-- Tit. 1. Directions for the right making such Vows and Covenants.
reach. The difference between them and you is but this, whether we should be Christians hypocritically in jest, or in good earnest.
CHAPTER V
Directions about Vows and Particular Covenants with God Tit. 1. Directions for the Right Making such Vows and Covenants.
Direct. I. 'UNDERSTAND the nature of a vow, and the use to which it is appointed.'
A vow is a promise made to God. 1. It is not a bare assertion or negation. 2. It is not a mere pollicitation, or expression of the purpose or resolution of the mind: for he that saith or meaneth no more than, 'I am purposed or resolved to do this,' may upon sufficient reason do the contrary: for he may change his mind and resolution, without any untruth or injury to any. 3. It is not a mere devoting of a thing to God for the present by actual resignation. For the present actual delivery of a thing to sacred uses is no promise for the future: though we usually join them both together, yet 'devovere' may be separated from 'vovere.' 4. It must be therefore a promise, which is, a voluntary obliging one's self to another 'de futuro' for some good. 5. It is therefore implied that it be the act of a rational creature, and of one that in that act hath some competent use of reason, and not of a fool, or idiot, or madman, or a child that hath not reason for such an act, no nor of a brain-sick, or melancholy person, who (though he be 'cætera sanus') is either delirant in that business, or is irresistibly borne down and necessitated by his disease to vow against the sober, deliberate conclusion of his reason at other times, having at the time of vowing, reason enough to strive against the act, but not self-government enough to restrain a
passionate, melancholy vow. 6. Whereas some casuists make deliberation necessary, it must be understood that to the being of a vow so much deliberation is requisite as may make it a rational human act, it must be an act of reason: but for any further deliberation, it is necessary only to the well-being, and not to the being of a vow, and without it it is a rash vow, but not no vow. 7.
When we say, it must be a voluntary act, the meaning is not that it must be totally and absolutely voluntary, without any fear or threatening to induce us to it; but only that it be really voluntary, that is, an act of choice, by a free agent, that considering all things doth choose so to do. He that hath a sword set to his breast, and doth swear or vow to save his life, doth do it voluntarily, as choosing rather to do it than to die. Man having freewill, may choose rather to die, than vow if he think best: his will may be moved by fear, but cannot be forced by any one, or any means whatsoever. 8. When I say that a vow is a promise, I imply that the matter of it is necessarily some real or supposed good; to be good, or to do good, or not to do evil. Evil may be the matter of an oath, but it is not properly a vow, if the matter be not supposed good. 9. It is a promise made to God, that we are now speaking of; whether the name of a vow belong to a promise made only to man, is a question 'de nomine' which we need not stop at.
A vow is either a simple promise to God, or a promise bound with an oath or imprecation. Some would appropriate the name of a vow to this last sort only, (when men swear they will do this or that,) which indeed is the most formidable sort of vowing; but the true nature of a vow is found also in a simple self-obliging promise.
The true reason and use of vows is but for the more certain and effectual performance of our duties: not to make new laws, and duties, and religions for us, but to drive on the backward, lingering soul to do its duty, and to break over difficulties and delays: that by strengthening our bonds, and setting the danger before our eyes, we may be excited to escape it.
It is a great question, whether our own vows can add any new obligation to that which before lay upon us from the command of God. Amesius saith (Cas. Consc. lib. iv. c. 16.) 'Non additur proprie in istis nova obligatio, neque augetur in se prior: sed magis agnoscitur et recipitur à nobis: passive in istis æque fuimus antea obligati: sed activa recognitione arctiùs nobis applicatur à nobismetipsis.' Others commonly speak of an additional obligation: and indeed there is a double obligation added by a vow, to that which God before had laid on us, to the matter of that vow. Premising this distinction between 'Obligatio imponentis,' a governing obligation, (which is the effect of governing right or authority,) and 'Obligatio consentientis,' a selfobliging by voluntary consent, (which is the effect of that dominion which a rational free agent hath over his own actions,) I say, 1. He that voweth doth oblige himself, who before was obliged by God only; and that a man hath a power to oblige himself, is discerned by the light of nature, and is the ground of the law of nations, and of human converse: and though this is no divine obligation, yet is not therefore none at all. 2. But moreover he that voweth doth induce upon himself a new divine obligation, by making himself the subject of it. For example; God hath said, "Honour the Lord with thy substance:" this command obligeth me to obey it whether I vow it or not. The same God hath said, "Pay thy vows to the Most High:" and,
"When thou vowest a vow to God, defer not to pay itc." This layeth no obligation on me till I vow: but when I have vowed it doth: so that now I am under a double divine obligation (one to the matter of the duty, and another to keep my vow), and under a self-obligation of my own vow: whence also a greater penalty will be due if I now offend, than else would have been.
