Chapter 14
Chapter 14
Does the Old Testament Endorse Slavery?
Paul Copan
Harriet Beecher Stowe (1811–96) was the famed author of Uncle Tom's Cabin. When Abraham Lincoln met her when she came to the White House, he purportedly said, "So you're the little woman who wrote the book that started this great war!" Stowe described the nature of antebellum (pre-Civil War) slavery: "The legal power of the master amounts to an absolute despotism over body and soul," and "there is no protection for the slave's life."1
When Christians and non-Christians alike read about "slaves" or "slavery" in Israel, they often think along the lines of antebellum slavery with its slave trade and cruelties. This is a terrible misperception, and many, including the "New Atheists," have bought into this misperception. One of them, Sam Harris, writes that slaves are human beings who are capable of suffering and happiness. Yet the Old Testament regards them as "farm equipment," which is "patently evil."2 This is, unfortunately, distortion and misrepresentation.
In my essay, I shall respond to the problem of "slavery," primarily in the Old Testament. The first two sections are devoted to servitude in the Old Testament—a general overview followed by a treatment of some problem passages. The final section will address slavery in light of the New Testament. While I have to be brief, I go into more detail in my book, Is God a Moral Monster? Understanding the Old Testament God, to which I refer the reader.3
Hebrew Servanthood as Indentured Servitude
Hebrew debt-servanthood (many translations, unfortunately, call it "slavery") is more fairly compared to apprentice-like positions to pay off debts—much like the indentured servitude during America's founding. People would work for about seven years to pay off the debt for their passage to the New World; then they went free. In most cases, servanthood was more like a live-in employee, temporarily embedded within the employer's household until terms of the contract were completed. Even today, sports players get "traded" to another team, which has an "owner," and they "belong" to a franchise. This language hardly suggests slavery but rather a formal contractual agreement that has to be fulfilled—like in the Old Testament.4
Through failed crops or other disasters, debt tended to come to families, not just individuals. One would voluntarily enter into a contractual arrangement ("sell" himself) to work in the household of another: "one of your countrymen becomes poor and sells himself" (Lev 25:47 NIV). A wife or children could be "sold" to help sustain the family through economically unbearable times—unless kinfolk "redeemed" them (paying their debt). They would be debt-servants for six years.5 Family land would have to be mortgaged until the year of Jubilee every 50 years.6
Note well: servanthood wasn't imposed by an outsider—as in the antebellum South.7 Indentured servants could even be "hired from year to year" and weren't to be "rule[d] over . . . ruthlessly" (Lev 25:53–54). Rather than being excluded from Israelite society, servants were thoroughly embedded within Israelite homes.
Unavoidable lifelong servanthood was prohibited—unless someone loved the head of the household and wanted to attach himself to him (Exod 21:5). Servants were to be granted eventual release every seventh year with all debts forgiven (Lev 29:35–43). Their legal status was unique in the ancient Near East (ANE)—a dramatic improvement over ANE law codes: "Hebrew has no vocabulary of slavery, only of servanthood."8
So, an Israelite strapped for shekels might become an indentured servant to pay off that debt to a "boss" or "employer" ('adon). Calling him a "master" is often far too strong a term—just as the term 'ebed ("servant, employee") typically shouldn't be translated "slave." John Goldingay comments that "there is nothing inherently lowly or undignified about being an 'ebed" in Israel. Indeed, it is an honorable, dignified term.9
An Israelite servant's guaranteed eventual release within seven years was a control or regulation to prevent the abuse and institutionalizing of such positions. The release year reminded the Israelites that poverty-induced servanthood wasn't an ideal social arrangement. On the other hand, servanthood existed in Israel precisely because poverty existed: no poverty, no servants in Israel. And if servants lived in Israel, this was voluntary (typically poverty-induced)—not forced.
