, in apposition; e.g. 3:20, 'that He may send the Messiah who has been before appointed—Jesus'; 5:42, 17:3, 18:5, 18:28, 'showing by the Scriptures that Jesus was the Messiah' " (p. 178). He speaks of these three facts as "completely attesting" the primary fact asserted, namely, that Luke always uses Χριστός with its official sense in mind. But we observe at once that the first of the three statements is inexact. To make it exact, the qualifying clause employed in later statements must be inserted. It is true only that Χριστός "when it stands alone" does not occur as a proper name.
It does occur as a proper name in conjunction with other designations:
"Jesus Christ" (8:12, 9:34, 10:36, 48), "Jesus Christ, the Nazarene (3:6, 4:10), "the Lord Jesus Christ" (11:17), "our Lord Jesus Christ" (15:26).
And its occurrence as a proper name in these compounds renders the inexact statement misleading. They show that "Christ" has so fully taken the place of a proper name in the consciousness of the community that even such compounds could be formed. Dr. Scott's second statement thus becomes also inexact and misleading. It is true that "Lord" is the ruling designation of Jesus in Acts; "Jesus" on the other hand is comparatively
sparingly employed, and only in particular circumstances which rendered it peculiarly natural to employ it: it occurs sometimes in conjunction with not only "Lord" ("the Lord Jesus") but "Christ" itself ("Jesus Christ") or both ("the Lord Jesus Christ"). It is no doubt a tardy remembrance of the use of "Jesus" along with "Christ" which compels the qualified form of the assertion in the second half of this second statement: "and Χριστός when it stands alone always means Messiah." It only rarely, however, stands alone; and when it does so, it is chiefly in such statements as "showing by the Scriptures that Jesus was the Christ"—which are scarcely ad rem. Even the last of the three statements thus becomes misleading. Some of the passages cited in it are not from the first part of Acts. Only those passages are adduced in which the order is "Christ Jesus" (17:3 certainly belongs in any event to a different category), not those in which the order is "Jesus Christ."
And the possibility that "Christ Jesus" in 3:20 and 5:42 as well as in 24:24
(the omission of which from Dr. Scott's list seems to show that he does not consider it to the point) may be a proper name, as it frequently is in the Epistles, is not allowed for. The statistics of the occurrence of Κύριος in I and II Thessalonians, p. 187b, are marred by the same kind of inexactness of statement. Decidedly, the reader would do well to scrutinize these statistical statements before drawing inferences from them in support of propositions.
If we do not like Dr. Scott's article on "Christ, Christology," we like Dr. A. S. Martin's articles on "Grace" and "Justification" even less. It would probably have been impossible to discover a person more unfitted to deal with these subjects sympathetically. The treatment of Grace is vitiated from the beginning by the determination of the writer to set man over against God as His fellow, not to say—as a personal spirit like Him—His equal.
Coöperation becomes thus the formula for the relation of the two, and a cooperation which ever tends to a certain equalization. Grace is not merely
given; it is taken. God and man work together to all effects, God's willingness to help being matched by man's willingness to be helped. It is a case of mutual love, the love of God to man meeting the love of man to God, and the conjunction of the two issuing in a common effect.
Accordingly there is nothing "infallible" or "irresistible" in grace: it is merely God's side of a mutual activity—which is barren, and to say the truth, not even instituted, until and unless man's side is in evidence also. All this is, of course, quite un-Biblical. When Paul declares, for example, on the one side, that man is carnal, sold under sin, and on the other, that sin shall not rule over those who are not under law but under grace, he certainly allows for the voluntary activities of men, but as certainly he presents the grace that comes to them gratuitously as both "infallible" and "irresistible."