Hence you may see what to think of the common determination of casuists concerning vows materially sinful, when they say, a man is not obliged to keep them. It is only thus far true, that God obligeth him not to do that particular thing which he voweth, for God had before forbidden it, and he changeth not his laws, upon man's rash vowings: but yet there is a self-obligation which he laid upon himself to do it: and this self-obligation to a sinful act, was itself a sin, and to
be repented of, and not performed: but it bringeth the person under a double obligation to penalty, as a perjured person, even God's obligation who bindeth the perjured to penalty, and the obligation of his own consent to the punishment, if there was any oath or imprecation in the vow. If it were true that such a person had brought himself under no obligation at all, then he could not be properly called perjured, nor punished as perjured: but he that sweareth and voweth to do evil, (as the Jews to kill Paul) though he ought not to do the thing, (because God forbiddeth it) yet he is a perjured person for breaking his vow, and deserveth the penalty, not only of a rash vower, but of one perjured. Thus error may make a man sinful and miserable, though it cannot warrant him to sin.
Direct. II. 'Try well the matter of your vows, and venture not on them till you are sure that they are not things forbidden:' things sinful or doubtful are not fit matter for a vow: in asserting, subscribing and witnessing, you should take care, that you know assuredly that the matter be true, and venture not upon that which may prove false: much more should you take care that you venture not doubtingly in vows and oaths. They are matters to be handled with dread and tenderness, and not to be played with, and rashly entered on, as if it were but the speaking of a common word: "Be not rash with thy mouth, and let not thy heart be hasty to utter any thing before God."
It is a grievous snare that men are oft brought into by ignorant and rash vowse: as the case of Jephtha, and Herod, and many another tell us for our warning: an error in such cases is much more safely and cheaply discerned before, than afterwards. To have a rash vow, or perjury to repent of, is to set a bone in joint, or pull a thorn out of your very eye, and who would choose such pain and smart? "Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin; neither say thou before the angel that it was an error: wherefore should God be angry at thy voice, and destroy the work of thy hands." "It is a snare to the man who devoureth that which is holy, and after vows to make inquiryg."
Be careful and deliberate to prevent such snares.
Direct. III. 'Vow not in a passion:' stay till the storm be over: whether it be anger or desire, or whatever the passion be, delay and deliberate before you vow: for when passion is up, the judgment is upon great disadvantage. In your passion you are apt to be most peremptory and confident when you are most deceived: if it be your duty to vow, it will be your duty to-morrow when you are calm. If you say, that duty must not be delayed, and that you must do it while the Spirit moveth you: I answer, Was it not as much a duty before your passion was kindled as now? It is no sinful delaying of so great a duty, to stay till you have well proved whether it be of God. If it be the Spirit of Christ that moveth you to it, he will be willing that you deliberate and try it by that Word which the same Spirit hath indited to be your rule.
God's Spirit worketh principally upon the judgment and the will, by settled convictions, which will endure a rational trial: it is more likely to be your own spirit which worketh principally on the passion, and will not endure the trial, nor come into the light.
Direct. IV. 'Make not a vow of things indifferent and unnecessary:' if they be not good, in a true, comparing, practical judgment, which considereth all accidents and circumstances, they are no fit matter for a vow. Some say, things indifferent are the fittest matter both for vows and human laws; but either they speak improperly or untruly, and therefore dangerously at the best. If an idle word be a sin, then an idle action is not a thing to be vowed, because it is not a thing to be done, being as truly a sin as an idle word: and that which is wholly indifferent is idle; for if it be good for any thing, it is not wholly indifferent: and because it is antecedently useless, it is consequently sinful to be done.
Object. I. 'But those that say things indifferent may be vowed, mean not, things useless or unprofitable to any good end; but only those things that are good and useful, but not commanded: such as are the matter of God's counsels, and tend to man's perfection, as to vow chastity, poverty, and absolute obedience.'
Anws. There are no such things as are morally good, and not commanded: this is the fiction of men that have a mind to accuse
God's laws and government of imperfection, and think sinful man can do better than he is commanded, when none but Christ ever did so well.
