Part 10
The specific connotation of 'holiness', as predicated of man, both in the Old Testament and the New Testament, should be carefully noted. When a man is declared to be ethically holy, even where the conception has been thoroughly spiritualized, the meaning is never simply that of moral goodness, considered in itself, but always ethical goodness seen in relation to God. The idea marks the consecration of ethics to religion.
RIGHTEOUSNESS
Midway between the transcendental and the communicative attributes stands the righteousness of Jehovah. The Hebrew words are tsedek and tsedakhah; the adjective is tsaddiq. First of all it ought to be observed that when righteousness is predicated of Jehovah, the analogy is not the duty of fair dealing between man and man, but always the procedure according to strict justice on the part of a judge. There are only apparent exceptions to this, as when, for the sake of metaphor, God is represented as Himself appearing in court seeking a verdict on His own action [Psa. 51:4]. As a rule the righteous God is the righteous judge. Now a judge among men is not called righteous simply because he follows an instinct of fairness towards the parties before him, but because he rigidly adheres to the law above him. Thus the question arises how this idea can be transferred to God, who has no law above Him. Still, the prophets and the Old Testament in general adhere to this form of representation. Nor is this with them a convenient anthropomorphism simply. The idea lies behind it, that underlying the decisions of Jehovah lies His nature. That is the law, not, to be sure, above Him, but yet truly within Him. And the same presupposition applies when not merely in a case of decision under the law, but also in the making of the law Jehovah is called righteous. The law was not made according to arbitrary fiat, it is a righteous law, because conforming to the divine nature, higher than which there is and can be no norm [Deut. 4:8].
This forensic or judicial righteousness of Jehovah further branches out in several directions. We can distinguish
[1] a righteousness of cognizance,
[2] a righteousness of retribution,
[3] a righteousness of vindication, and
[4] a righteousness of salvation, shading off into
[5] a righteousness of benevolence.
[1] First, then, the righteousness of cognizance
By this we mean that Jehovah is held to take notice and keep account of all moral conduct. This applies both to individuals and to nations collectively. All conduct falls under the divine jurisdiction. Here it should be remembered that God, while functioning as judge, none the less remains God, and His being God cannot be separated from His procedure as judge. In ordinary life it is not the business of a judge to watch the conduct of men subject to his jurisdiction. From Jehovah's oversight nothing escapes. Nor is He in any relation a disinterested spectator: the cognizance is with a view to corresponding action.
Amos has given most emphatic expression to this. To him the divine omniscience has practically become the pervasiveness of ethical appraisal and ethical control on the part of Jehovah. Righteousness and God are identical; to seek the one is to seek the other [5:4, 6, 14]. To such an extent does the prophet feel righteousness to be the inward governing principle of world-control, that it appears to him as the normal, the departure from which is monstrous and absurd [5:7; 6:12]. God stands beside every wall of conduct, a plumbline in His hand [7:8]. In this figure, however, the cognizance-aspect is seen at the point of turning into that of retribution, for the plumbline was used not merely for measuring, but likewise for tearing down [Isa. 28:17].
[2] Secondly, therefore, Jehovah is righteous as the One who punishes sin
The modern ethical admiration for the prophets but too often overlooks this feature of their teaching. Ritschl has even denied that the punishment of sin appears anywhere in the Old Testament, except in some of the latest writings, as a result of the divine righteousness. He would interpret the attribute as a benevolent one. Going back to the physical root-meaning of 'straightness' he defines it as 'the order and normal consistency with which God acts to secure
for the righteous and pious the attainment of salvation through protection from the wicked'. Only incidentally, because the positive beneficial end cannot be attained otherwise, the destruction of the wicked results. They stand in the way of God's plans and must be swept aside.
Our criticism upon this interpretation should not be that it is entirely wrong. There is a meaning of the term 'righteousness' imparting to it benevolent character and sometimes losing sight in doing so of the retribution administered to the wicked. We shall presently see what there is of this in the prophets. Ritschl's mistake does not lie in this either, that the later writings of the Old Testament evince a keener sense of this terrible side of the divine treatment of sin. The later generations had learned through the bitter experience of the judgment how true and inavertible the execution of this principle was. The more frequent occurrence of the word itself, for instance, in the penitential prayers of that period, may serve as proof of this [2 Chron. 12:6; Ezra 9:15; Neh. 9:33; Lam. 1:18; Dan. 9:14]. But the mistake of Ritschl lies in his taking part for the whole. Still, so far as the actual occurrence of the idea in the Old Testament is concerned, he was not mistaken.
We must, however, emphatically insist that there is a retribution for sin in the prophets and that this is for them associated with the word 'righteousness'. In fact Amos and Isaiah are all emphasis on this. The word is not lacking, but its relative infrequency is proof of its unworded presence to the mind of the prophets. There are things so self-understood that scarcely articulate expression is required for voicing them. The term is found in Amos 5:24: 'let justice roll down as waters and righteousness as a mighty stream.' This should not be interpreted as a demand for uprightness from Israel. Israel, being so degraded and corrupt as the prophet represents it to be, it would have been strange to ask for uprightness of such sudden and copious production as the figure implies. The idea is rather, that, the time for reasoning and expostulation having gone by, nothing remains but divine judgment rushing down and sweeping away the sinners. The
thought of the absolute necessity of this has made so deep an impression on Amos' mind, that he almost loses sight of everything else. There is a grandiose one-sidedness in this prophecy; Amos is the preacher of justice and retribution par excellence. His mind is carried away by the unparalleled energy, one might almost say impetuosity, of the divine resentment against sin. Jehovah, according to Amos, executed righteousness, not from any lower motive, such as safeguarding the structure of society, or converting the sinner, but from the supreme motive of giving free sway to the infinite force of his ethical indignation. In Isaiah we meet with essentially the same conception, although not perhaps in such impressive grandeur as with Amos. In two passages the divine righteousness is explicitly named as bringing the judgment on sin [Isa. 5:16; 10:22].
[3] The third aspect of righteousness in the prophets is that of vindication
Jehovah decides between two causes, puts the one in the right, the other in the wrong. He does this as part of His world-government, to which all issues are subject, but more particularly, because the fulfilment of His purpose is involved. The idea is soteric, though having in it a principle of universalism. It may be applied to individuals, but also collectively. The Psalmists sometimes claim that they are righteous, and appeal to Jehovah to acknowledge this and treat them accordingly. This has caused difficulty with interpreters on account of its seeming to run athwart the principle of unmeritoriousness in God's dealing with His people. The difficulty is relieved by giving such statements their proper setting. It is not over against God in the abstract, that the pleaders claim to be righteous, but over against their adversaries, who persecute them, not, however, for private reasons, but on account of their identification with the true religion.
The same holds true where the claimant is not an individual but the personification of Israel. In the Psalms it is not always easy to
determine whether the praying subject is an individual or the congregation of Jehovah. The principle, however, is the same in both cases. However sinful against Jehovah, Israel stands in the world for the true religion, the cause of God is bound up with her destiny. Over against her oppressors and persecutors she is in the right, although these at the same time are the instruments of God in pressing His claim against Israel. But they go too far and do not understand the merely instrumental nature of the service they render. It is the part of the divine righteousness to declare this, in doing which, for a moment, the issue between Jehovah and Israel may be put to one side. But not seldom also the sight of Israel's humiliation and sorrow seems to move Jehovah to deep compassion, and becomes the occasion for a signal display of grace towards His suffering people. An instructive and touching passage in this connection is Mic. 7:9, where Israel speaks: 'I will bear the indignation of Jehovah, because I have sinned against Him: until He plead my cause, and execute judgment for me: He will bring me forth to the light, and I shall behold his righteousness' [cp. for the righteousness of vindication, Isa. 41:10, 11; 50:8; 51:5; 54:1, 14, 17; 59:16, 17].
