Part 12
descends to beautify the earth, and employs its heat to midwife its fruits, and this for the good of the community, whereof man is the head ; and though all creatures have distinct natures, and must act for particular ends,
* Amy raid, de Trinitate, p. 13 and p. 18.
PS. XIV. l.j THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 155
according to the law of their creation, yet there is a joint combination for the good of the whole as the common end ; just as all the rivers in the world, from what part soever they come, whether north or south, fall into the sea, for the supply of that mass of waters ; which loudly proclaims some
infinitely wise nature who made those things in so exact an harmony. ' As in a clock, the hammer which strikes the bell leads us to the next wheel, that to another, the little wheel to a greater, whence it derives its motion, this at last to the spring, which acquaints us that there was some artist that framed them in this subordination to one another for this orderly
motion.'*
(4.) This order or subserviency is regular and uniform. Everything is determined to its peculiar nature. f The sun and moon make day and night, months and years, determine the seasons, never are defective in coming back to their station and place, they wander not from their roads, shock not against one another, nor hinder one another in the functions assigned them. From a small grain or seed a tree springs, with body, root, bark, leaves, fruit of the same shape, figure, smell, taste ; that there should be as many parts in one as in all of the same kind, and no more, and that in the womb of a sensitive creature should be formed one of the same kind, with all the due members and no more, and the creature that produceth it knows not how it is formed or how it is perfected. If we say this is nature, this nature is an intelligent being ; if not, how can it direct all causes to such uniform ends ? If it be intelligent, this nature must be the same we call God, who ordered every herb to yield seed, and every fruittree to yield fruit after its kind, and also every beast and every creeping thing after its kind, Gen. i. 11, 12, 24.
And everything is determined to its particular season. The sap riseth from the root at its appointed time, enlivening and clothing the branches
with a new garment at such a time of the sun's returning, not wholly hindered by any accidental coldness of the weather, it being often colder at
its return than it was at the sun's departure. All things have their seasons of flourishing, budding, blossoming, bringing forth fruit; they ripen in their seasons, cast their leaves at the same time, throw off their old clothes, and in the spring appear with new garments, but still in the same fashion.
The winds and the rain have their seasons,} and seem to be administered by laws for the profit of man. No satisfactory cause of those things can be ascribed to the earth, the sea, to the air or stars. * Can any understand the spreading of his clouds, or the noise of his tabernacle ? ' Job xxxvi. 29. The natural reason of those things cannot be demonstrated without recourse to an infinite and intelligent being. Nothing can be rendered capable of the direction of those things but a God.
This regularity in plants and animals is in all nations. The heavens have the same motion in all parts of the world ; all men have the same law of nature in their mind ; all creatures are stamped with the same law o f creation. In all parts the same creatures serve for the same use ; and thoug h there be different creatures in India and Europe, yet they have the same subordination, the same subserviency to one another, and ultimately to man, which shews that there is a God, and but one God, who tunes all those different strings to the same notes in all places. It is nature merely conducts these natural causes in due measures to their proper effects, with out interfering with one another ! Can mere nature be the cause of those musical proportions of time ? You may as well conceive a lute to sound its
* Morn, do Verit. cap. i. p. 7. f Amyrant. $ Coccei. Sum. Theol. cap. viii. sec. 77.
156 CHARNOCK'S WORKS. [Ps. XIY. 1.
own strings without the hand of an artist, a city well governed without a governor, an army keep its stations without a general, as imagine so exact an order without an orderer. Would any man, when he hears a clock strike, by fit intervals, the hour of the day, imagine this regularity in it, without the direction of one that had understanding to manage it? He would not only regard the motion of the clock, but commend the diligence of the clock-keeper.
(5.) This order and subserviency is constant. Children change the customs and manners of their fathers, magistrates change the laws they have received from their ancestors, and enact new ones in their room ; but in the world all things consist as they were created at the beginning ; the law of nature
in the creatures hath met with no change.* Who can behold the sun rising in the morning, the moon shining in the night, increasing and decreasing in its due spaces, the stars in their regular motions night after night, for all ages, and yet deny a president over them ? And this motion of the heavenly bodies, being contrary to the nature of other creatures, who move in order to rest, must be from some higher cause. But those, ever since the settling in their places, have been perpetually rounding the world. — Whether it be the sun or the earth that moves, it is all one ; whence have either of them this constant and uniform motion ? — What nature, but one powerful and in telligent, could give that perpetual motion to the sun, which being bigger than the earth a hundred sixty-six times, runs many thousand miles with a mighty swiftness in the space of an hour, with an unwearied diligence per forming its daily task, and as a strong man, rejoicing to run its race for above five thousand years together, without intermission but in the time of
Joshua ? Josh. x. 13. It is not nature's sun, but God's sun, which he
*tmakes to rise upon the just and unjust,' Mat. v. 45. So a plant receives its nourishment from the earth, sends forth its juice to every branch, forms a bud which spreads it into a blossom and flower ; the leaves of this drop off, and leave a fruit of the same colour and taste,
every year, which being ripened by the sun, leaves seed behind it for the propagation of its like, which contains in the nature of it the same kind of buds, blossoms, fruit, which were before ; and, being nourished in the womb of the earth, and quickened by the power of the sun, discovers itself at length in all the progresses and motions which its predecessor did. Thus, in all ages, in all places, every year it performs the same task, spins out fruit of the same colour, taste, virtue, to refresh the several creatures for which they are provided.
This settled state of things comes from that God who laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not be removed for ever, Ps. civ. 5, and set ordinances for them to act by a stated law, Job xxxviii. 33, according to which they move as if they understood themselves to have made a covenant with their Creator, Jer. xxxiii. 20.
3. Add to this union of contrary qualities, and the subserviency of one thing to another, the admirable variety and diversity of things in the world. What variety of metals, living creatures, plants ! What variety and dis tinction in the shape of their leaves, flowers, smell resulting from them ! Who can number up the several sorts of beasts on the earth, birds in the air, fish in the sea ? How various are their motions ! Some creep, some go, some fly, some swim ; and in all this variety each creature hath organs or members fitted for their peculiar motion. If you consider the multitude of stars, which shine like jewels in the heavens, their different magnitudes, or the variety of colours in the flowers and tapestry of the earth, you could
* Petav. ex Athanas. Theol,, Dog. torn. i. lib. i. sec. 4.
