Part 7
1. It is ingeniously illustrated by some by a unit.f All numbers depend upon it : it makes numbers by addition, multiplies them unexpressibly ; when one unit is removed from a number, how vastly doth it diminish it ! It gives perfection to all other numbers ; it receives perfection from none. If you add a unit before 100, how doth it multiply it to 1100. If you set a unit before twenty millions, it presently makes the number swell up to an hundred and twenty millions ; and so powerful is a unit by adding it to numbers, that it will infinitely enlarge them to such a yastness, that shall transcend the capacity of the best arithmetician to count them. By such a meditation as this, you may have some prospect of the power of that God who is only unity, the beginning of all things, as a unit is the beginning of all numbers ; and can perform as many things really as a unit can numeri cally, that is, can do as much in the making of creatures, as a unit can do in the multiplying of numbers. The omnipotence of God was scarce denied by any heathen that did not deny the being of a God, and that was Pliny, and that upon weak arguments.
2. Indeed, we cannot have a conception of God, if we conceive him not most powerful, as well as most wise. He is not a God that cannot do what he will, and perform all his pleasure. If we imagine him restrained in his power, we imagine him limited in his essence. As he hath an infinite know ledge to know what is possible, he cannot be without an infinite power to do what is possible. As he hath a will to resolve what he sees good, so he cannot want a power to effect what he sees good to decree. As the essence of a creature cannot be conceived without that activity that belongs to his nature ; as when you conceive fire, you cannot conceive it without a power of burning and warming, and when you conceive water, you cannot conceive it without a power of moistening and cleansing : so you cannot conceive an
* Lessius, de Perfect. Divin., lib. v. cap. 1. t Fotherby, Atheomastic., p. 306, 307.
JOB XXVI. 14.] GOD'S POWER. 105
infinite essence without an infinite power of activity. And therefore a heathen
could say, ' If you know God, you know he can do all things ; ' and therefore saith Austin, ' Give me not only a Christian, but a Jew ; not only a Jew, but a heathen, that will deny God to be almighty.' A Jew, a heathen, may deny Christ to be omnipotent, but no heathen will deny God to be omnipotent, and no devil will deny either to be so. God cannot be conceived without some power, for then he must be conceived without action. Whose, then, are those products and effects of power which are visible to us in the world ? to whom do they belong ? who is the father of them ? God cannot be con ceived without a power suitable to his nature and essence. If we imagine him to be of an infinite essence, we must imagine him to be of an infinite power and strength.
In particular, I shall shew, I. The nature of this power. II. Eeasons to prove that God must needs be powerful. III. How his power appears : in creation, in government, in redemption. IV. The use.
I. What this power is ; or, the nature of it. 1. Power sometimes signifies authority, and a man is said to be mighty and powerful in regard of his dominion, and the right he hath to command multitudes of other persons to take his part ; but power taken for strength, and power taken for authority, are distinct things, and may be separated from one another. Power may be without authority, as in successful inva sions that have no just foundation. Authority may be without power, as in a just prince expelled by an unjust rebellion ; the authority resides in him, though he be overpowered, and is destitute of strength to support and exer cise that authority. The power of God is not to be understood of his autho rity and dominion, but his strength to act, and the word in the text (WTO)!,
Sept. adevos) properly signifies strength.
2. This power is divided ordinarily into absolute and ordinate. Absolute, is that power whereby God is able to do that which he will not do, but is possible to be done ; ordinate, is that power whereby God doth that which he hath decreed to do, that is, which he hath ordained or appointed to be exercised ; * which are not distinct powers, but one and the same power : his ordinate power is a part of his absolute ; for if he had not a power to do everything that he could will, he might not have a power to do everything that he doth will.
The object of his absolute power is all things possible ; such things that imply not a contradiction, such that are not repugnant in their own nature to be done, and such as are not contrary to the nature and perfections of
God to be done. Those things that are repugnant in their own nature to be done are several, as to make a thing which is past not to be past. As for example, the world is created. God could have chose whether he would create the world, and after it is created he hath power to dissolve it ; but after it was created, and when it is dissolved, it will be eternally true that the world was created, and that it was dissolved ; for it is impossible that that which was once true should ever be false. If it be true that the world was created, it will for ever be true that it was created, and cannot be other wise ; and also, if it be once true that God hath decreed, it is impossible in its own nature to be true that God hath not decreed. Some things are
repugnant to the nature and perfections of God, as it is impossible for his nature to die and perish, impossible for him, in regard of truth, to lie and
* Scaliger, Publ. Exercit., 365, sec. 8.
106 CHARNOCK'S WORKS. [Jos XXVI. 14.
deceive ; but of this hereafter. Only at present to understand the object of
God's absolute power to be things possible, that is, possible in nature ; not by any strength in themselves or of themselves, for nothing hath no strength,
and everything is nothing before it comes into being.* So God, by his abso lute power, might have prevented the sin of the fallen angels, and so have preserved them in their first habitation. He might, by his absolute power, have restrained the devil from tempting of Eve, or restrained her and Adam from swallowing the bait, and joining hands with the temptation. By his absolute power, God might have given the reins to Peter to betray his master, as well as to deny him, and employed Judas in the same glorious and success ful service wherein he employed Paul. By his absolute power, he might have created the world millions of years before he did create it, and can reduce it into its empty nothing this moment. This the Baptist affirms
when he tells us, that ' God is able of these stones ' (meaning the stones in the wilderness, and not the people which came out to him out of Judea,
which were children of Abraham) ' to raise up children to Abraham,' Mat. iii. 9, that is, there is a possibility of such a thing, there is no contradiction in it, but that God is able to do it if he please.
But now the object of his ordinate power is all things ordained by him to be done, all things decreed by him ; and because of the divine ordination of things, this power is called ordinate ; and what is thus ordained by him he cannot but do, because of his unchangeableness. Both those powers are
expressed, Mat. xxvi. 53, 54, 'My Father can send twelve legions of angels,' there is his absolute power ; ' but how then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled,
that thus it must be ? ' there is his ordinate power. As his power is free from any act of his will, it is called absolute ; as it is joined with an act of his will, it is called ordinate. His absolute power is necessary, and belongs to his nature ; his ordinate power is free, and belongs to his will, a power guided by his will : not, as I said before, that they are two distinct powers, both belonging to his nature, but the latter is the same with the former,
only it is guided by his will and wisdom.