[4] Out of this reasonable righteousness of vindication, that of salvation easily develops
So far, even in the vindication of Israel against her enemy, the setting is plainly forensic. God acts in the instances cited plainly in the capacity of a judge. There are, however, cases where righteousness is spoken of as a source of salvation without particular reflection on the righting of the people's wrongs from the side of their enemies. This saving righteousness can appear as an attitude or intent in God [Isa. 46:4, 13]. But it can also be objectified, so as to acquire existence and embodiment outside of Jehovah, the product of the righteousness as it is in Him. Nay, it can even appear in the plural: 'righteousnesses' [Isa. 45:24; Mic. 6:5 Heb.]. It is synonymous with such terms as salvation, light, glory, peace [Isa. 46:12; 51:5, 6, 8; 56:1; 59:9, 11; 61:3, 10; 62:1, 2]. Isaiah 49:4 is the only passage where the salvationidea and the judicial-award-idea intermingle: 'Yet surely the
righteousness due to me is with Jehovah, and my recompense with my God.'
These passages, all in the latter part of Isaiah, furnish Ritschl with the evidence for his benevolent construction of the idea of 'righteousness' in general. It cannot be denied that here his contention is right, and credit due to him for having brought light into the facts. But his recurring upon the root-idea of 'straightness', and framing his definition upon it, is not thereby proven correct. It reflects his desire to cut the whole idea loose as much as possible from its forensic moorings. It need not be absolutely rejected, however, on that account. To us a sufficient explanation seems to be found in this, that the judge is commonly expected to be the saviour of the wronged and oppressed. When it is forgotten that he does this as a judge, and only the beneficent intent and the desirable result are remembered, the judge, as it were, disappears from the scene, and only the saviour remains. To us the association of righteousness in God as Judge on the one hand, and saving procedure on the other, [Psa. 51:14] appears more or less incongruous, just as the same combination of holiness with saving procedure, previously observed, has something strange for us. Compare, however—and it is found in the New Testament [1 John 1:9]—'He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins.'
For the pluralizing of the idea noticed in Isa. 45:24, and Mic. 6:5, analogies have been discovered outside of the prophets [Judg. 5:11; 1 Sam. 12:7; Psa. 11:7; 103:6]. According to some writers, however, this is a different usage, with its own peculiar etymology, and the rendering ought to be 'victories'. But the two ideas, perhaps, do not lie so far apart as is imagined. Even if the term be rendered 'victories', there may be reflected in this the belief, so common in war, that victory is a practical verdict from the deity, declaring the victor in the right. On this view the instances cited should be classified with the preceding rubric, the righteousness of vindication.
[5] One step farther still, the term 'righteousness' is removed from its forensic origin where it comes to stand for 'generosity', 'alms-giving'
This is a late development. Instances occur in Dan. 4:27 (Aramaic); Psa. 112:3, 9; Prov. 10:2; 11:4. Examples of it also occur in the New Testament [Matt. 6:1; 2 Cor. 9:9, quoting freely from the Psalm]. Undoubtedly in Judaism there was connected with the usage as such a sentiment of self-righteousness. Hence our Lord's criticism of the spirit, while retaining the current word.
EMOTIONS AND AFFECTIONS
The next group of attributes consists of what may be called the 'emotional' or 'affectional' dispositions in Jehovah's nature. Most of the material for this is found in Hosea and the second part of Isaiah. Hosea's temperament was strongly emotional, and therefore adapted for giving expression to this side of the divine self-disclosure. We are here in a sphere full of anthropomorphism, but this furnishes no excuse for neglecting or glossing over the subject. An anthropomorphism is never without an inner core of important truth, which only has to be translated into more theological language, where possible, to enrich our knowledge of God.
The prophet Hosea was not unaware of the relativity and limitations of this mode of description, as may be seen from 11:9: 'I will not execute the fierceness of mine anger … for I am God, and not man, the Holy One in the midst of thee.' What other prophets affirm concerning God in terms of will and purpose, Hosea expresses in language suffused with emotion. He speaks of the divine resentment of sin as 'hating' [9:15]. God's intention to punish Israel is 'a strong desire' [10:10]. 'Anger' appears as a motive for judgment [11:9; 13:11]. The strongest expressions are found in 5:14; 13:7, 8. Still the tendency towards this is not wholly absent from Isaiah either [42:13, 14; 59:17; 63:3–6].
The terms are usually derived from violent physical processes, but we must not forget that the language formed such words before the prophet, and the latter only made use of them. As to anger, chemah means 'a boiling heat within'; 'aph is 'the snorting quick breathing' of an angry person; as its opposite, 'erekh 'appim, literally 'long breathing', means 'longsuffering'; za'am is 'seething heat'; 'ebhrah, 'the overflowing of passion'.
But not only the dangerous, likewise the friendly, benevolent manifestation of Jehovah's nature is expressed, in similar terms. The most general term for this is chesed, a word which has received the most varying renderings, but, taking all in all, is best rendered by 'loving-kindness'. It expresses the warm, affectionate feeling that should exist between persons bound together in a previous bond of love. It presupposes love, but is even more than that. Compare Job 39:14–16; the pinions and feathers of the ostrich have no chesed, because she leaves her eggs in the sand. 'ahabhah, 'love', is distinguished from chesed, in that it expresses the spontaneous, free origin of the divine affection. Into chen, 'grace', the element of the unworthiness of the recipient enters. Still further we meet rachamim, literally 'bowels', for mercy and compassion. The importance of 'loving-kindness' is seen in this, that it underlies and enriches and makes more tender other disclosures of the divine affection [Hos. 2:19]; for the New Testament, cp. Eph. 2:4, 5.
[B] THE BOND BETWEEN JEHOVAH AND ISRAEL
According to the prophets a close and unique bond exists between Jehovah and Israel. This is so self-understood as not to need explicit affirmation. Indirectly its existence is expressed through references to its origin. Jehovah chose Israel, they are His people; He married her, they are like a vineyard which He cultivates for the sake of its fruit. A technical term for it is berith, usually rendered by 'covenant', although this is not always the proximate association. Of forms of some inter-human berith mention is made in Amos, Hosea and
Isaiah. The term does not appear in Micah. Of a berith between Jehovah and Israel we learn only in Hosea and Isaiah.
Of etymologies proposed for berith the chief ones are as follows. It has been derived from bara, 'to cut'. The reference to 'cutting' is then explained from the ceremony spoken of in Gen. 15:17 and Jer. 34:18, 19. The phrase karath berith, 'to cut a cutting', for making a berith, has been thought to favour this etymology. Usually, however, in such phrases, when verb and noun repeat the same idea, the identical root is employed for both, so that we should on this view expect bara berith. Others go back for their derivation to the same verb 'to cut', but give a different turn to the signification, cutting being interpreted as determining, defining, from which would result as the primary sense 'law', 'ordinance'. Still others go back to the Assyrian beritu, 'to bind', birtu, 'bond'. The etymology is not of overmuch importance, although it may sometimes do harm by unduly tying the conception down to one hard and fast meaning. The only common idea, always present, is that of a solemn religious sanction. Where this is present, a promise, law, agreement, may all be called berith. The main question is, how does it occur in Hosea and Isaiah?