PS. XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 157
no more conclude they made themselves, or were made by chance, than you can imagine a piece of arras, with a diversity of figures and colours, either wove itself or were knit together by hazard.
How delicious is the sap of the vine, when turned into wine, above that of a crab ? Both have the same womb of earth to conceive them, both agree in the nature of wood and twigs as channels to convey it into fruit. What is that which makes the one so sweet, the other so sour, or makes that sweet which was a few weeks before unpleasantly sharp ? Is it the earth ? * [No ; they both have the same soil ; the branches may touch each other, the strings of their roots may under ground entwine about one another. Is it the sun ? Both have the same beams ; why is not the taste and colour of the one as gratifying as the other ? Is it the root ? The taste of that is far different from that of the fruit it bears. Why do they not, when they have the same soil, the same sun, and stand near one another, borrow some
thing from one another's natures ? No reason can be rendered, but that there is a God of infinite wisdom hath determined this variety, and bound
up the nature of each creature within itself. ' Everything follows the law of its creation, and it is worthy observation that the Creator of them hath not given that power to animals, which arise from different species, to pro pagate the like to themselves ; as mules, that arise from different species. No reason can be rendered of this but the fixed determination of the Creator
that those species which were created by him should not be lost in those
mixtures, which are contrary to the law of the creation.'* This cannot possibly be ascribed to that which is commonly called nature, but unto the God of nature, who will not have his creatures exceed their bounds or como short of them.
Now, since among those varieties there are some things better than other, yet all are good in their kind, Gen. i. 31, and partake of goodness, there must be something better and more excellent than all those, from whom they derive that goodness, which inheres in their nature and is communi cated by them to others. And this excellent being must inherit in an eminent way in his own nature, the goodness of all those varieties, since they made not themselves, but were made by another. All that goodness which is scattered in those varieties must be infinitely concentrated in that nature, which distributed those various perfections to them: Ps. xciv. 9,
' He that planted the ear, shall not he hear ? he that formed the eye, shall not he see ? he that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know ? ' The Creator is greater than the creature, and whatsoever is in his effects is but an impression of some excellency in himself; there is therefore some chief fountain of goodness, whence all those various goodnesses in the world do flow.
From all this it follows, if there be an order and harmony, there must be an orderer, one that ' made the earth by his power, established the world by his wisdom, and stretched out the heavens by his discretion,' Jer. x. 12. Order being the effect, cannot be the cause of itself. Order is the disposi tion of things to an end, and is not intelligent, but implies an intelligent orderer ; and therefore it is as certain that there is a God as it is certain there is order in the world. Order is an effect of reason and counsel ; this reason and counsel must have its residence in some being before this order was fixed. The things ordered are always distinct from that reason and counsel whereby they are ordered ; and also after it, as the effect is after the cause. No man begins a piece of work but he hath the model of it in his own mind ; no man builds a house or makes a watch but he hath the
* Amyrald. de Trinitate, page 21.
158 CHAENOCK'S WORKS. [Ps. XIV. 1,
idea or copy of it in his own head. This beautiful world bespeaks an idea of it or a model, since there is such a magnificent wisdom in the make oi each creature, and the proportion of one creature to another ; this model must be before the world, as the pattern is always before the thing that is wrought by it. This therefore must be in some intelligent and wise agent, and this is God. Since the reason of those things exceed the reason and all the art of man, who can ascribe them to any inferior cause ? Chance it could not be ; the motions of chance are not constant, and at seasons, as the motions of creatures are. That which is by chance is contingent, this is necessary ; uniformity can never be the birth of chance. Who can imagine that all the parts of a watch can meet together, and put themselves
in order and motion, by chance ? * Nor can it be nature only, which indeed is a disposition of second causes. If nature hath not an understanding, it cannot work such effects. If nature therefore uses counsel to begin a thing, reason to dispose it, art to effect it, virtue to complete it, and power
to govern it, why should it be called nature rather than God ? ' * Nothing so sure as that that which hath an end to which it tends hath a cause by which it is ordered to that end. Since therefore all things are ordered in subserviency to the good of man, they are so ordered by him that made both man and them. And man must acknowledge the wisdom and good ness of his Creator, and act in subserviency to his glory, as other creatures act in subserviency to his good. Sensible objects were not made only to gratify the sense of man, but to hand something to his mind as he is a rational creature, to discover God to him as an object of love and desire to be enjoyed. f If this be not the effect of it, the order of the creature, as to such an one, is in vain, and falls short of its true end.
To conclude this ; as when a man comes into a palace, built according to the exactest rule of art, and with an unexceptionable conveniency for the in habitants, he would acknowledge both the being and skill of the builder, so whosoever shall observe the disposition of all the parts of the world, — their connection, comeliness, the variety of seasons, the swarms of different crea tures, and the mutual offices they render to one another, — cannot conclude less than that it was contrived by an infinite skill, effected by infinite power, and governed by infinite wisdom. None can imagine a ship to be orderly conducted without a pilot, nor the parts of the world to perform their several functions without a wise guide, considering the members of the body cannot perform theirs without the active presence of the soul. The atheist then is
a fool, to deny that which every creature in his constitution asserts, and thereby renders himself unable to give a satisfactory account of that constant uniformity in the motions of the creatures.
Prop. 4. As the production and harmony, so particular creatures, pur suing and attaining their ends, manifest that there is a God. All particular creatures have natural instincts, which move them for some end. The in tending of an end is a property of a rational creature ; since the lower
creatures cannot challenge that title, they must act by the understanding and direction of another. And since man cannot challenge the honour of inspiring the creatures with such instincts, it must be ascribed to some nature infinitely above any creature in understanding. No creature doth determine itself. Why doth the fruits and grain of the earth nourish us, when the earth, which instrumentally gives them that fitness, cannot nourish us, but because their several ends are determined by one higher than the world ?
1. Several creatures have several natures. How soon will all creatures, * Lactant. t Coecei. Sum. Theol. cap. 8, sec. 63, 64.
