Part 11
This will more evidently appear to be natural, because,
[1.] This consent could not be by mere tradition. [2.] Nor by any mutual intelligence of governors to keep people in awe, which are two things the atheist pleads. The first hath no strong foundation, and that other is as absurd and foolish as it is wicked and abominable.
[3.J Nor was it fear first introduced it. [1.] It could not be by mere tradition. Many things indeed are enter tained by posterity, which their ancestors delivered to them, and that out of a common reverence to their forefathers, and an opinion that they had a better prospect of things than the increase of the corruption of succeeding ages would permit them to have.
But if this be a tradition handed from our ancestors, they also must re ceive it from theirs ; we must then ascend to the first man, we cannot else escape a confounding ourselves with running into infinite. Was it then the only tradition he left to them ? Is it not probable he acquainted them with other things in conjunction with this, the nature of God, the way to worship
him, the manner of the world's existence, his own state ? We may reason ably suppose him to have a good stock of knowledge ; what is become of it ? It cannot be supposed, that the first man should acquaint his posterity with an object of worship, and leave them ignorant of a mode of worship, and of the end of worship. We find in Scripture his immediate posterity did the first in sacrifices, and without doubt they were not ignorant of the other.
How come men to be so uncertain in all other things, and so confident of this, if it were only a tradition ? How did debates and irreconcilable ques tions start up concerning other things, and this remain untouched, but by a small number ? Whatsoever tradition the first man left besides this, is lost, and no way recoverable, but by the revelation God hath made in his word. * Charleton.
PS. XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 139
How comes it to pass, this of a God is longer lived than all the rest, which we may suppose man left to his immediate descendants ? How come men to retain the one and forget the other ? What was the reason this survived the ruin of the rest, and surmounted the uncertainties into which the other sunk ? Was it likely it should be handed down alone without other attend ants on it at first ? Why did it not expire among the Americans, who have lost the account of their own descent, and the stock from whence they sprung, and cannot reckon above eight hundred or a thousand years at most ? Why was not the manner of the worship of a God transmitted, as well as that of his existence ? How came men to dissent in their opinions concerning his nature, whether he was corporeal or incorporeal, finite or infinite, omnipre sent or limited ? Why were not men as negligent to transmit this of his existence as that of his nature ? No reason can be rendered for the security of this above the other, but that there is so clear a tincture of a Deity upon the minds of men, such traces and shadows of him in the creatures, such indelible instincts within, and invincible arguments without to keep up this universal consent. The characters are so deep that they cannot possibly be razed out, which would have been one time or other, in one nation or other, had it depended only upon tradition, since one age shakes off frequently the sentiments of the former.
I cannot think of above one "which may be called a tradition, which indeed was kept up among all nations, viz., sacrifices, which could not be natural but instituted. What ground could they have in nature, to imagine that the blood of beasts could expiate and wash off the guilt and stains of a rational creature ? Yet they had in all places (but among the Jews, and some of them only) lost the knowledge of the reason and end of the institution, which the Scripture acquaints us was to typify and signify the redemption by the promised seed. This tradition hath been superannuated and laid aside in most parts of the world, while this notion of the existence of a God hath stood firm.
But suppose it were a tradition, was it likely to be a mere intention* and figment of the first man ? Had there been no reason for it, his posterity would soon have found out the weakness of its foundation. What advantage
had it been to him to transmit so great a falsehood, to kindle the fears or raise the hopes of his posterity, if there were no God ? It cannot be sup posed he should be so void of that natural affection men in all ages bear to their descendants, as so grossly to deceive them, and be so contrary to the simplicity and plainness which appears in all things nearest their original.
[2.] Neither was it by any mutual intelligence of governors among them selves, to keep people in subjection to them. If it were a political design at first, it seems it met with the general nature of mankind very ready to give it entertainment.
^ First, It is unaccountable how this should come to pass. It must be either by a joint assembly of them, or a mutual correspondence. If by any assembly, who were the persons ? Let the name of any one be mentioned. When was the time ? Where was the place of this appearance ? By what authority did they meet together ? Who made the first motion, and first started this great principle of policy ? By what means could they as semble from such distant parts of the world ? Human histories are utterly silent in it, and the Scripture, the ancientest history, gives an account of the attempt of Babel, but not a word of any design of this nature.
What mutual correspondence could such have, whose interests are for the most part different, and their designs contrary to one another ? How could
* Qu. 'invention'?— ED.
140 CHARNOCK'S WORKS. [Ps. XIV. 1.
they, who were divided by such vast seas, have this mutual converse ? How could those, who were different in their customs and manners, agree so unanimously together in one thing to gull the people ? If there had been such a correspondence between the governors of all nations, what is the reason some nations should be unknown to the world till of late times ? How could the business be so secretly managed, as not to take vent, and issue in a discovery to the world ? Can reason suppose so many in a joint conspi
racy, and no man's conscience in this life under sharp afflictions, or on his deathbed, when conscience is most awakened, constrain him to reveal
openly the cheat that beguiled the world ? How' came they to be so unani mous in this notion, and to differ in their rites almost in every country ? Why could they not agree in one mode of worship throughout all the world, as ^well as in this universal notion ? If there were not a mutual intelligence, it cannot be conceived how in every nation such a state engineer should rise up with the same trick to keep people in awe. What is the reason we can not find any law in any one nation, to constrain men to the belief of the existence of a God, since politic stratagems have been often fortified by laws ? Besides, such men make use of principles received to effect their contrivances, and are not so impolitic as to build designs upon principles that have no foundation in nature. Some heathen law-givers have pretended a converse
with their gods to make their laws be received by the people with a greater veneration, and fix with stronger obligation the observance and perpetuity of them ; but this was not the introducing of a new principle, but the supposi tion of an old received notion, that there was a God, and an application of that principle to their present design. The pretence had been vain had not the notion of a God been ingrafted. Politicians are so little possessed with a reverence of God, that the first mighty one in the Scripture (which may
reasonably gain with the atheist the credit of the ancientest history in the word), is represented without any fear of God. Gen. x. 9, ' Nimrod was a mighty hunter before the Lord.' An invader and oppressor of his neigh bours, and reputed the introducer of a new worship, and being the first that built cities after the flood (as Cain was the first builder of them before the flood), built also idolatry with them, and erected a new worship, and was so far from strengthening that notion the people had of God, that he en deavoured to corrupt it ; the first idolatry in common histories being noted to proceed from that part of the world, the ancientest idol being at Babylon, and supposed to be first invented by this person. Whence by the way per haps Rome is in the Revelations called Babylon, with respect to that simili
tude of their saintworship, to the idolatry first set up in that place.* It is evident politicians have often changed the worship of a nation, but it is not upon record, that the first thoughts of an object of worship ever entered into the minds of people by any trick of theirs.