As regards Isaiah, the emphasis and reason for introducing the idea lie largely in the association of the absolute sureness of the divine promise. The berith with Noah and the berith of Israel's coming redemption are put on a line with this as the point of comparison [54:9, 10]. Similarly, 55:3; 59:21; 61:8. In 24:5, on the other hand, the idea of law, ordinance prevails. There may be an allusion here to the Noachian berith. It will be noticed, however, that even so the emphasis rests on the perpetual obligation of the ordinances, constituting an 'everlasting' berith. Only in 56:4, 6, berith seems to signify in Isaiah the general legal relation between Jehovah and His servants, for here observance of the sabbath and other ordinances is specified as pertaining to the 'holding fast' of God's berith.
Difficult of interpretation are 42:6, and 49:8. In both the Servant of Jehovah is designated as berith 'am, a 'covenant of people'. The two
most plausible views about this phrase are either that in the future through the Servant the berith will be realized anew or restored, or, laying emphasis on the word 'people', that through the Servant the berith will once more assume the form of a relationship into which Israel enters as a people, in contrast with its present scattered, disorganized state of existence. On both interpretations the berith here also appears as the comprehensive, fundamental name for Israel's religious organization. It will be seen from this that the idea of the berith in this sense, while by no means absent, is neither particularly conspicuous nor pervasive in the prophecy.
As to Hosea we have the explicit statement [8:1]: 'They have transgressed my berith, and trespassed against my law'; here berith is legal organization of the ancient religion as a whole. For the rest all depends for this prophet on the question, whether the marriage-idea is at all to be equated with the berith-idea. The prophet works out everything belonging to the union of Jehovah with Israel on the basis of the marriage between the two. It is incapable of proof that in his day every marriage was per se a species of berith. Still, this does not exclude the possibility of Hosea's having made the equation.
The marriage-idea as a form of religious expression is old in Shemitic religion. For this reason Wellhausen's theory that Hosea, under the influence of his sad marital experience, had by brooding over it come upon the possibility of utilizing the figure for depicting the course of Israel's religion in past, present and future, is untenable. The whole setting of the figure from the very beginning proves its familiar nature. We have learned from the Decalogue about the conjugal jealousy of Jehovah. The figure is not even characteristic of revealed religion. Like that of fatherhood and kingship, it was current in paganism in Israel's neighbourhood. The name 'Baal' for the Canaanitish deity is based upon it, for this name means the husbandlord, through whose union with the land fruitfulness is obtained, or who from another point of view has the people for wife so that the individual members of the people become his sons and daughters [Num. 25:2–9; Jer. 2:27; Mal. 2:11]. On one of the Phoenician
inscriptions the phrase Bresyeth Baal, the 'Spouse of Baal', has been found, but this is individual, the name of a woman.
Isa. 54:1; 62:5; Jer. 31:32, may further be compared, but in all this there is so far no explicit combination of the berith-idea and the marriage-idea. Moreover, these last-cited passages are younger than Hosea and would not be conclusive with regard to him. It is first in Ezek. 16:8, that entering into berith with Israel is called a marrying her. Jeremiah also almost certainly associated the two conceptions, although not doing so explicitly anywhere. Prov. 2:17 calls marriage a berith, and so does Mal. 2:14. With the exception of Proverbs, we know that these writings are later than Hosea, and might have borrowed from him the combination. But this in itself would put it beyond question that Hosea was understood by them to have long ago made it. The critics can doubt this only because they have cut out from Hosea the passage 8:1. If this passage is genuine, and there is no reason for doubting it except that furnished by the critical desire to remove from Hosea all traces of acquaintance with a legitimate statutory religion, then it becomes almost impossible to deny that the prophet identified the berith-idea and his favourite idea of marriage between Jehovah and Israel. Only the expurgated Hosea could have lived in such naïve unconsciousness that the marriage meant a berith-union between the two.
Still in the pre-Jeremianic period we must acknowledge, always leaving Hosea to one side, that there is a scarcity of references to the berith-form of the religion, and the critics find support in this for their contention that the origin of the idea is as late as the latter part of the seventh century. We have already looked into this contention under the head of the Sinaitic berith-making. How, without impugning the latter as a historical fact, can the phenomenon of relative scarcity be explained? We have on that occasion already noted that in the subsequent prophets, excepting Jeremiah and Ezekiel, the conception again suffers eclipse. This shows that there must have been something in the prophetic teaching that temporarily forced it into the background.
The cause for this need not have been the same in each individual prophet. We shall presently see why the berith-thought was peculiarly adapted to the trend of Hosea's teaching, and that particularly in its specific form of a marriage-union. But with Isaiah it is different. His whole point of view is theocentric, emphasizing that Israel lives for the sake of Jehovah, and possibly the berith-idea with its strongly stressed mutualness did not appear to him peculiarly adapted for bringing this God-centred characteristic of religion to the front. In Amos and Micah again the rupture of the union between Jehovah and Israel appears so certain and inevitable, and so much in need of emphasizing, that perhaps a steady reference to the berith, with its inevitable reminder of the unbreakableness of the bond, may have been found to be less in line with their teaching.
But, apart from all such individual considerations, we must remember the general character of the prophetic revelation. The law institutes and commands, prophecy explains the reasons and motives on which institutions and obedience are based. Behind the berith lies something deeper and more fundamental, the nature and will of Jehovah. For the berith is after all an institution, which can be temporarily kept in the background, for sufficient reasons. Such a procedure does not convict the prophets of ignoring or opposing the berith-idea. It only shows that their teaching moves on deeper lines.
HOSEA'S TEACHING ON THE MARRIAGE-BOND
Hosea, on the supposition that marriage and berith with Jehovah are to him identical, is the chief source of our information in regard to the nature of the union. We learn from him:
[1] The union originated on the part of Jehovah
Not Israel offered herself to Him, He sought out Israel. Theologically speaking, we would say that the berith had its source in the divine election. Election is spoken of by Isaiah [14:1; 43:20; 49:7]. With Amos and Hosea, however, a more characteristic and intimate term
is chosen to convey somewhat of the religious depths and value of this idea. This term is yada', 'to know', not in the intellectual sense of 'to be informed about', but in the pregnant, affectional sense of 'to take loving knowledge of' [Hos. 13:5; Amos 3:2]. This act is not yet represented as an eternal act on the part of Jehovah; in keeping with their standpoint in the midst of history, the prophets think of it as something emerging in time. The New Testament makes out of this 'knowing' a 'fore-knowing'. But this is simply putting the act back into eternity. To cut it loose from its Old Testament antecedents and to intellectualize it in the interest of a Pelagianizing theology is an utterly unhistorical proceeding. The 'pro' in the Greek rendering does not serve to give God His standpoint in time, from which He then is able to look forward and base His decision on what the creature is foreseen to be about to do at a certain point in time; it serves the precisely opposite purpose of giving God His standpoint before, that is to say, in Old Testament language, above time.