The Dignity of Servants in Israel
Israel's servant laws were concerned about controlling or regulating—not idealizing—an inferior work arrangement. Israelite servitude, we've seen, though not optimal, was entered into voluntarily. The intent of Israel's laws was to combat potential abuses, not to institutionalize servitude. Indeed, forced slavery (kidnapping) was punishable by death, as we shall see. Once a person was freed from his servant obligations, he had the "status of full and unencumbered citizenship."10
Old Testament legislation sought to prevent voluntary debt-servitude. A good deal of Mosaic legislation was given to prevent the poor from entering even temporary, voluntary indentured service. The poor were given opportunities to glean the edges of fields or pick lingering fruit on trees from their fellow Israelites' harvest (Lev 19:9–10; 23:22; Deut 24:20–21; cf. Exod 23:10). Also, fellow Israelites were commanded to lend freely to the poor (Deut 15:7–8), who weren't to be charged interest (Exod 22:25; Lev 25:36–37). And when the poor couldn't afford high-end sacrificial animals, they could sacrifice smaller, less-expensive ones (Lev 5:7,11). Also, debts were to be automatically canceled every seven years. And when debt-servants were released, they were to be generously provided for—without a "grudging heart" (Deut 15:10). The bottom line: God didn't want there to be any poverty (or servanthood) in Israel (Deut 15:4). So, servant laws existed to help the poor, not harm them or keep them down.
Rather than relegating treatment of servants ("slaves") to the end of the law code (commonly done in other ANE law codes), the matter is front-and-center in Exodus 21. For the first time in the ANE, legislation required treating servants ("slaves") as persons, not property. No wonder: Gen 1:26–27 affirms that all human beings are God's image-bearers. Job himself declared that master and slave alike come from the mother's womb and are ultimately equals (31:13–15). As one scholar writes: "We have in the Bible the first appeals in world literature to treat slaves as human beings for their own sake and not just in the interests of their masters."11
Three Remarkable Provisions in Israel
A simple comparison of Israel's law code with those of the rest of the ANE reveals three remarkable differences. If these three provisions had been followed by "Bible-believing" Southerners, then antebellum slavery would not have existed or been much of an issue.
#1: Anti-Harm Laws. One marked improvement of Israel's laws over other ANE law codes is the release of injured servants themselves (Exod 21:26–27). When an employer ("master") accidentally gouged out the eye or knocked out the tooth of his male or female servant/employee, she was to go free. No bodily abuse of servants was permitted. If an employer's disciplining his servant resulted in immediate death, that employer ("master") himself was to be put to death for murder (Exod 21:20)—unlike other ANE codes.12 In fact, Babylon's Code of Hammurabi actually permitted the master to cut off his disobedient slave's ear (¶282). Typically in ANE law codes, masters—not slaves—were merely financially compensated. The Mosaic law, however, held masters to legal account for their own treatment of their own servants—not simply of another person's servants.
#2: Anti-Kidnapping Laws. Another unique feature of the Mosaic law was its condemnation of kidnapping a person to sell as a slave—an act punishable by death: "He who kidnaps a man, whether he sells him or he is found in his possession, shall surely be put to death" (Exod 21:16 NASB; cf. Deut 24:7). By contrast, of course, kidnapping is how slavery in the antebellum South got off the ground.
#3: Anti-Return Laws. Unlike the antebellum South, Israel was to offer safe harbor to foreign runaway slaves (Deut 23:15–16)—a marked contrast with the Southern states' Fugitive Slave Law. Hammurabi's Code demanded the death penalty for those helping runaway slaves (¶16). In other less-severe cases—in the Lipit-Ishtar (¶12), Eshunna (¶49–50), and Hittite (¶24) laws, fines were exacted for sheltering fugitive slaves. Some claim that this is an improvement. Well, sort of ! In these "improved" scenarios, the slave was still just property; the ANE extradition arrangements still required that the slave be returned to his master. And not only this, the slave was going back to the harsh conditions that prompted him to run away in the first place!13 Even upgraded laws in first-millennium BC Babylon included, yes, compensation to the owner (or perhaps something more severe) for harboring a runaway slave. Yet the returned slaves themselves were disfigured, including slitting ears and branding.14 This isn't the kind of improvement to publicize too widely!
Old Testament scholar Christopher Wright observes: "No other ancient near Eastern law has been found that holds a master to account for the treatment of his own slaves (as distinct from injury done to the slave of another master), and the otherwise universal law regarding runaway slaves was that they must be sent back, with severe penalties for those who failed to comply."15
If these three clear laws from Exodus and Deuteronomy had been followed in the American South, then "slavery" would have been a nonissue. What's more, Israel's treatment of servants ("slaves") was unparalleled in the ANE.
Examining Difficult Texts
We've looked at the general nature of Old Testament servitude. Now, let's look at three of the most challenging Old Testament servitude texts.
Beating Slaves to Death?
