-- Tit. 2. Directions against Perjury and Perfidiousness; and for keeping Vows and Oaths. The heinou

-- Tit. 2. Directions against Perjury and Perfidiousness; and for keeping Vows and Oaths. The heinou

that by holy wisdom and tenderness have kept themselves from the deceit.

Tit. 2. Directions against Perjury and Perfidiousness: and for keeping Vows and Oaths.

Direct. I. 'Be sure that you have just apprehensions of the greatness of the sin of perjury.' Were it seen of men in its proper shape, it would more affright them from it than a sight of the devil himself would do. I shall shew it you in part in these particulars.

1. It containeth a lie, and hath all the malignity in it which I before shewed to be in lying, with much more. 2. Perjury is a denial or contempt of God. He that appealeth to his judgment by an oath, and doth this in falsehood, doth shew that either he believeth not that there is a Godn, or that he believeth not that he is the righteous governor of the world, who will justly determine all the causes that belong to his tribunal. The perjured person doth as it were bid defiance to God, and setteth him at nought, as one that is not able to be avenged on him. 3. Perjury is a calling for the vengeance of God against yourselves. You invite God to plague you, as if you bid him do his worst: you appeal to him for judgment in your guilt, and you shall find that he will not hold you guiltless. Imprecations against yourselves are implied in your oaths: he that sweareth doth say in effect, 'Let God judge and punish me as a perjured wretch, if I speak not the truth.' And it is a dreadful thing to fall into the hands of the living God, "For vengeance is his and he will recompence:" and when he judgeth the wicked, "he is a consuming fire." 4. Perjury and perfidiousness are sins that leave the conscience no ease of an extenuation or excuse; but it is so heinous a villany, that it is the seed of self-tormenting desperation. Some sins conscience can make shift awhile to hide, by saying, 'It is a controversy:' and 'Many wise men are of another mind:' but perjury is a sin which heathens and infidels bear as free a testimony against (in their way) as Christians do. Some sins are shifted off by saying, 'They are little ones:' but Christians and heathens are agreed that perjury is a sin almost as great as the devil

can teach his servants to commit. Saith Plutarchq, 'He that deceiveth his enemy by an oath, doth confess thereby that he feareth his enemy, and despiseth God.' Saith Cicero, 'The penalty of perjury is destruction from God, and shame from man.' Saith Q. Curtius,

'Perfidiousness is a crime which no merits can mitigate.' Read Cicero de Offic. lib. iii. Saith Aristotle, 'He that will extenuate an oath, must say, that those villanous wretches that think God seeth not, do think also to go away with their perjury unpunished.' In a word, the heathens commonly take the revenge of perjury to belong in so especial a manner to the gods, that they conclude that man, and usually his posterity to be destined to ruin, that is perjured and perfidious: insomuch that it is written of Agesilaus and many others, that when their enemies; were perjured and broke their covenants, they took it for a sign of victory, and the best prognostic of their success against them. Plutarch recordeth this story of Cleomenes, that having made a truce for seven days with the Argives, he set upon them, and killed and took many of them in the night; and when he was charged with perfidiousness, answered, 'I made not a truce with them for seven nights, but for seven days.' But the women fetched arms out of the temples of the gods, and repulsed him with shame, and he ran mad, and with his sword did mangle his own body, and died in a most hideous manner. When conscience is awakened to see such a sin as perjury, no wonder if such run mad, or hang themselves, as perfidious Achitophel and Judas did. No doubt but everlasting horror and desperation will be the end of such, if true conversion do not prevent it. 5. It is a sin that ruineth families and societiess, like fire that being kindled in the thatch, never stoppeth till it have consumed all the house. Though "the curse of the Lord is in the house of the wicked, but he blesseth the habitation of the just;" yet among all the wicked, there are few so commonly marked out with their families to shame and ruin, as the perjured. Whatever nation is stigmatized with a 'fides Punica vel Græca,' 'with the brand of perjury,' it is not only their greatest infamy, but like 'Lord have mercy on us' written on your doors, a sign of a destroying plague within. Saith Silius,

Non illi domus aut conjux aut vita manebit Unquam expers luctus, lachrymæque: aget æquore semper

Ac tellure premens; aget ægrum nocte dieque; Despecta ac violata fides— Saith Claudian, In prolem dilatarunt perjuria patris, Et pœnam merito filius ore luit.— So Tibullus, Ah miser: et siquis primo perjuria celat,

Sera tamen tacitus pœna venit pedibus.

Saith Pausanias, 'The fraud that is committed by perjury, falleth upon posterity.' 6. Perjury and perfidiousness are virtually treason, rebellion, and murder against kings and magistrates, and no more to be favoured in a kingdom, by a king that loveth his life and safety, than the plague in a city, or poison to the body. 'Tristissimum et domesticum regibus omnibus pharmacum liberorum, amicorum et exercitus perfidia,' saith Appian. What security have princes of their crowns or lives, where oaths and covenants seem not obligatory?

There is then nothing left but fear of punishment to restrain the violence of any one that would do them mischief: and craft or strength will easily break the bonds of fear. He that would dissolve the bond of oaths, and teach men to make light of perjury, is no more to be endured in a kingdom, than he that openly inviteth the subjects to kill their king, or rise up in rebellion against him. If he that breaketh the least of God's commands, and teacheth men so to do, shall be called least in the kingdom of God, then surely he that breaketh the great commands by the most odious sin of perjury, and

teacheth men so to do, should neither be great, nor any thing, in the kingdoms of men. 7. Perjury is the poison of all societies, and of friendship, and of human converse, and turneth all into a state of enmity or hostility, and teacheth all men to live together like foes. He that is not to be believed when he sweareth, is never to be believed: and when oaths and covenants signify nothing, and no man can believe another, what are they but as so many foes to one another?

How can there be any relations of governors and subjects? of husband and wife? of masters and servants? Or how can there be any trading or commerce, when there is no trust? Perjury dissolveth all societies by loosening all the bonds of association. Well might

Dionys. Halic. lib. iii. say, 'The perfidious are far worse than open enemies, and worthy of far greater punishment. For a man may more easily avoid the ambushments of foes, and repel their assaults, than escape the perfidiousness of seeming friends.' Saith Val. Max. lib. ix. c. 6. 'Perfidiousness is a hidden and ensnaring mischief; whose effectual force is in lying and deceiving: its fruit consisteth in some horrid villany; which is ripe and sure when it hath compassed cruelty with wicked hands; bringing as great mischief to mankind, as fidelity bringeth good and safety.' He that teacheth the doctrine of perjury and perfidiousness, doth bid every man shift for himself, and trust no more his friend or neighbour, but all take heed of one another as so many serpents or wild beasts. Lions and bears may better be suffered to live loose among men, than those that teach men to make light of oaths. 8. Thus also it destroyeth personal love, and teacheth all men to be haters of each other: for it can be no better, when men become such hateful creatures to each other, as not at all to be credited or sociably conversed with. 9. Perjury and perfidiousness do proclaim men deplorate; and stigmatize them with this character, that they are persons that will stick at the committing of no kind of villany in the world, further than their fleshly interest hindereth them: no charity bindeth a man to think that he will make conscience of murder, rebellion, deceit, adultery, or any imaginable wickedness, who maketh no conscience of perjury and perfidiousness. Such a person alloweth you to judge that if the temptation serve, he will do any thing that the devil bids him: and that he is virtually a compound

of all iniquity, and prepared for every evil work. 10. Lastly, As perjury doth thus dissolve societies, and turn mankind into enmity with each other, so it would make the misery incurable, by making even penitents incredible. Who will believe him, even while he professeth to repent, that hath shewed that when he sweareth he is not to be believed? He that dare forswear himself, dare lie when he pretendeth repentance for his perjury. It must be some deeds that are more credible than words and oaths, that must recover the credit of such a man's professions. If perjury have violated any relations, it leaveth the breach almost incurable, because no professions of repentance or future fidelity can be trusted. Thus I have partly shewed you the malignity of perjury and covenant-breaking.

Direct. II. 'Be sure that you make no vow or covenant which God hath forbidden you to keep.' It is rash vowing and swearing which is the common cause of perjury. You should, at the making of your vow, have seen into the bottom of it, and foreseen all the evils that might follow it, and the temptations which were like to have drawn you into perjury. He is virtually perjured as soon as he hath sworn, who sweareth to do that which he must not do: the preventive means are here the best.