[2] The relation had a definite historical beginning
Israel had not been always thus united to Jehovah. The berithconception as here conceived does not belong to General but to Special Revelation. Israel entered into this special union with Jehovah at the time of the Exodus [Hos. 13:4; cp. 11:1, and Amos 2:10]. It is characteristic of the prophetic point of view, that the origin is sought, not so much in a concrete act of ratification, although that is presupposed, but in the events of the Exodus with all their rich implications. It was not a blind transaction, but one full of intelligence. The idea of marriage was eminently fitted to emphasize the historical birth of the union, better than that of fatherhood and sonship. Father and son never exist apart from each other. Husband and wife do so exist at first, and then are brought together at a definite point of time.
[3] Though the union originated effectually on Jehovah's part, yet Israel was led freely to enter upon it
The marriage-berith is to Hosea's mind a spiritualized union. We should, however, realize that this feature was not necessarily given with the idea of marriage as such. In Hosea's time marriage did not partake of the same spiritual character it has acquired in the course of time, chiefly through the regenerating influence of the subsequent Biblical religion. There was less of equality between the sexes, and less freedom of choice on the woman's part. It is all the more remarkable that Hosea, while utilizing the conception, has not allowed it to remain upon the level of the common custom of his day. If we adopt the realistic view of chapters 1–3, we shall have to assume that the prophet was by special grace enabled to live on a higher plane of love towards his wife than the average Israelite of that time [cp. Jer. 3:1]. If on the contrary we choose the allegorical interpretation, we must say that, at least in his understanding and vision of the matter, he was led by the Spirit to frame a conception of the divine-marriage-love towards Israel, far transcending, not only his own, but every ordinary experience known to him. The dispute between allegorists and realists is interesting, but doctrinally the points of arrival on each view coincide.
We can only rapidly sketch the features in which this spiritualized character of the union reveals itself. Jehovah is represented as having wooed Israel, sued for her affection [2:14]; as having drawn her with the cords of man [11:4]; here the figure of sonship comes in to supplement and enrich that of marriage. Jehovah strengthened Israel's arms and taught her to walk [7:15]; although the Giver of all nature-blessings, of corn, wine, oil, silver, gold, wool, and flax, Jehovah is distinguished from the Baals, in that He has something more and finer to give than these: loving-kindness, mercy and faithfulness [2:19]; in reality He gives, in and through all these things, Himself after a sacramental fashion [2:23]; He is personally present in all His favours, and in them surrenders Himself to His people for never-failing enjoyment. Even after Israel becomes unfaithful, He continues to appeal to her heart by proofs of his love; 6:4 is the language of divine disappointment at the failure of these efforts.
To these divine approaches corresponds the attitude expected from the people. The state of mind which the people ought to cultivate, by reason of their union with Jehovah, is described by Amos, Isaiah and Micah on the whole from an ethical, by Hosea from an affectional point of view. When Amos, Isaiah and Micah say: not sacrifices but righteousness, Hosea says: not sacrifices but the knowledge of Jehovah. All the demands made of the people are summed up in this one thing, that there should be the knowledge of God among them, and that not as a theoretical perception of what is Jehovah's nature, but as a practical acquaintance, the intimacy of love. It is that which corresponds on Israel's part to the knowledge of Jehovah from which the whole marriage sprang [13:4, 5]; this knowledge is intended to make Israel like unto Jehovah, it has a character-forming influence. This is so fundamental a law that it holds true even in idolatry [9:10].
[4] Although the berith is thus traced back to its highest ideal source in the nature and choice of Jehovah, it nevertheless established a legally defined relationship
The marriage exists under a marriage-law. Israel is charged not merely with having been deficient in love and affection, but with having violated distinct promises. She is legally guilty. Jehovah has a ribh, 'controversy at law' with Israel [4:1]. This presupposes a law giving the right to sue. In fact the prophet proceeds to enumerate the points in which the people are indictable. Amos likewise speaks of the torah and the chuqqim which the Judaeans have rejected [2:4] and this cannot be understood of prophetic instruction, as is possible in Isa. 5:24. In the second part of Isaiah there are indisputable references to the law as the norm under which Israel lives [42:21, 24; 51:7; 56:2, 4, 6]. Hosea puts the berith and the torah together [8:1]. Since this is a marriage-law, it must have been imposed at the time of the Exodus. Hosea, therefore, bears witness to the existence of an ancient berith-law among Israel, and in so far refutes the contention of the critics, that no law was recognized as in force by the prophets.
Of course, nothing can be determined from this passage alone as to the extent and nature of this law. From 8:12, however, we learn that it was of considerable compass, and had been given in written form: 'Though I write for him my law in ten thousand precepts, they are counted as a strange thing.' Certain statutes of the Mosaic torah are clearly presupposed in the early prophets [4:2]. Hosea considers it a calamity for Israel, that in the coming exile she will be debarred from fulfilling her ceremonial duties [9:3–5). Isaiah also had a high regard for the temple-service, and was on a friendly footing with Uriah, the priest [8:2]. To mark Egypt as belonging to Jehovah he predicts that an altar shall be in the midst of the land and a matstsebhah at its border [19:19]. The Egyptians shall in that day worship with sacrifice and oblation [vs. 21]. Zion is the city of 'our solemnities and appointed feasts' [33:20]. For the second part of Isaiah cp. 56:2, 4, 7; 60:6, 7; 63:18; 66:20–24. About the passages alleged to condemn the sacrificial cult on principle, see the next chapter of the discussion.
[5] The covenant is, according to Hosea, as it is to all New Testament writers, a national 'berith'
It was made when the descendants of Abraham had come to form a nation [11:1]. Nevertheless Hosea has become instrumental in imparting an individualizing direction to the teaching about it. His emotional temperament was a potent factor to this effect. From its emotional side, more than in any other aspect, religion is a personal, individual matter. Even where Hosea speaks of the people collectively, the impulse towards this is so strong as to make him personify and individualize Israel. Several of such passages the individual believer may appropriate even now almost without change [2:7, 16, 23; 6:1–3; 8:2; 14:2, 4, 8]. This will be the less surprising if we remember that, at the basis of such impersonations lay, at least on the realistic view, the intensely personal experiences with his wife, which were to him a mirror of the intercourse between Jehovah and the pious. Jeremiah, who in this poetic, emotional temperament so strongly resembles Hosea, has subsequently taken up this line of
thought, and consequently consciously developed further what to Hosea bore the nature of an intuition.
The marriage-idea worked towards individualism in still another manner. If Jehovah is the husband and Israel the wife, then individual Israelites will appear as Jehovah's children [2:1; 11:3, 4]. Very strongly the trend towards individualism asserts itself in the closing words of the book [14:9].
Finally, it should not be forgotten, that the prophetic doctrine of the coming judgment bore in it a fertile seed of individualism. In the approaching catastrophe the majority will perish. Those that inherit the promise are only a small remnant, and the differentiation rests on a spiritual basis. Isaiah has carried this doctrine of the saved remnant to its ultimate root in the divine election [4:3]; those that escape of Israel are every one that is written (in the book of life).
[C] THE RUPTURE OF THE BOND: THE SIN OF ISRAEL
The early prophets predict clearly that the bond of the berith will be suspended. It will not, to be sure, be irreparably broken off. Were the critical contention correct, that all connection between Jehovah and Israel is based by the prophets on inexorable justice, excluding every exercise of grace, then plainly the thought of restoration must have been intolerable to them, since it involved nothing less than the abandonment of the supreme principle in the divine nature, a principle moreover that they had learned to uphold only after a long struggle with the opposing forces of grace and favouritism. On that view the prophets would have gone back on themselves, and what is worse, have made Jehovah go back on Himself. That they nevertheless proclaim with obvious delight the idea of grace proves that the critical construction must be, to say the least, one-sided.
