Section 2

Again, if the substantial form of a mixed body is the act of matter in such a way that the forms of the simple bodies are not presupposed, then the simple bodies will lose the status of elements. For an element is that out of which a thing is made in a primary way, and remains in the thing, and is indivisible in kind. So that, if the substantial forms of the elements are taken away, a mixed body will not be made out of simple bodies in such a way that they remain in it.

As some see it, notes Aquinas in 2., the elements remain intact in the mixed body, i.e., with their respective substantial forms, though their active and passive qualities have been altered.

They argue, first, as Aquinas points out in 2., that the active and passive qualities of a mixed body are different from, indeed are some sort of mean between, those of each of its constituent elements; for, if they were not different, it would be impossible to differentiate the mixed body from its elements. For, a thing acts, and is acted upon, according to what it is. But the elements themselves, in a mixed body, must remain unchanged, must retain their substantial forms. For, if this were not the case, then the elements would have been corrupted. And, just as it is impossible for a whole to be made up of constituents which no longer exist; so too is it impossible to have a mixing of elements, out of elements which no longer exist.

They argue, secondly, as Aquinas notes in 3., that if the substantial form of a mixed body were to inform prime matter directly, so that the forms of the nowconstituting simple bodies had perished, then the simple bodies would not fulfill the definition of an element. For, whatever else an element is, it is something which remains in the mixed body.

Both these arguments, i.e., the argument in 2. and the one in 3., begin by supposing that the substantial forms of the simple bodies do not survive in the mixed body.

But, whereas the first argument notes that, in that case,

there would not be a mixing of simple bodies, but a corruption of them; the second argument notes that, in that case, the simple bodies could not be elements, because they would not remain in the mixed body. To have a mixing out of simple bodies, urges the argument in 2., one must have the simple bodies. For the simple bodies to be elements, insists the argument in 3., they must remain in the mixed body as its ingredients.

Suppose one were to apply some of these thoughts to water and oxygen and hydrogen, taking water as a mixed body, and oxygen and hydrogen as its elements. Do oxygen and hydrogen ”remain intact” in water? It seems that they do, at least in some way; for they can be retrieved. Have their active and passive qualities been altered? Changed into some sort of mean? And, what are the active and passive qualities of hydrogen and oxygen — i.e., before they became constituents of water?

And what is the mean, i.e., what are the active and passive qualities of water, in terms of which water is to be differentiated from oxygen and hydrogen? What exactly is it that oxygen does to hydrogen, and vice versa, to produce this mean quality (or qualities), which is the mean quality (or qualities) proper to water?

Arguments of Aquinas Against the First Answer

4. Est autem impossibile sic se habere.

But, it is impossible that it be this way.

In 4., Aquinas makes the claim that the substantial forms of the simple bodies cannot possibly remain in the mixed body of which these simple bodies have become the constituents. In 5. and in 6., he presents his arguments for that claim.

Before turning to those arguments, it might be helpful to consider that, if the substantial forms of hydrogen and oxygen remained in water, then water would be water throughout, yet simultaneously hydrogen in certain of its parts, and oxygen in certain other of its parts. Which is quite clearly impossible. It must be the case then that, when hydrogen and oxygen become constituents of water, they cease being hydrogen and oxygen respectively. For water is water, and just water. Nonetheless, both oxygen and hydrogen must remain in some way in the water. For, both are retrievable. But, how exactly do they remain? This is the main question being addressed by Aquinas in this brief work. Whatever the way in which they remain, they cannot remain precisely as hydrogen and oxygen, each with its appropriate substantial form.

Shall we say, then, that they remain by reason of their active and passive qualities, but as altered somehow into some sort of mean qualities, which are the qualities appropriate to water? Again, what exactly are these qualities, i.e., those of hydrogen and of oxygen, as well as those of water?

5. Impossibile est enim materiam secundum idem diversas formas suscipere elementorum. Si igitur in corpore mixto formae substantiales elementorum salventur, oportebit diversis materiae partibus eas inesse. Materiae autem diversas partes accipere est impossibile, nisi praeintellecta quantitate in materia; sublata enim quantitate, substantia remanet indivisibilis, ut patet primo Physicorum.1 Ex materia autem sub quantitate existente, et forma substantiali adveniente, corpus physicum constituitur. Diversae igitur partes materiae, formis elementorum subsistentes, plurium corporum rationem suscipint. Multa autem corpora impossibile est simul esse. Non igitur in qualibet parte corporis mixti erunt quatuor elementa. Et sic non erit vera mixtio, sed secundum sensum, sicut accidit in congregatione corporum, insensibilium propter parvitatem.

1 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, ch. 2, 185 b 11–18; Aquinas, In I Phys. , lect. 3, nn. 3–4. Aristotle does not say explicitly that if quantity were taken away, substance would remain indivisible; but this is very clearly implied in what he does say by way of arguing against the One of Parmenides and Melissus. Notice that Aquinas says: ut patet primo Physicorum, and not: ut dicitur primo Physicorum.

For it is impossible for matter, the same matter, to take on the forms of diverse elements. If therefore the substantial forms of the elements survive in a mixed body, they will have to be in diverse parts of its matter. But it is impossible for matter to have diverse parts, unless quantity is understood as being in that matter. For, if quantity were taken away, substance would remain indivisible, as is clear from book one of the Physics. Now, it is out of a matter which exists with quantity, and a substantial form which comes to that matter, that a physical body is constituted. And so, the diverse parts of matter, each of which subsists by means of the form of some element, take on the nature of more than one body. Now, it is impossible for a body to be many bodies at the same time. The four elements, therefore, will not be found in any and every part of the mixed body. And so, there will not be a true mixing, but a mixing according to sense, as happens in the case of a collection of bodies which cannot be perceived because they are so small.

6. Amplius, omnis forma substantialis propriam dispositionem in materia requirit, sine qua esse non potest. Unde alteratio est via ad generationem et corruptionem. Impossibile est autem in idem convenire propriam dispositionem quae requiritur ad formam ignis, et propriam dispositionem quae requiritur ad formam aquae, quia secundum tales dispositiones ignis et aqua sunt contraria. Contraria autem impossibile est simul esse in eodem. Impossibile est igitur quod in eadem parte mixti sint formae substantiales ignis et aquae. Si igitur mixtum fiat, remanentibus formis substantialibus simplicium corporum, sequitur quod non sit vera mixtio, se ad sensum solum, quasi iuxta se positis partibus, insensibilibus propter parvitatem.

Furthermore, every substantial form requires a proper disposition in its matter, a disposition without which it cannot exist. This is why alteration is the way to generation and to corruption. Now, it is impossible for the proper disposition which is required for the form of fire, and for the proper disposition which is required for the form of water, to be found together in the same thing; because according to such dispositions, fire and water are contraries. And it is impossible for contraries to be found in the same thing at the same time.

It is impossible, therefore, for the substantial forms of fire and

water to be together in the same part of the mixed body. If, therefore, a mixed body comes to be in such a way that the substantial forms of the simple bodies remain in it, it follows that this is not a true mixing, but a mixing only to sense, as though its parts, too small to be perceptible, had simply been placed next to one another.

It would be impossible, argues Aquinas in 5., for the matter of a mixed body, because it is a same matter, to take on the forms of diverse elements. For, in that case, a thing of one kind would be simultaneously a thing of a number of different kinds. Thus, if the substantial forms of diverse elements were to survive in a mixed body, each would have to be found in a diverse quantitative part of the matter of that body. It is clear, therefore, that the four elements could not be found in each and every part of the mixed body. And so, this would not be a true mixing, but only an apparent mixing, what Aquinas calls a “mixing to sense.” The wrongly called mixed body would be, rather, only a collection of bodies, a collection of four different kinds (the four elemental kinds) of juxtaposed (not mixed) bodies, each so small that neither they nor their juxtaposition could be perceived by sense.

Moreover, argues Aquinas in 6., every substantial form requires a proper disposition in its matter. Without its proper disposition, the substantial form cannot begin to exist; nor can it continue to exist. Now, it is alteration which both brings on proper dispositions and disperses them. As bringing them on, alteration is the way to generation; as dispersing them, it is the way to corruption. Now, it is impossible for contrary dispositions to be found in the same part of a mixed body, e.g., those of fire and of water. And so, it is impossible for the substantial forms of fire and water to be found in the same part of a mixed body. If, therefore, a mixed body were to come into existence, and the elements which constitute it were to retain their respective substantial forms, this would not be a true mixing, but a mixing only to sense —

and for the same reason given above in 5., i.e., because the mixed body, improperly so called, would be just a collection of juxtaposed (not mixed) Page 111

parts, each of which would be an elemental substance, placed alongside other elemental substances, all of them too small to be perceptible.

What exactly, one might ask at this point, is the difference between a true mixing ( vera mixtio) and a mixing only to sense ( mixtio ad sensum, secundum sensum, solum)? Is Aquinas suggesting in 5., by implication at least, that in a true mixing the four elements (or however many of them are required by the substantial form of the mixed body) are found in any and every quantitative part (“… in qualibet parte … “) of the mixed body? For, he writes: “Non igitur in qualibet parte corporis mixti erunt quatuor elementa. Et sic non erit vera mixtio, sed secundum sensum… .” If this is what he is suggesting, then it is clear that the elements cannot be in the mixed body with their respective substantial forms. For, a mixed body is just what the mixed body is, and throughout. It is certainly true that water (taking water as a mixed body) is water throughout, that every part of water is just water, and that no part of water is either hydrogen or oxygen (taking these as the constituting elements). And this clearly implies that, however it is that the elements survive in a mixed body, they cannot survive with their respective substantial forms. In a mixing which is a mixing to sense only, on the other hand, the parts which make up the resulting body remain, each of them, with their respective substantial forms. So that, if water were a mixing only to sense, some parts of the water would be oxygen, other parts would be hydrogen, and the water itself would not be water at all, let alone throughout.

Water would be only a collection of justaposed atoms of hydrogen and oxygen. Furthermore, water would not have the qualities which we know to be proper to water. Rather, some parts of it would have the qualities of hydrogen; other parts, the qualities of oxygen.

Water is water throughout. Every part of water is just water. No part of water is either hydrogen or oxygen. But hydrogen and oxygen are required to produce water.

Both are retrievable from water. Both can act upon, and be acted upon by, the other. Each is altered by the other in order to become a constituent (retrievable) of water. — How, then, are the elements, hydrogen

and oxygen, in the mixed body, water? Not actually. This is clear. Potentially, then? This seems the correct thing to say; for what other alternative is there? But, exactly what does this mean? Shall we say, as it seems Aquinas would (if he had taken water to be a mixed body), that what this means is that it is their active and passive qualities which remain, but as altered into water’s appropriate mean qualities by their waterconstituting interaction? And shall we take this to mean, as it seems Aquinas would, that the substantial form of water is both brought into existence and (having been brought into existence) acts through these mean qualities, until such time as some external agent (or agents) “realters” water’s mean qualities, i.e., nullifies the prior waterconstituting interaction between oxygen and hydrogen, releasing thereby their extreme elemental qualities, and thereby in turn bringing about their regeneration as actual, and separately existing and acting, physical entities?

In a true mixing, thus, the elements do not survive with their respective substantial forms. What survives is their active and passive qualities, appropriately changed (constricted, contracted, restrained; imprisoned, so to say) by alteration into a set of mean qualities. These mean qualities serve as 1) the disposition by which the mixed body is brought into existence, 2) as that by which the mixed body acts, and 3) as that by the removal of which the elements are released (as though from prison) to exist again as actual and separate and free physical realities.

In a mixing to sense only, on the other hand, the ingredients survive with their respective substantial forms. Such a mixing is just a collection or gathering of juxtaposed (not mixed, since they have not altered one another by some appropriate interaction) things, each of which is so small that neither they nor their juxtaposition is perceptible to sense. To sense, but to sense only, such a mixing may, in some cases, appear to be a true mixing.

A Second Answer—

The Elements Remain with Their Substantial Forms, but Their Substantial Forms Themselves Have Been Changed into Some Sort of Mean

7. Quidam autem, volentes utrasque rationes evitare, in maius inconveniens inciderunt.

But others, wanting to avoid both these arguments, fell into a greater inconsistency.

There are others, notes Aquinas in 7., who see the weight of the arguments which he presents in 5. and 6., and make an attempt to get around them. But their attempt is a failure. For it generates other and greater difficulties. These difficulties stem in part from the claim in 8. that, though the substantial forms of the elements remain in a mixed body, they do not remain therein in their fullness, and so can take on degrees of more and less; and in part from the further claim in 9. that the substantial forms of the elements (because they are so close to prime matter, and hence most imperfect) are a kind of mean between substantial forms and accidental forms; and so, again, can take on degrees of more and less.

8. Ut enim mixtionem elementorum ab eorum corruptione distinguerent, dixerunt formas quidem substantiales elementorum remanere in mixto aliqualiter. Sed ne cogerentur dicere esse mixtionem ad sensum, et non secundum veritatem, posuerunt quod formae elementorum non remanent in mixto secundum suum complementum, sed in quoddam medium reducuntur. Dicunt enim quod formae elementorum suscipiunt magis et minus, et habent contrarietatem ad invicem.

For, in order to distinguish a mixing of elements from a corruption of them, they said that the substantial forms of the elements do indeed remain in the mixed body — in some way.

But, lest they be forced to say that there is a mixing only to sense, rather than a true one, they claimed that the forms of the elements do not remain in the mixed body in their fullness. Rather they are reduced to some sort of mean. For they say that the forms of the elements take on degrees of more and less, and that they are contrary to one another.

9. Sed quia hoc repugnat communi opinioni, et dictis Philosophi dicentis in Praedicamentis quod substantiae nihil est contrarium, et quod non suscipit magis et minus;2 ulterius procedunt, et dicunt quod formae elementorum sunt imperfectissimae, utpote materiae primae propinquiores. Unde sunt mediae inter formas substantiales et accidentales. Et sic, inquantum accedunt ad naturam formarum accidentalium, magis et minus suscipere possunt.

But this is openly against the common opinion, and against what the Philosopher holds in the Categories, where he says that nothing is contrary to substance, and that substance does not take on degrees of more and less. This is why they go further, and say that the forms of the elements are most imperfect, being so close to prime matter.

Whence they are somehow midway, a kind of mean, between substantial forms and accidental forms. And so, insofar as they approach the nature of accidental forms, they can take on degrees of more and less.

These thinkers, too, points out Aquinas in 8., like those whose views were taken to task in 5. and 6., hold that the substantial forms of the elements do indeed survive in the mixed body — in some way. And for the same reason, i.e., in order to be able to claim that mixed bodies come into existence by a mixing of elements, not by a corruption of them. But unlike those other thinkers, who hold that the active and passive qualities of the elements take 2 Aristotle, Categories, ch. 5, 3 b 24– 33; 3 b 34 – 4 a 9.

on degrees of more and less, these thinkers maintain that it is the substantial forms themselves of the elements that take on degrees of more and less. And they do this in order to avoid having to say that the mixing is a mixing only to sense. The mixing, they say, is a true mixing, because the substantial forms of the elements survive, though not in their fullness. These forms have been reduced by alteration to a kind of mean, since they can take on degrees of more and less. And this mean is the form appropriate to the mixed body which has come into existence.

But these thinkers go further, points out Aquinas in 9., and argue (contrary to the common opinion and to the view of Aristotle, in the Categories, that a substance has no contraries, nor does it take on degrees of more and less) that the substantial forms of the elements are of a most imperfect sort, since they are so close to prime matter, so close that nothing can be closer. From which they conclude that these substantial forms are in some sense midway, a kind of mean, between substantial forms generally and accidental forms. They are less perfect than other substantial forms, and so can take on degrees of more and less, and have contraries. But they are more perfect than accidental forms, and so can account for the existence of substances.

Arguments of Aquinas Against the Second Answer

10. Haec autem positio multipliciter est improbabilis.

This position, however, is in many ways unacceptable.

In 10., Aquinas makes the claim that this position is in many ways improbable (“… multipliciter … improbabilis … “), which one might take on first reading in the sense of “quite unlikely to be true.” But, once one has seen

the arguments of Aquinas, it becomes clear that “improbabilis” would be better taken to mean: unacceptable and to be rejected, which would appeal to the clear link with the verb “improbare,” which means: to disapprove of, to blame, find fault with, reject; to find wrong or dishonest or wicked.

11. Primo quidem quia esse aliquid medium inter substantiam et accidens est omnino impossibile. Esset enim medium inter affirmationem et negationem. Proprium enim accidentis est in subiecto esse, substantiae vero in subiecto non esse. Formae autem substantiales sunt quidem in materia, non autem in subiecto. Nam subiectum est hoc aliquid; forma autem substantialis est quae facit subiectum hoc aliquid, non autem praesupponit illud.

First of all, indeed, because it is entirely impossible that there be something midway, a mean, between substance and accident. For, if that were so, there would be something midway, a mean, between affirmation and negation; since it is proper to an accident to be in a subject, but to a substance not to be in a subject. Though substantial forms are indeed in matter, they are not in a subject; for a subject is some actual individual, and a substantial form is what makes a subject some actual individual. It does not presuppose that actual individual.

12. Item, ridiculum est dicere medium esse inter ea quae non sunt unius generis; quia medium et extrema oportet eiusdem generis esse, ut probatur in decimo Metaphysicae.3 Nihil ergo potest esse medium inter substantiam et accidens.

Also, it is ridiculous to say that there is something midway, a mean, between things which are not of one genus; for the mean and the extremes must be of the same genus, as is proved in book ten of the Metaphysics. There can be nothing, therefore, which is a mean between substance and accident.

3 Aristotle, Metaph., Bk. X, ch. 7, 1057 a 20; Aquinas, In X Metaph., lect. 9.

13. Deinde, impossibile est formas substantiales elementorum suscipere magis et minus. Omnis enim forma suscipiens magis et minus est divisibilis per accidens, inquantum scilicet subiectum potest eam participare vel magis vel minus. Secundum id autem quod est divisibile per accidens vel per se, contingit esse motum continuum, ut patet in sexto Physicorum.4 Est enim loci mutatio, et augmentum et decrementum secundum quantitatem et locum, quae sunt per se divisibilia; alteratio autem secundum qualitates quae suscipiunt magis et minus, ut calidum et album. Si igitur formae elementorum suscipiunt magis et minus, tam generatio quam corruptio elementorum erit motus continuus. Quod est impossibile. Nam motus continuus non est nisi in tribus generibus, scilicet in quantitate et qualitate et ubi, ut probatur in quinto Physicorum.5

Next, it is impossible for the substantial forms of the elements to take on degrees of more and less. For every form which takes on degrees of more and less is divisible per accidens (i.e., because of something other than itself), insofar as its subject can participate in that form either more or less. Now, motion is continuous insofar as it is divisible, whether per accidens (i.e., because of something other than itself) or per se (i.e., because of itself), as is clear in book six of the Physics. Change of place, and increase and decrease in size, occur according to place and quantity respectively, which are divisible per se. But, alteration is divisible according to qualities which take on degrees of more and less, like hot and white. If, therefore, the forms of the elements take on degrees of more and less, the generation as well as the corruption of the elements will be a continuous motion. But this is impossible. For, continuous motion is found in three genera only, namely in quantity and quality and where, as is proved in book five of the Physics.

14. Amplius, omnis differentia secundum formam substantialem variat speciem. Quod autem suscipit magis et minus, differt ab eo quod est minus, et quodammodo est ei contrarium, ut magis album et minus album. Si igitur forma

4 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VI, ch. 1, 231 b 15; ch. 2, 233 b 15; Aquinas, In VI Phys., lect. 4.

5 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. V, ch. 1, 255 b 9; ch. 2, 226 a 23 – b 8; Aquinas, In V Phys., lect. 1; lects. 3–4.

substantialis ignis suscipiat magis et minus, magis facta vel minus facta speciem variabit, et non erit eadem forma, sed alia. Et hinc est quod dicit Philosophus in octavo Metaphysicae,6 quod sicut in numeris variatur species per additionem et subtractionem, ita in substantiis.

Further, every difference in substantial form varies the species. Now, what takes on degrees of more and less, differs from what is less, and is in some way contrary to it, like the more white and the less white. If, therefore, the substantial form of fire takes on degrees of more and less, then whether made more or made less, it will vary the species, and it will not be the same form, but another. And this is why the Philosopher says in book eight of the Metaphysics that, just as in the case of numbers the species is varied by addition and subtraction, so too is it varied in the case of substances.

It is altogether impossible, argues Aquinas in 11., that there be something midway, a mean, between substance and accident. For, in that case, there would be a mean between affirmation and negation, since it belongs to an accident to exist in a subject, and to a substance not to exist in a subject. — A thing either is, or is not; there is no inbetween. If there were, then there would be something which, so to say, neither is nor is not. — There cannot be something which is, but is neither a substance nor an accident; nor can something be a substance up to a point, and simultaneously an accident up to a point. If something exists, it is either a substance or an accident. It cannot be, and not be either. — Unacceptable, and so to be rejected.