Quest. I. What is moral goodness in any creature and subject, but a conformity to his ruler's will expressed in his law? And if this conformity be its very form and being, it cannot be that any thing should be morally good that is not commanded.
Quest. II. Doth not the law of God command us to love him with all our heart, and soul, and strength, and accordingly to serve him? And is it possible to give him more than all; or can God come after and counsel us to give him more than is possible?
Quest. III. Doth not the law of nature oblige us to serve God to the utmost of our power? He that denieth it, is become unnatural, and must deny God to be God, or deny himself to be his rational creature: for nothing is more clear in nature, than that the creature who is nothing, and hath nothing but from God, and is absolutely his own, doth owe him all that he is able to do.
Quest. IV. Doth not Christ determine the case to his disciples, Luke 17:10.?
A middle between good and evil in morality is a contradiction: there is no such thing; for good and evil are the whole of morality: without these species there is no morality.
Object. ii. 'It seems then you hold that there is nothing indifferent, which is a paradox.'
Answ. No such matter: there are thousands and millions of things that are indifferent; but they are things natural only, and not things moral. They are indifferent as to moral good and evil, because they are neither: but they are not 'indifferentia moralia:' the indifferency
is a negation of any morality in them 'in genere,' as well as of both the species of morality. Whatsoever participateth not of virtue or vice, and is not eligible or refusable by a moral agent as such, hath no morality in it. There may be two words so equal as it may be indifferent which you speak; and two eggs so equal, as that it may be indifferent which you eat: but that is no more than to say, the choosing of one before the other, is not 'actus moralis:' there is no matter of morality in the choice.
Object. iii. 'But if there may be things natural that are indifferent, why not things moral?'
Answ. As goodness is convertible with entity, there is no natural being but is good: as goodness signifieth commodity, there is nothing but is profitable or hurtful; and that is good to one that is hurtful to another: but if it were not so, yet such goodness or badness is but accidental to natural being; but moral goodness and badness is the whole essence of morality.
Object. iv. 'But doth not the apostle say, "He that marrieth doth well, and he that marrieth not doth better?" Therefore all is not sin, which is not best.'
Answ. The question put to the apostle to decide, was about marrying or not marrying, as it belonged to all Christians in general, and not as it belonged to this or that individual person by some special reason differently from others. And so in respect to the church in general, the apostle determineth that there is no law binding them to marry, or not to marry: for a law that is made for many must be suited to what is common to those many. Now marriage being good for one and not for another, is not made the matter of a common law, nor is it fit to be so, and so far is left indifferent: but because that to most it was rather a hindrance to good in those times of the church, than a help, therefore for the present necessity, the apostle calleth marrying
"doing well," because it was not against any universal law, and it was a state that was suitable to some; but he calls not marrying "doing
better," because it was then more ordinarily suited to the ends of Christianity. Now God maketh not a distinct law for every individual person in the church; but one universal law for all: and this being a thing variable according to the various cases of individual persons, was unfit to be particularly determined by an universal law. But if the question had been only of any one individual person, then the decision would have been thus: though marrying is a thing not directly commanded or forbidden, yet to some it is helpful as to moral ends, to some it is hurtful, and to some it is so equal or indifferent, that it is neither discernibly helpful nor hurtful; now by the general laws or rules of Scripture to them that 'consideratis considerandis' it is discernibly helpful, it is not indifferent, but a duty; to them that it is discernibly hurtful, it is not indifferent, but a sin; to them that it is neither discernibly helpful or hurtful as to moral ends, it is indifferent, as being neither duty nor sin; for it is not a thing of moral choice or nature at all. But the light of nature telleth us that God hath not left it indifferent to men to hinder themselves or to help themselves as to moral ends; else why pray we, "Lead us not into temptation?" And marriage is so great a help to some, and so great a hurt to others, that no man can say that it is morally indifferent to all men in the world: and therefore that being none of the apostle's meaning, it followeth that his meaning is as aforesaid.
Object. v. 'But there are many things indifferent in themselves, though not as clothed with all their accidents and circumstances: and these actions being good in their accidents, may be the matter of a vow.'
Answ. True, but those actions are commanded duties, and not things indifferent as so circumstantiated. It is very few actions in the world that are made simply duties or sins, in their simple nature without their circumstances and accidents: the commonest matter of all
God's laws, is actions or dispositions which are good or evil in their circumstances and accidents. Therefore I conclude, things wholly indifferent are not to be vowed.
