Part 14
than any man's since, in all probability. But, however, if he were not acquainted with the notion of God's foreknowledge, he could not be ignorant of his own act ; there could not have been any necessity upon him, any kind of constraint of him in his action that could have been unknown to him ; and he would not have omitted a plea of so strong a nature, when he was upon his trial for life or death, especially when he urgeth so weak an argu ment to impute his crime to God as the gift of the woman, as if that which
was designed him for a help were intended for his ruin. If God's prescience takes away the liberty of the creature, there is no such thing as a free action in the world (for there is nothing done but is foreknown by God, else we render God of a limited understanding), nor ever was, no, not by God him self ad extra ; for whatsoever he hath done in creation, whatsoever he hath done since the creation, was foreknown by him ; he resolved to do it, and therefore foreknew that he would do it. Did God do it therefore neces
sarily, as necessity is opposed to liberty ? As he freely decrees what he will do, so he effects what he freely decreed. Foreknowledge is so far from intrenching upon the liberty of the will, that predetermination, which in the notion of it speaks something more, doth not dissolve it ; God did not only
EXOD. XV. 11.] GOD'S HOLINESS. 221
foreknow, but determine the suffering of Christ, Acts iv. 27, 28. It was necessary, therefore, that Christ should suffer, that God might not be mis taken in his foreknowledge, or come short of his determinate decree. But
did this take away the liberty of Christ in suffering ? Eph. v. 2, ' Who offered himself up to God ; ' that is, by a voluntary act, as well as designed to do it by a determinate counsel. It did infallibly secure the event, but
did not annihilate the liberty of the action, either in Christ's willingness to suffer, or the crime of the Jews that made him suffer. God's prescience is God's prevision of things arising from their proper causes ; as a gardener foresees in his plants the leaves and the flowers that will arise from them in the spring, because he knows the strength and nature of their several roots which lie under ground, but his foresight of these things is not the cause of the rise and appearance of those flowers. If any of us see a ship moving towards such a rock or qnicksand, and know it to be governed by a negli gent pilot, we shall certainly foresee that the ship will be torn in pieces by the rock, or swallowed up by the sands ; but is this foresight of ours from the causes, any cause of the effect, or can we from hence be said to be the authors of the miscarriage of the ship, and the loss of the passengers and goods ? ^The fall of Adam was foreseen by God to come to pass by the consent of his free will in the choice of the proposed temptation. God fore knew Adam would sin, and if Adam would not have sinned, God would have foreknown that he would not sin. Adam might easily have detected
the serpent's fraud, and made a better election ; God foresaw that he would not do it ; God's foreknowledge did not make Adam guilty or innocent ; •whether God had foreknown it or no, he was guilty by a free choice, and a willing neglect of his own duty. Adam knew that God foreknew that he might eat of the fruit, and fall and die, because God had forbidden him ; the foreknowledge that he would do it was no more a cause of his action than the foreknowledge that he might do it. Judas certainly knew that his master foreknew that he should betray him, for Christ had acquainted him with it, John xiii. 21, 26, yet he never charged this foreknowledge of Christ with any guilt of his treachery.
Prop. 3. The holiness of God is not blemished by decreeing the eternal rejection of some men. Reprobation in its first notion is an act of preterition, or passing by. A man is not made wicked by the act of God, but it
supposeth him wicked, and so it is nothing else but God's leaving a man in that guilt and filth wherein he beholds him. In its second notion it is an ordination, not to a crime, but to a punishment ; Jude 4, an ordaining to condemnation. And though it be an eternal act of God, yet in order of nature it follows upon the foresight of the transgression of man, and sup
poseth the crime. God considers Adam's revolt, and views the whole mass of his corrupted posterity, and chooses some to reduce to himself by his grace, and leaves others to lie sinking in their ruins. Since all mankind fell by the fall of Adam, and have corruption conveyed to them successively by that root whereof they are branches ; all men might justly be left wallowing in that miserable condition to which they were reduced by the apostasy of their common head, and God might have passed by the whole race of man, as well as he did the fallen angels, without any hope of redemption. He was no more bound to restore man than to restore devils, nor bound to repair the nature of any one son of Adam ; and had he dealt with men as he dealt with the devils, they had had all of them as little just ground to com plain of God ; for all men deserved to be left to themselves, for all were
' concluded under sin.' But God calls out some to make monuments of his grace, which is an act of the sovereign mercy of that dominion whereby
222 CHAJRNOCK'S WORKS. [Exoc. XV. 11.
' he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy,' Rom. ix. 18. Others he passes by, and leaves them remaining in that corruption of nature wherein they were born. If men have a power to dispose of their own goods, with out any unrighteousness, why should not God dispose of his own grace, and bestow it upon whom he pleases, since it is a debt to none, but a free gift to any that enjoy it ? God is not the cause of sin in this, because his operation about this is negative ; it is not an action, but a denial of action, and therefore cannot be the cause of the evil actions of men.* God acts nothing, but withholds his power ; he doth not enlighten their minds, nor incline their wills so powerfully as to expel their darkness, and root out those evil habits which possess them by nature. God could, if he would, savingly enlighten the minds of all men in the world, and quicken their hearts with a new life by an invincible grace, but in not doing it there is no positive act of God, but a cessation of action. We may with as much reason say, that God is the cause of all the sinful actions that are committed by the cor poration of devils since their first rebellion, because he leaves them to themselves, and bestows not a new grace upon them ; as say God is the cause of the sins of those that he overlooks and leaves in that state of guilt wherein he found them. God did not pass by any without the considera tion of sin, so that this act of God is not repugnant to his holiness, but conformable to his justice.
Prop. 4. The holiness of God is not blemished by his secret will to suffer sin to enter into the world. God never willed sin by his preceptive will. It was never founded upon, or produced by any word of his, as the creation was. He never said, Let there be sin under the heaven, as he said, Let there be water under the heaven. Nor doth he will it by infusing any habit
of it, or stirring up inclinations to it ; no, ' God tempts no man,' James i. 13. Nor doth he will it by his approving will ; it is detestable to him, nor ever can be otherwise. He cannot approve it either before commission or after.