Direct. III. 'Be sure you take no oath or vow which you are not sincerely resolved to perform.' They that swear or vow with a secret reserve, that rather than they will be ruined by keeping it, are habitually and reputatively perjured persons, even before they break it: besides that, they shew a base, hypocritical, profligate conscience, that can deliberately commit so great a sin.

Direct. IV. 'See that all fleshly, worldly interest be fully subdued to the interest of your souls, and to the will of God.' He that at the heart sets more by his body than his soul, and loveth his worldly prosperity above God, will lie, or swear, or forswear, or do any thing to save that carnal interest which he most valueth. He that is carnal and worldly at the heart, is false at the heart: the religion of such an hypocrite will give place to his temporal safety or commodity, and will carry him no

further than the way is fair. It is no wonder that a proud man, or a worldling will renounce both God and his true felicity for the world, seeing indeed he taketh it for his god and his felicity: even as a believer will renounce the world for God.

Direct. V. 'Beware of inordinate fear of man, and of a distrustful withdrawing of your heart from God.' Else you will be carried to comply with the will of man, before the will of God, and to avoid the wrath of man before the wrath of God. Read and fear that heavy curse, Jer. 17:5, 6. God is unchangeable, and hath commanded you so far to imitate him, as 'If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word; he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth." But man is mutable, and so is his interest and his affairs; and therefore if you are the servants of men, you must swear one year, and forswear it, or swear the contrary the next: when their interest requireth it, you must not be thought worthy to live among men, if you will not promise or swear as they command you: and when their interest altereth and requireth the contrary, you must hold all those bonds to be but straws, and break them for their ends.

Direct. VI. 'Be sure that you lose not the fear of God, and the tenderness of your consciences.' When these are lost, your understanding, and sense, and life are lost; and you will not stick at the greatest wickedness; nor know when you have done it, what you did. If faith see not God continually present, and foresee not the great approaching day, perjury or any villany will seem tolerable, for worldly ends; for when you look but to men's present case, you will see that "the righteous and the wise, and their works are in the hand of God: no man knoweth love or hatred by all that is before them. All things come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked; to the good, and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath." But in the end, men "shall discern between the righteous and the wickedz."

Therefore it is the believing foresight of the end, that by preserving

the fear of God and tenderness of conscience, must save you from this, and all other heinous sin.

Direct. VII. 'Be not bold and rash about such dreadful things as vows.' Run not as fearlessly upon them as if you were but going to your dinner: the wrath of God is not to be jested with. 'Usque ad aras,' was the bounds even of a heathen's kindness to his friend.

Meddle with oaths with the greatest fear, and caution, and circumspection. It is terrible here to find that you were mistaken, through any temerity, or negligence, or secret seduction of a carnal interest.

Direct. VIII. 'Especially be very fearful of owning any public doctrine, or doing any public act, which tendeth to harden others in their perjury, or to encourage multitudes to commit the sin.' To be forsworn yourselves is a dreadful case; but to teach whole nations or churches to forswear themselves, or to plead for it, or justify it as a lawful thing, is much more dreadful. And though you teach not or own not perjury under the name of perjury, yet if first you will make plain perjury to seem no perjury, that so you may justify it, it is still a most inhuman, horrid act. God knoweth I insult not over the Papists, with a delight to make any Christians odious: but with grief I remember how lamentably they have abused our holy profession, while not only their great doctors, but their approved General

Council at the Lateran under Pope Innocent the Third, in the third canon hath decreed that the pope may depose temporal lords from their dominions, and give them unto others, and discharge their vassals from their allegiance and fidelity, if they be heretics, or will not exterminate heretics, (even such as the holy men there condemned were, in the pope's account). To declare to many

Christian nations, that it is lawful to break their oaths and promises to their lawful lords and rulers, or their vows to God, and to undertake, by defending or owning this, to justify all those nations that shall be guilty of this perjury and perfidiousness, O what a horrid crime is this! what a shame even unto human nature! and how great a wrong to the Christian name!

Direct. IX. 'Understand and remember these following rules, to acquaint you how far a vow is obligatory:' which I shall give for the most part out of Dr. Sanderson, because his decisions of these cases are now of best esteem.

Rule I. 'The general rule laid down Numb. 30:2, 3. doth make a vow, as such, to be obligatory, though the party should have a secret equivocation or intent, that though he speak the words to deceive another, yet he will not oblige himself.' Such a reserve not to oblige himself hindereth not the obligation, but proveth him a perfidious hypocrite. Dr. Sanderson, p. 23. 'Juramentum omne ex suâ naturâ est obligatorium: ita ut si quis juret non intendens se obligare, nihilominus tamen suscipiendo juramentum ipso facto obligetur:' that is, If he so far understand what he doth, as that his words may bear the definition of an oath or vow: otherwise if he speak the words of an oath in a strange language, thinking they signify something else, or if he spake in his sleep, or deliration, or distraction, it is no oath, and so not obligatory.

Rule II. 'Those conditions are to be taken as intended in all oaths, (whether expressed or no,) which the very nature of the thing doth necessarily imply;' unless any be so brutish as to express the contrary). And these are all reducible to two heads, 1. A natural, and 2. A moral impossibility. 1. Whoever sweareth to do any thing, or give any thing, is supposed to mean, 'If I live; and if I be not disabled in my body, faculties, estate; if God make it not impossible to be,' &c.

For no man can be supposed to mean, I will do it whether God will or not, and whether I live or not, and whether I be able or not.' 2.

Whoever voweth or sweareth to do any thing, must be understood to mean it 'If no change of providence make it a sin; or if I find not contrary to my present supposition, that God forbiddeth it.' For no man that is a Christian is to be supposed to mean when he voweth, 'I will do this, though God forbid it, or though it prove to be a sin;' especially when men therefore vow it, because they take it to be a duty. Now as that which is sinful is morally impossible, so there are divers ways by which a thing may appear or become sinful to us. (1.)

When we find it forbidden directly in the Word of God, which at first we understood not. (2.) When the change of things doth make that a sin, which before was a duty: of which may be given an hundred instances: as when the change of a man's estate, of his opportunities, of his liberty, of his parts and abilities, of objects, of customs, of the laws of civil governors, doth change the very matter of his duty.

Quest. 'But will every change disoblige us? If not, what change must it be? seeing casuists use to put it as a condition in general, 'rebus sic stantibus.' Answ. No: it is not every change of things that disobligeth us from the bonds of a vow. For then vows were of no considerable signification. But, 1. If the very matter that was vowed, or about which the vow was, do cease, 'cessante materiâ cessat obligatio: as if I promise to teach a pupil, I am disobliged when he is dead. If I promise to pay so much money in gold, and the king should forbid gold and change his coin, I am not obliged to it. 2. 'Cessante termino vel correlato cessat obligatio.' If the party die to whom I am bound, my personal obligation ceaseth. And so the conjugal bond ceaseth at death, and civil bonds by civil death. 3. 'Cessante fine, cessat obligatio.' If the use and end wholly cease, my obligation, which was only to that use and end, ceaseth. As if a physician promise to give physic for nothing for the cure of the plague, to all the poor of the city; when the plague ceaseth, his end, and so his obligation, ceaseth.

4. 'Cessante personâ naturali relatâ cessat obligatio personalis.'

When the natural person dieth, the obligation ceaseth. I cannot be obliged to do that when I am dead, which is proper to the living. The subject of the obligation ceasing, the accidents must cease. 5.

'Cessante relatione vel personâ civili, cessat obligatio talis, quà talis.'

The obligation which lay on a person in any relation merely as such, doth cease when that relation ceaseth. A king is not bound to govern or protect his subjects if they traiterously depose him, or if he cast them off, and take another kingdom, (as when Henry III. of France, left the kingdom of Poland:) nor are subjects bound to allegiance and obedience to him that is not indeed their king. A judge, or justice, or constable, or tutor, is no longer bound by his oath to do the offices of these relations, than he continueth in the relation. A divorced wife is

not bound by her conjugal vow to her husband as before, nor masters and servants, when their relations cease: nor a soldier to his general by his military sacrament, when the army is disbanded, or he is cashiered or dismissed.

