-- Tit. 2. Cases of Conscience about Theft and such injuries
Tit. 2. Certain Cases of Conscience about Theft and Injury Quest. I. 'Is it a sin for a man to steal in absolute necessity, when it is merely to save his life?'
Answ. The case is very hard. I shall, I. Tell you so much as is past controversy, and then speak to the controverted part. 1. If all unquestionable means be not first used, it is undoubtedly a sin. If either labouring or begging will save our lives, it is unlawful to steal.
Yea, or if any others may be used to intercede for us. Otherwise it is not stealing to save a man's life, but stealing to save his labour, or to gratify his pride and save his honour. 2. It is undoubtedly a sin if the saving of our lives by it, do bring a greater hurt to the commonwealth or other men, than our lives are worth. 3. And it is a sin if it deprive the owner of his life, he being a person more worthy and useful to the common good. These cases are no matter of controversy.
4. And it is agreed of, that no man may steal beforehand out of a distrustful fear of want. 5. Or if he take more than is of necessity to save his life. These cases also are put as out of controversy.
But whether in an innocent, absolute necessity it be lawful to steal so much as is merely sufficient to save one's life, is a thing that casuists are not agreed on. They that think it lawful, say that the preservation of life is a natural duty, and preservation of propriety is but a subservient thing which must give place to it. So Amesius de
Conscient. lib. v. cap. 50. maketh it one case of lawful taking that which is another's, 'Si irrationabiliter censeatur dominus invitus: ut in eis quæ accipit aliquis ex alieno ad extremam et præsentem suam necessitatem sublevandam, cui alia ratione succurrere non potest.
Hoc enim videtur esse ex jure naturali, divisione rerum antiquiore et superiore; quod jure humano quo facta est divisio rerum non potuit abrogari: Quo sensu non male dicitur, omnia fieri communia in extrema necessitate.'
On the other side, those that deny it say, that the same God that hath bid us preserve our lives, hath appointed propriety, and forbidden us to steal, without excepting a case of necessity, and therefore hath made it simply evil, which we may not do for the procurement of any good: and the saving of a man's life will not prove so great a good, as the breaking of God's law will be an evil.
For the true determining of this case, we must distinguish of persons, places, and occasions. 1. Between those whose lives are needful to the public good and safety, and those that are not of any such concernment. 2. Between those that are in an enemy's or a strange country, and those that are in their own. 3. Between those that are in a commonwealth, and those that are either in a community, or among people not embodied or conjoined. 4. Between those that take but that which the refuser was bound to give them, and those that take that which he was not bound to give them. And so I answer,
1. Whensoever the preservation of the life of the taker, is not in open probability, like to be more serviceable to the common good, than the violation of the right of propriety will be hurtful, the taking of another man's goods is sinful, though it be only to save the taker's life. For the common good is to be preferred before the good of any individual.
2. In ordinary cases, the saving of a man's life will not do so much good, as his stealing will do hurt. Because the lives of ordinary persons are of no great concernment to the common good: and the violation of the laws may encourage the poor to turn thieves, to the loss of the estates and lives of others, and the overthrow of peace and order. Therefore ordinarily it is a duty, rather to die, than take another man's goods against his will, or without his consent.
3. But in case that the common good doth apparently more require the preservation of the person's life, than the preservation of propriety and the keeping of the law in that instance, it is then no sin, (as I conceive): which may fall out in many instances.
As, (1.) In case the king and his army should march through a neighbour prince's country, in a necessary war against their enemies; if food be denied them in their march, they may take it rather than perish. (2.) In case the king's army in his own dominions have no pay, and must either disband or die, if they have not provision, they may rather take free quarter, in case that their obedience to the king, and the preservation of the country forbiddeth them to disband. (3.)
When it is a person of so great honour, dignity, and desert, as that his worth and serviceableness will, do more than recompense the hurt: as if Alexander or Aristotle were on ship-board with a covetous ship-master, who would let them die rather than relieve them. (4.)
