Why God Became a Man

Why God Became a Man

WHY GOD BECAME A MAN

(Cur Deus Homo)

COMMENDATION! OF THIS WORK

TO POPE URBAN II

Succeeding the Apostles, many of our holy Fathers and holy teachers make very many significant points regarding the rational basis of our faith. They do so not only in order to confound the foolishness of unbelievers and to break through their hardheartedness, but also in order to nourish those who, having hearts already cleansed by faith, delight in the rational basis of our faith

— a rational basis for which we ought to hunger once [we have] the certainty of faith. Although our holy Fathers make so many significant points that we do not expect either in our own day or in future times anyone to be equal to them in contemplating the truth, nevertheless if anyone who is steadfast in faith wants to engage in investigating the rational basis for his faith, I think he ought not to be reproached. For because "'the days of man are short,''? the holy Fathers were not able to say all of the things which they could have said if they had lived longer. Moreover,

, ¢ ee the rational basis of truth is so extensive and so deep that it cannot be exhausted by mortals. Furthermore, within His Church, with which He promises to remain unto the end of the world, the Lord does not cease to impart the gifts of His grace. And — to mention only one passage in which the Sacred Page summons us to rational investigation — the passage ''Unless you believe you will not understand'' ? clearly advises us to direct our attention toward understanding, for it teaches us the way in which we ought to © / advance to understanding. Finally, since I discern that the under- | standing which we acquire in this life is a middle-way between ' faith and sight, I think that the more anyone advances to under- | standing, the closer he comes to the actual seeing for which we all

~ long.

Strengthened, then, by these considerations, I endeavor (although I am a man of meager learning) to rise up a bit higher in order to behold (to the extent that heavenly grace deigns to grant

Anselm of Canterbury me) the rationale for those doctrines which we believe. And when

I find some point which I did not previously notice, I shall willingly disclose it to others, so that I may learn from another's judgment what I ought to believe confidently.

Therefore, Pope Urban, my father and lord, you who are worthy of all Christians' loving reverence and reverential love, and whom God's providence has established as supreme pontif within His Church: since I can present the enclosed treatise to no one else more rightly, I present it to the scrutiny of Your Holiness, so that by the authority of Your Holiness what is therein deserving of acceptance may be approved and what must be corrected may be amended.

PREFACE There are certain men who without my knowledge copied for themselves the first parts of the enclosed work before it was completed and perfected. Because of these individuals I have been forced to finish this treatise as best I could and more hastily than suited me, and hence in a more abbreviated form than I had intended. For if I had been permitted to publish it unhurriedly and at a convenient time, I would have added many things which I have left unsaid. With great tribulation of heart — God knows the source and the cause' of my having suffered this — I began it in England upon request and finished it in the province of Capua as _an exile. In accordance with the subject-matter with which it'

- "deals T entitled it Why God Became a Man; and | divided it into two short books. The first of these contains the answers of believers to the objections of unbelievers who repudiate t

'the Christan faith because they regard it as incompatible with reason. And t his ~ book-goes-on'to prove by rational necessity — 'Christ béing removed from sight, as if there had never been anything known about Him — that no man can possibly be saved without Him.

However, in the second book — likewise proceeding as if nothing were known of Christ — I show with equally clear reasoning and truth that human nature was created in order that the whole man (i.e., with a body and a soul) would some day enjoy a happy immortality. And I show the necessity of man's attaining this end for which he was created, and [that it can be attained] only by means of a God-man." And I show that all the things which we believe about Christ ought, necessarily, to occur.

I ask all those who wish to copy this volume to affix this preface, together with all the chapter titles, before the beginning of the text.* This way anyone into whose hands the volume comes will see on its countenance, so to speak, whether the whole body of the text contains anything which he may deem important.

CHAPTER TITLES OF BOOK I

. The central problem governing the entire work.

. How the things to be said are to be construed.

. The objections of unbelievers and the replies of believers.

. These answers seem to unbelievers to lack cogency and to be BW DY H pictures, as it were.

. The redemption of man could not have been accomplished through any other person than a divine person.