PS. XIV. lfc] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 159
even as soon as they see the light, move to that whereby they must live, and make use of the natural arms God hath given their kind for their defence, before they are grown to any maturity to afford them that defence. The Scripture makes the appetite of infants to their milk a foundation of
the divine glory: Ps. viii. 3, 'Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings hast thou ordained strength;' that is, matter of praise and acknowledgment of God, in the natural appetite they have to their milk, and their relish of it. All creatures have a natural affection to their young ones, all young ones by a natural instinct move to and receive the nourishment that is proper for them. Some are their own physicians as well as their own caterers, and naturally discern what preserves them in life, and what restores them when sick. The swallow flies to its celandine, and the toad hastens to
its plantain.
Can we behold the spider's nets or silkworm's web, the bee's closets or the ant's granaries, without acknowledging a higher being than a creature, who hath planted that genius in them ? The consideration of the nature of several creatures God commended to Job (chap, xxxix., where he discourseth to Job of the natural instincts of the goat, the ostrich, horse, and eagle, &c.), to persuade him to the acknowledgment and admiration of God, and humiliation of himself.
The spider, as if it understood the art of weaving, fits its web both for its own habitation and a net to catch its prey. The bee builds a cell which serves for chambers to reside in and a repository for its provision. Birds are observed to build their nests with a clammy matter without, for the firmer duration of it, and with a soft moss and down within, for the conveniency and warmth of their young : « The stork knows his appointed time,' Jer. viii. 7; 'and the swallows observe the time of their coming;' they go and return according to the seasons of the year. This they gain not by consideration, it descends to them with their nature ; they neither gain nor increase it by rational deductions. It is not in vain to speak of these. How little do we improve by meditation those objects, which daily offer themselves to our view, full of instruction for us ? And our Saviour sends his disciples to spell God in the lilies, Mat. vi. 28. It is observed also that the creatures offensive to man go single ; if they went by troops, they would bring destruction upon man and beast. This is the nature of them for the preservation of others.
2. They know not their end. They have a law in their natures, but have no rational understanding, either of the end to which they are appointed, or the means fit to attain it. They naturally do what they do, and move by no counsel of their own, but by a law impressed by some higher hand upon their natures.
What plant knows why it strikes its root into the earth ? Doth it under stand what storms it is to contest with, or why it shoots up its branches towards heaven ? Doth it know it needs the droppings of the clouds to pre serve itself, and make it fruitful ? These are acts of understanding : the root is downward to preserve its own standing, the branches upward to pre serve other creatures. This understanding is not in the creature itself, but originally in another. Thunders and tempests know not why they are sent, yet by the direction of a mighty hand they are instruments of justice upon a wicked world.
Rational creatures that act for some end, and know the end they aim at, yet know not the manner of the natural motion of the members to it.* When we intend to look upon a thing, we take no counsel about the natural motion
* Coccei. Sum. Theolog. cap. 8. sec. 67, &o.
160 CHARNOCK'S WORKS. [Ps. XTV. 1.
of our eyes, we know not all the principles of their operations ; or how that dull matter whereof our bodies are composed, is subject to the order of our minds. We are not of counsel with our stomachs about the concoction of
our meat, or the distribution of the nourishing juice to the several parts of
the body.* Neither the mother nor the foetus sit in council how the forma tion should be made in the womb. We know no more than a plant knows what stature it is of, and what medicinal virtue its fruit hath for the good of man ; yet all those natural operations are perfectly directed rto their proper end, by an higher wisdom than any human understanding is able to con ceive, since they exceed the ability of an inanimate or fleshly nature, yea, and the wisdom of a man. Do we not often see reasonable creatures acting for one end, and perfecting a higher than what they aimed at, or could sus
pect ? When Joseph's brethren sold him for a slave, their end was to be rid of an informer, Gen. xxxvii. 12 ; but the action issued in preparing him to be the preserver of them and their families. Cyrus his end was to be a
conqueror, but the action ended in being the Jews' deliverer : Prov. xvi. 9,
' A man's heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directs his steps.'
3. Therefore there is some superior understanding and nature which so acts them. That which acts for an end unknown to itself, depends upon some over ruling wisdom that knows that end. Who should direct them in all those ends, but he that bestowed a being upon them for those ends,f who knows what is convenient for their life, security, and propagation of their natures ? An exact knowledge is necessary, both of what is agreeable to them, and the means whereby they must attain it ; which, since it is not inherent in them, is in that wise God, who puts those instincts into them, and governs them in the exercise of them to such ends. Any man that sees a dart flung, knows it cannot hit the mark without the skill and strength of an archer ; or he that sees the hand of a dial pointing to the hours successively, knows that the dial is ignorant of its own end, and is disposed and directed in that motion by another. All creatures ignorant of their own natures could not universally in the whole kind, and in every climate and country, without any
difference in the whole world, tend to a certain end, if some over-ruling wis dom did not preside over the world and guide them ; and if the creatures
have a conductor, they have a creator. All things are * turned round about by his counsel, that they may do whatsoever he commands them upon the
face of the world in the earth,' Job xxxvii. 12.
So that in this respect the folly of atheism appears. Without the owning a God no account can be given of those actions of creatures, that are an imitation of reason. To say the bees, &c., are rational, is to equal them to man ; nay, make them his superiors, since they do more by nature than the wisest man can do by art. It is their own counsel whereby they act, or
another's : if it be their own, they are reasonable creatures ; if by another's, it is not mere nature that is necessary ; then other creatures would not be without the same skill : there would be no difference among them. If nature be restrained by another, it hath a superior ; if not, it is a free agent : it is an understanding being that directs them. And then it is something supe rior to all creatures in the world ; and by this, therefore, we may ascend to the acknowledgment of the necessity of a God.
Prop. 5. Add to the production and order of the world, and the creatures acting for their end, the preservation of them. Nothing can depend upon itself in its preservation, no more than it could in its being. If the order of the world was not fixed by itself, the preservation of that order cannot be continued by itself.
* Pearson on the Creed, page 35. f Lessius. de providen. lib. i. page 652.