3. It follows, then, that the power of God is that ability and strength whereby he can bring to pass whatsoever he please, whatsoever his infinite wisdom can direct, and whatsoever the infinite purity of his will can resolve. Power, in the primary notion of it, doth not signify an act, but an ability to bring a thing into act ; it is power, as able to act before it doth actually produce a thing. As God had an ability to create before he did create, he had power before he acted that power without. Power notes the principle of the action, and therefore is greater than the act itself. Power exercised
and diffused in bringing forth and nursing up its particular objects without, is unconceivably less than that strength which is infinite in himself, the same with his essence, and is indeed himself. By his power exercised, he doth whatsoever he actually wills ; but by the power in his nature, he is able to do whatsoever he is able to will. The will of creatures may be, and is more extensive than their power, and their power more contracted and shortened than their will ; but, as the prophet saith, ' His counsel shall stand, and he will do all his pleasure,' Isa. xlvi. 10. His power is as great as his will ; that is, whatsoever can fall within the verge of his will, falls within the compass of his power. Though he will never actually will this or that, yet supposing he should will it, he is able to perform it. So that you must in your notion of divine power enlarge it further than to think
God can only do what he hath resolved to do ; but that he hath as infinite a capacity of power to act as he hath an infinite capacity of will to resolve.
* Estius in Sent., lib. i. dist. 43, sec. 2.
JOB X-XVI. 14.] GOD'S POWEB. 107
Besides, this power is of that nature, that he can do whatsoever he pleases without difficulty, without resistance ; it cannot be checked, restrained, frustrated.* As he can do all things possible in regard of the object, he can do all things easily in regard of the manner of acting. What in human artificers is knowledge, labour, industry, that in God is his will ; his will works without labour, his works stand forth as he wills them. Hands and arms are ascribed to him for our conceptions, because our power of acting
is distinct from our will; but God's power of acting is not really distinct from his will, it is sufficient to the existence of a thing that God wills it to exist ; he can act what he will only by his will, without any instruments. He needs no matter to work upon, because he can make something from nothing ; all matter owes itself to his creative power. He needs no time to work in, for he can make time when he pleases to begin to work ; he needs no copy to work by, himself is his own pattern and copy in his works. All created agents want matter to work upon, instruments to work with, copies to work by, time to bring either the births of their minds or the works of their hands to perfection ; but the power of God needs none of these things, but is of a vast and incomprehensible nature, beyond all these. As nothing can be done without the compass of it, so itself is without the compass of every created understanding.
4. This power is of a distinct conception from the wisdom and will of God. They are not really distinct, but according to our conceptions. We cannot discourse of divine things without observing some proportion of them with human, ascribing unto God the perfections, sifted from the imperfec tions of our nature. In us there are three orders, of understanding, will, power ; and accordingly three acts, counsel, resolution, execution ; which, though they are distinct in us, are not really distinct in God. In our con ceptions, the apprehension of a thing belongs to the understanding of God ; determination, to the will of God ; direction, to the wisdom of God ; exe cution, to the power of God. The knowledge of God regards a thing as possible, and as it may be done ; the wisdom of God regards a thing as fit and convenient to be done ; the will of God resolves that it shall be done ; the power of God is the application of his will to effect what it hath resolved. Wisdom is a fixing the being of things, the measures and perfections of their several beings ; power is a conferring those perfections and beings upon them. His power is his ability to act, and his wisdom is the director of his action. His will orders, his wisdom guides, ^and his power effects. His will
as the spring, and his power as the worker, are expressed, Ps. cxv. 8, ' He hath done whatsoever he pleased.' ' He commanded, and they were created,' Ps. cxlviii. 5. And all three expressed Eph. i. 11, 'Who works all things according to the counsel of his own will.' So that the power of God is a perfection (as it were) subordinate to his understanding and will, to execute the results of his wisdom and the orders of his will ; to his wis dom, as directing, because he works skilfully ; to his will, as moving and applying, because he works voluntarily and freely. The exercise of his power depends upon his will. His will is the supreme cause of everything that stands up in time, and all things receive a being as he wills them. His power is but will perpetually working, and diffusing itself in the season his will hath fixed from eternity. It is his eternal will, in perpetual and suc cessive springs and streams in the creatures ; it is nothing else but the constant efficacy of his omnipotent will. This must be understood of his ordinate power. But his absolute power is larger than his resolving will ; for though the Scripture tells us he hath done whatsoever he will, yet it tells
* Cra. Syntag., lib. iii. cap. xvii. p. 611.
108 CHAENOCK'S WORKS. [Jos XXVI. 14.
us not that he hath done whatsoever he could. He can do things that he will never do.
Again, his power is distinguished from his will in regard of the exercise of it, which is after the act of his will. His will was conversant about objects when his power was not exercised about them. Creatures were the objects of his will from eternity, but they were not from eternity the effects of his power. His purpose to create was from eternity, but the execution of his purpose was in time. Now, this execution of his will we call his ordinate power. His wisdom and his will are supposed antecedent to his power, as the counsel and resolve, as the cause precedes the performance of the purpose, as the effect. Some* distinguish his power from his under standing and will, in regard that his understanding and will are larger than his absolute power ; for God understands sins, and wills to permit them, but he cannot himself do any evil or unjust action, nor have a power of
doing it. But this is not to distinguish that divine power, but impotence f; for to be unable to do evil is the perfection of power, and to be able to do things unjust and evil is a weakness, imperfection, and inability. Man indeed wills many things that he is not able to perform, and understands many things that he is not able to effect ; he understands much of the crea tures, something of sun, moon, and stars ; he can conceive many suns, many moons, yet is not able to create the least atom. But there is nothing that belongs to power but God understands and is able to effect. To sum this up, the will of God is the root of all, the wisdom of God is the copy of all, and the power of God is the framer of all.
5. The power of God gives activity to all the other perfections of his nature, and is of a larger extent and efficacy, in regard of its objects, than
some perfections of his nature. I put them both together.