Rule III. 'No vows or promises of our own can dissolve the obligation, laid upon us by the law of God.' For we have no coordinate, much less superior authority over ourselves; our selfobligations are but for the furthering of our obedience.

Rule IV. 'Therefore no vows can disoblige a man from any present duty, nor justify him in the committing of any sin.' Vows are to engage us to God, and not against him: if the matter which we vow be evil, it is a sin to vow it, and a sin to do it upon pretence of a vow. Sin is no acceptable sacrifice to God.

Rule V. 'If I vow that I will do some duty better, I am not thereby disobliged from doing it at all, when I am disabled from doing it better.' Suppose a magistrate, seeing much amiss in church and commonwealth, doth vow a reformation, and vow against the abuses which he findeth; if now the people's obstinacy and rebellion disable him to perform that vow, it doth not follow that he must lay down his sceptre, and cease to govern them at all, because he cannot do it as he ought, if he were free. So if the pastors of any church do vow the reformation of church abuses, in their places, if they be hindered by their rulers, or by the people, it doth not follow that they must lay down their callings, and not worship God publicly at all, because they cannot do it as they would, and ought if they were free; as long as they may worship him without committing any sin. God's first obligation on me is to worship him, and the second for the manner, to do it as near his order as I can: now if I cannot avoid the imperfections of worship, though I vowed it, I must not therefore avoid the worship itself, (as long as corruptions destroy not the very nature of it, and I am put myself upon no actual sin). For I was bound to worship God before my vows, and in order of nature before my obligation 'de modo:' and my vow was made with an implied

condition, that the thing were possible and lawful: and when that ceaseth to be possible or lawful which I vowed, I must nevertheless do that which still remaineth possible and lawful. To give over God's solemn worship with the church, is no reformation. To prefer no worship before imperfect worship, is a greater deformation and corruption, than to prefer imperfect worship before that which is more perfect. And to prefer a worship imperfect in the manner, before no church worship at all, is a greater reformation than to prefer a more perfect manner of worship before a more imperfect and defective. To worship God decently and in order, supposeth that he must be worshipped; and he that doth not worship at all, doth not worship him decently. If a physician vow that he will administer a certain effectual antidote to all his patients that have the plague, and that he will not administer a certain less effectual preparation, which some apothecaries, through covetousness or carelessness, had brought into common use, to the injury of the sick; his vow is to be interpreted with these exceptions, 'I will do it if I can, without dishonesty or a greater mischief: I will not administer the sophisticated antidote when I can have better: I vow this for my patients' benefit, and not for their destruction.' Therefore if the sophisticated antidote is much better than none, and may save men's lives, and the patients grow wilful and will take no other, or authority forbid the use of any other, the physician is neither bound to forsake his calling rather than use it, nor to neglect the life of his patients: (if their lives indeed lie upon his care, and they may not be in some good hopes without him, and the good of many require him not to neglect a few). But he must do what he can, when he cannot do what he would, and only shew that he consenteth not to the sophistication.

Rule VI. 'Though he that voweth a lawful thing, must be understood to mean, if it continue possible and lawful; yet if he himself be the culpable cause that afterwards it becometh impossible or unlawful, he violateth his vow.' He that voweth to give so much to the poor, and after prodigally wasteth it, and hath it not to give, doth break his vow; which he doth not if fire and thieves deprive him of it against his will. He that voweth to preach the Gospel, if he cut out his own

tongue, or culpably procure another to imprison, silence or hinder him, doth break his vow; which he did not if the hindrance were involuntary and insuperable; consent doth make the impedition his own act.

Rule VII. 'In the taking and keeping of oaths and vows we must deal simply and openly without equivocation and deceit.' "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand in his holy place?

He that hath clean hands, and a pure heart; who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor sworn deceitfully. He shall receive the blessing from the Lord, and righteousness from the God of his salvationf."

Rule VIII. 'He that juggleth or stretcheth his conscience by fraudulent shifts and interpretations afterwards, is as bad as he that dissembleth in the taking of the oath.' To break it by deceit, is as bad as to take it in deceit. "Lord who shall abide in they tabernacle—he that sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not." Saith Dr.

Sandersong, "Ista mihi aut non cogitare," &c. "It seemeth to me that the greater part of the men of these times either think not of these things, or at least not seriously: who fear not, at large and in express words, without going about, to swear to all that, whatever it be, which is proposed to them by those that have power to hurt them: yea, and they take themselves for the only wise men, and not without some disdain deride the simplicity and needless fear of those, that lest they hurt their consciences forsooth, do seek a knot in a rush, and oppose the forms prescribed by those that have power to prescribe them. And in the meantime they securely free themselves from all crime and fear of perjury, and think they have looked well to themselves and their consciences, if either when they swear, like

Jesuits, they can defend themselves by the help of some tacit equivocation, or mental reservation, or subtle interpretation which is strained and utterly alien from the words; or else after they have sworn can find some chink to slip through, some cunning evasion, as a wise remedy, by which they may so elude their oath, as that keeping the words, the sense may by some sophism be eluded, and

all the force of it utterly enervated. The ancient Christians knew not this divinity, nor the sounder heathens this moral philosophy. Far otherwise saith Augustine, 'They are perjured, who keeping the words, deceive the expectation of those they swear to:' and otherwise saith Cicero," &c. He goeth on to confirm it at large by argument.

Rule IX. 'An oath is to be taken and interpreted strictly.' Sanderson saith, "Juramenti obligatio est stricti juris;" that is, "non ut excludat juris interpretationem æquitate temperatam; sed ut excludat juris interpretationem gratia corruptam:" "not as excluding an equitable interpretation, but as excluding an interpretation corrupted by partiality:" that it be a just interpretation, between the extremes of rigid, and favourable or partial; and in doubtful cases it is safer to follow the strict, than the benign or favourable sense. It is dangerous stretching and venturing too far in matters of so sacred a nature, and of such great importance as vows and oaths.

Rule X. 'In the exposition of such doubtful oaths and vows, 1. We must specially watch against self-interest or commodity that it corrupt not our understandings. 2. And we must not take our oaths or any part of them in such a sense, as a pious, prudent stander-by that is impartial, and no whit interested in the business, cannot easily find in the words themselves.'

Rule XI. 'In doubtful cases the greatest danger must be most carefully avoided, and the safer side preferred: but the danger of the soul by perjury is the greatest, and therefore no bodily danger should so carefully be avoided: and therefore an oath that in the common and obvious sense seemeth unlawful should not be taken, unless there be very full evidence that it hath another sense.' Sand. p. 46.

'Nititur autem,' &c. This reason leaneth on that general and most useful rule, that in doubtful cases we must follow the safer side: but it is safer not to swear, where the words of the oath proposed, do seem according to the common and obvious sense of the words to contain in them something unlawful; than by a loose interpretation so to lenify them for our own ends, that we may the more securely swear

them. For it is plain that such an oath may be refused without the peril of perjury; but not that it can be taken without some danger or fear. The same rule must guide us also in keeping vows.

Rule XII. 'It is ordinarily resolved that imposed oaths must be kept according to the sense of the imposer.' See Sanderson, pp. 191, 192.

But I conceive that assertion must be more exactly opened and bounded. 1. Where justice requireth that we have respect to the will or right of the imposer, there the oath imposed must be taken in his sense; but whether it must be kept in his sense is further to be considered. 2. When I have done my best to understand the sense of the imposer in taking the oath, and yet mistake it, and so take it

(without fraud) in another sense, the question then is somewhat hard, whether I must keep it in the sense I took it in, or in his sense, which then I understood not. If I must not keep it in my own sense, which I took it in, then it would follow that I must keep another oath, and not that which I took: for it is the sense that is the oath. And I never obliged myself to any thing, but according to my own sense: and yet on the other side, if every man may take oaths in their private sense, then oaths will not attain their ends, nor be any security to the imposers.

In this case you must carefully distinguish between the formal obligation of the oath or vow as such, and the obligation of justice to my neighbour which is a consequent of my vow. And for the former I conceive (with submission) that an oath or vow cannot bind me, formally as such, in any sense but my own in which 'bonâ fide' I took it. Because formally an oath cannot bind me which I never took: but I never took that which I never meant, or thought of; if you so define an oath as to take in the sense, which is the soul of it.

But then in regard of the consequential obligation in point of justice unto man, the question I think must be thus resolved. 1. We must distinguish between a lawful imposer or contractor, and a violent usurper or robber that injuriously compelleth us to swear. 2.