. How unbelievers find fault with our saying that God has redeemed us by His death, that in this way He has shown His love for us, and that He has come to vanquish the Devil on our behalf.

. The Devil had no just claim against man. Why the reason for God's liberating man in this manner seems to have been based in the Devil.

. How although the lowly things which we affirm of Christ do not apply to His divinity, nonetheless to unbelievers it seems unfitting that these things are affirmed of Him with respect to His humanity. Why it seems to them that this man did not undergo death willingly.

. He died willingly. The meaning oF the following texts: ''He became obedient unto death''; ''For this reason God has also exalted Him''; ''I have not come to do my will''; ''God spared not His own son''; ''Not as I will but as You will.''

How these same texts can rightly be interpreted in another LO: way.

; What sinning and making satisfaction for sin are.

Whether it is fitting for God to forgive sin out of mercy alone, apart from any repayment of debt.

Nothing ought less to be tolerated in the order of things than that the creature remove the honor owed to the Creator and not repay what he removes.

How the punishment of a sinner honors God.

Sie Ws 13.

14.

, Cur Deus Homo Whether God lets His honor be violated even slightly.

The reason that the number of angels who fell is to be made up from among human beings.

Other angels cannot be substituted for fallen ones.

Whether there will be more holy men than there are evil angels.

Man cannot be saved without satisfaction for sin.

Satisfaction ought to be proportional to the measure of the 15.

'16.

L7 18. sin. Man cannot make satisfaction by himself.

. How grave sin is.

. How when man permitted himself to be conquered by the Devil he did an injury to God for which he is unable to make satisfaction.

What it was that man, when he sinned, removed from God and cannot repay.

As long as man does not repay to God what he owes, he cannot be happy and is not excused because of his inability.

Necessarily, man is saved through Christ.

24.

25.

CHAPTER TITLES OF BOOK II

Man was created just in order to be happy.

. Man would not have died if he had not sinned.

. Man will be resurrected with the body in which he lives during this present life.

. God will accomplish with human nature that which He began.

. Although [what God began] must be accomplished, nevertheless He will not accomplish it under the constraint of necessity. There is a necessity which diminishes or eliminates gratitude, and there is a necessity which increases it.

Only a God-man can make the satisfaction by means of which man is saved.

It is necessary that one and the same being be fully divine and fully human.

God ought to assume a human nature from the race of Adam and from a virgin woman.

It is necessary that the Word alone and a human nature conjoin in one person.

This man is not required to die. How He is able to sin and not 10. able to sin. Why He and an angel ought to be praised for their justice even though they cannot sin.

He dies of His own power. Mortality does not pertain to ACh: sinless human nature.

Although He shares our misfortunes, He is not unhappy.

It is not the case that along with our other infirmities He has 12:

13, ignorance.

How His death outweighs the number and the magnitude of 14. all sins.

How His death blots out even the sins of those who put Him 15. to death.

How God assumed from the sinful mass a sinless human nature. The salvation of Adam and of Eve.

16.

/ Cur Deus Homo 7.

In God there is neither necessity nor impossibility. There is a necessity which compels and a necessity which does not compel.

How the life of Christ is paid to God for the sins of men. The 18. sense in which Christ ought, and the sense in which He ought not, to have suffered.

. How very reasonable it is that human salvation results from His death.

How great and how just the mercy of God is.

It is impossible for the Devil to be reconciled.

The truth of the Old and of the New Testament has been proved within the statements that have been made.

20. aN Me 22.

WHY GOD BECAME A MAN!

(Cur Deus Homo) BOOK I Chapter One: The central problem governing the entire work.

In reply to those who make inquiry, I am accustomed to give the rational bases of a particular problem of our faith. On numerous occasions and with very great fervor many individuals have urged me, both by word of mouth and in letters, to write down these considerations for posterity. For they say that these considerations please them; and they regard them as satisfactory. They make their request not in order to approach faith by way of ~ reason but in order to delight in the comprehension and contem_ plation of the doctrines which they believe, as well as in order to be ready, as best they can, always to give a satisfactory answer to everyone who asks of them a reason for the hope which is in us."

