-- Tit. 3. Directions against Lying and Dissembling
twelve pence an oath,) lay more on thyself, and give it to the poor.
Though you are not bound to do justice on yourselves, you may medicinally help to cure yourselves, by that which hath a rational aptitude thereto.
Tit. 3. Special Directions against Lying and Dissembling That you may know what lying is, we must first know what truth is, and what is the use of speech. Truth is considerable, 1. As it is in the things known and spoken of. 2. As it is in the conception or knowledge of the mind. 3. As it is in the expressions of the tongue. 1.
Truth in the things known is nothing but their reality; that indeed they are that which their names import, or the mind apprehendeth them to be: this is that which is called both physical and metaphysical truth. 2. Truth in the conception or knowledge of the mind, is nothing else but the agreement or conformity of the knowledge to the thing known: to conceive of it truly, is to conceive of it as it is: mistake or error is contrary to this truth. 3. Truth as it is in the expressions is indeed a twofold relation. (1.) The primary relation is of our words or writings, to the matter expressed. And so truth of speech is nothing but the agreeableness of our words to the things expressed; when we speak of them as they are. (2.) The secondary relation of our words is to the mind of the speaker: for the natural use of the tongue is to express the mind as well as the matter: and thus truth of speech is nothing but the agreeableness of our words to our thoughts or judgments. Truth as it is the agreement of thoughts or words to the matter, may be called logical truth. And this is but the common matter of moral or ethical truth, which may be found partly in a clock, or watch, or weather-cock, or a seaman's chart. The agreement of our words to our minds, is the more proper or special matter of moral truth: the form of it as a moral virtue is its agreement to the law of the God of truth. And as the 'terminus'
entereth the definition of relations, so our words have respect to the mind of the hearer or reader, as their proper 'terminus;' their use being to acquaint him, 1. With the matter expressed; 2. With our minds concerning it. Therefore it is necessary to the logical truth of speech, that it have an aptitude rightly to inform the hearer; and to the ethical truth, that it be intended by the speaker really to inform him, and not to deceive him. (Supposing that it is another that we speak to.) You see then that to a moral truth all these things are necessary: 1.
That it be an agreement of the words with the matter expressed, (as far as we are obliged to know the matter.) 2. That it be an agreement of the words, with the speaker's mind or judgment. 3. That the expressions have an aptitude to inform the hearer of both the former truths. 4. That we really intend them to inform him of the truth, so far as we speak it. 5. That it be agreeable to the law of God; which is the rule of duty, and discoverer of sin.
In some speeches the truth of our words as agreeing to the matter and to the mind is all one, viz. when our own conception or judgment of a thing is all that we assert. As when we say, 'I think, or I believe, or I judge that such a thing is so.' Here it is no whit necessary to the truth of my words, that the thing be so as I think it to be: (for I affirm it not to be so,) but that indeed I think as I say I think. But that our words and minds agree, is always and inseparably necessary to all moral truth.
We are not bound to make known all that is true, (for then no man must keep a secret,) much less to every man that asketh us.
Therefore we are not bound to endeavour the cure of every man's error in every matter: for we are not bound to talk at all to every man. And if I be not bound to make known the truth at all, or my
mind at all, I am not bound to make known all the truth, or all that is in my mind; no, not to all those to whom I am bound to make known part of both. If I find a man in an ignorance or error which I am not bound to cure, (nay, possibly it were my sin to cure it; as to open the secrets of the king's counsels or armies to his enemies, &c.) I may and must so fit my speech to that man, even about those matters, as not to make him know what he should not know either of the matter or of my mind: I may either be silent, or speak darkly, or speak words which he understandeth not, (through his own imperfection,) or which I know his weakness will misunderstand: but I must speak no falsehood to him. Also there is a great difference between speaking so as not to cure the ignorance or error of the hearer, which I found him in; and so speaking as to lead him into some new error: I may do the former in many cases, in which I may not do the latter. And there is great difference between speaking such words, as in the common use of men are apt to inform the hearers of the truth, though I may know, that through some weakness of their own they will misunderstand them, and be deceived by them; and the speaking of words which in the common use of men, have another signification than that which I use them to. By the former way, the hearer sometimes is the deceiver of himself, and not the speaker, when the speaker is not bound to reveal any more to him: but by the latter way the speaker is the deceiver. Also there is great difference to be made between my speaking to one to whom it is my duty to reveal the truth, and my speaking to a man to whom I am not bound to reveal it; yea, from whom my duty to God, and my king or country, bind me to conceal it. By these grounds and distinctions you may know what a lie is, and may resolve the ordinary doubts that are used to be raised about our speaking truth or falsehood. As,
Quest. I. 'Am I bound to speak the truth to every one that asketh me?' Answ. You are not bound to speak at all in every case to every
one that asketh you: and he that is silent, speaketh not the truth.
Quest. II. 'Am I bound to speak the truth to every one that I answer to?' Answ. Your answer may sometimes be such as signifieth but a denying to answer, or to reveal what is demanded of you.
Quest. III. 'Am I bound to speak all the truth, whenever I speak part of it?' Answ. No: it is God's Word that must tell you when, and how much you must reveal to others: and if you go as far as God alloweth you, it followeth not, that therefore you must go no farther. A soldier taken by the enemy may tell the truth when he is asked in things that will do no harm to his king and country; but he must conceal the rest, which would advantage the enemy against them.
Quest. IV. 'Is it always a sin to speak a logical falsehood; that is, to speak disagreeably to the thing which I speak of?' Answ. Not always: for you may sometimes believe an untruth without sin. For you are to believe things according to their evidence and appearance. Therefore if the deceit be unavoidably caused by a false appearance or evidence, without any fault of yours, it is not then your fault to be mistaken. But then your expressions must signify no more certainty than you have, nor any more confidence, than the evidence will warrant. When you say, such a thing is so; the meaning must be but,
I am persuaded it is so: for if you say, I am certain it is so, when you are not certain, you offend.