Between the obvious, usual sense of the words, and an unusual,

forced sense. 3. Between a sincere, involuntary misunderstanding the imposer, and a voluntary, fraudulent reservation or private sense. 4. Between one, that I owe something to antecedently, and one that I owe nothing to but by the mere self-obligation of my vow. c

Between an imposer that is himself the culpable cause of my misunderstanding him, and one that is not the cause, but my own weakness or negligence is the cause. 6. Between a case where both senses may be kept, and a case where they cannot, being inconsistent. Upon these distinctions, I thus resolve the question.

Prop. I. If I fraudulently and wilfully take an oath in a sense of my own, contrary to the sense of the imposer, and the common and just sense of the words themselves, I am guilty of perfidiousness and profaneness in the very taking of it.

Prop. ii. If it be long of my own culpable ignorance or negligence that I misunderstood the imposer, I am not thereby disobliged from the public sense.

Prop. iii. When the imposer openly putteth a sense on the words imposed contrary to the usual, obvious sense, I am to understand him according to his own expression, and not to take the oath, as imposed in any other sense.

Prop. iv. If the imposer refuse or neglect to tell me his sense any otherwise than in the imposed words, I am to take and keep them according to the obvious sense of the words, as they are commonly used in the time and place which I live in.

Prop. v. If it be long of the imposer's obscurity, or refusing to explain himself, or other culpable cause that I mistook him, I am not bound to keep my oath in his sense, as different from my own (unless there be some other reason for it).

Prop. vi. If the imposer be a robber or usurper, or one that I owe nothing to in justice, but what I oblige myself to by my oath, I am not

then bound at all to keep my oath in his sense, if my own sense was according to the common use of the words.

Prop. vii. Though I may not lie to a robber or tyrant that unjustly imposeth promises or oaths upon me, yet if he put an oath or promise on me which is good and lawful in the proper, usual sense of the words, though bad in his sense, (which is contrary to the plain words,) whether I may take this to save my liberty or life, I leave to the consideration of the judicious: that which may be said against it is, that oaths must not be used indirectly and dissemblingly: that which may be said for it is, 1. That I have no obligation to fit my words to his personal, private sense. 2. That I deceive him not, but only permit him to deceive himself, as long as it is he and not I that misuseth the words. 3. That I am to have chief respect to the public sense; and it is not his sense, but mine that is the public sense. 4.

That the saving of a man's life or liberty is cause enough for the taking a lawful oath.

Prop. viii. In case I misunderstood the imposed oath through my own default, I am bound to keep it in both senses (my own and the imposer's) if both be consistent and lawful to be done. For I am bound to it in my own sense, because it was formally my oath or vow which I intended. And I am bound to it in his sense, because I have in justice made the thing his due. As if the king command me to vow that I will serve him in wars against the Turk; and I misunderstand him as if he meant only to serve him with my purse; and so I make a vow with this intent, to expend part of my estate to maintain that war; whereas the true sense was that I should serve him with my person: in this case, I see not but I am bound to both.

Indeed if it were a promise that obliged me only to the king, then I am obliged no further, and no longer than he will: for he can remit his own right: but if by a vow I become obliged directly to God himself as a party, then no man can remit his right, and I must perform my vow as made to him.

Rule XIII. 'If any impose an ambiguous oath, and refuse to explain it, and require you only to swear in these words, and leave you to your own sense, Dr. Sanderson thinketh that an honest man should suspect some fraud in such an oath, and not take it at all till all parties are agreed of the sense, pp. 193, 194.' And I think he should not take it at all, unless there be some other cause that maketh it his duty. But if a lawful magistrate command it, or the interest of the church or state require it, I see not but he may take it, on condition that in the plain and proper sense of the words the oath be lawful, and that he openly profess to take it only in that sense.

Rule XIV. 'If any power should impose an oath, or vow, or promise, which in the proper, usual sense were downright impious, or blasphemous, or sinful, and yet bid me take it in what sense I pleased, though I could take it in such a sense as might make it no real consent to the impiety, yet it would be impious in the sense of the world, and of such heinous consequence as will make it to be unlawful.' As if I must subscribe, or say, or swear these words, 'There is no God;' or, 'Scripture is untrue;' though it is easy to use these or any words in a good sense, if I may put what sense I will upon them, yet the public sense of them is blasphemy; and I may not publicly blaspheme, on pretence of a private right sense and intention.

Rule XV. 'If the oath imposed be true in the strict and proper sense, yet if that sense be not vulgarly known, nor sufficiently manifest to be the imposer's sense, and if the words are false or blasphemous in the vulgar sense of those that I have to do with, and that must observe and make use of my example, I must not take such an oath, without leave to make my sense as public as my oath.' As if I were commanded to swear, 'That God hath no foreknowledge, no knowledge, no will,' &c.; it were easy to prove that these terms are spoken primarily of man, and that they are attributed to God but analogically or metaphorically, and that God hath no such human acts 'formaliter,' but 'eminenter,' and that 'forma dat nomen,' and so that strictly it is not knowledge and will in the primary, proper notion, that God hath at all, but something infinitely higher, for

which man hath no other name. But though thus the words are true and justifiable in the strictest, proper sense, yet are they unlawful, because they are blasphemy in the vulgar sense: and he that speaks to the vulgar, is supposed to speak with the vulgar: unless he as publicly explain them.

Rule XVI. 'If the supreme power should impose an oath or promise which in the ordinary, obvious sense were sinful, and an inferior officer would bid me take it in what sense I pleased, I might not therefore take it: because that such an officer hath no power to interpret it himself; much less to allow me to take it in a private sense.' But if the lawgiver that imposeth it bid me take it in what sense I will, and give me leave to make my sense as public as my oath, I may take it, if the words be but dubious, and not apparently false or sinful: (so there be no reason against it, 'aliunde,' as from ill consequents, &c.) Rule XVII. 'If any man will say in such a case, (when he thinketh that the imposer's sense is bad) 'I take not the same oath or engagement which is imposed, but another in the same words, and I suppose not inferior officers authorized to admit any interpretation, but I look at them only as men that can actually execute or not execute the laws upon me; and so I take a vow of my own according to my own sense, though in their words, as a means of my avoiding their severities:' as this is a collusion in a very high and tender business, so that person

(if the public sense of the oath be sinful) must make his professed sense as public as his oath or promise; it being no small thing to do that which in the public sense is impious, and so to be an example of perfidiousness to many.'

Rule XVIII. 'Though an oath imposed by an usurper or by violence is not to be taken in formal obedience, nor at all, unless the greatness of the benefit require it, yet being taken it is nevertheless obligatory

(supposing nothing else do make it void).' Man is a free agent and cannot be forced though he may be frightened: if he swear to a thief for the saving of his life, he voluntarily doth choose the

inconveniences of the oath, as a means to save his life. Therefore being a voluntary act it is obligatory; else there should be no obligation on us to suffer for Christ, but any thing might be sworn or done to escape suffering: see of this Dr. Sanderson largely Prælect. iv. Sect. 14–16. The imposition and the oath are different things: in the imposition, a thief or tyrant is the party commanding, and I am the party commanded; and his having no authority to command me, doth nullify only his command, and maketh me not obliged to obey him, nor to take it in any obedience to him; but yet if I do take it without any authority obliging me (as private oaths are taken), it is still an oath or vow, in which the parties are God and man; man vowing and making himself a debtor to God; and God hath authority to require me to keep my vows, when men have no authority to require me to make them. All men confess that private vows bind: and the nullity of the imposer's authority, maketh them but private vows; this case is easy, and commonly agreed on.

Rule XIX. 'If in a complex vow or promise there be many things which prove materially unlawful, and one or more that are lawful, the conjunction of the things unlawful doth not disoblige me from the vow of doing the lawful part.' Otherwise a man might make void all his vows to God, and oaths, and covenants with men, by putting in something that is evil with the good: and so God, and the king, and our neighbours would all have their debts paid by our sin and injury done them on the bye.