Unbelievers habitually raise this particular problem as an objection to us, while derisively terming Christian simplicity a foolish simplicity; and many believers repeatedly mull over this same problem in their minds. I mean the following problem: For what_ reason and on the basis of what necessity did God become a man and by Hi His~death restore tifeto-the-world (as we believe and confess), seeing ine that He could have accomplished this restoration" éither by means of some other person (whether angelic or human) or else by merely willing it? Now, not only learned men but also many unlearned men ask about this problem and desire to know its solution. Many individuals, then, keep asking that this problem be dealt with; and in spite of the fact that the investigation seems very difficult, the solution is intelligible to everyone and is commendable because of the utility and the elegance of the reasoning. Therefore, even though the holy Fathers have said about this problem what ought to be adequate, nevertheless what God will deign to disclose to me about this topic I will endeavor to show to those who are inquiring.

Anselm of Canterbury Now, issues which are, examined by the method of questionand-answer are clearer, and so more acceptable, to many minds — especially to minds that are slower. Therefore, from among those who have been making this entreaty I shall take as my fellowdisputant the one who has been urging me to this end more insistently than the others, so that in the following way Boso may ask and Anselm answer.

Boso. Just as right order requires that we believe the deep matters of the Christian faith before we presume to discuss them rationally, so it seems to me to be an instance of carelessness if, having been confirmed in faith, we do not eagerly desire to understand what we believe. Indeed, assisted by the prevenient grace of God I am, it seems to me, holding so steadfastly to faith in our redemption that even if I were not in any respect able to understand what I believe, nothing could wrest me from firmness of faith. Accordingly, I ask you to disclose to me that which, as you know, many are asking about along with me: viz., for what reason and on the basis of what necessity did God — although He is omnipotent — assume the lowliness and the weakness of human nature in order to restore it?

Anselm. What you are asking of me exceeds my capacities.

And so I fear to deal with matters too high for me,® lest perhaps when someone suspects or even observes that I do not give him a satisfactory answer, he may think that I have departed from true doctrine rather than that my intellect is not powerful enough to comprehend this truth.

B. You ought not so much to have this fear as you ought to remember that in a discussion of some problem it often happens that God discloses what at first was hidden. Moreover, you ought to hope from the grace of God that if you willingly share those things which you have freely received, you will merit the receiving of the higher things to which you have not yet attained.

A. There is another reason why it seems to me that we cannot at all — or else can only scarcely — deal amply with this matter now. For in order to do so we need an analysis of ability and necessity and will and of certain other notions which are so interrelated that no one of them can be fully examined apart from the others. And so to deal with these notions requires a separate work

— one not easy [to compose], it seems to me, but nonetheless one not altogether useless. For an ignorance of these notions produces

/ Cur Deus Homo I certain difficulties which become easy [to deal with] as a result of understanding these notions.

B. Where these notions become relevant you can speak briefly about them, so that we may have the knowledge which is adequate for the present work but may postpone to another time* the additional points which need to be discussed.

A. I am also very reluctant to honor your request both because the topic is very important and because just as it deals with Him who is beautiful in appearance above the sons of men," so it is also adorned with a rationale which exceeds human understanding. Hence, I fear that just as I am accustomed to become indignant with untalented artists when I see the Lord Himself portrayed with an uncomely countenance, so I may provoke indignation if I presume to explore such an elegant topic by an inelegant and contemptible discourse.

B. This fear ought not to deter you, since just as you permit whoever can to say these things better, so you forbid no one who does not like your discourse from writing more beautifully. But so that I may exclude all your excuses: [remember that] what I am asking of you, you will be writing not for the learned but for me

_ and for those who are seeking this solution together with me.

Chapter Two: How the things to be said are to be construed.

A. observe your importunity and the importunity of those who with you seek this solution out of love and religious desire.