"If a man strikes his male servant or his female servant with a staff so that he or she dies as a result of the blow, he will surely be punished [naqam]. However, if the injured servant survives one or two days, the owner will not be punished [naqam], for he has suffered the loss." (Exod 21:20–21 NET)
Is the servant merely property here? The Old Testament affirms each person's full dignity (e.g., Gen 1:26–27; Deut 15:1–18; Job 31:13–15), and this passage proves no exception. If the servant died after "a day or two," the master was given the benefit of the doubt that no murderous intent was involved. But the master's striking a servant so that he immediately dies means the master would be tried for capital punishment: "he shall be avenged" (ESV). This verb naqam always involves the death penalty.16 This theme reinforces the "life for life" theme (21:23–24), which follows the servant-beating passage. The servant was to be treated not as property, but as a dignified human being.
Leaving Wife and Children Behind?
"If you buy a Hebrew servant, he is to serve you for six years, but in the seventh year he will go out free without paying anything. If he came in by himself he will go out by himself; if he had a wife when he came in, then his wife will go out with him. If his master gave him a wife, and she bore sons or daughters, the wife and the children will belong to her master, and he will go out by himself. But if the servant should declare, 'I love my master, my wife, and my children; I will not go out free,' then his master must bring him to the judges, and he will bring him to the door or the doorposts, and his master will pierce his ear with an awl, and he shall serve him forever." (Exod 21:2–6 NET)
Above, we noted that, out of desperation, a man might contract to hire out temporarily ("sell") his wife or children or even himself to help get the family out of debt—a voluntary servitude, quite unlike antebellum slavery. The man, wife, and children would have a roof over their heads with food and clothing supplied by the employer ("master"). As for this particular law, some critics complain that a woman and children are disadvantaged—even trapped—but the man gets to go free, and this reflects an anti-woman/-child bias—or it traps the man into staying with the master if he marries a fellow servant woman.
Three responses are in order. First, we have good reason to think this passage isn't gender-specific. This is an example of case law ("if such-and-such a scenario arises, then this is how to proceed"), and case law was typically gender-neutral. Furthermore, Israelite judges were quite capable of applying laws to male and female alike. An impoverished woman, who wasn't given by her father as a prospective wife to a (widowed or divorced) man or his son (Exod 21:7–11), could perform standard household tasks,17 and she could go free by this same law.18
Various scholars suggest this legitimate, alternative reading to illustrate this passage's nongender-specific nature: "If you buy a Hebrew servant, she is to serve you for six years. But in the seventh year, she will go out free. . . . If her master gives her a husband, and they have sons or daughters, the husband and the children will belong to her master, and she will go out by herself." This reading makes perfect sense, and the law's spirit isn't violated at all.
Second, this scenario isn't as harsh as it first appears. Let's stick with a male servant scenario. Say the employer arranges for a marriage between this unmarried male servant and a female servant. (In this case of debt servitude, the employer's family would now engage in marriage negotiations.) By taking the male servant into his home to work off a debt, the boss has made an investment. He would stand to suffer loss if the servant walked out on the contract. In military service, even if a soldier marries, he can't simply walk away as he still owes the military his time. So it wouldn't make sense to let the man go with his family without paying off the debt.
Third, the released man has three options: (a) He could wait for his wife and children to finish their term of service while he worked elsewhere. No, his wife and children weren't "stuck" in the employer's home the rest of their lives! They could be released when the wife worked off her debt. Yet if the now-free man worked elsewhere, this would mean he would have been separated from his family, and his boss would no longer supply him with food, clothing, and shelter. On the other hand, if he lived with his family after release, he'd still have to pay for room and board. So this scenario created its own set of financial challenges.
(b) He could get a decent job elsewhere and save his shekels to pay his boss to release his wife and children from contractual obligations. The problem is that it would have been very difficult for the man to support himself and to earn enough money for his family's debt-release.
(c) He could commit himself to working permanently for his employer—a lifetime contract (vv. 5–6). He could stay with his family and remain in fairly stable economic circumstances, formalizing his intent in a legal ceremony before the judges ("God") by having his ear pierced with an awl.
In general, destitution in Israel brought about voluntary servitude. In unfortunate circumstances during bleak economic times, Israel's laws provided safety nets for protection, not oppression.
Owning Foreign Slaves?