Rule XX. 'If some part of that which you vowed become impossible, that doth not disoblige you from so much as remaineth possible.' As if you vow allegiance to the king, and tyrants or disability hinder you from serving him as subjects in some one particular way, you remain still obliged to serve him by those other ways in which you are yet capable to serve him. So if you had taken an oath against Popery, to preach against it, and reject the practice of it, and for ever renounce it; this would not bind you from the common truths and duties of Christianity which Papists hold in common with all other Christians: nor could you preach against Popery, if you were hindered by

imprisonment, banishment or restraint; but you have still power to forbear approving, consenting, subscribing, or practising their errors; and this you are still bound to do.

Rule XXI. 'Though you are not bound to do that of your vow which changes have made impossible or unlawful, yet if another change make them possible and lawful again, your obligation doth return afresh (unless you made it with such limitation).' It is not a temporary cessation of the matter, or end, or correlate that will perpetually discharge you from your vow. If your wife be taken captive many years, when she returneth, you are bound to the duties of a husband. If the king be expelled by usurpers, you are bound at present to so much duty as is possible, and to obey him as your actual governor when he returneth. But in the case of servants and soldiers, and other temporary relations, it is otherwise; for a removal may end the relation itself, If you promise to preach the Gospel, to medicate the sick, to relieve the poor, to reform your families, &c. you are not hereby obliged to do it, while any irresistible impediment maketh it impossible; but when the hindrance ceaseth, you are obliged to do it again; the matter and your capacity being restored.

Rule XXII. 'Therefore many a vow and promise may be lawfully unperformed, which may not be renounced or disclaimed.' When you are taken captives you must forbear your duty to your king, your father, your husband or wife, but you may not therefore renounce them, and say, 'I have no obligation to them:' no, not to the death, because they are relations for life: and how improbable soever it may seem that you should be returned to them, yet God can do it, and you must wait on him.

Rule XXIII. 'A former vow or promise is not nullified by a latter that contradicteth it.' Otherwise a man might disoblige himself at his pleasure. Yet he that maketh contrary vows, obligeth himself to contraries and impossibles; and bringeth a necessity of perjury on himself, for not doing the things impossible which he vowed. And in some cases a later promise to men may null a former, when we made

the former with the reserve of such a power or liberty, or are justly supposed to have power to recal a former promise; or when it is the duty of a mutable relation which we vow, (as of a physician, a schoolmaster, &c.) and by a later vow we change the relation itself:

(which we may still lawfully change.) Rule XXIV. 'The 'actus jurandi' must still be distinguished from the 'materia juramenti:' and it very often cometh to pass that the act of swearing (or the oath as our act) is unlawfully done, and was a sin from the beginning, and yet it is nevertheless obligatory as long as the 'res jurata,' the matter sworn is lawful or necessary.' Dr.

Sanderson instanceth in Joshua's oath to the Gibeonites. The nature of the thing is proof enough; for many a thing is sinfully done, for want of a due call, or manner, or end, that yet is done, and is no nullity. A man may sinfully enter upon the ministry, that yet is bound to do the duty of a minister: and many marriages are sinful that are no nullities.

Rule XXV. 'The nullity of an oath 'ad initio' is 'quando realiter vel reputative non juravimus:' 'when really or reputatively we did not swear.' The sinfulness of an oath is when we did swear really but unlawfully as to the ground, or end, or matter, or manner, or circumstances. Really that man did not swear, 1. Who spake not (mentally nor orally) the words of an oath. 2. Who thought those words had signified no such thing, and so had no intent to swear either mentally or verbally.' As if an Englishman be taught to use the words of an oath in French, and made believe that they have a contrary sense. 3. Who only narratively recited the words of an oath, as a reporter or historian, without a real or professed intent of swearing. 2. Reputatively he did not swear. (1.) Who spake the words of an oath in his sleep, or in a deliration, distraction, madness, or such prevalent melancholy as mastereth reason: when a man is not 'compos mentis,' his act is not 'actus humanus.' (2.) When a man's hand is forcibly moved by another against his will to subscribe the words of an oath or covenant; for if it be totally involuntary it is not a moral act. But words cannot be forced; for he that sweareth to save

his life, doth do it voluntarily to save his life. The will may be moved by fear, but not forced. Yet the person that wrongfully frighteneth another into consent, or to swear, hath no right to any benefit which he thought to get by force or fraud, and so 'in foro civili' such promises, or covenants, or oaths may 'quoad effectum' be reputatively null; and he that by putting his sword to another man's breast doth compel him to swear or subscribe and seal a deed of gift, may be judged to have no right to it, but to be punishable for the force; but thought this covenant or promise be null 'in foro humano' because the person cannot acquire a right by violence, yet the oath is not a nullity before God; for when God is made a party, he hath a right which is inviolable; and when he is appealed to or made a witness, his name must not be taken in vain. (3.) It is a nullity reputatively when the person is naturally incapable of self-obligation, as in infancy, when reason is not come to so much maturity as to be naturally capable of such a work: I say naturally incapable for the reasons following.

Rule XXVI. 'We must distinguish between a natural inpacity of vowing or swearing at all, and an incapacity of doing it lawfully: and between a true nullity, and when the oath is only 'quasi nullum,' or as null 'quoad effectum; or such as I must not keep.' There are many real oaths and vows which must not be kept, and so far are 'quasi nulla' as to the effecting of the thing vowed; but they are not simply null; for they have the effect of making the man a sinner and perjured. They are sinful vows, and therefore vows. A natural incapacity proveth it no vow at all; but if I am naturally capable, and only forbidden (by God or man), this maketh it not no vow, but a sinful vow, of which some must be kept and some must not.

In these following cases a real vow is 'quasi nullum', or must not be kept.

1. In case the thing vowed (all things considered) be a thing which God hath forbidden to be done: that is, in case it be a thing in itself evil; but if the thing in itself be a duty, though there be some

inseparable sins which we shall be guilty of in the performance, we must not therefore leave the duty itself undone which we have vowed: as if I vow to praise God, and yet am sure that I cannot praise him without a sinful defect of that love and delight in him which is due, I must not therefore forbear to praise him; else we must cast off all other duty, because we cannot do it without some sin. But yet, though in case of unwilling infirmity, we must thus do the duty though we are sure to sin in it, yet in case of any chosen, voluntary sin, which we have an immediate power to avoid, we must rather forbear the duty itself (vowed or not vowed) than commit such a sin: as if I vow to preach the Gospel, and am forcibly hindered unless I would voluntarily tell one lie, or commit one sin wilfully for this liberty; I ought rather never to preach the Gospel; nor is it then a duty, but become morally impossible to me: as if in France or Spain I may not preach unless I would take Pope Pius's Trent confession or oath. Nay, if those very defects of love, and wandering thoughts, which now inseparably cleave to my best performances, were morally and immediately in my power, and I could avoid them, I ought not electively and by consent to commit them, for any liberty of duty, but rather to forbear the duty itself as no duty to me when it cometh upon such conditions: for then it is supposed that I could serve God better without that duty, because I could love him more, &c.

Yet here is observable a great deal of difference between omissions and commissions. A man may never commit a sin that good may come by it, though he vowed the good; but a man may ofttimes omit that which else would have been his duty, to do some good which he hath vowed; for negative commands bind 'semper et ad semper;' but the affirmative do not (at least as to outward duty); therefore in case of necessity a man may himself consent to the present omission of some good, for the escaping of greater, unavoidable omissions another time, or for the performing of a vow or greater duty which is to be preferred.

2. A vow is not to be kept, when the matter of it is unjust and injurious to another (unless you have his consent): as if you vow to

give away another man's lands or goods, or to do him wrong by word or deed; or if you vow to forbear to pay him his due, or to do that which you owe him: as if a servant vow to forbear his master's work

(unless it be so small an injury as he can otherwise repair); or a husband, or wife, or parents, or children, or prince, or subjects should vow to deny their necessary duties to each other. Here man's right together with God's law doth make it unjust to perform such vows.

3. A vow is as null or not to be kept, when the matter is something that is morally or civilly out of our power to do: as if a servant, or child, or subject vow to do a thing, which he cannot do lawfully without the consent of his superior: this vow is not simply null, for it is a sinful vow, (unless it was conditional). Every rational creature is so far 'sui juris,' as that his soul being immediately subject to God, he is capable of obliging himself to God; and so his vow is a real sinful vow, when he is not so far 'sui juris' as to be capable of a lawful vowing, or doing the thing which he voweth. Such an one is bound to endeavour to get his superior's consent, but not without it to perform his vow; no though the thing in itself be lawful. For God having antecedently bound me to obey my superiors in all lawful things, I cannot disoblige myself by my own vows.