Aquinas moves on to clarify the immediately preceding argument by reminding the reader that whereas substantial forms are in matter, they are nonetheless not in a subect, i.e., not in an actually existing subject. For an actually existing subject is a substance, i.e., a hoc aliquid, i.e., some actual individual thing. An accident presupposes the existence of a subject. A

6 Aristotle, Metaph., Bk. VIII, ch. 3, 1043 b 36 – 1044 a 2; Aquinas, In VIII Metaph., lect. 3.

substantial form, on the other hand, does not; by way of significant difference, a substantial form is precisely what accounts for the existence of the subject.

Besides, argues Aquinas in 12., the mean and the extremes must belong to the same genus, as is proved in book ten of the Metaphysics. If there were a mean between substance and accident, it would follow that substances and accidents and substantial forms, all three, would be substances; or that all three would be accidents, or that all three would be substantial forms. All unacceptable, and so to be rejected.

Furthermore, Aquinas argues in 13., it is impossible for the substantial forms of the elements to take on degrees of more and less. For, if they did, then both the generation and the corruption of the elements would be a motion which is a continuous one. And this is impossible, because the generation and the corruption of the elements are motions in the genus of substance. — To explain. Motion is continuous, as Aquinas notes, if it is divisible, whether divisible per se or per accidens, as is clear in book six of the Physics. Now, change in place, and increase and decrease in size (i.e., growth and its opposite, diminution) are motions which are divisible per se, since place and quantity, both, are divisible per se. Alteration, on the other hand, is a motion which is divisible per accidens, i.e., because of qualities which take on degrees of more and less, like hot and white. So that, if the substantial forms of the elements were to change so as to take on degrees of more and less, the change would be a substantial change, and at the same time a motion which is divisible per accidens. And so, the substantial forms of the elements would be undergoing a motion which is continuous, and which is in the genus of substance. But, this is impossible, because motion is continuous in three genera only, i.e., in quantity and quality and where, as is proved in book five of the Physics.

Moreover, adds Aquinas in 14., every difference in substantial form varies, or changes, the species. It is clear that what takes on degrees of more and less Page 120

is different from what is less, and is in some way contrary to it. For example, a thing, A, which becomes even more white than something else, B, which was already less white than A; or a thing, A, which becomes less white than something else, B, which was previously less white than A — in both cases, A differs from B, and is in some way contrary to B. So that, if the substantial form of fire — using fire as an example — takes on degrees of more and less, then, whether it becomes more ”firey” than it was, or less “firey”, in either case it will not be the same form, but another. That is, the more “firey” fire will not be fire, or, not fire of the same species. The less “firey” fire, too, will not be fire, or, not fire of the same species. For, in either case, there would have been a substantial change. And this is what Aristotle had in mind when he wrote, in book eight of the Metaphysics, that just as numbers differ in species because of degrees of more, i.e., addition (of units), and degrees of less, i.e., subtraction (of units); so, too, do substances differ in species, but by the addition and subtraction of differences (rather than units).

The Answer of Aquinas:

The Elements Remain with Their Powers and with Retrievability, but Not with Their Substantial Forms 15. Oportet ergo alium modum invenire, quo et veritas salvetur mixtionis, et tamen elementa non totaliter corrumpantur, sed aliqualiter in mixto permaneant.

Another way must be found, therefore, which both safeguards a true mixing, and insures, as well, that the elements are not totally corrupted, but remain in some way in the mixed body.

In 15., Aquinas begins to give what he takes to be the proper answer to the question: how are elements in a mixed body?, an answer which will both 1) safeguard that the mixing is a true one, rather than a mixing to sense only, and 2) make certain that the elements have become, and remain, ingredients Page 121

of the mixed body, and so have not been totally corrupted. A true mixing requires that the elements have interacted and have changed one another in some way, but the change cannot be so radical as to have been their total corruption. Still, the elements must have been corrupted — at least in some way; otherwise the mixed body could not have been generated. Nonetheless, the elements must remain — at least in some way; otherwise the elements cannot be ingredients of the mixed body. And so, the generation of a mixed body out of elements requires that these elements be both corrupted and not corrupted — corrupted in one respect (how? is the question); not corrupted in another respect (how? is again the question).

16. Considerandum est igitur quod qualitates activae et passivae elementorum sunt ad invicem contrariae, et suscipiunt magis et minus. Ex contrariis autem qualitatibus suscipientibus magis et minus constitui potest media qualitas, quae utriusque sapiat extremi naturam, sicut pallidum inter album et nigrum, et tepidum inter calidum et frigidum. Sic igitur, remissis excellentiis qualitatum elementarium, constituitur ex eis quaedam qualitas media, quae est propria qualitas corporis mixti, differens tamen in diversis secundum diversam mixtionis proportionem. Et haec quidem qualitas est propria dispositio ad formam corporis mixti, sicut qualitas simplex ad formam corporis simplicis. Sicut igitur extrema inveniuntur in medio, quod participat utriusque naturam, sic qualitates simplicium corporum inveniuntur in propria qualitate corporis mixti.

It must be taken into consideration that the active and passive qualities of the elements are contrary to one another, and take on degrees of more and less. Now, a mean quality which partakes of the nature of each extreme, can be constituted out of contrary qualities which take on degrees of more and less, as pale between white and black, and warm between hot and cold. Thus, therefore, when the excelling intensities of the elementary qualities are diminished, a certain mean quality is constituted out of them, a quality which is the proper quality of a mixed body, a quality which differs however in diverse mixed bodies in accord with diverse proportions of mixing. And this mean quality is the proper disposition to the form of a mixed body, just

as the simple quality is to the form of a simple body. Just as the extremes, therefore, are found in a mean which shares the nature of each of them; so too are the qualities of simple bodies found in the proper quality of a mixed body.

17. Qualitas autem corporis simplicis est quidem aliud a forma substantiali ipsius. Agit tamen in virtute formae substantialis. Alioquin calor calefaceret tantum, non autem per eius actionem forma substantialis educeretur in actum, cum nihil agat extra suam speciem. Sic igitur virtutes formarum substantialium simplicium corporum salvantur in corporibus mixtis.

Though the quality of a simple body is indeed other than its substantial form, it acts nonetheless in the power of the substantial form. Otherwise, all that heat would do is make things hot, and a substantial form would not be brought to a state of actuality by its action, since nothing acts beyond the limits of its species. It is in this way, therefore, that the powers of the substantial forms of simple bodies are preserved in mixed bodies.

18. Sunt igitur formae elementorum in corporibus mixtis, non quidem actu, sed virtute. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus in primo De Generatione: 7 “Non igitur manent actu —

elementa scilicet, in mixto — ut corpus et album, nec corrumpuntur nec ambo nec alterum. Salvatur enim virtus eorum.”

The forms of the elements, therefore, are in mixed bodies; not indeed actually, but virtually (by their power). And this is what the Philosopher says in book one of On Generation:

“Elements, therefore, do not remain in a mixed body actually, like a body and its whiteness. Nor are they corrupted, neither both nor either. For, what is preserved is their power.”

7 Aristotle, De Gen. et Corrupt. , Bk. I, ch. 10, 327 b 29–31; see the commentary, In I De Gen. et Corrupt. , lect. 24, in fine. St. Thomas’ commentary on Aristotle’s De Gen. et Corrupt.

is unfinished, terminating with Bk. I, lect. 17; the rest was written by Thomas Sutton and others (see below, p. 172, footnote 11).

In 16., Aquinas begins by pointing out that it is the active and passive qualities of the elements, and not their substantial forms, which are contrary to one another, and take on degrees of more and less. And one can add to this that the elements change, and are changed by, one another, precisely by means of, and with respect to, their active and passive qualities. Thus, when the most (i.e., the excelling intensity, or the “excellentia,” to use the word Aquinas uses, e.g., the hottest, the coldest, the driest, the wettest, i.e., these qualities at their most intense, at their most “excelling”) which is the proper degree of some elemental quality meets head on with the most which is the proper degree of some other elemental quality, there results an interaction which tempers or diminishes both mosts (the mosts are the extremes), the result being some sort of more or less, some sort of inbetween, some sort of mean quality. Now, this mean quality is the proper or distinguishing quality of some mixed body, different mixed bodies having appropriately different mean qualities, some closer to one extreme, some closer to the other extreme. And it is through this mean quality, as through the required proper disposition, that alteration, as the way to the generation of a mixed body, brings the mixed body into existence out of the required elements, mixed according to an appropriate proportion; just as it is through the extreme quality, as through the required proper disposition, that alteration, this time as the way to the corruption of a mixed body, retrieves, and thereby brings back into existence, the elements which had been the required ingredients of the nowcorrupted mixed body.

Aquinas concludes his reflection in 16. by noting that the qualities of the simple bodies, i.e., of the elements, are found in the proper quality of a mixed body in a way which is similar to the way in which extremes are found in a mean which participates in the nature of each of them. To exemplify this with water and hydrogen and oxygen (taking water as a mixed body, and hydrogen and oxygen as its elements), one can say that the active and passive qualities of water are a mean of some sort, which participates, in some way, in the extremes which are the active and passive qualities of hydrogen and oxygen. And it is not at all necessary for this mean quality to be anything at

all like either of the extreme qualities; it may indeed turn out to be a surprise of some sort, even a complete surprise (oxygen supports burning, whereas water quenches — surprise? — burning). Only experience will tell.

In 17., Aquinas comments briefly on the relation between the qualities of the elements and their substantial forms. He begins by emphasizing the fact that the quality of a simple body, or element, is other than its substantial form. Then he makes his main point, namely that the quality of an element acts, nonetheless, under the influence (guidance) — in virtute — of its substantial form. Or, to put it a bit differently, the element acts as it does, because of the qualities which it has; and it has the qualities which it has, because of the substantial form which it has. The substantial form of an element, once brought into existence, is not only continuously productive (and receptive) of the proper or distinguishing quality of that element, but performs its proper acts through that quality. Otherwise, the heat of fire — to use Aquinas’

example at this point — would do nothing but make things hot, and the substantial form of fire would not be brought to a state of actuality through fire’s heating action on a combustible material. For nothing can produce what is beyond its kind. Fire produces fire, its own kind, through its proper quality or power, i.e., heat; but as under the influence (guidance) — in virtute — of its substantial form. — Neither, one can add, would the substantial form of water (taking water to be a mixed body) be brought to a state of actuality via the interaction between the proper qualities of hydrogen and oxygen, unless this interaction took place under the joint influence (guidance) — in virtute — of their substantial forms (i.e., the substantial forms of hydrogen and oxygen), as well as of the substantial forms of other things (to be discovered by careful investigation) which might be required to bring about the substantial change in which water is generated.

Aquinas concludes 17. with the comment that it is in this way that the powers (virtutes), or qualities, of the substantial forms of the simple bodies survive in mixed bodies. In what way? one wants to ask, since Aquinas does not make this explicit at this point. It seems that he is making a reference to Page 125

what he had said at the end of 16., namely that the qualities of simple bodies are found in the proper quality of a mixed body in a way which is much like the way in which extremes are found in a mean which participates to some extent in the nature of each of them. Accepting this, one can say that the powers (virtutes), or qualities, of the substantial forms of the elements survive in mixed bodies; but not the substantial forms themselves. And so, the elements have been corrupted with respect to their substantial forms; but they have not been corrupted with respect to their qualities. These elemental qualities survive in the mixed body as tempered mean qualities. When hydrogen and oxygen become water — as we understand this today — what is there, is neither hydrogen nor oxygen, but water. That is, hydrogen and oxygen are not there actually, though they are there potentially — and in two senses of “potentially”: 1) virtually (by their power), and 2) retrievably.

Water, nonetheless, does what water does, through its appropriate mean qualities, which are nothing but the nowtempered qualities of what were earlier, i.e., before the water came into existence, the “excelling” qualities of hydrogen and of oxygen, as separately existing entities. It is the nowtempered (formerly excelling) qualities which actually survive, and actually remain, in the mixed body; but now under the influence (guidance) — in virtute — of the substantial form of that mixed body.

In 18., Aquinas gives a concluding summary statement of how elements are in a mixed body. They survive, and are there, not by reason of their substantial forms, but by reason of their powers, i.e., qualities. He puts it this way: “… the forms of the elements, therefore, are in mixed bodies, not indeed actually, but virtually (by their power)… .” None of the elements is completely corrupted; neither is any of them completely preserved. As Aristotle puts it: “… what is preserved is their power.”

And — might add — their power, precisely because preserved, is retrievable. And so are their substantial forms retrievable, and precisely via their power, functioning as the appropriate disposition.

Thus, the substantial forms of the elements are not actually present in mixed bodies. Each mixed body has its own, and one, substantial form. And it is this substantial form which manifests its proper activities through its proper qualities, which had been the extreme, or excelling, qualities (now brought, or tempered, to a mean) of the formerly separately existing elements. The mixed body, like any corporeal substance, can have actually but one substantial form, its own. Potentially, however, i.e., both virtually (in their power) and retrievably, it has as many substantial forms, in number and in kind, as the elements which are required as its ingredients.

PART THREE—

ELEMENTS IN THE COMPOSITION OF PHYSICAL SUBSTANCES

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, all physical substances, including the elements, are composed out of prime matter and substantial form; and all physical substances, excluding the elements, are composed out of elements in addition to being composed out of prime matter and substantial form.

What follows is an attempt to do at least the following: 1) to clarify Aquinas’ account of the role(s) which the elements play in the composition of physical substances, with help from what he has to say here and there throughout his many works, and in various contexts, and 2) to determine whether his account of their role(s) can be accepted, i.e., to argue for or against the various claims and arguments of his account, as each may require.

1—

If a Physical Substance Is Composed Out of Elements, Must It Also Be Composed Out of Prime Matter and Substantial Form?

It is the view of Aquinas that there are two kinds of composition in physical substances which come to be and cease to be in substantial change: 1) composition out of prime matter and substantial form, and 2) composition out of elements. What exactly, one wants to ask, is the relation between these two sorts of composition?

More specifically, can a physical substance be composed out of elements, without also being composed out of prime matter and substantial form? And, the other way around, can a physical substance be composed out of prime matter and substantial form, without also being composed out of elements?

With respect to the immediately preceding question, it seems that it can, i.e., it seems that a physical substance can be composed out of prime matter and substantial form, without also being composed out of elements. Consider an element itself — whatever it might be, whether a quark, or something (yet to be discovered) which is a bodily ingredient of a quark, or something else again (still to be discovered) which is a bodily ingredient of that bodily ingredient, and so on. An element itself is not, cannot be, composed out of elements, i.e., out of prior bodily ingredients; for an element itself is the most primitive, the most simple, of all bodily ingredients. But, being a substance which can come to be and cease to be in substantial change, an element must be composed out of prime matter and substantial form. Indeed, an element is the only physical substance which is composed only out of prime matter and substantial form. Unlike a mixed body — i.e., a physical thing which is composed out of elements, as well as out of prime matter and substantial form, e.g., wood, water, flesh, bones, sticks, stones; and, one might add, molecules, atoms, protons, neutrons, indeed all hadrons — an element itself cannot be resolved by alteration into bodies which are more simple than itself. There are no bodies which are more simple than an element. Only prime matter and substantial form — and these are not bodies — are more simple than an element. All other bodies — and these are mixed bodies — are composed both out of elements (i.e., they can be resolved by alteration into bodies which are more simple than they are, and ultimately into elements) and out of prime matter and substantial form (because they can come to be and cease to be in substantial change).

With respect to the other question, that is: Can a physical substance be composed out of elements, without also being composed out of prime matter and substantial form?, it seems that it cannot. For, if it could, then certain changes which are in fact substantial changes — like the change in which sperm and ovum become a human being, or the change in which food becomes part of a human body — could not be substantial changes (rather, Page 131

only accidental changes). Or, to put this in another way, certain things which are in fact substances — e.g., mixed bodies like men and dogs and horses —could not be substances (rather, only accidental collections, or aggregates, of elements). That is, they would differ from one another not substantially, but only accidentally. The elements out of which they are composed would be genuine substances, but they themselves (i.e., the entities so composed) would differ from one another only by reason of the number and the kind of their ingredient elements, and by reason of the way in which these ingredient elements were put together. They would differ from one another, by way of comparison, in the way in which this house differs from that house, e.g., by reason of the number (e.g., 1800 for this one, 2000 for that one) and the kind (e.g., pine for this one, oak for that one) of the pieces of wood out of which each has been made, and by reason of the way (e.g., plan A for this one, plan B for that one) in which these pieces of wood have been put together. And these differences are, all of them, only accidental (predicamental) differences.

2—

If a Physical Substance Is Composed Out of Elements As Well As Out of Prime Matter and Substantial Form, Are the Elements Ingredients of Its Essence?

It is the view of Aquinas that prime matter and substantial form are ingredients of the essence of any physical substance which comes to be in substantial change, whether it be a simple body, i.e., an element, or a complex body, i.e., something which is composed out of elements. How, one wants to ask, are the elements of a complex body related to that complex body? Are they, like its prime matter and its substantial form, also ingredients of its essence? Or, are they related to that essence in some other way? As properties perhaps?

Someone might argue that, in the view of Aquinas, the elements of a complex body are ingredients of its essence. For he notes in C.G., III, cap. 22, and elsewhere, that prime matter is in potency to forms in a certain order: first of all, to the forms of the elements; and then, through those, in potency Page 132

to the forms of mixed bodies; through the forms of mixed bodies, in turn, in potency to the forms (souls) of living bodies; then through those, in potency to the forms (souls) of animal bodies; and lastly, through those, in turn, in potency to the forms (souls) of human bodies. This clearly implies, one might argue, that the elements which are found in the composition of a physical substance are ingredients of its essence, whether this substance is as lowly as the mixed body iron, or as lofty as the living body which is a human being. For prime matter can have no form at all if it does not have, in some way, the form of an element(s) — either actually and only, as in the case of the elements themselves; or virtually and retrievably, along with another which it has actually (but only because of a certain dispositional and instrumental dependence on certain virtually and retrievably present elemental forms), as in the case of all complex bodies. Clearly, one might conclude, if prime matter cannot have a certain substantial form, say the soul of a human being, without the virtual, retrievable, dispositional, and instrumental presence in it of certain required elements, say quarks (in protons, which are in atoms, which are in molecules of certain sorts), then the essence of the substance made out of prime matter and such a substantial form must include the required elements as well.

This conclusion — i.e., that the essence of such a substance, a complex body, must include the required elements as well as prime matter and a certain sort of substantial form — seems correct (at least at first look); and for the reason given, i.e., because without the intervening dispositional presence of the required elements, prime matter could not have acquired such a form; and the complex body could not have come to be what it is. But, for a proper understanding of this, one must emphasize the following. Whereas the essence of such a substance includes prime matter and such a substantial form actually (otherwise the substance could not be what it is); it includes the required elements only potentially, i.e., virtually, or in their power, both because 1) a substance can have actually only one substantial form, its own, and 2) because such a substance, a complex body, needs the powers of the elements as the means or instruments through which it performs its proper Page 133

activities. Prime matter and substantial form are actual ingredients of the essence, i.e., each is present with respect to what it is. The required elements are virtual ingredients of the essence, i.e., each is present not with respect to what it is, but with respect to what it can do, i.e., with respect to its powers.

A further look at this conclusion, however, might bring one to want to say the following. Since the required elements are present in the mixed body not with respect to what each is, but with respect to what each can do, i.e., with respect to its powers, it might be better to say, perhaps closer to the truth to say, that the elements are among the accidents (predicamental) of the mixed body. For that is exactly what the powers of a substance are, i.e., predicamental accidents. The substantial form of a mixed body, once brought into existence, is not only the cause (efficient, in the sense of sustaining or continuing, and receptive as well) of its powers, but performs its proper activities through those powers. And so, one might want to say, the idea: virtual ingredient of an essence, might be better expressed as: actual accident (predicamental) of that essence. Moreover, one might want to continue, since the powers of an essence are found wherever that essence is found (and since this is so because their continued existence is caused — efficiently and receptively — by the substantial form of that essence), the elements which survive as components of a newly generated mixed body are, precisely as surviving in it, properties of that mixed body, i.e., commensurately universal per se (predicable) accidents.

But this is not in accord with what Aquinas writes in In Boetii De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3, c., where he says explicitly, using man as an example, that the four elements are ingredients of the essence of a mixed body. Man, exemplifies Aquinas, is something composed of a soul and a body — of a soul which is a rational soul, and of a body which is made up of the four elements combined in an appropriate ratio. That is, man’s essence is made up of soul and body, and that body is made up of as much of each of the four elements, properly combined (propria mixtione), as is required to constitute an appropriate subject for his soul. Aquinas writes: Page 134

Sunt … quaedam partes a quibus totius ratio dependet, quando scilicet hoc est esse tali toti ex talibus partibus componi, sicut se habet syllaba ad litteras, et mixtum ad elementa;

et tales partes [sunt] partes … sine quibus totum intelligi non potest, cum ponantur in eius definitione.

Quaedam vero partes sunt quae accidunt toti inquantum huiusmodi, sicut semicirculus se habet ad circulum. Accidit enim circulo quod sumantur per divisionem duae eius partes aequales, vel inaequales, vel etiam. plures; non autem accidit triangulo quod in eo designentur tres lineae, quia ex hoc triangulus est triangulus.