"[Israelites] are not to be sold in a slave sale. . . . As for your male and female slaves whom you may have—you may acquire male and female slaves from the pagan nations that are around you. Then, too, it is out of the sons of the sojourners who live as aliens among you that you may gain acquisition, and out of their families who are with you, whom they will have produced in your land; they also may become your possession. You may even bequeath them to your sons after you, to receive as a possession; you can use them as permanent slaves. . . ." (Lev 25:42,44–46)
This text troubles many, as it seems that foreigners here could be treated as chattel. But consider the following points. First, according to Lev 19:33–34, Israel was to love the stranger in the land. Also, Exodus's laws (Exod 21:20–21,26–27) protect from abuse all persons in service to others—not just Israelites.19 Second, the verb "acquire [qanah]" in Lev 25:39–51 need not involve selling or purchasing foreign servants as property. This verb appears in Gen 4:1 (Eve's having "gotten a manchild" NASB) and 14:19 (God as "Possessor of heaven and earth" NASB),20 and Boaz "acquired" Ruth as a wife (Ruth 4:10)—clearly a full partner and no inferior.
Third, the very "aliens" in servitude (v. 45) are the same ones capable of sufficient "means" to purchase their own freedom (v. 47)! They weren't inevitably stuck in lifelong servitude. The text continues: "if the means of a stranger or of a sojourner with you becomes sufficient" (v. 47 NASB). The terms stranger (ger) and sojourner (toshab) are connected to the terms used in verse 45. That is, these "acquired" foreign servants could potentially better themselves to the point of hiring servants themselves. (Of course, an alien's hiring an Israelite servant was prohibited.) In principle, all persons in servitude within Israel could be released, unless they had committed a crime.21
Fourth, in some cases, foreign servants could become elevated and apparently fully equal to Israelite citizens. For instance, Caleb's descendant Jarha ended up marrying an Egyptian servant: "Now Sheshan had no sons, only daughters. And Sheshan had an Egyptian servant whose name was Jarha. Sheshan gave his daughter to Jarha his servant in marriage, and she bore him Attai" (1 Chron 2:34–35 NASB). We have marriage between a foreign servant and an established free person with quite a pedigree, and the key implication is that inheritance rights would fall to the servant's offspring, Attai.
Fifth, Israel was required to give foreign runaway slaves protection within Israel's borders and not be returned to their harsh masters (Deut 23:15–16), and kidnapping slaves was also prohibited (Exod 21:16; Deut 24:7). Thus, Leviticus 25 should be understood with these general humanizing protections in mind.
Sixth, since non-Israelites weren't to acquire land in Israel, homeless and landless foreigners wouldn't have much choice but to attach themselves to Israelite households as servants, which might have been the only alternative possible—and not necessarily a bad alternative. John Goldingay writes that "perhaps many people would be reasonably happy to settle for being long-term or lifelong servants. Servants do count as part of the family." He adds: "one can even imagine people who started off as debt servants volunteering to become permanent servants because they love their master and his household" (cf. Deut 15:16–17).22
Seventh, various scholars see the "Hebrew" servant of Exod 21:2 as a foreigner without political allegiances who has come to Israel. Note that he wasn't locked in to lifelong servitude (unless he chose this); he had to be released in the seventh year—presumably to go back to his country of origin.
Slavery in the New Testament
In the two sections above, I focused on Old Testament debt-servitude and some of the difficult passages critics commonly raise. In this section, I focus on slavery in the New Testament—a much different world of institutionalized chattel (property) slavery—a topic I address in more detail in Is God a Moral Monster? During the first century, a whopping 85–90 percent of Rome's population consisted of slaves with both lowly and prestigious positions. A step backward from the Old Testament, yes, but that was Rome's fault!
Slaves as Persons
The New Testament presupposes a fundamental equality because all humans are created in God's image (Jas 3:9; cf. Gen 1:26–27), yet an even deeper unity in Christ transcends human boundaries and social structures: no Jew or Greek, slave or free, no male and female, as believers are all "one in Christ Jesus" (Gal 3:28 NASB; cf. Col 3:11).
Some critics claim, "Jesus never said anything about the wrongness of slavery." Not so! In his "mission manifesto," He explicitly opposed every form of oppression; after all, he came "to proclaim release to the captives . . . to set free those who are oppressed" (Luke 4:18 NASB; cf. Isa 61:1). But just as Jesus didn't press for some economic reform plan in Israel but rather addressed attitudes like greed, materialism, contentment, and generosity, so the New Testament writers addressed underlying attitudes regarding slavery: Christian masters called Christian slaves "brother" or "sister" and were commanded to show compassion, justice, and patience; "master" meant responsibility and service—not oppression and privilege. Thus, the worm was already in the wood for altering the social structures.