Yet here are very great difficulties in this case, which causeth difference among the most learned, pious casuists, 1. If a governor have beforehand made a law for that which I vow against, it is supposed by many that my vow is not to be kept (the thing being not against the law of God); because the first obligation holdeth. 2. Yet some think that magistrates' penal laws binding but 'aut ad obedientiam aut ad pœnam,' 'to obedience or punishment,' I am therefore obliged in indifferent things to bear his penalty, and to keep my vow. 3. But if I first make an absolute vow in a thing indifferent, (as to drink no wine, or to wear no silks, &c.) and the magistrate afterwards command it me, some think I am bound to keep my vow; because though I must obey the magistrate in all things lawful, yet my vow hath made this particular thing to be to me

unlawful, before the magistrate made it a duty. 4. Though others think that even in this case the general obligation to obey my superiors preventeth my obliging myself to any particular which they may forbid in case I had not vowed it, or against any particular which they may command. 5. Others distinguish of things lawful or indifferent, and say that some of them are such as become accidentally so useful or needful to the common good, the end of government, that it is fit the magistrate make a law for it, and the breaking of that law will be so hurtful, that my vow cannot bind me to it, as being now no indifferent thing; but other indifferent things they say, belong not to the magistrate to determine of (as what I shall eat or drink, whether I shall marry or not, what trade I shall be of, how each artificer, tradesman, or professor of arts and sciences shall do the business of his profession, &c.) And here the magistrate they think cannot bind them against their vows, because their power of themselves in such private cases is greater than his power over them in those cases. All these I leave as so many questions unfit for me to resolve in the midst of the contentions of the learned. The great reasons that move on both sides you may easily discern. 1. Those that think an oath in lawful things, obligeth not contrary to the magistrate's antecedent or subsequent command, are moved by this reason, that else subjects and children might by their vows exempt themselves from obedience, and null God's command of obeying our superiors. 2. Those that think a vow is obligatory against a magistrate's command, are moved by this reason, because else, say they, a magistrate may at his pleasure dispense with all vows, except in things commanded before by God: for he may come after and cross our vows by his commands, which, against the pope's pretensions, Protestants have denied to be in the power of any mortal man. And God, say they, hath the first right, which none can take away. I must not be forward in determining where rulers are concerned; only to those that may and must determine it, I add these further materials to be considered of.

1. It is most necessary to the decision of this case, to understand how far the inferior that voweth was 'sui juris,' and had the power of

himself when he made the vow, as to the making of it, and how far he is 'sui juris' as to the act which he hath vowed; and to that end to know, in a case where there is some power over his act, both in his superior and in himself, whether his own power, or his superiors, as to that act, be the greater.

2. It is therefore needful to distinguish much between those acts that are of private use and signification only, and those that (antecedently to the ruler's command) are of public use and nature, or such as the ruler is as much concerned in as the inferior.

3. It is needful to understand the true intent and sense of the command of our superior; whether it be really his intent to bind inferiors to break their vows, or whether they intend only to bind those that are not so entangled and pre-engaged by a vow, with a tacit exception of those that are. And what is most just must be presumed, unless the contrary be plain.

4. It must be discerned whether the commands of superiors intend any further penalty than that which is affixed in their laws: as in our penal laws about using bows and arrows, and about fishing, hunting,

&c.; whether it be intended that the offender be guilty of damnation, or only that the threatened temporal penalty do satisfy the law; and whether God bind us to any further penalty than the superior intendeth.

5. The end of the laws of men must be distinguished from the words; and a great difference must be put between those forbidden acts that do no further harm than barely to cross the letter of the law, or will of a superior, and those that cross the just end of the command or law, and that either more or less, as it is more or less hurtful to others, or against the common good: for then the matter will become sinful in itself.

6. Whether perjury, or the unwilling violation of human laws be the greater sin, and which in a doubtful case should be most feared and

avoided, it is easy to discern.

Rule XXVII. 'A vow may be consequently made null or void, 1. By cessation of the matter, or any thing essential to it, (of which before,) or by a dispensation or dissolution of it by God to whom we are obliged.' No doubt it is in God's power to disoblige a man from his vow; but how he ever doth such a thing is all the doubt: extraordinary revelations being ceased, there is this way yet ordinary, viz. by bringing the matter which I vowed to do, under some prohibition of a general law, by the changes of his providence.

Rule XXVIII. 'As to the power of man to dispense with oaths and vows, there is a great and most remarkable difference between those oaths and vows where man is the only party that we are primarily bound to, and God is only appealed to as witness or judge, as to the keeping of my word to man; and those oaths or vows where God is also made (either only or conjunct with man) the party to whom I primarily oblige myself.' For in the first case man can dispense with my oath or vow, by remitting his own right, and releasing me from my promise; but in the second case no created power can do it. As e.g. if I promise to pay a man a sum of money, or to do him service, and swear that I will perform it faithfully; if upon some after bargain or consideration he release me of that promise, God releaseth me also, as the witnesses and judge have nothing against a man, whom the creditor hath discharged. But if I swear or vow that I will amend my life, or reform my family of some great abuse, or that I will give so much to the poor, or that I will give up myself to the work of the Gospel, or that I will never marry, or never drink wine, or never consent to Popery or error, &c.; no man can dispense with my vow, nor directly disoblige me in any such case; because no man can give away God's right; all that man can do in any such case is, to become an occasion of God's disobliging me; if he can so change the case, or my condition, as to bring me under some law of God, which commandeth me the contrary to my vow, then God disobligeth me, or maketh it unlawful to keep that vow. And here because a vow is commonly taken for such a promise to God, in which we directly

bind ourselves to him, therefore we say, that a vow (thus strictly taken) cannot be dispensed with by man; though in the sense aforesaid, an oath sometimes may.

The Papists deal most perversely in this point of dispensing with oaths and vows: for they give that power to the pope over all the Christian world, who is an usurper, and none of our governor, which they deny to princes and parents that are our undoubted governors: the pope may disoblige vassals from their oaths of allegiance to their princes (as the council of Lateran before cited,) but no king or parent may disoblige a man from his oath to the pope: nay, if a child vow a monastical life, and depart from his parents, they allow not the parents to disoblige him.

Rule XXIX. 'In the determining of controversies about the obligation of oaths and vows, it is safest to mark what Scripture saith, and not to presume, upon uncertain pretences of reason, to release ourselves, where we are not sure that God releaseth us.'

Rule XXX. 'That observable chapter, Numb. 30 about dispensations, hath many things in it that are plain for the decision of divers great and useful doubts; but many things which some do collect and conclude as consequential or implied, are doubtful and controverted among the most judicious expositors and casuists.'

1. It is certain that this chapter speaketh not of a total nullity of vows 'ab initio,' but of a relaxation, or disanulling of them by superiors.

For, 1. Bare silence (which is no efficient cause) doth prove them to be in force. 2. It is not said, 'She is bound, or not bound;' but 'Her vow and bond shall stand,' ver. 4. 7. 9. 11.: or 'shall not stand,' ver. 5.

12.: and 'He shall make it of none effect,' ver. 8. The Hebrew, ver. 5. signifieth, 'Quia annihilavit pater ejus illud.' And ver. 8. 'Et si in die audire virum ejus, annihilaverit illud, et infregerit votum ejus—.' 3. It is expressly said, that she had 'bound her soul' before the dissolution.

4. It is said, 'The Lord shall forgive her,' ver. 5. 8. 12. which signifieth a relaxation of a former bond. Or at the most, the parent's silence is a

confirmation, and his disowning it hindereth only the confirmation.

So the Chaldee paraphrase, the Samaritan and Arabic 'Non erunt confirmata,' the Syriac 'Rata vel irrita erunt.'

2. It is certain that a father hath the power of relaxation here mentioned as to an unmarried daughter, in her youth living in his house, and a husband over his wife; for it is the express words of the text.

3. It is certain that this power extendeth to vows about all things in which the inferior is not 'sui juris,' but is under the superior's care and oversight, and cannot perform it (in case there had been no vow) without the superior's consent.

4. It is certain that it extendeth not only to matters concerning the governors themselves, but concerning vows to God, as they are good or hurtful to the inferiors.

