Part 2
A further objection against this second form of the mythical version may be drawn from the prominent part woman is represented to have played in the transaction. Would an Oriental myth-maker have given this role to a member of what is in the Orient usually regarded as the inferior sex? Could woman be regarded in such a circle as
more efficient than man in the advancement of civilization? Agriculture, one of the most powerful factors in the progress of civilization, is represented in the account as a punishment, not as something desirable from man's point of view, withheld from him by the gods. In order to escape from these difficulties, of which the force cannot be denied, some writers propose to cut up the narrative into two sections, finding in the one the representation of divine jealousy roused by the fear of man's advance in culture, and in the other an account of man's fall into sin as the traditional interpretation assumes. Into this critical phase of the question we cannot enter here.
Dismissing, then, this mythological version of the account, we proceed to examine:
(b) a second interpretation of the tree, and of the phrase 'knowledge of good and evil' connected with it. This view attaches itself to the linguistic observation that in Hebrew 'to know' can signify 'to choose'. The name would then really mean 'the tree of the choice of good and evil'. Some keep this in the general form of 'the tree by means of which man was to make his choice of good or evil'. This would be equivalent to 'the probation-tree'. Others give a peculiar sinister sense to the word 'knowing', making it to mean 'the independent autonomous choice over against God's direction of what was good and what was evil for man'. This makes the name of the tree one of evil omen anticipating the disastrous result. In itself this would not be impossible, although it could hardly be considered a likely view. An objection, however, lies in this, that an arbitrary twist is thus given to the verb 'to know', when it is made to mean not 'to choose' in general, with a neutral connotation, but particularly 'to choose presumptuously', for which no evidence can be quoted. The most serious obstacle to the whole view, in both of its forms, arises from this, that it takes 'knowledge' as descriptive of an act, the act of 'choosing', not as descriptive of a state, the acquaintance with good and evil. Now in the sequel the symbol of the 'knowledge of good and
evil' is found in the consciousness of nakedness, and nakedness stands not for an act but for a condition.
Thus we are led to the view most commonly held in the past:
(c) the tree is called the tree of 'knowledge of good and evil', because it is the God-appointed instrument to lead man through probation to that state of religious and moral maturity wherewith his highest blessedness is connected. The physical meaning of the phrase has been transferred to the spiritual sphere. On this view the name does not prejudge the result. To attain to a knowledge of good and evil is not necessarily an undesirable and culpable thing. It could happen in a good way, in case man stood in probation, no less than in an evil way, in case man fell. The name is neutral as to its import. That this is so frequently overlooked is due to the prohibitive form which the probation-test assumed. Because man was forbidden to eat of the tree associated with the knowledge of good and evil, it has been rashly assumed that the knowledge of good and evil was forbidden him. Obviously there is in this a confusion of thought. The prohibitive form of the test has quite a different cause, as will be presently shown.
If now we enquire how the maturity designated as 'knowledge of good and evil' was to be attained, either in a desirable or in an undesirable sense, regard must be had first of all to the exact form of the phrase in Hebrew. The phrase is not 'knowledge of the good and the evil'. It reads, literally translated: 'knowledge of good-and-evil', i.e., of good and evil as correlated, mutually conditioned conceptions. Man was to attain something he had not attained before. He was to learn the good in its clear opposition to the evil, and the evil in its clear opposition to the good. Thus it will become plain how he could attain to this by taking either fork of the probation-choice. Had he stood, then the contrast between good and evil would have been vividly present to his mind: the good and evil he would have known from the new illumination his mind would have received through the crisis of temptation in which the two collided. On the other hand,
had he fallen, then the contrast of evil with good would have even more vividly impressed itself upon him, because the remembered experience of choosing the evil and the continuous experience of doing the evil, in contrast with his memory of the good, would have shown most sharply how different the two are. The perception of difference in which the maturity consisted related to the one pivotal point, whether man would make his choice for the sake of God and of God alone.
Of course, it is possible to go back of the mere command of God for finding the bottom-reason for why a thing is good and evil. This bottom-reason lies in the nature of God regulating His command. But in the present instance it was not a question of the ultimate theology or metaphysic of evil and good. For the simple practical purpose of this first fundamental lesson it was necessary only to stake everything upon the unreasoned will of God. And there was a still further reason why this should be done. If the inherent nature of good and evil had been drawn into the scope of the test, then it would have resulted in a choice from instinct alone rather than in a choice of a deliberate character. But it was precisely the purpose of the probation to raise man for a moment from the influence of his own ethical inclination to the point of a choosing for the sake of personal attachment to God alone.
Too much is often made of the purely autonomous movement of ethics, eliminating as unworthy the unexplained, unmotivated demand of God. To do the good and reject the evil from a reasoned insight into their respective natures is a noble thing, but it is a still nobler thing to do so out of regard for the nature of God, and the noblest thing of all is the ethical strength, which, when required, will act from personal attachment to God, without for the moment enquiring into these more abstruse reasons. The pure delight in obedience adds to the ethical value of a choice. In the present case it was made the sole determinant factor, and in order to do this an arbitrary prohibition was issued, such as from the very fact of its
arbitrariness excluded every force of instinct from shaping the outcome.
From the true conception of the purpose of the tree we must distinguish the interpretation placed upon it by the tempter according to Gen. 3:5. This carries a twofold implication: first that the tree has in itself, magically, the power of conferring knowledge of good and evil. This lowers the plane of the whole transaction from the religious and moral to the pagan-magical sphere. And secondly, Satan explains the prohibition from the motive of envy. This also we have already found to be a piece of pagan-mythological interpretation. Again, the divine statement in Gen. 3:22 alludes to this deceitful representation of the tempter. It is ironical.
[3] The principle of temptation and sin symbolized in the serpent
There is a difference between probation and temptation, and yet they appear here as two aspects of the same transaction. The close interweaving reflects itself even in the use of identical words for trying and tempting both in Hebrew and Greek. We may say that what was from the point of view of God a probation was made use of by the evil power to inject into it the element of temptation. The difference consists in this, that behind the probation lies a good, behind the temptation an evil, design, but both work with the same material. It is, of course, necessary to keep God free from tempting anybody with evil intent [cp. James 1:13]. But it is also important to insist upon the probation as an integral part of the divine plan with regard to humanity. Even if no tempter had existed, or projected himself into the crisis, even then some form for subjecting man to probation would have been found, though it is impossible for us to surmise what form.