Quest. V. 'Is it always a sin to speak falsely or disagreeably to the matter, when I know it to be false? that is, Is it always a sin to speak contrary to my judgment or mind?' Answ. Yes: for God hath forbidden it, and that upon great and weighty reasons, as you shall hear anon.
Quest. VI. 'Is it a sin when I speak not a known untruth, nor contrary to my opinion, nor with a purpose to deceive?' Answ. Yes; it is oft a sin when there is none of this. For if it be your duty to know what you say; and to deliberate before you speak, and your duty to be acquainted with the truth or falsehood which you are ignorant of, and your duty to take heed that you deceive not another negligently, and yet you neglect all these duties, and by a culpable ignorance and negligence deceive both yourselves and others, then this is a sin, as well as if you knowingly deceived them.
Quest. VII. 'But though it be a sin, it remaineth doubtful, whether it be a lie.' Answ. This is but 'lis de nomine,' a controversy about the name and not the thing. As long as we are agreed that it is a sin against God, and to be avoided, whether you call it a lie, or by another name, is no great matter. But I think it is to be called a lie: though I know that mest definers follow Cicero, and say that a lie is
'A falsehood spoken with a purpose to deceive;' yet I think, that where the will is culpably neglective of not deceiving, an untruth so negligently uttered deserveth the name of a lie.
Quest. VIII. 'Must my words, to free them from falsehood, be always true in the proper, literal sense?' Answ. No. Augustine's determination in this case is clear truth, 'Quod figuratè dicitur non est mendacium, (i.e. eo nomine.)'
To speak ironically, metonymically, metaphorically, &c., is not therefore to lie. For the truth of words lying in that aptitude to express the thing and mind, which is suited to the intellect of the hearers, they are true words that thus express them, whether properly or figuratively: but if the words be used figuratively, contrary to the hearers, and the common sense of them, with a purpose to deceive, then they are a lie, notwithstanding you pretend a figure to verify them.
Quest. IX. 'Must my words be used by me in the common sense, or in the hearer's sense?' Answ. No doubt, but so far as you intend to inform the hearer, you are to speak to him in his own sense. If he have a peculiar sense of some word, differing from the common sense, and this be known to you, you must speak in his peculiar sense. But if it be in a case that you are bound to conceal from him, the question is much harder. Some think it an untruth and sinful to speak to him in words which you know he will use to his own deceit.
Others think that you are not bound to fit yourselves to his infirmity, and speak in his dialect contrary to common sense: and that it is not your fault that he misunderstandeth you, though you foresee it, where it will not profit him to understand you, nor yourselves are obliged to make him understand you, but the contrary: the next will open this.
Quest. X. 'Is it lawful by speech to deceive another, yea, and to intend it? Supposing it be by truth?' Answ. It is not a sin in all cases, to contribute towards another man's error or mistake. For, 1. There are many cases in which it is no sin in him to mistake, nor any hurt to him: therefore to contribute to that which is neither sin or hurt, is of itself no sin: yea, there are some cases in which an error (though not as such) may be a duty: as, to think charitably and well of an hypocrite, as long as he seemeth to be sincere. Here if by charitable reports I contribute to his mistake, it seemeth to be but my duty. For as he is bound to believe, so I am bound to report the best while it is probable. 2. There are many cases in which a man's ignorance or mistake may be his very great benefit: his life or estate may lie upon it: and I may know that if he understood such or such a thing, he would make use of it to his ruin. 3. There are many cases in which a man's innocent error is necessary to the safety of others, or of the commonwealth. 4. It is lawful in such cases to deceive such men by actions: as an enemy by military stratagems, or a traitor by signs
which he will mistake. And words of truth which we foreknow he will mistake, not by our fault, but by his own, do seem to be less questionable than actions, which have a proper tendency to deceive.
5. God himself hath written and spoken those words which he foreknew that wicked men would mistake and deceive themselves by: and he hath done those works, and giveth those mercies, which he knoweth they will turn to a snare against themselves. And his dominion or prerogative cannot here be pleaded to excuse it, if it were unholy. And in this sense (as to permitting and occasioning) it is said, "And if the prophet be deceived, I the Lord have deceived that prophet." Yet must we not think with Plato, that it is lawful to lie to an enemy to deceive him. For, 1. All deceit that is against charity or justice is sinful. 2. And all deceit that is performed by a lie. As Augustine saith, 'There are some lies which are spoken for another's safety or commodity, not in malice, but in benignity, as the midwives to Pharaoh.—These lies are not commended in themselves, but in the deceit (or charity) of them. They that thus lie will deserve (that is, be in the way) to be at last delivered from all lying. There is also a lying in jest, which deceiveth not; because he that is spoken to, knoweth it to be spoken in jest. And these two sorts are not faultless; but the fault is not great. A perfect man must not lie to save his life.—But it is lawful to silence the truth, though not speak falsely.' In Psal. And in Enchirid. he saith, 'Mihi non absurdum, &c.' 'It seemeth not absurd to me that every lie is a sin: but it is a great matter or difference, with what mind, and in what matters a man lieth.' Some think a physician may lie to entice his patient to take a medicine to save his life: he may lawfully deceive him by hiding a medicine, and by true speeches and dark, which he thinketh will be misunderstood; but not by falsehood.
Quest. XI. 'Wherein lieth the proper vice of lying? Is it in deceiving? or in speaking falsely? or in speaking contrary to the thoughts?'
Answ. It is the aggravation of a lie, that it be an injurious deceit. But the malignity of the sin doth not consist in the mere deceit of another man's intellect: for, as is said, it may be a great benefit to many men to be deceived: a patient's life may be saved by it, when his physician findeth it necessary to his taking a medicine, which without deceit he will not take. And so children and weak-headed people must be used.