1. The will of God is in some sort concurrent with sin. He doth not properly will it, but he wills not to hinder it, to which by his omnipotence he could put a bar. If he did positively will it, it might be wrought by himself, and so could not be evil. If he did in no sort will it, it would not be committed by his creature. Sin entered into the world, either God willing the permission of it, or not willing the permission of it. The latter cannot be said : for then the creature is more powerful than God, and can do that which God will not permit. God can, if he be pleased, banish all sin in a moment out of the world ; he could have prevented the revolt of angels, and the fall of man, they did not sin whether he would or no ; he might by his grace have stepped in the first moment, and made a special impression upon them of the happiness they already possessed, and the misery they would incur by any wicked attempt. He could as well have prevented the sin of the fallen angels, and confirmed them in grace, as of those that continued in their happy state ; he might have appeared to man, informed him of the issue of his design, and made secret impressions upon his heart, since he was acquainted with every avenue to his will. God could have kept all sin out of the world, as well as all creatures from breathing in it ; he was as well able to bar sin for ever out of the world as to let creatures lie in the womb of nothing, wherein they were first wrapped. To say God doth will sin as he doth other things, is to deny his holiness ; to say it entered without anything of his will, is to deny his omnipotence. If he did necessitate Adam to fall, what shall we think of his purity? If
* Amyrald, Defens. de Calv., p. 145.
EXOD. XV. 11.] GOD'S UGLINESS. 223
Adam did fall without any concern of God's will in it, what shall we say of his sovereignty ? The one taints his holiness, and the other clips his power. If it came without anything of his will in it, and he did not foresee it, where is his omniscience ? If it entered whether he would or no, where
is his omnipotence ? Kom. ix. 19, ' Who hath resisted his will ? ' There cannot be a lustful act in Abimelech, if God will withhold his power : Gen.
xx. 6, ' I withheld thee ; ' nor a cursing word in Balaam's mouth, unless God give power to speak it : Num. xxii. 88, ' Have I now any power at all to say anything ? The word that God puts in my mouth, that shall I speak.' As no action could be sinful if God had not forbidden it, so no sin could be committed if God did not will to give way to it.
2. God doth not will sin directly, and by an efficacious will. He doth not directly will it, because he hath prohibited it by his law, which is a discovery of his will. So that if he should directly will sin, and directly prohibit it, he would will good and evil in the same manner, and there
would be contradictions in God's will. To will sin absolutely is to work it : Ps. cxv. 3, ' God hath done whatsoever he pleased.' God cannot absolutely will it, because he cannot work it. God wills good by a positive decree, because he hath decreed to effect it.* He wills evil by a privative decree, because he hath decreed not to give that grace which would certainly pre vent it. God doth not will sin simply, for that were to approve it, but he wills itt in order to that good his wisdom will bring forth from it. He wills not sin for itself, but for the event. To will sin as sin, or as purely evil, is not in the capacity of a creature, neither of man nor devil. The will of a rational creature cannot will anything but under the appearance of good, of gome good in the sin itself, or some good in the issue of it. Much more is this from God, who being infinitely good, cannot will evil as evil, and being infinitely knowing, cannot will that for good which is evil. J Infinite wisdom can be under no error or mistake. To will sin as sin would be an unanswer
able blemish on God, but to will to suffer it in order to good is the glory of his wisdom. It could never have peeped up its head unless there had been some decree of God concerning it. And there had been no decree of God concerning it, had he not intended to bring good and glory out of it. If
God did directly will the discovery of his grace and mercy to the world, he did in some sort will sin, as that without which there could not have been any appearance of mercy in the world ; for an innocent creature is not the object of mercy, but a miserable creature, and no rational creature but must be sinful before it be miserable.
8. God wills the permission of sin. He doth not positively will sin, but he positively wills to permit it. And though he doth not approve of sin, yet he approves of that act of his will whereby he permits it. For since that sin could not enter into the world without some concern of God's will about it, that act of his will that gave way to it could not be displeasing to him. God could never be displeased with his own act : ' He is not a man
that he should repent,' 1 Sam. xv. 29. What God cannot repent of, he cannot but approve of ; it is contrary to the blessedness of God to disap-
irove of, and be displeased with, any act of his own will. If he hated any
it of his own will, he would hate himself, he would be under a torture ; every one that hates his own acts is under some disturbance and torment for them. That which is permitted by him is in itself, and in regard of the evil of it, hateful to him ; but as the prospect of that good which he aims at in the permission of it is pleasing to him, so that act of his will whereby
* Rispolis. t Bradward., lib. i. cap. xxxiv., God wills it, secundum quid. % Aquin. Cont. Gent. 1. i. p. 95.
224 CHARNOCK'S WORKS. [Exor>. XV. 11.
he permits it is ushered in by an approving act of his understanding. Either God approved of the permission or not ; if he did not approve his own act of permission, he could not have decreed an act of permission. It is unconceivable that God should decree such an act which he detested,
and positively will that which he hated. Though God hated sin, as being against his holiness, yet he did not hate the permission of sin, as being subservient by the immensity of his wisdom to his own glory. He could never be displeased with that which was the result of his eternal counsel, as this decree of permitting sin was, as well as any other decree resolved upon in his own breast. For as God acts nothing in time, but what he decreed from eternity, so he permits nothing in time, but what he decreed from eternity to permit. To speak properly, therefore, God doth not will sin, but he wills the permission of it, and this will to permit is active and positive in God.
4. This act of permission is not a mere and naked permission, but such an one as is attended with a certainty of the event. The decrees of God to make use of the sin of man for the glory of his grace, in the mission and passion of his Son, hung upon this entrance of sin ; would it consist^with the wisdom of God to decree such great and stupendous things, the event
whereof should depend upon an uncertain foundation, which he might be mistaken in ? • God would have sat in council from eternity to no purpose, if he had only permitted those things to be done, without any knowledge of the event of this permission ; God would not have made such provision for redemption to no purpose, or an uncertain purpose, which would have been if man had not fallen, or if it had been an uncertainty with God whether he
would fall or no. Though the 'will of God about sin was permissive, yet the will of God about that glory he would promote by the defect of the creature
was positive, and therefore, he would not suffer so many positive acts of his will to hang upon an uncertain event, and therefore he did wisely and righteously order all things to the accomplishment of his great and gracious purposes.