Therefore, to the best of my ability, and assisted by God and by means of your prayers, I will attempt not so much to exhibit the solution you are seeking as to seek it with you. (In requesting this solution, you have often promised these prayers to me, who was requesting them for this same end.) But I want everything that I say to be accepted in the following manner: ® If I say something which a greater authority does not confirm, then even though I seem to prove it rationally, it should be accepted as certain only in the sense that it appears to me for the time being to be thus, until God somehow reveals the matter to me more fully.' But if to some extent I am able to give a satisfactory answer to your question, then assuredly it must be the case that one who is wiser than I would be able to give a more fully satisfactory answer.

Anselm of Canterbury Indeed, we must realize that no matter what a man can say about this topic, the deeper rationale for so important a doctrine will still remain hidden.

Chapter Three: The objections of unbelievers and the replies of believers.

B. Allow me, then, to use the words of unbelievers. For since we are fervently seeking the rational basis of our faith, it is fair that I should present the objections of those who are altogether unwilling to approach our faith without rational argumentation. Although they seek a rational basis because they do not believe whereas we seek it because we do believe, nevertheless it is one and the same thing that both we and they are seeking. And if you give any reply to which Sacred Authority seems opposed, let me exhibit this Authority so that you may disclose how it is not really opposed.

A. Say what seems [right] to you.

B. The unbelievers who scoff at our simplicity raise against us the following objection: that we dishonor and affront God when we maintain that He descended into the womb of a woman, that He was born of a woman, that He grew, being nourished by milk and food for human beings, and — not to mention many other things which seem to be unsuitable for God — that He experienced weariness, hunger, thirst, scourging, and (in the midst of thieves) crucifixion and death.

A. We do not dishonor or affront Sod; instead, we give Him thanks from our whole heart, and we laud and proclaim the ineffable depth of His mercy. For the more miraculously and wondrously He has restored us from such grave and such deserved evils in which we found ourselves — restored us to such great and such undeserved goods which we -had lost — the more He has demonstrated the greater degree of His love and graciousness toward us. Indeed, if unbelievers would carefully consider how appropriately the restoration of human nature was obtained in this manner, they would not deride our simplicity but with us would praise God's wise loving-kindness. For it was fitting that as death had entered into the human race by the disobedience of man, so life would be restored by the obedience of man.8 And [it was

/ Cur Deus Homo I fitting that] as the sin which was the cause of our condemnation had its beginning from a woman, so the Author of our justification and salvation would be born from a woman. And [it was fitting that] the Devil, who had conquered man by persuading him to taste of the tree, would be conquered by man through the suffering-on-the-tree which he himself inflicted. There are also many other things which when carefully examined manifest a certain inexpressible beauty in the fact of our redemption's having been accomplished in this manner.

Chapter Four: These answers seem to unbelievers to lack cogency and to be pictures, as it were.

B. All of these things must be acknowledged to be beautiful and to be pictures, as it were. However, if there is not a solid foundation upon which they rest, they do not seem to unbelievers to suffice for showing why we ought to believe that God was willing to suffer these things of which we are speaking. For someone who wants to paint a picture choses something solid upon which to paint, in order that what he paints may remain. No one paints on water or in the air, because no traces of the picture would remain there. Hence, when we exhibit to unbelievers these considerations of fittingness which you say are pictures, as it were, of a real event, then since they regard what we believe as a fiction rather than as a real event, they think that we are painting on a cloud, so to speak. Therefore, first of all we must exhibit the truth's firm rational foundation, i.e., the cogent reasoning which proves that God should or could have humbled Himself to [undergo] those things which we proclaim. Next, so that this bodyof-truth, so to speak, may shine even more splendidly, these considerations of fittingness must be set forth as pictures of this body-of-truth.

A. Do not the following considerations seem to constitute a very cogent argument for why God ought to have done those things about which we are speaking?: viz., that the human race —

His very precious work — had utterly perished; and it was not fitting that God's plan for man should be completely thwarted; and this plan of God's could not be carried out unless the human race was set free by its very Creator.

Anselm of Canterbury * Chapter Five: The redemption of man could not have been accomplished through any other person than a divine person.