(1.) It contributes life and activity to all the other perfections of his nature. How vain would be his eternal counsels, if power did not step in to execute them ? His mercy would be a feeble pity, if he were destitute of power to relieve ; and his justice a slighted scare-crow, without power to
punish ; his promises an empty sound, without power to accomplish them. As holiness is the beauty, so power is the life of all his attributes in their exercise ; and as holiness, so power is an adjunct belonging to all, a term that may be given to all. God hath a powerful wisdom to attain his ends, without interruption. He hath a powerful mercy to remove our misery ; a powerful justice to lay all misery upon offenders ; he hath a powerful truth to perform his promises ; an infinite power to bestow rewards and inflict penalties. It is to this purpose power is first put in the two things which
the psalmist had heard : Ps. Ixii. 11, 12, ' Twice have I heard,' or ' two things have I heard ;' first power, then mercy and justice included in that expression, ' Thou renderest to every man according to his work.' In every perfection of God he heard of power. This is the arm, the hand of the Deity, which all his other attributes lay hold on, when they would appear in their glory ; this hands them to the world, by this they act, in this they triumph. Power framed every stage for their appearance in creation, pro vidence, redemption.
(2.) It is of a larger extent, in regard of its objects, than some other attri butes. Power doth not alway suppose an object, but constitutes an object. It supposeth an object in the act of preservation, but it makes an object in
the act of creation ; but mercy supposeth an object miserable, yet doth not make it so. Justice supposeth an object criminal, but doth not constitute it so ; mercy supposeth him miserable, to relieve him. Justice supposeth
* Gamachous. t Qu. ' impotence, but power ' ? — ED.
JOB XXVI. 14.] GOD'S POWER. 109
him criminal, to punish him ; but power supposeth not a thing in real existence, but as possible ; or rather, it is from power that anything hath a possibility, if there be no repugnancy in the nature of the thing.
Again, power extends further than either mercy or justice. Mercy hath particular objects, which justice shall not at last be willing to punish ; and justice hath particular objects, which mercy at last shall not be willing to
refresh ; but power doth, and alway will extend to the objects of both mercy and justice. A creature, as a creature, is neither the object of mercy nor justice, nor of rewarding goodness ; a creature, as innocent, is the object
of rewarding goodness ; a creature, as miserable, is the object of compas sionate mercy ; a creature, as criminal, is the object of revenging justice ; but all of them the objects of power, in conjunction with those attributes of goodness, mercy, and justice, to which they belong. All the objects that mercy, and justice, and truth, and wisdom, exercise themselves about, have a possibility and an actual being from this perfection of divine power. It is power first frames a creature in a capacity of nature for mercy or justice, though it doth not give an immediate qualification for the exercise of either. Power makes man a rational creature, and so confers upon him a nature mutable, which may be miserable by its own fault, and punishable by
God's justice, or pitiable by God's compassion, and relievable by God's mercy ; but it doth not make him sinful, whereby he becomes miserable and punishable.
Again, power runs through all the decrees of the states of a creature. As a thing is possible, or may be made, it is the object of absolute power ; as it
isfactibile, or ordered to be made, it is the object of ordinate power. As a thing is actually made, and brought into being, it is the object of preserving power. So that power doth stretch out its arms to all the works of God, in all their circumstances, and at all times. When mercy ceaseth to relieve a creature, when justice ceaseth to punish a creature, power ceaseth not to preserve a creature. The blessed in heaven, that are out of the reach of punishing justice, are for ever maintained by power in that blessed condi tion ; the damned in hell, that are cast out of the bosom of entreating mercy, are for ever sustained in those remediless torments by the arm of power.
6. This power is originally and essentially in the nature of God, and not distinct from his essence. It is originally and essentially in God. The strength and power of great kings is originally in their people, and managed and ordered by the authority of the prince for the common good. Though a prince hath authority in his person to command, yet he hath not sufficient strength in his person, without the assistance of others, to make his com mands to be obeyed. He hath not a single strength in his own person to conquer countries and kingdoms, and increase the number of his subjects. He must make use of the arms of his own subjects, to overrun other places, and yoke them under his dominion. But the power of all things that ever were, are, or shall be, is originally and essentially in God. It is not derived from anything without him, as the power of the greatest potentates in the
world is. Therefore, Ps. Ixii. 11, it is said, ' power belongs unto God,' that is,
solely, and to none else. He hath a power to make his subjects, and as many as he pleases ; to create worlds, to enjoin precepts, to execute penal ties, without calling in the strength of his creatures to his aid. The strength
that the subjects of a mortal prince have, is not derived to them from the prince, though the exercise of it for this or that end is ordered and directed by the authority of the prince. But what strength soever anything hath to act as a means, it hath from the power of God as Creator, as well as what-
110 CHAENOCK'S WORKS. [Jos XXVI. 14.
soever authority it hath to act is from God, as a rector and governor of the
world. God hath a strength to act without means, and no means can act anything without his power and strength communicated to them. As the
clouds in the 8th verse before the text are called God's clouds, ' his clouds,' so all the strength of creatures may be called, and truly is, God's strength and power in them ; a drop of power shot down from heaven, originally only in God. Creatures have but a little mite of power ; somewhat communicated
to them, somewhat kept and reserved from* them, of what they are capable to possess. They have limited natures, and therefore a limited sphere of activity. Clothes can warm us, but not feed us ; bread can nourish us, but not clothe us. One plant hath a medicinal quality against one disease, another against another ; but God is the possessor of universal power, the common exchequer of this mighty treasure. He acts by creatures, as not needing their power, but deriving power to them ; what he acts by them, he could act himself without them ; and what they act as from themselves, is derived to them from him through invisible channels. And hence it will follow, that because power is essentially in God, more operations of God are possible than are exerted.
And as power is essentially in God, so it is not distinct from his essence. It belongs to God in regard of the unconceivable excellency and activity of his essence.f And omnipotence is nothing but the divine essence efficacious ad extra. It is his essence as operative, and the immediate principle of operation ; as the power of enlightening in the sun, and the power of heat ing in the fire, are not things distinct from the nature of them ; but the nature of the sun bringing forth light, and the nature of the fire bringing forth heat. The power of acting is the same with the substance of God, though the action from that power be terminated in the creature. If the power of God were distinct from his essence, he were then compounded of substance and power, and would not be the most simple being. As when the understanding is informed in several parts of knowledge, it is skilledfin the government of cities and countries, it knows this or that art, it learns mathematics, philosophy, this or that science, the [understanding hath a power to do this ; but this power, whereby it learns those excellent things, and brings forth excellent births, is not a thing distinct from the under standing itself; we may rather call it the understanding powerful, than the power of the understanding ; and so we may rather say God powerful, than
say, the power of God ; because his power is not distinct from his essence.