Similiter etiam per se competit homini quod inveniatur in eo anima rationalis, et corpus compositum ex quatuor elementis; unde sine his partibus homo intelligi non potest: et sic oportet poni in definitione eius …

Sed digitus, pes, manus et huiusmodi, sunt praeter intellectum hominis, unde ex illis ratio essentialis hominis non dependet, unde sine his intelligi potest.

Sive enim habeat pedes, sive non, dummodo ponatur coniunctum ex anima rationali et corpore composito ex quatuor elementis propria mixtione quam requirit talis forma, erit homo.

( In Boetii De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3, c.)

There are some parts on which being a whole of a certain kind depends — when, that is, it belongs to the essence of such and such a whole to be composed of such and such parts; this is how a syllable is related to letters, and a mixed body to elements. Such parts [are] parts … without which the whole cannot be understood; and this is why such parts are put into the definition of the whole.

But there are other parts which just happen to, are accidental to, a whole as such; this is how a semicirlcle is related to a circle. For being divided into two equal parts — or into two unequal parts, or even into several parts — is something which just

happens to a circle. But it does not just happen to a triangle that there are three lines designated in it, because it is by reason of them that a triangle is a triangle.

Similarly, it belongs to man as such that there be found in him a rational soul and a body composed of the four elements. And this is why man cannot be understood without these parts. And so, they must be put into the definition of man …

But a finger, a foot, a hand and such like, are outside what it is to be a man. Whence man’s essential nature does not depend on them, and so can be understood without them.

For whether a man has feet, or not, so long as he is held to be a conjunction of 1) rational soul, and 2) body composed of the four elements, properly mixed, as required by such a form, he will be a man.

There are two kinds of parts, notes Aquinas in effect. There are essential parts, and there are accidental parts. Essential parts are parts on which a whole depends for being the whole that it is, parts without which it could not be the whole that it is. Letters, for example, are essential parts of a syllable. A syllable could not be a syllable without having letters as its parts. And elements are essential parts of a mixed body. A mixed body could not be a mixed body without having elements as its parts.

Accidental parts are parts on which a whole does not depend for being the whole that it is. A circle, for example, can be said to have two semicircles as parts, a semicircle being exactly one half of a circle. But having two semicircles as parts does not make a circle what it is, i.e., a circle. It just happens that a circle can be described as made out of two equal parts, i.e., out of two semicircles. But a circle can just as well be described as made out of two unequal parts; indeed, out of any number of parts, whether equal or not. What a circle is, i.e., the essence of a circle, is this: a closed plane curve every point of which is equidistant from a fixed point within the curve called its

center. What a circle is, is not something made out of two semicircles. A circle can be divided into parts of various sorts, equal and unequal. But it is not something made up out of these parts. A circle is not made out of semicircles in the way in which a syllable is made out of letters, or a mixed body out of elements. A triangle, by way of contrast, is made out of three straight lines (put together in a certain way), in a way which is like the way in which a syllable is made out of letters (put together in a ceratin way), or like the way in which a mixed body is made out of elements (put together in a certain way).

Having talked about the circle, the triangle, the syllable, and the mixed body, in relation to essential parts and accidental parts, Aquinas turns next to talk about man in relation to these two sorts of parts. It belongs to man as man (… per se competit homini … ), notes Aquinas, to be made out of a rational soul and a body composed out of the four elements put together in an appropriate way (propria mixtione). Man cannot be understood without these parts, i.e., without soul and body;

and man’s body cannot be understood without the four elements appropriately combined. This is why it is necessary to include these parts in man’s definition. A finger, however, or a foot, a hand, an elbow, a knee, and the like — these are outside what it is to be a man. Whence, the essence of the whole which man is does not depend on them, and what a man is can be understood without them. Whether or not a man has feet or hands, or other like parts — so long as he is held to be made up out of a rational soul and a mixed body, i.e., a body composed of the four elements put together in the proportion required by the rational soul — a man will be a man.

This is completely in accord with what follows from Aquinas’ view that prime matter is in potency to forms in a certain order, i.e., first of all, to the forms of the elements, then through these to the forms of mixed bodies, etc., i.e., from the view that prime matter cannot have a certain substantial form, say the soul of a human being, without the virtual, retrievable, dispositional and instrumental presence in it of certain elements, appropriately put Page 137

together. For what follows is this: the essence of the substance made out of prime matter and such a substantial form must include within itself the required elements as well.

3—

Is an Element in Any Way an Agent Cause, in Addition to Being a Special Sort of Material Cause?

Si in aliquo genere aliquod primum invenitur quod sit causa aliorum, eiusdem considerationis est commune genus et id quod est primum in genere illo: quia illud primum est causa totius generis, oportet autem eum qui considerat genus aliquod, causas totius generis considerate. Et inde est quod Philosophus in Metaphysica simul determinat de ente in communi et de ente primo, quod est a materia separatum. Sunt autem in genere generabilium et corruptibilum quaedam prima principia, scilicet elementa, quae sunt causa generationis et corruptionis et alterationis in omnibus aliis corporibus. Et inde est quod Aristoteles in hoc libro qui est tertia pars scientiae naturalis, determinat non solum de generatione et corruptione in communi et aliis motibus consequentibus, sed etiam de generatione et corruptione elementorum. ( Prooemium In De Generatione et Corruptione, n.

2).

If in a given genus of things something first is found which is the cause of the others, the common genus and that which is first in that genus belong to the same consideration.

This is so because that first thing is the cause of the whole genus, and the one who considers a given genus should consider the causes of the whole genus as well. This is why the Philosopher, in the Metaphysics, decides questions about the first being which is separated from matter, along with deciding questions about being in common. Now, in the genus of generable and corruptible things, there are certain first principles, namely the elements, which are the cause of generation, corruption, and alteration in all other bodies.

This explains why Aristotle in this book [i.e., in the De Generatione et Corruptione], which is the third part of natural science, decides not only questions about generation and corruption in common, and other

consequent motions, but questions about the generation and corruption of the elements as well.

The point of a philosophical investigation, as Aquinas sees it, is to come to a knowledge of the causes — all the causes — of the things being investigated, and at some designated level of universality. If one is investigating all things, in terms of what they have in common, i.e., if one is investigating ens in communi, one should strive for a knowledge of all the causes of what they have in common, including a knowledge of the First Being which is separated from matter, i.e., of their First Efficient Cause, God, ”… de ente primo, quod est a materia separatum.” Similarly, if one is investigating all generable and corruptible bodies, in terms of what they have in common, one should strive for a knowledge of all the causes of what they have in common, including a knowledge of the elements. For, as Aquinas points out, the elements are causes of generation, corruption, and alteration in all other generable and corruptible bodies. One should strive therefore for a knowledge of, strive to decide questions about, the exact causal role(s) which the elements have in relation to all other generable and corruptible bodies.

What can one derive from the comparison which Aquinas makes of the elements to God? Just as God is the first cause of all other beings, i.e., of ens in communi, notes Aquinas, so too the elements are first causes of all other generable and corruptible bodies. Elsewhere, and in many places, Aquinas notes that the elements are intrinsic components of all other generable and corruptible bodies, and that they have the role of material causes. Since he is comparing the elements to God, and not God to the elements, one can safely say that Aquinas is not suggesting that God is an intrinsic and material component of all other things. He is suggesting, rather, that the elements have another role, a role in addition to that of a material cause — the role of an efficient cause. He is suggesting that an element is matter and agent, at the same time — matter in relation to the composition of all other generable Page 139

and corruptible bodies, and agent in some other relation(s). What does it mean to say — one wants to ask — as we say nowadays, that potassium is good for one’s health? Doesn’t potassium, as a remaining material component of our bodies, i.e., as an element (in some sense), do something, exercise some sort of agent causality, in addition to being a material component? Or, better (since potassium, along with all the chemical elements in the periodic table, is not a true element, i.e., not an element in the sense defined above, beginning on p. 48), don’t the two uquarks and the one dquark, as remaining material components of a proton, i.e., as true elements, do something, exercise some sort of agent causality, in addition to being material components? Don’t they at least “whirl about each other in their proton prison”?, as someone has said. And what, if anything, does their whirling about each other do for the proton of which they are the components? For the atom of which that proton is a component? For the molecule of which that atom is a component? For the human being of which that molecule is a component?

To answer these questions in a completely acceptable way (this would be a scientific answer), one would have to pursue studies in at least these three disciplines: 1) in particle physics, 2) in chemistry, and 3) in biology. Moreover, most of these questions would have to be asked in a more careful, and more pointed, way. Other questions, no doubt, would have to be asked. The first question seems pointed enough (though perhaps not careful enough), as it stands: what, if anything, does the whirling of the quarks about each other do for the proton of which they are the components? This would be a question for particle physics. There would be other questions, e.g.: what exactly do protons do within an atom? and what does this do for the atom of which the protons are components? Some questions (there would surely be others) for chemistry: what exactly do atoms do within a molecule? and what does this do for the molecule of which the atoms are components? Some questions (and there would doubtless be others) for biology: what exactly do molecules do within a tissue? and what does this do for the tissue of which the molecules are components?; what exactly do tissues do within

an organ? and what does this do for the organ of which the tissues are components?; what exactly do organs do within a living body, e.g., the human body? and what does this do for the living body of which the organs are components?

To answer these questions in an incipiently acceptable way (this would be a philosophical answer), one would have to keep in mind what is meant by the virtual, retrievable, dispositional and instrumental presence of the lower in the higher, i.e., of certain required elements (the simplest and lowliest of bodily components, like quarks and electrons), and of other required bodily components as well (complex and higher ones, like the chemical elements of the periodic table, and the molecules made out of these) in progressively more and more complex bodily things, all the way up to, and including, of course, the most complex bodily thing which we know, i.e., man. That is, one would have to keep in mind Aquinas’ view 1) that prime matter is in potency to forms in a certain order (above, pp. 131–132), and see this in relation to his view 2) that whereas a mixed body, like any corporeal substance, can have actually only one substantial form, its own; potentially, nonetheless, it can have — indeed must have — at least as many substantial forms, in number and in kind, as the elements which are required as its ingredients, i.e., without which it could neither be nor act (above, p. 126).

To say that a mixed body could not be without a certain number of certain kinds of elements (and atoms and molecules) is to say that without their intervening dispositional presence, prime matter could not have acquired a given sort of substantial form (nor continue to possess it), and so the mixed body could not have come to be, nor continue to be, what it is. To say that the mixed body could not act without a certain number of certain kinds of elements (and atoms and molecules) is to say that it depends on their instrumental presence, i.e., that it needs the powers of the elements (and of the atoms and the molecules) as the means, the instruments, the instrumental agent causes, through which it performs its proper activities.

Thus, elements (along with certain sorts of atoms and molecules) are not only material causes of a special sort, they are also agent causes of a special sort, i.e., instrumental agent causes.

Aquinas makes this point, though only about substantial forms which are souls (since souls are his concern in the context), when he writes in the De Homine: Tota … natura corporalis subiacet animae, et comparatur ad ipsam sicut materia et instrumentum. (S.T., I, q. 78, a. 1. c.) The whole of corporeal nature is an underlying subject to the soul, and is related to it as matter and instrument.

All corporeal things, observes Aquinas — i.e., everything bodily, down to and including the ultimate bodily components which are the elements — are related to souls of all types, whether intellectual or sensitive or vegetative, as that which can be their matter (subject) and their instrument, i.e., as that in which they can exist (their matter) and through which (their instrument) they can perform their proper activities, i.e., life activities like selfnourishment, growth, reproduction, sensation. What Aquinas says here about the substantial forms of all living things, i.e., about souls (souls, recall, are his concern in this context), is also the case, as he sees it, with respect to the substantial forms of all nonliving things as well. That is, all lower nonliving things, down to and including the elements, are related to the substantial forms of all higher nonliving things, as that which can be their matter (subject) and their instrument, i.e., as that in which these substantial forms can exist (their matter) and through which (their instrument) they can perform their proper activities.

An instrument, it might be helpful to note at this point, can be either a separated instrument or a conjoined instrument, as Aquinas points out in his Page 142

commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul ( In II De Anima, lect. 9, n. 348). A separated instrument is one whose form is a form different from that of the principal agent.

For example, the pen with which I write is a separated instrument, inasmuch as its form is different from my form, i.e., from my substantial form, or soul. A conjoined instrument, on the other hand, is an instrument whose form is the form of the principal agent. A conjoined instrument might be a bodily part, like a hand; or a bodily organ, like the heart; a molecule, like carbon dioxide; an atom, like oxygen; or an element, like a quark or an electron. All of these are, in various ways, parts or components of mixed bodies (a mixed body is any body which is composed of elements, whether living or nonliving), however lowly (e.g., quarks are components of the lowly proton), or however exalted (e.g., quarks, protons, atoms, molecules, hands, etc. are components of man); and their form is the form of the mixed body.

Thus, my hand, and my pen, are instruments by which my soul writes, and without which my soul could not write. Like all instruments, both my hand and my pen contribute something which arises out of the nature and power of each. My hand (directed by my soul) holds and moves the pen with certain handappropriate motions by which letters and words are formed; my pen contributes the ink. Without my hand, and without my pen, my soul could not write, though my soul is the principal agent. Without my soul, neither my hand nor my pen could write; for neither my hand nor my pen is the principal agent. An instrumental agent is a moved mover of sorts, a moved mover with two functions: 1) an instrumental function, i.e., it performs as directed by the power of, and to the end of, the principal agent, and 2) a proper function, i.e., it performs by something of itself. Thus, my soul moves my hand to move the pen. My soul uses my hand to do what a hand can do; and my hand uses the pen to do what a pen can do. But both the hand and the pen, as used by the soul, are used to do what the soul wants to do, i.e., to write.

Now, quarks are related to the form of a proton as matter and conjoined instrument. That is, the proton uses its component quarks to do what quarks, as put together into a proton, can do — in order to do what a proton, as proton, does. And since the component quarks are a conjoined instrument, their form is the form of the proton. Protons, in turn (and therefore also quarks, inasmuch as they are components of the proton), are related to the form of an atom as matter and conjoined instrument. That is, an atom uses its component protons and quarks to do what protons and quarks, as put together into an atom, can do — in order to do what an atom, as atom, does. And since the component protons are a conjoined instrument, their form is the form of the atom. Molecules, in turn (and therefore also quarks and protons and atoms, inasmuch as they are components of the molecule), are related to the forms of progressively higher bodily things, up to and including man, as matter and conjoined instrument. And man, for example, uses his component bodily organs (e.g., heart and lungs), molecules (e.g., carbon dioxide), atoms (e.g., oxygen), and elements (e.g., quarks and electrons) to do what they, as put together into man, can do — in order to do what man, as man, does. And since these components are, all of them, conjoined instruments, their form is the form of man. — It should be clear, therefore, that elements (along with atoms and molecules and bodily organs, etc.) are each, in their own way, not only material causes of a special sort, but also agent causes of a special sort, i.e., conjoined instrumental agent causes.

4—

Is a Mixed Body, i.e., a Physical Thing Made Out of Certain Elements Combined in a Certain Ratio, the Same as a Natural Organed8 Body, i.e., the Appropriate Subject of Soul?

Materia prima est in potentia primo ad formam elementi. Sub forma vero elementi est in potentia ad formam mixti; propter quod elementa sunt materia mixti. Sub forma autem mixti considerata est in potentia ad animam vegetabilem; nam talis corporis [i.e., corporis mixti] anima actus est. Itemque anima vegetabilis est in potentia ad sensitivam; sensitiva vero ad intellectivam … … Sunt ergo elementa propter corpora mixta; haec veto propter viventia; in quibus plantae sunt propter animalia, animalia vero propter hominem. ( C.G. , III, cap. 22)

Prime matter is in potency first of all to the form of an element. Then, as existing under the form of an element, it is in potency to the form of a mixed body. This is why elements are the matter of a mixed body. Moreover, considered under the form of a mixed body, it is in potency to the vegetable soul. It is of such a body, thus, that the soul is the act. Similarly, the vegetable soul is in potency to the sensitive soul, and the sensitive to the intellectual … … The elements therefore exist for the sake of mixed bodies, and mixed bodies for the sake of living things, among which plants exist for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man.

Anima est actus corporis physici habentis vitam in potentia, … [et] tale est omne corpus organicum. Et dicitur corpus organicum, quod habet diversitatem organorum. Diversitas 8 To translate “organicum” as “organed” is to invent a word which seems to convey the sense of “organicum” better than the commonly used word “organized.” For “organized,”

as said of a body, can be taken to mean: having an orderly structure and/or function; or, put together into a whole of ordered and interdependent parts; whereas “organicum”

means precisely: having bodily organs, in the way in which “uniformed” means: having (wearing) a uniform, or “armed” means: having (bearing) arms, e.g., a gun. A bodily organ is an instrument (organon) by means of which the living thing performs its life activities; but unlike a gun, it is, of course, a conjoined instrument (see above, pp. 141–142, beginning at “An instrument, it might be helpful to note at this point, can be either a separated or a conjoined instrument, … “.

autem organorum necessaria est in corpore suscipiente vitam propter diversas operationes animae. ( In II De Anima, lect. 1, n. 230) The soul is the act of a physical body having life in potency, … [and] such is every body which is organed. Those bodies are said to be organed which have a diversity of organs.

And a diversity of organs is necessary in a body which takes on life, because of the diverse operations of the soul.

Si aliqua definitio communis debeat assignari, quae convenit omni animae, erit haec: Anima est actus primus corporis physici organici. Non autem oportet addere: potentia vitam habentis. Loco enim huius ponitur organicum, ut ex dictis pater. ( In II De Anima, lect. 1, n. 233) If a common definition of the soul is to be given, one which applies to every soul, it will be this: Soul is the first act of a physical body which is organed. And it is not necessary to add: having life in potency. For in place of that, one adds: organed, as is clear from the things that have been said.

What Aquinas writes in the passages just above raises some questions about the nature of the body of which the soul is said to be the act or actuality. 1) Is it a mixed body? For Aquinas does say: “… nam talis corporis [sc. mixti] anima actus est.” 2) Or is it a physical body having life potentially, i.e., having a diversity of organs ordered to a diversity of life activities? For Aquinas also says: “Anima est actus corporis physici habentis vitam in potentia, [i.e., actus corporis physici organici, quod est corpus habens] … diversitatem organorum … propter diversas operationes animae.” 3) Is a mixed body the same as a physical body with a diversity of organs ordered to performing a diversity of life activities? 4) Or does being a mixed body imply being a physical body with such organs? 5) Or, the other way around, does being a physical body with such organs imply being a mixed body? 6) If being a physical body with such organs implies being a mixed body, what is Page 146

the role of the component elements with respect to the life activities performed by the living thing? 7) Does such a body need to be composed of certain sorts of elements, in addition to having certain sorts of organs, in order to enable the living thing to perform its appropriate life activities?

What Aquinas writes in the passage just below provides the beginnings of some sort of answer to these questions. In the context in which these lines appear, he is concerned to make clear why it is that one can speak of three types of soul, of four modes of living, and of five powers of soul. The criterion for distinguishing the three types of soul is the way in which life activities rise above the activities of merely bodily or corporeal things, i.e., of matter in its nonliving states. The criterion, secondly, for distinguishing the four modes of living is the way in which life activities are found together in various grades of living thing. And lastly, the criterion for distinguishing the five genera of powers of soul is the scope or range of the object to which the activities of soul are ordered. Of special interest in the context in which these lines appear are Aquinas’ remarks with respect to the three types of soul:

Diversae animae distinguuntur secundum quod diversimode operatio animae supergreditur operationem naturae corporalis: tota enim natura corporalis subiacet animae, et comparatur ad ipsam sicut materia et instrumentum.

Est ergo quaedam operatio animae, quae intantum excedit naturam corpoream, quod neque etiam exercetur per organum corporale. Et talis est operatio animae rationalis.

Est autem alia operatio animae infra istam, quae quidem fit per organum corporale, non tamen per aliquam corpoream qualitatem. Et talis est operatio animae sensibilis: quia etsi calidum et frigidum, et humidum et siccum, et aliae huiusmodi qualitates corporeae requirantur ad operationem sensus; non tamen ita quod mediante virtute talium qualitatum operatio animae sensibilis procedat; sed requiruntur solum ad debitam dispositionem organi.

Infima autem operationum animae est, quae fit per organum corporeum, et virtute corporeae qualitatis. Supergreditur tamen operationem naturae corporeae: quia motiones corporum sunt ab exteriori principio, huiusmodi autem operationes sunt a principio intrinseco; hoc enim commune est omnibus operationibus animae; omne enim animatum aliquo modo movet seipsum. Et talis est operatio animae vegetabilis: digestio enim, et ea quae consequuntur, fit instrumentaliter per actionem caloris, ut dicitur in II de Anima … ( S.T. , I, q. 78, a. 1, c.)

Diverse souls are distinguished in accord with the diverse ways in which the operation of the soul rises above the operation of corporeal nature. For the whole of corporeal nature is an underlying subject to the soul, and is related to it as matter and instrument.

Now, there is a certain operation of soul which rises above corporeal nature to such an extent that it is in no way even performed by a bodily organ. And such is the operation of the rational soul.