B. If this liberation were said to have been accomplished in any manner at all through a person — whether an angel or a man — other than a divine person, the human mind would find this view much more tolerable. For God could have created another man who had no sin and who was not from the sinful mass and who — as He created Adam — was not even from another man; and through this man, it seems, God's work could have been accomplished.

A. Don't you realize that man would rightly be deemed to be the servant of whatever other person would redeem him from eternal death? And if so, then man would not at all have been restored to the dignity which he would have had if he had not sinned. For man, who was meant to be the servant only of God and meant to be equal in every respect to the good angels, would become the servant of him who is not God and whom the angels do not serve.

Chapter Six: How unbelievers find fault with our saying that God has redeemed us by His death, that in this way He has shown His love for us, and that He came to vanquish the Devil on dur behalf.

B. What especially astounds unbelievers is that we call this liberation redemption. Indeed, they ask: ''In what captivity, in which prison, or in whose power were you being held from which God could free you only by redeeming you through so much effort and, in the end, through His own blood?'' We answer: He has redeemed us from sins and from His own wrath and from Hell and from the power of the Devil, whom He came to vanquish on our behalf because we ourselves were unable to conquer him; moreover He has bought back the Kingdom of Heaven for us.

And because He has done all these things in this way, He has manifested how much He loves us.

/ Cur Deus Homo I But when we make this reply to them, they retort: ''If you maintain that God, whom you say created all things by His command, was unable solely by His command, to do all the things

[you have just mentioned], then you contradict yourselves, because you make Him powerless. On the other' hand, if you say that He was able [to do these things solely by His command] but willed [to do them] only in the above manner, then how can you argue for the wisdom of this one whom you claim willed to suffer so many unbecoming things for no reason at all? For all the things which you set forth depend upon His will. Indeed, God's wrath is nothing other than His will-to-punish. Therefore, if He does not will to punish men's sins, man is free from sins; and He is free from God's wrath and from Hell and from the power of the Devil, all of which he suffers because of his sins; and he receives those goods of which he is deprived because of his sins. For who has power over Hell or the Devil, or who possesses the Kindgom of Heaven, except Him who created all things? Thus, whatever things you fear or desire are subject to His will, which nothing can resist. Therefore, if He was unwilling to save the human race except in the way that you state, although He was able to do so by His merely willing to, then (to put it mildly) look at how you impugn His wisdom. For if for no reason at all a man were to do with great strain that which He could have done effortlessly, he would surely not be judged by anyone to be wise. Indeed, your saying that God showed in this manner how much He loves you is not at all defensible unless you show that He could not at all have saved man in any other way. For if He could not have saved man in some other way, then perhaps it might have been necessary that He manifest His love in this way. But since, indeed, He could have saved man by another means, why is it that in order to show His love He endured and performed those things which you

~ have mentioned? Does He not show the good angels how much - He loves them even though He does not endure such things for them? Now, as for your saying that He came to vanquish the Devil on your behalf: how is it that you dare to make this claim?

Does not God's omnipotence reign everywhere? How is it, then, that God needed to descend from Heaven in order to conquer the Devil?''

These objections unbelievers seem to be able to raise against US.

Anselm of Canterbury * Chapter Seven: The Devil had no just claim against man. Why the reason for God's liberating man in this manner seems to have been based in the Devil.

B. Now, we regularly make the following claim: !° ''In order to free man, God was required to deal with the Devil in terms of justice rather than dealing with him in terms of power — so that when the Devil killed Him who was God and in whom there was no reason for death, the Devil justly lost the power which he had over sinners. Otherwise God would have done unjust violence to the Devil. For the Devil justly possessed man, whom he had not seized by force; rather, man had freely delivered himself to the Devil.'' But I do not see what cogency this claim has. For if the Devil or man belonged to himself, or if he belonged to someone other than to God, or if he remained in some power other than

God's, perhaps this claim might rightly be made. However, since neither the Devil nor man does belong to anyone except to God, and since neither of them exists outside the domain of God's power, how ought God to have dealt justly with one of His servants, regarding another of His servants, in an affair that was