PS. XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 161
Though the matter of the world after creation cannot return to that nothing whence it was fetched, without the power of God that made it
(because the same power is as requisite to reduce a thing to nothing as to
raise a thing from nothing), }ret without the actual exerting of a power that made the creatures they would fall into confusion. Those contesting quali ties which are in every part of it could not have preserved, but would have consumed and extinguished one another, and reduced the world to that con fused chaos wherein it was before the Spirit moved upon the waters. As contrary parts could not have met together in one form, unless there had been one that had conjoined them, so they could not have kept together after their conjunction unless the same hand had preserved them. Natural contrarieties cannot be reconciled. It is as great power to keep discords knit, as at first to link them. Who would doubt, but that an army made up of several nations and humours, would fall into a civil war, and sheathe their
swords in one another's bowels, if they were not under the management of some wise general, or a ship dash against the rocks without the skill of a
pilot ?* As the body hath neither life nor motion, without the active presence of the soul, which distributes to every part the virtue of acting, sets every one in the exercise of its proper function, and resides in every part, so there is some powerful cause which doth the like in the world, that rules and tempers it. There is need of the same power and action to pre serve a thing, as there was at first to make it. When we consider that we are preserved, and know that we could not preserve ourselves, we must necessarily run to some first cause which doth preserve us. All works of art depend upon nature, and are preserved while they are kept by the force of nature. As a statue depends upon the matter whereof it is made, whether stone or brass, this nature therefore must have some superior by whose influx it is preserved. Since therefore we see a stable order in the things of the world, that they conspire together for the good and beauty of the universe, that they depend upon one another, there must be some principle upon which they depend, something to which the first link of the chain is fastened, which himself depends upon no superior, but wholly rests in his own
essence and being. It is the title of God to be the ' preserver of man and
beast,' Ps. xxxvi. 6. The psalmist elegantly describeth it: Ps. civ. 24, &c.,
' The earth is full of his riches ; all wait upon him, that he may give them their meat in due season ; when he opens his hand, he fills them with good ; when he hides his face, they are troubled : if he take away their breath, they die and return to dust ; he sends forth his Spirit, and they are created, and renews the face of the earth. The glory of the Lord shall endure for ever,
and the Lord shall rejoice in his works.' Upon the consideration of all which the psalmist, ver. 84, takes a pleasure in the meditation of God, as the cause and manager of all those things, which issues into a joy in God and a praising of him. And why should not the consideration of the power and wisdom of God in the creatures produce the same effect in the hearts of us, if he be our God ? Or as some render it, ' my meditation shall be
sweet,' or acceptable ' to him,' whereby I find matter of praise in the things of the world, and offer it to the Creator of it.
Eeason 3. It is a folly to deny that which a man's own nature witnesseth to him. The whole frame of bodies and souls bears the impress of the infinite power and wisdom of the Creator. A body framed with an admir able architecture, a soul endowed with understanding, will, judgment, memory, imagination. Man is the epitome of the world, contains in himself the substance of all natures, and the fulness of the whole universe, not only
* Gassend. Phys., sect. 6, lib. 4, cap. 2, p. 101. VOL. 'I. L
162 CHAKNOCK'S WORKS. [Ps. XIV. 1.
in regard of the~universalness of his knowledge, whereby he comprehends the reasons of many things, but as all the perfections of the several natures of the world are gathered and united in man for the perfection of his own, in a smaller volume. In his soul he partakes of heaven, in his body of the earth. There is the life of plants, the sense of beasts, and the intellectual nature of angels. Gen. ii. 7, ' The Lord breathed into his nostril the breath of life, and man,' &c., D^Jl; of lives. Not one sort of life, but several, not only an animal, but a rational life, a soul of a nobler extract and nature than what was given to other creatures.
So that we need not step out of doors, or cast our eyes any further than ourselves to behold a God. He shines in the capacity of our souls and the vigour of our members. We must flee from ourselves and be stripped of
our own humanity before we can put off the notion of a deity. He that is ignorant of the existence of God must be possessed with so much folly as to be ignorant of his own make and frame.
1. In the parts whereof he doth consist, body and soul. First, Take a prospect of the body. The psalmist counts it a matter of praise and admiration : Ps. cxxxix. 14, 15, * I will praise thee ; for I am fear fully and wonderfully made. When I was made in secret, and curiously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth, in thy book all my members were written.' The scheme of man and every member was drawn in his book ; all the sinews, veins, arteries, bones, like a piece of embroidery or tapestry, were wrought by God, as it were, with deliberation, like an artificer that draws out the model of what he is to do in writing, and sets it before him when he begins his work.
And indeed the fabric of man's body, as well as his soul, is an argument for a divinity. The artificial structure of it, the elegancy of every part, the proper situation of them, their proportion one to another, the fitness for
their several functions, drew from Galen* (a heathen, and one that had no raised sentiments of a deity) a confession of the admirable wisdom and power of the Creator, and that none but God could frame it.
(1.) In the order, fitness, and usefulness of every part. The whole model of the body is grounded upon reason. Every member hath its exact pro portion, distinct office, regular motion. Every part hath a particular comeli ness and convenient temperament bestowed upon it according to its place in the body. The heart is hot to enliven the whole ; the eye clear to take in objects to present them to the soul. Every member is fitted for its peculiar service and action. Some are for sense, some for motion, some for prepar ing, and others for dispensing nourishment to the several parts ; they mutu ally depend upon and serve one another. What small strings fasten the
particular members together, as * the earth that hangs upon nothing,' Job xxvi. 7. Take but one part away, and you either destroy the whole, or stamp upon it some mark of deformity. All are knit together by an admir able symmetry ; all orderly perform their functions, as acting by a settled law, none swerving from their rule but in case of some predominant humour ; and none of those in so great a multitude of parts stifled in so little a room, or jostling against one another to hinder their mutual actions, none can be better disposed. And the greatest wisdom of a man could not imagine it, till his eyes present them with the sight and connection of one part and member with another.
[1.] The heart, f How strongly it is guarded with ribs like a wall, that it might not be easily hurt! It draws blood from the liver through a
* Lib. 3, de usu partium. Petav. Tlieol. Dog., torn. 1, lib. 1, cap. 1, p. 6. t Theod. de providentia, Orat. 3.
PS. "XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 163
charjnel made for that purpose, rarefies it, and makes it fit to pass through the arteries and veins, and to carry heat and life to every part of the body, and by a perpetual motion, it sucks in the blood and spouts it out again, which motion depends not upon the command of the soul, but is pure natural.