There is another operation of the soul, below the one just noted, which is indeed performed by a corporeal organ, but not through some corporeal quality. And such is the operation of the sensible soul. For even though hot and cold, and wet and dry, and other such corporeal qualities are required for the operation of the senses, they are not required in such a way that the operation of the sensible soul proceeds by means of the power of such qualities. They are required, rather, only for the proper disposition of the organ.

The lowest of the activities of soul is the one which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by means of the power of a corporeal quality. But even this operation rises above the operation of corporeal nature, because the motions of bodies derive form some exterior principle, whereas such operations arise from an intrinsic principle. And this is common to all operations of soul, for every thing which has a soul in some way moves itself. And

such is the operation of the vegetable soul; digestion, for example, and the things which follow, is performed instrumentally through the action of heat, as is said in Bk. II of On the Soul.

In Aquinas’ remarks concerning the operations of the vegetating soul, and those of the sensing soul, one finds some sort of reply to the last, the seventh, of the questions raised above on pp. 144–145, i.e., to the question: Does such a body [i.e., corpus physicum organicum] need to be composed of certain sorts of elements, in addition to having certain sorts of organs, in order to enable the living thing to perform its appropriate life activites? Certain sorts of bodily organs are required, quite obviously (on the basis of minimal scientific sense observation), for the performance of vegetative activities, e.g., stomach, intestines, liver. Similarly (but on the basis of ordinary, everyday sense observation and introspection), certain bodily organs are required for the performance of sensory activities, e.g., eye, ear, tongue. But, in addition to the instrumental causality of bodily organs of certain sorts, such activities require, quite clearly, the presence and accompanying instrumental causality of certain sorts of elements (and compounds as well). Digestion, exemplifies Aquinas, takes place through the accompanying instrumental causality of the powers of the quality heat, which requires that the element fire be a component of the body of the living thing. Nowadays we would say (on the basis of some minimal scientific investigation) that digestion takes place through the accompanying instrumental causality of the powers of various compounds, like saliva in the mouth, hydrochloric acid in the stomach, and bile in the duodenum.

Speaking generally of the basic vegetative activites, i.e., selfnourishment, growth and reproduction, we would say, nowadays, that they take place through the accompanying instrumental causality of the powers of various minerals, like chromium, iron, magnesium, calcium, manganese, copper, potassium, selenium, zinc; of various vitamins, like choline, folic acid, niacin, ascorbic acid, dalpha tocopherol; of various enzymes, like bromelain, Page 149

lactase, amylase, protease, lipase; of various and countless phytochemicals; and of hosts of other as yet unknown, as yet undiscovered, instrumental materials; all of these being instances of the “materia et instrumentum” of which Aquinas speaks in the S.T. , I, q. 78, a. 1, c. — updated, of course, to reflect the thinking of our times.

Speaking generally of the activities of the sensing soul, we might say nowadays, following Aquinas (though some might object — see the immediately following paragraph), that they are performed by the relevant bodily organs, though not by means of the powers of any minerals, or vitamins, or enzymes, or phytochemicals;

but that, nonetheless, certain sorts of minerals, vitamins, etc., are required to keep the relevant bodily organs in good and healthy working order. For example, the minerals and phytochemicals contained in Gyu Hwa Tea, which is a blend of the herbs Flos chrysanthemi and Semen cassiae torae, are claimed by the Chinese to keep the focusing muscles of the eye in peak working order, resulting in heightened focusing ability, and thereby sharpened vision.

But, someone might object that sensory activity, like vegetative activity, is performed by means of the powers of various elements and/or compounds; and that it is not true that these elements and compounds are required just to keep the relevant bodily organs in good working order. For, doesn’t vision in faint light take place by means of the photosensitivity of the rhodopsin in the retinal rods? And doesn’t color vision take place by means of the chromatosensitivity of the retinal cones?

In response to this objection, it should be noted that sensory activity takes place by virtue of a special sort of sensible form, as Aquinas argues quite plausibly in many places, e.g., by virtue of a special sort of visible form, which the bodily organ is capable of receiving from an appropriate object, both by virtue of its being the particular sort of bodily organ which it is, e.g., an eye,

and by virtue of the activities of certain elements and/or compounds which are among its constituents, e.g., the chemical and electrical activities initiated by the impact of faint light on the photosensitive rhodopsin in the retinal rods. This sensible form is quite unlike an ordinary sensible form, in that it is received into the seeing organ, i.e., the eye — the eyeball plus optic nerve plus proper cortical area — in such a way that the eye remains the eye that it was. That is, the eye can take on the visible features of a tree, say, without having to take on the physical matter of a tree. In the physical world, it is treematter which takes on the visible features of a tree. In the activity of seeing, it is eyematter (i.e., eyeball plus optic nerve plus proper cortical area) which takes on the visible features of a tree. And these eyereceived treefeatures (this is the special sort of sensible form) become the means by which seeing a tree takes place.

Thus, whereas digestion takes place by virtue of the action of certain bodily organs, like stomach and intestines, and also, as Aquinas would say, by virtue some bodily quality, like heat, i.e., by the action of the power of the element fire; seeing takes place by virtue of the relevant bodily organ, and also by the visible form for the reception of which it has been properly disposed by virtue of some bodily quality, like the photosensitivity of rhodopsin. Rhodopsin of proper quality and in proper quantity, among other things, is required for an eye to be in good and healthy working order, i.e., “for the proper disposition of the organ,” as Aquinas would put it.

The chemical and electrical activities initiated by rhodopsin, when affected by faint light, do not have the same role in the activity of seeing that the action of HCl has in the activity of digesting. For, whereas rhodopsin enables the eye to receive the visible form, and the visible form is that by virtue of which the eye does its seeing; the action of HCl is precisely that (at least one of the relevant things) by virtue of which the stomach does its digesting. Which is to say that vegetative activity takes place by virtue of the relevant bodily organ(s) in concert with the power of certain bodily elements and/or compounds; whereas sensory activity takes place by virtue of the relevant bodily organs (properly disposed for the reception of sensible forms by virtue of the powers of certain bodily elements and/or Page 151

compounds) in concert with the relevant received sensible form. And the sensible form is not an ordinary sort of sensible form. It is rather a special sort of sensible form, a form which can be received into a matter which is not an ordinary sort of physical matter, i.e., into a bodily organ of sensation. That is, for example, as noted above, the visible features of treematter can be received into eyematter.

This, then, seems to be an acceptable answer to the seventh question raised above on p. 146, namely the question: Does a natural or physical organed body need to be composed of certain sorts of elements, in addition to having certain sorts of bodily organs, in order to enable the living thing to perform its appropriate life activities?, namely this answer: Yes. But, for the performance of vegetative activities, it needs these composing elements (and/or compounds) as material instrumental causes. For the performance of sensory activities, however, it needs these composing elements (and/or compounds) for the proper disposition of the sensory organ. Properly disposed, the sensory organ becomes capable of receiving a special sort of sensible form. And this form takes on the role of an instrumental cause.

This answer to the seventh question is also an answer to the sixth question, i.e., to the question about “the role of the component elements [and compounds] with respect to the life activities performed by the living thing.”

Is the body, of which the soul is said to be the actuality, a mixed body (question one)? The answer is clearly: Yes. But, not just a mixed body. It is observed to be a mixed body, indeed, but with bodily organs for performing life activities. Moreover, it would be difficult to see how a living thing could perform its life activities without certain relevant bodily organs.

Is the body, of which the soul is said to be the actuality, an organed body (question two)? The answer is clearly: Yes. But, one must add that organed bodies are observed to be mixed bodies as well. Indeed, it would be difficult to see how an organed body could perform life activities by means of its Page 152

organs alone, without help from certain component elements and/or compounds. Which provides an answer to question five: Yes; being an organed body does imply being a mixed body.

The answer to question three is quite clear: No; a mixed body is not the same as a natural organed body. For, there are mixed bodies which are not organed bodies, e.g., gold, silver; salt, pepper, sugar; water, oil.

And this supplies the answer to question four: No; being a mixed body does not imply being an organed body.

5—

Elements in the Definition of a Mixed Body (The Elements As Definientia)

The things said so far in PART THREE lead quite naturally to considerations about the role of elements in the definition of a mixed body. A definition, as Aquinas understands it, is a statement which identifies and describes the causes — all the causes, whenever possible — of a thing’s becoming, of its being, and of its activities.

That is, a definition is an attempt to answer the question: What, both extrinsic and intrinsic to a thing, accounts for these facts: 1) that the thing has come into existence (its becoming), 2) that it is now in existence (its being), 3) that it does what it does (its activities)? An identification and description of all relevant causes, both those which are intrinsic to the thing, i.e., matter, form, elements, compounds, organs (if the thing has organs), and those which are extrinsic to the thing, i.e., agents and ends, provide a complete answer to this question, a complete definition of the thing. A definition in terms of what is intrinsic (only) — matter, form, elements, organs (if there are organs) — expresses what a thing is, i.e., its essence, and thereby also explains why it does what it does. A definition in terms of what is extrinsic (only), on the other hand, identifies and describes either what produced the thing, and what accounts for its continued existence, i.e., its agent(s), or what the thing is for,

i.e., its end(s). Clearly, agents and ends are not ingredients of the essence of a thing. And this is why such definitions do not express what a thing is.

Now, as Aquinas sees it, a definition in terms of what is intrinsic to a thing identifies and describes the thing’s matter and its form. For example, when man is defined as something composed of sensitive body and rational soul, “sensitive body” designates the matter and “rational soul” designates the form. But a definition in terms of what is intrinsic can also, as Aquinas sees it, identify and describe the thing’s proximate genus and its specific difference. For example, when man is defined as a rational animal, “animal” designates the proximate genus and ”rational” designates the specific difference. Moreover, as Aquinas sees it, the genus of the genusdifference definition derives from, is taken from, matter; the specific difference from form; and the genusdifference definition, as a whole, from the matterform definition, as a whole. For example, man’s genus, animal, is taken from man’s matter, the sensitive body; man’s specific difference, rational, from man’s form, the rational soul; and man’s genusdifference definition, rational animal, from man’s matterform definition, something composed of sensitive body and rational soul. Since

“is taken from” means simply furnishes the content of the concept of, one can say either that man is an animal (using the genus with “is”) or that man has (as a component part) a sensitive body (using the matter with “has”); and one has said the same thing. To be an animal means to have (as a component part) a sensitive body. Similarly, one can say either that man is rational (using the specific difference with “is”) or that man has (as a component part) a thinking soul (using the form with “has”); and one has said the same thing. To be rational means to have (as a component part) a thinking soul. Similarly, again, one can say either that man is a rational animal (using the genus and the specific difference with “is”) or that man has (is composed of) a sensitive body and a thinking soul (using the matter and the form with “has”); and one has said the same thing. To be a rational animal means to have (to be composed of) a sensitive body and a thinking soul.

Furthermore, as Aquinas would most certainly say, an identification and description of each of the elements and compounds and organs (if it has any organs) of a thing would provide a more detailed account of the thing’s matter, and thereby of the genus which is taken from matter. There is more than a very strong hint at this in what Aquinas writes in In Boetii De Trinitate, in a passage considered briefly above (pp. 136–137), while reflecting on the question whether elements are ingredients of the essence of a thing which is composed of them:

… per se competit homini quod inveniatur in eo anima rationalis, et corpus compositum ex quatuor elementis; unde sine his partibus homo intelligi non potest: et sic oportet poni in definitione eius …

Sed digitus, pes, manus et huiusmodi, sunt praeter intellectum hominis, unde ex illis ratio essentialis hominis non dependet, unde sine his intelligi potest.

Sive enim habeat pedes, sive non, dummodo ponatur coniunctum ex anima rationali et corpore composito ex quatuor elementis propria mixtione quam requirit talis forma, erit homo.

( In Boetii De Trinitate, q.5, a.3, c.)

… it belongs to man as such that there be found in him a rational soul and a body composed of the four elements. And this is why man cannot be understood without these parts.

And so, they must be put into the definition of man …

But a finger, a foot, a hand, and such like, are outside what it is to be a man. Whence man’s essential nature does not depend on them, and so can be understood without them.

It is clear that man cannot be, nor therefore can man be understood, except as composed of a rational soul and a sensitive body. And man’s sensitive body, as Aquinas sees it, cannot be, nor therefore can it be understood, except as composed of the four elements (today, we would say, composed of certain quarks and leptons) put together in the way required by man’s rational soul. And this is why, as Aquinas sees it, the rational soul and the sensitive body and the four elements (today, certain quarks and leptons) must be put into the definition of man, the elements (today, quarks and leptons) being included in order to provide details with respect to the nature of man’s body. A finger, however, or a hand or an elbow, a toe or a foot or a knee — these, and other parts like them, are outside what it is to be a man. Experience teaches us that a man can exist without them. And this is why such parts do not have to be put into man’s definition. But there are other parts, like the brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the intestines, without which —experience teaches us — man cannot exist. These, therefore, are clearly parts of what it is to be a man, and so must be included in man’s definition. And although Aquinas makes no mention of bodily parts like these in the passage quoted just above, he would most certainly recognize parts like these as bodily organs which must be included in an account of man’s body.

6—

Ingredients in the Definition of an Element (The Elements As Definienda)

The matter of a mixed body, according to Aquinas, cannot be, nor can it be understood, except as composed of the four elements (today, we would say, except as composed of certain quarks and leptons), put together in the way required by the form of that mixed body. But what about the elements themselves (or today, the quarks and leptons themselves)? What are their intrinsic components; what are the ingredients of their essences; how are they to be defined? What is that within them which accounts for the fact 1) that they have come into existence (their becoming), 2) that they are now Page 156

in existence (their being), and 3) that they do what they do (their activities)? The question here is not about the meaning of the word “element,” the meaning considered above, and in some detail (pp. 46–52). Nor is it about the word “element” in the very general sense in which any cause at all which enters the composition of a thing can be said to be an element, a sense which Aquinas notes as he comments on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, the sense in which matter and form can be said to be the universal elements of all things which come to be in change, even though they themselves (i.e., matter and form) are not bodies. 9 Nor is it about the nature of matter and form themselves. The question is rather about the elements themselves, about those elements which are bodies, i.e., about earth, water, air and fire, both in general and in particular. In general. Are these bodily elements composed of matter and form? If so, does the matter of each have something in common with the matter of the others? Does the form of each have something in common with the form of the others? If so, then they have both a common genus and a common specific difference. In particular. How is the element earth to be defined? What sort of matter does earth have? This will supply its genus. What sort of form does earth have? This will supply its specific difference. Similarly with respect to water and air and fire. For us today, how is a quark to be defined? How is a lepton to be defined? Further, how is each of the various types of quark to be defined? For example, the uquark, and the dquark? And how, the various types of lepton? For example, the electron, and the electronneutrino? Would a matterform definition (and its derivative, a genusdifference definition) be acceptable, appropriate, possible? If not, what sort of definition would be acceptable, appropriate, possible?

9 … non enim quaelibet causa potest dici elementum, sed solum quae intrat rei compositionem. Unde universalia elementa sunt materia et forma, ut patet in I Physic. , quae tamen non sunt corpora. Hic autem intendit Philosophus de elementis quae sunt corpora … ( In III De Caelo, lectio 8, in medio).

The following comments of Aquinas (on pp. 157–158) can be used to provide the beginnings of some sort of general account of the essences of the four elements.

… omne quod est melius, Deo attribuendum est. Sed, apud nos, composita sunt meliora simplicibus, sicut corpora mixta elementis, et elementa suis partibus. Ergo non est dicendum quod Deus sit omnino simplex. ( S.T. , I, q.3, a.7, obj. 2)

… everything which is better is to be attributed to God. But, here in this world, composed things are better than simple things, like mixed bodies which are better than the elements, and the elements which are better than their parts. Therefore, it is not to be said that God is utterly simple.

Just above, in a possible objection to God’s utter simplicity, Aquinas explicitly states that the elements are composed out of parts, just as mixed bodies are composed out of the elements. But he says nothing about the nature of these parts.

… elementorum corpora sunt simplicia, et non est in eis compositio nisi materiae et formae … ( C.G. , III, cap. 23)

… the bodies of the elements are simple, and there is no composition in them except out of matter and form …

Here, however, Aquinas explicitly states that the elements are simple. And what is simple, one wants to note, cannot be composed of parts. Nonetheless, Aquinas immediately adds that there is a composition in the elements, i.e., a composition out of matter and form, but only out of matter and form; thereby both identifying the nature of the parts out of which the elements are composed, and limiting the composition to just one kind. He must mean that the elements are simple precisely as bodies, i.e., that they are not composed out of parts which are bodily parts (… elementorum corpora sunt simplicia… .). The elements, thus, are both composed and simple; composed with respect to matter and form, simple with respect to bodily components.

But this is puzzling. For how can something which is a body — the elements are bodies — have no bodily components?

… non enim quaelibet causa potest dici elementum, sed solum quae intrat rei compositionem. Unde universalia elementa sunt materia et forma, ut patet in I Physicorum, quae tamen non sunt corpora. Hic autem intendit Philosophus de elementis quae sunt corpora … ( In III De Caelo, lectio 8, n.)

… not just any cause can be called an element, but only those which enter the composition of a thing. Whence the universal elements [of physical things] are matter and form, as is clear from Bk. I of the Physics; but matter and form are not bodies. Here, however, the Philosopher intends to treat of those elements which are bodies …

Just above, in terms of the meaning of the word “element” pointed out earlier (p. 156), Aquinas sheds some light on what it means to say that each of the four elements is both composed and simple. This meaning of “element” is a very general meaning, i.e., any cause, whether a body or not, which in any way enters the composition of a thing can be called an element. In this sense of “element,” matter and form, as intrinsic causes, are universally the elements of all substances which can come to be in change, though they themelves (i.e., matter and form) are not bodies. And so, one can argue, since each of the four elements is a substance which can come to be in change, each is composed out of matter and form; even though no one of them comes to be, nor is composed, out of prior bodily things. There are no prior bodily things. The four elements are, each of them, the ultimate bodily things out of which all other sorts of bodily things come to be. That is, there are no bodily things prior to the elements, out of which the elements themselves could come to be, in such a way that these prior bodily things could survive in the elements in a way which would be like the way in which the elements themselves survive in the mixed bodies which come to be out of them. When an element comes to be, it can come to be only out of another element. And what survives in it from the one out of which it came Page 159

to be, can be only prime matter. Which means that the form by which it differs fom the element out of which it came to be, must be a substantial form.

How, then, is it that each of the four elements is a bodily thing, something threedimensional? How, since each is composed out of prime matter and substantial form, and only out of prime matter and substantial form; and neither of these components is a body?

Though it is true, for Aquinas, that neither prime matter nor substantial form is a body, i.e., that neither is something of itself three dimensional, and that prime matter and substantial form are the only ingredients in the essence of an element (indeed, in the essence of any substance which can come to be in change); it is also true, for Aquinas, that these dimensions are a property of any such substance. That is, by means of its substantial form in one of its several grades (or functions), i.e., in its grade of corporeity, any such substance is continuously productive of its three dimensions, much like the sun is continuously productive of light; and by means of its prime matter, in its (i.e., prime matter’s) role as ultimate subject, any such substance is continuously receptive of those three dimensions. So that, although its three dimensions are not ingredients of its essence, such a substance does have three dimensions — as a property which is caused by the ingredients of its essence —

produced (continuously), as by an agent cause, by its substantial form; and received (continuously), as by a subject, by its prime matter.

It may be helpful, at this point, to consider briefly the following comments of Aquinas (on pp. 159–164), as a kind of continuation of his general account of the essences of the four elements. He is concerned to point out the distinctive contributions of prime matter and of substantial form to the individuation of physical substances, but what he points out is quite clearly relevant to our present concern.

The contribution of prime matter:

… materia … est subjectum primum. … Primum autem subjectum est quod in alio recipi non potest . . . …materia … est principium individuationis ut est primum subjectum … ( De Natura Materiae et Dimensionibus Interminatis, cap. 1; vol. 27, 489 b–490 a)

… matter … is the first subject. … Now, a first subject is a subject which cannot be received into another … … And matter … is the principle of individuation precisely as it is the first subject …

To say that prime matter is the first subject is to say that there is nothing, no subject, prior to prime matter into which prime matter itself could be received; that prime matter is the ultimate subject, the irreceivable subject. It is also to say that prime matter is that into which all physical forms are received, both substantial and accidental; substantial forms (including of course the forms of each of the four elements), immediately into prime matter; accidental forms (including of course three dimensional quantity), into the physical substance itself, but by virtue of the receptivity of prime matter. This is what is of relevance to our present concern.

With respect to individuation, now, the irreceivability of prime matter is what accounts for the fact that a physical substance cannot be received into another as into a subject, i.e., for the fact that it is a substance, an ultimate existing subject (one of the basic features of an individual), thereby differentiating it from substantial forms and from accidental forms as well, neither of which is an individual in the sense of an ultimate existing subject. Each exists in another as in a subject, and is individuated (with respect to its being irreceivable into yet another) by that other; the substantial form, by the irreceivability of the prime matter in which it exists;

accidental forms, by the irreceivability of the substance itself (composed of prime matter and substantial form) in which they exist.