When a child taketh meat from a cruel parent that would famish him, or a wife from such a cruel husband! Or any man taketh his own by stealth from another who unjustly detaineth it, when it is to save his life. For here is a fundamental right 'ad rem,' and the heinousness of his crime that would famish another, rather than give him his own, or his due, doth take off the scandal and evil consequents, of the manner of taking it. (5.) But the greatest difficulty is, in case that only the common law of humanity and charity bind another to give to one that else must die, and he that needeth may take it so secretly that it shall in likelihood never be known, and so never be scandalous, nor encourage any other to steal! May not the needy then steal to save his life? This case is so hard, that I shall not venture to determine it; but only say that he that doth so in such a case, must resolve when he hath done, to repay the owner if ever he be able, (though it be but a piece of bread;) or to repay him by his labour and service, if he have no other way, and be thus able; or if not so, to confess it to him that he took it from, and acknowledge himself his debtor, (unless it be to one whose cruelty would abuse his confession).
Quest. II. 'If another be bound to relieve me and do not, may I not take it, though it be not for the immediate saving of my life?'
Answ. If he be bound only by God's law to relieve you, you must complain to God, and stay till he do you right, and not break his law
and order, by righting yourself, in case you are not in the necessity aforesaid. If he be bound also by the laws of man to relieve you, you may complain to the rulers, and seek your right by their assistance; but not by stealth.
Quest. III. 'If another borrow or possess my goods or money, and refuse to pay me, and I cannot have law and justice against him, or am not rich enough to sue him, may I not take them if I have an opportunity?'
Answ. If he turn your enemy in a time of war, or live under another prince, with whom you are at war, or where your prince alloweth you to take it, there it seemeth undoubtedly lawful to take your own by that law of arms, which then is uppermost. But when the law that you are under forbiddeth you, the case is harder. But it is certain that propriety is in communities, and is in order of nature antecedent to human government in republics; and the preservation of it is one of the chief ends of government. Therefore I conceive that in case you could take your own so secretly, or in such a manner as might no way hinder the ends of government as to others, by encouraging thievery or unjust violence, it is not unlawful before God, the end of the law being the chief part of the law: but when you cannot take your own without either encouraging theft or violence in others, or weakening the power of the laws and government by your disobedience, (which is the ordinary case,) it is unlawful: because the preservation of order and of the honour of the government and laws, and the suppression of theft and violence, is much more necessary than the righting of yourself, and recovering your own.
Quest. IV. 'If another take by theft or force from me, may I not take my own again from him, by force or secretly, when I have no other way?'
Answ. Not when you do more hurt to the commonwealth by breaking law and order, than your own benefit can recompense: for you must
rather suffer, than the commonwealth should suffer: but you may when no such evils follow it.
Quest. V. 'If I be in no necessity myself, may I not take from rich men to give to the poor who are in extreme necessity?'
Answ. The answer to the first case may suffice for this: in such cases wherein a poor man may not take it for himself, you may not take it for him. But in such cases he may take it for himself, and no one else is fit to do it, he himself being unable, you may do it, (when no accidental consequents forbid you).
Quest. VI. 'If he have so much as that he will not miss it, and I be in great want, though not like to die of famine; may I not take a little to supply my want?'
Answ. No; because God hath appointed the means of just propriety; and what is not gotten by those means, is none of your's by his approbation. He is the giver of riches; and he intendeth not to give to all alike: if he give more to others, he will require more of them: and if he give less to you, it is the measure which he seeth to be meetest for you, and the condition in which your obedience and patience must be tried: and he will not take it well, if you will alter your measure by forbidden means, and be carvers for yourselves, or level others.
Quest. VII. 'There are certain measures which humanity obligeth a man to grant to those in want, and therefore men take without asking: as to pluck an apple from a tree, or as Christ's disciples, to rub the ears of corn to eat: if a Nabal deny me such a thing, may I not take it?'
Answ. If the laws of the land allow it you, you may: because men's propriety is subjected to the law for the common good. But if the law forbid it you, you may not: except when it is necessary to save your life, upon the terms expressed under the first question.
Quest. VIII. 'May not a wife, or child, or servant take more than a cruel husband, or parent, or master doth allow? Suppose it to be better meat or drink?'