Now such a charitable deceit, as such, can be no sin. Therefore the common nature of a lie consisteth not, only, in the purpose of deceiving, but in the speaking falsely, contrary to the mind: else it would follow, either that all deceit is sin, or that all lying or false speaking is lawful, where the deceit of another is charitable or lawful: which are neither of them to be granted. Yet is it not every untruth that is a lie. Some schoolmen distinguish between 'mentiri' (as being
'contra mentem ire') and 'mendacium dicere;' as if to tell a lie were not always to lie, because not contrary to the mind. But then by 'mendacium' they mean no more than 'falsum.'
I conclude then, that 'a lie is the voluntary asserting of a falsehood.'
And the more it tendeth to the injury of another, the more it is aggravated; but it is one thing to be injurious, and another thing to be a lie. When I name 'a falsehood,' I mean that which is apt to deceive the hearer. So that it is necessary to the being of a lie, that it be deceitful, though the purpose of deceiving be found only in the more explicit sort of lies: for 'falsum dicitur à fallendo:' it were not false, if it were not deceitful, or apt to deceive. For an unapt or figurative expression, which hath a right sense as used by the speaker and hearer, is no falsehood. In one language a double negative affirmeth; and in another a double negative is a more vehement kind of denial; and yet neither is to be called by the others an untruth. By 'asserting,' I mean any expression that maketh the falsehood our own, as distinct from a historical narration: for it is not lying to repeat a lie, as only telling what another said. By 'voluntary,' I mean
not only that which is done knowingly, upon actual will and deliberate choice, or consent; but also that which is done 'ex culpa voluntatis,' 'by the fault of the will,' and is to be imputed to the will.
For it is of great necessity to observe this about every sin, that whereas we truly say, that all sin is voluntary, and no further sin than voluntary; yet by 'voluntary,' here, is not meant only that which is actually willed; but all that the will is guilty of. For it is true that Austin saith, 'Ream linguam non facit nisi rea mens:' 'The tongue is not made guifty, but by a guilty mind.' But then it must be known, that the mind or will is guilty of forbidden omissions as well as aetions: and so it is a lie or voluntary untruth, when the mind and will do not restrain the tongue from it when they ought: As, 1. When a men erreth or is ignorant through wilful sloth or negligence, and so speaketh falsely when he thinks it true; this is a culpable falsehood, and so a lie; because he might have avoided it and did not: and this is the case of most false teachers and heresics. So, also, if a man will through passion, custom, or carelessness, let his tongue run before his wits, and speak falsely for want of considering or heeding what he saith, this is a culpable untruth; and a lie, and it is voluntary; because the will should have prevented it and did not; though yet there was no purpose to deceive.
You see then that there are two degrees of lying. 1. The grossest is the speaking of a known falsehood, with a purpose to deceive. 2. The other is the speaking falsely through culpable ignorance, error; or inconsiderateness:
Direct. I. 'Be well informed of the evil of the sin of lying:' for the common cause of it is, that men think that there is no great harm in it, unless some one be greatly wronged by it: but it is not forbidden by God only because it wrongeth others, but it hath all this evil in it.
1. Lying is the perverting of man's noble faculties, and turning them clean contrary to their natural use. God gave man a tongue to express his mind, and reveal the truth; and lying doth monstrously turn it to the hindering of the mind and truth, yea, to the venting of the contrary to both. And as it is the evil of drunkenness to be a voluntary madness or corruption of so noble a faculty as reason, so it is the fault of lying, to be corrupting, perverting, and deforming both of the mind and tongue; and by confusion, a destroying of God's work and ereature as to its proper use.
2. 'Lying is the enemy and destroyer of truth:' and truth is a thing divine, of unspeakable excellency and use. It is God's instrument by which he maketh man wise, and good, and happy. Therefore if he should not make strict laws for the preservation of so excellent a thing as truth, he should not secure the happiness of the world. As to the securing of men's lives it is not enough to make a law that you shall not kill men without just cause (though that be all that the law intendeth to attain): for then every man being left to judge, would think there were just cause whenever his passion or interest told him so: but the law is, 'You shall not kill at all without the judgment of the magistrate.' So, if the law against lying did intend no more than the securing men from the injuries of error and deceit, yet would it not have been a sufficient means, to have said only, 'You shall not injure men by lying:' for then men would have judged of the injury by their own interests and passions: but much more is it needful to have a stricter law, when truth itself is the thing that God intendeth to secure, as well as the interest of men. In the eyes of Christians, and Heathens, and all mankind that have not unmanned themselves, there appeareth a singular beauty and excellency in truth. Aristotle could say, that the 'Nature of man is made for truth.' Cicero could say, that 'Quod verum, simplex, sincerumque est, id naturæ hominis accommodatissimum est.' Verity and virtue were ever taken as the
inseparable perfections of man. Pythagoras could say, that to 'Love truth and do good, were the two things that made man likest to God, and therefore were his two most excellent gifts.' Plato could say, that 'Truth was the best rhetoric and sweetest oration.' Epictetus could say, that 'Truth is a thing immortal, eternal, of all things most precious; better than friendship as being less obnoxious to blind affections.' Jamblichus could say, that 'As light naturally and constantly accompanieth the sun, so truth accompanieth God and all that follow him.' Epaminondas is praised for that he would 'not lie, no not in jest.' Pomponius Atticus was so great a hater of a lie, that 'all his friends were desirous to trust him with their business, and use him as their counsellor.' He knoweth not what use man's understanding or his tongue were made for, that knoweth not the excellency of truth. Let a Pilate only ask as a stranger "what is truthp?" as Pharaoh asked, "who is the Lord?" "For this end Christ himself came into the world to bear witness to the truth, and every one that is of the truth will hear him." "He is the truthr," and "full of grace and truth." "Grace and truth came by himt." His Spirit is given to "guide his servants into the truth," and to "sanctify them by the truthx," that "knowing the truth, it might make them free." "The fruit of the Spirit is in all truthz." His ministers can "do nothing against the truth, but for the truth." "Truth" is the "girdle" that must "gird our loinsb." The "church" is the "pillar" and "ground of truth." The faithful are "they that believe and know the truthd." "Speaking the truth in love," is the way of the churches' growth and edification.