The New Testament writers, like Jesus their Master, opposed the dehumanization and oppression of others. In fact, Paul gives "household rules" in Ephesians 6 and Colossians 4 not only for Christian slaves but for Christian masters as well. Slaves are ultimately responsible to God, their heavenly Master. But masters are to "treat your slaves in the same way"—namely, as persons governed by a heavenly Master (Eph 6:9 NIV). Commentator Peter O'Brien points out that "Paul's cryptic exhortation is outrageous" for his day.23
Given the spiritual equality of slave and free, slaves could even take on leadership positions in churches or be equal partners in the gospel with, say, Paul. Paul's ministry illustrates how in Christ there is neither slave nor free, greeting people in his epistles by name. Most of these individuals had commonly used slave and freedman names. For example, in Rom 16:7 and 9 he refers to Andronicus and Urbanus (common slave names) as kinsman, fellow prisoner, and fellow worker. The New Testament's approach to slavery is utterly contrary to that of aristocrats and philosophers like Aristotle, who held that certain humans were slaves by nature (Politics I.13).
Paul reminded Christian masters that they, with their slaves, were fellow slaves of the same impartial Master; so they weren't to mistreat them but rather deal with them as brothers and sisters in Christ. Paul called on human masters to grant "justice and fairness" to their slaves (Col 4:1 NASB). In unprecedented fashion, Paul treated slaves as morally responsible persons (Col 3:22–25) who, like their Christian masters, are "brothers" and part of Christ's body (1 Tim 6:2).24 Christian slaves and masters alike belong to Christ (Gal 3:28; Col 3:11). Spiritual status is more fundamental and freeing than social status.
The "Silence" of the New Testament Writers on Slavery
Though critics claim that the New Testament writers keep quiet about slavery, we see a subtle opposition to it in various ways. We can confidently say that Paul would have considered antebellum slavery with its slave trade to be an abomination—an utter violation of human dignity and an act of human theft. In Paul's "vice list" in 1 Tim 1:9–10, he expounds on the fifth through the ninth commandments (Exodus 20/Deuteronomy 5); there he condemns "slave traders" (NIV) who steal what isn't rightfully theirs.25
Critics wonder why Paul or New Testament writers (cf. 1 Pet 2:18–20) didn't condemn slavery outright and tell masters to release their slaves. Yet we should first separate this question out from other considerations. The New Testament writers' position on the negative status of slavery was clear on various points:
Paul along with Peter didn't call for an uprising to overthrow slavery in Rome. On the one hand, they didn't want the Christian faith to be perceived as opposed to social order and harmony. Hence Christian slaves were told to do what is right; even if they were mistreated, their conscience would be clear (1 Pet 2:18–20). Yes, obligations fell to these slaves without their prior agreement. So the path for early Christians to take was tricky—very much unlike the situation of voluntary servitude in Mosaic law.
A slave uprising would do the gospel a disservice—and prove a direct threat to an oppressive Roman establishment (e.g., "Masters, release your slaves!" or "Slaves, throw off your chains!"). Rome would quash flagrant opposition with speedy, lethal force. So Peter's admonition to unjustly treated slaves implies a suffering endured without retaliation. No, suffering in itself is not good—a sadistic, unscriptural attitude; rather, the right response in the midst of suffering is commendable.
On the other hand, early Christians undermined slavery indirectly, rejecting many common Greco-Roman assumptions about it (e.g., Aristotle's) and acknowledging the intrinsic, equal worth of slaves. Since the New Testament leveled all distinctions at the foot of the cross, the Christian faith was particularly attractive to slaves and lower classes, being countercultural, revolutionary, and anti-status quo. Thus, like yeast, such Christlike living can have a gradual leavening effect on society so that oppressive institutions like slavery could finally fall away. This is, in fact, what took place throughout Europe: slavery fizzled since "Christianized" Europeans clearly saw that owning another human being was contrary to creation and the new creation in Christ.26
This incremental strategy was taken by President Abraham Lincoln, who despised slavery but approached it shrewdly. Being an exceptional student of human nature, he recognized that political realities and predictable reactions to abolition required an incremental approach. The radical abolitionist route of John Brown and William Lloyd Garrison would (and did!) simply create a social backlash against hard-core abolitionists and make emancipation all the more difficult.27
Returning Onesimus: A Throw-Back to Hammurabi?