Direct. V. 'It is not every duty that is the matter of a lawful vow.' Else you might have as many vows as duties: every good thought, and word, and deed might have a vow. And then every sin which you commit would be accompanied and aggravated with the guilt of perjury. And no wise man will run his soul into such a snare. Object.
'But do we not in baptism vow obedience to God? And doth not obedience contain every particular duty?' Answ. We vow sincere obedience, but not perfect obedience. We do not vow that we will never sin, nor neglect a duty (nor ought we to do so). So that as sincere obedience respecteth every known duty as that which we shall practise in the bent of our lives, but not in perfect constancy or degree, so far our vow in baptism hath respect to all known duties, but no further.
Direct. VI. 'To make a vow lawful, besides the goodness of the thing which we vow, there must be a rational, discernible probability that the act of vowing it will do more good than hurt: and this to a wise, foreseeing judgment.' For this vowing is not an ordinary worship to be offered to God (except the baptismal vow renewed in the Lord's supper and at other seasons); but it is left as an extraordinary means, for certain ends which cannot by ordinary means be attained: and therefore we must discern the season, by discerning the necessity or usefulness of it. Swearing is a part of the service of God, but not of his daily worship, nor frequently and rashly to be used, by any that would not be held guilty of taking the name of God in vain: and so it is in the case of vowing. Therefore he that will make a lawful vow, must see beforehand what is the probable benefit of it, and what is the probable hurt or danger: and without this foresight it must be rash, and cannot be lawful. And therefore no one can make a lawful vow, but wise, foreseeing persons, and those that advise with such, and are guided by them, if they be not such themselves: unless in a case where God hath prescribed by his own determining commands
(as in the covenant of Christianity). Therefore to one man the same vow may be a sin, that to another may be a duty; because one may have more reason for it, or necessity of it, and less danger by it than another. One man may foresee that vowing (in case where there is no
necessity) may ensnare him either in perplexing doubts, or terrors, which will make all his life after more irregular or uncomfortable.
Another man may discern that he is liable to no such danger.
Direct. VII. 'No man should pretend danger or scruple against his renewing the vow of Christianity, or any one essential part of it; viz.
To take God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost for my God, and Saviour, and Sanctifier, my Owner, Governor, and Father; renouncing the devil, the world, and the flesh.' Because there is an absolute necessity 'præcepti et medii,' of performing this, and he that doth it not shall certainly be damned; and therefore no worse matter can stand up against it: he that denieth it, giveth up himself despairingly to damnation. Yet I have heard many say, I dare not promise to turn to God, and live a holy life, lest I break this promise, and be worse than before. But dost thou not know, that it must be both made and kept, if thou wilt be saved? Wilt thou choose to be damned, for fear of worse? There is but one remedy for thy soul, and all the hope of thy salvation lieth upon that alone. And wilt thou refuse that one, for fear lest thou cast it up and die? when thou shalt certainly die unless thou both take it, and keep it, and digest it.
Direct. VIII. 'About particular sins and duties, deliberate resolutions are the ordinary means of governing our lives; and vows must not be used where these will do the work without them.' For extraordinary means must not be used, when ordinary will serve the turn. Nor must you needlessly draw a double guilt upon yourselves in case of sinning. And in mutable or doubtful cases, a resolution may be changed, when a vow cannot. Try therefore what deliberate resolutions will do, with the help of other ordinary means, before you go any further.
Direct. IX. 'When ordinary resolutions and other helps will not serve the turn, to engage the will to the forbearance of a known sin, or the performance of a known duty, but temptations are so strong as to bear down all, then it is seasonable to bind ourselves by a solemn vow, so it be cautelously and deliberately done, and no greater
danger like to follow.' In such a case of necessity, 1. You must deliberate on the benefits and need. 2. You must foresee all the assaults that you are like to have to tempt you to perjury, that they come not unexpected. 3. You must join the use of all other means for the keeping of your vows.