"Repentance" is given men, "to the acknowledging of the truth, that they may escape out of the power of the devilf." The dullards are they that are "never able to come to the knowledge of the truth." "They are men of perverse minds that resist the truthh." "They that receive not the truth in the love of it cannot be saved." All they "are damned that believe not the truthk." You see what truth is in the judgment of God and all the sober world. Therefore a lie that is contrary to truth as
darkness to light, must be equally odious as truth is amiable: no wonder therefore if it be absolutely forbidden of God.
3. You may the more easily perceive this by considering, that other faults of the tongue, as idle talk, swearing and such like, are forbidden, not only because they are a hurt to others, but for the intrinsical evil in the thing itself; great reason therefore that it should be so in this.
4. Lying is a vice which maketh us most unlike to God. For he is called the "God of truth." All his "ways" are "mercy and truthm." His
"judgment is according to truth." "It is impossible for God to lieo."
His word is the "word of truth." And who shall "dwell in his tabernacle," but those that "speak the truth in their heartsq." The disconformity of the soul to God then, being its greatest deformity, in things wherein it is made to be conformed to him, it may hence appear that lying is an odious sin. And thin may the more easily appear, if you consider, what a case the would were in if God could lie, and were not of undoubted truth: we should then be sure of nothing; and therefore could have no sure information by his word; no sure direction and guidance by his precepts; and no sure consolation in any of his promises. Therefore that which maketh us so unlike to the true and holy God, must needs be odious.
5. Lying is the image or work of the devil, and liars are his children in a special sort: for Christ telleth, us that he "abode not in the truth, for there is no truth in him: when he speaketh a lie he speaketh of his own: for he is a lier, and the father of it." The proud the malicious, and the liers, are in a special sort the children of the devil: for these there are in Scripture in a special manner made the devil's sinss.
Therefore sure there is an intrinsical evil and odiousness in a lie. It was satan that filled the hearts of Ananias and Sapphira to lie to the
Holy Ghost. To change the "truth of God into a lie" and "to make God a liar, are therefore the most odious sinsu;" because it is a feigning him to be like the devil: and should we make ourselves like him then by the same vice? If you love not the devil's sin and image, love not a lie.
6. Lying destroyeth human converse, and bringeth most pernicious confusion into the affairs of mankind. If truth be excluded, men cannot buy and sell, and trade, and live together. It would be sufficient to destroy their rational converse if they had no tongues: but much more to have false tongues: silence openeth not the mind at all: lying openeth it not when it pretendeth to open it; and falsely representeth it to be what it is not. And therefore though you say, that your lies do no such hurt; yet seeing this is the nature and tendency of lying as such, it is just and merciful in the righteous God, to banish all lying by the strictest laws: as the whole nature of serpents is so far at enmity with the nature of man, that we hate and kill them though they never did hurt us, because it is in their nature to hurt us: so God hath justly and mercifully condemned all lying, because its nature tendeth to the desolation and confusion of the world; and if any indulgence were given to it, all iniquity and injustice would presently like an inundation overwhelm us all.
7. Lying tendeth directly to perjury itself. It is the same God that forbiddeth them both: and when once the heart is hardened in the one, it is but a step further to the other. Cicero could observe, that 'He that is used to lie, will easily be perjured.' A seared conscience that tolerateth one, will easily be brought to bear the other.
8. There is a partiality in the liar that condemneth himself, and the sin in another, which in himself he justifieth: for there is no man that would have another lie to him. As Austin saith, 'I have known many
that would deceive, but never any that would be deceived.' If it be good, why should not all others lie to thee? If it be bad, why wilt thou lie to others? Is not thy songue under the same law as theirs? Dost thou like it in thy children and in thy servants? If not, it should seem much worse to thee in thyself, as thou art most concerned in thy own actions.
9. Judge what lying is by thy own desire and expectation to be believed. Wouldst thou not have men believe thee, whether thou speak truth or not? I know thou wouldst: for the liar loseth his end if he be known to lie, and be not believed. And is it a reasonable desire or expectation in thee to have men believe a lie? If thou wouldst be believed, speak that which is to be believed.
10. Lying maketh thee to be always incredible, and so to be useless and dangerous to others: for he that will lie doth leave men uncertain whether ever he speak truth, unless there be better evidence of it, than his credibility. As Aristotle saith, 'A liar gets this by lying, that nobody will believe him when he speaks the truth.' How shall I know that he speaketh truth to day who lied yesterday? unless open repentance recover his credibility. Truth will defend itself, and credit him that owneth it at last: but falsehood is indefensible, and will shame its patrons. Saith Petrarch excellently, 'As truth is immortal, so a fiction and lie endureth not long: dissembled matters are quickly opened: as the hair that is combed and set with great diligence is ruffled with a little blast of wind: and the paint that is laid on the face with a deal of labour, is washed off with a little sweat: the craftiest lie cannot stand before the truth; but is transparent to him that nearly looketh into it; every thing that is covered is soon uncovered: shadows pass away; and the native colour of things remaineth: it is a great labour to keep hidden long. No man can live long under water:
he must needs come forth, and shew the face which he concealed.' At the farthest God at the day of judgment will lay open all.
Direct. II. 'If you would avoid lying, take heed of guilt.' Unclean bodies need a cover; and are most ashamed to be seen. Faultiness causeth lying; and lying increaseth the fault. When men have done that which they are afraid or ashamed to make known, they think there is a necessity of using their art to keep it secret. But wit and craft are no good substitute for honesty: such patches make the rest much worse. But because the corrupted heart of man will be thus working and flying to deceitful shifts, prevent the cause and occasion of your lying. Commit not the fault that needs a lie. Avoiding it is much better than hiding it, if you were sure to keep it never so close.