But to return to the present argument ; the being of a God is owned by some nations that have scarce any form of policy among them. It is as wonderful how any wit should hit upon such an invention, as it is absurd to ascribe it to any human device, if there were not prevailing arguments to constrain the consent. Besides, how is it possible they should deceive them selves ? What is the reason the greatest politicians have their fears of a deity upon their unjust practices, as well as other men, they intended to befool ? How many of them have had forlorn consciences upon a deathbed, upon the consideration of a God to answer an account to in another world ?
* Or if we understand it, as some think, that he defended his invasions under a pre text of the preserving religion, it assures us that there was a notion of an object of religion before, since no religion can be withuut an object of worship.
PS. XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 141
Is it credible they should be frighted by that wherewith they knew they beguiled others ? No man satisfying his pleasures would impose such a deceit upon himself, or render and make himself more miserable than the creatures he hath dominion over.
Secondly, It is unaccountable how it should endure so long a time ; that this policy should be so fortunate as to gain ground in the consciences of men, and exercise an empire over them, and meet with such an universal
success. If the notion of a God were a state-engine, and introduced by some politic grandees for the ease of government, and preserving people with more felicity in order, how comes it to pass the first broachers of it were never upon record ? There is scarce a false opinion vented in the world, but may as a stream be traced to the first head and fountain. The inventors of par ticular forms of worship are known, and the reasons why they prescribed them known ; but what grandee was the author of this ? who can pitch a time and person that sprung up this notion ? If any be so insolent as to impose a cheat, he can hardly be supposed to be so successful as to deceive the whole world for many ages. Impostures pass not free through the whole world without examination and discovery. Falsities have not been univer sally and constantly owned without control and question. If a cheat irnposeth upon some towns and countries, he will be found out by the more piercing inquiries of other places ; and it is not easy to name any imposture that hath walked so long in its disguise in the world, without being unmasked and whipped out by some nation or other. If this had been a mere trick, there would have been as much craft in some to discern it as there was in others to contrive it. No man can be imagined so wise in a kingdom, but others may be found as wise as himself ; and it is not conceivable that so many clear-sighted men in all ages should be ignorant of it, and not endeavour to
free the world from so great a falsity.* It cannot be found that a trick of state should always beguile men of the most piercing insights, as well as the most credulous. That a few crafty men should befool all the wise men in the world, and the world lie in a belief of it, and never like to be freed from it. What is the reason the succeeding politicians never knew this stratagem, since their maxims are usually handed to their successors ? f
This persuasion of the existence of God, owes not itself to any imposture or subtlety of men. If it had not been agreeable to common nature and reason, it could not so long have borne sway. The imposed yoke would have been cast off by multitudes. Men would not have charged themselves with that which was attended with consequences displeasing to the flesh, and hindered them from a full swing of their rebellious passions ; such a shackle would have mouldered of itself, or been broke by the extravagances human nature is inclined unto. The wickedness of men, without question, hath prompted them to endeavour to unmask it, if it were a cozenage, but could never yet be so successful as to free the world from a persuasion, or their own consciences from the tincture, of the existence of a deity. It must be, therefore, of an ancienter date than the craft of statesmen, and descend into the world with the first appearance of human nature. Time, which hath rectified many errors, improves this notion, makes it shock down its roots deeper, and spread its branches larger.
It must be a natural truth that shines clear by the detection of those errors that have befooled the world, and the wit of man is never able to name any human author that first insinuated it into the beliefs of men.
[3.] Nor was it fear first introduced it. Fear is the consequent of wicked-
* Fotherby, A theomastrix, p. 64. f * And there is not a Kichelicu, but leaves his axioms to a Mazarin.'
142 CHAKNOCK'S WOEKS. [Ps. XIV. 1.
ness. As man was not created with any inherent sin, so he was not created with any terrifying fears ; the one had been against the holiness of the Crea tor, the other against his goodness. Fear did not make this opinion, but the opinion of the being of a deity was the cause of this fear, after his sense of angering the deity by his wickedness. The object of fear is before the act of fear ; there could not be an act of fear exercised about the deity, till it was believed to be existent, and not only so, but offended. For God, as existent only, is not the object of fear or love : it is not the existence of a thing that excites any of those affections, but the relation a thing bears to us in particular. God is good, and so the object of love, as well as just, and thereby the object of fear. He was as much called love (Egug) and mens, or mind, in regard of his goodness and understanding, by the heathens, as much
as by any other name. Neither of those names were proper to insinuate fear, neither was fear the first principle that made the heathens worship a god. They offered sacrifices out of gratitude to some, as well as to others out of fear ; the fear of evils in the world, and the hopes of belief and assist ance from their gods, and not a terrifying fear of God, was the principal spring of their worship. When calamities from the hands of men, or judgments by the influences of heaven, were upon them, they implored that which they thought a deity. It was not their fear of him, but a hope in his goodness, and persuasion of remedy from him, for the averting those evils, that rendered them adorers of a god. If they had not had pre-existent notions of his being and goodness, they would never have made addresses to him, or so frequently
sought to that they only apprehended as a terrifying object.* When you hear men calling upon God in a time of affrighting thunder, you cannot imagine that the fear of thunder did first introduce the notion of a God, but implies that it was before apprehended by them, or stamped upon them, though their fear doth at present actuate that belief, and engage them in a
present exercise of piety ; and whereas the Scripture saith, « the fear of God
is the beginning of wisdom,' Prov. ix. 10, Ps. cxi. 10, or .of all religion, it is not understood of a distracted and terrifying fear, but a reverential fear of him, because of his holiness, or a worship of him, a submission to him, and sincere seeking of him.