One key portion of the New Testament begs to be discussed—the letter of Philemon. Was Paul's sending Onesimus back to his alleged owner Philemon a moral step backward? Was it more like the oppressive Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, which insisted on returning fugitive slaves to their masters—something prohibited in the Old Testament (Exod 21:16; Deut 23:15–16)? Some charge that Paul was siding with this ancient oppressive code against the Old Testament.
Keep in mind that reading a New Testament epistle like Philemon is like listening to just one party in a phone conversation. We only hear Paul's voice, but plenty of gaps exist that we'd like to have filled in. What was Paul's relation to Philemon ("dear friend and fellow worker" and "partner" [vv. 1,17, NIV])? What debt did Philemon owe Paul? How had Onesimus wronged Philemon (if he even did)?28 Many interpreters have taken the liberty to "help" us fill in the gaps. The typical result? Too much gets read into the text. The common "fugitive-slave hypothesis" (that Onesimus was a runaway slave of Philemon's) is actually quite late, dating back to the church father John Chrysostom (AD 347–407). However, genuine scholarly disagreement exists about this interpretation. For one thing, the epistle contains no "flight" verbs, as though Onesimus had suddenly gone AWOL. And Paul revealed no hint of fear that Philemon would brutally treat a returning Onesimus, as Roman masters typically did when their runaway slaves were caught.
It's been plausibly suggested that Onesimus and Philemon were estranged Christian (perhaps biological) brothers.29 Paul exhorted Philemon not to receive Onesimus as a slave (whose status in Roman society meant alienation and dishonor); rather, Onesimus was to be welcomed as a beloved brother: "that you might have him back for good—no longer as a slave, but better than a slave, as a dear brother. He is very dear to me but even dearer to you, both as a man and as a brother in the Lord" (Phlm 1:15–16 NIV, my emphasis).
Notice the similar-sounding language in Gal 4:7: "Therefore you are no longer a slave, but a son; and if a son, then an heir through God" (NASB). This may shed further light on how to interpret the epistle of Philemon: Paul wanted to help heal the rift so that Onesimus (not an actual slave) would be received back as a beloved brother in the Lord—not even simply a biological brother. To do so would be to follow God's own example in receiving us as sons and daughters rather than slaves.
Even if Onesimus were an actual slave, this still didn't mean he was a fugitive. If a disagreement or misunderstanding had occurred between Onesimus and Philemon, and Onesimus had sought out Paul to intervene somehow or to arbitrate the dispute, then this wouldn't have rendered Onesimus an official fugitive. And given Paul's knowledge of Philemon's character and track record of Christian dedication, the suggestion that Onesimus's coming back was "Hammurabi Revisited" is way off the mark. Again, if Onesimus were a slave in Onesimus's household, Paul's strategy was this: Instead of forbidding slavery, impose fellowship!30
Concluding Remarks
In the Old Testament, we see a much-improved, humanizing legal system over against other ancient Near Eastern law codes. And when we look at the New Testament, we gain further a deepened perspective. Written during Roman rule with its chattel slavery in place, the Gospels call for freedom from dehumanization and tyranny. Christ's mission is not one of oppression and destruction; rather, he comes to give life, to heal, to redeem, and to release (Luke 4:18). And Paul in Gal 3:28 doesn't abolish slavery; rather, he makes it ultimately irrelevant! All the structures that separated Jew and Greek, male and female, slave and free were radically overturned by these Christians sharing a common meal together to celebrate the Lord's death (cf. 1 Cor 11:17–34). Indeed, this was a defiant, countercultural act against Rome's embedded social structures—a far cry from the critics' "passive resignation" argument ("Paul didn't speak out against slavery but accepted it").
Furthermore, the Lord's Supper was also a culturally shameful—yet socially defiant—act: not only did these Christians worship at the table of their once humiliated and crucified Messiah (who rose from the dead!); the lower social status Christians—females, Gentiles, and slaves—were treated as equals with males, Jews, and free persons. In the early church, a social revolution had begun!