The problem arises, how we must conceive of the role played by the serpent in the fall, and of its traditional connection with an evil spirit. There are varying views in regard to this. Quite in keeping with the modern aversion to much Biblical realism in general, many
are inclined to understand the entire account as a piece of allegorizing, which in the intent of the writer was not meant to describe a single occurrence but the ever-repeated efforts of sin to find an entrance into the human heart. The serpent then becomes a symbol or allegory with the rest. This view is contrary to the plain intent of the narrative; in Gen. 3:1, the serpent is compared with the other beasts God had made; if the others were real, then so was the serpent. In vs. 14 the punishment is expressed in terms requiring a real serpent.
Others have gone to the opposite extreme of asserting that there was nothing but a serpent. The terms used in the passages just quoted would certainly fit better into this than into the allegorical view. But it ill accords with the Scriptural teaching on the animal world in general to conceive of a simple serpent as speaking. The Bible always upholds against all pantheizing confusion the distinction between man who speaks and the animals who do not speak, Balaam's ass forming the only exception on record.
It therefore becomes necessary to adopt the old, traditional view according to which there were present both a real serpent and a demonic power, who made use of the former to carry out his plan. So far from there being anything impossible in this, it finds a close analogy in the demoniacs of the Gospels, through whose mouths demons speak. Recent archaeological scholarship has at this point vindicated the correctness of the old exegesis, for in the Babylonian representations there appears often behind the figure of the serpent the figure of a demon. Besides, there is ample Biblical testimony for the presence of an evil spirit in the temptation.
True, the Old Testament throws no light upon the subject. This is for the twofold reason that, on the one hand, the fall is seldom referred to, and, on the other hand, the whole subject of evil spirits and of 'the Satan', 'the adversary' is long kept in darkness. For reference to the fall cp. Job 31:33; Hos. 6:7; Ezek. 28:1–19. For reference or allusion to the 'Evil Spirit' cp. 'the Satan' in Job; in 1 Chron. 21:1. Evil spirits
in general appear, 1 Sam. 16; 1 Ki. 22. In none of these passages, however, is the first entrance of evil into the world of men brought into connection with Satan. For the first time, so far as we know, this is done in the Apocryphal book of 'Wisdom', where in 11:24, it is stated: 'By the envy of Satan death entered into the world'. In later Jewish writings also Sammael (The Angel of Death) is called 'The Old Serpent'. In the New Testament we have the words of Jesus to the Jews, John 8:44, where in the reference to the Devil he is represented as both a liar and a murderer from the beginning. This must refer to the temptation. 'The father thereof', i.e., of lying, means the primordial liar. Further, 'your father the devil' alludes to the phrase 'your seed' addressed to the serpent [Gen. 3:15]. So does the phrase 'children of the Wicked One' in Matt. 13:38. Paul in Rom. 16:20 understands of Satan what in the curse is made the serpent's punishment, viz., his being bruised under foot. 1 John 3:8 says that the Devil sins from the beginning. In Rev. 12:9, Satan is called 'the great dragon, the old serpent'.
It is said of the serpent that it was more subtle than any other beast of the field. This finds in its subtlety the reason of its fitness for serving as the demon's instrument. If Satan had appeared bluntly and boldly, the temptation would have been much less alluring. The tempter addresses himself to the woman, probably not because she is more open to temptation and prone to sin, for that is hardly the conception of the Old Testament elsewhere. The reason may have lain in this, that the woman had not personally received the prohibition from God, as Adam had; cp. 2:16, 17.
The process of the temptation divides itself in two stages. In both the central purpose of the tempter is the injection of doubt into the woman's mind. But the doubt suggested in the first stage is of an apparently innocent kind, a doubt as to the question of fact. Yet there is already mixed with this a carefully disguised allusion to the far more serious kind of doubt consisting in the distrust of God's word recognized as such. In the second stage of the temptation this serious form of doubt casts off all disguise, because in the meanwhile the
woman has in principle given entrance to the thought so skilfully put before her at the beginning. In the first stage it is at the start a mere question of fact: 'Yea, has God said?' Has the prohibition been actually issued? Still even here the suggestion of a more serious aspect of the matter lies in the words 'of every tree in the garden'. In this phrasing the Serpent hints at the possibility that, should such a prohibition have been actually issued, God has made it far too sweeping through excluding man from the use of the fruit of every tree.
Now the woman reacts to this in two distinct ways. First, as to the question of bare facts, she repudiates the intimation of no prohibition having been actually issued: 'God had said'. At the same time she rejects the suggestion, as though God had ignominiously extended the scope of the prohibition to all the trees: 'We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden.' And yet in the more or less indignant form of this denial there already shines through that the woman had begun to entertain the possibility of God's restricting her too severely. And by entertaining this, even for a moment, she had already begun to separate in principle between the rights of God and her own rights. In doing this she has admitted the seed of the act of sinning into her heart. And still further, in this direction goes the inexact form of her quoting the words of God: 'ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it.' In this unwarranted introduction of the denial of the privilege of 'touching' the woman betrays a feeling, as though after all God's measures may have been too harsh.
Satan does not fail to follow up the advantage thus gained. Entering boldly upon the second stage of the temptation he now seeks to awaken in the woman doubt in the pronounced form of distrust of the word of God recognized as such: 'Ye shall not surely die'. In the Hebrew of these words the placing of the negative at the opening of the sentence should be observed. Where for emphasis' sake the infinitive and a finite verb are put together, and to this a negation is added, the negation usually stands between. Had this been followed here, the correct rendering would have been: 'Ye shall surely not die'.
This would merely have cast doubt on the fulfilment of the threat. On the other hand the unusual construction followed makes it to mean: 'It is not so (what God has said), this: ye shall surely die'. This is intended to give the lie to God's utterance in the most pointed manner. And to the temptation to charge God with lying the reasons for the likelihood of His lying is added, viz., God is one whose motives make His word unreliable. He lies from selfishness; 'For God does know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil'.
Thus prepared, the woman needs only the inducement of the delicious appearance of the fruit, apparently confirming the beneficial effect ascribed to its eating, for committing the overt act of sin. It is not, however, the mere sensual appetite that determines her choice, for her motive was complex; 'She saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise'. In part at least, the pivotal motive of the act was identical with the pivotal motive that gave strength to the temptation. It has been strikingly observed that the woman in yielding to this thought virtually put the tempter in the place of God. It was God who had beneficent purposes for man, the serpent had malicious designs. The woman acts on the supposition that God's intent is unfriendly, whilst Satan is animated with the desire to promote her well-being.