Well then, is it not a folly for an atheist to deny that which is the reason and common sentiment of the whole world, to strip himself of humanity, run counter to his own consience, prefer a private before a universal judgment, give the lie to his own nature and reason, assert things impossible to be proved, nay, impossible to be acted, forge irrationalities for the support of his fancy against the common persuasion of the world, and against himself, and so much of God as is manifest in him and every man ? Bom. i. 19.
Eeason 2. It is a folly to deny that which all creatures, or all things in the world manifest. f Let us view this in Scripture since we acknowledge it, and after consider the arguments from natural reason.
The apostle resolves it : Eom. i. 19, 20, « The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without
excuse.' They know, or might know, by the things that were made, the eternity and power of God ; their sense might take circuit about every object, and their minds collect the being, and something of the perfections of the deity. The first discourse of the mind upon the sight of a delicate piece of workmanship, is the conclusion of the being of an artificer, and the admira tion of his skill and industry. The apostle doth not say, the invisible things
* Gassend. Phys., sect. 1, 1. 4, c. 2, p. 291, 292. t Jupiter est quodcucque vides, &e.
PS. XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 143
of God are believed, or they have an opinion of them, but they are seen, and clearly seen. They are like crystal glasses, which give a clear representation of the existence of a deity, like that mirror reported to be in a temple in Arcadia, which represented to the spectator, not his own face, but the image of that deity which he worshipped.
The whole world is like a looking-glass, which whole and entire represents the image of God, and every broken piece of it, every little shred of a crea ture, doth the like ; not only the great ones, elephants and the leviathan, but ants, flies, worms, whose bodies rather than names we know ; the great cattle and the creeping things, Gen. i. 24. Not naming there any interme diate creature, to direct us to view him in the smaller letters, as well as the greater characters of the world. His name is glorious, and his attributes
are excellent ' in all the earth,' Ps. viii..l, in every creature, as the glory of the sun is in every beam and smaller flash ; he is seen in every insect, in
every spire of grass. The voice of the Creator is in the most contemptible creature.* The apostle adds that they are so clearly seen, that men are inexcusable if they have not some knowledge of God by them ; if they might not certainly know them, they might have some excuse. So that his exist ence is not only probably, but demonstratively, proved from the things of the world.
Especially the heavens declare him, which God ' stretches out like a cur tain,' Ps. civ. 2, or as some render the word, ' a skin,' whereby is signified, that heaven is as an open book, which was anciently made of the skins of beasts, that by the knowledge of them we may be taught the knowledge of God. Where the Scripture was not revealed, the world served for a witness of a God; whatever arguments the Scripture uses to prove it are drawn from nature (though indeed it doth not so much prove as suppose the exist ence of a God), but what arguments it uses are from the creatures, and particularly the heavens, which are the public preachers of this doctrine. The breath of God sounds to all the world through those organ pipes. His being is visible in their existence, his wisdom in their frame, his power in
their motion, his goodness in their usefulness ; for * their voice goeth to the end of the earth,' Ps. xix. 1, 2. They have a voice, and their voice is as intelligible as any common language. And those are so plain heralds of a deity, that the heathen mistook them for deities, and gave them a particular adoration which was due to that god they declared. The first idolatry seems to be of those heavenly bodies, which began probably in the time of
Nimrod. In Job's time it is certain they admired the glory of the sun and the brightness of the moon, not without kissing their hand, a sign of adora tion, Job xxxi. 25, 27. It is evident a man may as well doubt whether there be a sun, when he sees his beams gilding the earth, as doubt whether there be a God, when he sees his works spread in the world.
The things in the world declare the existence of a God.
1, In their production; 2, harmony; 3, preservation; 4, answering their several ends.
1. In their production. The declaration of the existence of God was the chief end for which they were created, that the notion of a supreme and independent eternal being might easier incur into the active understanding
of man from the objects of sense dispersed in every corner of the world, that he might pay a homage and devotion to the Lord of all: Isa. xl. 12,
13, 18, 19, &c., 'Have you not understood from the foundation of the earth, it is he that sits upon the circle of the heaven,' &c. How could this great heap be brought into being unless a God had framed it ? Every
* Banes in Aquiii., Par. 2, Qu. 2, Artie. 2, p. 78, col. 2.
144 CHARNOCK'S WOEKS. [Ps. XIV. 1.
plant, every atom, as well as every star, at the first meeting whispers this
in our ears, I have a Creator, I am witness to a deity. Who ever sawstatues or pictures, but presently thinks of a statuary and limner ? Who beholds garments, ships, or houses, but understands there was a weaver, a
carpenter, an architect ? * Who can cast his eyes about the world, but must think of that power that formed it, and that the goodness which appears in
the formation of it hath a perfect residence in some being ? ' Those things that are good must flow from something perfectly good ; that which is chief in any kind is the cause of all of that kind. Fire, which is most hot, is the cause of all things which are hot. There is some being therefore which is
the cause of all that perfection which is in the creature, and this is God' (Aquin. i. qu. 2, art. 3). All things that are demonstrate something from whence they are. All things have .a contracted perfection, and what they have is communicated to them. Perfections are parcelled out among several creatures. Anything that is imperfect cannot exist of itself. We are led therefore by them to consider a fountain which bubbles up in all perfection, a hand which distributes those several degrees of being and perfection to what we see. We see that which is imperfect, our minds conclude some thing perfect to exist before it; our eye sees the streams, but our under standing riseth to the head ; as the eye sees the shadow, but the under standing informs us whether it be the shadow of a man or of a beast.
God hath given us sense to behold the objects in the world, and under standing to reason his existence from them ; the understanding cannot conceive a thing to have made itself, that is against all reason, Rom. i. 20. As they are made, they speak out a maker, and cannot be a trick of chance, since they are made with such an immense wisdom, that is too big for the grasp of all human understanding. Those that doubt whether the existence of God be an implanted principle, yet agree that the effects in the world lead to a supreme and universal cause ; and that if we have not the know ledge of it rooted in our natures, yet we have it by discourse, since by all masters of reason a processus in infinitum must be accounted impossible in subordinate causes.