… impossibile est quamcumque partitionem ante formam substantialem in ea [sc. in materia prima] ponere, cum inductio formae sit generatio compositi, cujus solum est habere partes per se. Materia [prima] autem et forma [substantialis] non habent partes per se, sed tantum per accidens. Unde non dividitur nisi per accidens, ad divisionem scilicet totius.

Ex quo manifestum est quod priusquam compositum constitueretur, nulla partibilitas fuit ex parte materiae, cum hoc non competit sibi nisi per accidens. (De Natura Materiae et Dimensionibus Interminatis, cap. 2, vol. 27, 493 b)

… it is impossible that there be any partition at all in it [i.e., in prime matter] before the substantial form, since the coming in of the substantial form is the generation of the composite, to which alone it belongs properly (per se) to have parts. Whence it [i.e., matter] is not divided except through the division of something else (per accidens), i.e., at the division of the whole. From which it is clear that before the composite was constituted, there was no way at all that matter could be divided into parts, since that does not belong to matter except through something else (per accidens).

Threedimensional quantity, notes Aquinas, belongs properly (per se) to the composite of prime matter and substantial form, i.e., to the ultimate existing subject; and to prime matter (to the substantial form, too) only because it is an ingredient in the essence of the ultimate existing subject. Prime matter is nothing but pure receptive potentiality for substantial form; and substantial form is simply what actualizes that potentiality. Neither one nor the other, therefore, is as such three dimensional. Each is three dimensional in virtue of the three dimensionality of the substance. This is what is of relevance to our present concern.

With respect to individuation, now, the three dimensionality of prime matter, which it has in virtue of the three dimensionality of the substance of the essence of which it is an ingredient, is that in virtue of which prime matter can be divided into various parts, into each of which it can receive a diverse substantial form, thus accounting for the fact of many individuals

within a same species.

The contribution of substantial form:

… actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subjecti; ita quod subjectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis; inquantum autem est in actu, est eius productivum. Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente; nam respectu accidentis extranei, subjectum est susceptivum tantum; productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum. (S.T., I, q. 77, a.1, c.)

… the actuality of an accidental form is caused by (derived from) the actuality of the subject, in such a way that the subject, to the extent that it is in potency, is receptive of the accidental form; and to the extent that it is in act, it is productive of that accidental form. And I say this about a proper and per se accident. For with respect to an extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only; and what is productive of it is an extrinsic agent.

Here, Aquinas points out that it is the physical substance itself, by virtue of the components of its essence, which accounts for the fact that it has all the per se accidents which it has, including its three dimensional quantity. By virtue of its prime matter, the physical substance is receptive of its per se accidents, including its three dimensions; and by virtue of its substantial form, which is that by which it is in act, the physical substance is productive of them. There are, of course, certain accidents with respect to which a physical substance is receptive only, and this by virtue of the receptivity of the prime matter in it, e.g., the shape which the marble of a given statue happens to have. The productive cause of this shape, i.e., the sculptor, is quite clearly something extrinsic to, something not included in, the essence of the marble. This is what is of relevance to our present concern.

With respect to individuation, now, the substantial form is that which (as formal cause) accounts for 1) the fact that a newly generated physical substance both begins to be, and continues to be, an actual existing individual, and (as productive cause) accounts for 2) the fact that prime matter is threedimensionally extended, and so capable of being divided into various parts, each of which can become an individual quantitatively divided from others.

… forma perfectior virtute continet quidquid est inferiorum formarum. Et ideo una et eadem existens, perficit materiam secundum diversos perfectionis gradus. Una enim et eadem forma est per essentiam, per quam homo est ens actu, et per quam est corpus, et per quam est vivum, et per quam est animal, et per quam est homo. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque genus consequuntur propria accidentia. Sicut ergo materia intelligitur perfecta secundum esse ante intellectum corporeitatis, et sic de aliis; ita praeintelliguntur accidentia quae sunt propria entis, ante corporeitatem. (S.T., I, q. 76, a. 6, ad 1).

… a more perfect form contains in its power (virtute) whatever belongs to inferior forms. Thus, one and the same form perfects matter with respect to diverse grades of perfection.

For it is essentially one and the same form through which man is a being in act, and through which he is a body, and through which he is a living thing, and through which he is an animal, and through which he is a man. Moreover, it is clear that certain proper accidents are consequent upon each genus. Therefore, just as matter is understood as perfected by existence before being understood as perfected by corporeity, and similarly with respect to other grades; so too the accidents which are proper to being are understood before corporeity itself is understood.

… cum anima sit forma substantialis, quia constituit hominem in determinata specie substantiae, non est aliqua alia forma substantialis media inter animam et materiam primam; sed homo ab ipsa anima rationali perficitur secundum diverssos gradus perfectionum, ut sit scilicet corpus, et animatum corpus, et animal raionale. (Q. D., De Anima, a. 9, c.) Page 164

… since the soul is a substantial form, because it constitutes man in a determinate species of substance, there is no other substantial form between the soul and prime matter.

Rather, it is by the rational soul itself that man is perfected with respect to diverse grades of perfection, so as to be a body, and an animated body, and a rational animal.

… per formam substantialem, quae est anima humana, habet hoc individuum non solum quod sit homo, sed quod sit animal, et quod sit vivum, et quod sit corpus, et substantia, et ens.. (Q.D., De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 3, c.)

… through the substantial form, which is the human soul, this individual is not only a man, but also an animal, and a living thing, and a body, and a substance, and a being.

In the three quotations just above, Aquinas is making the point that the one substantial form of an individual bodily substance, whether element or mixed body, is that which confers upon it all its essential characteristics, along with all its properties, i.e., its per se accidental characteristics. Thomas, for example, is a man. It is his one substantial form which confers upon him the essential characteristics proper to a man, of which there are several. To be a man is to be a body, to be a living thing, to be a sensing thing, to be rational. And it is Thomas’ one substantial form, by informing prime matter, which makes him a body, living, sensing, rational. It is also through that same substantial form that Thomas is a being, i.e., an actually existing substance. His substantial form, thus, has a number of grades (or functions): the grade of being, the grade of corporeity, the grade of animation, etc. Consequent upon the substantial form in each of its grades, as effects following naturally from their cause (sometimes formal cause, sometimes productive or agent cause) are the properties or per se accidents of that grade. For example, following upon the substantial form in its grade of animation are the three vegetative powers, i.e., the power of nutrition, of growth, and of reproduction.

Following upon the substantial form in its grade of sensitivity are the sensory powers, both internal and external. The property, or per se accident, consequent upon the substantial form in its grade of corporeity is three dimensional quantity.

The same is to be said about an element. This particle of fire (the smallest possible particle of fire), for example, has its various characteristics from its one substantial form, both those which belong to its essence, and those which follow on its essence as properties or per se accidents. To be a particle of fire is to be a being, i.e., an ultimate existing subject, to be a body, and to be fire. The substantial form of fire has at least these three grades (or functions): 1) that of being (i.e., of substantiality), by which fire is an ultimate existing subject (essential), and from which follow (as from a formal cause) being true, being good, being beautiful, etc. (the properties or per se accidents of being); 2) that of corporeity, by which fire is a body (essential), and from which follow (as from a productive or agent cause) three dimensions (the property or per se accident of corporeity); and 3) that of being the species or kind of element which it is, by which it is fire (essential), and from which follows (as from a productive or agent cause) being hot (one of the properties or per se accidents of fire).

It may be helpful, at this point, to describe the birth of an element in the following way, a way which is quite in accord with how Aquinas might describe it. Suppose that one of the four elements (the smallest possible particle of that element) is coming to be out of another of the four elements (the smallest possible particle of this other element). Now the corruption (the going out of existence) of the one particle is identically the generation (the coming into existence) of the other particle. What survives in the newly generated particle, from the just corrupted particle, is prime

matter, pure receptive potentiality for all physical forms, both substantial and accidental. And the effect of the agent causality of the appropriate changeinducing causes (whatever these might be) is the conferring of the substantial form of the newly generated particle on the prime matter which was formerly actualized by the substantial form of the just corrupted particle. As soon as that new substantial form is introduced into prime matter, and just so long as it remains in prime matter, its continuous agent causality confers three dimensions on prime matter. To be sure, the prime matter which was formerly actualized by the substantial form of the now corrupted particle was then, too, in possession of three dimensions, by reason of the continuous agent causality of that prior substantial form. So that there was never a moment in which prime matter was without three dimensions, since there was never a moment in which prime matter was without a substantial form. Of itself, however, prime matter is without dimensions, i.e., it is in this respect like a mathematical point. Any substantial form, too, of itself, is without dimensions, i.e., like a mathematical point. But each, i.e., prime matter and substantial form, is also quite unlike a mathematical point. A mathematical point is not only dimensionless, but also incapable of any sort of physical causality. A substantial form, by way of contrast, though dimensionless, is capable of physical causality, and of various sorts, including an agent causality with respect to quantity, i.e., if has the power to spread prime matter out threedimensionally, and to keep it that way (a kind of ” small”

Big Bang, — small, since it occurs within, and is limited to, the confines of any given physical substance, whether an element or a mixed body). Prime matter, too, though dimensionless, is capable of physical causality. But its causality is of a different sort, i.e., of a receptive sort. It has a receptive capacity, a continuously receptive capacity, not only with respect to the three dimensions productively emitted by the substantial form which is informing it (the substantial form in its grade or function of corporeity), but with respect to any and every other feature (both substantial and accidental) which that substantial form has it in its power to confer on prime matter. Thus, the substantial form of the newly generated particle confers (as a formal cause) on the prime matter, which has survived in it from the now corrupted

prior particle, not only corporeity (which is among the features of the substantial essence of the newly generated particle) and (as a productive cause) the three dimensions which are consequent on corporeity (these dimensions are predicamental accidents, and so not of the substantial essence of the newly generated particle), but all the other features (both those which belong to its substantial essence, and those which are among its productively emitted predicamental accidents) which pertain to the newly generated particle, e.g., a certain limit on its dimensions, being hot, or being cold, or wet, or dry.

The preceding (pp. 157–167) can be taken to be Aquinas’ general account of the essences of the four elements. The following (pp. 167–183) can be taken to be his particular account of the essence of each of them.

It will be good to begin with an account of the essence of fire. For, while reflecting on the appropriateness of Boethius’ definition of “persona,” i.e., rationalis naturae individua substantia, Aquinas, to illustrate a point, not only suggests a definition of fire, but a definition which, it seems, can be used as a pattern to define the other three elements as well. He writes:

… quia substantiales differentiae non sunt nobis notae, vel etiam nominatae non sunt, oportet interdum uti differentiis accidentalibus loco substantialium, puta si quis diceret: ignis est corpus simplex, calidum et siccum; accidentia enim propria sunt effectus formarum substantialium, et manifestant eas. ( S.T., I, q. 29, a.1, ad 3)

… because substantial differences are not known to us, or even because they haven’t been named, it is necessary sometimes to use accidental differences in the place of substantial ones, for

instance if one were to say: fire is a simple body, hot and dry. For proper accidents are effects of substantial forms, and manifest them.

Fire, suggests Aquinas, can be defined as a simple body, hot and dry. To explain. Bodies are either simple, i.e., elements, or complex (mixed), i.e., made out of elements. A mixed body is composed out of prime matter and substantial form, and out of simple bodies, i.e., elements, as well. And these elements are put together not by a simple aggregation, in the way in which a heap is made out of stones; nor by a composition which both puts them together in a given order, in the way in which a house is put together out of wood and stones, and holds them together by using certain sorts of joining materials like nails and glue and mortar; but by a mixing (per mixtionem) in which the elements affect and alter one another so as to remain in the mixed body in a special way (i.e., virtually, or with their powers, and retrievably), though not actually (i.e., not with their substantial forms.10

A simple body, by way of contrast, is composed out of prime matter and substantial form indeed, but not also out of simple bodies. It has no composing bodily ingredients. There are no prior bodily things out of which simple bodies could be composed. Simple bodies, i.e., elements, are the ultimate bodily constituents of all other bodily things. The expression “simple body,” it is clear, functions as a genus in this definition of fire. That is, all elements have this in common that they are simple bodies.

The expression “hot and dry,” by way of contrast, it is clear, functions as a specific difference. Hot and dry are proper accidents of fire, caused by, and manifesting, the substantial form of fire.

10 … quod plura corpora veniant ad constitutionem unius, hoc non potest esse nisi tribus modis: vel per simplicem aggregationem, sicut ex lapidibus fit acervus;

vel per compositionem, quae est cum ordine partium determinato, et ligamento, sicut ex lignis et lapidibus fit domus;

vel per mixtionem, sicut ex elementis efficitur mixtum.

… in tertio … modo oportet esse alterationem componentium, quia mixtio est miscibilium alteratorum unio, ut in I De gener. dicitur … ( In II Sent., d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol.).

But, being hot belongs to fire in a primary or immediate way, i.e., precisely because fire is fire, whereas being dry belongs to fire in a secondary or derived way, i.e., precisely because fire is hot. Or, fire is hot, because it is fire; and it is dry, because it is hot; as if to say, explains Aquinas, that by the intensity of its heat, it has consumed (or destroyed or dissipated or vanquished or evaporated) wetness. Fire is so hot, it has to be dry. Pure fire is as hot as hot can be, and therefore also as dry as dry can be.

Although two of the four elemental qualities, explains Aquinas, belong to each of the elements — fire is hot and dry, air hot and wet, water cold and wet, earth cold and dry — one of these four qualities belongs principally to each of the four elements as properly its own, the other belonging to each in some secondary way.

Aquinas puts it as follows:

Quamvis quatuor qualitatum elementalium duae conveniunt singulis (nam. ignis est calidus et siccus, aer calidus et humidus, aqua frigida et humida, terra frigida et sicca), in singulis tamen elementis singulae harum qualitatum principaliter inveniuntur quasi proprie ipsis: nam ignis proprium est calidum, quia enim ignis est nobilissimum inter elementa et propinquissimum caelesti corpori, convenit ei proprie et secundum se calidum, quod est maxime activum, siccum vero competit ei propter excessum caliditatis, quasi iam humiditate consumpta;

aeri vero competit quidem calidum secundario, ex affinitate ad ignem, secundum se autem competit ei humidum, quod est nobilius inter qualitates passivas, quasi calore resolvente humiditatem et non consumente, propter maiorem distantiam a prima cause caloris, quae est corpus caeleste;

aquae vero proprie et secundum se competit ei frigidum, quod est secunda qualitas activa, quasi privative se habens ad calidum, competit autem ei humidum secundario secundum propinquitatem ad aerem;

terrae vero competit quidem frigidum secundario, quasi ex propinquitate aquae, siccum autem competit ei proprie et per se, quasi propter longissimam distantiam a fonte caloris non resoluta terra in humiditatem, sed in ultima grossitie permanente … ( In De Sensu et Sensato, Tract. I, De Sensu Exteriori, cap. 9, circa princ.) Of the four elemental qualities, two are found together in each of the elements; fire is hot and dry, air hot and wet, water cold and wet, earth cold and dry. Nonetheless, just one of these qualities is found principally in each of the elements as though properly its own.

Being hot is proper to fire. For, since fire is the most noble of the elements, and closest to the heavenly bodies; being hot, which is in the highest degree active, belongs to fire properly and because of itself. Being dry, however, belongs to fire because of the intensity of its heat, as though wetness had already been consumed.

To air, being hot belongs secondarily, because of its closeness to fire. Being wet, however, which is the more noble of the passive qualities, belongs to air because of itself, as though by its heat driving away, but not consuming, wetness because of its greater distance from the first causes of heat, which are the heavenly bodies.

To water, properly and because of itself, belongs being cold, which is the second active quality, since it is privatively related to being hot. And being wet belongs to water secondarily, because of its closeness to air.

To earth, being cold belongs secondarily, as though because of its closeness to water. Being dry, however, belongs to earth properly and because of itself, as though earth had not been resolved into humidity because of its great distance from the source of heat, but had remained in utmost density.

Fire is the most noble of the elements, explains Aquinas, i.e., among the elements it is the closest to, most like, the heavenly bodies, which are the first causes of heat.

And this is why — though fire is both hot and dry — being hot, which is as active as active can be, belongs to fire immediately, i.e., as an accident which is properly its own because of itself; whereas being dry is an accident which belongs to it mediately or derivatively, i.e., because of its first being hot. Thus, it is hot because it is fire;

and it is dry because it is hot. — And so, fire can be defined as a simple body (the genus, which affirms composition out of prime matter and substantial form, and denies composition out of simpler bodies), hot immediately and dry derivatively (the specific difference, expressed in terms of proper accidents, which are caused by, and manifest, the substantial form).

This definition of fire can be used as a pattern to define air, as noted above, and the two other elements as well. Air can be defined as a simple body, wet and hot.

Being hot, explains Aquinas, is an accident which belongs to air only secondarily, i.e., because of its closeness, its likeness, to fire; whereas being wet — the more noble passive quality (the less noble passive quality is being dry) — is an accident which belongs to air because of itself, as though, by the heat which is in it, driving away but not totally vanquishing wetness, because it is further away from, less like, the heavenly bodies than fire is. Thus, it is wet because it is weaker than, i.e., less hot than, fire; and hot because it is close to, in a way like, fire. — And so, air can be defined as a simple body (the genus, which affirms composition out of prime matter and substantial form, and denies composition out of simpler bodies), wet primarily and hot secondarily (the specific difference, expressed in terms of proper accidents, which are caused by, and manifest, the substantial form).

Patterning the definition of water after that of fire, one can say that water is a simple body, cold and wet. Being cold — the second active quality, inasmuch as it is privatively related to being hot (the first active quality) — is an accident which belongs to water properly and because of itself. Being wet, Page 172

however, is an accident which belongs to water because it is close to air. It is nonetheless, less like the heavenly bodies than air is. Thus, it is cold because it is water;

and it is wet because it is close to air. — And so, water can be defined as a simple body (the genus, which affirms composition out of prime matter and substantial form, and denies composition out of simpler bodies), cold primarily and wet secondarily (the specific difference, expressed in terms of proper accidents which are caused by, and manifest, the substanital form).

The definition of earth, too, can be patterned after that of fire. Earth can be defined as a simple body, dry and cold. Being cold is an accident which belongs to earth only secondarily, because of its closeness to water. But being dry — the less noble passive quality, because (can one say?) it is privatively11 related to being wet (being wet is the more noble passive quality) — is an accident which belongs to earth properly and because of itself. Earth is dry, as though not yet released into humidity, because it is so far away from (of the elements, the least like) both fire and the heavenly bodies. Thus, it is dry because it is earth, and as such so far away from, so unlike, fire; it is cold because it is close to water. — And so, earth can be defined as a simple body (the genus, which affirms composition out of prime matter and substantial from, and denies composition out of simpler bodies), dry primarily and cold secondarily (the specific difference, expressed in terms of proper accidents, which are caused by, and manifest, the substantial form).

11 … siccitas … non est aliud quam humiditatis privatio … ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt., lect. 3, in fine). — Fr. Weisheipl points out that St. Thomas’ “commentary on De generatione is unfinished, terminating with Book I, lect. 17, the remainder being written by Thomas Sutton and others. William of Tocco himself saw Thomas writing this commentary on De generatione, and testified that he believed this to have been Thomas’s ‘last work in philosophy.’” (Weisheipl, James A., O.P. Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works (with corrigenda and addenda). The Catholic University of America Press: Washington, D.C.. 1983; p. 317). — My comments on In II De generatione, therefore, reflect “Thomas Sutton and others;” but what they have to say is not, as far as I can see, inconsistent with anything which Aquinas would hold.

To summarize, and perhaps to clarify as well. Fire, as Aquinas sees it, is hot because it is fire, and dry because it is hot. And it is hot, because it is more like the heavenly bodies than any other element. The heavenly bodies are just above fire, and in contact with it. Being hot is fire’s unique property, the property which differentiates fire from the other elements. — Air is wet because it is air. It is hot because it is like fire, indeed more like fire than either water or earth are. Fire is just above air, and in contact with it. And this is why air is hot. But being wet is air’s unique property, the property by which air differs from the other elements. — Water is cold because it is water, and wet because it is like air, indeed more like air than earth is. Air is just above water, and in contact with it. And this is why water is wet.

But being cold is water’s unique property, the property which differentiates water from the other elements. — Earth is dry because it is earth, and cold because it is like water. Earth is in no way like air or fire, not even in its dryness. Water is just above earth, and in contact with it. And this is why earth is cold. But being dry is earth’s unique property, the property by which earth differs from the other elements.