[2.] The mouth takes in the meat, the teeth grind it for the stomach, the stomach prepares it, nature strains it through the milky veins, the liver refines it and mints it into blood, separates the purer from the drossy parts, which go to the heart, circuits through the whole body, running through the veins like rivers through so many channels of the world, for the water ing of the several parts, which are framed of a thin skin for the straining the blood through for the supplying of the members of the body, and framed with several valves or doors for the thrusting the blood forwards to perform its circular motion.
[3.] The brain, fortified by a strong skull to hinder outward accidents, a tough membrane or skin to hinder any oppression by the skull, the seat of sense, that which coins the animal spirits, by purifying and refining those which are sent to it, and seems like a curious piece of needlework.
[4.] The ear, framed with windings and turnings, to keep anything from entering to offend the brain ; so disposed as to admit sounds with the greatest safety and delight, Eccles. xii. 4 ; filled with an air within, by the motion whereof the sound is transmitted to the brain, as sounds are made in the air by diffusing themselves, as you see circles made in the water by the flinging in a stone. This is the gate of knowledge, whereby we hear the oracles of God, and the instruction of men for arts. It is by this they are ^exposed to the mind, and the mind of another man framed in our understandings.
[5.] What a curious workmanship is that of the eye, which is in the body as the sun in the world ; set in the head as in a watch-tower, having the softest nerves for the receiving the greater multitude of spirits necessary for the act of vision ! How is it provided with defence, by the variety of coats, to secure and accommodate the little humour and part whereby the vision is made ! Made of a round figure, and convex, as most commodious to receive the species of objects ; shaded by the eyebrows and eyelids, secured by the eyelids, which are its ornament and safety, which refresh it when it is too much dried by heat, hinder too much light from insinuating itself into it to offend it, cleanse it from impurities, by their quick motion preserve it from invasion, and by contraction confer to the more evident discerning of things ; both the eyes seated in the hollow of the bone for security, yet standing out that things may be perceived more easily on both sides. And this little member can behold the earth, and in a moment view things as high as heaven.
[6.J The tongue* for speech framed like a musical instrument ; the teeth serving for variety of sounds ; the lungs serving for bellows to blow the organs, as it were, to cool the heart : by a continual motion transmitting a pure air to the heart, expelling that which was smoky and superfluous. It is by the tongue that communication of truth hath a passage among men ; it opens the sense of the mind ; there would be no converse and commerce without it. Speech among all nations hath an elegancy and attractive force, master ing the affections of men.
Not to speak of other parts, or of the multitude of spirits that act every part, the quick flight of them where there is a necessity of their presence.
Solomon, Eccles. xii., makes an elegant description of them in his speech of
* Coccei. Sum. Theolog., cap. 8, sec. 49.
164 CHAENOCK'S WORKS. [Ps. XIY. 1.
old age ; and Job speaks of this formation of the body, Job x. 9-11, &c. Not the least part of the body is made in vain. The hairs of the head have their use, as well as are an ornament. The whole symmetry of the body is a ravishing object. Every member hath a signature and mark of God and his wisdom ; he is visible in the formation of the members, the beauty of the parts, and the vigour of the body. This structure could not be from the body : that only hath a passive power, and cannot act in the absence of the
soul ; nor can it be from the soul. How comes it then to be so ignorant of the manner of its formation ? The soul knows not the internal parts of its own body, but by information from others, or inspection into other bodies. It knows less of the inward frame of the body than it doth of itself. But he that makes the clock can tell the number and motions of the wheels within, as well as what figures are without.
This short discourse is useful to raise our admirations of the wisdom of God, as well as to demonstrate that there is an infinite, wise Creator. And the consideration of ourselves every day, and the wisdom of God in our frame, would maintain religion much in the world, since all are so framed that no man can tell any error in the constitution of him. If thus the body of man is fitted for the service of his soul by an infinite God, the body ought to be ordered for the service of this God, and in obedience to him.
(2.) In the admirable difference of the features of men, which is a great argument that the world was made by a wise Being. This could not be wrought by chance, or be the work of mere nature, since we find never, or very rarely, two persons exactly alike. This distinction is a part of infinite wisdom ; otherwise, what confusion would be introduced into the world ! Without this, parents could not know their children, nor children their parents, nor a brother his sister, nor a subject his magistrate. Without it there had been no comfort of relations, no government, no commerce. Debtors would not have been known from strangers, nor good men from bad ; propriety could not have been preserved, nor justice executed ; the innocent might have been apprehended for the nocent ; wickedness could not have been stopped by any law.
The faces of men are the same for parts, not for features. A dissimiltude in a likeness ; man, like to all the rest in the world, yet unlike to any, and differenced by some mark from all, which is not to be observed in any other species of creatures. This speaks some wise agent which framed man ; since for the preservation of human society and order in the world, this distinction was necessary.
Secondly, As man's own nature witnesseth a God to him in the structure of his body, so also in the nature of his soul.* We know that we have an understanding in us : a substance we cannot see, but we know it by its ope rations, as thinking, reasoning, willing, remembering, and as operating about things that are invisible and remote from sense. This must needs be distinct from the body, for that, being but dust and earth in its original, hath not the power of reasoning and thinking, for then it would have that power when the soul were absent, as well as when it is present. Besides, if it had that power of thinking, it could think only of those things which are sensible and made up of matter, as itself is. This soul hath a greater excellency. It can know itself, rejoice in itself, which other creatures in this world are not capable of. The soul is the greatest glory of this lower world ; and as one saith,f there seems to be no more difference between the soul and an angel, than between a sword in the scabbard and when it is out of the scabbard.
* Coccei. Sum. Theolog., cap. 8, sec. 50, 61.
PS. XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 165
1. Consider the vastness of its capacity. The understanding can conceive
the whole world, and paint in itself the invisible ^pictures of all things. It is capable of apprehending and discoursing of things superior to its own
nature. ' It is suited to all objects, as the eye to all colours, or the ear to
all sounds.' * How great is the memory to retain such varieties, such diver sities ! The will also can accommodate other things to itself. It invents arts for the use of man, prescribes rules for the government of states, ransacks the bowels of nature, makes endless conclusions, and steps in reasoning from one thing to another, for the knowledge of truth ; it can contemplate and form notions of things higher than the world.