5. This act of permission doth not taint the holiness of God. That there
is such an act as permission is clear in Scripture : Acts xiv. 16, ' Who in
times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways ;' but that it doth not blemish the holiness of God will appear,
(1.) From the nature of this permission. [l.J It is not a moral permission, a giving liberty of toleration by any law to commit sin with impunity, when what one law did forbid another law doth leave indifferent to be done or not, as a man sees good in himself ; as when there is a law made among men, that no man shall go out of a city or country without license, to go without license is a crime by the law ; but when that law is repealed by another, that gives liberty for men to go and come at their pleasure, it doth not make their going or coming necessary, but leaves those which were before bound, to do as they see good in them selves. Such a permission makes a fact lawful, though not necessary ; a man is not obliged to do it, but he is left to his own discretion to do as he pleases, without being chargeable with a crime for doing it. Such a per mission there was granted by God to Adam of eating of the fruits of the garden, to choose any of them for food, except the tree of knowledge of good and evil. It was a precept to him not to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, but the other was a permission, whereby it was lawful for him to feed upon any other that was most agreeable to his appetite. But there is not such a permission in the case of sin ; this had been an indulgence of it which had freed man from any crime, and consequently from
EXOD. XV. 11.] GOD'S HOLINESS. 225
punishment, because by such a permission by law he would have had autho rity to sin if he pleased. God did not remove the law which he had before placed as a bar against evil, nor ceased that moral impediment of his threaten ing ; such a permission as this, to make sin lawful or indifferent, had been
a blot upon God's holiness. [2.] But this permission of God in the case of sin, is no more than the not hindering a sinful action which he could have prevented. It is not so much an action of God, as a suspension of his influence, which might have hindered an evil act, and a forbearing to restrain the faculties of man from sin ; it is properly the not exerting that efficacy which might change the counsels that are taken, and prevent the action intended ; as when one man sees another ready to fall, and can preserve him from falling by reaching out his hand, he permits him to fall, that is, he hinders him not from falling : so God describes his act about Abimelech, Gen. xx. 6, ' I withheld thee from
sinning against me, therefore suffered I thee not to touch her.' If Abimelech
had sinned, he had sinned by God's permission, that is, by God's not hinder ing or not restraining him, by making any impressions upon him ; so that permission is only a withholding that help and grace, which, if bestowed, would have been an effectual remedy to prevent a crime ; and it is rather a suspen sion or cessation, than properly a permission ; and sin may be said to be
committed not without God's permission, rather than by his permission. Thus in the fall of man, God did not hold the reins strict upon Satan to restrain him from laying the bait, nor restrain Adam from swallowing the bait; he kept to himself that efficacious grace which he might have darted out upon man to prevent his fall. God left Satan to his malice of tempting, and Adam to his liberty of resisting and his own strength, to use that sufficient grace he had furnished him with, whereby he might have resisted and overcome the temptation. As he did not drive man to it, so he did not secretly restrain him from it. So in the Jews' crucifying our Saviour ; God did not im print upon their minds, by his Spirit, a consideration of the greatness of the crime, and the horror of his justice due to it, and being without those impediments, they run furiously of their own accord to the commission of that evil; as when a man lets a wolf or dog out upon his prey, he takes off the chain which held them, and they presently act according to their
natures.* In the fall of angels and men, God's act was a leaving them to their own strength. In sins after the fall, it is God's giving them up to their .own corruption. The first is a pure suspension of grace, the other
hath the nature of a punishment : Ps. Ixxxi. 1, ' So I gave them up to their own hearts' lust.' The first object of this permissive will of God was to leave angels and men to their own liberty and the use of their free will, which was natural to them,f not adding that supernatural grace which was neces sary, not that they should not at all sin, but that they should infallibly not sin ; they had a strength sufficient to avoid sin, but not sufficient infallibly to avoid sin, a grace sufficient to preserve them, but not sufficient to confirm them.
[3.] Now this permission is not ther cause of sin, nor doth blemish the holiness of God ; it doth not intrench upon the freedom of men, but supporteth it, establisheth it, and leaves man to it. God acted nothing, but
only ceased to act, and therefore could not be the efficient cause of man's sin. As God is not the author of good but by willing and effecting it, so he is not the author of evil but by willing and effecting it. But he doth not positively will evil, nor effect it by any efficacy of his own. Permission is
no action, nor the cause of that action which is permitted, but the will of that person who is permitted to do such an action is the cause, j God can
* Lawson, p. 64. t Suarez, vol. iv. p. 414. J Suarez, de Legib. p. 43. VOL. II. p
226 CHARNOCK'S WORKS. [ExoD. XY. 11.
no more be said to be the cause of sin, by suffering a creature to act as it will, than he can be said to be the cause of the not being of any creature by
denying it being, and letting it remain nothing ; it is not from God that it is nothing, it is nothing in itself. Though God be said to be the cause of creation, yet he is never by any said to be the cause of that nothing which was before creation. This permission of God is not the cause of sin, but the cause of not hindering sin. Man and angels had a physical power of sinning from God, as they were created with free will and supported in their natural strength, but the moral power to sin was not from God ; he coun
selled them not to it, laid no obligation upon them to use their natural power for such an end ; he only left them to their freedom, and not hindered them in their acting what he was resolved to permit.
(2.) The holiness of God is not tainted by this, because he was under no obligation to hinder their commission of sin. Ceasing to act, whereby to prevent a crime for mischief, brings not a person permitting it under guilt, unless where he is under an obligation to prevent it ; but God, in regard of his absolute dominion, cannot be charged with any such obligation. One man that doth not hinder the murder of another when it is in his power, is guilty of the murder in part ; but it is to be considered that he is under a tie by
nature, as being of the same kind, and being the other's brother by a com munion of blood, also under an obligation of the law of charity, enacted by the common sovereign of the world ; but what tie was there upon God, since the infinite transcendency of his nature and his sovereign dominion frees him from any such obligation ? Job. ix. 12, 'If he takes away, who shall say, What dost thou ?' God might have prevented the fall of men and angels, he might have confirmed them all in a state of perpetual innocency, but where is the obligation ? He had made the creature a debtor to him self, but he owed nothing to the creature. Before God can be charged with any guilt in this case, it must be proved, not only that he could, but that he was
bound to hinder it. No person can be justly charged with another's fault merely for not preventing it, unless he be bound to prevent it ; else not only the first sin of angels and man would be imputed to God as the author, but all the sins of men. He could not be obliged by any law, because he had no superior to impose any law upon him, and it will be hard to prove that he was obliged from his own nature to prevent the entrance of sin, which
he would use as an occasion to declare his own holiness, so transcendent a perfection of his nature, more than ever it could have been manifested by a total exclusion of it, viz., in the death of Christ. He is no more bound in his own nature to preserve, by supernatural grace, his creatures from falling
after he had framed them with sufficient strength to stand, than he was obliged in his own nature to bring his creature into being, when it was no thing. He is not bound to create a rational creature, much less bound to create him with supernatural gifts ; though, since God would make a rational creature, he could not but make him with a natural, uprightness and rectitude.