"Sin shall not rule over you"; it is a definite promise of what shall be. "For ye are under grace": the reason is defined; grace is a power which irresistibly brings the result. What Martin has done is to transform the almighty power of God which creatively works its effect into a mere influx of immanently acting influence, which in concourse with the human soul, as a second cause, makes towards an end. The article "Grace," in these circumstances, becomes not one on Grace itself, that is, the divine activities in saving the soul, but on "the grace-filled life," that is, the growth of the human soul under the divine influences. Everything is subjectivized—translated into terms of human action. This is sometimes nothing less than absurd. Take this definition of Election: "Election expresses the soul's experience and certainty of saving grace" (p. 510). Or this definition of Grace itself: "Grace is a sense of God's favor."
We are not sure that it is possible—we are sure that it is very difficult— to obtain from Martin's discussion of Justification any clear conception of how he really thinks it is accomplished. Take the section, for example, in which he sums up what he conceives to be meant by "the new
righteousness" in Paul's teaching—that is to say, in his own. We are told (p.
671) that we cannot "stand before God's righteousness" on the basis of a self-righteousness which is the righteousness of the Law. Then we are told that "there is another righteousness, never lost sight of under the old Law, which has now appeared in Jesus Christ" and is "by Him made ours." But we seek in vain to learn what this "other righteousness" is, or how it is made ours by Christ. We are told that it is "presented in Christ"; that "it awakes in the sinner penitence and faith—a love of Christ's holiness, a hatred of his own sinfulness"; and that it does this "by God's grace." We are told that the very thing provided in it is a provision "to bridge the chasm between God and sin." But we are not told what it is. And when an effort is made to point out how it "bridges the chasm between God and sin" it is in this, if not confused, certainly confusing sentence: "In Christ God gives His own righteousness, which is the end and meaning of all faith." What is "the end and meaning of all faith"? God's own righteousness? Or the gift of God's own righteousness in Christ? And what is this righteousness of God's own, which He gives in Christ, and which, or the gift of which, is the end and meaning of all faith? Until we know that we are told nothing and we are not in the least told that. We are only told that "he who receives it"— whatever this mysterious "it" is—"in initio receives it virtually in extenso; such is the mode of God's gift of it."
This sounds so good that we are the more anxious to know what "it" is.
And fortunately we strike now a stream of lucid writing, which, however, does not obviously relate itself to what has been said before. "The condition of possible or future righteousness," we read, "is the right attitude or intention of mind towards the actual present righteousness. It is possible to justify or accept as right only that attitude which at the time is the nearest right possible for the person. In the initial moment of contrition, the only possible and right posture of the sinner is that
consciousness of himself which could not be the beginning of his hatred of sin if it were not to the same extent the beginning of a love of holiness.
Where this exists in love and sincerity, even though it be but the beginning of an infinite process, it is possible and right to accept and treat as right that which as yet is only a first turning to and direction towards right (cf. 1 John
1:8–10)." This is an admirably clear statement of the doctrine, not indeed of Paul, but of current modern Pelagianism, which bases God's acceptance of the sinner on the sinner's own righteous conduct, but (here is where it differs from fifth century Pelagianism), in concession to the imperfection of the sinner's righteousness, supposes that God accepts the will for the deed, takes the beginnings in anticipation of the completion, is willing, in other words, to accept the sinner's note of hand in lieu of the cash down, as the purchase price of His favor. But that "other righteousness" presented in Christ, described as "God's own righteousness given in Christ," "which is the end and meaning of all faith"—what has it to do with this Pelagian scheme? God demands from man a righteousness of his own, and graciously accepts its first motions as if the completion were already present
—that is all we have here.
Martin does make some effort to institute a connection between our righteousness and Christ. But it seems lame and ineffective. He proceeds (p.
671): "Thus the righteousness of faith"—we have not heard before of any "righteousness of faith" but our righteousness is suddenly called by this name—"thus the righteousness of faith begins with our sense of sin and experience of impotence, and God's loving acceptance of this repentance in us is the condition, starting-point, and earnest of a righteousness in us which is maintained and increased through Christ's,"—it is the possessive case and hence means "Christ's righteousness"—"in whom we see revealed all the presence and power of God in us, and in consequence all the power in ourselves necessary to its actual attainment and possession." We can
attach no other meaning to this sentence except this: that we begin our own righteousness with a sense of sin and experience of impotence; that God lovingly accepts this repentance as the condition, starting-point, and earnest of a righteousness of our own ("in us"); that we then see all the presence and power of God "in us"—that "in us" is very disturbing!— revealed in Christ, which apparently means that we see already manifested in Christ all that we hope to be, that complete righteousness of which we as yet have only the beginnings; that this is equivalent in some way unexplained ("consequently") to seeing in Him "all the power in ourselves necessary to its actual possession"—"its" being apparently the complete righteousness already manifested in Christ and begun in us; and finally, that this sight of these revelations in Him "maintains and increases our faith."