From both these it will follow, that this omnipotence is communicable to any creature ; no creature can inherit it, because it is a contradiction for any creature to have the essence of God. This omnipotence is a peculiar right of God, wherein no creature can share with him. To be omnipotent is to be essentially God. And for a creature to be omnipotent, is for a creature to be its own Creator. It being therefore the same with the essence of the Godhead, it cannot be communicated to the humanity of Christ, as the Lutherans say it is, without the communication of the essence of the God head ; for then the humanity of Christ would not be humanity, but deity.
If omnipotence were communicated to the humanity of Christ, the essence of God were also communicated to his humanity, and then eternity would be communicated. His humanity then was not given him in time, his humanity would be uncompounded, that is, his body would be no body, his soul no soul. Omnipotence is essentially in God ; it is not distinct from the essence of God, it is his essence, omnipotent, able to do all things.
* Qu. ' for' ?— ED. t Ratione sumrnse actualitatis essentise. — Suarez, vol. i. p. 150, 151.
JOB XXVI. 14.J GOD'S POWEB. HI
7. Hence it follows that this power is infinite : Eph. i. 19, ' What is the
exceeding greatness of his power,' &c., 'according to the working of his mighty power.' God were not omnipotent unless his power were infinite ; for a finite power is a limited power, and a limited power cannot effect every thing that is possible. Nothing can be too difficult for the divine power to effect. He hath a fulness of power, an exceeding strength, above all human
capacities ; it is a mighty power, Eph. i. 19, able to do ' above all that we can ask or think, Eph. iii. 20. That which he acts is above the power of any creature to act. Infinite power consists in the bringing things forth from nothing. No creature can imitate God in this prerogative of power. Man indeed can carve various forms, and erect various pieces of art, but from pre-existent matter. Every artificer hath the matter brought to his hand, he only brings it forth in a new figure. Chemists separate one thing from another, but create nothing, but sever those things which were before compacted and curdled together ; but when God speaks a powerful word, nothing begins to be something. Things stand forth from the womb of nothing, and obey his mighty command, and take what forms he is pleased to give them. The creating one thing, though never so small and minute, as the least fly, cannot be but by an infinite power, much less can the pro ducing of such variety we see in the world. His power is infinite, in regard it cannot be resisted by anything that he hath made, nor can it be confined by anything he can will to make. ' His greatness is unsearchable, Ps. cxlv. 8. It is a greatness, not of quantity, but quality. The greatness of his power hath no end. It is a vanity to imagine any limits can be affixed
to it, or that any creature can say, ' Hitherto it can go, and no further.' It is above all conception, all inquisition of any created understanding. No creature ever had, nor ever can have, that strength of wit and understanding to conceive the extent of his power, and how magnificently he can work.
(1.) His essence is infinite. As in a finite subject there is a finite virtue, so in an infinite subject there must be an infinite virtue. Where the essence
is ^limited, the power is so ; * where the essence is unlimited, the power knows no bounds. f Among creatures, the more excellency of being and form anything hath, the more activity, vigour, and power it hath to work according to its nature. The sun hath a mighty power to warm, enlighten, and fructify, above what the stars have, because it hath a vaster body, more intense degrees of light, heat, and vigour. Now if you conceive the sun made much greater than it is, it would proportionably have greater degrees of power to heat and enlighten than it hath now ; and were it possible to have an infinite heat and light, it would infinitely heat and enlighten other things ; for everything is able to act according to the measures of its being. Therefore, since the essence of God is unquestionably infinite, his power of
acting must be so also. His power (as was said before) is one and the same with his essence. And though the knowledge of God extends to more objects than his power, because he knows all evils of sin, which, because of his holiness, he cannot commit ; yet it is as infinite as his knowledge, be cause it is as much one with his essence as his knowledgle and wisdom is. For as the wisdom or knowledge of God is nothing but the essence of God knowing, so the power of God is nothing but the essence of God able.
(2.) The objects of divine power are innumerable. The objects of divine power are not essentially infinite ; and therefore we must not measure the infiniteness of divine power by an ability to make an infinite being, because there is an incapacity in any created thing to be infinite ; for to be a creature and to be infinite, to be infinite and yet made, is a contradiction.
* Operationes sequuntnr essentiam. t Aquin. par. i. qu. 25, artic. 2.
CHAKNOCK'S WORKS. [Jos XXVI. 14.
To be infinite, and to be God, is one and tbe same thing. Nothing can be infinite but God, nothing but God is infinite. But the power of God is infinite, because it can produce infinite effects, or innumerable things, such as surpass the arithmetic of a creature ; nor yet doth the infiniteness consist simply in producing innumerable effects, for that a finite cause can produce. Fire can by its finite and limited heat burn numberless combustible things and parcels, and the understanding of man hath an infinite number of thoughts and acts of intellection, and thoughts different from one another. Who can number the imaginations of his fancy, and thoughts of his mind, the space of one month or year ? much less of forty or a hundred years ; yet all these thoughts are about things that are in being, or have a founda
tion in things that are in being. But the infiniteness of God's power con sists in an ability to produce infinite effects, formally distinct, and diverse from one another, such as never had being, such as the mind of man cannot
conceive : 'Able to do above what we can think,' Eph. iii. 20. And what soever God hath made, or is able to make, he is able to make in an infinite manner, by calling them to stand forth from nothing. To produce innumer able effects of distinct natures, and from so distant a term as nothing, is an argument of infinite power.
Now, that the objects of divine power are innumerable, appears, because God can do infinitely more than he hath done or will do. Nothing that God hath done can enfeeble or dull his power ; there still resides in him an ability beyond all the settled contrivances of his understanding and resolves of his will, which no effects which he hath wrought can drain and put to a stand. As he can raise stones to be children to Abraham, Mat. iii. 9, so with the same mighty word whereby he made one world, he can make
infinite nnmbers of worlds to be the monuments of his • glory. After the prophet Jeremiah, xxxii. 17, had spoke of God's power in creation, he adds, 'And nothing is too hard for thee.' For one world that he hath made he can create millions, for one star which he hath beautified the hea vens with he could have garnished it with a thousand, and multiplied, if he
had pleased, every one of those into millions ; for he can ' call things that are not,' Eom. iv. 17; not some things, but all things possible. The barren womb of nothing can no more resist his power now to educe a world from it than it could at first. No doubt but for one angel which he hath made he could make many worlds of angels. He that made one with so much ease as by a word, cannot want power to make many more, till he wants a word. The word that was not too weak to make one, cannot be too weak to make multitudes. If from one man he hath, in a way of nature, multiplied so many in all ages of the world, and covered with them the whole face of the earth, he could in a supernatural way, by one word, multiply as many more.