[4] The principle of death symbolized by the dissolution of the body
According to Gen. 2:17, God said: 'Of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die' [cp. 3:3]. On the basis of these words the belief of all ages has been that death is the penalty of sin, that the race became first subject to death through the commission of the primordial sin. At present many writers take exception to this, largely on scientific grounds. With these as such we have here nothing to do. But, as is frequently the case, strenuous attempts are made to give such a turn to the Biblical phrases as to render them
compatible with what science is believed to require, and not only this, some proceed to the assertion that the Scriptural statements compel acceptance of the findings of science.
Attempts of this kind make for poor and forced exegesis. Scripture has a right to be exegeted independently from within; and only after its natural meaning has been thus ascertained, can we properly raise the question of agreement or disagreement between Scripture and science. In the present case the 'posthumous' exegetical arguments depended upon to make the Bible teach in the account of the fall that man was created subject to death, deserve examination as examples of this type of exegesis. They are the following:
Firstly, the tree of life is represented as something from which man had not yet eaten; therefore he was not yet endowed with life and consequently was subject to death.
Secondly, in Gen. 3:19, it is, we are told, explicitly affirmed that man's return to dust is natural: 'till thou return unto the ground, for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return'.
Thirdly, Gen. 2:17 proves that the sense of the threatening was not, sin will cause thee to die; but simply: sin will subject thee to instantaneous, premature death: 'in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die'.
Now each of these three arguments rests on careless exegesis. The first fails to distinguish between the life man had in virtue of creation and that higher unlosable life to be attained through probation. Of the latter the tree of life was the probable prospective sacrament. That it had not as yet been eaten of could not signify such an absence of life in general as would involve the necessity of death. Man enjoyed fellowship with God in the garden, and God is according to our Lord's statement not a God of the dead but of the living [Lk. 20:38].
The second argument, in order to prove the point, would have to be wrenched from its context. The words 'dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return' occur in a curse. If they expressed a mere declaration of the natural working out of man's destiny, as created mortal, there would be nothing of a curse in them. Nor is it possible to say here that premature death is the element of curse involved. The preceding words forbid this, since they speak of a slow process of exhausting labour issuing unto death. The conjunction 'till' is not simply chronological, as though the words could mean: 'thou wilt have to endure hard labour up till the moment of death.' The force is climactic: 'thy hard labour will finally slay thee'. In man's struggle with the soil, the soil will conquer and claim him. Consequently, if the second half of the statement implied the naturalness of death, it would be in contradiction with the first, where returning to dust is represented as a curse. But what then do the final words, which clearly connect creation from dust with return to it, mean? The simple explanation lies in this, that they declare not the natural lot of death, but explain particularly the form in which the curse of death had been expressed in the foregoing, viz., the form of a return to dust. And this was due to the form in which the curse had been described: hard, fatal struggle with the soil. Now the closing words explain not that death must come, but why, when it comes, it will assume that specific form of a return to dust. In other words not death as such, but the manner of death is here brought into connection with the creation. Had man been created otherwise, and through sin death supervened, then death might have assumed a different form. Death is adjusted in its form to the natural, material constitution of man, but it does not spring as a necessity from this natural, material constitution.
Finally the stressing of the phrase 'in the day' in 2:17, is not only uncalled for, but, in view of the sequel of the narrative, impossible. As a threat of immediate, premature death the words have not been fulfilled, and that God subsequently mitigated or modified the curse, there is nothing whatever to suggest. Some knowledge of Hebrew idiom is sufficient to show that the phrase in question simply means
'as surely as thou eatest thereof'. Close conjunction in time is figuratively used for inevitable eventuation. Our English idiom is not unacquainted with this form of expression [cp. 1 Ki. 2:37].
MORTALITY AND IMMORTALITY
It may be well to define the several senses in which man can be called 'mortal' or 'immortal' in order to clear the situation as to his natural state, in regard to which so much trouble arises from confusion of thought. 'Immortality' in philosophical language may express the persistence of the soul, which, even when the body is dissolved, retains its identity of individual being. In this sense every human being is under all circumstances 'immortal', and so were our first parents created; so were they after the fall. Next, 'immortality' is used in theological terminology for that state of man in which he has nothing in him which would cause death. It is quite possible that at the same time an abstract contingency of death may overhang man, i.e., the bare possibility may exist of death in some way, for some cause, invading him, but he has nothing of it within him. It is as if we should say of somebody that he is liable to the invasion of some disease, but we should not on that account declare him to have the disease. In this second sense it can be appropriately said that man as created was 'immortal', but not that after the fall he was so, for through the act of sinning the principle of death entered into him; whereas before he was only liable to die under certain circumstances, he now inevitably had to die. His immortality in the first sense had been lost. Again, 'immortality' can designate, in eschatological language, that state of man in which he has been made immune to death, because immune to sin. Man was not, in virtue of creation, immortal in this highest sense: this is a result of redemption accompanied by eschatological treatment. Such 'immortality' is the possession, first of all of God, who has it by nature [cp. 1 Tim. 6:16]; next of the glorified human nature of Christ, who has it in virtue of his resurrection; next of the regenerate, here already in principle [John 11:26], and, of course, in their heavenly state.
At the hand of this definition of the various senses of 'immortality', as applying to the various stages or states in the history of man, it now becomes easy to determine in which of them, and in what sense, he was 'mortal'. In the first sense he is never mortal. In the second sense or stage he was immortal and mortal both, according to the definition employed: mortal as not yet lifted above the contingency of death, but non-mortal as not carrying death as a disease within himself. Here, therefore, immortality and mortality coexisted. In the third stage he is in no sense (except the first, philosophical one) anything else but mortal: he must die; death works in him. In the fourth stage, finally, the word 'mortal' has only a qualified application to the regenerate man, viz., in so far as during his earthly state death still exists and works in his body, whilst from the centre of his renewed spirit it has been in principle excluded, and supplanted by an immortal life, which is bound in the end to overcome and extrude death. In this case the coexistence of mortality and immortality is based on the bipartite nature of man.