This will appear in several things. (1.) The world and every creature had a beginning. The Scripture ascer tains this to us, Gen. i. David, who was not the first man, gives the praise
to God of his being 'curiously wrought,' &c., Ps. cxxxix. 14, 15. God gave being to men, and plants, and beasts, before they being to one another. He gives being to them now as the fountain of all being, though the several modes of being are from the several natures of second causes.
It is true indeed we are ascertained that they were made by the true God,
that they were made by his word (' By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God,' &c., Heb. xi. 3), that they were made of nothing, and not only this lower world wherein we live, but according to the Jewish division, the world of men, the world of stars, and the world of spirits and souls. We do not waver in it, or doubt of it, as the heathen did in their disputes ; we know they are the workmanship of the true God,
of that God we adore, not of false gods. 'By his word:' without any instrument or engine as in earthly structures ; « of things which do not appear:' without any pre-existent matter, as all artificial works of men are framed.
Yet the proof of the beginning of the world is affirmed with good reason ; and if it had a beginning, it had also some higher cause than itself; every effect hath a cause.
* Philo, ex Petav. Theol. Dog. torn. i. lib. 1, cap. 1, p. 4, somewhat changed.
PS. XIV. l.J THE EXISTENCE OP GOD. 145
The world was not eternal or from eternity.* The matter of the world cannot be eternal; matter cannot subsist without form, nor put on any form without the action of some cause ; this cause must be in being before it acted ; that which is not cannot act. The cause of the world must neces sarily exist before any matter was endued with any form ; that therefore cannot be eternal before which another did subsist. If it were from eternity, it would not be subject to mutation ; if the whole was from eternity, why not also the parts ? What makes the changes so visible, then, if eternity would exempt it from mutability ?
[1.] Time cannot be infinite, and therefore the world not eternal ;f all motion hath its beginning; if it were otherwise, we must say the number of heavenly revolutions of days and nights, which are past to this instant, is actually infinite, which cannot be in nature. If it were so, it must needs be granted that a part is equal to the whole; because infinite being equal to infinite, the number of days past in all ages to the beginning of one year being infinite (as they would be, suppoaing the world had no beginning), would by consequence be equal to the number of days which shall pass to the end of the next ; whereas the number of days past is indeed but a part, and so a part would be equal to the whole.
[2.] Generations of men, animals, and plants could not be from eternity.} If any man say the world was from eternity, then there must be propaga tions of living creatures in the same manner as are at this day, for without this the world could not consist. What we see now done must have been perpetually done, if it be done by a necessity of nature ; but we see nothing now that doth arise but by a mutual propagation from another. If the world were eternal, therefore, it must be so in all eternity. Take any par ticular species, suppose a man, if men were from eternity, then there were perpetual generations, some were born into the world and some died. Now the natural condition of generation is, that a man doth not generate a man, nor a sheep a lamb, as soon as ever itself is brought into the world, but gets strength and vigour by degrees, and must arrive to a certain stated age before they can produce the like ; for whilst anything is little and below the due age, it cannot increase its kind. Men therefore and other creatures did propagate their kind by the same law, not as soon as ever they were born, but in the interval of some time, and children grew up by degrees in the
mother's womb till they were fit to be brought forth. If this be so, then there could not be an eternal succession of propagating; for there is no eternal continuation of time. Time is always to be conceived as having one part before another; but that perpetuity of nativities is always after some time, wherein it could not be for the weakness of age. If no man, then, can conceive a propagation from eternity, there must be then a beginning of generation in time, and consequently the creatures were made in time.
To express it in the words of one of our own : ' If the world were eternal, it must have been in the same posture as it is now, in a state of generation
and corruption ; and so corruption must have been as eternal as generation, and then things that do generate and corrupt must have eternally been, and eternally not have been : there must be some first way to set generation on
work.'§ We must lose ourselves in our conceptions; we cannot conceive a father before a child, as well as we cannot conceive a child before a father ;
and reason is quite bewildered, and cannot return into a right way of con-
* Daille, 20 Serm. Psa. cii. p. 13, 14. t Daille ut supra. I Petav. Theo. Dogmat. torn. i. lib. 1, cap. 2, p. 15. $ Wolseley of Atheism, page 47.
VOL. i. K
146 CHABNOCKTS WORKS. [PS. XIY. 1.
ception till it conceive one first of every kind : one first man, one first ani mal, one first plant, from whence others do proceed. The argument is unan swerable, and the wisest atheist (if any atheist can be called wise) cannot unloose the knot. We must come to something that is first in every kind, and this first must have a cause, not of the same kind, but infinite and independent ; otherwise men run into inconceivable labyrinths and contra dictions.
Man, the noblest creature upon earth, hath a beginning. No man in the world but was some years ago no man. If every man we see had a
beginning, 'then the first man had also a beginning, then the world had a beginning ; for the earth, which was made for the use of man, had wanted that end for which it was made. ' We must pitch upon some one man that was unborn ;'* that first man must either be eternal, — that cannot be, for he that hath no beginning hath no end, — or must spring out of the earth, as plants and trees do, — that cannot be. Why should not the earth produce men to this day, as it doth plants and trees ? He was therefore made ; and what soever is made hath some cause that made it, which is God. If the world were uncreated, f it were then immutable, but every creature upon the earth is in a continual flux, always changing. If things be mutable, they were created; if created, they were made by some author; whatsoever hath a beginning must have a maker ; if the world hath a beginning, there was then a time when it was not : it must have some cause to produce it. That which makes is before that which is made, and this is God ; which will appear further in this
Prop. No creature can make itself: the world could not make itself. If every man had a beginning, every man then was once nothing ; he could not then make himself, because nothing cannot be the cause of some
thing : Ps. c. 3, ' The Lord he is God : he hath made us, and not we our selves.' Whatsoever begun in time, was not ; and when it was nothing, it had nothing, and could do nothing : and therefore could never give to itself nor to any other to be, or to be able to do ; for then it gave what it had not, and did what it could not. J Since reason must acknowledge a first of every kind, a first man, &c., it must acknowledge him created and made, not by him self. Why have not other men since risen up by themselves ? Not by chance ; why hath not chance produced the like in that long time the world hath stood ? If we never knew any thing give being to itself, how can we ima gine any thing ever could ? If the chiefest part of this lower world cannot, nor any part of it hath been known to give being to itself, then the whole cannot be supposed to give any being to itself. Man did not form himself: his body is not from himself; it would then have the power of moving itself, but that is not able to live or act without the presence of the soul. Whilst the soul is present, the body moves ; when that is absent, the body lies as a senseless log, not having the least action or motion. His soul could not form itself; can that which cannot form the least mote, the least grain of dust, form itself a nobler substance than any upon the earth ?