It is ' the breath of the Almighty that gives life,' Job. xxxiii. 4. He can create infinite species and kinds of creatures more than he hath created, more variety of forms. For since there is no searching of his greatness, there is no conceiving the numberless possible effects of his power. The understanding of man can conceive numberless things possible to be, more than have been or shall be. And shall we imagine that a finite understand
ing of a creature hath a greater omnipotency to conceive, things possible, than God hath to produce things possible ? When the understanding of man is tired in its conceptions, it must still be concluded that the power of God extends not only to what can be conceived, but infinitely beyond the measures
of a finite faculty : ' Touching the Almighty, we cannot find him out : he is excellent in power and in judgment,' Job xxxvii. 23. For the understanding of man, in its conceptions of more kind of creatures, is limited to those
JOB XXVI. 14.] GOD'S POWER. j^g
creatures which are. It cannot in its own imaginations conceive anything but what hath some foundation in and from something already in being. It may frame a new kind of creature, made up of a lion, a horse, an ox ; but all those parts whereof its conceptions are made have distinct beings in the world, though not in that composition as his mind mixes and joins them. But no question but God can create creatures that have no resemblance with any kind of creatures yet in being. It is certain that if God only knows those things which he hath done and will do, and not all things possible to be done by him, his knowledge were finite ; so if he could do no more than what he hath done, his power would be finite.
[l.J Creatures have a power to act about more objects than they do. The understanding of man can frame, from one principle of truth, many con clusions and inferences more than it doth. Why cannot then the power of God frame from one first matter an infinite number of creatures more than have been created ? The almightiness of God in producing real effects is not inferior to the understanding of man in drawing out real truths. An artificer that makes a watch, supposing his life and health, can make many more of a different form and motion; and a limner can draw many draughts, and frame many pictures with a new variety of colours, according to the richness of his fancy. If these can do so, that require a pre-existent matter framed to their hands, God can much more, who can raise beautiful structures from nothing. As long as men have matter, they can diversify the matter, and make new figures from it ; so long as there is nothing, God
can produce out of that nothing whatsoever he pleases.
We see the same in inanimate creatures. A spark of fire hath a vast power in it ; it will kindle other things, increase and enlarge itself. No thing can be exempt from the active force of it. It will alter, by consum ing or refining, whatsoever you offer to it. It will reach all, and refuse none ; and by the efficacious power of it, all those new figures which we see in metals are brought forth. When you have exposed to it a multitude of things, still add more, it will exert the same strength, yea, the vigour is increased. rather than diminished. The more it catcheth, the more fiercely and irresistibly it will act ; you cannot suppose an end of its operation, or a decrease of its strength, as long as you can conceive its duration and con tinuance. This must be but a weak shadow of that infinite power which is in God. Take another instance in the sun. It hath power every year to produce flowers and plants from the earth, and is as able to produce them now as it was at the first lighting it and rearing it in the sphere wherein it
moves. And if there were no* kind of flowers and plants now created, the sun hath a power residing in it, ever since its first creation, to afford the same warmth to them for the nourishing and bringing them forth. What soever you can conceive the sun to be able to do in regard of plants, that can God do in regard of worlds, produce more worlds than the sun doth plants every year, without weariness, without languishment. The sun is
able to influence more things than it doth, and produce numberless effects ; but it doth not do so much as it is able to do, because it wants matter to work upon. God, therefore, who wants no matter, can do much more than he doth ; he can either act by second causes if there were more, or make more second causes if he pleased.
[2.] God is the most free agent. Every free agent can do more than he will do. Man being a free creature, can do more than ordinarily he doth will to do. God is most free, as being the spring of liberty in other crea tures. He acts not by a necessity of nature, as the waves of the sea, or
» Qu. 'new'?— ED. VOL. H. H
114 CHAENOCK'S WORKS. [Jos XXVI. 14.
the motions of the wind, and therefore is not determined to those things which he hath already called forth into the world. If God be infinitely wise in contrivance, he could contrive more than he hath, and therefore can effect more than he hath effected. He doth not act to the extent of his power upon all occasions. It is according to his will that he works, Eph. i. 11. It is not according to his work that he wills ; his work is an evidence of his will, but not the rule of his will. His power is not the rule of his will, but his will is the disposer of his power, according to the light of his infinite wis dom, and other attributes that direct his will ; and therefore his power is not to be measured by his actual will. No doubt but he could in a moment have
produced that world which he took six days' time to frame. He could have drowned the old world at once, without prolonging the time till the revolu tion of forty days. He was not limited to such a term of time by any weak ness, but by the determination of his own will. God doth not do the hundred thousandth part of what he is able to do, but what is convenient to do, according to the end which he hath proposed to himself. Jesus Christ, as man, could have asked legions of angels ; and God, as a sovereign, could have sent them, Mat. xxvi. 53. God could raise the dead every day if he pleased, but he doth not. He could heal every diseased person in a moment, but he doth not. As God can will more than he doth actually will, so he can do more than he hath actually done. He can do whatsoever he can will ; he can will more worlds, and therefore can create more worlds. If God hath not ability to do more than he will do, he then can do no more than what he actually hath done ; and then it will follow that he is not a free, but a natural and necessary agent, which cannot be supposed of God.
(8.) This power is infinite in regard of action. As he can produce num berless objects above what he hath produced, so he could produce them more magnificently than he hath made them. As he never works to the extent of his power in regard of things, so neither in the manner of acting ; for he never acts so, but he could act in a higher and perfecter manner.