As indeed you are not: for commonly truth will come to light. It is the best way in the world to avoid lying, to be innocent; and do nothing which doth fear the light: truth and honesty do not blush, nor desire to be hid. Children and servants are much addicted to this crime: when their folly, or wantonness, or appetites, or slothfulness, or carelessness hath made them faulty, they presently study a lie to hide it with: which is to go to the devil to entreat him to defend or cover his own works. But wise, and obedient, and careful, and diligent, and conscionable children and servants, have need of no such miserable shifts.
Direct. III. 'Fear God more than man, if you would not be liars.' The excessive fear of man, is a common cause of lying: this maketh children so apt to lie, to escape the rod; and most persons that are obnoxious to much hurt from others, are in danger of lying to avoid their displeasure. But why fear you not God more, whose displeasure is unspeakably more terrible? Your parents or master will be angry, and threaten to correct you: but God threateneth to damn you; and his wrath is a consuming fire: no man's displeasure can reach your
souls, and extend to eternity: will you run into hell to escape punishment on earth? Remember, whenever you are tempted to escape any danger by a lie, that you run into a thousand fold greater danger, and that no hurt that you escape by it, can possibly be half so great as the hurt it bringeth. It is as foolish a course as to cure the tooth-ach by cutting off the head.
Direct. IV. 'Get down your pride, and over-much regard of the thoughts of men, if you would not be liars.' Pride makes men so desirous of reputation, and so impatient of the hard opinion of others, that all the honest endeavours of the proud, are too little to procure the reputation they desire, and therefore lying must make up the rest. Shame is so intolerable a suffering to them, that they make lies the familiar cover of their nakedness. He that hath not riches, hath pride, and would be thought somebody, and therefore will set out his estate by a lie. He that hath not eminency of parentage and birth, if he have pride will make himself a gentleman by a lie. He that is a contemptible person at home, if he be proud, will make himself honourable among strangers by a lie. He that wanteth learning, degrees, or any thing that he would be proud of, will endeavour by a lie to supply his wants: even as wanton women by the actual lie of painting, would make themselves beautiful, through a proud desire to be esteemed. Especially he that committeth a shameful crime, if he be proud will rather venture on a lie than on the shame. But if your pride be cured, your temptation to lie will be as nothing: you will be so indifferent in matters of honour or reputation, as not to ventare your souls on God's displeasure for it: not that any should be important, OF utterly regardless of their reputation: but none should over-value it, nor prefer it before their souls, nor seek it by unlawful means. Avoid shame by well-doing, and spare not: (only see that you have a higher end.) Seneca saith, 'There are more that abstain from sin through shame, than through virtue or a good will:' it is well
when virtue is so much in credit, and vice in discredit, that those that have not the virtue would fain have the name, and these that will not leave the vice, would escape the shame; and it is well that there are human motives to restrain them that case not for divine ones. But as human motives came no saving virtues; so devilish and wicked means are far from preventing any pernicious hurt, being the certain means to procure it.
Direct. V. 'Avoid ambition and human, unnecessary dependance if you would avoid lying.' For the ambitious give up themselves to men; and therefore flattering must be their trade; and how much of lying is necessary to the composition of flattery, I need not tell you. Truth is seldom taken for the fittest instrument of flattery. It is contranily the common road to hatred: 'Libere et sine adulatione veritatem predicantes, et gesta pravæ vitæ arguentes, gratiam non habent æpud homines,' saith Ambrose. 'They that preach truth freely and without flattery, and reprove the deeds of a wicked life, find not favour with men.' 'Veritatem semper inimicitiæ persequuntur.'
Hatred is the shadow of truth, as envy is of happiness. When Aristippus was asked why Dionysius spake so much against him, he answered, 'for the same reason that all other men do;' intimating that it was no wonder if the tyrant was impatient of truth and plaindealing, when it is so with almost all mankind: they are so culpable, that all but flatterers seem to handle them too hard, and hurt their sores. And herein lieth much of the misery of great men, that few or none deal truly with them, but they are flattered into perdition: saith
Seneca, 'Divites cum omnia habent, unum illis deest; scilicet qui verum dicat: si enim in clientelam fœlicis hominis potentnmque perveneris, aut veritas aut amicitia perdenda est:' 'One thing rich men want when they have all things, that is, a man to speak the truth: for if thou become the dependant or client of prosperous or great men, thou must cast away (or lose) either the truth or their
friendsipe.' Hierome thought that therefore Christ had not a house to put his head in, because he would flatter nobody, and therefore nobody would entertain him in the city. And the worst of all is, that where flattery reigneth, it is taken for a duty, and the neglect of it for a vice: as Hieron. (ad Cel.) saith 'Quodque gravissimam est, quia humilitatis ac benevolentiæ loeo ducitur, its fit us qui adulari nescit, aut invidus aut supenbus reputetur,' that is, 'and, which is most grievous, because it goes for humility and kindness, it comes to pass that he that cannot flatter is taken to be envious or proud.' But the time will come, that the flutterer will be hated even by him that his fallacious praises pleased. Deceit and lies do please the flattered person but a while; even till he find the bitterness of the effects, and the fruit have told him that it was but a suganed kind of enmity: and therefore he will not be long pleased with the flatterer himself.
Flattery ever appeareth at last, to be but 'permission dulcedo' as Austin calls it. Saith the same Austin (in Psal. 59) 'There are two sorts of persecutors; the opposer (or dispraiser) and the flatterer: but the tongue of the flatterer hurteth more than the hand of the persecutor.' And think not that any man's greatness or favour will excuse thee or save thee harmless in thy lies; for God that avengeth them is greater than the greatest. Saith Austin (lib. de mendac.)
'Quisquis autem esse aliquod genus mendacii, quod peccatum non sit putaverit, decipiet semetipsum turpiter, cum honestum se deceptorem arbitretur aliorum,' i.e. 'whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is no sin, he deceiveth himself foully, whilst he thinks himself an honest deceiver of others.' "Be not the servants of men," if you would be true.
Direct. VI. 'Love not covetousness, if you would not be liars.' A lie will seem to a covetous man an easy means to procure his gain, to get a good bargain, or put off a cracked commodity for more than it is worth. 'Rupêre fœdus, impius lucri furor, et ira præceps.' Sen. Hip.