This will be evident to every man's reason, if we consider, 1. Nothing can act before it be. The first man was not, and therefore could not make himself to be : for any thing to produce itself is to act ; if it acted before it was, it was then something and nothing at the same time ; it had then a being before it had a being ; it acted when it brought itself into being. How could it act without a being, without it was ? So that if it were the cause of itself, it must be before itself as well as after itself: it
* Petav. ut supra, page 10. f Damason. J Petav. Theol. Dog. torn. i. lib. i. cap. 2, page 14.
PS. XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 147
was before it was ; it was as a cause before it was as an effect. Action always supposes a principle from whence it flows ; as nothing hath no exist ence, so it hath no operation ; there must be therefore something of real existence to give a being to those things that are, and every cause must be an effect of some other before it be a cause. To be and not be at the same time, is a manifest contradiction, which would be if any thing made itself. That which makes is always before that which is made. Who will say the house is before the carpenter, or the picture before the limner ? The world as a creator must be before itself as a creature.
2. That which doth not understand itself, and order itself, could not make
itself. If the first man fully understood his own nature, the excellency of his own soul, the manner of its operations, why was not that understanding conveyed to his posterity ? Are not many of them found, who understand their own nature almost as little as a beast understands itself, or a rose understands its own sweetness, or a tulip its own colours ? The Scripture indeed gives us an account how this came about, viz., by the deplorable rebellion of man, whereby death was brought upon them, a spiritual death, which includes ignorance as well as an inability to spiritual action, Gen. ii. 17, Ps. xlix. 8. Thus he fell from his honour, and became like the beasts that perish, and not retaining God in his knowledge, retained not himself in his own knowledge.
But what reply can an atheist make to it, who acknowledges no higher cause than nature ? If the soul made itself, how comes it to be so muddy, so wanting in its knowledge of itself and of other things ? If the soul made
its own understanding, whence did the defect arise ? If some first principle was settled by the first man in himself, where was the stop, that he did not implant all in his own mind, and consequently in the minds of all his descend ants ? Our souls know little of themselves, little of the world, are every day upon new inquiries, have little satisfaction in themselves, meet with many an invincible rub in their way ; and when they seem to come [to some reso lution in some cases, stagger again, and like a stone rolled up to the top of the hill, quickly find themselves again at the foot. How come they to be so purblind in truth ? so short of that which they judge true goodness ? How comes it to pass they cannot order their own rebellious affections, and suffer the reins they have to hold over their affections to be taken out of their hands by the unruly fancy and flesh ?
Thus no man that denies the being of a God, and the revelation in Scrip ture, can give an account of. Blessed be God that we have the Scripture, which gives us an account of those things, that all the wit of men could never inform us of ; and that when they are discovered and known by reve lation, they appear not contrary to reason.
3. If the first man made himself, how came he to limit himself? If he gave himself being, why did he not give himself all the perfections and orna ments of being ? Nothing that made itself could sit down contented with a little, but would have had as much power to give itself that which is less, as to give itself being when it was nothing. The excellencies it wanted had not been more difficult to gain than the other which it possessed, as belonging to its nature. If the first man had been independent upon another, and had his perfection from himself, he might have acquired that perfection he wanted, as well as have bestowed upon himself that perfection he had ; and then there would have been no bounds set to him. He would have been
omniscient and immutable. He might have given himself what he would ; if he had had the setting his own bounds, he would have set none at all ; for what should restrain him ? No man now wants ambition to be what he is
148 CHARNOCK'S WORKS. [Ps. XIV. 1.
not ; and if the first man had not been determined by another, but had given himself being, he would not have remained in that determinate being, no more than a toad would remain a toad, if it had power to make itself a man, and that power it would have had, if it had given itself a being. Whatso ever gives itself being, would give itself all degrees of being, and so would have no imperfection, because every imperfection is a want of some degree
of being.* He that could give himself matter and life, might give himself every thing. The giving of life is an act of omnipotence, and what is omni potent in one thing, may be in all. Besides, if the first man had made himself, he would have conveyed himself to all his posterity in the same manner ; every man would have had all the perfections of the first man, as every creature hath the perfections of the same kind ; from whence it natu rally issues, all are desirous to communicate what they can to their pos terity. Communicative goodness belongs to every nature. Every plant propagates its kind in the same perfection it hath itself ; and the nearer any thing comes to a rational nature, the greater affection it hath to that which descends from it ; therefore this affection belongs to a rational nature much more. The first man, therefore, if he had had power to give himself being, and consequently all perfection, he would have had as much power to convey it down to his posterity ; no impediment could have stopped his way : then all souls proceeding from that first man would have been equally intellectual. What should hinder them from inheriting the same perfections? whence should they have diverse qualifications and differences in their understand ings ? No man then would have been subject to those weaknesses, doubtings, and unsatisfied desires of knowledge and perfection. But being all souls are not alike, it is certain they depend upon some other cause for the communication of that excellency they have. If the perfections of men be so contracted and kept within certain bounds, it is certain that they were not in his own power, and so were not from himself. Whatsoever hath a determinate being must be limited by some superior cause. There is there fore some superior power, that hath thus determined the creature by set bounds and distinct measures, and hath assigned to every one its proper nature, that it should not be greater or less than it is ; who hath said of
every one, as of the waves of the sea, Job xxxviii. 11, * Hitherto shalfc thou come, but no further;' and this is God. Man could not have reserved any perfection from his posterity ; for since he doth propagate not by choice but nature, he could no more have kept back any perfection from them than he could, as he pleased, have given any perfection belonging to his nature to them.