If, then, death is actually the punishment of sin, not merely according to later Pauline teaching [Rom. 5:12], whose import to that effect no one denies, but according to the account of Genesis itself, the question arises: what kind or form of death? Since in theology several aspects of death have come to be distinguished, it can but conduce to clearness to put the question, even though the answer is not easy to give. If there was a symbol here, as in the case of the three other great principles of the revelation, and the symbol is always something concretely external, the answer indicated would seem to be, the reference is to bodily death. But, it is asked, how could there be such a symbolical significance of bodily death, before death was in the world? Some have pointed to the death of animals as occurring regularly before the fall of man. This cannot be discussed here, because the account gives no suggestion to that effect. So far as the language employed goes, it seems necessary to think proximately of momentary, bodily death. The Hebrew words cannot be translated 'thou shalt become mortal or 'thou shalt begin to die'. Nevertheless a deeper conception of death seems to be hinted at. It was intimated
that death carried with it separation from God, since sin issued both in death and in the exclusion from the garden. If life consisted in communion with God, then, on the principle of opposites, death may have been interpretable as separation from God. In this way preparation would be made for the working out of the idea of death in a more internal sense. An allusion to the connection of death with the separation from God is found in vs. 23: 'God sent him forth to till the ground from whence he was taken'. 'Tilling the ground from whence he was taken' contains an unmistakable reminder of vs. 19. In other words: expulsion from the garden (i.e. from God's presence) means expulsion to death. The root of death is in having been sent forth from God.
FOUR:
THE CONTENT OF THE FIRST REDEMPTIVE SPECIAL REVELATION
The term 'redemption' is used by anticipation. It does not occur until the Mosaic period. We employ it for convenience' sake. The characteristics of God's saving approach to, and dealing with, man immediately appear. Both justice and grace are turned towards fallen man. The justice is shown in the penal character of the three curses pronounced; the grace for mankind lies implicitly in the curse upon the Tempter. It is, however, clearly present in the whole manner of God's seeking and interrogating man after the fall. In every one of its features this breathes the spirit of One who prepared for the ultimate showing of grace. We can further observe at this point how Special Revelation attaches itself to General Revelation. The feelings of shame and fear were produced in fallen man by General Revelation.
To this God attaches Himself in His interview with man, which was Special Revelation.
The shame arising from nakedness is in its sexual form the most primitive mode in which the loss of innocence reveals itself. Various theological explanations have been worked out in regard to this. According to some, the physical nakedness is the exponent of the inner nakedness of the soul, deprived of the divine image. According to others the shame of sin is localized where it is in order to bring out that sin is a race matter. According to still others, shame is the reflex in the body of the principle of corruption introduced by sin into the soul. Shame would then be the instinctive perception of the degradation and decay of human nature. But for none of these views can we claim the authority of the account itself. It should be noted, however, that the shame and fear operate with reference to God. The man and the woman hide themselves, not from each other, but from the presence of God. The divine interrogation reduces the sense of shame and fear to its ultimate root in sin. God does not permit man to treat the physical as if it were sufficient reason for his sensation, but compels man to recognize in it the reflex of the ethical.
THE THREE CURSES
The three curses are pronounced in the same sequence as that in which the sin had been committed. In the curse upon the serpent lies a promise of victory over the serpent and his seed. His being condemned to go on his belly enables the woman's seed to bruise his head, whilst the serpent can only bruise the heel of the seed of the woman. The principle of ultimate victory is further resolved into its principal elements in the formulation given to this curse. They are the following:
(a) The divine initiative in the work of deliverance. The emphasis rests on the pronoun: God says 'I will put enmity'. Here is not primarily an appeal to man but a divine promise. Nor does God merely instigate or promote enmity; He sovereignly puts it.
(b) The essence of the deliverance consists in a reversal of the attitude assumed by man towards the serpent and God respectively. Man in sinning had sided with the serpent and placed himself in opposition to God. Now the attitude towards the serpent becomes one of hostility; this must carry with it a corresponding change in man's attitude towards God. God being the mover in the warfare against Satan, man, joining in this, becomes plainly the ally of God.
(c) The continuity of the work of deliverance is declared; the enmity extends to the seed of the woman and of the serpent. God's promise is to the effect that he will keep up the enmity in the line of human descent and will not allow it to die out. The phrase, 'seed of the woman' indicates that the organism of the race will be drawn within the circle of redemption, which does not, of course, mean that all individuals are to become enemies of the serpent. The point is that God saves not merely individual men, but the seed of the woman.
With reference to the seed of the serpent, there are two views. According to one, this phrase designates that part of the human race which continues on the side of the serpent. In that case, 'seed' is used metaphorically. The objection to this is that thus the seed of the serpent would at the same time be part of the seed of the woman, whereas the two appear distinctly separated. To this it has been answered that henceforth only the allies of God constitute the true humanity; that they alone deserve the name of the 'seed of the woman'. It seems more plausible to seek the seed of the serpent outside of the human race. The power of evil is a collective power, a kingdom of evil, of which Satan is the head. The evil spirits are called a seed of the serpent to assimilate the figure to that in the corresponding clause. While not descended from Satan by physical propagation, they derive from him their nature.
(d) The issue of the enmity is foretold. In the R.V. the text-rendering reads, 'he shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel'. But in the margin, as an alternative translation, is given, 'he shall lie in wait for thy head, thou shalt lie in wait for his heel'. The verb, in Hebrew,
is shuf and the marginal rendering makes this equivalent to sha'af. This originally means 'to snap at' something, then 'to seek to snap at' something, i.e. 'to lie in wait' for it. The verb shuf occurs, outside of this passage, only twice in the Old Testament [Job 9:17; Psa. 139:11]. The text in the Psalter seems incapable of meaning either 'to bruise' or 'to lie in wait for'. But in Job the sense of bruising seems indicated. To the text-rendering it is objected that, while appropriate as from the seed of the woman to the serpent, it is not the natural verb for describing what is done by the serpent. This objection is not serious. If one were to substitute for the idea of 'bruising' that of 'lying in wait for', the same result would follow, viz., its fitting the one clause and not the other. Besides this, nothing would be said in that case concerning the issue of the struggle. Both in Greek and Aramaic the words for 'beating' and 'striking' are used of bites and stings. Perhaps also the verb in the second clause is repeated from the first in order that the same expression might be retained. In Rom. 16:20, Paul uses the word 'bruising' with evident allusion to the passage before us. Observe that the pronoun 'it' in 'It shall bruise thy head', has for its antecedent 'the seed of the woman', not, as the Vulgate would have it, the woman herself, a rendering which has led some Romanist commentators to find the Virgin Mary here.
'SEED'
As to the word 'seed' there is no reason to depart from the collective sense in either case. The seed of the serpent must be collective, and this determines the sense of the seed of the woman. The promise is, that somehow out of the human race a fatal blow will come which shall crush the head of the serpent. Still, indirectly the possibility is hinted at that in striking this fatal blow the seed of the woman will be concentrated in one person, for it should be noticed that it is not the seed of the serpent but the serpent itself whose head will be bruised. In the former half of the curse the two seeds are contrasted; here the woman's seed and the serpent. This suggests that as at the climax of the struggle the serpent's seed will be represented by the serpent, in the same manner the woman's seed may find representation in a
single person; we are not warranted, however, in seeking an exclusively personal reference to the Messiah here, as though He alone were meant by 'the woman's seed'. Old Testament Revelation approaches the concept of a personal Messiah very gradually. It sufficed for fallen man to know that through His divine power and grace God would bring out of the human race victory over the serpent. In that faith could rest. The object of their faith was much less definite than that of ours, who know the personal Messiah. But none the less, the essence of this faith, subjectively considered, was the same, viz., trust in God's grace and power to bring deliverance from sin.