Now, the dryness of earth is different from the dryness of fire. Fire is dry because, as the most noble of the elements, it is as hot as hot can be, and as such, i.e., propter excessum caliditatis, consumes, or dissipates, any wetness which might have invaded it from the air which is just beneath it, and in contact with it — …

siccum … competit ei [sc. igni] propter excessum caliditatis, quasi iam humiditate [aeris] consumpta. Fire is dry (has no wetness in it), because its heat drives that wetness out, or, better put, does not allow it to enter fire at all; the heat of fire consumes wetness.12 Earth, by way of difference, is dry because it is the least noble of the elements, the

12 Duae … sunt causae siccitatis: una est frigus condensans et comprimens humidum, et per consequens removens; siccitas enim non est aliud quam humiditatis privatio. Alia causa est caliditas humiditatem consumens. ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt., lect. 3, in fine).

furthest away from the first source of heat, i.e., the heavenly bodies, and because of this in no way fluid (fire and air and water are “fluid”, i.e., they flow, each in is own way), but rather as dense, as compact, as solid, and therefore, as nonflowing, as can be — … siccum competit ei [sc. terrae] quasi propter longissimam distantiam a fonte caloris [sc. a caelesti corpore] non resoluta terra in humiditatem, sed in ultima grossitie [i.e., denseness, solidness, compactness]

permanente. Moreover, because earth is as dense, as compact, as solid as can be, there is no room, there are no empty spaces, within it, to permit the wetness of air or of water to invade it. Earth is as dense, as compact, as solid as the atoms of Democritus. Lastly, earth is dry because its coldness condenses, compresses, and thereby removes, whatever air or water and accompanying wetness might have attempted to invade it (if this were possible; and it seems that it is not, because of the absolute density of earth).

One might ask why, according to Aquinas following Aristotle, only the contraries hotcold and wetdry figure in an account of the elements, and not others like heavylight, hardsoft, supplebrittle, roughsmooth, coarsegrained/finegrained. All of these are clearly contraries which are related to touch and physical contact, but not all are capable of acting upon, and of being acted upon by, one another. And this is most clearly required of the elements. The elements must be capable of affecting one another, and of being affected by one another and by the heavenly bodies, since they both come together to constitute mixed bodies and are changed into one another. It is clear that if a heavy body is put into contact with a lighter body, the lighter body does not thereby become heavier, nor the heavier one lighter.

But it is clearly the case that if a hot body (e.g., a hot hotwater bottle) is placed in contact with a cooler body (e.g., my hand), the cooler body becomes thereby hotter, and the hotter thereby cooler. Similarly, if a wet body (e.g., a turkish towel) is placed in contact with a dry, or drier, one (e.g., another towel) the dry or drier one becomes thereby wetter, and the wetter one thereby drier. Neither does a hard body put into contact with a softer one become thereby softer. Nor does the softer body become thereby harder; and similarly with

respect to the other contraries mentioned above.

If the definition of each of the four elements includes, appropriately, a specific difference which is expressed in terms of proper accidents (proper accidents are caused by, and manifest, the substantial form), each of these accidents, too, should be defined in some appropriate way, in order to make the definitions of each of the elements more complete. Being hot, the principal or dominating13 property of fire, is an active quality which gathers together (congregat) things which are like one another, things which have a like nature (homogenea), and thereby separates (segregat) things which are unlike one another, things which are different in nature (heterogenea);14 for example, it purifies metals. Being cold, the primary or dominating property of water, is also an active quality. But, unlike being hot, it gathers together anything and everything (congregat omnia), both things which are of the same nature and things which are of different natures.15 For example, freezing gathers together not only portions of water, but all sorts of debris, in the ice which is its effect. Being wet, the primary or dominating property of air, is a passive quality. To be wet is to have no set limit or boundary of its own, but to be easily limited or bounded by the limits or boundaries of other 13 … elementa, cum sint quatuor, et quodlibet habeat duas qualitates, non tamen habet eas aequaliter, sed … in unquoque dominatur una: sicut in terra magis dominatur siccitas quam frigiditas, in aqua magis frigiditas quam humiditas, in aere magis humiditas quam caliditas, in igne vero magis dominatur caliditas quam siccitas. Non est autem intelligendum, ut quidam dicunt, quod terra, licet sit magis sicca quam frigida, propter hoc sit siccior igne … ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt., lect. 3, in fine). — Though being dry is the dominating property of earth, earth is not drier than fire. Earth in simply more dry than it is cold. Similarly, though being cold is the dominating property of water, water is not colder than earth.

Water is simply more cold than it is wet. Again, though being wet is the dominating property of air, air is not wetter than water. Air is simply more wet than it is hot.

14 … calidum … est quod congregat homogenea sibi … , … [et] licet … calidum segregat, sicut dicunt quidam ignem facere, tamen illud segregate est congregate, quia congregans homogenea, segregat heterogenea per accidens … ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt., lect. 2, in medio).

15 … quod … frigidum sit activum patet … per hoc, quia congregat omnia, tam quae sunt ejusdem naturae, quam illa quae sunt diversae … ( Ibid. ).

things16 (to accept a given shape is a way of being affected, of being passive). For example, air (and water, too) accepts the shape of the inside of the bottle into which it has been blown (poured). Being dry, the primary or dominating property of earth, is also a passive quality. To be dry is to be such that whereas it has a boundary of its own, it is only with difficulty, sometimes with great difficulty, that it can be bounded by the limits or boundaries of other things.17 For example, a brick has to be cut and chiseled in order to be made to fit exactly into a hole in a wall.

Moreover, though being dry, according to Aquinas, is the primary or dominating property of earth (this means simply that earth is drier than it is cold)18, it is not the case, as Aquinas sees it, that earth is drier than fire, to which being dry belongs only secondarily. For, there are two causes of dryness, as noted above (p. 173, footnote 12): one is coldness, condensing and compressing wetness, thereby removing it; the second cause is heat, consuming wetness. Now, the heat of fire is more potent with respect to consuming wetness than the coldness of earth is with respect to condensing and compressing it. And this is why fire is drier than earth, Indeed, because fire is the hottest of the hot,19 it is also the driest of the dry. But it is hot primarily, and dry secondarily, i.e., precisely because it is hot.

Similarly, though being wet, according to Aquinas, is the primary or dominating property of air (this means simply that air is wetter than it is hot), it is not the case, as Aquinas sees it, that air is wetter than water, to which being wet belongs only secondarily. Water is wetter than air, as is 16 … humidum … est indeterminatum proprio termino, belle terminabile termino alieno … ( Ibid. ).

17 … siccum autem terminatur termino proprio, difficulter autem terminabile termino alieno … ( Ibid. ).

18 How exactly, one might ask, is this to be understood? Perhaps as follows. If one measures both dryness and coldness on a scale of one (the least) to ten (the most), ”drier than cold”

might mean, for example, that dryness measures at 9, and coldness at 3.

19 … [ignis] est calidissimum omnium calidorum … ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt., lect. 3, in fine).

clear to sense observation.20 And of itself, one can say, water is the wettest of the wet. Similarly again, though being cold, according to Aquinas, is the primary or dominating property of water (this means simply that water is colder than it is wet), it is not the case, as Aquinas sees it, that water is colder than earth, to which being cold belongs only secondarily. For earth is further away from the first cause of heat, i.e., the heavenly bodies, than any other element; and so is the coldest of all the elements,21 and so the coldest of the cold — frigidissima omnium frigidorum, one might say.

If Aquinas, following Aristotle, is correct in the claim that only the contrary qualities hotcold and wetdry are relevant in distinguishing the four elements from one another, since, as he argues, only these qualities enable the elements to affect, and to be affected by, one another (see above p. 172); it seems nonetheless, on the basis of one’s ordinary senseobservational experience22 of fire, air, water, and earth, that Aquinas is not quite correct as regards what the primary or dominating quality of each element is. The primary or dominating quality of fire seems to be being hot (as for Aquinas);

20 … [aqua est] humida magis quam calida. Non tamen magis quam aqua … … aqua est magis humida quam aer; sensu enim sensibilia judicamus: manifestum est autem omnibus habentibus sensum tactus quod aqua humidior est quam aer … ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt., lect. 3, in fine).

21 … [aqua] est … minus frigida quam terra, quod sic patet. Frigiditas enim causatur ex distantia ab orbe, sicut caliditas ex propinquitate. Cum ergo inter cetera elementa terra magis distet a caelo, necessario sequitur quod terra frigidissima sit inter omnia elementa … ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt., lect. 3, in fine).

22 [… quod elementa transmutantur ad invicem, hoc] videmus ad sensum. [Videmus enim] quod eadem materia, quae nunc est sub frigiditate aquae, aliquando est sub caliditate aeris;

et quod erat sub caliditate aeris, aliquando est sub caliditate ignis … ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt., lect. 1, in fine). … hoc … ad sensum videmus, [quod] ipsa [elementa] sunt ad invicem generata, … cum … videamus quod alteratio secundum passiones tactus [sc. secundum caliditatem, humiditatem, siccitatem et frigiditatem] est inter ea … ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt., lect. 4, circa princ.) It is quite clear, as indicated in these two brief quotes, that sense observational experience is what determines what is to be said about the nature of each of the four elements. But how can one decide by sense observation whether the primary or dominating quality of air is being dry (as I would want to say) or being wet (as Aquinas says), whether that of water is being wet (as I would want to say) or being cold (as Aquinas says), and whether that of earth is being cold (as I would want to say) or being dry (as Aquinas says)?

of air, being dry (rather than being wet, as for Aquinas); of water, being wet (rather than being cold, as for Aquinas); of earth, being cold (rather than being dry, as for Aquinas). Moreover, still on the basis of one’s ordinary senseobservational experience, it seems that each of the elements has more than just one secondary quality (there is just one, for Aquinas), in some sense of “secondary.”

To make this clear, it will be helpful to consider each of the elements in a pure state. Pure fire — fire which is just fire and nothing else, i.e., fire with nothing in it of air or of water or of earth, in any conceivable way of being in it — is of itself, and primarily, hot; it is dry secondarily (in the sense of derivatively), i.e., precisely because it is hot. It is wet, in some secondary sense of wet, only wherever and whenever and to the extent that it has been (if it can be) invaded by evaporated water. It is clear that fire can never be cold, without thereby ceasing to be fire. Fire, in its pure state, is as hot as hot can be, and so, as dry as dry can be, since fire consumes wetness.

But fire is not as wet as wet can be; perhaps never wet in any way at all.

Pure air — air which is just air and nothing else, i.e., air with nothing in it of fire or of water or of earth, in any conceivable way of being in it — is of itself, and primarily, dry. In some secondary sense, it is hot (wherever and whenever it is in contact with fire), and wet (wherever and whenever and to the extent that it has been invaded by evaporated water), and cold (wherever and whenever it is in contact with earth). Pure air is as dry as dry can be, (of itself and primarily, as opposed to derivatively, in the way in which fire is as dry as dry can be); but not as hot as hot can be, nor as wet as wet can be, nor as cold as cold can be.

Pure water — water which is just water and nothing else, i.e., water with nothing in it of fire or of air or of earth, in any conceivable way of being in it — is of itself, and primarily, wet. In some secondary sense, it is hot (wherever and whenever it is in contact with fire), and cold (wherever and Page 179

whenever it is in contact with earth). It is clear that water can never be dry, without thereby ceasing to be water. Water, in its pure state, is as wet as wet can be; but not as cold as cold can be, nor as hot as hot can be.

Pure earth — earth which is just earth and nothing else, i.e., earth with nothing in it of fire or of air or of water, in any conceivable way of being in it — is of itself, and primarily, cold. In some secondary sense, it is hot (wherever and whenever it is in contact with fire), dry (wherever and whenever it is in contact with a breeze, i.e., air in motion, or with fire), and wet (wherever and whenever and to the extent that it has been invaded, if it can be, by liquid water). Pure earth is as cold as cold can be, but not as hot as hot can be, nor as wet as wet can be, nor as dry as dry can be.

But, someone might ask, is there a difficulty here? That is, if earth is of itself, and primarily, cold, how can it ever be hot, even in some secondary sense, without ceasing thereby to be earth? Or, just how hot can earth become without ceasing to be earth? Shall we say that earth remains earth until it has become as hot as hot can be, i.e., so hot that nothing can be hotter, at which point it has become fire? It is clear to ordinary sense observation that earth can be made warm, or even quite hot, without thereby ceasing to be earth.23 Was it correct, then, to have said that pure earth is of itself, and primarily, cold? Or, should one ask: How exactly is the word

“earth” to be understood here, when it is being used to designate one of the four elements? It cannot be taken to mean what one ordinarily means by the word “soil,”

as in “the soil in which plants grow,” for soil in that sense can become very hot indeed without ceasing thereby to be soil. What exactly does the theory of the four elements take the element earth to be?

And that question gives rise to the same question about each of the other elements. Thus, exactly what, according to the theory of the four elements, 23 This raises the question whether the earth of ordinary senseobservational experience is the same as the earth of the theory of the four elements, i.e., whether it is the same as the element earth.

is the element fire? And the element air? And the element water? — These four questions give rise, in turn, to the following ones. 1) What exactly is heat (calidity), the primary or dominating property of the element fire? And what is there about the elements air and water and earth which allows calidity to penetrate, to invade, to possess (are these the right words?) them, thereby changing them in different ways? 2) What exactly is dryness (siccity, aridity), the primary or dominating property of the element air? And what is there about the elements fire and water and earth which allows siccity to penetrate, to invade, to possess (are these the right words?) them, thereby changing them in different ways? 3) What exactly is wetness (humidity), the primary or dominating property of the element water? And what is there about the elements fire and air and earth which allows humidity to penetrate, to invade, to possess (are these the right words?) them, thereby changing them in different ways? 4) What exactly is coldness (frigidity), the primary or dominating property of the element earth?24 And what is there about the elements fire and air and water which allows frigidity to penetrate, to invade, to possess (are these the right words?) them, thereby changing them in different ways?

How, now, are these questions to be answered? It will be helpful to begin with an answer to the general question: What is an element? and then, in terms of that, to move on to the particular questions: What exactly, according to the theory of the four elements, is the element fire? The element air? The element water? The element earth?

As regards the general question: What is an element?, this seems an acceptable answer. An element is a simple body, i.e., something composed out of prime matter and a substantial form (but not out of any prior bodies, since there are none), which (substantial form), as efficient cause, not only 24 See above pp. 177–178, where it was noted that, according to one’s ordinary senseobservational experience, the primary or dominating quality of air seems to be being dry (rather than being wet), of water, being wet (rather than being cold), and of earth, being cold (rather than being dry).

extends the element threedimensionally, but also causes it to have certain proper accidents by which it can both affect, and be affectd by, the other elements,25 so as to undergo the substantial changes in which it is transformed into other elements, and the alterations by which it becomes an ingredient in the makeup of mixed bodies.

The particular questions, now — beginning with the element fire. What exactly, according to the theory of the four elements, is the element fire?26 That is, what exactly are the proper accidents of fire? The answer seems to be the following. The element fire is hot, it is dry, it emits light, it is translucent, even transparent (diaphanous) in a way, it is light in weight, it has an upward rising motion. Now which of these proper accidents is (are) relevant to the substantial changes and to the alterations mentioned in the preceding paragraph? It is obvious to sense observation that being hot is relevant, and being dry, too; as Aquinas rightly claims. But, what about emitting light?27 And translucency? Transparency? Being light in weight? Having an upward rising motion? What sense observations can be made to establish their relevancy, if they are relevant?

What exactly, in the theory of the four elements, is the element air? That is, what exactly are its proper accidents? Air is dry, it is transparent (diaphanous), it is light in weight, it has an upward rising motion, it has the

25 And by the heavenly bodies as well. … nec terrae siccitas, nec caliditas aeris videntur ad generationem ignis posse sufficere: ignis enim multo calidior est quam aer, et siccior quam terra … … licet illa caliditas [sc. aeris] non sufficiat, juvatur tamen et intenditur per virtutem corporis caelestis, et luce Solis, et per virtutem aliarum stellarum … ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt. , lect. 4, in fine).

26 It is becoming increasingly clearer, at this point, that fire, i.e., the fire of ordinary senseobservational experience, is not the same thing as the element fire, i.e., the fire of the theory of the four elements. This seems also to be the case with the other three elements. That is, the air and the water and the earth of ordinary senseobservational experience seem not to be the same as the elements air and water and earth.

27 … per ipsam [sc. lucem] movet caelum materiam generabilium et corruptibilium ad omnem formam … ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt. , lect. 2, in princ.). Can this claim, i.e., the claim that light has a causal impact with respect to the generation and the corruption of all physical things, be substantiated by sense observation(s)? By what sorts of sense observations?

capability to become wet (moist, humid), it has the capability to become warm (even hot), it has the capability to become cool (even cold). Which of these proper accidents is (are) relevant to the substantial changes and to the alterations mentioned above? It is clear to sense observation that being dry is relevant, as Aquinas rightly notes. But what about the others, especially the capabilities? And what sense observations can be made to establish that they are relevant, if they are?

What exactly, according to the theory of the four elements, is the element water? That is, exactly what are its proper accidents? Water is wet, it is transparent (diaphanous), it is heavy, it has a downward falling motion, it has the capability to become warm (indeed hot), the capability to become cool (indeed cold), the capability to be either a liquid, or a solid (as in ice and snow), or a gas (as in steam). Which of these proper accidents is (are) relevant to the substantial changes and to the alterations mentioned above? It is clear to sense observation that being wet is relevant, as Aquinas correctly observes. But what about the others, especially the capabilities? And what sense observations can be made to substantiate their relevancy, if they are relevant?

Lastly, what exactly, in the theory of the four elements, is the element earth? That is, exactly what are its proper accidents? Earth is cold, it is dry, it is opaque, it is heavier than water, it has a downward falling motion, it has the capability to become warm (indeed hot), the capability to become wet (moist). Perhaps others.

Which of these proper accidents is (are) relevant to the substantial changes and to the alterations mentioned above? Being cold and being dry are relevant, as Aquinas correctly notes, and sense observation confirms. But what about the others, especially the capabilities? And by what sense observations can their relevancy be shown, if they are relevant?

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It would be very difficult indeed — more important, it would be without purpose — to try to get a settled answer to these questions about each of the four ancient elements; for we know today that these four cannot possibly be the elements of physical things, inasmuch as they are themselves composed out of prior bodily constituents (which does not befit an element), and inasmuch as it is quite clear today that the elements are, as a matter of established scientific fact, quarks and leptons of various sorts. Nonetheless, these reflections on the ancient four have a lesson to impart, a valuable and important lesson. The lesson is this: in any attempt to identify and to describe the elements of things in the physical world (whether one claims that they are fire and air and water and earth, as people claimed in days gone by; or that they are quarks and leptons of various sorts, as people claim today) — one must identify and describe them by using, in some way, the method of sense observation. Moreover, to be sure that the elements have been identified and described in an appropriate and acceptable way, so that everybody, if possible, would find the account a convincing one, one would have to sophisticate (to enhance, to fortify) the required sense observations with a creative use of controlled experiments, observational instruments, and measuring instruments — as people do today when, for example, they use Tevatron, the world’s most powerful “atom smasher,” i.e., particle accelerator, at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab), in Batavia, Illinois.

7—

The Elements and Creation

… illa quae non possunt produci in esse nisi per creationem, a Deo immediate sunt. Manifestum est autem quod corpora caelestia non possunt produci in esse nisi per creationem.

Non enim potest dici quod ex materia aliqua praeiacenti sunt facta, quia sic essent generabilia et corruptibilia, et contrarietati Page 184

subiecta, quod eis non competit, ut motus eorum declarat. Moventur enim circulariter; motus autem circularis non habet contrarium. Relinquitur igitur quod corpora caelestia sint immediate in esse a Deo producta.

Similiter etiam elementa secundum se tota non sunt ex aliqua materia praeiacenti, quia illud quod praeexisteret, haberet aliquam formam, et sic oporteret quod aliquod corpus aliud ab elementis esset prius eis in ordine causae materialis, si materia praeexistens elementis haberet formam aliam. Oporteret tamen quod unum eorum esset aliis prius in eodem ordine, si materia praecedens formam elementi haberet. Oportet igitur etiam ipsa elementa immediate esse a Deo producta. ( Compendium Theologiae, c. 95).

… things which cannot be brought into being except through creation, are immediately from God. It is clear that heavenly bodies cannot be brought into being except through creation. For, it cannot be said that they were made from some preexisting matter, because if that were the case they would be generable and corruptible, and subject to contrariety, neither of which belongs to them, as their motion makes clear. For they are moved in a circular way, and circular motion has no contrary. It remains therefore that heavenly bodies are brought into being immediately by God.

Similarly the elements, too, taken together in their totality, do not come into being from some preexisting matter, because that which preexisted, would have had some form. And so, some body different from the elements would have had to have been prior to them in the order of material cause, if the matter which existed before the elements had had another form. Moreover, one of them would have had to have been prior to the others in the same order [i.e., in the order of material cause], if the preexisting matter had had the form of an element. The elements too, therefore, must be brought into being immediately by God.

The heavenly bodies, argues Aquinas, cannot be brought into being except by creation, and so, immediately by the power of God, and not from Page 185

some preexisting matter. If they had been brought into being out of a preexisting matter, then they would have been generable and corruptible. And in the view of Aquinas (which we now know to be incorrect), they are neither generable nor corruptible. They would have been subject, too, in the view of Aquinas, to the contrariety of the four elements, for anything which is not an element and which is brought into being out of a preexisting matter, must be composed out of the elements, and so subject to the effects of their contrary qualities, i.e., to the effects of being hot or cold, and of being wet or dry. But, the heavenly bodies, according to Aquinas, are not composed out of these elements, and so not subject to their contrarieties.28 And this is evident, notes Aquinas, from their circular motion, which has no contrary. Aquinas concludes, therefore, that the heavenly bodies are brought into being immediately by the creative power of God, and not from a preexisting matter.