God did as much for angels and men as became a wise governor. He had published his law, backed it with severe penalties, and the creature wanted not a natural strength to observe and obey it. Had not man a power to obey all the precepts of the law as well as one ? How was God bound to give him more grace, since what he had already was enough to shield him, and keep up his resistance against all the power of hell ! It had been enough to have pointed his will against the temptation, and he had kept off the force of it. Was there any promise passed to Adam of any further grace, which he could plead as a tie upon God ? No
EXOD. XV. 11.] GOD'S HOLINESS. 227
such voluntary limit upon God's supreme dominion appears upon record. Was anything due to man which he had not ? anything promised him which was not performed ? What action of debt, then, can the creature bring against God ? Indeed, when man began to neglect the light of his own reason, and became inconsiderate of the precept, God might have en lightened his understanding by a special flash, a supernatural beam, and imprinted upon him a particular consideration of the necessity of his obedi ence, the misery he was approaching to by his sin, the folly of any such apprehension of an equality in knowledge ; he might have convinced him of
the falsity of the serpent's arguments, and uncased to him the venom that lay under those baits. But how doth it appear that God was bound to those additional acts, when he had already lighted up in him a spirit which was
' the candle of the Lord,' Prov. xx. 27, whereby he was able to discern all, if he had attended to it. It was enough that God did not necessi tate man to sin, did not counsel him to it, that he had given him suffi cient warning in the threatening, and sufficient strength in his faculties, to fortify him against temptation. He gave him what was due to him as a creature of his own framing, he withdrew no help from him that was due to him as a creature, and what was not due he was not bound to im part. Man did not beg preserving grace of God, and God was not bound to offer it when he was not petitioned for it especially ; yet if he had begged it, God having before furnished him sufficiently, might, by the right of his sovereign dominion, have denied it without any impeachment of his holiness and righteousness. Though he would not in such a case have dealt so bountifully with his creature as he might have done, yet he could not have been impleaded as dealing unrighteously with his creature. The single word that God had already uttered when he gave him his precept, was enough to oppose against all the devil's wiles, which tended to invalidate that word. The understanding of man could not imagine that the word of God was vainly spoken ; and the very suggestion of the devil, as if the Creator should envy his creature, would have appeared ridiculous if he had attended to the voice of his own reason. God had done enough for him, and was obliged to do no more, and dealt not unrighteously in leaving him to act according to the principles of his nature.
To conclude ; If God's permission of sin were enough to charge it upon God, or if God had been obliged to give Adam supernatural grace, Adam, that had so capacious a brain, could not be without that plea in his mouth, Lord, thou mightest have prevented it ; the commission of it by me could not have been without thy permission of it ; or, Thou hast been wanting to me, as the author of my nature. No such plea is brought by Adam into the court, when God tried and cast him ; no such pleas can have any strength in them. Adam had reason enough to know that there was sufficient reason to overrule such a plea.
Since the permission of sin casts no dirt upon the holiness of God, as I think hath been cleared, we may under this head consider two things more.
1. That God's permission of sin is not so much as his'restraint or limita tion of it. Since the entrance of the first sin into the world by Adam, God is more a hinderer than a permitter of it. If he hath permitted that which he could have prevented, he prevents a world more, that he might, if he pleased, permit. The hedges about sin are larger than the outlets ; they are but a few streams that glide about the world, in comparison of that mighty torrent he dams up both in men and devils. He that understands what a
lake of Sodom is in every man's nature, since the universal infection of human nature, as the apostle describes it, Rom. iii. 9, 10, &c., must acknow-
228 CHABNOCK'S WORKS. [Exoo. XV. 11.
ledge, that if God should cast the reins upon the necks of sinful men, they would run into thousands of abominable crimes more than they do. The impression of all natural laws would be razed out, the world would be a public stew, and a more bloody slaughter-house ; human society would sink into a chaos ; no star-light of commendable morality would be seen in it ; the world would be no longer an earth, but a hell, and have lain deeper in wickedness than it doth. If God did not limit sin, as he doth the sea, and put bars to the waves of the heart, as well as those of the waters, and say
of them, ' Hitherto you shall go, and no further,' man hath such a furious ocean in him, as would overflow the banks ; and where it makes a breach in one place, it would in a thousand, if God should suffer it to act according to its impetuous current.
As the devil hath lust enough to destroy all mankind, if God did not bridle him ; deal with every man as he did with Job, ruin their comforts, and deform their bodies with scabs ; infect religion with a thousand more errors ; fling disorders into commonwealths, and make them as a fiery furnace, full
of nothing but flame : if he were not chained by that powerful arm, that might let him loose to fulfil his malicious fury, what rapines, murders, thefts, would be committed, if he did not stint him ! Abimelech would not only lust after Sarah, but deflower her ; Laban not only pursue Jacob, but rifle him ; Saul not only hate David, but murder him ; David not only threaten Nabal, but root him up, and his family, did not God girdle in the wrath of man, Ps. Ixxvi. 10 (as the word restrain signifies). A greater remainder of wrath is pent in, than flames out, which yet swells for an outlet. God may be con
cluded more holy in preventing men's sins, than the author of sin in permit ting some ; since, were it not for his restraints, by the pull-back of conscience, and infused motions and outward impediments, the world would swarm more with this cursed brood.