HUMAN SUFFERING
Finally, we note the revelation of justice in the curses upon the woman and the man. The woman is condemned to suffer in what constitutes her nature as woman. (For the precise construction or possible emendation of the Hebrew text, cp. Dillmann's Commentary, in loco.) The element of grace interwoven with this consists in the implication that, notwithstanding the penalty of death, the human race will be enabled to propagate itself. The punishment of man consists in toil unto death. Not labour as such is a penalty, for man had been placed in the garden to dress it and to keep it. But painful labour, death-bringing labour is referred to. This applies to labour in general, but the form in which the curse puts it is derived from the most primitive form of labour, that of tilling the soil. At the same time, this brings out the idea that man must henceforth labour for the most necessary food. His will be a veritable struggle for subsistence. In the sweat of his face shall he eat bread, and 'bread', perhaps, instead of meaning food in general, has reference specifically to food produced from the soil, in contrast to the more easily procured earlier nourishment, the fruit of the garden. Nothing is said about a subjective deterioration in man, making his labour heavy and in the end fatal. The cause assigned is objective, viz., the productivity of nature is impaired. Cursed is the ground for man's sake; it brings forth thorns and thistles; here the element of
grace mingling with the curse consists in that the bread will after all be bread; it will sustain life. As the woman is enabled to bring new life into the world, so the man will be enabled to support life by his toil.
FIVE:
THE NOACHIAN REVELATION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT LEADING UP TO IT
Two features characterize the revelation of this period. In the first place, its significance lies not in the sphere of redemption, but in the sphere of the natural development of the race, although it has ultimately an important bearing on the subsequent progress of redemption. Secondly, revelation here bears on the whole a negative rather than positive character. It contents itself with bestowing a minimum of grace. A minimum could not be avoided either in the sphere of nature or of redemption, because in the former sphere, without at least some degree of divine interposition, collapse of the world-fabric would have resulted, and in the latter the continuity of fulfilment of the promise would have been broken off, had special grace been entirely withdrawn. These two features find their explanation in the purpose of the period in general. It was intended to bring out the consequences of sin when left so far as possible to itself. Had God permitted grace freely to flow out into the world and to gather great strength within a short period, then the true nature and consequences of sin would have been very imperfectly disclosed. Man would have ascribed to his own relative goodness what was in
reality a product of the grace of God. Hence, before the work of redemption is further carried out, the downward tendency of sin is clearly illustrated, in order that subsequently in the light of this downgrade movement the true divine cause of the upward course of redemption might be appreciated. This constitutes the indirect bearing of the period under review on redemption.
The narrative proceeds in three stages. It first describes the rapid development of sin in the line of Cain. In connection with this it describes the working of common grace in the gift of invention for the advance of civilization in the sphere of nature. It shows further that these gifts of grace were abused by the Cainites and made subservient to the progress of evil in the world. We have here a story of rapid degeneration, so guided by God as to bring out the inherent tendency of sin to lead to ruin, and its power to corrupt and debase whatever of good might still develop. So far as this circle of humanity is concerned, the facts bear out the interpretation above put upon the period. The details of the description are evidently chosen with a view to emphasize the result. The slaying of Abel by Cain illustrates a rapid development of sin, issuing into murder in the second generation. Hence the careful manner in which Cain's conduct before and after the act is described. Cain committed his sin with premeditation, having been warned beforehand. After the act he denies his sin, is defiant, repudiates every obligation to the law of love. Even after God has pronounced sentence upon him, he is exclusively concerned about the consequences of his sin, not about the sin itself. When this is compared with the act committed in paradise, it becomes evident that a rapid progress in corruption of the human heart had taken place. Sin proves powerful enough to prostitute the gifts of God's common grace in the sphere of nature for purposes of evil. The first step in natural progress is taken by Enoch, the son of Cain, who built a city. Afterwards, in the eighth generation from Cain, the inventions of cattle-raising, of music, of metalworking appear. The inventors were sons of the Cainite Lamech, from whose song it appears that the increase in power and prosperity made possible by them only caused a further estrangement from
God. The song [Gen. 4:23, 24] is a sword-song. Delitzsch well observes that it is an expression of Titanic arrogance. It makes its power its god, and carries its god, i.e. its sword, in its hand. What God had ordained as a measure of protection for Cain is here scorned, and sole reliance placed upon human revenge through the sword. Even Cain still felt the need of help from God; the spirit of Lamech depends upon itself alone. No trace of the sense of sin remains. It is also recorded that Lamech changed the monogamic relation between the sexes into one of polygamy.
CAINITES AND SETHITES
The narrative next proceeds to describe the development of things in the line of the Sethites [Gen. 4:25–5:32]. In connection with this line nothing is said about natural inventions and secular progress. It is the continuity of redemption that is stressed. The two kinds of progress appear distributed over the two lines of the Cainites and the Sethites. God sometimes chooses families and nations standing outside the sphere of redemption to carry on the progress in secular culture. Examples of this are: the Greeks, who were the cultivators of art; and the Romans, who received a genius for the development of legal and political institutions. Notice that, while among the Sethites the continuity of redemption is carefully marked, nothing is said about a new influx of special grace even among them. The import of the narrative remains negative. Not that the Sethites made great progress in the knowledge and service of God, but rather that they kept themselves relatively free from the degeneration of the Cainites; this is the burden of the narrative. Its high-lights are in the contrasts drawn between certain outstanding figures in this line and corresponding prominent figures in the Cainite succession. Thus Cain and Abel are put over against each other. Similarly Enoch, the son of Cain, and Enosh, the son of Seth. But the culmination of the contrast is seen in the seventh generation. Here the Sethite Enoch and the Cainite Lamech are opposites. In distinction from the pride and arrogance of Lamech, Enoch is related to have 'walked with God'. This means more than that he led a pious life, for the
customary phrases for that are 'to walk before God', and 'to walk after God'. 'To walk with God' points to supernatural intercourse with God. The phrase is after this used but twice in the Old Testament, of Noah in the immediate sequel, and in Mal. 2:6 of the priests. Obviously some connection is intended between this unique degree of closeness to God and Enoch's exemption from death. Through the patriarch's translation it is once more proclaimed, that where communion with God has been restored, there deliverance from death is bound to follow. The correctness of the view taken of 'walking with God' may be verified from the later Apocalyptic tradition of the Jews, which represents Enoch as the great prophet, initiated into all mysteries. With the description of the Cainite Lamech, it will be noticed, the further pursuit of the Cainite line is dropped. The other line is continued until it reaches Noah. In harmony with this the chronology is attached to the Sethite line, for the chronology is the frame-work on which in Scripture the progress of redemption is suspended. The only other point commemorated in the Sethite tradition concerns the utterance of Lamech, Noah's father, at the birth of his child: 'This same shall comfort us for our work and toil of our hands, because (not out of the ground) of the ground which Jehovah has cursed' [5:29]. This saying expresses a profound sense of the burdensomeness of the curse, and in so far of the burdensomeness of sin, the cause of the curse, and it also voices a, perhaps premature, expectation that from this burden relief, comfort, will soon be found. It contrasts vividly once more with the paganistic sentiment of the Cainites, who either did not feel the curse, or, if they felt it, expected relief from themselves and their human inventions.