The judgment comes on account of the sin of the people. Itself it belongs, as we shall see, to the eschatological perspective. But the sins leading up to it belong to the present stage. The prophets
nowhere deal with sin in the abstract. It is always the concrete sin of Israel with which they are concerned. This, however, they most strictly relate to Jehovah. Strictly speaking, there is no sin except against God. The prophets deal with certain large aspects of the sinful conduct of the people. This, however, is a division on the external side, which does not contribute much to the psychology of sin. In fact the material for this is more largely to be gathered from such writings as the Psalter. Still, as compared with the law, there is more of reflection on the inner nature of sin in the prophets. From the groups of sin that the prophets single out for attack something can be learned concerning the motives of condemnation, and this opens the possibility of drawing inferences as to the real sinfulness of what they protest against. We further can distinguish in the individual prophets a peculiar view-point from which each regards the sin inveighed against. We shall therefore first have to look into the large groups of sin dealt with, and then, in the second place, examine the two prophets who reveal an individual way of judging sin.
COLLECTIVE NATIONAL SIN
The sin which the prophets condemn is largely collective national sin [Amos 2:6–8; 3:1; 7:15; 8:2]. And where not the whole nation in its solidarity is rebuked, certain classes are attacked. Still this is not collectivism pure and simple, as some writers assert, for the distinction between class and class, which accompanies this masstreatment, proves that the judgment is a qualitative one, and qualitativeness bears in itself the beginning of individualism. We find distinctions drawn between the profligates, the rich oppressors, the voluptuaries, the corruptors of justice, the externalists in the worship of Jehovah. And, on the other hand, we learn of the righteous, the needy, the poor, the meek [Amos 2:6, 7; 5:11, 12; 8:4]. [While this is a collective treatment of sin, it is generically collective. The collectivism of the Old Testament is enforced, however, in this, that when the catastrophe comes, the pious are made to suffer with the wicked. But this is a problem that afterwards staggered Jeremiah and
Ezekiel. All we can do is to recognize that there is solidarity in punishment, and that, following the principles of revelation, we must posit, behind solidarity of judgment, a solidarity of guilt, though we may not be able to reckon this out in detail. It is at bottom the question whether ethical laws or physical laws are supreme in the government of the universe.
The problem is apt to be realized more keenly to the extent that the organic structure of a community falls into pieces. At the time of Amos such a process was not as yet visible on the surface. At the time of Jeremiah and Ezekiel it had become different. The critical judgment on this point has been warped by the assumption that the prophets stood absolutely alone against the whole nation. But this is merely theory. The prophets recognize gradations in the moral and religious condition of the people. Amos knows of a sifting that will take place, although he refers to this not so much in order to console, as rather to frighten: it will be as bad as sifting, the saving of two legs or the piece of an ear out of the mouth of the lion [3:12; 9:9, 10]. For Isaiah compare 3:10. In Micah there is not the same clear distinction of classes, but this is due not so much to an excess of nationalism as to the perception that there are no good individuals left [7:2]. The beginning of the individualized treatment of sin is most clearly perceptible in Hosea, just as the individualization of the berith received from him a powerful impulse [14:9].
THE CORRUPTION OF RITUAL WORSHIP
One great source of sin unanimously attacked by the prophets is the cult, the ritual worship of Jehovah. As stated above, in connection with the sacrificial system of the Mosaic law, the Wellhausen school takes the ground that the prophets opposed sacrifices and similar rites on principle, and that consequently they cannot have looked upon these as ordained by Jehovah, which again amounts to saying that the Pentateuch did not exist in their time. It is admitted, of course, that some passages speak of specific features of the cult, and cannot be quoted in support of such a generalizing theory. Thus
images and other paraphernalia of idolatry are denounced [Mic. 1:7; 5:13, 14]. The corruptness of the priests is rebuked [Mic. 3:11]. According to Amos 2:7, religious prostitution of a particularly aggravated kind occurred, probably in connection with the cult of Jehovah. Amos 2:8, may be compared with Ex. 22:26, 27. These denunciations, as referring to special forms of misconduct, must be kept separated from the passages in which the critics find an unqualified condemnation of the cult expressed. The main passages thus interpreted are: Amos 4:4; 5:5, 21–26; 8:14; Hos. 6:6; Isa. 1:11ff.; Mic. 6:6–8. In the later prophets the passage most frequently appealed to is Jer. 7:21–23.
In endeavouring to estimate the purport of these passages it is necessary at the outset to warn against the attempt to break their force made from the apologetic side, namely, that all these condemnations are turned against a wrong technique with which the sacrifices were handled. This is a highly implausible exegesis, for the prophets are not as a rule concerned with forms, or the correct observance of forms, as such. They deal with principles of spiritual significance only. Thus Amos 4:4–5 discloses a ritual flaw in the offering of leavened things. This is against the law [Lev. 2:11]. But what the prophet censures is not this; he makes use of it only to ridicule the excessive ritual impulse, unable to satisfy itself with the ordinary requirements. Similarly, the advertising of sacrifices brought is condemned, not because any law existed forbidding this, but because of the perversion of the principle of true sacrifice observable in it. Again in the second half of vs. 4, not the bringing of tithes every third day, instead of every third year, is made an object of serious criticism by the prophet. It was, of course, impossible to bring tithes every third day. The prophet on purpose exaggerates, in order to mock the perverted zeal of the offerers. Hos. 10:1 is another example of the same kind of polemic; disapproval of the multiplication of altars has the support of the law, but the prophet has in mind the sinful tendency behind it: multiplying o altars is a piece of religious adultery, which spreads itself over a number of degrading liaisons [cp. vs. 2: 'their heart is divided'].
This conservative apologetic is therefore not in accord with the facts. What the prophet ridicules is sometimes in harmony with the Mosaic law, sometimes not: hence the point must have lain in something else, as suggested above. Still the critical exegesis is not thereby justified. In carefully examining the passages under debate we shall find that the disapproval of the cult on the part of the prophets is not based on principle, but due to one of the three following considerations: Either, the cult is conducted in a materialistic, mercantile spirit, in order that by giving so much value for returnfavour to be obtained, certain benefits may be purchased from the deity after a semi-magical fashion;
or, the cult is conducted, jointly with gross immoral practices, so as to divorce Jehovah's religious interest from his ethical requirements; or, finally, the cult is employed in order to secure escape from the approaching judgment or to avert the latter entirely.
If we now look into the passages it will become clear that the presence of one or other of these three thoughts is sufficient to account for the phenomena.