5. It is certain that there are some vows so necessary and clearly for the inferior's good, that in them he is 'sui juris,' and no superior can suspend his vows: as to have the Lord for his God; and not to commit idolatry, murder, theft, &c. No superior can disoblige us here; for the power of superiors is only for the inferior's indemnity and good.

6. It is certain that the superior's recal must be speedy or in time, before silence can signify consent, and make a confirmation of the vow.

7. It is certain that if the superior have once ratified it by silence or consent, he cannot afterwards disannul it.

8. It is agreed, that if he awhile dissent and disannul it, and afterwards both inferior and superior consent again, that it remaineth ratified.

9. It is agreed that the superior that can discharge the vow of the inferior, cannot release himself from his own vows. If the pope could

release all men, who shall release him?

2. But in these points following there is no such certainty or agreement of judgments, because the text seemeth silent about them, and men conjecture variously as they are prepared. 1. It is uncertain whether any but women may be released by virtue of this text: (1.)

Because the text expressly distinguishing between a man and a woman doth first say, 'Si vir—If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond; he shall not break his word; he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.'

And 2. Because women are only instanced in, when Scripture usually speaketh of them in the masculine gender, when it includeth both sexes, or extendeth it to both. 3. And in the recapitulation in the end, it is said by way of recital of the contents, ver. 16. "These are the statutes which the Lord commanded Moses between a man and his wife; between the father and his daughter—in her youth in her father's house:" as if he would caution us against extending it any further. And though many good expositors think that it extendeth equally to sons as to daughters, in their minority, because there is a parity of reason, yet this is an uncertain conjecture. 1. Because God seemeth by the expression to bound the sense. 2. Because God acquainteth not man with all the reasons of his laws. 3. Because there may be special reasons for an indulgence to the weaker sex in such a weighty case. And though still there is a probability it may extend to sons, it is good keeping to certainties in matters of such dreadful importance as oaths and vows to God.

2. It is uncertain whether this power of disannulling vows do belong also to other superiors, to princes, to inferior magistrates, to pastors, masters, to commanders, as to their soldiers, as well as to parents and husbands: some think it doth, because there is, say they, a parity of reason. Others think it is dangerous disannulling oaths and vows upon pretences of parity of reason, when it is uncertain whether we know all God's reasons: and they think there is not a parity, and that it extendeth not to others. 1. Because parents and husbands are so emphatically named in the contents in the end, ver. 16. 2. Because it

had been as easy to God to name the rest. 3. Because there is no instance in Scripture of the exercise of such a power, when there was much occasion for it. 4. Because else vows signify no more in a kingdom than the king please, and in an army than the general and officers please; and among servants than the master please, which is thought a dangerous doctrine. 5. Because there will be an utter uncertainty when a vow bindeth and when it doth not to almost all the people in the world; for one superior may contradict it, and another or a hundred may be silent: the king and most of the magistrates through distance will be silent, when a master, or a justice, or a captain that is at hand may disannul it: one officer may be for it, and another against it: a master or a pastor may be for it, and the magistrate against it: and so perjury will become the most controverted sin, and a matter of jest. 6. Because public magistrates and commanders, and pastors have not the near and natural interest in their inferiors as parents and husbands have in their children and wives; and therefore parents have not only a restraining power (as husbands here also have); but also a disposing power of the relation of their infant children, and may enter them in baptism into the vow and covenant of Christianity, the will and acts of the parents standing for the child's till he come to age; but if you say that upon a parity of reason, all princes, and rulers, and pastors may do so with all that are their inferiors, it will seem incredible to most Christians.

7. Because public magistrates are justly supposed to be so distant from almost all their individual subjects, as not to be capable of so speedy a disowning their personal vows. Whatever this text doth, it is certain that other texts enough forbid covenants and combinations against the persons, or power, or rights of our governors, and not only against them but without them, in cases where our place and calling alloweth us not to act without them. But it is certain that God who commanded all Israel to be entered successively into the covenant of circumcision with him, would not have held them guiltless for refusing that covenant, if the prince had been against it.

And few divines think that a subject, or soldier, or servant that hath vowed to forbear wine, or feasting, or marriage is discharged, if his prince, or captain, or masters be against it. Jonathan and David were

under an oath of friendship; (called the Lord's oath, 2 Sam. 21:7.) Saul as a parent could not discharge Jonathan as being a man at full age. Quære whether Saul as a king being against it, did null the oath to David and Jonathan? No, the Scripture sheweth the contrary. 8.

Because else that benefit which God extendeth only to a weaker sort, would extend to any, the wisest and most learned persons through the world, whose vows to God even for the afflicting of their own souls, may be nulled by the king or other superiors. Many such reasons are urged in this case.

3. It is uncertain whether this chapter extend to assertory or testimonial oaths, (if not certain that it doth not): it speaketh but of binding their souls in vows to God, which is to offer or do something which by error may prove prejudicial to them. But if a parent or husband (much more a king or general) might nullify all the testimonial oaths of their inferiors that are given in judgment, or discharge all their subjects from the guilt of all the lies or false oaths which they shall take, it would make a great change in the morality of the world.

4. It is not past all controversy how far this law is yet in force: seeing the Mosaical law as such is abrogated; this can be now no further in force than as it is the law of nature, or some way confirmed or revived by Christ. The equity seemeth to be natural.

Rule XXXI. 'It is certain that whoever this power of disannulling vows belongeth to, and to whomsoever it may be given, that it extendeth not to discharge us from the promise or vow of that which is antecedently our necessary duty by the law of God.' Else they should dispense with the law of God, when none but the lawgiver can relax or dispense with his laws, (unless it be one superior to the lawgiver): therefore none can dispense with the laws of God. But I speak this but of a duty necessary also as a means to our salvation, or the good of others, or the honouring of God: for otherwise as to some smaller things, the duty may be such as man cannot dispense with, and yet a vow to do that duty may be unnecessary and sinful: as if I

swear to keep all the law of God, and never to sin, or never to think a sinful thought: to do this is good, but to vow it is bad, because I may foreknow that I shall break it.

Rule XXXII. 'In some cases a vow may oblige you against that which would have been your duty if you had not vowed, and to do that which would else have been your sin: viz. if it be such a thing as is sin or duty but by some lesser accident, which the accident of a vow may preponderate or prevail against.' As if you swear to give a penny to a wandering beggar, or to one that needeth it not, which by all circumstances would have been an unlawful misemploying of that which should have been better used; yet it seemeth to me your duty to do it when you have moved it. To cast away a cup of drink is a sin, if it be causelessly; but if you vow to do it, it is hard to say that a man should rather be perjured than cast away a cup of drink, or a penny, or a pin. The Jesuits think it lawful to exercise the obedience of their novices by bidding them sometimes cast a cup of wine into the sink, or do some such action which causelessly done were sin: and shall not a vow require it more strongly? Suppose it would be your duty to pray or read at such or such an honour of the day (as being fittest to your body and occasions): yet if you have (foolishly) vowed against it, it seemeth to me to be your duty to put it off till another time. For perjury is too great a thing to be yielded to on every such small occasion. Dr. Sanderson 'ubi supra' giveth this instance: 'If there be a law that no citizen elected to it shall refuse the office of a prætor; and he that doth refuse it shall be fined: Caius sweareth that he will not bear the office: his oath is unlawful (and disobedience would have been his sin if he were free) yet it seems he is bound to pay his fine, and disobey the precept of the law, rather than break his vow.'

Rule XXXIII. 'There are so great a number of sins and duties that are such by accidents and circumstantial alterations, and some of these greater and some less, that it is a matter of exceeding great difficulty in morality to discern when they are indeed sins and duties and when not, which must be by discerning the preponderancy of accidents;

and therefore it must be exceeding difficult to discern when a vow shall weigh down any of these accidents, and when not.'

Rule XXXIV. 'The exceeding difficulty and frequency of such cases maketh it necessary to those that have such entanglements of vows, to have a very wise and faithful counsellor to help them better to resolve their particular cases, upon the knowledge of every circumstance, than any book or general rules can do, or any that are not so perfectly acquainted with the case.' And O what great ability is necessary in divines that are employed in such works!