2. His permission of sin is in order to his own glory and a greater good. It is no reflection upon the divine goodness to leave man to his own conduct, whereby such a deformity as sin sets foot in the world ; since he makes his wisdom illustrious in bringing good out of evil, and a good greater than that
evil he suffered to spring up.* God did not permit sin, as sin, or permit it barely for itself. As sin is not lovely in its own nature, so neither is the permission of sin intrinsecally good or amiable for itself, but for those ends aimed at in the permission of it. God permitted sin, but approved not of the object of that permission, sin ; because that, considered in its own nature, is solely evil : nor can we think that God could approve of the act of per mission, considered only in itself as an act, but as it respected that event which his wisdom would order by it. We cannot suppose that God should permit sin, but for some great and glorious end ; for it is the manifestation of his own glorious perfections he intends in all the acts of his will : Prov.
xvi. 4, ' The Lord hath made all things for himself;' ^E) hath wrought all things, which is not only his act of creation, but ordination ; for himself, that is, for the discovery of the excellency of his nature, and the communi cation of himself to his creature. Sin, indeed, in its own nature, hath no tendency to a good end ; the womb of it teems with nothing but monsters ;•
it is a spurn at God's sovereignty, and a slight of his goodness. It both deforms and torments the person that acts it ; it is black and abominable, and hath not a mite of goodness in the nature of it. If it ends in any good, it is only from that infinite transcendency of skill that can bring good out of evil, as well as light out of darkness.
Therefore God did not permit it as sin, but as it was an occasion for the
* Majus bonum, saith Bradward.
EXOD. XV, 11.] GOD'S HOLINESS. 229
manifestation of his own glory. Though the goodness of God would have appeared in the preservation of the world, as well as it did in the creation of it, yet his mercy could not have appeared without the entrance of sin, because the object of mercy is a miserable creature ; but man could not be miserable as long as he remained innocent. The reign of sin opened a door for the
reign and triumph of grace : Rom. v. 21, ' As sin hath reigned uuto death,
so might grace reign through righteousness to eternal life." Without it, the bowels of mercy had never sounded, and the ravishing music of divine grace could never have been heard by the creature. Mercy, which renders God so amiable, could never else have beamed out to the world. Angels and men upon this occasion beheld the stirrings of divine grace, and the tenderness of divine nature, and the glory of the divine persons in their several functions about tbe redemption of man, which had else been a spring shut up and a
fountain sealed ; the song of Glory to God, and good it-ill to men, in a way of redemption, had never been sung by them. It appears in his dealings with Adam, that he permitted his fall, not only to shew his justice in punish ing, but principally his mercy in rescuing ; since he proclaims to him first
the promise of a Redeemer to bruise the serpent's head, before he settled the punishment he should smart under in the world, Gen. iii. 15-17. And what fairer prospect could the creature have of the holiness of God, and his hatred of sin, than in the edge of that sword of justice which punished it in the sinner, but glittered more in the punishment of a surety so near allied to him ? Had not man been criminal, he could not have been punishable, nor any been punishable for him ; and the pulse of divine holiness could not have beaten so quick, and been so visible, without an exercise of his vindicative
justice. He left man's mutable nature to fall under unrighteousness, that thereby he might commend the righteousness of his own nature, Rom. iii. 7. Adam's sin in its nature tended to the ruin of the world, and God takes an occasion from it for the glory of his grace in the redemption of the world. He brings forth thereby a new scene of wonders from heaven, and a surprising knowledge on earth : as the sun breaks out more strongly after a night of darkness and tempest. As God in creation framed a chaos by his power, to manifest his wisdom in bringing order out of disorder, light out of darkness, beauty out of confusion and deformity, when he was able by a word to have made all creatures to stand up in their beauty, without the precedency of a chaos : so God permitted a moral chaos, to manifest a greater wisdom in the repairing a broken image, and restoring a deplorable creature, and bringing out those perfections of his nature, which had else been wrapt up in a per
petual silence in his bosom.* It was therefore very congruous to the holi ness of God, to permit that which he could make subservient for his own glory, and particularly for the manifestation of this attribute of holiness, which seems to be in opposition to such a permission.
Prop. 5. The holiness of God is not blemished by his concurrence with the creature in the material part of a sinful act. Some, to free God from having any hand in sin, deny his concurrence to the actions of the creature ; because, if he concurs to a sinful action, he concurs to the sin also : not understanding how there can be a distinction between the act and the sinfulness or viciousness of it, and how God can concur to a natural action, with out being stained by that moral evil which cleaves to it.
For the understanding of this, observe, 1. There is a concurrence of God to all the acts of the creature : Acts
xvii. 28, « In him we live, and move, and have our being.' We depend upon
* But of the wisdom of God in the permitting sin in order to redemption, I have handled in tbe attribute of Wisdom.
230 CHARNOCK'S WORKS. LExoD. XV. 11.
God in our acting as well as in our being. There is as much an efficacy of God in our motion, as in our production ; as none have life without his power in producing it, so none have any operation without his providence concur ring with it. In him, or by him, that is, by his virtue preserving and govern ing our motions, as well by his power bringing us into being. Hence man is compared to an axe, Isa. x. 15, an instrument that hath no action, with out the co-operation of a superior agent handling it : and the actions of the second causes are ascribed to God ; the grass, that is the product of the sun, rain, and earth, he is said to make to grow upon the mountains, Ps. cxlvii. 8, and the skin and flesh, which is by natural generation, he is said to clothe us with, Job. x. 5, in regard of his co-working with second causes, according to their natures. As nothing can exist, so nothing can operate without him ; let his concurrence be removed, and the being and action of the creature cease ; remove the sun from the horizon, or a candle from a room, and the
light which floweth from either of them ceaseth. Without God's preserving and concurring power, the course of nature would sink, and the creation be in vain. All created things depend upon God as agents, as well as beings, and are subordinate to him in a way of action, as well as in a way of existing. f If God suspend his influence from their action, they would cease to act (as the fire did from burning the three children), as well as if God suspend his influence from their being, they would cease to be. God supports the nature whereby actions are-wrought, the mind where actions are consulted, and the will where actions are determined, and the motive power whereby actions are produced. The mind could not contrive, nor the hand act a wickedness, if God did not support the power of the one in designing, and the strength of the other in executing a wicked intention. Every faculty in its being, and every faculty in its motion, hath a dependence upon the influence of God. To make the creature independent upon God in anything which speaks per fection, as action considered as action is, is to make a creature a sovereign being. Indeed, we cannot imagine the concurrence of God to the good actions of men since the fall, without granting a concurrence of God to evil actions ; because there is no action so purely good, but hath a mixture of evil in it, though it takes its denomination of good from the better part :
Eccles. vii. 20, ' There is no man that doeth good and sins not.' 2. Though the natural virtue of doing a sinful action be from God, and supported by him, yet this doth not blemish the holiness of God ; while God
concurs with them in the act, he instils no evil into men.