Similarly, neither can the elements be brought into being from some preexisting matter. For, explains Aquinas, if that were the case, then the preexisting matter would have had some form, either that of an element, or of something other than an element. Now, it is impossible that there be bodily things other than elements, which are prior to the elements. And it is just as impossible that there be bodily things which are elements, which are prior to the elements. For, an element is a bodily thing prior to which (as material cause) there can be no bodily thing at all, of whatever kind. The elements, therefore, concludes Aquinas, must be brought into being immediately by the creative power of God, and not from some preexisting matter.

But what, then, is to be made of the claim of Aquinas that although both the heavenly bodies and the elements are simple bodies, i.e., not composed of 28 We know today, of course, that the heavenly bodies, i.e., the sun, the moon, the planets, the stars, and such like, are composed out of the same elements out of which all mixed bodies are composed; not out of the four of Aquinas, to be sure, but out of the same elements nonetheless — i.e., quarks and leptons of various kinds — and are subject, therefore, to the effects of their differing and contrary qualities.

prior bodies, they are nonetheless composed out of matter and form? Doesn’t it follow from that, that both the heavenly bodies and the elements are generable and corruptible? Isn’t anything composed out of matter and form generable and corruptible? — Aquinas would respond that the matter of the heavenly bodies and that of the elements is not the same sort of matter.29 The matter which is an ingredient of the nature of the elements is prime matter, whereas that of the nature of the heavenly bodies is not. And that is why the elements are generable and corruptible, whereas the heavenly bodies are not.

Moreover, someone might object, since Aquinas holds that the elements, unlike the heavenly bodies, are generable and corruptible, he should not have concluded that the elements can be brought into being only by the creative power of God. Indeed, Aquinas explicitly maintains in many places that the elements can be generated out of one another. For example:

…si … unum [elementum] omnino alteri praedominatur, tunc transmutantur adinvicem, et non fit mixtio, sed corruptio debilioris, et generatio sive augmentum praedominantis …

( In II De Gen. et Corrupt. , lect 8, in medio).

…if … one [element] totally overpowers another, then they are changed into one another, and a mixing is not brought about, but rather a corruption of the weaker one, and a generation or an increase of the overpowering one …

29 … materia corporis caelestis, secundum se considerata, non est in potentia nisi ad formam quam habet … … illa forma sic perficit illam materiam, quod nullo modo in ea remanet potentia ad esse, sed ad ubi tantum, … Et sic non est eadem materia corporis caelestis et elementorum, nisi secundum analogiam, secundum quod conveniunt in ratione potentiae … ( S.T. , I, q. 66, a. 2, c., in fine). — … materia corporis caelestis est alia a materia elementi, quia non est in potentia ad formam elementi … ( S.T. , I, q. 66, a. 2, ad 4). —

… caelum, cum sit secundum suam naturam incorruptibile, habet materiam quae non potest subesse aliam formam … ( S.T. , I, q. 68, a. 1, c. in medio). — It is to be noted that matter

”quae potest subesse aliam formam” is prime matter. The matter of the heavenly bodies, according to Aquinas, cannot exist under another form; it has no potentiality with respect to being (nullo modo in ea remanet potentia ad esse), but only with respect to place (sed ad ubi tantum).

… primo ostendit [Philosophus] quod elementa ad invicem transmutantur, tali ratione. Generatio est ex contrariis, et in contraria; omnia elementa habent contrarietatem ad invicem, quia eorum differentiae sunt contrariae. Ostensum est ergo quod elementa adinvicem generantur. Majorem propositionem ostendit inducendo in singulis elementis, dicens quod quaedam elementa secundum ambas differentias contrariantur, sicut ignis et aqua. Ignis enim est calidus et siccus, aqua veto frigida et humida. Calidum autem et frigidum sunt contraria, et similiter humidum et siccum. Quaedam autem contrariantur solum secundum alteram qualitatem, sicut aer et aqua, quia aer est calidus, et aqua est frigida, sed in humiditate conveniunt. Simile est de terra et igne, et de terra et aqua. Sic ergo concludit quod universaliter manifestum est quod quodlibet elementum ex quolibet generetur. ( In II Gen. et Corrupt., lect. 4, circa princ.).

… first [the Philosopher] shows that the elements are changed into one another, with the following reason. Generation is from contraries, and into contraries. All the elements have contrarieties with respect to one another, because they have differences which are contraries. The elements, therefore, are generated from and into one another. He shows the major proposition to be true by arguing inductively from each of the elements. Some elements, he points out, are contrary to one another according to both differences, like fire and water. For fire is hot and dry, whereas water is cold and wet. Now, hot and cold are contraries, and so are wet and dry. Other elements are contrary to one another according to one quality only, like air and water. Air is hot, and water is cold, but they agree in being wet. This is likewise the case as regards earth and fire; as regards earth and water, too.

Thus, he concludes, it is universally true that any element is generated from just any other element.

… licet omnia elementa in hoc conveniant quod quodlibet ex quolibet generatur, differunt in hoc quod quaedam ipsorum facilius et citius, et quaedam tardius et difficilius ad invicem transmutantur. Quaecumque enim habent symbolum, idest convenientiam, in aliqua qualitate, citius et facilius transmutanur ad invicem; illa vero, quae in nulla qualitate conveniunt, tardius et difficilius. Et ratio hujus est quia, cum ea quae habent symbolum transmutantur, non est necesse Page 188

transmutari nisi tantum alteram qualitatem; quando vero ea quae transmutantur ad invicem in nulla qualitate coveniunt, utramque qualitatem necesse est transmutari; facilius autem. est unum transmutari quam plura. ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt., lect. 4, circa medium).

… although all the elements have this in common that any one of them can be generated from and into any other one of them, they differ in that some of them undergo these generations more easily and more quickly, whereas others more slowly and with more difficulty. Those which have a quality in common are changed into one another more quickly and more easily; whereas those which do not have a quality in common, more slowly and with more difficulty. And the reason for this is that, in the case of those which have a quality in common, it is necessary that only one quality be changed; whereas in the case of those which have no quality in common, it is necessary that both qualities be changed.

And, of course, it is easier for one quality to be changed than it is for more than one to be changed.

Although the elements are generable and corruptible, indeed such that they can be generated out of one another, this in no way affects Aquinas’ claim (in the Comp.

Theol., c. 95; see above pp. 182–183) that the elements must be brought into being immediately by the power of God. For the careful reader will notice Aquinas’

careful introductory comment, namely: … elementa secundum se tota … , i.e., the elements taken together in their totality… . Aquinas is writing about God’s creating the heavens and the earth, about what happens “… in prima … corporalis creaturae productione … ,” i.e., “in the first production of corporeal creatures,”

as he puts it in the Summa of Theology.30 God’s power is such that He could have created all corporeal things (the elements, the heavenly bodies, and mixed bodies as

30 … in prima … corporalis creaturae productione non consideratur aliqua transmutatio de potentia in actum. Et ideo formae corporales quas in prima productione corpora habuerunt, sunt immediate a Deo productae, cui soli ad nutum obedit materia, tanquam propriae causae … ( S.T. , I, q. 65, a. 4, c., in fine). It is clear from the context that the corporeal created things (… corporales, creaturae …) mentioned here are generable and corruptible things, i.e., terrestrial bodily things, and not heavenly bodies.

well) in the same beginning instant. But He could not, in that beginning instant, have created something (or some things) such that the elements and the heavenly bodies could have come on the scene later on as deriving from these first created things as out of a preexisting matter. For anything which is brought into being out of a preexisting matter must be composed out of the elements (whether one takes these elements to be the four of which Aquinas speaks, or to be the quarks and leptons of which people speak today). And neither the elements (this is correct) nor the heavenly bodies (this is correct according to Aquinas, but not according to people today) can be composed out of (prior) elements. There can be no bodily things prior to the elements. The elements, whatever one takes them to be, are the absolutely first bodily things.

Someone might ask the question whether God could have, in the beginning instant, created just one of the elements, and then have had the other elements, followed by mixed bodies in an ordered progression from lower kinds to higher kinds on up to man, come on the scene at a later time, and as derived from that one element as from an original preexisting matter. There would, of course, be the need for some corporeal agent cause(s) to act on that one element, and this might give rise to some difficulties. Could one part of fire, for example — if fire had been that one original element — excercise its activity, and so function as a corporeal agent, with respect to another part(s) of fire, which would function as matter, so as to produce air and water and earth out of the part(s) being acted on, and then, out of all four of the elements, once produced, produce mixed bodies as well? Could one part of any one of the elements, whichever one had been the one original element, function as a corporeal agent with respect to another part(s) of that same element (which would function as matter) so as to produce the three other elements, and then, out of all four of the elements, once produced, produce mixed bodies as well?

Fire is hot and dry. Can fire, one part(s) acting on another part(s), produce air and water and earth? Can the hot and dry (fire), acting on the hot and dry Page 190

(fire), produce the wet and hot (air)? Whence would the wet arise? Can the hot and dry (fire), acting on the hot and dry (fire), produce the cold and wet (water)?

Whence would the cold arise? And whence the wet? Can the hot and dry (fire), acting on the hot and dry (fire), produce the dry and cold (earth)? Whence would the cold arise? — It seems, thus, that there could not have been just one element created in that beginning instant.

Could two of the elements, then, have been created in that beginning instant? Say, fire and water, since between them they have all four of the primary qualities, i.e., hot and dry (in fire), cold and wet (in water)?

fire:

hot and dry

water:

cold and wet

Further, could the heat of fire overpower the coldness of water, which is already wet, so as to eliminate that coldness altogether, and thereby produce air (the wet and hot)? Which would overpower (and eliminate) which? Would the heat of fire overpower (and eliminate) the coldness of water, thereby producing air? Or, would the coldness of water overpower (and eliminate) the heat of fire, which is already dry, thereby producing earth (the dry and cold)? Would something in addition to fire and water be needed to determine which would overpower (and eliminate) which? And what would this something additional be? — Further, could the dryness of fire overpower the wetness of water, which is already cold, so as to eliminate that wetness altogether, and thereby produce earth (the dry and cold)? Again, which would overpower (and eliminate) which?

Or, could air and earth (rather than fire and water) have been created as the original two, since they, too, have between them all four of the primary qualities, i.e., wet and hot (in air), dry and cold (in earth)? And which two would have been better as the original two, fire and water, or air and earth? And why?

air:

wet and hot

earth:

dry and cold

Which quality of which of the two elements, air and earth, would overpower (and eliminate) which quality of the other element? Would anything in addition to these two elements be needed to determine which would overpower (and eliminate) which? And what would this something additional be? Would it be some sort of primitive, rudimentary, superdense, superhot particle(s) which could bang out to become a star(s), perhaps the sun of our solar system? The question: Is something additional needed, and what? is raised in the commentary on II De Gen. et Corrupt., where one reads:

… dubitatur de hoc quod hic dicit Philosophus, quod corrupta frigiditate terrae et humiditate aeris fiet ignis. Hoc enim non videtur possibile esse, quia nec terrae siccitas nec caliditas aeris videntur ad generationem ignis posse sufficere. Ignis enim multo calidior est quam aer, et siccior quam terra … … licet illa caliditas [sc. caliditas aeris] non sufficiat, juvatur tamen et intenditur per virtutem corporis caelestis, et luce solis, et per virtute aliarum stellarum … ( In II De Gen. et Corrupt., lect. 4, in fine).

… there is a difficulty with respect to what the Philosopher says here, that fire comes to be at the corruption of the coldness of earth and the wetness of air. It seems impossible for this to happen, because neither the dryness of earth nor the heat of air can suffice for the generation of fire. For fire is much hotter than air, and much drier than earth … …

although the heat of air does not suffice, it is helped and intensified by the power of the body of the heavens, by the light of the sun, and by the power of other stars …

How can the heat of fire be generated by (from?) the heat of air, since fire is so much hotter than air? Indeed, fire is as hot as hot can be. Similarly, how Page 192

can the dryness of fire be generated by (from?) the dryness of earth, since fire is so much drier than earth? Indeed, fire is as dry as dry can be (and precisely because it is as hot as hot can be). Something in addition to air and earth is required, suggests the commentary, namely the agent causality of some heavenly body, like the sun, and/or some star(s). Their agent causality will intensify the heat of air, and thereby intensify the dryness of earth, so as to suffice for the generation of fire.

Furthermore, what exactly would be needed (and it seems that it would be something in addition to the two original elements, whichever they had been, whether fire and water, or air and earth) to give rise to the first and lowest of mixed bodies? To the first and lowest of living mixed bodies? To the first and lowest of animal mixed bodies? To the highest of mixed bodies, that of man? — These are questions, one can quite readily see, which touch, though in a very medieval way, on whether, and how, the Big Bang can be used to understand the origin, expansion, and evolution of the universe as a whole, and whether and how some form of Darwinism can be used to understand the origin and evolution of life on the planet earth.

8—

Opus Creationis, Opus Distinctionis, Et Opus Ornatus

In [creaturae corporalis] … productione tria opera Scriptura commemorat, scilicet opus creationis, cum dicitur, In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, etc. ( Gen., 1, 1); opus distinctionis, cum dicitur, Divisit lucem a tenebris, et aquas quae sunt supra firmamentum ab aquis quae sunt sub firmamento ( Gen., v, 4, 7); et opus ornatus, cum dicitur, Fiant luminaria in firmamento, etc. ( Gen., v, 14). ( S.T., I, q. 65, prooemium).

Scripture mentions three works in the production [of corporeal creatures], namely the work of creation, when it is said, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, etc. ; the work of distinction, when it is said, He divided the light from the

darkness, and the waters which are above the firmament from the waters which are below the firmament; and the work of adornment, when it is said, Let there be lightgiving bodies in the firmament …

… in recapitulatione divinorum operum, Scriptura sic dicit, Igitur perfecti sunt caeli et terra, et omnis ornatus eorum (Gen., 2, 1). In quibus verbis triplex opus intelligi potest, scilicet opus creationis, per quod caelum et terra producta leguntur, sed informata. Et opus distinctionis, per quod caelum et terra sunt perfecta, sive per formas substantiales attributas materiae omnino informi, ut Augustinus vult; sive quantum ad convenientem decorem et ordinem, ut alii Sancti dicunt. Et his duobus operibus additur ornatus. Et differt ornatus a perfectione. Nam perfectio caeli et terrae ad ea pertinere videtur quae caelo et terrae sunt intrinseca; ornatus vero, ad ea quae sunt a caelo et terra distincta. Sicut homo perficitur per proprias partes et formas. ornatur autem per vestimenta, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Distinctio autem aliquorum maxime manifestatur per motum localem, quo ab invicem separantur. Et ideo ad opus ornatus pertinet productio illarum rerum quae habent motum in caelo et in terra.

Sicut autem supra dictum est, de tribus fit mentio in creatione, scilicet de caelo et aqua et terra. Et haec tria etiam formantur per opus distinctionis tribus diebus: primo die, caelum;

secundo die distinguuntur aquae; tertio die fit distinctio in terra, maris et aridae. Et similiter in opere ornatus, primo die, qui est quartus, producuntur luminaria, quae moventur in caelo, ad ornatum ipsius. Secundo die, qui est quintus, aves et pisces, ad ornatum medii elementi, quia habent motum in aere et aqua, quae pro uno accipiuntur. Tertio die, qui est sextus, producuntur animalia quae habent motum in terra, ad ornatum ipsius.

Sed sciendum est quod in productione luminarium non discordat Augustinus ab aliis Sanctis. Dicit enim luminaria esse facta in actu, non in virtute tantum; non enim habet firmamentum virtutem productivam luminarium, sicut habet terra virtutem productivam plantarum. Unde Scriptura non dicit, Producat firmamentum luminaria, sicut dicit, Germinet terra herbam virentem. ( S.T., I, q. 70, a. 1, c.).

… briefly summarizing the [creating] works of God, Scripture says, The heavens and the earth, therefore, were brought to a kind of completion, and all their adornment as well.

A threefold work can be understood in these words. There is the work of creation, about which one reads that heaven and earth were produced, but not yet brought to full form.

There is also the work of distinction, by which heaven and earth were moved toward some sort of completion, either by the substantial forms given to a completely formless matter, as Augustine wants it; or with respect to a certain fitting beauty and order, as other holy authors say. And to these two works, there is added the work of adornment. The work of adornment differs from the work of being moved toward a kind of completion. Now, being moved toward completion seems to pertain to those things which are intrinsic to heaven and earth; whereas adornment, to those which are distinct from heaven and earth. Man, for example, is brought to a kind of completion by his proper parts and forms; but is adorned by clothing, or something else of that sort. Now, the distinction of things from one another is made most manifest by their moving from place to place, thereby separating themselves from one another. And so, it pertains to the work of adornment to produce those things which move about in heaven and on earth.

As said above, three things were mentioned in the work of creation, namely heaven and water and earth. And these same three things were given some form during the three days of the work of distinction. On the first day, heaven was given some form. On the second day, the waters were distinguished. On the third day, a distinction was made on earth, of sea from dry land. And similarly, in the work of adornment. On the first day of adornment, which is the fourth from the beginning, the lightgiving bodies which are in motion in heaven for its adornment, were produced. On the second day, which is the fifth, birds and fishes were produced to adorn the middle element, because they move about in air and water, which are taken here as one thing. On the third day, which is the sixth, we see produced, for the adornment of the earth, the animals which move about upon it.

It should be noted at this point that Augustine does not disagree with other holy authors as regards the production of the lightgiving bodies. For he says that these lightgiving bodies were made actually, and not only in the power of other things. The firmament does not have the power to produce the lightgiving bodies in the way in which earth has the power to produce plants. And so, Scripture does not say, Let the firmament produce the lightgiving bodies, as it says, Let earth sprout forth green plants.

In the beginning — in the beginning instant of the existence of the physical universe, just after the first now of time — everything in that universe was in some way all together, in the minutest possible particle of matter; and so, that universe was then as small as small can be, as small as it could possibly be. To explain. Within their cause, i.e., within God, “before” they were produced (if one can speak of such a before), all the physical things that came to be, were gathered together as though within a mathematical point, since God is a spirit, and as such something without dimensions. There in God, these things took up no space at all. There was no space for them to take up. They were there, within His infinite power to call them into existence, but not as within some preexisting matter, nor as with dimensions, nor therefore as taking up any space. There was then only God, nothing but God. There was then neither matter, nor dimensions, nor space — there was then nothing outside of God as distinct from Him — for God had not yet created. Nor was there any matter, or dimensions, or space within God as part of His nature, for God is a spirit. As soon as God spoke His creating word, Fiant (Let them be), the power of this word hurled these things — i.e., the three, heaven and water and earth ( … de tribus fit mentio in creatione, scilicet de caelo et aqua et terra … ) — out from within Him, hurled them out into their own existence, with a motion of increasing speed, and into a space

(the empyrean heaven?)31 which came to be with them, and with that same increasing speed. Now, nothing material can be in motion with the speed of light. And so, some might want to say, the speed of the motion with which these material things came forth from the essence of God, in Whom they had tarried, motionless and dimensionless, for an eternity, was less than that of light, even though it was very great, since there was nothing ”outside” God, if one can speak of such an outside, which could possibly impede this speed. But, others might want to point out, the speed of their emerging motion could not have been very great, since they, previously motionless and dimensionless, emerged into existence with a motion which had to begin, and with dimensions which had to be taken on. Motion takes time. Taking on dimensions takes time. And so, in the beginning instant of its existence, the material universe must have been as small as small can be, and in motion with an emerging motion as slow as a motion can be. It takes time for a motion which is beginning, to take on acceleration. Similarly, it takes time for a thing which is taking on dimensions, to take them on. — And so, in the beginning — in that beginning instant of the existence of the physical universe, just after the first now of time, which (now of time) is not time itself, but that from which time begins 32 — all bodily things were in some way all together (exactly how is to be discovered and described) in a particle of

31 There are some, Aquinas notes, who identify the heaven which was created on the first day along with water and earth, as the empyrean heaven: … communiter dicitur quatuor esse primo creata, scilicet naturam angelicam, caelum empyreum, materiam corporalem informem, et tempus … ( S.T., I, q. 66, a. 4, c., in princ.; see also S.T., I, q. 46, a.3, c., in fine).

Since the empyrean heaven is the highest, the outermost, heaven and as such containing the whole physical universe (containing, therefore, all the lower heavens, and all the heavenly bodies which inhabit them, including our Earth which is at the center of the spherical whole) within the space it provides (… locus intelligitur in caelo empyreo omnia continente … ; S.T., I, q. 66, a. 4, ad 5), one can conclude that the empyrean heaven began to exist just after the first now of time, as containing all (… omnia continente …), however small that heaven was when it first began to be; and indeed, it must have been as small as small can be, when it first began to be. One can also conclude, since the heaven was created on the first day along with water and earth, that the fifth body, or fifth essence, if there had been such a thing, was created along with the four terrestrial elements.