He that loveth money better than God and conscience, will for money displease God and conscience, by this or any other sin.
Direct. VII. 'Learn to trust God, if you would not be liars.' For lying is the practice of him that thinks he must provide and shift for himself.
Even Abraham's and Isaac's equivocation (saying their wives were their sisters) and David's feigning himself mad, proceeded from some distrust in God: they would not have thought it necessary so to shift for their lives, if they had fully trusted God with their lives.
Gehazi's covetousness and lying did both proceed from a want of confidence in God. If a man were confident of God's protection, and that he had better stand to God's choice in all things than his own, what use could he think he hath for lying, or for any sinful shift?
Direct. VIII. 'Be not too credulous of bad reports, if you would not be liars.' Malice is so mad, and so unconscionable a sin, and the tongues of men are commonly so careless of what they say, that if you easily believe evil, you do but easily believe the devil, and thereby make yourselves his servants in divulging malicious lies. You think because they are spoken by many, and spoken confidently, you may lawfully believe or report what you hear! But this is but to think that the commonness of liars, and their malice and impudence will warrant you to follow them, even because they are so bad. Will you bark and bite because that dogs do so? If a man be stung with an adder, you should help to cure him, and not desire yourselves to sting him: selfish, and interested, and malicious, and partial, factious persons, are so commonly liars, and impudent in their lies, that it behoveth you, if you would not be liars yourselves, to take heed of reporting any thing they say. These spiders will weave a web of the air, or out of their own bowels.
Direct. IX. 'Be not rash in speaking things before you have tried them.' Consider what you say, and know before you speak. Is it not a shame when you have spoken falsely, to come off with saying, 'I thought it had been true?' But why will you speak upon thought, and not stay till you better understood the case? If the matter required such haste in speaking, you should have said no more than, 'I think it is so.' "Prove all things," and then "hold that which is good," and assert that which is true. Saith Cicero, 'Nihil est temeritate turpius, nec quicquam tam indignum sapientis gravitate aut constantiâ, quam aut falsum sentire, aut quad non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum sine ulla dubitatione defendere.' 'Nothing is more unseemly than temerity: nor any thing so unworthy the gravity or constancy of a wise man, than either to hold a falsehood, or confidently to defend that which is not received and known upon sufficient trialk.'
Direct. X. 'Foresee that which is like to entrap you in a lie, that you may prevent it.' Let not the occasion and temptation surprise you unprepared. Foresight will make the temptation easy to be overcome, which unforeseen will be too strong for you.
Direct. XI. 'Get a tender conscience, and walk as in the sight and hearing of God, and as one that is passing to his judgment.' A seared conscience dare venture upon lies or any thing; but the fear of God is the soul's preservative. What makes men lie; but thinking they have to do with none but men? For they think by a lie to deceive a man, and hide the truth; but if they remembered that they have most to do with God, and that he is always present who cannot be deceived, and that his judgment will bring all secret things to light, and detect all their lies before all the world, they would not hire a torn and dirty cloak at so dear a rate, for so short a time. No wonder if men are liars that fear not God, and believe not the day of judgment.
Direct. XII. 'To save others from lying as well as yourselves, be sure to watch against it in your children, and wisely help them to see the evil of it. For children are very prone to it; and unwise correction frighteneth them into lies to save themselves, as indulgence and connivance do encourage them to it. Make them oft read such texts as these: "Ye shall not steal, nor deal falsely, nor lie one to another."—"He that speaketh the truth from his heart, &c.n" "He said, surely they are my people; children that will not lie; so he was their Saviour."—"The devil is a liar and the father of itp."—"There shall in no wise enter into it any thing that defileth—or maketh a lie—
For without are dogs—and whoever loveth and maketh a lie."—"The mouth of him that speaketh lies shall be stoppedr."—"He that speaketh lies shall not tarry in my sight."—"A false witness shall not be unpunished, and be that speaketh lies shall not escape (shall perisht.")—"If a ruler hearken to lies, all his servants are wicked."—"I hate and abhor lying, but thy law do I lovex."—"A righteous man hateth lying."—"Wherefore putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbour, for we are members one of anotherz" q. d. a man would not lie to deceive his own members: no more should we to deceive one another. In a word, where the love of God and man prevaileth, there truth prevaileth; but where self-love, partiality, there truth prevaileth; but where self-love, pertiality, and carnal selfinterest prevail, there lying is a household servant, and thought a necessary means to these ends.
But because lying is so common, and so great a sin, and many cases occur about it daily, through I think what is said offereth matter enough to answer them, I shall mention some more of them distinctly, to help their satisfaction who cannot accommodate general answers to all their particular cases.
Quest. I. 'Is frequent, known lying a certain sign of a graceless state, that is, a mortal sin, proving the sinner to be in a state of damnation?'