His own, except by punishing His servant who had persuaded a fellow-servant of God to forsake their common Lord and to come over to him, and who as a traitor had received a fugitive, and as a thief had received a thief together with what he had stolen from the Lord. Both of them were thieves, since under the persuasion of the one the other stole himself from his Lord. Now, if God were to deal in this way with His servant, what could be done more justly? Or if God (who is the judge of all) were to deliver man (who in the above way had come into captivity) from the power of the one who was unjustly holding him captive — no matter whether God would deliver. him in order to punish him otherwise than at the hands of the Devil or in order simply to spare him from punishment — why would this be unjust? For although man was justly tormented by the Devil, the Devil was unjustly tormenting man. For man deserved to be punished — and by no one more fittingly than by him to whom he had consented in sinning. But the Devil was not entitled to punish man; indeed, the more he was driven to this end by a malicious impulse

/ Cur Deus Homo I rather than drawn by a love for justice, the more unjust it was for him to be administering punishment. For he did not administer punishment by the command of God but by the permission of God's incomprehensible wisdom, by which God arranges even evil things for good.

Moreover, I think that those who believe that the Devil had some just claim to possessing man are led to this conclusion by the following consideration: They see that man is justly subjected to torment by the Devil and that God justly permits this tormenting; and so they suppose that the Devil justly inflicts it. Now, it sometimes happens that some one thing is both just and unjust in different respects, and that for this reason the thing is judged to be either just or unjust as a whole by those who do not examine the matter carefully. For example, it happens that someone unjustly strikes an innocent man and hence himself justly deserves to be struck. However, if the one who has been struck ought not to avenge himself but nonetheless does strike the one who struck him, he does so unjustly.!! Therefore, this beating is unjust with respect to the man administering it, because he ought not to have avenged himself; but it is just with respect to the one who has received it, because by unjustly delivering a blow he justly deserved to receive one. Accordingly, from different viewpoints this very same action is both just and unjust; but it can happen that it is judged by one person only as just and by another person only as unjust. Hence, in this manner the Devil is said to torment man justly, because God justly permits this tormenting and because man justly suffers it. But regarding even the fact that man is said to suffer justly: he is said to suffer justly not because he himself is just but because he is punished by the just judgment of God.

But suppose that the handwriting of the decree which the apostle declares!2 to have been against us and to have been blotted out by the death of Christ is alluded to. And suppose someone thinks that the apostle's reference to handwriting signifies that prior to the suffering of Christ the Devil, as if by an agreement in writing, justly required man to continue sinning — this requirement being the interest due on the first sin which he persuaded man to commit, as well as being the penalty for this first sin. If hereby someone supposes himself to establish the Devil's just claim over man, I do not regard his interpretation as at all correct. For that Ey

Anselm of Canterbury handwriting, to be sure, is not the Devil's because it is called

''the handwriting of the tecree.'' And that decree was not the Devil's decree but'God's. For by the just judgment of God, it was decreed and confirmed, as if in writing, that man, who had freely sinned, would not be able by himself to avoid either sin or the penalty for sin. For man is a ''wind that departs and does not return.''!? And ''he who sins is a servant of sin.'' 14 Now, he who sins ought not to be let-off unpunished — unless mercy spares the sinner and frees him and restores him. Therefore, we ought not to believe that by reference to this handwriting some justice on the Devil's part can be found in his tormenting of man.

Indeed, even as in a good angel there is no injustice at all, so in an evil angel there is no justice at all. Therefore, there was in the Devil no reason why God ought not to use His power against him in order to liberate man.

Chapter Eight: How although the lowly things which we affirm . of Christ do not apply to His divinity, nonetheless to unbelievers it seems unfitting that these things are affirmed of Him with respect to His humanity. Why it seems to them that this man did not undergo death willingly.

A. When God does some thing, then even though we do not see why He wills [to do it], His will ought to suffice us as a reason.

For the will of God is never unreasonable.