(1.) No act in regard of the substance of it is evil. Most of the actions of our faculties, as they are actions, might have been in the state of innocency. Eating is an act Adam would have used if he had stood firm, but not eating to excess. Worship was an act that should have been performed to God in innocence, but not hypocritically. Every action is good by a physical goodness, as it is an act of the mind or hand, which have a natural goodness by creation, but every action is not morally good. The physical goodness of the action depends on God, the moral evil on the creature. f There is no action, as a corporeal action, is prohibited by the law of God, but as it springs from an evil disposition, and is tainted by a venomous temper of mind. There is no action so bad, as attended with such objects and circumstances, but if the objects and circumstances were changed might be a brave and commendable action. So that the moral goodness or bad ness of an act is not to be esteemed from the substance of the act, which hath always a physical goodness, but from the objects, circumstances, and constitution of the mind in the doing of it. Worship is an act good in itself,
* Suarez, Metaph., part i. p. 652. f Amyrald. de Libero arbit., p. 98, 99.
EXOD. XV. 11. j GOD'S HOLINESS. 281
but the worship of an image is bad in regard of the object. Were that act of worship directed to God that is paid to a statue, and offered up to him with a sincere frame of mind, it would be morally good. The act in regard of the substance is the same in both, and considered as separated from the object to which the worship is directed, hath the same real goodness in regard of its substance ; but when you consider this action in relation to the different objects, the one hath a moral goodness, and the other a moral eviL So in speaking. Speaking being a motion of the tongue in the form ing of words, is an excellency belonging to a reasonable creature, an endow ment bestowed, continued, and supported by God. Now if the same tongue
forms words whereby it curseth God this minute, and forms words whereby it blesses and praises God the next minute, the faculty of speaking is the same, the motion of the tongue is the same in pronouncing the name of God
either in a way of cursing or blessing : James iii. 9, 10, it is the ' same mouth that blesseth and curseth ; ' and the motion of it is naturally good in regard of the substance of the act in both ; it is the use of an excellent power God hath given, and which God preserves in the use of it. But the estimation of the moral goodness or evil is not from the act itself, but from the disposition of the mind. Once more, killing as an act is good, nor is it unlawful as an act ; for if so, God would never have commanded his people Israel to wage any war, and justice could not be done upon malefactors by the magistrate. A man were bound to sacrifice his life to the fury of an invader, rather than secure it by despatching that of an enemy. But killing an innocent, or killing without authority, or out of revenge, is bad. It is not the material part of the act, but the object, manner, and circumstance,
that makes it good or evil. It is no blemish to God's holiness to concur to the substance of an action, without having any hand in the immorality of it, because whatsoever is real in the substance of the action might be done without evil. It is not evil as it is an act, as it is a motion of the tongue or hand, for then every motion of the tongue or hand would be evil.
(2.) Hence it follows that an act as an act is one thing, and the viciousness another. The action is the efficacy of the faculty,* extending itself to some outward object ; but the sinfulness of an act consists in a privation of that comeliness and righteousness which ought to be in an action, in a want of conformity of the act with the law of God, either written in nature or revealed in the word. Now the sinfulness of an action is not the act itself, but is considered in it as it is related to the law, and is a deviation from it; and so it is something cleaving to the action, and therefore to be distin guished from the act itself, which is the subject of the sinfulness. When we say, such an action is sinful, the action is the subject, and the sinfulness of the action is that which adheres to it. The action is not the sinfulness, nor the sinfulness the action ; they are distinguished, as the member and a disease in the member, the arm and the palsy in it. The arm is not the palsy, nor is the palsy the arm ; but the palsy is a disease that cleaves to the arm. So sinfulness is a deformity that cleaves to an action.
The evil of an action is not the effect of an action, nor attends it as it is an action, but as it is an action so circumstantiated and conversant about this or that object ; for the same action done by two several persons may be good in one and bad in the other. As when two judges are in joint com mission for the trial of a malefactor, both upon the appearance of his guilt condemn him. This action in both, considered as an action, is good; for it is an adjudging a man to death whose crime deserves such a punishment. But this same act, which is but one joint act of both, may be morally good
* Amyrald., p. 821, 322.
232 CHAENOCK'S WORKS. [ExoD. XV. 11.
in one judge and morally evil in the other : morally good in him that con
demns him out of an unbiassed consideration of the demerit of his fact, obedience to the law, and conscience of the duty of his place ; and morally evil in the other, who hath no respect to those considerations, but joins in the act of condemnation, principally moved by some private animosity
against the prisoner, and desire of revenge for some injury he hath really received, or imagines that he hath received from him. The act in itself is the same materially in both ; but in one it is an act of justice, and in the other an act of murder, as it respects the principles and motives of it in the two judges; take away the respect of private revenge, and the action in the ill judge had been as laudable as the action of the other. The substance of an act, and the sinfulness of an act, are separable and distinguishable ; and God may concur with the substance of an act without concurring with the sinfulness of the act. As the good judge, that condemned the prisoner out of conscience, concurred with the evil judge who condemned the prisoner out of private revenge, not in the principle and motive of condemnation, but in the material part of condemnation, so God assists in that action ol a man wherein sin is placed, but not in that which is the formal reason of sin, which is a privation of some perfection the action ought morally to have.