Answ. How far the wife hath a true propriety herself, and therefore may take it, dependeth on the contract and the laws of the land; which I shall not now meddle with. But for children and servants, they may take no more than the most cruel and unrighteous parents or masters do allow them; except to save their lives upon the conditions in the first place: but the servant may seek relief of the magistrate; and he may leave such an unrighteous master: and the child must bear it patiently as the cross by which it pleaseth God to try him; unless that the government of the parent be so bad, as to tend to his undoing; and then I think he may leave his parents for a better condition: (except it be when their own necessity obligeth him to stay and suffer for their help and benefit). For it is true that a child oweth as much to his parents as he can perform, by way of gratitude, for their good: but it is true also, that a parent hath no full and absolute propriety in his child, as men have in their cattle, but is made by nature their guardian for their benefit: and therefore when parents would undo their children's souls or bodies, the children may forsake them, as being forsaken by them; further than as they are obliged in gratitude to help them, as is aforesaid.
Quest. IX. 'If a man do deserve to lose somewhat which he hath by way of punishment, may I not take it from him?'
Answ. Not unless the law either make you a magistrate or officer to do it, or allow and permit it at the least; because it is not to you that the forfeiture is made: or if it be, you must execute the law according to the law, and not against it. For else you will offend in punishing offences.
Quest. X. 'But what if I fully resolve, when I take a thing in my necessity, to repay the owner, or make him satisfaction if ever I be able?'
Answ. That is some extenuation of the sin, but no justification of the fact; which is otherwise unjustifiable, because it is still without his consent.
Quest. XI. 'What if I know not whether the owner would consent, or not?'
Answ. In a case where common custom and humanity alloweth you to take it for granted that he would not deny it you (as to pluck an ear of corn, or gather an herb for medicine in his field) you need not scruple it; unless you conjecture that he is a Nabal and would deny you. But otherwise if you doubt of his consent, you must ask it, and not presume of it without just cause.
Quest. XII. 'What if I take a thing from a friend but in a way of jest, intending to restore it?'
Answ. If you have just grounds to think that your friend would consent if he knew it, you will not be blamable; but if otherwise, either you take it for your own benefit and use, or you take it only to make sport by: the former is theft, for all your jest; the latter is but an unlawful way of jesting.
Quest. XIII. 'What if I take it from him, but to save him from hurting his body with it: as if I steal poison from one that intended to kill himself by it: or take a sword from a drunken man, that would hurt himself: or a knife from a melancholy man: or what if it be to save another; as to take a madman's sword from him, who would kill such as are in his way, or any angry man's that will kill another?'
Answ. This is your duty according to the sixth commandment, which bindeth you to preserve your neighbour's life: so be it these conditions be observed. 1. That you keep not his sword for your benefit and advantage, nor claim a property in it; but give it his friends, or deliver it to the magistrate. 2. That you do nothing without the magistrate, in which you may safely stay for his authority and help: but if two be fighting, or thieves be robbing or murdering a
man, or another's life be in present danger, you must help them without staying for the magistrate's authority. 3. That you make not this a pretence for the usurping of authority, or for resisting or deposing your lawful prince, or magistrate, or parent, or master, or of exercising your own will and passions against your superiors: pretending that you take away their swords to save themselves or others from their rage, when it is indeed but to hinder justice.
Quest. XIV. 'May I not then much more take away that by which he would destroy his own or other men's souls: as to take away cards or dice from gamesters; or heretical or seditious books, or play-books and romances; or to pull down idols which the idolaters do adore, or are instruments of idolatry?'
Answ. There is much difference in the cases, though the soul be more precious than the body: for, 1. Here there is supposed to be so much leisure and space as that you may have time to tell the magistrate of it, whose duty primarily it is; whereas in the other case it is supposed that so much delay would be a man's death. Therefore your duty is to acquaint the magistrate with the sin and danger, and not to anticipate him, and play the magistrate yourself. Or in the case of cards, and dice, and hurtful books, you may acquaint the persons with the sin, and persuade them to cast them away themselves. 2.
Your taking away these instruments is not like to save them: for the love of the sin, and the will to do it remain still: and the sinner will be but hardened by his indignation against your irregular course of charity. 3. Men are bound to save men's bodies whether they will or not; because it may be so done; but no man can save another's soul against his will! And it is God's will that their, salvation or damnation shall be more the fruit of their own wills, than of any other's.
Therefore though it is possible to devise an instance, in which it is lawful to steal a poisonous book or idol from another (when it is done so secretly as will encourage no disobedience or disorder; nor is like to harden the sinner, but indeed to do him good, &c.) yet ordinarily all this is unlawful, for private men, that have no government of others, or extraordinary interest in them.