4. That which hath power to give itself being, cannot want power to pre serve that being. Preservation is not more difficult than creation. If the first man made himself, why did he not preserve himself? He is not now among the living in the world. How came he to be so feeble as to sink into the grave ? Why did he not inspire himself with new heat and moisture, and fill his languishing limbs and declining body with new strength ? Why did he not chase away diseases and death at the first approach ? What crea ture can find the dust of the first man ? All his posterity traverse the stage and retire again ; in a short space again their ' age departs, and is removed from them as a shepherd's tent, and is cut off with pining sickness,' Isa. xxxviii. 12. The life of man is as a wind, and like a cloud that is con
sumed and vanishes away. * The eye that sees him shall see him no more. He returns not to his house, neither doth his place know him any more,'
* Therefore the heathens called God rb oi/, the only being. Other things were not beings, because they had not all degrees of being.
PS. XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OP GOD. 149
Job vii. 8, 10. The Scripture gives us the reason of this, and lays it upon the score of sin against his Creator, which no man without revelation can give any satisfactory account of.
Had the first man made himself, he had been sufficient for himself, able to support himself without the assistance of any creature. He would not have needed animals and plants, and other helps to nourish and refresh him, nor medicines to cure him. He could not be beholding to other things for his support, which he is certain he never made for himself. His own nature would have continued that vigour which once he had conferred upon him self. He would not have needed the heat and light of the sun ; he would have wanted nothing sufficient for himself in himself ; he needed not have
sought without himself for his own preservation and comfort. What de pends upoa another is not of itself, and what depends upon things inferior to itself is less of itself. Since nothing can subsist of itself, since we see those things upon which man depends for his nourishment and subsistence growing and decaying, starting into the world and retiring from it, as well as man himself, some preserving cause must be concluded upon which all depends.
5. If the first man did produce himself, why did he not produce himself before ?
It hath been already proved that he had a beginning, and could not be from eternity. Why then did he not make himself before ? Not because
'he would not. For having no being, he could have no will ; he could
neither be willing nor not willing. If he could not then, how could he after wards ? If it were in his own power he could have done it, he would have done it ; if it were not in his own power, then it was in the power of some other cause, and that is God. How came he by that power to produce him self ? If the power of producing himself were communicated by another, then man could not be the cause of himself. That is the cause of it which communicated that power to it. But if the power of being was in and from himself, and in no other, nor communicated to him, man would always have been in act, and always have existed, no hindrance can be conceived. For that which had the power of being in itself was invincible by anything that should stand in the way of its own being.
We may conclude from hence the excellency of the Scripture, that it is a word not to be refused credit. It gives us the most rational account of things in the 1st and 2d of Genesis, which nothing in the world else is able to do.
Prop. 2. No creature could make the world. No creature can create another. If it creates of nothing, it is then omnipotent, and so not a crea ture. If it makes something of matter unfit for that which is produced out of it, then the inquiry will be, Who was the cause of the matter ? and so we must arrive to some uncreated being, the cause of all. Whatsoever gives being to any other must be the highest being, and must possess all the per fections of that which it gives being to. What visible creature is there which possesses the perfections of the whole world ? If, therefore, an in visible creature made the world, the same inquiries will return, whence that creature had its being ? For he could not make himself. If any creature did create the world, he must do it by the strength and virtue of another, which first gave him being ; and this is God. For whatsoever hath its exist ence and virtue of acting from another is not God. If it hath its virtue from another, it is then a second cause, and so supposeth a first cause. It must have some cause of itself, or be eternally existent. If eternally existent, it is not a second cause, but God ; if not eternally existent, we must come to
156 CHAENOCK'S WOBKS. [Ps. XIV. 1.
something at length which was the cause of it, or else be bewildered without being able to give an account of anything. We must come at last to an infinite, eternal, independent being that was the first cause of this structure and fabric wherein we and all creatures dwell. The Scripture proclaims this aloud : Isa. xlv. 6, 7, Deut. iv. 35, ' I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light, and I create darkness.' Man, the noblest creature, cannot of himself make a man, the chiefest part of the world. If our parents only, without a superior power, made our bodies or souls, they would know the frame of them ; as he that makes a lock knows the wards of it ; he that makes any curious piece of arras knows how he sets the various colours together, and how many threads went to each division in the web ; he that makes a watch, having the idea of the whole work in his mind, knows the motions of it, and the reason of those motions. But both parents and chil dren are equally ignorant of the nature of their souls and bodies, and of the reason of their motions. God only, that had the supreme hand in inform ing us, * in whose book all our members are written, which in continuance were fashioned/ Ps. cxxxix, 16, knows what we all are ignorant of. If man hath, in an ordinary course of generation, his being chiefly from an higher cause than his parents, the world then certainly had its being from some infinitely wise intelligent being, which is God. If it were, as some iancy, made by an assembly of atoms, there must be some infinite intelligent cause that mhde them, some cause that separated them, some cause that mingled them together for the piling up so comely a structure as the world. It is the most absurd thing to think they should meet together by hazard, and rank themselves in that order we see without a higher and a wise agent. So that no creature could make the world. For supposing any creature was formed before this visible world, and might have a hand in disposing things, yet he must have a cause of himself, and must act by the virtue and strength of another, and this is God.
Prop. 3. From hence it follows, that there is a'first cause of things, which we call God. There must be something supreme in the order of nature, something which is greater than all, which hath nothing beyond it or above it, otherwise we must run in infinitwn. We see not a river but we conclude a fountain ; a watch, but we conclude an artificer. As all number begins from unit}7, so all the multitude of things in the world begins from some unity, oneness, as the principle of it. It is natural to arise from a view of those things to the conception of a nature more perfect than any. As from heat mixed with cold, and light mixed with darkness, men conceive and arise in their understanding to an intense heat and a pure light, and from a corporeal or bodily substance joined with an incorporeal (as man is an earthly body and a spiritual soul), we ascend to a conception of a substance purely in corporeal and spiritual, so from a multitude of things in the world, reason leads us to one choice being above all. And since, in all natures in the
•world, we still find a superior nature, the nature of one beast above the nature of another, the nature of man above the nature of beasts, and some invisible nature, the worker of strange effects in the air and earth, which cannot be ascribed to any visible cause, we must suppose some nature above all those, of inconceivable perfection.
Every sceptic, one that doubts whether there be anything real or no in the world, that counts everything an appearance, must necessarily own a
first cause.* They cannot reasonably doubt but that there is some first cause, which makes the things appear so to them. They cannot be the cause of their own appearance. For as nothing can have a being from
* Coccei. Sum. Theol. cap. 8, sec. 33.