AMOS 5:25
Amos 5:25 is of uncertain interpretation as to the meaning of the question proposed by God: 'Did ye bring unto me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?' Some take this as a protestation on Jehovah's part that the wilderness-journey proves sacrifices unnecessary for securing or obtaining the divine favour. This would imply that Amos regarded the wildernessjourney, in contradiction to the Pentateuch, a period of divine favour for Israel. The critics profess to find this view in Hosea and Jeremiah, and so take for granted that it must be likewise the view of Amos. But this by no means follows. Amos' words must be interpreted by themselves. If so taken, the situation immediately takes on another aspect. Its natural meaning becomes: Did you endeavour in the wilderness, after having been rejected by me, to
propitiate me by sacrifices and offerings? If at that time ye were not foolish enough to attempt this, why do ye act on this principle now? Such an exegesis makes the question only negate the effiaccy of the cult as a means for regaining the favour of Jehovah, once forfeited by sin. The law itself precludes this delusion, when it allows no sacrificial covering for sin committed with a high hand, and that was precisely the sin which both the generation of the wilderness-journey and the contemporaries of Amos had committed. The words of vs. 26 also favour this exegesis, when, passing from question to affirmation, God proceeds: 'Yea, ye have borne Sakkuth, your king [R.V. "the tabernacle of your king"], and Kaiwan, your images, your star-god, which you made unto yourselves.' This rendering of the verb as a perfect tense, 'ye have borne', simply excludes that Amos should have regarded the period of such idolatry as a period of high favour with Jehovah. It is true, some exegetes render vs. 26 as relating to the future: 'so ye shall take up Sakkuth, your king', etc., that is, you will have to take all your idolatrous paraphernalia into exile (cp. R.V. in the margin).
While this interpretation is possible grammatically, the perfect being taken as a perfect consecutive, it is by no means necessary, and it would involve an unusually harsh transition to make the statement as a whole mean: the wilderness-journey proved that sacrifices are not essential to right standing with God, therefore ye shall go into captivity with all your idols. This is certainly a strange way of speaking, that might be perhaps tolerated in Hosea; but in Amos, with his closely consequential thought, it seems oddly out of place. What a harsh sentence for such a mere mistaken opinion! And the mild description of the state in the wilderness, as one proving no sacrifices to be necessary, sounds oddly tame for Amos with all his vehemence of expostulation in the context. If our exegesis, on the other hand, be adopted, the preceding context can also be interpreted to the same effect: God hates, despises their feasts, because these things cannot avail to stem the judgment, as the foolish people believe they are able to do. Not sacrifices but
retribution will satisfy Jehovah: 'Let judgment roll down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream.'
ISAIAH 1:10–17
Isa. 1:10–17, sounds even stronger than the language of Amos just considered. But in this case likewise there is nothing to indicate that the statement is meant as a pronouncement on the value or worthlessness of sacrifices in the abstract. The words 'who has required this at your hand?' in vs. 12 might, at first sight, seem to imply a divine declamation, 'I have never required it', and that would rule out the revelation-origin of the sacrificial laws. But the added qualification, 'to trample my courts', clearly shows what is meant. Ordinary frequentation of the temple Isaiah would hardly have stigmatized as a trampling of the temple-courts. Isaiah himself visited the temple, as chapter 6 proves. And how absurd it is to impute to the prophet a sweeping condemnation of all the acts enumerated here! Prayer is one of the things that God refuses to receive! This alone suffices to prove, that not these acts in the abstract, but some peculiar accompaniment of them, rendered them unacceptable in Jehovah's sight. What this attending feature is the prophet clearly enough indicates. It is the joining together of all these things with flagrant iniquity. Vs. 13 should be rendered: 'I cannot away with iniquity joined to a solemn meeting.' When they pray God will not hear. This is not because prayer is wrong as such, but because the hands lifted up in prayer are 'full of blood'.
It should never be forgotten that in the prophets God speaks the language of burning indignation. If all sorts of qualifications and safeguarding of the words had been added, the entire force of the denunciation would have been broken. What the critics demand, as necessary for our exegesis to stand, is that the prophet should have made Jehovah speak on this wise: 'Although in the abstract I do not disapprove of ritual worship, and even demand it, yet in the way you offer it to me I cannot accept it.' What the critics have failed to appreciate psychologically is the rhetorical absoluteness of the
condemnation. They have made a precisely-formulated theological deliverance out of it. What we have in such passages is the anthropomorphic speech of one whose indignation has been aroused to the point of refusal to consider the question in the abstract or with nicety of distinctions. No man, no preacher, truly capable of resentment against sin, would have stopped to add qualifications under such circumstances.
HOSEA 6:6
In Hos. 6:6, the difference between the two members of the sentence is a difference in form but not in reality. The meaning is not that when mercy comes under consideration, God absolutely rejects all sacrifice ('mercy and not sacrifice'), whilst, when it is a matter of the knowledge of Himself, He has only a relative preference, which does not absolutely reject the sacrifice ('knowledge of God more than burnt offerings'). There is here simply an idiomatic variation of the same thought in both clauses. The second clause is a way of speaking such as anyone might employ: I want acts rather than mere promises. It therefore should not be regarded as weaker than the 'not' makes the first, but be interpreted in harmony with it: Jehovah desires knowledge of God and not burnt offering. The rejection is absolute in both cases. But the point at issue is on what this double rejection is based. The context furnishes the answer. What God here scorns is sacrifice as a means for appeasing His righteous displeasure, sacrifice moreover offered without true repentance. When their goodness is as a morning cloud and the dew that goes early away, offerings cannot avail to avert the judgment. Therefore God hewed them by the prophets, and slew them by the word of His mouth. It is to this train of thought that, by means of 'for' the sixth verse is joined. The chesed here points back to the false chesed of vs. 4, and the knowledge of God to the pretended knowledge of vs. 3. When the words are thus interpreted in the light of the context, they no longer prove the contention of the critical theory.
MICAH 6:6–9
In Mic. 6:6–9 likewise everything depends on a correct apprehension of the context. The question, 'Wherewith shall I come before Jehovah', etc. is not asked by the prophet himself, but by someone representing the people. It is not permissible at the outset to put into it the expectation of a negative answer, and to make this negative answer the opinion of the prophet; I will not come before Jehovah with any of these things. If it is a question asked by the people, we must understand it as meant in all seriousness; the speaker wants to know what would be the proper way of approaching Jehovah under the circumstances, and to what limit of exertion and expense he ought to go. The structure of the discourse is dramatic. The offer of the speaker in vs. 6 is induced by the expostulation of Jehovah voiced in vss. 1–5. Jehovah has a controversy with Israel, the point of which is that they have been ungrateful for ancient favours received. In response to this charge of ingratitude the prophet introduces the representative of the people, who asks how he can make amends for an acknowledged delinquency. He offers to reimburse Jehovah by ritual service of a most excessive kind, and to conciliate Him by means of a pagan form of expiation, the sacrifice of the first-born.
The prophet is the third speaker. He opposes to the twofold offer of vss. 6, 7, the declaration, 'He has showed thee, O man, what is good, and what does Jehovah require of thee, but to do justly, to love kindness, and to walk humbly with thy God?' Does such an answer imply disapproval of sacrifice on principle? The law itself nowhere represents sacrifice as a sufficient return for the favour of God. Besides this, the idea of lavishness in ritual to make up for past neglect and ingratitude is offensive on every right interpretation of sacrifice. The words, 'He has showed thee, O man, what is good', etc. do not refer to the time of the Exodus, so as to carry the implication that these things were the only things taught Israel at that time, to the exclusion of sacrifice. They refer to prophetic instruction of later date.
It has been suggested that in the three things named the characteristic burden of each of the three great prophets, Amos,
Hosea, Isaiah, can be recognized. To do justly would then sum up the message of Amos, to love kindness that of Hosea, and to walk humbly with one's God, that of Isaiah.