Direct. X. 'Make not a law and religion to yourselves by your voluntary vows, which God never made you by his authority: nor bind yourselves for futurity to all that is a duty at present, where it is possible that the change of things may change your duty.' God is our
King and Governor, and not we ourselves: it is not we, but he that must give laws to us. We have work enough to do of his appointing: we need not make more to ourselves, as if he had not given us enough. Vows are not to make us new duties or religions, but to further us in the obedience of that which our Lord hath imposed on us. It is a self-condemning sin of foolish will-worshippers, to be busy in laying more burdens on themselves, when they know, they cannot do so much as God requireth of them. Yea, some of them murmur at God's laws as too strict, and at the observers of them as too precise,
(though they come far short of what is their duty); and yet will be cutting out more work for themselves.
And it is not enough that what you vow be your duty at the present, but you must bind yourselves to it by vows no longer than it shall remain your duty. It may be your duty at the present to live a single life; but if you will vow therefore that you will never marry, you may bind yourselves to that which may prove your sin: you know not what alterations may befall you in your body or estate, that may invite you to it. Are you sure that no change shall make it necessary to you? Or will you presume to bind God himself by your vows, that he shall make no such alteration? Or if you were never so confident of your own unchangeableness, you know not what fond and violent affections another may be possessed with, which may make an alteration in your duty. At the present it may be your duty to live retiredly, and avoid magistracy and public employments; but you may not therefore vow it for continuance: for you know not but God
may make such alterations, as may make it so great and plain a duty, as without flat impiety or cruelty you cannot refuse: perhaps at the present it may be your duty to give half your yearly revenues to charitable and pious uses; but you must not therefore vow it for continuance (without some special cause to warrant it): for perhaps the next year it may be your duty to give but a fourth or a tenth part, or none at all, according as the providence of God shall dispose of your estate and you. Perhaps God may impose a clear necessity on you, of using your estate some other way.
Direct. XI. 'If you be under government, you may not lawfully vow without your governor's consent, to do any thing which you may not lawfully do without their consent, in case you had not vowed it.' For that were, 1. Actually to disobey them at the present, by making a vow without the direction and consent of your governors. 2. And thereby to bind yourselves to disobey them for the future, by doing that without them, which you should not do without them. But if it be a thing that you may do, or must do, though your governors forbid you, then you may vow it though they forbid you, (if you have a call from the necessity of the vow).
Direct. XII. 'If oaths be commanded us by usurpers that have no authority to impose them, we must not take them in formal obedience to their commands.' For that were to own their usurpation and encourage them in their sin: if we owe them no obedience in any thing, we must not obey them in so great a thing: or if they have some authority over us in other matters, but none in this (as a constable hath no power to give an oath), we must not obey them in the point where they have no authority. But yet it is possible that there may be other reasons that may make it our duty to do it, though not as an act of formal obedience: as I may take an oath when a thief or murderer requireth it, not to obey him, but to save my life.
And if any man command me to do that which God commandeth me, I must do it, because God commandeth it.
Direct. XIII. 'If a lawful magistrate impose an oath or vow upon you, before you take it you must consult with God, and know that it is not against his will.' God must be first obeyed in all things: but especially in matters of so great moment, as vows and promises.
Quest. I. 'What if I be in doubt whether the oath or promise imposed be lawful? must I take it, or not? If I take an oath which I judge unlawful or false, I am a perjured or profane despiser of God: and if a man must refuse all oaths or promises, which the magistrate commandeth, if he do but doubt whether they be lawful, then government and justice will be injured, while every man that hath ignorance enough to make him dubious, shall refuse all oaths and promises of allegiance, or for witness to the truth.'
Answ. I. I shall tell you what others say first in the case of doubting:
Dr. Sanderson saith, Prælect. iii. Sect. 10. pp. 74, 75. 'Tertius casus est cum quis juramento pollicetur se facturum aliquid in se fortassis licitum, quod tamen ipse putat esse illicitum. Ut siquis ante hæc tempora admittendus ad beneficium (ut vocant) Ecclesiasticum, promisisset in publicis sacris observare omnes ritus legibus
Ecclesiasticis imperatos; vestem scilicet lineam, crucis signum ad sacrum fontem, ingeniculationem in percipiendis symbolis in sacra cœna, et id genus alios; quos ipse tamen ex aliquo levi præjudicio putaret esse superstitiosos et Papisticos: quæritur in hoc casu quæ sit obligatio? Pro Resp. dico tria: Dico 1. Non posse tale juramentum durante tali errore sine gravi peccato suscipi. Peccat enim gravitur qui contra conscientiam peccat, etsi erroneam. Judicium enim intellectus cum sit unicuique proxima agendi regula; voluntas, si judicium illud non sequatur, deficiens à regula sua, necesse est ut in obliquum feratur. Tritum est illud, Qui facit contra conscientiam ædificat ad gehennam. Sane qui jurat in id quod putat esse illicitum, nihilominus juraturus esset, si esset revera illicitum; atque ita res illa, ut ut alii licita, est tamen ipsi illicita; sententiam ferente
Apostolo, Rom. 14:14. &c. Dico 2. Tale juramentum non obligare, &c.