Notwithstanding these isolated instances of the continuity of redemptive grace, the account as a whole tends to bring out the divine purpose above formulated. Even the good kept alive was not enabled to force back the evil. Nothing is said about any influence proceeding from the Sethites upon the Cainites. While the power of redemption remained stationary, the power of sin waxed strong, and became ready to attack the good that still existed.
The character of the period in this respect finds clearest expression in what is said, thirdly, about the commingling of the Cainites and Sethites through intermarriage. The latter allowed themselves to become assimilated to the wickedness of the former. This was permitted by God to go on to the point where the lesson of the inherent destructive potencies of sin had been fully taught, and where it could not go on any further, because Noah and his family only having remained faithful, the continuity of the work of God appeared in danger, and where the time had been reached to teach the finishing lesson of the judgment, without which the entire period would have failed of its purpose. In the above statement the more usual interpretation of 'the daughters of men', and 'the sons of God', is followed. The former are women of the Cainites, the latter are the Sethites. This interpretation, however, is disputed by not a few exegetes. They hold that 'the sons of God' here designates, as it elsewhere sometimes does, superhuman beings, angels. We shall not discuss all the arguments that may be used in favour of or against each of these two views. The former alone would seem to fit into the construction of the significance of the period as a whole above made. We assumed the period to serve the purpose of showing the necessary outcome of sin, when left to work itself out freely. If the angel theory be accepted, this will tend to obscure the idea aimed at. In that case we shall have no longer a development of human sin left to itself, but a development under the influence of a quite extraordinary superhuman factor ab extra. The illogical nature of the contrast between 'daughters of men' and 'sons of God' in case the latter also belong to the human race, is not decisive. In Hebrew idiom sometimes a genus is set over against part of the genus, as though the two were mutually exclusive. The explanation lies in the circumstance, that in such cases the whole is thought of as having only the generic characteristics and nothing more, whereas to the part a certain distinction is attributed which raises it above the genus, to which nevertheless logically it belongs. So here: the daughters of men, that is, of those who were men and nothing more, are set over against those who, while being men naturally, had the distinction of being besides this the sons of God. Ps. 73:5 and Jer.
32:20, are cases entirely similar. It has been urged that the name 'sons of God' in a spiritual sense would be out of place at such an early stage of revelation, but this overlooks the fact that the use is not carried back into that period; it is employed from the writer's standpoint. An argument in favour of the angel theory is taken from Jude's Epistle vs. 7; here, after the description of the fall of the angels in vs. 6, the writer proceeds: 'Even as Sodom and Gomorrah and the cities about them, having in like manner as these given themselves over to fornication and gone after strange flesh, etc.' It is urged that the words 'in like manner as these' must link together the angels of vs. 6 and the cities of the plain, so that the sin of the former would have also been of a sexual kind, intercourse of angels with human beings. And confirmation for this is still further found in the term 'strange flesh' meaning that angels went after human beings. It cannot be denied that this argument from Jude has some force. Closely looked at, however, it is not conclusive, and open to certain objections. 'In like manner as these' is by some interpreters taken to link together not the angels of vs. 6, and the cities of vs. 7, but Sodom and Gomorrah and 'the cities about them'. In that case no fornication of angels is referred to. A serious objection to the theory arises from the phrase 'taking to themselves wives', which could mean nothing short of permanent intermarriage, not casual fornication, between angels and women, a difficult thing to envisage. Finally, 'strange flesh' seems hard to fit into the angel theory, for the angels according to the Old Testament are not 'flesh'. On the other hand, the word precisely fits into what was the abomination of the cities of the plain, viz., homosexuality.
It ought to be observed that critical writers often connect with the angel view the further assumption that the narrative in Gen. 6 is meant to give an account of the origin of sin, that the writer was unacquainted with the story of the fall in the earlier chapters, in other words that the two accounts belong to different documents. This is what renders the exegesis of primary importance.
Fourthly, in 6:3, 5–7, we have the divine summing up of the issue of the period, and the judgment pronounced upon the prediluvian race. In regard to vs. 3, there is considerable uncertainty of interpretation. This arises from the two words adhon and beshaggam, especially from the former. The word dun or din may be rendered 'to strive' or 'to rule'. The former meaning is adopted by the A.V., which renders: 'My spirit shall not always strive with man'. The R.V. in the text retains this, but in the margin offers the alternative: 'shall not always abide in man'. Beshaggam is a compound form resolvable in two ways: it may be taken as made up of the preposition be, the relative sha (an abbreviation of esher') and the adverb gam, 'also'. This yields 'in that also'. Or it may be resolved into the preposition be, the infinitive of the verb shagag, 'to go astray', and the suffix am, 'their'. This yields 'in their going astray'. Each of these resolvings may be joined to each of the two given renderings of dun or din. The difference between the latter is of great importance, for the choice in favour of one or the other will place the statement in quite a different sphere. The version with 'strive' places it in the ethical sphere. God would mean by this that He will not always continue to let His Spirit exercise the restraining influence hitherto exerted upon sin. A certain limit of time, 120 years, is fixed for the divine abstention from withdrawing this influence; after that comes the judgment. And the reason assigned is either that man also is 'flesh', 'morally and religiously corrupt', or that in their going astray they are flesh, i.e., the judgment to come suits their condition. The version of dun or din with 'to rule' puts the whole matter in the physical sphere. The Spirit of God is according to the general teaching of the Old Testament the source of natural life in man [cp. Psa. 104:29, 30]. God by saying that His Spirit will not indefinitely abide in man announces the purpose of putting an end to the physical existence of mankind after the limit of 120 years. The reason is either that he also is flesh, by reason of sin fallen a prey to physical corruption, or that in his going astray they are become physically subject to corruption, which will actually overtake them after 120 years. The rendering of the verb with 'rule' or 'abide' deserves the preference. The ethical notion of 'the flesh', if it occurs in the Old Testament at all, can hardly be expected to occur
thus early. On the alternate view of the three things mentioned, the Spirit, the flesh, the shortening of humanity's lease of life, all lie on the same line. Some would understand the 120 years of the length henceforth allotted to the life of individual men. This does not agree with the subsequent facts. It could be accepted only on the basis of a critical view, according to which the passage originally stood in no connection with the later patriarchal narratives, and that it was written by one who knew nothing of a flood, but assumed an uninterrupted development of mankind from the earliest times.