AMOS 4:4
It is far from certain that in Amos 4:4, sacrifice is called 'transgression'. The form of statement, 'Come to Bethel and transgress, to Gilgal and multiply transgression' does, it is true, permit of this exegesis. But it does not require it. The words lose nothing of their point, when the transgression is found, not in the act of sacrificing per se, but in the character which this act had habitually come to bear at Bethel and Gilgal. To sacrifice there was, under the circumstances, to transgress, to do so lavishly involved the multiplying of transgression. To be sure, the transgression cannot in this case, as in Isa. 1:13, have consisted in some sinful manner of life added to the sacrifice. The context in Amos shows that the sin must have been something entering into the sacrificial act itself. We cannot render: 'Come to Bethel, sacrifice there, and then lead a dissolute life.' But the sin that increased at the same ratio with the sacrifice need not, for all that, have lain in the sacrifice as such. Apart from the wrong ritual spirit prevailing at the sanctuaries named, we must not forget that precisely at Bethel and Gilgal Jehovah was notoriously served under the form of an image, and that may well have vitiated every sacrifice brought there from the prophet's point of view. This also would not amount to a denial of the legitimacy of sacrifice in the abstract.
The last-named consideration will have to be remembered likewise in interpreting Amos 5:4, 5. A pointed contrast is here drawn between seeking Jehovah, and seeking Bethel or entering into Gilgal or passing over to Beersheba. In the sanctuaries named Jehovah is not to be found. Why? Not necessarily because sacrifices are brought there, for that happened at many another place in Amos' time, but because through their officially legitimatized idolatry and the frequency of visits paid to them, they had become the special
exponents of what the prophets regarded as the wrong type of religion.
Even less reason is there to infer from Amos 8:14, and 9:1, that the prophet regards all sacrificial worship as per se sinful. On the contrary, the former passage confirms the suggestion just made, that the image-worship practised at Samaria, Dan and Beersheba, provoked his irony. 'To swear by the sin of Samaria' cannot mean to swear by the cult of Samaria. Swearing is usually done by the name of a god, and less frequently in the name of a custom or practice. Probably the 'sin' is here the image of the Samaritans, though it may have stood at Bethel, for that was the official sanctuary of the capital. In the formula, 'as thy God, O Dan, liveth', we may find a confirmation of this view as to 'the sin of Samaria.' Only in the third clause we read of swearing by something that is not directly a god. The exact formula here also is given: 'As the way of Beersheba liveth.' It is not easy to tell what 'the way' means here. The use of the verb 'liveth' makes us expect a reference to something personal. But there is no evidence, so far as we know, of a god or idol having been designated as 'a way'. There are writers who think that 'the way' can mean the type of religion practised at a certain place; here: 'the cultway of Beersheba'. This use of derek for religion (cp. the Greek hodos in a similar sense) cannot be proven to have been familiar at the time of Amos. Probably 'the way of Beersheba' means the pilgrimage to Beersheba. One could swear by that, even as the Moslem of the present day swears by the pilgrimage to Mecca. But, however interpreted, the phrase gives no countenance to the idea that the prophet meant any condemnation of sacrifice on principle.
JEREMIAH 7:21–23
We find, therefore, that in no passage of the four early prophets is the cult of sacrifice denounced as in itself and under all circumstances sinful. The most convincing passage, however, from their point of view, the critics find in Jeremiah, a prophet of the seventh century [Jer. 7:21–23]. Here Jehovah first declares, 'Add
your burnt offerings to your sacrifices and eat ye flesh', and then explains, that in the day of His bringing up Israel out of Egypt He did not speak unto them, nor command them aught about sacrifices. On the contrary, these were the things He had required: 'Hearken unto my voice, and I will be your God, and ye shall be my people, and walk ye in all the way that I command you, that it may be well with you.' And yet a moment's reflection will show how difficult it is from the critical standpoint itself to attribute to Jeremiah the opinion that the Mosaic legislation imposed no ritual demands upon Israel.
These critics generally assume that Jeremiah had a hand in the Deuteronomic reform-movement, which laid the Deuteronomic code upon the people. Now Deuteronomy does contain considerable ritual material. The code is said to have been a compromise. We ask: how could the prophet compromise on a matter that was to his view a matter of principle, beyond the reach of all compromise, namely, that sacrifices were sinful as such? Wellhausen believes that Jeremiah had cut himself loose from this reform movement, and he finds in 7:8 a characterization of its reprehensible methods from the prophet's later standpoint. 'The false pen of the scribes has wrought falsely' would then be a very bitter word spoken by the prophet against his own past. But there would be more than culpable inconsistency here; it would be a case of unparalleled audacity to dare to speak after such a volte face about anything commanded or not commanded at the time of Moses.
Further, in 17:26 the prophet foretells that in case of obedience to the sabbath law, Jehovah's favour will be shown in this, that men shall come from all quarters of the land to bring Jehovah burnt offerings and sacrifices and meal offerings and frankincense and thankofferings. Similarly in 33:11 it is foretold that in the future there will be again heard in Jerusalem the voice of joy and gladness … the voice of them that bring sacrifices of thanksgiving unto the house of Jehovah. It will be necessary to declare these passages spurious, if Jeremiah on principle rejected every form of sacrifice. For these
reasons we shall either have to let the passage in chapter 7 stand as an unsolvable enigma, or put another interpretation upon it.
The reference to the situation in Ex. 19 points the way to its understanding. It was at the very first approach of Jehovah to Israel with the offer of the berith, even before the Decalogue had been promulgated; it was at this earliest coming together of Jehovah and Israel that God refrained from saying anything about sacrifices, and simply staked the entire agreement between Himself and the people on their loyalty and obedience to Him [cp. Ex. 19:5]. Thus understood, the prophet means to affirm that the berith does not ultimately rest on sacrifice, but the sacrifices on the berith.
The fact that no explicit evidence for the prophetic condemnation of sacrifice can be adduced from their writings, gains in significance by observing that there are indubitable statements in which certain particular features connected with the cult are condemned. In Hos. 10:8 the high places of Samaria are called 'the sin of Israel'. In Hos. 10:10 it is said that the Israelites are bound to their two transgressions, that is to say, to the two calves at Dan and Bethel. In Mic. 1:5 we read in parallelism: 'What is the transgression of Jacob, and what are the high places of Judah?' But all this concerns cultinstruments; the cult as such is never declared sin.
Finally, by way of caution against drawing rash inferences from the prophetic passages discussed, reference may be made to analogous statements in the Psalter, and that in Psalms which the modern school itself regards as of post-exilic date, in which, therefore, the Psalmists cannot, on the critical view, have possibly meant to deny the existence or Mosaic provenience or divine authority of the laws of sacrifice (cp. Psa. 40:6; 50:7–15; 51:16–19]. If such statements could coexist with belief in the divine approbation and the religious value of sacrifice, when performed in the proper spirit, there is no reason to deny the possibility of the same mental attitude in the case of the prophets.
SOCIAL SIN
Side by side with the ritual sin of Israel, its social sin falls under the prophetic condemnation. Owing to the present-day sociological trend of religion, this side of the prophetic message has attracted considerable attention. At the outset the caution is necessary, that we may not expect overmuch light from this quarter on specific modern social and economic problems. The situation in the two cases is too widely different for that. The grave economic problems of modern society arise largely from commercial and industrial causes. The people of Israel were not a commercial nor an industrial community. Such a problem as that of the relation of capital to labour did not exist for them. A striking illustration of this is found in the rule that, while no interest may be taken from Israelite by Israelite, this is not forbidden in dealing with foreigners. What is allowed on economic grounds is forbidden on theocratic grounds: a higher rule exists for the people of God than that of economic rightness [Ex. 22:25; Lev. 25:36; Deut. 23:20; Ezek. 18:8]. Thus the cases where analogies can be drawn and applications made from ancient to modern conditions are few.