This seems to mean nothing more than that the righteousness which we begin in ourselves and which is accepted by God as the promise and potency of a completed righteousness yet to come, is maintained and increased by the inspiration of Christ's example: we see in Him what we fain would be, and that inspires us to become it. Accordingly Martin continues: "Faith in Christ as our righteousness can justify us because it is based on the one condition in ourselves of becoming righteous—a loyal disposition—and the one power without ourselves to make us righteous— the righteousness of God." We do not profess to understand that sentence; but it seems to be explicated by the next one which runs: "The grace of God in Christ makes the sinner righteous, by enabling him to make himself righteous. It starts the process by regarding and treating as righteous the penitent believer." Thus, out of all the confusion, we get—mere
Pelagianism. And this is represented as the doctrine of Paul!
No doubt Martin would not confess himself a Pelagian. And it is very true that he frequently makes use of expressions which are inconsistent with the complete Pelagianism of this reasoned statement of doctrine. The
main point to insist on, therefore, is his lack of clarity. And perhaps it is well to note that he is not very exact in his history of doctrine. At one point in the article on Grace (p. 512), he undertakes to discriminate Pelagianism,
Augustinianism, and Semi-Pelagianism. He does it thus: "In the Pelagian view, grace precedes and assists the natural (unregenerate) will; in the Augustinian, grace prepares and assists the regenerate will; in the SemiPelagian, grace is not operative at all till man's will (indifferent) brings it into play." Did anyone ever hear such confusion? We are tempted to conjecture that the terms Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian have accidently got interchanged. But that correction will not cure all the faults of the statement. It is hopelessly incompetent.
That we should meet with this bald Pelagianism here should not in the least surprise us. Pelagianism is the anthropological aspect of that "reduced
Christianity" which calls itself "modern Liberalism." It is, therefore, very much in evidence in this Dictionary which is tinctured everywhere with this "Liberalism." We open it, for example, at the article "Hardening." This is written by Prof. James Strahan. We find him struggling unsuccessfully with the ascription of "hardening" to God. The reason is simply that he does not believe in a "Fall." He does not recognize that man stands before God as a guilty creature, who already deserves all the punishment which may befall him. He quotes Hermann Schultz as saying, "Nor does any one doubt that it is an effect intended by God, when, at a certain stage in sin,
His revelation makes the heart harder" (p. 522)—and in quoting this saying approvingly he undermines his whole labored argument (and Schultz's as well)—if indeed man be a sinner. Every man is always, the Scriptures being witness, at that stage of sin that any manifestation of God makes his heart harder; and it requires a creative operation by the Spirit of God to beget in him a new life. Dr. Strahan is a professor in the M'Crea-Magee Presbyterian
College, Londonderry, Ireland; and Dr. Martin is a minister of the Church
of Scotland and was formerly an examiner in Divinity in Edinburgh University. We have sometimes fancied that it is the men of these better traditions who have fallen most hopelessly under the newer "reduced" influences. We were glad, accordingly, to see that the article on the Freedom of the Will has been committed to a good Wesleyan, Prof. W. F. Lofthouse.
When we read it, we were gladder still. We may not agree with everything Prof. Lofthouse says: but there is nothing shallow here. The article is written not only with solid learning but with true insight, and at least touches the full truth. Prof. Lofthouse knows not only his own philosophy but his Paul. His article is like an oasis in a dry land.
1. 1 The Princeton Theological Review, xv. 1917, pp. 147–157.