(3.) It will appear further in this, that hence it follows that the action and the viciousness of the action may have two distinct causes. That may be a cause of the one that is not the cause of the other, and hath no hand in the producing of it. God concurs to the act of the mind as it counsels, and to the external action upon that counsel, as he preserves the faculty, and gives strength to the mind to consult, and the other parts to execute ; yet he is not in the least tainted with the viciousness of the action. Though the action be from God as a concurrent cause, yet the ill quality of the action is solely from the creature with whom God concurs. The sun and the earth concur to the production of all the plants that are formed in the womb of the one and midwived by the other. The sun distributes heat,, and the earth communicates sap ; it is the same heat dispersed by the one, and the same juice bestowed by the other. It hath not a sweet juice for one and a sour juice for another. This general influx of the sun and earth is not the imme
diate cause that one plant is poisonous and another wholesome, but the sap of the earth is turned by the nature and quality of each plant. If there were not such an influx of the sun and earth, no plant could exert that poison which is in its nature ; but yet the sun and earth are not the cause of that poison which is in the nature of the plant. If God did not concur to the motions of men, there could be no sinful action, because there could be no action at all ; yet this concurrence is not the cause of that venom that is in the action, which ariseth from the corrupt nature of the creature, no more than the sun and earth are the cause of the poison of the plant, which is purely the effect of its own nature upon that general influx of the sun and earth. The influence of God pierceth through all subjects, but the action of man done by that influence is vitiated according to the nature of its own corruption. As the sun equally shines through all the quartels in the win dow ; if the glass be bright and clear, there is a pure splendour ; if it be red or green, the splendour is from the sun, but the discolouring of that light upon the wall is from the quality of the glass.* But to be yet plainer, the soul is the image of God, and by the acts of the soul we may come to the knowledge of the acts of God ; the soul gives motion to the body and every member of it, and no member could move without a concurrent virtue of the
* Zanch., torn. ii. lib. iii. cap. iv. qu. 4, p. 226.
EXOD. XV. 11.] GOD'S HOLINESS. 233
soul. If a member be paralytic or gouty, whatsoever motion that gouty member hath is derived to it from the soul ; but the goutiness of the mem ber was not the act of the soul, but the fruit of ill humours in the body ; the lameness of the member and the motion of the member have two distinct causes ; the motion is from one cause, and the ill motion from another. As the member could not move irregularly without some ill humour or cause of that distemper, so it could not move at all without the activity of the soul. So though God concur to the act of understanding, willing, and execution, why can he not be as free from the irregularity in all those as the soul is free from the irregularity of the motion of the body, while it is the cause of the motion itself? There are two illustrations generally used in this case that are not unfit : the motion of the pen in writing is from the hand that holds it, but the blurs by the pen are from some fault in the pen itself; and the music of the instrument is from the hand that touches it, but the jar ring from the faultiness of the strings; both are the causes of the motion of the pen and strings, but not the blurs or jarrings.
(4.) It is very congruous to the wisdom of God, to move his creatures according to their particular natures ; but this motion makes him not the cause of sin. Had our innocent nature continued, God had moved us according to that innocent nature ; but when the state was changed for a corrupt one, God must either forbear all concourse, and so annihilate the world, or move us according to that nature he finds in us. If he had over thrown the world upon the entrance of sin, and created another upon the same terms, sin might have as soon defaced his second work, as it did the first ; and then it would follow, that God would have been alway building and demolishing. It was not fit for God to cease from acting as a wise governor of his creature, because man did cease from his loyalty as a subject.
Is it not more agreeable to God's wisdom as a governor, to concur with his creature according to his nature, than to deny his concurrence upon every
evil determination of the creature ! God concurred with Adam's mutable nature in his first act of sin ; he concurred to the act, and left him to his mutability. If Adam had put out his hand to eat of any other unlbrbidden fruit, God would have supported his natural faculty then, and concurred with him in his motion.
When Adam would put out his hand to take the forbidden fruit, God con curred to that natural action, but left him to the choice of the object, and to the use of his mutable nature ; and when man became apostate, God concurs with him according to that condition wherein he found him, and cannot move him otherwise, unless he should alter that nature man had contracted. God moving the creature as he found him, is no cause of the ill motion of the creature ; as when a wheel is broken the space of a foot, it cannot but move ill in that part till it be mended. He that moves it, uses the same motion (as it is his act) which he would have done had the wheel been sound ; the motion is good in the mover, but bad in the subject. It is not the fault of him that moves it, but the fault of that wheel that is moved, whose breaches came by some other cause. A man doth not use to lay aside his watch for some irregularity, as long as it is capable of motion, but winds it up. Why should God cease from concurring with his creature in its vital operations and other actions of his will, because there was a flaw contracted in that nature, that came right and true out of his hand ? And as he that winds up his disordered watch, is in the same manner the cause of its motion then, as he was when it was regular, yet by that act of his, he is not the cause of the false motion of it, but that is from the deficiency of some part of the watch itself. So though God concurs to that action of
234 CHARNOCK'S WORKS. [Exoo. XV. 11.
the creature, whereby the wickedness of the heart is drawn out ; yet is not God therefore as unholy as the heart. •
(5.) God hath one end in his concurrence, and man another in his action. So that there is a righteous, and often a gracious end in God, when there is a base and unworthy end in man. God concurs to the substance of the act ; man produceth the circumstance of the act, whereby it is evil. God orders both the action wherein he concurs, and the sinfulness over which he
presides, as a governor, to his own ends. In Joseph's case, man was sinful, and God merciful ; his brethren acted envy, and God designed mercy, Gen. xlv. 4, 5. They would be rid of him as an eyesore, and God concurred with their action to make him their preserver : Gen. 1. 20, ' Ye thought evil against me, but God meant it unto good.' God concurred to Judas hia action of betraying our Saviour ; he supported his nature while he con tracted with the priests, and supported his members while he was their
guide to apprehend him ; God's end was the manifestation of his choicest love to man, and Judas his end was the gratification of his own covetousness. The Assyrian did a divine work against Jerusalem, but not with a divine end, Isa. x. 5—7. He had a mind to enlarge his empire, enrich his coffers with the spoil, and gain the title of a conqueror ; he is desirous to invade
his neighbours, and God employs him to punish his rebels ; but ' he means not so, nor doth his heart think so.' He intended not as God intended. The axe doth not think what the carpenter intends to do with it. But God used the rapine of an ambitious nature as an instrument of his justice. As the exposing malefactors to wild beasts was an ancient punishment, whereby the magistrate intended the execution of justice, and to that purpose used the natural fierceness of the beasts to an end different from what those ravaging creatures aimed at, God concurred with Satan in spoiling Job of
his goods, and scarifying his body ; God gave Satan license to do it, and
Job acknowleges it to be God's act, Job. i. 12, 21. But their ends were different ; God concurred with Satan for the clearing the integrity of his ser vant, when Satan aimed at nothing but the provoking him to curse his
Creator. The physician applies leeches to suck the superfluous blood, but the leeches suck to glut themselves, without any regard to the intention of the physician, and the welfare of the patient. In the same act where men intend to hurt, God intends to correct ; so that his concurrence is in a holy manner, while men commit unrighteous actions. A judge commands the executioner to execute the sentence of death which he hath justly pronounced against a malefactor, and admonisheth him to do it out of love to justice ; the executioner hath the authority of the judge for his commission, and the protection of the judge for his security. The judge stands by to counte nance and secure him in the doing of it ; but if the executioner hath not the same intention as the judge, viz., a love to justice in the performance
of his office, but a private hatred to the offender, the judge, though he com manded the fact of the executioner, yet did not command this error of his in it ; and though he protects him in the fact, yet he owns not his corrupt disposi tion in him in the doing of what was enjoined him, as any act of his own.