PS. XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 151
itself, so nothing can appear by itself and its own force. Nothing can be and not be at the same time. But that which is not, and yet seems to be, if it be the cause why it seems to be what it is not, it may be said to be and not to be. But certainly such persons must think themselves to exist. If they do not, they cannot think ; and if they do exist, they must have some cause of that existence. So that, which way soever we _ turn ourselves, we must in reason own a first cause in the world.
Well, then, might the psalmist term an atheist a fool, that disowns a God against his own reason. Without owning a God as the first cause of the world, no man can give any tolerable or satisfactory account of the world to his own reason.
And this first cause,
1. Must necessarily exist. It is necessary that he by whom all things
are should be before all things, and nothing before him.* And if nothing be before him, he comes not from any other ; and then he always was, and without beginning. He is from himself; not that he once was not, but because he hath not his existence from another, and therefore of necessity he did exist from all eternity. Nothing can make itself or bring itself into being ; therefore there must be some being which hath no cause, that depends upon no other, never was produced by any other, but was what he is from eternity, and cannot be otherwise, and is not what he is by will, but nature, necessarily existing, and always existing without any capacity or possibility ever not to be.
2. Must be infinitely perfect. Since man knows he is an imperfect being, he must suppose the perfections he wants are seated in some other being, which hath limited him, and upon which he depends. Whatsover we con ceive of excellency or perfection must be in God ; for we can conceive no perfection but what God hath given us a power to conceive. And he that gave us power to conceive a transcendent perfection above whatsoever we saw or heard of, hath much more in himself, or else he could not give us such a conception.
II. As the production of the world, so the harmony of all the parts of it declare the being and wisdom of a God. Without the acknowledging God, the atheist can give no account of those things. The multitude, elegancy, variety, and beauty of all things are steps whereby to ascend to one fountain and original of them.
Is it not a folly to deny the being of a wise agent, who sparkles in the beauty and motions of the heavens, rides upon the wings of the wind, and is writ upon the flowers and fruits of plants ? As the cause is known by the effects, so the wisdom of the cause is known by the elegancy of the work, the proportion of the parts to one another. Who can imagine the world could be rashly made, and without consultation, which in every part of it is so artificially framed ?f No work of art [springs up of its own accord. The world is framed by an excellent art, and therefore made by some skilful artist. As we hear not a melodious instrument but we conclude there is a musician that touches it, as well as some skilful hand that framed and dis posed it for those lessons, — and no man that hears the pleasant sound of a lute but will fix his thoughts, not upon the instrument itself, but upon the skill of the artist that made it, and the art of the musician that strikes it, though he should not see the first when he saw the lute, nor see the other when he hears the harmony, — so a rational creature confines not his thoughts to his sense when he sees the sun in its glory and the moon walking in its
* Petav. Theol. Dog. torn. i. lib. i. cap. 2, page 10, 11. t Philo. Judae. Tetav. Theol. Dogmat. torn. i. lib. i. cap. 1, page 9.
152 CHARNOCK'S WORKS. [Ps. XIY. 1.
brightness, but riseth np in a contemplation and admiration of that infinite
spirit that composed and filled them with such sweetness.
This appears, 1. In the linking contrary qualities together. All things are compounded of the elements. Those are endued with contrary qualities, dryness and moisture, heat and cold ; these would always be contending with and infest
ing one another's rights, till the contest ended in the destruction of one or both. Where fire is predominant, it would suck up the water ; where water is prevalent, it would quench the fire : the heat would wholly expel the
cold, or the cold overpower the heat. Yet we see them chained and linked one within another in every body upon the earth, and rendering mutual offices for the benefit of that body wherein they are seated, and all conspiring together in their particular quarrels for the public interest of the body. How could those contraries, that of themselves observed no order, that are always preying upon one another, jointly accord together of themselves for one common end, if they were not linked in a common band, and reduced to that order by some incomprehensible wisdom and power, which keeps a hand upon them, orders their motions, and directs their events, and makes
them friendly pass into one another's natures ? Confusion had been the result of the discord and diversity of their natures ; no composition could have been of those conflicting qualities for the frame of any body, nor any harmony arose from so many jarring strings, if they had not been reduced into concord by one that is supreme Lord over them, and knows how to dispose their varieties and enmities for the public good.* If a man should see a large city or country, consisting of great multitudes of men of different tempers, full of frauds, and factions, and animosities in their natures against one another, yet living together in good order and peace, without oppressing and invading one another, and joining together for the public good, he would presently conclude there were some excellent governor, who tempered them by his wisdom and preserved the public peace, though he had never yet beheld him with his eye. It is as necessary to conclude a God, who mode rates the contraries in the world, as to conclude a wise prince, who over rules the contrary dispositions in a state, making every one to keep his own bounds and confines. Things that are contrary to one another subsist in an admirable order.
2. In the subserviency of one thing to another. All the members of liv ing creatures are curiously fitted for the service of one another, destined to a particular end, and endued with a virtue to attain that end, and so dis tinctly placed, that one is no hindrance to the other in its operations.! Is not this more admirable than to be the work of chance, which is incapable to settle such an order, and fix particular and general ends, causing an exact correspondency of all parts with one another, and every part to conspire together for one common end ? One thing is fitted for another. The eye is fitted for the sun, and the sun fitted for the eye. Several sorts of food are fitted for several creatures, and those creatures fitted with organs for the partaking of that food.
(1.) Subserviency of heavenly bodies. The sun, the heart of the world, is not for itself but for the good of the world,J as the heart of man is for the good of the body. How conveniently is the sun placed, at a distance from the earth and the upper heavens, to enlighten the stars above and enliven the earth below ! If it were either higher or lower, one part would want its influences. It is not in the higher parts of the heavens ; the earth then,
* Athanasius, Petav. Theol., Dog. torn. i. lib. i. cap. 1, p. 4, 5. t Gassend. Physic, sect. i. lib. iv. cap. 2, page 315. J Lessius.