2. The quickness of its motions. ' Nothing is more quick in the whole course of nature. The sun runs through the world in a day : this can do it in a moment. It can, with one flight of fancy, ascend to the battlements of
heaven. 'f The mists of the air, that hinder the sight of the eye, cannot hinder the flights of the soul ; it can pass in a moment from one end of the world to the other, and think of things a thousand miles distant. It can think of some mean thing in the world, and presently, by one cast, in the twinkling of an eye, mount up as high as heaven. As its desires are not bounded by sensual objects, so neither are the motions of it restrained by them. It will break forth with the greatest vigour, and conceive things infinitely above it ; though it be in the body, it acts as if it were ashamed to be cloistered in it. This could not be the result of any material cause. Who ever knew mere matter understand, think, will ? And what it hath not, it cannot give. That which is destitute of reason and will, could never confer reason and will. It is not the effect of the body, for the body is fitted with members to be sub ject to it. | It is in part ruled by the activity of the soul, and in part by the
counsel of the soul. It is used by the soul, and knows not how it is used. Nor could it be from the parents, since the souls of the children often tran scend those of the parents in vivacity, acuteness, and comprehensiveness. One man is stupid, and begets a son with a capacious understanding ; one is debauched and beastly in morals, and begets a son who from his infancy testifies some virtuous inclinations, which sprout forth in delightful fruit with the ripeness of his age. § Whence should this difference arise, a fool begat the wise man, and a debauched the virtuous man ? The wisdom of the one could not descend from the foolish soul of the other, nor the virtues of the son from the deformed and polluted soul of the parent. It lies not in the organs of the body ; for if the folly of the parent proceeded not from their souls, but the ill disposition of the organs of their bodies, how comes it to pass that the bodies of the children are better organised beyond the goodness of their immediate cause ? We must recur to some invisible hand, that makes the difference, who bestows upon one at his pleasure richer qualities than upon another. You can see nothing in the world endowed with some excellent quality, but you must imagine some bountiful hand did enrich it with that dowry. None can be so foolish as to think that a vessel ever enriched itself with that sprightly liquor wherewith it is filled ; or that any thing worse than the soul should endow it with that knowledge and activity which sparkles in it. Nature could not produce it. That nature is intelli gent, or not ; if it be not, then it produceth an effect more excellent than itself, inasmuch as an understanding being surmounts a being that hath no understanding. If the supreme cause of the soul be intelligent, why do we
* Culverwell. t Theodoret. J Coccei. Sum. Theolog., cap. 8, sec. 61, 52. § I do not dispute whether the soul were generated or no. Suppose the substance of it was generated by the parents, yet those more excellent qualities were not the result of them.
166 CHAENOCK'S WORKS. [Ps. XIY. 1.
not call it God as well as nature ? We must arise from hence to the notion
of a God. A spiritual nature cannot proceed but from a spirit higher than itself, and of a transcendent perfection above itself. If we believe we have souls, and understand the state of our own faculties, we must be assured that there was some invisible hand which bestowed those faculties and the riches
of them upon us. A man must be ignorant of himself before he can be igno rant of the existence of God. By considering the nature of our souls, we may as well be assured that there is a God, as that there is a sun by the shining of the beams in at our windows. And indeed the soul is a statue and representation of God, as the landscape of a country or map represents all the parts of it, but in a far less proportion than the country itself is. The soul fills the body, and God the world ; the soul sustains the body, and God the world ; the soul sees, but is not seen ; God sees all things, but is him
self invisible. How base are they then that prostitute their souls, an image of God, to base things unexpressibly below their own nature !
3. I might add the union of soul and body. Man is a kind of compound of angel and beast, of soul and body ; if he were only a soul, he were a kind of angel ; if only a body, he were another kind of brute. Now, that a body
as vile and dull as earth, and a so'ul that can mount up to heaven and rove about the world with so quick a motion, should be linked in so strait an acquaintance ; that so noble a being as the soul should be an inhabitant in such a tabernacle of clay, must be owned to some infinite power that hath so chained it.
4. Man witnesseth to a God in the operations and reflections of conscience :
Eom. ii. 15, ' Their thoughts are accusing or excusing.' An inward com fort attends good actions, and an inward torment follows bad ones ; for
there is in every man's conscience fear of punishment and hope of reward. There is therefore a sense of some superior judge, which hath the power both of rewarding and punishing. If man were his supreme rule, what need he fear punishment, since no man would inflict any evil or torment on him self; nor can any man be said to reward himself, for all rewards refer to another, to whom the action is pleasing, and is a conferring some good a man had not before. If an action be done by a subject or servant, with hopes of reward, it cannot be imagined that he expects a reward from himself, but from the prince or person whom he eyes in that action, and for whose sake he doth it.
1. There is a law in the minds of men which is a rule of good and evil. There is a notion of good and evil in the consciences of men, which is evident by those laws which are common in all countries, for the preserving human societies, the encouragement of virtue and discouragement of vice ; what standard should they have for those laws but a common reason ? The design of those laws was to keep men within the bounds of goodness, for mutual commerce ; whence the apostle calls the heathen magistrate ' a minister of God for good,' Rom. xiii. 4 ; and the Gentiles * do by nature the things contained in the law,' Rom. ii. 14. Man in the first instant of the use of reason finds natural principles within himself, directing and choosing them ; he finds a distinction between good and evil ; how could this be if there were not some rule in him to try and distinguish good and evil ? If there were not such a law and rule in man, he could not sin ; for where there is no law, there is no transgression. If man were a law to himself, and his own will his law, there could be no such thing as evil ; whatsoever he willed would be good and agreeable to the law, and no action could be accounted sinful ; the worst act would be as com
mendable as the best. Every thing at man's appointment would be good or
PS. XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 167
evil. If there were no such law, how should men that are naturally inclined to evil disapprove of that which is unlovely, and approve of that good which they practise not ? No man but inwardly thinks well of that which is good while he neglects it, and thinks ill of that which is evil while he commits it. Those that are vicious do praise those that practise the contrary virtues. Those that are evil would seem to be good, and those that are blameworthy, yet will rebuke evil in others. This is really to distinguish between good and evil ; whence doth this arise, by what rule do we measure this, but by some innate principle ?