32 … nihil fit nisi secundum quod est. Nihil autem est temporis nisi nunc. Unde non potest fieri [tempus] nisi secundum aliquod nunc, non quia in ipso primo nunc sit tempus, sed quia ab ipso incipit tempus. ( S.T., I, q. 46, a. 3, ad 3).

matter so small that it could not possibly have been any smaller, and with the emerging motion of each of these things so slow that it could not possibly have been any slower, if they were to exist in their own natures (outside God), as things distinct from and created by God. In some way, the first three were there, i.e., heaven and water and earth; in some way, the firmament was there, and the waters which came to be both above it and below it; in some way, the sea was there, and the dry land; in some way, the lightgiving bodies which were to adorn heaven, were there; in some way, the birds and the fishes which were to adorn the air and water, were there; in some way, the animals, and man too,33 which were to adorn earth, were there.

How, then? In the elements, in some way? In the elements as in their producing agent causes, at least in some partial way?34 In the elements as in their preexisting material components as well? Aquinas writes:

… ad opus creationis pertinet producere ipsam elementorum substantiam; ad opus autem distinctionis et ornatus pertinet formare aliqua ex praeexistentibus elementis … ( S.T., I, q. 68, a. 1, c., in medio).

… it belongs to the work of creation to produce the substance of the elements, whereas it belongs to the work of distinction and of adornment to form certain other things out of the already existing elements …

… oportet dicere quod materia prima [non] fuit creata omnino sine forma … ( S.T., I, q. 66, a. 1, c., in medio).

… it must be said that prime matter was [not] created completely without form …

33 Man was there, but only with respect to the body, not the soul. Man’s soul is not, cannot be, educed from the potency of matter, since it has an operation which is performed without any dependence on man’s body. See below, pp. 228–241, section 11, The elements and the eduction of substantial forms from the potency of matter, especialy pp. 236–

238.

34 The other partial agent causes would be, no doubt, the (some) heavenly bodies, like the sun and/or the (some) stars.

… formae elementorum sunt quae primo adveniunt materiae [primae] … ( S.T., I, q. 68, a. 1, c., in medio).

… the forms of the elements are the first forms which come to [prime] matter …

… materia prima est in potentia primo ad formam elementi. Sub forma vero elementi est in potentia ad formam mixti … Sub forma autem mixti considerata est in potentia ad animam vegetabilem … Itemque anima vegetabilis est in potentia ad sensitivam; sensitiva veto ad intellectivam … Sunt ergo elementa propter corpora mixta; haec vero propter viventia; in quibus plantae sunt propter animalia, animalia vero propter hominem. ( C.G., III, cap. 22).

… prime matter is in potency first of all to the form of an element. Then, as existing under the form of an element, it is in potency to the form of a mixed body … Moreover, considered under the form of a mixed body, it is in potency to the vegetable soul … Similarly, the vegetable soul is in potency to the sensitive soul, and the sensitive to the intellectual … The elements therefore exist for the sake of mixed bodies, and mixed bodies for the sake of living things, among which plants exist for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man.

Since prime matter cannot be created completely without form, and so must have been created with forms of some sort; and since the forms of the elements are the first forms which come to prime matter; it follows that prime matter was created with the forms of the elements. The elements, therefore, were produced on the first day (as part35 of the opus creationis);

35 The other parts of the opus creationis were the empyrean heaven, the angels, and time: … communiter dicitur quatuor esse primo creata, scilicet naturam angelicam, caelum (footnote continued on next page)

and mixed bodies, i.e., things made up out of the elements, came into existence later on (as pertaining to the opus distinctionis and to the opus ornatus).

9—

The Elements and the Heavenly Bodies

It will be helpful at this point to look a bit at what Aquinas has to say about the nature of the heavens, and of the heavenly bodies which inhabit them. For they exercise a certain wideranging agent causality on the four terrestrial elements, i.e., fire, air, water, and earth. The elements depend on the heavens and the heavenly bodies not only for their existence as elements, but also for their transformations into one another, and for their becoming ingredients of mixed bodies, and in a determinate order from the lower (less perfect) to the higher (more perfect) sorts. This will make clear how the four elements fit into the developmental (in a way, evolutionary) tria opera of God’s creative production of corporeal creatures, i.e., into the opus creationis, the opus distinctionis and the opus ornatus, in which there is a passage from being not yet fully formed to becoming progressively more fully formed.

The Nature of the Heavens and of the Heavenly Bodies

Each of the heavens,36 and each of the heavenly bodies,37 as Aquinas sees

(footnote continued from previous page)

empyreum, materiam corporalem informem, et tempus … ( S.T., I, q. 66, a. 4, c., in princ.; see also S.T., I, q. 46, a .3, c., in fine). The four of this commonly held view are not inconsistent with the three mentioned in Scripture. The empyrean of the four is simply the highest, or outermost, sphere of the heaven of the three, and the place in which the angels were created: … conveniens fuit quod angeli in supremo corpore crearentur, tanquam toti naturae corporae praesidentes, sive id dicatur caelum empyreum, sive qualitercumque nominetur … ( S.T., I, q. 61, a. 4, c.). The not yet fully formed corporeal matter of the four (… materia corporalis informis …) is the water and earth of the three, and the time of the four is the measure of their (i.e., of the water and the earth) motion.

36 From the highest to the lowest, the heavens are: the empyrean heaven, wholly luminous; the aqueous or crystalline heaven, wholly transparent; the starry heaven, in part transparent, in part actually luminous, and divided into eight spheres (or heavens),

(footnote continued on next page)

it, is a fifth body (quintum corpus),38 or a body of a fifth essence (quinta essentia).39 That is, each is composed of a matter and a form so related that the matter is completely actualized by the form which it has. Its matter is in potency to that form alone, and to no other. The matter of each of them, therefore, is a matter quite unlike prime matter, which is the matter of the four terrestrial elements, and of all mixed bodies. Each of the heavens, and each of the heavenly bodies, nonetheless, is exactly like each of the four terrestrial elements in being a simple body, i.e., a bodily thing which is not composed out of prior bodily things. A simple body is composed out of a matter and a form, and out of nothing else. A mixed body; by way of contrast, is composed out of prior bodily things (i.e., out of the elements) as well as out of a matter and a form.

Furthermore, in the view of Aquinas, the heavens and the heavenly bodies which are their inhabitants, are incorruptible.

… aliquid [dicitur} esse corruptibile … per hoc quod in seipso aliquod principium corruptionis habet, vel contrarietatem vel saltem potentiam materiae … ( S.T., I, q. 50, a. 5, ad 3).

(footnote continued from previous page)

the highest being the sphere (or heaven) of the fixed stars, followed by the spheres (or heavens) of the seven planets. — Ad distinctionem … caelorum sciendam, considerandum est quod caelum tripliciter dicitur in Scripturis. Quandoque enim dicitur proprie et naturaliter. Et sic dicitur caelum corpus aliquod sublime, et luminosum actu vel potentia, et incorruptibile per naturam. Et secundum hoc, ponuntur tres caeli. Primum totaliter lucidum, quod vocant empyreum. Secundum totaliter diaphanum, quod vocant caelum aqueum vel crystallinum. Tertium partim diaphanum et partim lucidum actu, quod vocant caelum sidereum; et dividitur in octo sphaeras, scilicet in sphaeram stellarum fixarum, et septem sphaeras planetarum; quae possunt dici octo caeli. ( S.T., I, q. 68, a.4, c.)

37 See In II De Caelo et Mundo, lect. 15, n. 2, where Aquinas, commenting on how long, and why, it takes the various planets to move through their circular orbits ( … pertransire circulum suum … ), mentions each of what were then taken to be the seven planets, which are, from the lowest to the highest: the moon, the sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn — followed, higher still, by the fixed stars.

38 Alii … dixerunt caelum non esse de natura quatuor elementorum, sed esse quintum corpus, praeter quatuor elementa. Et haec est opinio Aristotelis. ( S.T., I, q. 68, a. 1, c.).

39 … Augustinus, sequitur in hoc opinionem Platonis, non ponentis quintam essentiam … ( S.T., I, q. 66, a. 2, ad 1).

… a thing is said to be corruptible … because it has within itself some princple of corruption, either some contrariety or at least the potency of matter …

Aquinas is here pointing out that the corruptibility of a thing derives from what is intrinsic to that thing, and not from something extrinsic to it, like the power of God to reduce it to absolute nothingness by withdrawing from it His conserving causality. A thing is said to be corruptible because it has within itself some source of corruption; either some sort of contrariety, like that which derives from being composed out of the four elements, in which are found the contrary pairs hotcold and wetdry; or because it is composed out of prime matter and substantial form, prime matter being such that while actualized by one form, it can, given the causality of certain appropriate agent cause(s), become actualized by another form. Neither the heavens nor the heavenly bodies, in the view of Aquinas, have within themselves any sort of contrariety, since they are not composed out of the four elements; nor are they composed out of prime matter and substantial form, though they are composed out of matter and form. The heavens and the heavenly bodies, therefore, are incorruptible.

This becomes clearer in the following.

… materia corporis caelestis … non est in potentia nisi ad formam quam habet … Unde illa forma sic perficit illam materiam, quod nullo modo in ea remanet potentia ad esse, sed ad ubi tantum, ut Aristoteles dicit. ( S.T. , I, q. 66, a.2, c., in fine).

… the matter of a heavenly body … is in potency only to the form which it has … Whence that form perfects that matter in such a way that in no way does there remain in it a potency with respect to being, but only with respect to place …

The matter of each heavenly body, as Aquinas sees it, is such that its potentiality for form is totally actualized by the form which it has. That is, its form so perfects its matter that there remains in the heavenly body no potentiality with respect to existence, but only with respect to place. Its matter, unlike prime matter, cannot take on any other form. And so, a heavenly body cannot go out of existence by corruption, nor can it come into existence by generation: … nullo modo in ea remanet potentia ad esse … ; though it can go out of this place into another one: … remanet in ea potentia ad ubi tantum … The potentiality of the matter of the moon, for example, is such that it is actualized by the substantial form of the moon, but only by that form, and totally by that form. Similarly, the potentiality of the matter of the sun is such that it is actualized by the substantial form of the sun, but only and totally by that form. Similarly, too, for each of the other five planets, i.e., Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. So, too, for each of the fixed stars, and for each of the heavens as well.

The heavens have three basic charateristics (and what can be said of each of the heavens can be said of each of the heavenly bodies as well, as Aquinas sees it).

… caelum … dicitur in Scripturis quandoque … proprie et naturaliter. Et sic dicitur caelum corpus aliquod sublime, et luminosum actu vel potentia, et incorruptibile per naturam…

(S.T., I, q. 68, a. 4, c., in medio).

… the word “heaven” is sometimes used in the Scriptures … properly and naturally. And in this way heaven is said to be some body high up, and lightgiving either actually or potentially, and incorruptible by nature …

These are the three basic characteristics. 1) Each is a corpus sublime, i.e., a body which is up high, away from our Earth, or having a high location (… habens situm altum … , as Aquinas puts it in In II Sent. , d. 14, a. 4, ad 4). 2) Each is luminosum, i.e., lightgiving, either actually or potentially; that is, Page 203

it is capable either of emitting (or reflecting) light, or of being illuminated. 3) Each is incorruptibile per naturam, incorruptible by nature, because it is not composed out of the four elements, the contrarieties of which are a source of corruptibility; and because it does not include prime matter as an ingredient of what it is.

Their incorruptibility, as Aquinas sees it following Aristotle, is connected with their circular motion.

… cum … corpus caeleste habet naturalem motum diversum a naturali motu elementorum, sequitur quod eius natura sit alia a natura quatuor elementorum. Et sicut motus circularis, qui est proprius corporis caelestis, caret contrarietate, motus autem elementorum sunt invicem contrarii, ut qui est sursum ei qui est deorsum; ita corpus caeleste est absque contrarietate, corpora vero elementaria sunt cum contrarietate. Et quia corruptio et generatio sunt ex contrariis, sequitur quod secundum suam naturam corpus caeleste sit incorruptibile, elementa vero sunt corruptibilia. ( S.T. , I, q. 66, a. 2, c., circa princ.).40

… since … a heavenly body has a natural motion which is diverse from the natural motion of the elements, it follows that its nature is other than the nature of the four elements.

And just as circular motion, which is proper to a heavenly body, lacks contrariety, whereas the motions of the elements are contrary to one another, upward motion being contrary to downward motion; so too the heavenly body itself is without contrariety, whereas the elements themselves are with contrariety. And since corruption and generation are from contraries, it follows that a heavenly body is according to its nature incorruptible, whereas the elements are by their natures corruptible.

40 For an extended and detailed version of this argumentation, see In I De Caelo et Mundo, lect. 4, nn. 9–18; also lect. 6. In Aristotle, see De Caelo, Bk. I, ch. 2, 269 a 18 – b 17; ch.

3, 270 a 12 – 22.

Without reflecting on what is unacceptable about this argument for the clearly false claim that the heavenly bodies are incorruptible, it is interesting to notice that Aquinas himself (in the brief passage immediately below) noticed a very interesting fact, i.e., that Plato and all philosophers before Aristotle felt (a sound feeling, indeed, one wants to add) that all bodies in the physical universe are of the nature of the four elements, i.e., that any physical body is either one of the four elements or composed out of some combination of them; and that, therefore, all physical bodies, terrestrial and heavenly, share in a matter of the same nature.

… Plato … et omnes philosophi ante Aristotelem posuerunt omnia corpora esse de natura quatuor elementorum. Unde cum quatuor elementa communicent in una materia, ut mutua generatio et corruptio in eis ostendit; per consequens sequebatur quod omnium corporum [et terrestrium et caelestium] sit materia una. Quod autem quaedam corpora sint incorruptibilia, Plato adscribebat non conditioni materiae, sed voluntati artificis, scilicet Dei, quem introducit corporibus dicentem: Natura vestra estis dissolubilia, voluntate autem mea indissolubilia, quia voluntas mea maior est nexu vestro. ( S.T. , I, q. 66, a. 2, c., in princ).41

41 See also S.T. , I, q. 50, a. 5, ad 2: … Plato … existimabat [corpora caelestia] esse ex elementis composita, et ideo secundum suam naturam dissolubilia, sed voluntate divina semper conservantur in esse. — Elsewhere, having observed that the firmament — i.e., the “vault or arch of the sky,” which is to say, the heaven — which the Scriptures say was made on the second day, can be understood in two ways, either 1) as the starry heaven, or 2) as the considerably lower arch of the sky which is that part of air in which clouds are condensed; Aquinas carefully points out how Plato and Empedocles differed in their respective views on the nature of the starry heaven, i.e., of the “firmamentum in quo sunt sidera,” or “firmamentum illud in quo fixae sunt stellae.” Aquinas writes: … Quidam … dixerunt firmamentum illud [sc. in quo sunt sidera] esse ex elementis compositum. Et haec fuit opinio Empedocles, qui tamen dixit ideo illud corpus indissolubile est, quia in eius compositione lis non erat, sed amicitia tantum. Alii vero dixerunt firmamentum esse de natura quatuor elementorum, non quasi ex elementis compositum, sed quasi elementum simplex. Et haec fuit opinio Platonis, qui posuit corpus caeleste esse elementum ignis. ( S.T. , I, q.

68, a. 1, c., circa princ,).

… Plato … and all philosophers before Aristotle held that all bodies are of the nature of the four elements. Whence, since the four elements share a common matter, as the mutual generation and corruption among them shows; it follows therefore that there is but one matter for all bodies [both terrestrial and heavenly]. That some bodies are incorruptible, Plato attributed not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, namely God, Whom he brought in as saying to the heavenly bodies: By your nature itself you are dissolvable, but by my will undissolvable, because my will is greater than what holds you together The Causality of the Heavens and of the Heavenly Bodies

… principia activa in istis inferioribus corporibus non inveniuntur nisi qualitates activae elementorum, quae sunt calidum et frigidum et huiusmodi … Sed … huiusmodi accidentia se habent sicut materiales dispositiones ad formas substantiates naturalium corporum. Materia autem non sufficit ad agendum. Et ideo oportet super has materiales dispositiones ponere aliquod principium activum … quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam causet … generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quidquid in istis inferioribus generat, movet ad speciem sicut instrumentum caelestis corporis; secundum quod dicitur in II Physic. quod homo generat hominem, et sol. ( S.T. , I, q. 115, a. 3, ad 2).

… there are no active principles found in bodies here below except the active qualities of the elements, which are hot and cold and the like … But accidents of this sort are but material dispositions for the substantial forms of natural bodies. And matter is not enough to do the work of an agent cause. This is why it is necessary that there be above these material dispositions some active principle.., which by its presence and its absence causes … the generation and corruption of bodies here below. The heavenly bodies are active principles of this kind. And so, whatever generates here below, causing the motion which produces a [substantial] species, does this as an instrument of a heavenly body. And this is why it is said in Bk. II of the Physics that man, and the sun, generates man.

The four terrestrial elements and their proper qualities are not enough, of themselves, to explain, as agent causes, the generation and corruption of terrestrial bodies, neither the transformations of the elements into one another, nor the entering of the elements into the composition of mixed bodies. There is need for additional agent causes, and of sufficient power, to do this work, namely the heavens and the heavenly bodies, without whose light42 terrestrial agents could not function as agents at all.

Indeed, these terrestrial agents could not even remain in existence without the conserving causality, through light (and heat), of the heavens and the heavenly bodies.

Moreover, they are but particular instrumental agents of the heavens and the heavenly bodies, which function as universal agents. This is why Aristotle says that though man generates man, since in nature like generates like, it is man as instrument of the sun — homo generat hominem, et sol. The sun, as universal cause, generates man, but through man as particular cause. In this same sense, the sun generates dog through dog, and tree through tree. It is only life forms of the lowest sort, those — exemplifies Aquinas (and wrongly) which come to be through putrefaction,43 (perhaps maggots, to suggest an 42 … sicut calor est qualitas activa consequens formam substantialem ignis, ita lux est qualitas activa consequens formam substantialem solis, vel cuiuscumque alterius corporis a se lucentis, si aliquod tale est … ( S.T. , I, q. 67, a. 3, c., in fine)… . lux caelestium corporum causat formas substantiales in istis inferioribus … ( Ibid. , obj. 3)… . sicut calor agit ad formam ignis quasi instrumentaliter in virtute formae substantialis [ignis], ita lumen agit quasi instrumentaliter in virtute corporum caelestium ad producendas formas substantiales

[in istis inferioribus] … ( Ibid. , ad 3).

43 … ad generationem animalium imperfectorum [sicut patet in animalibus generatis per putrefactionem] sufficit agens universale, quod est virtus caelestis, cui assimilantur [haec animalia] non secundum speciem, sed secundum analogiam quandam … Ad generationem vero animalium perfectorum non sufficit agens universale, sed requiritur agens proprium, quod est generans univocum … ( S.T. , I q. 45, a. 1, obj, 3 and ad 3). — Observation, we can point out in our day, confirms the fact that the lowly life forms said by those in Aquinas’

day to be ”generated from putrefaction” have and need a generans univocum. Indeed, all life forms, as we know today, have and need a generans univocum. And, one suspects, if Aquinas knew about what he took to be the elements, what we today know about what we take to be the elements, he would also have said that ignis generat ignem, et sol, and that aer generat aerem, et sol, and similarly for the other elements, water and earth. That is, he would have seen that in any generation, whether of living things or nonliving (footnote continued on next page)

example, i.e., the legless larvae of the housefly) which are produced directly by the sun, i.e., without the intervening particular instrumental causality of some terrestrial agent.

Applying the immediately preceding (pp. 205–207) to the three works of the initial sixday production of corporeal creatures, i.e., to the opus creationis, the opus distinctionis, and the opus ornatus, one can see in Aquinas’ thinking a kind of primitive and implicit version of a physical universe which has banged out of, expanded out of, an initially infinitesimally miniscule one, coupled with a similarly primitive and implicit version of the evolution of life on the planet Earth. A bare outline of this expansion of the universe, and of this evolution of life, was presented above on pp. 195–199. Some details can be added at this point, as a kind of commentary (over pp. 207–227) on the two passages which follow:

… ad opus creationis pertinet producere ipsam elementorum substantiam; ad opus distinctionis et ornatus pertinet formare aliqua ex praeexistentibus elementis … ( S.T. , I, q. 68, a.

1, c., in medio).

… it belongs to the work of creation to produce the substance of the elements, whereas it belongs to the work of distinction and of adornment to form certain other things out of the already existing elements …

Sicut … supra dictum est, de tribus [in Scripturis] fit mentio in creatione, scilicet de caelo et aqua et terra. Et haec tria etiam formantur per opus distinctionis tribus diebus: primo die, caelum; secundo die distinguuntur aquae; terio die fit distinctio in terra, maris et aridae. Et similiter in opere ornatus, primo die, qui est quartus, producuntur luminaria, quae moventur in caelo, ad ornatum ipsius. Secundo die, qui est quintus, aves et pisces, ad ornatum medii elementi, quia habent motum in aere (footnote continued from previous page)

things, there is required an agens univocum of an appropriate sort in addition to an agens universale. How else could the final effect come to be of the particular sort that it is?

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