The other part of the divine summing up, the statement of vss. 5–7, offers no difficulty. In the strongest terms the extreme wickedness reached at the end of the period is described. The points brought out are firstly: the intensity and extent of evil ('great in the earth'); secondly: its inwardness ('every imagination of the thoughts of his heart'); thirdly: the absoluteness of the sway of evil excluding everything good ('only evil'); fourthly: the habitual, continuous working of evil ('all the day'). The same judgment or irremediable wickedness is even more emphatically affirmed in the words: 'It repented Jehovah that He had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at His heart'. In anthropomorphic fashion this expresses the idea that the development of mankind frustrated the end for which God had placed man on the earth. Hence God said: 'I will destroy man whom I have created from the face of the ground; both man and beast and creeping thing and fowl of the air, for it repenteth me that I have made them'. The inclusion of the lower orders of life shows that through humanity the entire organism of nature has become infected with evil. Still it is significantly added: 'But Noah found grace in the eyes of Jehovah'. The continuity of the race is preserved. God saves enough out of the wreck to enable Him to carry out His original purpose with the self-same humanity He had created.
REVELATION AFTER THE FLOOD
We now come to the Noachian Revelation which took place after the flood. In this positive, constructive measures were taken for the
further carrying out of the divine purpose. Here again the reminder is in place that the principles disclosed and the measures taken did not directly relate to the prosecution of redemption, although an indirect bearing upon that also must not be overlooked. That the development of natural life is proximately dealt with, follows from the following: what is ordained by God and the promise made have equal reference to the entire Noachian family. But we know that the work of redemption was carried on in the line of Shem only; the arrangement made is not even confined to the human race; it is made with every living creature, nay, with the earth herself; that the berith is a berith of nature appears from the berith-sign; the rainbow is a phenomenon of nature, and absolutely universal in its reference. All the signs connected with redemption are bloody, sacramentally dividing signs.
The positive Noachian revelation proceeds in three stages. The first of the three recites the purpose of God, expressed in a monologue, to institute a new order of affairs. The second describes the measures taken that give content and security to this order. The third relates how the new order was confirmed in the form of a berith.
The first section consists of Gen. 8:20–22. God declares, 'I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake … neither will I smite any more everything living, as I have done. While the earth remaineth, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease'. The regularity of nature in its great fundamental processes will henceforth continue. There is, however, added to this a qualification—'while the earth remaineth'. This pertains to the eschatological background of the deluge [cp. 1 Pet. 3:20, 21; 2 Pet. 2:5]. In vs. 21 the motive is assigned for the divine declaration: 'for that the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth'. Before the deluge almost identical words were spoken by God to motive the necessity of the judgment, 6:5. How can the same statement explain, first, that the judgment is unavoidable, and then that there will be no repetition of the judgment henceforth? The solution of the difficulty lies in the addition of the words 'from
his youth' in the second case. What was described in Gen. 6:5, was the historical culmination of a process of degeneration; that called for judgment. What is here described is the natural state of evil in the human heart as such, altogether apart from historical issues. Because the evil is thus deep-seated, no judgment can cure it. Therefore other means must be resorted to, and these other means would become impossible of execution, if repeated, catastrophic judgments of this nature in the sequel interfered with the ordinary unfolding of history.
The second section [9:1–7] relates the ordinances instituted in order to make possible and safeguard this programme of forbearance. These ordinances refer to the propagation of life, the protection of life, from animals and men both, and the sustenance of life. What relates to the sustenance of life has been inserted into the promise of protection of life from animals, because the permission of animal food for better sustenance naturally attached itself to this. In order to understand these measures we must clearly visualize the reduced state of the human race in which the flood had resulted. Hence the echo of some of the original creative ordinances is heard here. The command and benediction of fruitfulness are anew issued. The importance of this may be inferred from its double occurrence, first in vs. 1, and then again in vs. 7. As to the protection of human life from animals, vs. 2 provides for the subjection of the animals to man: 'the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every bird of the heavens, with all wherewith the ground teemeth, and all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered'. To this is added in vs. 5: 'And surely the blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it'.
Originally, there was a supremacy of man [Gen. 1:26, 28], but, as instituted at creation, this was of the nature of a voluntary submission. This may be seen from the eschatological pictures given of it by the prophets, on the principles of a return of paradise at the end [Isa. 11:6–8]. In the state of sin the result is obtained by fear and dread instilled into the animals. And God promises to avenge man where devouring animals destroy his life: 'your blood of your lives
will I require'. It is not possible to tell with certainty how this law works itself out; it has been suggested that every species of carnivorous animals is doomed to ultimate extinction. Intercalated between these references to hostile animals is the permission of animal food. The permission is qualified: 'but flesh with the life thereof, the blood thereof ye shall not eat'. This being coupled with the promise of vengeance from animals reveals the point of view. Since the animals are not to devour man after a carnivorous fashion, man also is not to eat animals as wild beasts devour their living prey. He must show proper reverence for life as a sacred thing, of which God alone has the disposal, and for the use of which man is dependent on the permission of God. The Levitical law repeats this prohibition, but adds as another ground the fact that the blood comes upon the altar, which, of course, for the Old Testament makes the prohibition of blood-eating absolute. Through failure to distinguish between the simple and the complicated motive this practice of absolute abstention was continued in the church for many centuries. The so-called decree of the Apostles [Acts 15:20] made the restraint obligatory for Gentile Christians, yet not because the thing was wrong in itself, but for the reason that no offence should be given to Jewish-Christian brethren.