And this is universal, the same in one man as in another, the same in one nation as in another ; they are born with every man, and inseparable from his nature : Prov. xxvii. 19, 'As in water face answers to face, so the heart
of man to man.' Common reason supposeth that there is some hand which hath fixed this distinction in man. How could it else be universally im pressed ? No law can be without a law-giver ; no sparks but must be kindled by some other. Whence should this law then derive its original ? Not from man ; he would fain blot it out, and cannot alter it when he pleases. Natural generation never intended it ; it is settled therefore by some higher hand, which, as it imprinted it, so it maintains it against the violences of men, who, were it not for this law, would make the world, more than it is, an Aceldama and field of blood ; for, had there not been some supreme good, the measure of all other goodness in the world, we could not have had such a thing as good. The Scripture gives us an account that this good was distinguished from evil before man fell, they were objecta scibilia ; good was commanded and evil prohibited, and did not depend upon man. From this a man may rationally be instructed that there is a God ; for he may thus argue : I find myself naturally obliged to do this thing and avoid that, I have therefore a superior that doth oblige me ; I find something within me that directs me to such actions, contrary to my sensitive appetite, there
must be something above me therefore that put this principle into man's nature. If there were no superior, I should be the supreme judge of good and evil. Were I the lord of that law which doth oblige me, I should find no contradiction within myself between reason and appetite.
2. From the transgression of this law of nature fears do arise in the consciences of men. Have we not known or heard of men struck by so deep a dart that could not be drawn out by the strength of men, or appeased by the pleasure of the world, and men crying out with horror upon a death bed of their past life, when ' their fear hath come as a desolation, and destruction as a whirlwind' ? Prov. i. 27. And often in some sharp affliction the dust hath been blown off from men's consciences, which for a while hath obscured the writing of the law. If men stand in awe of punishment, there is then some superior to whom they are accountable. If there were no God, there were no punishment to fear. What reason of any fear, upon the dissolution of the knot between the soul and body, if there were not a God to punish, and the soul remained not in being to be punished ?
How suddenly will conscience work upon the appearance of an affliction,
rouse itself from sleep like an armed man, and fly in a man's face before he is aware of it ? It will * surprise the hypocrites,' Isa. xxxiii. 14. It will bring to mind actions committed long ago, and set them in order before the
face, as God's deputy acting by his authority and omniscience. As God hath not left himself without a witness among the creatures, Acts xiv. 17, so he hath not left himself without a witness in a man's own breast.
1. This operation of conscience hath been universal. No nation hath been any more exempt from it than from reason ; not a man but hath one
168 CHAENOCK'S WORKS. [Ps. XIV. 1.
time or other more or less smarted under the sting of it. All over the world conscience hath shot its darts. It hath torn the hearts of princes in the midst of their pleasures ; it hath not flattered them whom most men flatter, nor feared to disturb their rest whom no man dares to provoke. Judges have trembled on a tribunal, when innocents have rejoiced in their
condemnation ; the iron bars upon Pharaoh's conscience were at last broke up, and he acknowledged the justice of God in all that he did : Exod. ix. 27,
1 1 have sinned, the Lord is righteous, and I and my people are wicked.' Had they been like childish frights at the apprehension of bug-bears, why hath not reason shaken them off? But, on the contrary, the stronger reason grows, the smarter those lashes are ; groundless fears had been short-lived, age and judgment would have worn them off, but they grow sharper with the growth of persons. The Scripture informs us they have been of as ancient a date as the revolt of the first man : Gen. iii. 10, * I was afraid,' saith Adam, « because I was naked,' which was an expectation of the judg ment of God. All his posterity inherit his fears, when God expresseth him
self in any tokens of his majesty and providence in the world. Every man's conscience testifies that he is unlike what he ought to be according to that law engraven upon his heart. In some, indeed, conscience may be seared or dimmer ; or, suppose some men may be devoid of conscience, shall it be denied to be a thing belonging to the nature of man ? Some men have not their eyes, yet the power of seeing the light is natural to man, and belongs to the integrity of the body ; who would argue, that because some men are mad, and have lost their reason by a distemper of the brain, that therefore reason hath no reality, but is an imaginary thing ? But I think it is a standing truth, that every man hath been under the scourge of it, one time or other, in a less or greater degree ; for, since every man is an offender, it cannot be imagined conscience, which is natural to man and an active faculty, should always lie idle, without doing this part of its office ? The apostle tells us of the thoughts, accusing or excusing one another, or by turns, according as the actions were. Nor is this truth weakened by the corrup tions in the world, whereby many have thought themselves bound in con science to adhere to a false and superstitious worship and idolatry, as much as any have thought themselves bound to adhere to a worship commanded by God. This very thing infers that all men have a reflecting principle in them ; it is no argument against the being of conscience, but only infers that it may err in the application of what it naturally owns. We can no more say, that because some men walk by a false rule, there is no such thing as conscience, than we can say that because men have errors in their minds, therefore they have no such faculty as an understanding ; or, because men will that which is evil, they have no such faculty as a will in them.
2. These operations of conscience are when the wickedness is most secret. These tormenting fears of vengeance have been frequent in men who have had no reason to fear man, since, their wickedness being unknown to any but themselves, they could have no accuser but themselves. They have been in many acts which their companions have justified them in ; persons above the stroke of human laws, yea, such as the people have honoured as gods, have been haunted by them. Conscience hath not been frighted by the power of princes, or bribed by the pleasures of courts. David was pur sued by his horrors, when he was by reason of his dignity above the punish ment of the law, or at least was not reached by the law ; since, though the murder of Uriah was intended by him, it was not acted by him. Such
examples are frequent in human records. When the crime hath been above any punishment by man, they have had an accuser, judge, and executioner in
PS. XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 109
their own breasts. Can this be originally from a man's self ? He who loves and cherishes himself would fly from anything that disturbs him. It is a greater power and majesty from whom man cannot hide himself, that holds him in those fetters. What should affect their minds for that which can never bring them shame or punishment in this world, if there were not some supreme judge to whom they were to give an account, whose instrument conscience is ? Doth it do this of itself ; hath it received an authority from the man himself to sting him ? It is some supreme power that doth direct and commission it against our wills.