Answ. The difficulty of this case doth no more concern lying, than any other sin of equal malignity. Therefore I must refer you to those places where I have opened the difference between mortal, reigning sins, and infirmities. At present take this brief solution. 1. It is a thing of too great difficulty, to determine just how many acts of a great sin may consist with a present state of grace, (that is, of right by covenant to heaven.) 2. All sin which consisteth with an habitual, predominant love of God and holiness, consisteth with a state of life, and no other. 3. He that seldom or never committeth such external crimes, and yet loveth not God, and heaven, and holiness above all the pleasures and interests of the flesh, is in a state of death. 4. It is certain that this love to God and holiness is not predominant, whose carnal interest and lust hath ordinarily in the drift and tenor of his life, more power to draw him to the wilful committing of known sin, than the said love of God, and heaven, and holiness have to keep him from it. For his servants men are, whom they obey, whether it be sin unto death, or obedience unto righteousness. 5. Therefore the way to know whether sin be mortified, or mortal, is, (1.) By feeling the true bent of the will, whether we love or hate it. (2.) By observing the true bent and tenor of our lives, whether God's interest in us, or the contrary be predominant when we are ourselves, and are tempted to such sins. 6. He that will sin thus as oft as will stand with saving grace, shall never have the assurance of his sincerity, or the peace or comfort of a sound believer, till he repent and lead a better life. 7. He that in his sin retaineth the spirit of adoption, or the image of God, or habitual divine love, hath also habitual and virtual repentance for that very sin, before he actually repenteth: because he hath that habitual hatred of it, which will cause actual repentance, when he is
composed to act according to his predominant habits. 8. In the meantime the state of such a sinner is, neither to be unregenerate, carnal, unholy, as he was before conversion, and so to lose all his right to life; nor yet to have so full a right as if he had not sinned: but a bar is put in against his claim, which must be removed before his right be full, and such as is ripe for present possession. 9. There are some sins which all men continue in while they live. As defect in the degrees of faith, hope, love, &c.; vain thoughts, words, disorder, passions, &c. And these sins are not totally involuntary: otherwise they were no sins. Yea, the evil is prevalent in the will against the good, so far as to commit those sins, though not so far as to vitiate the bent of heart or life. 10. There are some sins which none on earth do actually repent of, viz. Those that they know not to be sins; and those that they utterly forget; and those faults which they are guilty of just at the time of dying. 11. In these cases, virtual, or implicit, or habitual repentance doth suffice to the preventing of damnation. As also a will to have lived perfectly sufficeth in the case (of continued imperfections). 12. Things work not on the will as they are in themselves; but as they are apprehended by the understanding: and that which is apprehended to be either of doubtful evil, or but a little sin and of little danger, will be much less resisted, and oftener committed than sins that are clearly apprehended to be great.
Therefore, where any sort of lie is apprehended thus, as of small or doubtful evil, it will be the oftener committed. 13. If this apprehension be wrong, and come from the predominancy of a carnal or ungodly heart, which will not suffer the understanding to do its office, nor to take that to be evil which he would not leave, then both the judgment and the lie are mortal, and not mortified, pardoned sins. 14. But if this misapprehension of the understanding do come from natural impotency, or unavoidable want of better information, or only from the fault of a vicious inclination, which yet is not predominant, but is the remnant of a vice which is mortified in
the main; then neither the error nor the often lying is a mortal, but a mortified sin. As, for instance, If false teachers (as the Jesuits) should persuade a justified person, that a lie that hurteth no man, but is officious, is but a venial or no sin, it is possible for such a person often to commit it, though he err not altogether innocently.
15. Though it is true that all good Christians should not indulge the smallest sin, and that true grace will make a man willing to forsake the least, yet certain experience telleth us, that some constant sinning (aforenamed) doth consist with grace in all that have it upon earth; and therefore that lesser sins, as thoughts, passions, are not resisted so much as greater be; and therefore that they are more indulged and favoured, or else they would not be committed. No good men rise up with so great and constant watchfulness against an idle thought or word, or a disorder in prayer, &c. as they do against a heinous sin.
He that would have this and all such cases resolved in a word, and not be put on trying the case by all these distinctions, must take another casuist, or rather a deceiver instead of a resolver: for I cannot otherwise resolve him.
Quest. II. 'Is it not contrary to the light of nature, to suffer e. g. a parent, a king, myself, my country, rather to be destroyed, than to save them by a harmless lie?'
Answ. No. Because, 1. Particular good must give place to common.
And if once a lie may pass for lawful in cases where it seemeth to be good, it will overthrow human converse, and debauch man's nature and the world.
2. And if one evil may be made a means for good, it will infer that other may be so too, and so will confound good and evil, and leave vicious man to take all for good which he thinks will do good. That is
not to be called a harmless lie, which is simply evil, being against the law of God, against the order of nature, the use of human faculties, and the interest and converse of the sociable world.
3. The error of the objectors chiefly consisteth in thinking that nothing is further hurtful and morally evil, than as it doth hurt to some men in corporal respects. Whereas that is evil, which is against the universal rule of rectitude, against the will of God, and against the nature and perfection of the agent; much more if it also tend to the hurt of other men's souls, by giving them an example of sinning.
4. And though there may sometimes be some human probability of such a thing, yet there is no certainty that ever it will so fall out, that a lie shall save the life of king, parent, or yourselves. For God can open the eyes of that enemy whom you think to blind by a lie, and cause him to know all the truth, and so take away that life, which you thought thus to have saved.
5. And there are lawful means enough to save your lives when it is best for you to save them. That is, Obey God, and trust him with your lives, and he can save them without a lie, if it be best: and if it be not, it should not be desired.
6. And if men did not erroneously overvalue life, they would not think that a lie were necessary for it. When it is not necessary to live, it is not necessary to lie for life. But thus one sin brings on another: when carnal men overvalue life itself, and set more by it than by the fruition of God in the glory of heaven, they must needs then overvalue any means which seemeth necessary to preserve it.
7. Yet as to the degree of evil in the sin, I easily grant (with Augustine Enchirid.) that 'Multum interest quo animo et de quibus quisque mentiatur: non enim ita peccat qui consulendi, quomodo ille qui
nocendi voluntate mentitur: nec tantum nocet qui viatorem mentiendo in adversum iter mittit, quantum is qui viam vitæ mendacio fallente depravat.'
Object. 'Are not the midwives rewarded by God for saving the Israelitish children by a lie?'
Answ. I need not say with Austin, "The fact was rewarded, and the lie pardoned;" for there is no such thing as a lie found in them. Who can doubt but that God could strengthen the Israelitish women to be delivered without the midwives? And who can doubt but when the midwives had made known the king's murderous command, that the women would delay to send for the midwives, till, by the help of each other, the children were secured? Which yet is imputed to the midwives, because they confederated with them, and delayed to that end. So that here is a dissembling and concealing part of the truth, but here is no lie that can be proved.
Object. 'But Heb. 11:31, and James 2:25, Rahab is said to be justified by faith and works, when she saved the spies by a lie.'