The last point relates to the protection of human life from the assault of man, and lays down the divine law for the punishment of murder: 'At the hand of man, even at the hand of every man's brother, will I require the life of man. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God made He man'. Some, in order to evade the institution of the death penalty for murder, would understand these words as a mere prediction, that murder is apt to be followed by blood-vengeance under the lex talionis. This exegesis is made positively impossible by the added clause: 'for in the image of God made He man'. The image of God in man can never furnish a motivation for the likelihood of the exaction of blood-vengeance.
The question remains what the image of God in man has to do with the infliction of the death-penalty. Two answers have been given to
this. According to the one this clause explains why such an extraordinary power of taking away the life of another man can be conferred upon man's fellow creature. It is in virtue of the sovereignty of God, being part of the divine image, laid upon him that man can execute justice in capital matters. Others understand the clause as furnishing the reason why assault upon the life of man should meet with this extreme penalty; in life slain it is the image of God, i.e., the divine majesty that is assaulted. The latter interpretation deserves the preference. Notice the difference that here the instrument for the execution of the divine ordinance is clearly indicated: 'by man shall his blood be shed', whereas in the case of retribution upon the animals this aspect of the matter is left indefinite. Further, the ground for the institution of the penalty appears to be a twofold one; on the one hand, the larger context in which the ordinance occurs proves it to be a measure of protection for society. At the same time the reference to the image of God shows that something still deeper underlies. It may well be questioned, whether the former alone, and that without an explicit injunction from God, could ever justify the infliction of death from one man upon another. Purely utilitarian, social considerations would be hardly sufficient here. They can come in as a secondary reason only after the matter has been put upon the high ground of the administration of justice sanctioned by God. The argument so frequently met with, that capital punishment adds but a second murder to the first, is an argument based either on total ignorance of the facts of Scripture or on open denial of the obligatory character of what the Bible teaches. How can that be characterized as a duplicated murder that professes to rest on the most explicit command of God, and over against which menhave nothing to put except sentimental objections, and an unproven theory about the meliorating efficacy of forms of discipline which from their very nature exclude the punishment of death?
The last section is 9:8–17. God gives His promise the form of a berith through adding a solemn sign to it. This serves the purpose of bringing out the absolute sureness of the order instituted. Jer. 33:25
speaks in this sense of God's berith of day and night, i.e., of the unfailing succession of these two. Perhaps, however, there is more here than a comparative introduction of the berith idea: an actual reference to the Noachian episode may be intended. This is certainly the case in Isa. 54:9, where the Noachian berith stands in its infallibility as a type of the even greater perpetuity of the promise of God's oath of redemption. The promise to Noah has its limit in the eschatological crisis, which shall bring the earth to an end, but, though in that final catastrophe the mountains depart and the hills are removed, yet even then God's lovingkindness shall not depart from Israel, nor the berith of his peace be removed [vs. 10]. The representation with regard to the sign of the rainbow is anthropomorphic, but for that very reason more impressive than it could possibly be otherwise. The idea is not, as usually assumed, that by the bow man will be reminded of the divine promise, but that God Himself, were it possible for Him to forget, will by the sign Himself be reminded of His oath: 'When I bring a cloud over the earth, it shall come to pass that the bow shall be seen in the cloud, and I will remember my berith'. With the rainbow it is as later on it was with circumcision; both existed before, and at a certain time, the appointed time, were consecrated by God to serve as signs of his berith. The sign here is connected in its character with the ominous force of nature from which it pledges protection. It is produced against the background of the very clouds that had brought destruction to the earth. But it is produced upon these by the rays of the sun which in the symbolism of Scripture represent the divine grace.
SIX:
THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOAH AND THE
GREAT PATRIARCHS
The points to be discussed here are: [1] the prophetic deliverances of Noah with regard to his descendants; [2] the table of the nations; [3] the confusion of tongues; [4] the election of the Shemites.
[1] The prophetic deliverances of Noah [Gen. 9:20–27]
These prophecies are in the case of Canaan (Ham) a curse, in the case of Japhet and Shem a blessing. The words must be regarded throughout as words of prophecy. Even paganism ascribes to such utterances a real influence to affect the persons concerned. This influence was conceived as magical, but in Scripture this is raised to the plane of inspired prophecy. Such prophecies in this early period represent the high-water mark of the advancing tide of revelation.
It will be observed, that the basis for the distinction between cursing and blessing lay in the ethical sphere. The shameless sensuality of Ham, the modesty of Japhet and Shem, marked a difference in common morality. Nevertheless it shaped in a most far-reaching manner the whole subsequent course of redemptive history. The supernatural process of redemption remains in contact with the natural development of the race. These influential traits were typical traits. They were the source of great racial dispositions. The event took place at a critical juncture where no significant event could fail to influence history for ages to come. The Old Testament recognizes that among the Canaanites the same type of sin here cursed was the dominating trait of evil. The descriptions given in the Pentateuch leave no doubt as to this [cp. Lev. 18:22; Deut. 12:29–32]. Even among the ancients outside of Israel (Japhetites) the sensual depravity in sexual life of Phoenicians, and Carthaginians in particular, had become proverbial.
The question has been raised why, instead of Ham, who had committed the sin, Canaan his son is cursed. Some assume that Ham was the youngest son of Noah, and Canaan the youngest son of Ham. The underlying principle would then be that Ham is punished in that son who sustains the same relation to him as he sustained to Noah. This would bring out the fact of its being a sin committed against his father. There would be nothing in this against the Old Testament law of retribution, for the Old Testament is not in such points so morbidly individualistic as we are apt to be. Especially in the earlier part of Old Testament revelation the principle of generic solidarity is stressed [cp. Ex. 20:5, 6, where the operation of the rule both in malam and in bonam partem is affirmed]. Later revelation, especially in Ezekiel, brought the closer working out of the problem involved.
However, the facts of the genealogical relationship above assumed are subject to doubt. The usual sequence in which the names of Noah's sons are given is Shem, Ham and Japhet, which indicates that Ham occupied the middle place. Nor is there any evidence for Canaan having been the youngest son of Ham. 'Youngest son' in the Revised Version, vs. 24, is not conclusive, because the Hebrew word can be comparative as well as superlative, which would yield 'younger son' (as in R.V. margin), assigning to Ham the middle place in the triad. Under these circumstances it is best to adopt a modified form of the view proposed, and to say: Ham was punished in one of his sons because he had sinned against his father, and he was punished in that particular son, because Canaan most strongly reproduced Ham's sensual character. It should be noticed that not all the descendants of Ham are cursed but only the Canaanites; the others receive neither curse nor blessing.