3. These operations of conscience cannot be totally shaken off by man. If there be no God, why do not men silence the clamours of their con sciences, and scatter those fears that disturb their rest and pleasures ? How inquisitive are men after some remedy against those convulsions ? Some times they would render the charge insignificant, and sing a rest to them
selves, though they ' walk in the wickedness of their own hearts,' Deut. xxix. 19. How often do men attempt to drown it by sensual pleasures, and perhaps overpower it for a time ; but it revives, reinforceth itself, and acts
a revenge for its former stop. It holds sin to a man's view, and fixes his eyes upon it, whether he will or no : ' The wicked are like a troubled sea, and cannot rest,' Isa. Ivii. 20. They would wallow in sin without control, but this inward principle will not suffer it ; nothing can shelter men from those blows. What is the reason it could never be cried down ? Man is
an enemy to his own disquiet ; what man would continue upon the rack, if it were in his power to deliver himself ? Why have all human remedies been without success, and not able to extinguish all those operations, though all the wickedness of the heart hath been ready to assist and second the attempt ? It hath pursued men notwithstanding all the violence used against it, and renewed its scourges with more severity, as men deal with their resisting slaves. Man can as little silence those thunders in his soul, as he can the thunders in the heavens. He must strip himself of his humanity before he can be stripped of an accusing and affrighting conscience : it sticks as close to him as his nature. Since man cannot throw out the process it makes against him, it is an evidence that some higher power secures its throne and standing. Who should put this scourge into the hand of conscience, which no man in the world is able to wrest out ?
4. We may add, the comfortable reflections of conscience. There are excusing as well as accusing reflections of conscience, when .things are done as works of the law of nature, Rom. ii. 15. As it doth not forbear to accuse and torture, when a wickedness, though unknown to others, is committed, so when a man hath done well, though he be attacked with all the calumnies the wit of man can forge, yet his conscience justifies the action, and fills him with a singular contentment. As there is torture in sinning, so there
is peace and joy in well-doing. Neither of those it could do, if it did not understand a sovereign judge, who punishes the rebels and rewards the well doer. Conscience is the foundation of all religion ; and the two pillars upon which it is built, are the being of God, and the bounty of God to those that diligently seek him, Heb. xi. 6.
This proves the existence of God. If there were no God, conscience were useless ; the operations of it would have no foundation, if there were not an eye to take notice, and a hand to punish or reward the action. The accu sations of conscience evidence the omniscience and the holiness of God ; the terrors of conscience, the justice of God ; the approbations of con science, the goodness of God. All the order in the world owes itself, next to the providence of God, to conscience : without it the world would be a
170 CHARNOCK'S WORKS. [Ps. XIV. 1.
Golgotha. As the creatures witness there was a first cause that produced them, so this principle in man evidenceth itself to be set by the same hand for the good of that which it had so framed. There could be no conscience if there were no God, and man could not be a rational creature if there were no conscience. As there is a rule in us, there must be & judge, whether our actions be according to the rule ; and since conscience in our corrupted state is in some particular misled, there must be a power superior to conscience to judge how it hath behaved itself in its deputed office : we must come to
some supreme judge, who can judge conscience itself. As a man can have no surer evidence that he is a being, than because he thinks, he is a thinking being, so there is no surer evidence in nature that there is a God, than that every man hath a natural principle in him, which continually cites him before God, and puts him in mind of him, and makes him one way or other fear him, and reflects upon him whether he will or no. A man hath less power over his conscience than over any other faculty. He may choose whether he will exercise his understanding about, or move his will to, such an object, but he hath no such authority over his conscience ; he cannot limit it, or cause it to cease from acting and reflecting ; and therefore both that, and the law about which it acts, are settled by some supreme autho rity in the mind of man, and this is God.
Prop. 4. The evidence of a God results from the vastness of the desires in man, and the real dissatisfaction he hath in every thing below himself. Man hath a boundless appetite after some sovereign good. As his under standing is more capacious than any thing below, so is his appetite larger. This affection of desire exceeds all other affections. Love is determined to something known : fear to something apprehended ; but desires approach nearer to infiniteness, and pursue, not only what we know, or what we have a glimpse of, but what we find wanting in what we already enjoy. That which the desire of man is most naturally carried after, is bonum ; some fully satisfying good. We desire knowledge by the sole impulse of reason ; but we desire good before the excitement of reason, and the desire is always after good, but not always after knowledge.
Now the soul of man finds an imperfection in every thing here, and can not scrape up a perfect satisfaction and felicity. In the highest fruitions of worldly things, it is still pursuing something else, which speaks a defect in what it already hath. The world may afford a felicity for our dust, the body, but not for the inhabitant in it ; it is too mean for that. Is there any one soul among the sons of men, that can upon due inquiry say, it was at rest and wanted no more, that hath not sometimes had desires after an immaterial goodj?
The soul ' follows hard' after such a thing, and hath frequent looks after it, Ps. Ixiii. 8. Man desires a stable good, but no sublunary thing is so ; and he that doth not desire such a good, wants the rational nature of a man. This is as natural as understanding, will, and conscience. Whence should the soul of man have those desires ? How came it to understand that some
thing is still wanting to make its nature more perfect, if there were not in it some notion of a more perfect being, which can give it rest ?
Can such a capacity be supposed to be in it without something in being able to satisfy it ? If so, the noblest creature in the world is miserablest, and in a worse condition than any other : other creatures obtain their ulti
mate desires, ' they are filled with good,' Ps. civ. 28 ; and shall man only have a vast desire without any possibility of enjoyment ? Nothing in man is in vain : he hath objects for his affections, as well as affections for objects. Every member of his body hath its end, and doth attain it. Every affection
of his soul hath an object, and that in this world ; and shall there be none
PS. XIV. l.J THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 171
for his desire, which "comes nearest to infinite of any affection planted in him ? This boundless desire had not its original from man himself. Nothing would Vender itself restless ; something above the bounds of this world implanted those desires after a higher good, and made him restless in every thing else. And since the soul can only rest in that which is infinite, there is something infinite for it to rest in. Since nothing in the world, though a man had the whole, can give it a satisfaction, there is something above the world only capable to do it, otherwise the soul would be always without it, and be more in vain than any other creature.
There is therefore some infinite being that can only give a contentment to the soul, and this is God. And that goodness which implanted such desires in the soul would not do it to no purpose, and mock it in giving it an infinite desire of satisfaction, without intending it the pleasure of enjoy ment, if it doth not by its own folly deprive itself of it. The felicity of human nature must needs exceed that which is allotted to other creatures.