B. True — Provided one is sure {hat God wills the thing in question. For if reason seems to oppose [God's willing something], many persons do not at all admit that He wills it.

A. When we say that God willed those things which we believe regarding His incarnation, what seems to you to go against reason?

B. To put it briefly: that the Most High descends to such lowly things, that the Almighty does something so laboriously.

A. Those who say this do not understand what we believe. For without doubt we maintain that the divine nature is impassible — that it cannot at all be brought down from its exaltation and cannot labor in what it wills to do. And we affirm that the Lord

Jesus Christ is true God and true man — one person in two na-

Cur Deus Homo I tures, and two natures in one person. Therefore, when we state that God undergoes some lowliness or weakness, we understand this to be in accordance with the weakness of the human substance which He. assumed, not in accordance with the sublimity of His impassible [divine] nature. Accordingly, no rational considerations are recognized to oppose our faith. For by the above statement we do not signify any abasement of the divine substance; rather we declare the personal unity of the divine nature and the human nature. Therefore, we do not understand any abasement of the divine substance to have occurred in the incarnation of God; instead, we believe that the human nature was exalted.

B. So be it. Let nothing which is affirmed of Christ in accordance with the weakness of His human nature be attributed to His divine nature. But how can we show the justice or the reasonableness of God's having thus treated, or having permitted to be thus treated, that man whom the Father called His beloved son in whom He was well-pleased,!> that man whom the Son caused

Himself to become? And what justice is there in delivering up unto death, in place of a sinner, the most just of all men? What man would not be adjudged worthy of condemnation if he were to condemn an innocent party in order to free a guilty one? The conclusion seems to come to the same incongruity which was mentioned above.!® For if God was not able to save sinners otherwise than by condemning a just man, where is His omnipotence? On the other hand, if He was able to but did not will to, how shall we defend His wisdom and justice?

A. God the Father did not treat that man as you seem to think He did, nor did He hand over someone innocent in the place of someone guilty-of-death. The Father did not force the Son to die against His will; nor did He permit Him to be put to death against His will. Instead, that man willingly underwent death in order to save men.

B. Even if [the Father did not compel Him to die] against His will — since He consented to the Father's will — nevertheless, in a certain respect the Father does seem to have compelled Him [to die], in that He commanded Him [to undergo death]. For it is said that Christ ''humbled Himself and became obedient to the Father unto death, even unto death on the cross; for this reason God has also exalted Him.''!7 And [we read] that ''He learned obedience

BS)

Anselm of Canterbury by the things which He suffered,''!® and that ''the Father spared not His own son but delivered Him up for us all.''?° And the Son

Himself says: "'I have not come to do my will but to do the will of Him who sent me.''?° And approaching the time of His crucifixion He said: ''As the Father has given me commandment, so I do.''?? And again: ''Shall I not drink of the chalice which my father has given me?''?? And elsewhere: ''Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me; nevertheless not as I will but as You will.''?% Also: ''Father, if this chalice cannot pass from me except I drink of it, Your will be done.''?* According to all of these passages Christ seems to have undergone death more because He was compelled by obedience than because He was committed by free will.

Chapter Nine: He died willingly. The meaning of the following texts: "'He became obedient unto death''; ''For this reason God has also exalted Him''; ''I have not come to do my will''; ''God spared not His own son''; ''Not as I will but as You will.''

A. As I see it, you are not distinguishing clearly between (1) that which He did because obedience required it and (2) that which, happening to Him because He remained obedient, He underwent even though obedience did not require it.

B. I need to have you explain this more clearly.

A. Why did the Jews persecute Him to the point of death?

B. For no other reason than that He held unwaveringly to justice and truth in His deeds and words.

A. I think that God requires this of every rational creature and that every rational creature owes this to God as a matter of obedience.

B. Yes, we ought to admit it.

A. Therefore, that man?> owed this obedience to God the Father; and His humanity owed it to His divinity; and the Father required it of Him.

B. No one doubts this point.

A. Here, then, you have what He did because obedience required it.

B. That's true. And I now begin to see what He underwent,

/ Cur Deus Homo I having had it inflicted on Him because He persevered in obedience. For because He remained steadfast in obedience, death was inflicted on Him and He underwent death. But I do not understand how it is that obedience did not require Him to die.