—' That is, 'The third case is, when a man promiseth by oath that he will do a thing which in itself perhaps is lawful, but he thinketh to be
unlawful: as if one before these times being to be admitted to an Ecclesiastical benefice (as they call it), had promised, that in public worship he would observe all the rites commanded in the Ecclesiastic laws, to wit, the surplice, the sign of the cross at the sacred font, kneeling in the receiving of the symbols in the holy supper, and others the like; which yet out of some light prejudice, he thought to be superstitious and Papistical. The question is, what obligation there is in this case? For answer I say three things, 1. I say that an oath, while such an error lasteth, cannot be taken without grievous sin: for he grievously sinneth, who sinneth against his conscience, although it be erroneous. For when the judgment of the intellect is to every man the nearest rule of action, it must be that the will is carried into obliquity, if it follow not that judgment, as swerving from its rule. It is a common saying, he that doth against his conscience, buildeth unto hell: verily he that sweareth to that which he thinketh to be unlawful, would nevertheless swear if it were indeed unlawful. And so the thing, though lawful to another, is to him unlawful, the apostle passing the sentence, Rom. 14:14. &c. 2. I say, that such an oath bindeth not, &c.—' Of the obligation I shall speak anon; but of the oath or promise, I think the truth lieth here as followeth.
1. The question 'de esse' must first be resolved, before the question of knowing or opinion. Either the thing is really lawful which is doubted of, or denied, or it is not. If it be not, then it is a sin to swear or promise to it; and here there is no case of error. But if it be really lawful, and the vowing of it lawful, then the obligations that lie upon this man are these, and in this order, (1.) To have a humble suspicion of his own understanding. (2.) To search, and learn, and use all means to discern it to be what it is. (3.) In the use of these means to acknowledge the truth. (4.) And then to promise and obey accordingly. Now this being his duty, and the order of his duty, you cannot say that he is not obliged to any one part of it, though he be obliged to do it all in this order, and therefore not to do the last first, without the former: for though you question an hundred times,
'What shall he do as long as he cannot see the truth?' the law of God
is still the same; and his error doth not disoblige him: 'Nemini debetur commodum ex sua culpa.' So many of these acts as he omitteth, so much he sinneth. It is his sin if he obey not the magistrate; and it is his sin that he misjudgeth of the thing, and his sin that he doth not follow the use of the means till he be informed.
So that his erring conscience entangleth him in a necessity of sinning; but disobligeth him not at all from his obedience. 2. But yet this is certain, that in such a case, he that will swear because man biddeth him, when he taketh it to be false, is a perjured, profane despiser of God; but he that forbeareth to swear for fear of sinning against God, is guilty only of a pardonable, involuntary weakness.
Direct. XIV. 'Take heed lest the secret prevalency of carnal ends or interest, and of fleshly wisdom do bias your judgment, and make you stretch your consciences to take those vows or promises, which otherwise you would judge unlawful, and refuse.' Never good cometh by following the reasonings and interest of the flesh, even in smaller matters; much less in cases of such great importance. Men think it fitteth them at the present, and doth the business which they feel most urgent; but it payeth them home with troubles and perplexities at the last: it is but like a draught of cold water in a fever. You have some present charr to do, or some strait to pass through, in which you think that such an oath, or promise, or profession would much accommodate you; and therefore you venture on it, perhaps to your perdition. It is a foolish course to cure the parts (yea, the more ignoble parts) with the neglect and detriment of the whole: it is but like those that cure the itch by anointing themselves with quicksilver; which doth the charr for them, and sendeth them after to their graves, or casteth them into some far worse disease. Remember how deceitful a thing the heart is, and how subtly such poison of carnal ends will insinuate itself. O how many thousands hath this undone! that before they are aware, have their wills first charmed and inclined to the forbidden thing, and fain would have it to be lawful; and then have brought themselves to believe it lawful, and so to commit the sin; and next to defend it, and next to become the champions of satan, to fight his battles, and vilify and abuse them,