[1 .] His power is infinite in regard of the independency of action. He wants no instrument to act. When there was nothing but God, there was no cause of action but God. When there was nothing in being but God, there could be no instrumental cause of the being of anything. God can perfect his action without dependence on anything;* and to be simply independent is to be simply infinite. In this respect it is a power incommunicable to any creature, though you conceive a creature in higher degrees of perfection than it is. A creature cannot cease to be dependent, but it must cease to be a creature : to be a creature and independent, are terms repugnant ,to one another.
[2.] But the mfiniteness of divine power consists in an ability to give higher degrees of perfection to everything which he hath made. As his power is infinite extensive, in regard of the multitude of objects he can bring into being, so it is infinite fntensive, in regard of the manner of operation, and the endowments he can bestow upon them.f Some things, indeed, God doth so perfect, that higher degrees of perfection cannot be imagined to be added to them.J As the humanity of Christ cannot be united more glo riously than to the person of the Son of God, a greater degree of perfection cannot be conferred upon it ; nor can the souls of the blessed have a nobler object of vision and fruition than God himself, the infinite being. No higher than the enjoyment of himself can be conferred upon a creature, respectu termini. This is not want of power. He cannot be greater because he is greatest, nor better because he is best ; nothing can be more than infinite ;
* Suarez, de Deo, vol. i. p. 151. J Becan., Sum. Theol. p. 84. t Becan., Sum. Theol. p. 82.
JOB XXVI. 14.] GOD'S POWER. 115
but as to the things which God hath made in the world, he could have given them other manner of beings than they have. A human understanding may improve a thought or conclusion, strengthen it with more and more force of reason, and adorn it with richer and richer elegancy of language ; why, then, may not the divine providence produce a world more perfect and excel lent than this ? He that makes a plain vessel can embellish it more, engrave more figures upon it, according to the capacity of the subject ; and cannot
God do so much more with his works ? Could not God have made this world of a larger quantity, and the sun of a greater bulk and proportionable strength to influence a bigger world ; so that this world would have been to another that God might have made as a ball or a mount, this sun as a star to another sun that he might have kindled ? He could have made every star a sun, every spire of grass a star, every grain of dust a flower, every soul an angel. And though the angels be perfect creatures, and inexpres sibly more glorious than a visible creature, yet who can imagine God so confined that he cannot create a more excellent kind, and endow those which he hath made with excellency of a higher rank than he invested them with at the first moment of their creation ? Without question God might have given the meaner creatures more excellent endowments, put them into another order of nature for their own good, and more diffusive usefulness in the world. What is made use of by the prophet in another case, may be used
in this, ' yet had he a residue of Spirit,' Mai. ii. 15. The capacity of every creature might have been enlarged by God ; for no work of his in the world doth equal his power, as nothing that he hath framed doth equal his wisdom. The same matter which is the matter of the body of a beast, is the matter of a plant and flower, is the matter of the body of a man, and so was capable of a higher form and higher perfections than God hath been pleased to bestow upon it. And he had power to bestow that perfection on one part of matter which he denied to it, and bestowed on another part. If God can not make things in a greater perfection, there must be some limitation of him. He cannot be limited by another, because nothing is superior to God. If limited by himself, that limitation is not from a want of power, but a want of will. He can by his own power raise stones to be children to Abraham, Mat. iii. 9. He could alter the nature of the stones, form them into human bodies, dignify them with rational souls, inspire those souls with such graces that may render them the children of Abraham. But for the more fully understanding the nature of this power, we may observe,
First, That though God can make everything with a higher degree of per fection, yet still within the limits of a finite being. No creature can be made infinite, because no creature can be made God. No creature can be so im
proved as to equal the goodness and perfection of God ;* yet there is no creature but we may conceive a possibility of its being made more perfect in that rank of a creature than it is ; as we may imagine a flower or plant to have greater beauty and richer qualities imparted to it by divine power, without rearing it so high as to the dignity of a rational or sensitive creature.
Whatsoever perfections may be added by God to a creature, are still finite perfections ; and a multitude of finite excellencies can never amount to the value and honour of infinite : as if you add one number to another as high
as you can, as much as a large piece of paper can contain, you can never make the numbers really infinite, though they may be infinite in regard of the inability of any human understanding to count them. The finite condi tion of the creature suffers it not to be capable of an infinite perfection. God is so great, so excellent, that it is his perfection not to have any equal ; the
* Gamach. in Aquin., torn. i. qu. 25.
116 CHARNOCK'S WOBKS. [Jos XXYI. 14.
defect is in the creature, which cannot be elevated to such a pitch ; as you can never make a gallon measure hold the quantity of a butt, or a butt the quantity of a river, or a river the fulness of the sea.
Secondly, Though God hath a power to furnish every creature with greater and nobler perfections than he hath bestowed upon it, yet he hath framed all things in the perfectest manner, and most convenient to that end for which he intended them. Everything is endowed with the best nature and
quality suitable to God's end in creation, though not in the best manner for itself.* In regard of the universal end, there cannot be a better; for God himself is the end of all things, who is the supreme goodness. Nothing can be better than God, who could not be God if he were not superlatively best or optimus ; and he hath ordered all things for the declaration of his goodness or justice, according to the behaviours of his creatures. Man doth not consider what strength or power he can put forth in the means he useth to attain such an end, but the suitableness of them to his main design, and so fits and marshals them to his grand purpose. Had God only created things that are most excellent, he had created only angels and men ; how, then, would his wisdom have been conspicuous in other works, in the sub ordination and subserviency of them to one another ? God therefore deter mined his power by his wisdom; and although his absolute power could have made every creature better, yet his ordinate power, which in every step was regulated by his wisdom, made everything best for his designed intention. f A musician hath a power to wind up a string on a lute to a higher and more perfect note in itself; but in wisdom he will not do it, because the intended melody should be disturbed thereby if it were not suited to the other strings on the instrument; a discord would mar and taint the harmony which the lutenist designed. God in creation observed the proportions of nature ; he can make a spider as strong as a lion, but according to the order of nature which he hath settled, it is not convenient that a creature of so small a compass should be as strong as one of a greater bulk. The absolute power of God could have prepared a body for Christ as glorious as that he had after his resurrection, but that had not been agree able to the end designed in his humiliation; and therefore God acted most perfectly by his ordinate power in giving him a body that wore the livery of
our infirmities. God's power is alway regulated by his wisdom and will ; and though it produceth not what is most perfect in itself, yet what is most perfect and decent in relation to the end he fixed. And so in his provi dence, though he could rack the whole frame of nature to bring about his ends in a more miraculous way and astonishment to mortals, yet his power is usually and ordinarily confined by his will to act in concurrence with the nature of the creatures, and direct them according to the laws of their being, to such ends which he aims at in their conduct, without violencing their nature.