Rule XXXV. 'Thus also the case must be resolved whether an oath bind that hindereth a greater good which I might do if I had not taken it.' In some cases it may bind: as if I swear to acquaint none with some excellent medicine which I could not have known myself unless I had so sworn; or in case that the breaking of the oath, will do more hurt to me or others than the good comes to which I omit: or in case all things considered, the doing of that good 'hic et nunc' is not my duty: see Dr. Sanderson of the difficulties here also.

Rule XXXVI. 'No personal hurt or temporal loss is any sufficient cause for the violation of an oath.' He that taketh a false oath, or breaketh a promissory oath for the saving of his life or a thousand men's lives, or for lands or riches, or crowns and kingdoms, hath no considerable excuse for his perfidiousness and perjury, all temporal things being such inconsiderable trifles in comparison of the will and pleasure of God, and life everlasting: that which will not justify a lie, will much less justify perjury.

Rule XXXVII. 'If the matter of an oath prove only a temptation to sin, and not sin itself, it must be kept:' but with the greater vigilance and resolution! As if a man have married a forward wife that will be a temptation to him all his life, he is not disobliged from her.

Rule XXXVIII. 'If the matter of an oath be such as maketh me directly the tempter of myself or others, it is a sin, and not to be kept,

unless some greater good preponderate that evil.' For though it be no sin to be tempted, yet it is a sin to tempt: though it be no sin to tempt by a necessary trial, (as a master may lay money before a suspected servant to try whether he be a thief,) nor any sin to tempt accidentally by the performance of a duty (as a holy life doth accidentally tempt a malignant person to hatred and persecution); yet it is a sin to be directly and needlessly a tempter of ourselves or others unto sin; and therefore he that voweth it must not perform it.

As if you had vowed to persuade any to unchastity, intemperance, error, rebellion, &c.

Rule XXXIX. 'If the matter of an oath be such as accidentally layeth so strong a temptation before men (especially before a multitude), as that we may foresee it is exceeding likely to draw them into sin, when there is no greater good to preponderate the evil of such a temptation, it is a sin to do that thing, though in performance of a vow.' When actions are good or evil only by accident, then accidents must be put in the balance against each other, and the weightiest must preponderate. As in matter of temporal commodity or discommodity, it is lawful to do that action which accidentally bringeth a smaller hurt to one man, if it bring a greater good to many; or which hurteth a private person to the great good of the commonwealth; but it is not lawful to do that which clearly tendeth

(though but by accident) to do more hurt than good. As to sell powder and arms, when we foresee it will be used against the king and kingdom; or to sell ratsbane when you foresee it is like to be used to poison men. Much more should the salvation of many or one be preferred before our temporal commodity; and therefore for a lesser good, we may not tempt men to evil, though but accidentally: as he that liveth where there is but little need of taverns or alehouses, and the common use of them is for drunkenness, it is unlawful for him there to sell ale or wine, unless he can keep men from being drunk with it: (as if they take it home with them, or be unruly he cannot.) For thus to be a foreknowing tempter and occasion, unnecessarily, is to be a moral cause. Two things will warrant a man to do that which by accident tempteth or occasioneth other men to

sin: one is a command of God, when it is a duty which we do: the other is a greater good to be attained by the action, which cannot be attained in a less dangerous way. As in a country where there is so great a necessity for alehouses and taverns that the good that is done by them is greater than the hurt is like to be, though some will be drunk; it is lawful to use these trades though some be hurt by it. It is lawful to sell flesh though some will be gluttonous; it is lawful to use moderate, decent ornaments, though some vain minds will be tempted by the sight to lust. As it is lawful to go to sea though some be drowned: to act a comedy, or play at a lawful game, with all those cautions, which may secure you that the good of it is like to be greater than the hurt, is not unlawful: but to set up a play-house, or gaming-house, where we may foresee that the mischief will be far greater than the good (though the acts were lawful in themselves), this is but to play the devil's part, in laying snares for souls: men are not thus to be ticed to hell and damned in sport, though but accidentally, and though you vowed the act.

Rule XL. 'Thus also must the case of scandal be resolved: as scandal signifieth an action that occasioneth another to sin, or a stumblingblock at which we foresee he is like to fall to the hurt of his soul,

(which is the sense that Christ and the apostles usually take it in) so it is the same case with this last handled, and needs no other resolution: but as scandal signifieth (in the late abusive sense) the mere displeasing of another, or occasioning him to censure you for a sinner, so you must not break a vow to escape the censure or displeasure of all the world.' Otherwise pride would be still producing perjury, and so two of the greatest sins would be maintained.

Rule XLI. 'Though in the question about the obligation of an oath that is taken ignorantly, or by deceit, there be great difficulties, yet this much seemeth clear, 1. That he that is culpably ignorant is more obliged by his vow or contract while he useth all the outward form, than he that is inculpably ignorant. 2. That though the deceit (as the force) of him that I swear to, do forfeit his right to what I promise

him, yet my oath or vow obligeth me to do or give the thing, having interested God himself in the cause. 3. That all such errors of the essentials of an oath or vow as nullify it (of which I spake before) or make the matter sinful, do infer a nullity in the obligation (or that it must not be kept).' But no smaller error (though caused by deceit) doth disoblige.

The commonest doubt is, 'Whether an error about the very person that I swear to, and this caused by his own deceit, do disoblige me?'

All grant that I am obliged notwithstanding any circumstantial error, (as if I think a woman rich whom I marry, and she prove poor, or wise and godly, and she prove foolish or ungodly: yea, if the error be about any integral part; as if I think she had two eyes or legs, and she have but one:) and all grant that an error about an essential part, that is, which is essential to the relation or thing vowed, (if inculpable at least) disobligeth: as if I took a man in marriage thinking he had been a woman; or if I took a person for a pastor, a physician, a counsellor, a pilot, that hath no tolerable ability or skill in the essentials of any of those professions. But whether I am bound if I swear to Thomas thinking it was John, or if I marry Leah thinking she is Rachel, is the great doubt. And most casuists say I am not: and therefore I dare not be bold to contradict them. But I much suspect that they fetched their decision from the lawyers; who truly say, that in 'foro civili' it inferreth no obligation: but whether it do not oblige me ethically and 'in foro conscientiæ et cœli' I much doubtx, 1.

Because it seemeth the very case of Joshua and the Israelites, who by the guile of the Gibeonites were deceived into an 'error personarum,' taking them to be other persons than they were: and yet that this oath was obligatory, saith Dr. Sanderson is apparent (1.) In the text itself, Josh. 9:19. (2.) In the miracle wrought for that victory which Joshua obtained in defending the Gibeonites when the sun stood still. (3.) In the severe revenge that was taken on the lives of Saul's posterity for offering to violate itz. 2. And this seemeth to be the very case of Jacob who took not himself disobliged from Leah notwithstanding the mistake of the person through deceit, And though the 'concubitus' was added to the contract, that obliged most

as it was the perfecting of the contract, which an oath doth as strongly. 3. And the nature of the thing doth confirm my doubt; because when I see the person before me there is the 'individuum determinatum,' in the 'hæc homo,' and so all that is essential to my vow is included in it: if I mistake the name or the quality, or birth or relations of the person, yet my covenant is with this determinate person that is present, though I be induced to it by a false supposition that she is another. But this I leave to the discussion of the judicious.

Rule XLII. 'The question also is weighty and of frequent use, if a man vow a thing as a duty in obedience to God and conscience, which he would not have done if he had taken it to be no duty, and if he afterwards find that it was no duty, is he obliged to keep this vow?

And the true answer is, that the discovery of his error doth only discover the nullity of his obligation to make that vow, and to do the thing antecedently to the vow; but if the thing be lawful, he is bound to it by his vow notwithstanding the mistake which induced him to make it.

Rule XLIII. 'Vows about trifles (not unlawful) must be kept though they are sinfully made.' As if you vow to take up a straw, or to forbear such a bit or sort of meat, or garment, &c. But to make such is a great profanation of God's name, and a taking it in vain as common swearers do.

Rule XLIV. 'A general oath though taken upon a particular occasion must be generally or strictly interpreted (unless there be special reasons for a restraint, from the matter, end, or other evidence).' As if you are afraid that your son should marry such a woman, and therefore swear him not to marry without your consent; he is bound thereby neither to marry that woman nor any other. Or if your servant haunt any particular alehouse, and you make him forswear all houses in general, he must avoid all other. So Dr. Sanderson instanceth in the oath of supremacy, p. 195.

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