Answ. It is uncertain whether it was a lie, or only an equivocation, and whether her words were not true of some other men that had been her guests. But suppose them a lie, (as is most like,) the Scripture no more justifieth her lie, than her having been a harlot. It is her believing in the God of Israel, whose works she mentioned, that she is commended for, together with the saving of the spies with the hazard of her own life. And it is no wonder if such a woman in Jericho had not yet learned the sinfulness of such a lie as that.
Object. 'But at least it could be no mortal sin, because Heb. 11:31., and James 2:25., say she was justified.'
Answ. It was no mortal sin in her, (that is, a sin which proveth one in a state of death,) because it had not these evils that make sin mortal: but a lie in one that doth it knowingly, for want of such a predominancy of the authority and love of God in the soul, as should prevail against the contrary motives habitually, is a mortal sin, of an ungodly person. It is pernicious falsehood and soul delusion in these teachers, that make poor sinners think that it is the smallness of the outward act or hurt of sin alone, that will prove it to be, as they call it, venial, or mortified, and not mortal.
Quest. III. 'Is deceit by action lawful, which seemeth a practical lie?
And how shall we interpret Christ's making as if he would have gone farther, and David's feigning himself mad, and common stratagems in war, and doing things purposely to deceive another?'
Answ. 1. I have before proved that all deceiving another is not a sin, but some may be a duty: as a physician may deceive a patient to get down a medicine to save his life, so he do it not by a lie.
2. Christ's seeming to go farther was no other than a lawful concealment or dissimulation of his purpose, to occasion their importunity: for all dissimulation is not evil, though lying be. And the same may be said of lawful stratagems as such.
3. David's case was not sinful as it was mere dissimulation to deceive others for his escape. But whether it was not a sinful distrust of God, and a dissimulation by too unmanly a way, I am not able to say, unless I had known more of the circumstances.
Quest. IV. 'Is it lawful to tempt a child or servant to lie, merely to try them?'
Answ. It is not lawful to do it without sufficient cause, nor at any time to do that which inviteth them to lie, or giveth any countenance to the sin, as satan and bad men use to tempt men to sin, by commending it, or extenuating it. But to lay an occasion before them barely to try them (as to lay money, or wine, or other things in their way, to know whether they are thieves or addicted to drink, that we may the better know how to cure them: and so to try their veracity) is not unlawful. For, 1. The sin is virtually committed when there is a will to commit it, though there should be no temptation or opportunity. 2. We do nothing which is either a commendation of the sin, or a persuading to it, nor any true cause either physical or moral; but only an occasion. 3. God himself, who is more contrary to sin than any creature, doth thus by trial, administer such occasions of sin to men that are viciously disposed, as he knoweth they will take; and his common mercies are such occasions. 4. God hath no where forbidden this to us: we may not do evil that good may come by it; but we may do good when we know evil will come of it by men's vice.
5. It may be a needful means to the cure of that sin, which we cannot know till it be thus directed.
Quest. V. 'Is all equivocation unlawful?'
Answ. There is an equivocating which is really lying: as when we forsake the usual or just sense of a word, and use it in an alien, unusual sense, which we know will not be understood, and this to deceive such as we are bound not to deceive.
But there is a use of equivocal words which is lawful and necessary:
(for human language hath few words which are not of divers significations.) As, 1. When our equivocal sense is well understood by the hearers, and is used not to deceive them, but because use hath made those words to be fit; as all metaphors are equivocal, and yet
may be used. 2. When the equivocal sense is the most usual or obvious, and if it be not understood, it is through the hearer's fault or extraordinary dulness. 3. When a robber, or usurping tyrant, or any cruel enemy, that hath no authority to do it, shall seek to ensnare my life by questions, I may lawfully answer him in such doubtful words, as purposely are intended to deceive him, or leave him ignorant of my sense, so be it they be not lies or false in the ordinary usage of those words. 4. And to such a person I may answer doubtfully, when it is apparent that it is a doubtful answer, and that I do it as professing that I will answer him no more particularly nor plainly, but will conceal the rest.
Quest. VI. 'Whether all mental reservation be unlawful?'
Answ. This needeth no other answer than the former. If the expressed words be a lie, the mental reservation will not make them justifiable as a truth. But if the expressed words of themselves be true, then the mental reservation may be lawful, when it is no more than a concealment of part of the truth, in a case where we are not bound to reveal it.
But of both these cases I must refer the reader to what I have said about vows, Part iii. Chap. v. Tit. 2. without which he will not know my meaning.
Quest. VII. 'May children, servants, or subjects, in danger, use words which tend to hide their faults?'
Answ. 1. When they are bound not to hide the fault, they may not: which is, 1. When due obedience; or, 2. The greater good which will follow, require them to open it.
2. When they are not bound to open it, they may hide it by just means, but not by lies or any evil. In what cases they may hide a fault by just means, I shall here say no more to.
Quest. VIII. 'May I speak that which I think is true, but am not sure.
Answ. If you have a just call, you may say you think it is true; but not flatly that it is so.
Quest. IX. 'May I believe and speak that of another, by way of news, discourse or character, which I hear reported by godly, credible persons, or by many?'
Answ. I. The main doubt is when you have a call to speak it, which is answered after, Part iv. at large.
2. You may not so easily believe and report evil of another as good.
3. You must not believe ill of another any further than evidence doth constrain you: yet you may believe it according to the degree of evidence or credibility; and make use of the report for just caution or for good; but not to defame another, upon uncertainty, or without a call.
4. The sin of receiving, and spreading false reports of others upon hearsay, is now so common among those that do profess sobriety and religion, that all men should take heed of it in all company, as they would do of the plague in an infectious time. And now it is so notorious that false news and slanders of others are so common, neither good men's words, nor common fame, will allow you, (or excuse you,) to believe or report any evil of another, till you are able to prove that it is your duty: but all Christians should join in lamenting and reproving this common, uncharitable sin.