Thirdly, Though God hath an absolute power to make more worlds, and infinite numbers of other creatures, and to render every creature a higher mark of his power, yet in regard of his decree to the contrary, he cannot do it. He hath a physical power, but after his resolve to the contrary, not a moral power. The exercise of his power is subordinate to his decree, but not the essence of his power.J The decree of God takes not away any power from God, because the power of God is his own essence, and incapable of change, and is as great physically and essentially after his decree as it was
* Best, ex parte facientis et modi, but not ex parte rei. — Esti. in Senten. lib. i. distin. xliv. sec. 2.
t Aquin. part i. qu. xxv. art. 6. \ Gamach. in Aquin. torn. i. qu. xxv.
JOB XXVI. 14.] GOD'S POWER. 117
before, only his will hath put in a bar to the demonstration of all that power which he is able to exercise. As a prince that can raise a hundred thou sand men for an invasion raises only twenty or thirty thousand, he here, by his order, limits his power, but doth not divest himself of his authority and power to raise the whole number of the forces of his dominions if he pleases. The power of God hath more objects than his decree hath ; but since it is his perfection to be immutable, and not to change his decree, he cannot morally put forth his power upon all those objects, which, as it is essen tially in him, he hath ability to do. God hath decreed to save those that believe in Christ, and to judge unbelievers to everlasting perdition.* He cannot morally damn the first or save the latter ; yet he hath not divested himself of his absolute power to save all or damn all. Or suppose God hath decreed not to create more worlds than this we are now in, doth his decree weaken his strength to create more if he pleased ? His not creating more is not a want of strength, but a want of will ; it is an act of liberty, not an act of impotency. As when a man solemnly resolves not to walk in such a way, or come at such a place, his resolution deprives him not of his natural strength to walk thither, but fortifies his will against using his strength in any such motion to that place. The will of God hath set bounds to the exercise of his power, but doth not infringe that absolute power which still resides in his nature ; he is girded with more power than he puts forth, Ps. kv. 6.
(4.) As the power of God is infinite in regard of his essence, in regard of the objects, in regard of action, so, fourthly, in regard of duration. The
apostle calls it an ' eternal power,' Rom. i. 20. His eternal power is collected and concluded from the things that are made ; they must needs be the product of some being which contains truly in itself all power, who wrought them without engines, without instruments ; and therefore this power must be infinite, and possessed of an unalterable virtue of acting. If it be eternal it must be infinite, and hath neither beginning nor end. What is eternal hath no bounds. If it be eternal, and not limited by time, it must be infinite, and not to be restrained by any finite object. His power never begun to be, nor ever ceaseth to be ; it cannot languish. Men are fain to unbend themselves, and must have some time to recruit their tired spirits ; but the power of God is perpetually vigorous, without any interrupting qualm : Isa. xl. 28, ' Hast thou not known, hast thou not heard, that the everlastiag God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the
earth, fainteth not, neither is weary ? ' That might which suffered no diminution from eternity, but hatched so great a world by brooding upon nothing, will not suffer any dimness or decrease to eternity. This power being the same with his essence, is as durable as his essence, and resides for ever in his nature.
8. The eighth consideration, for the right understanding of this attri bute. The impossibility of God's doing some things, is no infringing of his almightiness, but rather a strengthening of it. It is granted that some things God cannot do ; or rather, as Aquinas and others, it is better to say, such things cannot be done, than to say that God cannot do them ; to remove all kind of imputation or reflection of weakness on God,f and because the reason of the impossibility of those things is in the nature of the things themselves.
(1.) First, Some things are impossible in their own nature. Such are all those things which imply a contradiction; as for a thing to be and not to be at the same time, for the sun to shine and not to shine at the samd
* Crell. de Deo, cap. xxii. t Robins. Observat. p. 14,
118 CHAENOCK'S WORKS. [JoB XXVI. 14.
moment of time, for a creature to act and not to act at the same instant.
One of those parts must be false ; for if it be true that the sun shines this moment, it must be false to say it doth not shine. So it is impossible that a rational creature can be without reason. It is a contradiction to be a
rational creature, and yet want that which is essential to a rational creature ; so it is impossible that the will of man can be compelled, because liberty is the essence of the will. While it is will, it cannot be constrained ; and if it be constrained, it ceaseth to be will. God cannot at one time act as the
author of the will and the destroyer of the will.* It is impossible that vice and virtue, light and darkness, life and death, should be the same thing. Those things admit not of a conception in any understanding. Some things are impossible to be done, because of the incapability of the subject ; as for a creature to be made infinite, independent, to preserve itself without the divine concourse and assistance. So a brute cannot be taken into communion with God, and to everlasting spiritual blessedness, because the nature of a brute is incapable of such an elevation. A rational creature only can understand and relish spiritual delights, and is capable to enjoy God and have com munion with him. Indeed, God may change the nature of a brute, and bestow such faculties of understanding and will upon it as to render it capable of such a blessedness ; but then it is no more a brute, but a rational creature ; but while it remains a brute, the excellency of the nature of God doth not admit of communion with such a subject ; so that this is not for want of power in God, but because of a deficiency in the creature. To suppose that God could make a contradiction true, is to make himself false, and to do just nothing.
(2.) Some things are impossible to the nature and being of God. As to die, implies a flat repugnance to the nature of God ; to be able to die, is to be able to be cashiered out of being. If God were able to deprive himself of life, he might then cease to be ; he were not then a necessary, but an
uncertain, contingent being, and could not be said ' only to have immor tality' as he is, 1 Tim. vi. 16. He cannot die who is life itself, and neces sarily existent ; he cannot grow old or decay, because he cannot be measured by time. And this is no part of weakness, but the perfection of power. His
power is that whereby he remains for ever fixed in his own everlasting being; that cannot be reckoned as necessary to the omnipotence of God which all mankind count a part of weakness in themselves. God is omnipotent, because he is not impotent, and if he could die he would be impotent, not omnipotent ; death is the feebleness of nature. It is undoubtedly the great est impotence to cease to be. Who would count it a part of omnipotency to disenable himself, and sink into nothing and not being ? The impossi bility for God to die is not a fit article to impeach his omnipotence. This would be a strange way of arguing ; a thing is not powerful because it is not feeble, and cannot cease to be powerful, for death is a cessation of all power. God is almighty in doing what he will, not in suffering what he will not.f To die is not an active, but a passive, power ; a defect of a power. God is of too noble a nature to perish.