In summary, Jesus and the New Testament writers opposed oppression, slave trade, and treating humans as cargo. The earliest Christians were a revolutionary, new community united by Christ—a people transcending racial, social, and sexual barriers—which eventually led to a slavery-free Europe a few centuries later.
1 Harriet Beecher Stowe, A Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin; Presenting the Facts and Documents upon which the Story is Founded, together with Corroborative Statements verifying the Truth of the Work (Boston: John P. Jewett, 1853), I.10, 139.
2 Sam Harris, The End of Faith (New York: Norton, 2004), 18.
3 Paul Copan, Is God a Moral Monster? Understanding the Old Testament God (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011). This chapter is adapted from three essays I wrote for Enrichment Journal.
4 Douglas Stuart, Exodus (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2009), 474–75.
5 From Tikva Frymer-Kenski, "Anatolia and the Levant: Israel," in A History of Ancient Near East Law, vol. 2, ed. Raymond Westbrook (Leiden: Brill, 2003).
6 See Gregory C. Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery in Israel and the Ancient Near East, JSOT Supplement Series 141 (Sheffield: University of Sheffield Press, 1993), 351–54.
7 See Gordon Wenham, "Family in the Pentateuch," in Family in the Bible, ed. Richard S. Hess and Daniel Carrol (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 21.
8 J. A. Motyer, The Message of Exodus (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2005), 239.
9 John Goldingay, Old Testament Theology: Israel's Life, vol. 3 (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009), 460.
10 John I. Durham, Exodus (Waco, TX: Word, 1987), 321.
11 Muhammad A. Dandamayev, s.v. "Slavery (Old Testament)," in Anchor Bible Dictionary, vol. 6, ed. David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992).
12 See Christopher Wright, Old Testament Ethics and the People of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 292.
13 ANE legal text references are from The Context of Scripture: Volume II: Monumental Inscriptions from the Biblical World, ed. William W. Hallo (Leiden: Brill, 2003); Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 2nd ed. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997). See also Elisabeth Meier Tetlow, Women, Crime, and Punishment in Ancient Law and Society: Volume 1: The Ancient Near East (New York: Continuum, 2004).
14 Raymond Westbrook, ed., s.v. "Neo-Babylonian Period," in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, ed. Raymond Westbrook, Handbook of Oriental Studies (Leiden: Brill Academic, 2003), 2: 932.
15 Wright, Old Testament Ethics, 292.
16 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery in Israel and the Ancient Near East, 155–63.
17 It is incorrect that this passage implies polygamy or concubinage. The daughter was to be married either to the master (who was divorced or widowed) or to the master's marriageable son—not as a backup wife to provide offspring. We're already told in v. 8 that the man doesn't choose to take the servant woman as his wife. In that case, we should understand v. 10 to mean that he marries another instead of the servant woman. Also, v. 11 is sometimes misleadingly translated "conjugal rights"; it more likely means "oil" or "shelter/protection." On this, see chap. 11 in Paul Copan, Is God a Moral Monster?
18 Chap. 6 in Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery in Israel and the Ancient Near East.
19 Roy Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, NIV Application Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2004), 441–42.
20 John Goldingay, Israel's Life (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2009), 464 and note.
21 Walter C. Kaiser, "A Principlizing Model," in Four Views of Moving Beyond the Bible to Theology, ed. Stanley N. Gundry and Gary T. Meadors (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009), 40.
22 Goldingay, Israel's Life, 465–66.
23 Peter T. O'Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians, Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 454.
24 Ibid., 455.
25 See Gordon D. Fee, 1 and 2 Timothy, Titus, NIBC 13 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1988), 45–46, n49.
26 Jonathan Hill, What Has Christianity Ever Done for Us? (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2005), 176.
27 See Ronald C. White's A. Lincoln: A Biography (New York: Random House, 2009), which explores these themes in detail.
28 For a fine general discussion, see David B. Capes, Rodney Reeves, and E. Randolph Richards, Rediscovering Paul (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2007), 237–41. I also borrow insights from Allen Dwight Callahan, "Paul's Epistle to Philemon: Toward an Alternative Argumentum," Harvard Theological Review 86 (1993): 357–76; Sarah Winter, "Paul's Letter to Philemon," New Testament Studies 33 (1987): 1–15.
29 See Callahan, "Paul's Epistle to Philemon."
30 James Tunstead Burtchaell, Philemon's Problem: A Theology of Grace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 21.