To conclude this. Since the creature cannot act without God, cannot lift
up a hand, or move his tongue, without God's preserving and upholding the faculty and preserving the power of action, and preserving every member
of the body in its actual motion, and in every circumstance of its motion, we must necessarily suppose God to have such a way of concurrence as doth not intrench upon his holiness. We must not equal the creature to God, by denying its dependence on him ; nor must we imagine such a concurrence to the fulness of an act, as stains the divine purity, which is, I
EXOD. XV. 11. J GOD'S HOLINESS. 235
think, sufficiently salved by distinguishing the matter of the act, from the evil adhering to it. For since all evil is founded in some good ; the evil is distinguishable from the good, and the deformity of the action from the action itself, which as it is a created act, hath a dependence on the will and influence of God ; and as it is a sinful act, is the product of the will of the creature.
Prop. 6. The holiness of God is not blemished by proposing objects to a man which he makes use of to sin. There is no object proposed to man, but is directed by the providence of God, which influenceth all motions in the world ; and there is no object proposed to man, but his active nature may, according to the goodness or badness of his disposition, make a good or an ill use of. That two men, one of a charitable, the other of a hard hearted disposition, meet with an indigent and necessitous object, is from the providence of God ; yet this indigent person is relieved by the one, and neglected by the other. There could be no action in the world, but about some object ; there could be no object offered to us but by divine provi dence ; the active nature of man would be in vain, if there were not objects about which it might be exercised. Nothing could present itself to man as an object, either to excite his grace, or awaken his corruption, but by the conduct of the governor of the world. That David should walk upon the battlements of his palace, and Bathsheba be in the bath at the same time, was from the divine providence which orders all the affairs of the world, 2 Sam. xi. 2 ; and so some understand Jer. vi. 21, ' Thus saith the Lord, I will lay stumbling-blocks before his people, and the fathers and sons together shall fall upon them.' Since they have offered sacrifices without those due qualifications in their hearts, which were necessary to render them acceptable to me, I will lay in their way such objects, which their corruption
will use ill, to their further sin and ruin : so Ps. cv. 25, ' He turned their
heart to hate his people ;' that is, by the multiplying his people, he gave occasion to the Egyptians of hating them, instead of caressing them as they had formerly done.
But God's holiness is not blemished by this ; for,
1. This proposing or presenting of objects invades not the liberty of any man. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil, set in the midst of the garden of Eden, had no violent influence on man to force him to eat of it ; his liberty to eat of it, or not, was reserved entire to himself ; no such charge can be brought against any object whatsoever. If a man meet accidentally at a table with meat that is grateful to his palate, but hurtful to the present temper of his body, doth the presenting this sort of food to him strip him of his liberty to decline it, as well as to feed of it ? Can the food have any internal influence upon his will, and lay the freedom of it asleep, whether he will or no ? Is there any charm in that more than in other sorts of diet ? No ; but it is the habit of love which he hath to that particular dish, the curiosity of his fancy, and the strength of his own appetite, whereby he is brought into a kind of slavery to that particular meat, and not anything in the food itself. When the word is proposed to two persons, it is embraced
the one, rejected by the other ; is it from the word itself, which is the bject, that these two persons perform different acts ? The object is the ime to both, but the manner of acting about the object is not the same. Is there any invasion of their liberty by it ? Is the one forced by the word to receive it, and the other forced by the word to reject it ? Two such con trary effects cannot proceed from one and the same cause ; outward things have only an objective influence, not an inward. If the mere proposal of things did suspend or strike down the liberty of man, no angels in heaven,
236 CHABNOCK'S WORKS. [Exon. XV. 11.
no man upon earth, no, not our Saviour himself, could do anything freely,
but by force.* Objects that are ill used are of God's creation, and though they have allurements in them, yet they have no compulsive power over the
will. The fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good" and evil was pleasing to the sight ; it had a quality to allure, there had not else needed a prohibi tion to bar the eating of it ; but it could not have so much power to allure as the divine threatening to deter.
2. The objects are good in themselves, but the ill use of them is from
man's corruption. Bathsheba was, by God's providence, presented to David's sight, but it was David's disposition moved him to so evil an act. What if God knew that he would use that object ill ? yet he knew he had given him a power to refrain from any ill use of it. The objects are in nocent, but our corruption poisons them. The same object hath been used by one to holy purposes and holy improvements, that hath been used by another to sinful ends; when a charitable object is presented to a good man and a cruel man, one relieves him, the other reviles him. The object was rather an occasion to draw out the charity of one, as well as the other ; but the refusing to reach out a helping hand was not from the person in calamity, but the disposition of the refuser to whom he was presented. It is not from the nature of the object that men do good or evil, but from the disposition of the person ; what is good in itself is made bad by our corruption. As the same meat which nourishes and strengthens a sound constitution cherisheth the disease of another that eats at the same table, not from any unwholesome quality in the food, but the vicious quality of the humours lodging in the stomach, which turns the diet into fuel for themselves, which in its own nature was apt to engender a wholesome juice. Some are perfected by the same things whereby others are ruined. Riches are used by some, not only for their own, but the advantage of others in the world ; by others only for themselves, and scarcely so much as their necessities require. Is this the