An exceptional case is, perhaps, what may be called 'the problem of the city'. Amos, and especially Micah, recognize that the city, while an accumulator of the energies of culture, is also an accumulator of potencies of evil [Amos 3:9; Mic. 1:5]. In the capital all evil is concentrated. Hence in the future all cities will have to cease to exist [Mic. 2:10; 3:8–12; 4:9, 13; 5:10, 13]. Men shall then sit in rural simplicity and security, each under his own vine and fig-tree, and none shall make them afraid [4:4]. The Messianic King will not proceed from the city of Jerusalem, but from the country-town of Bethlehem, as David did originally.
But even in this relative approximation to one of our modern problems, there are points of difference. The prophet has not in mind as one of the chief causes of evil in city-life the congestion of population of which modern sociologists make so much. It is moral
evil that is congested there, and no attempt is made to reduce it, even in part, to physical causes. The cities are condemned for the specific reason of their being instruments of warfare, fortified places, perhaps also on account of their being exponents of a spirit of rebellious self-dependence over against God [Mic. 5:11; cp. Gen. 4:17]. The prophetic polemic against war has only in a subordinate sense the modern humanitarian and economic motive. The motive is largely religious: Israel must trust in Jehovah, not in its own strength. Of course, peace is better than war. In the great eschatological pictures, such as Isa. 2 and Mic. 5 the peace-ideal has its place. Swords will be beaten into ploughshares and spears into hoes, but this has nothing to do with the wickedness of war as such, except in so far as it is cruelly conducted. It stands on a line with the idea that devouring animals will cease.
The prophetic condemnation of the social sin of Israel does not have its deepest root in humanitarian motives. The humanitarian element is not, of course, absent. Nor could it be absent, for it is as old as the theocracy. The law takes the poor and defenceless under its special protection. It is in keeping with this, that the chief institutions of the theocracy, for example, that of the kingdom, bear a conspicuously humane, beneficent character. And we find this preserved and further developed in the prophets. Their rebuke of social sin attaches itself to the distinction between rich and poor, powerful and weak, a distinction that has been at all times the symptom and occasion, though not the cause, of social disease [Amos 2:7; 4:1; 5:11; 6:4–6; 8:4; Mic. 6:12]. The note of divine compassion makes itself distinctly heard in these passages. But against the fact that rich and poor exist together the prophet does not raise his voice; all the prophets would have subscribed to Prov. 22:2. The institution of slavery is not condemned.
Oversounding this note of humanitarianism is the note of resentment of social injustice, and with this the whole problem is raised to the religious sphere. For injustice is sin against God, and no consequences, however deplorable from the manward point of view,
could equal the terrible significance of the religious fact to the prophetic consciousness. In short, it is not the circumstance that the rich injure the poor from which the prophetic mind in the first instance revolts, but what shocks and excites the prophets' resentment is the bearing of the wicked conduct upon Jehovah and His rights. Hence the phenomenon that the conduct of the rich is condemned in equally strong terms even where it does not directly affect the lot of the poor and the weak.
Amos denounces not merely violence and robbery in the palaces, not only tumults and oppressions in Samaria, worse than what Philistines and Egyptians are accustomed to [3:9, 10], but equally the vain luxury of the rich, lying upon their beds of ivory, feasting at their banquets, engaging in drunken revels, anointing themselves with the finest ointments, trying to imitate David as musicians, keeping up winter-houses and summer-residences, but—and this is the main point—who are through all their pride of life and luxury rendered oblivious of the deplorable state of the people of God, and do not grieve for the affliction of Joseph.
Not wealth and luxury in themselves the prophets attack. Of social burdens, such as heavy taxation, and cruel exactions they do not even speak, but of the reflex indignity offered through social maltreatment to Jehovah in the persons of His people. Amos himself was a man of frugal antecedents, yet there is no note of social jealousy in his denunciation of the opposite. His charge is that wealth and luxury such as were observable in his day render their possessors blind to all higher religious interests. Isaiah, who sprang from quite a different stratum of society, and whose regal mind was keenly sensitive to all æsthetic impressions, none the less renders on this point the same verdict as Amos. Not that to be rich and powerful in itself is a sin. The sin lies in the inordinate, irreligious desire to be so, which in its eagerness brushes aside all other considerations [Amos. 8:4, 5].
All this is of importance, because it marks a great difference between the social message of the prophets, and much that passes as social preaching nowadays. To the prophet it is the sinfulness of the wrong social conduct, to the modern social preacher it is too often the injuriousness to the social organism, that stands in the foreground. The prophets view the facts in their relation to God, as measured by the standards of absolute ethics and religion; the modern sociological enthusiast views them mainly, if not exclusively, in their bearing upon the welfare of man. What the prophets feature is the religious in the social; what many at the present time proclaim is the social devoid of or indifferent to the religious.
The features so far dwelt upon are the common property of all the prophets in the period we are dealing with. There are two of these, however, who have so strongly put the stamp of their religious individuality upon the conception and treatment of it as to place in the strongest possible relief the inner character of sin. These are Hosea and Isaiah. Of their doctrine of sin we shall, therefore, speak separately.
HOSEA'S DOCTRINE OF SIN
First, of Hosea's. With him it is the conception of Jehovah as the marriage-Lord of Israel that has at nearly every point shaped his presentation of the subject. Hosea dwells upon the sin which Israel as a unit has committed against Jehovah. Sin is to Hosea want of conformity to the ideal of marriage-affection and loyalty. His indictment of Israel reads: 'There is no truth (i.e. faithfulness), no lovingkindness, no knowledge of God in the land' [4:1]. And correspondingly Israel's sin is positively described as treachery [5:7; 6:7], the speaking of lies against Jehovah [7:13], the compassing Him about with falsehood and deceit [11:12; cp. further 7:16; 10:2]. Not merely that the people transgress the laws of Jehovah, but their considering them 'a strange thing' constitutes the wickedness of their conduct; they disavow that special claim on their obedience which God has as their marriage-Lord [8:12]. Their sin is a failure to
regard, to fear, to know Jehovah; they have left off to take heed to Jehovah [4:10].
The same idea is expressed by the figure in which Hosea describes the sin of serving other gods. He calls this 'whoredom'. Sometimes the term is to be understood in the literal sense, for example, 4:11, 'Whoredom and wine must take away the understanding'. Here the reference undoubtedly is to prostitution as practised in the idolatrous sanctuaries [cp. Amos 2:7]. But in Hos. 4:12 'the spirit of whoredom' is a figurative description of the idolatrous bent of the people: whoredom coincides with adultery. The principal cause of this adultery lies in sensual selfishness. Israel has withdrawn her affection from Jehovah. As He called them (the more He called them), so (the more) they went from Him; they sacrificed unto the Baals, they burned incense to graven images [11:2]. They knew no longer that Jehovah had healed them [11:3]. Their heart was exalted, they had forgotten Him [13:6]. To what Jehovah had given her: 'I will go after my lovers that give me my bread and my water, my wool and my flax, mine oil and my drink' [2:5].