PS. XIV. 1.] THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 153
which lives and fructifies by its influence, would have been exposed to a per petual winter and chillness, unable to have produced anything for the suste nance of man or beast ; if seated lower, the earth had been parched up, the world made uninhabitable, and long since had been consumed to ashes by the strength of its heat. Consider the motion, as well as the situation, of the sun. Had it stood still, one part of the world had been cherished by its beams, and the other left in a desolate widowhood, in a disconsolate
darkness. Besides, the earth would have had no shelter from its perpendi cular beams striking perpetually and without any remission upon it. The same incommodities would have followed upon its fixedness as upon its too great nearness. By a constant day the beauty of the stars had been ob
scured, the knowledge of their motions been prevented, and a considerable
part of the glorious wisdom of the Creator in those choice ' works of his fingers,' Ps. viii. 3, had been veiled from our eyes. It moves in a fixed line, visits all parts of the earth, scatters in the day its refreshing blessings in every creek of the earth, and removes the mask from the other beauties of heaven in the night, which sparkle out to the glory of the Creator. It spreads its light, warms the earth, cherisheth the seeds, excites the spirit in the earth, and brings fruit to maturity. View also the air, the vast extent between heaven and earth, which serves for a watercourse, a cistern for water to bedew the face of the sunburnt earth, to satisfy the desolate
ground, and to cause the ' bud of the tender herb to spring forth,' Job xxxviii. 25, 27. Could chance appoint the clouds of the air to interpose as fans before the scorching heat of the sun and the faint bodies of the creatures ?
Can that be the * father of the rain,' or ' beget the drops of dew ' ? ver. 28. Could anything so blind settle those ordinances of heaven for the preserva tion of creatures on the earth ? Can this either bring or stay the bottles of heaven, when l the dust grows into hardness and the clods cleave fast together ' ? ver. 37, 38. (2.) Subserviency of the lower world, the earth and sea, which was created to be inhabited, Isa. xlv. 18. The sea affords water to the rivers ; the rivers, like so many veins, are spread through the whole body of the earth to refresh and enable it to bring forth fruit for the sustenance of man
and beast: Ps. civ. 10, 11, ' He sends the springs into the valleys, which run among the hills. They give drink to every beast of the field : the wild asses quench their thirst. He causes the grass to grow for the cattle, and the herb for the service of man, that he may bring forth food out of the
earth,' ver. 14. The trees are provided for shades against the extremity of heat, a refuge for the panting beasts, ' an habitation for birds ' wherein to make their nests, ver. 17, and a basket for their provision. How are the valleys and mountains of the earth disposed for the pleasure and profit of man ! Every year are the fields covered with harvests, for the nourishing the creatures ; no part is barren, but beneficial to man. The mountains that are not clothed with grass for his food are set with stones to make him an habitation ; they have their peculiar services of metals and minerals, for the conveniency, and comfort, and benefit of man. Things which are not fit for his food are medicines for his cure under some painful sickness. Where the earth brings not forth corn, it brings forth roots for the service of other creatures. Wood abounds more in those countries where the cold
is stronger than in others. Can this be the result of chance, or not rather of an infinite wisdom ?
Consider the usefulness of the sea for the supply of rivers to refresh the
earth, « which go up by the mountains and down by the valleys into the place God hath founded for them,' Ps. civ. 8 : a storehouse for fish for the
154 CHAENOCK'S WORKS. [Ps. XIV. 1.
nourishment of other creatures, a shop of medicines for cure, and pearls for
ornament ; the band that ties remote nations together, by giving oppor tunity of passage to, and commerce with one another. How should that natural inclination of the sea to cover the earth submit to this subserviency
to the creatures ? Who hath pounded in this fluid mass of water in certain
limits, and confined it to its own channel for the accommodation of such creatures, who by its common law can only be upon the earth ? Naturally the earth was covered with the deep as with a garment, the waters stood above the mountains : ' Who set a bound that they might not pass over, that they return not again to cover the earth ? ' Ps. civ. 6, 9. Was it blind chance, or an infinite power, that ' shut up the sea with doors, and made thick darkness a swaddling band for it, and said, Hitherto shall thou come, and no
further; and here shall thy proud waves be stayed'? Job xxxviii. 8, 9, 11.
All things are so ordered that they are not propter se, but propter aliud. What advantage accrues to the sun by its unwearied rolling about the world? Doth it increase the perfection of its nature by all its circuits ? No, but it
serves the inferior world, it impregnates things by its heat. Not the most abject thing, but hath its end and use. There is a straight connection : the earth could not bring forth fruit without the heavens, the heavens could not water the earth without vapours from it.
(3.) All this subserviency of creatures centres in man. Other creatures are served by those things as well as ourselves, and they are provided for their nourishment and refreshment as well as ours ; * yet both they and all creatures meet in man, as lines in their centres. Things that have no life or sense are made for those that have both life and sense, and those that have life and sense are made for those that are endued with reason. When
the psalmist admiringly considers the heavens, moon, and stars, he intimates man to be the end for which they were created : Ps. viii. 3, 4, ' What is man that thou art mindful of him ? ' He expresseth more particularly the dominion that man hath over ' the beasts of the fields, the fowl of the air,
and whatsoever passes through the paths of the sea,' ver. 6-8, and con cludes from thence the ' excellency of God's name in all the earth.' All things in the world, one way or other, centre in an usefulness for man : some to feed him, some to clothe him, some to delight him, others to instruct him, some to exercise his wit, and others his strength. Since man did not make them, he did not also order them for his own use. If they conspire to serve him who never made them, they direct man to acknowledge another, who is the joint Creator both of the lord and the servants under his dominion. And therefore, as the inferior natures are ordered by an invisible hand for the good of man, so the nature of man is by the same hand ordered to acknowledge the existence and the glory of the Creator of him. This visible order man knows he did not constitute, he did not settle those creatures in subserviency to himself ; they were placed in that order before he had any acquaintance with them, or existence of himself, which is a question God puts to Job, to consider of: Job xxxviii. 4, * Where wast thou when I laid
the foundation of the earth ? Declare if thou hast understanding.' All is
ordered for man's use, the heavens answer to the earth as a roof to a floor, both composing a delightful habitation for man ; ' vapours ascend from the earth,' and the heavens concocts them, and returns them back in welcome showers for the supplying of the earth, Jer. x. 13. The light of the sun