Some things are impossible to that eminency of nature which he hath above all creatures ; as to walk, sleep, feed, these are imperfections belonging to bodies and compound natures. If he could walk, he were not every where present. Motion speaks succession. If he could increase, he would not have been perfect before.
(3.) Some things are impossible to the glorious perfections of God. God cannot do anything unbecoming his holiness and goodness, anything
* Magalano, de scientia Dei, part ii. cap. vi. sec. 3. t August.
JOB XXVI. 14.J GOD'S POWEB. 119
unworthy of himself, and against the perfections of his nature. God can do whatsoever he can will. As he doth actually do whatsoever he doth actually will, so it is possible for him to do whatsoever it is possible for him to will. He doth whatsoever he will, and can do whatsoever he can will, but he cannot do what he cannot will. He cannot will any un righteous thing, and therefore cannot do any unrighteous thing. God cannot love sin, this is contrary to his holiness ; he cannot violate his word, this is a denial of his truth ; he cannot punish an innocent, this is contrary to his goodness ; he cannot cherish an impenitent sinner, this is an injury to bis justice ; he cannot forget what is done in the world, this is a disgrace
to his'omniscience ; he cannot deceive his creature, this is contrary to his faithfulness. None of these things can be done by him, because of the perfection of his nature. Would it not be an imperfection in God to absolve the guilty, and condemn the innocent ? Is it congruous to the righteous and holy nature of God to command murder and adultery, to command men not to worship him, but to be base and unthankful ? These things would be against the rules of righteousness. As when we say of a good man, he cannot rob or fight a duel, we do not mean that he wants a courage for such an act, or that he hath not a natural strength and know ledge to manage his weapon as well as another, but he hath a righteous principle strong in him which will not suffer him to do it; his will is settled
against it. No power can pass into act unless applied by the will. But the will of God cannot will anything but what is worthy of him, and decent for his goodness.
[1.] The Scripture saith, it is ' impossible for God to lie,' Heb. vi. 13 ; and God ' cannot deny himself,' 2 Tim. ii. 13, because of his faithfulness. As he cannot die, because he is life itself; as he cannot deceive, because he is goodness itself; as he cannot do an unwise action, because he is wisdom itself; so he cannot speak a false word, because he is truth itself. If he should speak anything as true, and not know it, where is his infinite know ledge and comprehensiveness of understanding ? If he should speak any thing as true, which he knows to be false, where is his infinite righteous ness ? If he should deceive any creature, there is an end of his perfection, and fidelity, and veracity. If he should be deceived himself, there is an end of his omniscience ; we must then fancy him to be a deceitful God, an ignorant God, that is, no God at all. If he should lie, he would be God and no God ; God upon supposition, and no God, because not the first truth.* All unrighteousness is weakness, not power ; it is a defection from right reason, a deviation from moral principles and the rule of perfect action, and ariseth from a defect of goodness and power. It is a weakness, and not omnipotence, to lose goodness. f God is light ; it is the perfection of light not to become darkness, and a want of power in light, if it should become darkness. His power is infinitely strong, so is his wisdom infinitely clear, and his will infinitely pure. Would it not be a part of weakness to have a disorder in himself, and these perfections shock one against another ?
Since all perfections are in God in the most sovereign height of perfection, nothing can be done by the infiniteness of one against the infiniteness of
the other. He would then be unstable in his own perfections, and depart from the infinite rectitude of his own will, if he should do, an evil action. Again, J what is an argument of greater strength than to be utterly ignorant of infirmity ? God is omnipotent, because he cannot do evil, and would not be omnipotent if he could. Those things would be marks of weakness, and not characters of majesty. Would you count a sweet fountain impotent,
* Becan. sum. Theolog. p. 83. t Maximus Tyrius. J Auiicoae.
120 CHAKNOCK'S WORKS. [Jos XXVI. 14.
because it cannot send forth bitter streams ? or the sun weak, because it
cannot diffuse darkness as well as light in the air ? There is an inability arising from weakness, and an ability* arising from perfection. It is the perfection of angels and blessed spirits that they cannot sin ; and it would
be the imperfection of God if he could do evil.
[2.] Hence it follows, that it is impossible that a thing past should not be past. If we ascribe a power to God, to make a thing that is past not to
be past, we do not truly ascribe power to him, but a weakness, for it is to make God to lie ; as though God might not have created man, yet after he had created Adam, though he should presently have reduced Adam to his first nothing, yet it would be for ever true that Adam was created, and it would for ever be false that Adam never was created. So though
God may prevent sin, yet when sin hath been committed it will alway be true that sin was committed. It will never be true to say such a creature that did sin, did not sin ; his sin cannot be recalled. Though God by pardon
take off the guilt of Peter's denying our Saviour, yet it 'will be eternally true that Peter did deny him. It is repugnant to the righteousness and truth of
God, to make that which was once true to become false, and not true ; that is, to make a truth to become a lie, and a lie to become a truth.
This is well argued from Heb. vi. 18, it is ' impossible for God to lie.' The apostle argues, that what God had promised and sworn will come to pass, and cannot but come to pass.f Now if God could make a thing past not
to be past, this consequence would not be good, for then he might make himself not to have promised, not to have sworn, after he hath promised and sworn. And so if there were a power to undo that which is past, there would be no foundation for faith, no certainty of revelation. It cannot be asserted, that God hath created the world, that God hath sent his Son to die, that God hath accepted his death for man. These might not be true, if it were possible that that which hath been done might be said never to have been
done ; so that what any may imagine to be a want of power in God is the highest perfection of God, and the greatest security to a believing creature that hath to do with God.
(4.) Some things are impossible to be done, because of God's ordination. Some things are impossible, not in their own nature, but in regard of the determined will of God. So God might have destroyed the world after
Adam's fall, but it was impossible ; not that God wanted power to do it, but because he did not only decree from eternity to create the world, but did