A. If man had never sinned, ought he to have undergone death, or ought God to have required him to do so?

B. As we believe, man would not have died, nor would dying have been required of him. But I want to hear from you the rationale for this belief.

A. You do not deny that the rational creature was created just and was created for the purpose of being happy in the enjoyment of God.

B. No.

A. Now, you will not in the least suppose it to befit God to compel a creature, whom He had created just and for the purpose of happiness, to be unhappy through no fault of his own. But for a man to encounter death against his will constitutes a form of unhappiness.

B. It is evident that if man had not sinned, God ought not to have required him to die.

A. Therefore, God did not compel Christ to die, for in Christ there was no sin. Instead, Christ willingly underwent death — not by obeying a command to give up His life, but by obeying the command to keep justice. For He persevered so steadfastly in justice that He incurred death as a result.

But it can also be said that the Father commanded Christ to die when He commanded the thing in consequence of which Christ incurred death. In this sense, then, He did as the Father gave Him commandment;2® and He drank of the chalice which the Father gave;"7 and He became obedient to the Father unto death;

7° and thus He learned obedience — i.e., He learned the extent to which obedience ought to be kept — by the things which He suffered.*®

But the phrase ''He learned,'' which is used in the text, can be interpreted in two senses. Either ''He learned'' is used in place of ''He caused others to learn,"' or else it is used because He learned in terms of experience that which He already knew-about in terms other than experience. Now, after the apostle had said *'He humbled Himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross,''3° he added: ''For this reason God has also exalted

Him and given Him a name which is above every name''** (to

Anselm of Canterbury which the words of David are similar: ''He drank of the stream in the way; therefore, he lifted up his head'').?? This addition was not meant in the sense (1) that Christ could not at all have arrived at this exaltation except by obedience unto death and (2) that this exaltation was conferred only as a reward for this obedience. (For even before Christ had suffered, He said that all things had been given to Him by the Father,*? and that all the Father's possessions were His*4 as well.) Rather, the additon was meant in the sense that the Son, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, had decreed that He Himself would manifest to the world, in no other way than by dying, the loftiness of His omnipotence. Indeed, when this manifestation-of-loftiness which was decreed to occur only by means of His death does occur by means of His death, is it not unfittingly said to occur because of His death.

Suppose that we intend to perform some action but that we decide to do beforehand another action by means of which the intended action will be done. Now, if we do the intended action after having done the action which we willed to do beforehand, the intended action is rightly said to be done because of the fact that the preceding action, on account of which the intended action was delayed, has occurred; for we decided to do the intended action only by means of the preceding action. For example, suppose that I can cross a certain river either by horse or by boat.

And suppose that I decide to cross the river only by boat, and so I postpone crossing because no ship is available. If I do cross the river after a boat has become available, then it is right to say of me: "'A ship was ready; therefore he crossed over.'' And we speak in this manner not only when we determine to do something else by means of a thing which w® will to occur beforehand but also when we determine to do something else only subsequent to the preceding thing and not by means of it. For example, suppose someone postpones eating because of the fact that on that day he has not yet attended the celebration of mass. After he has done this thing which he willed to do first, it is appropriate to say to him: ''Eat something now, because you have done the thing on account of which you postponed eating.'' Therefore, it is an even less unusual expression to say that Christ was exalted because He underwent death, for He decreed to make Himself exalted both after death and by means of death. This expression can also be construed in the sense in which Christ the Lord is read

¥ Cur Deus Homo I to have advanced in wisdom and in grace with God?? (i.e., not in the sense that it was really true but in the sense that He conducted

Himself as if it were true). For after His death He was exalted as if this exaltation had occurred because of His death.

But His statement ''I have not come to do my will but to do the will of Him who sent me''?® is similar to His statement "'My doctrine is not mine.''?' For what someone has from God rather than from Himself he ought to speak of as more God's than His own. Now, no man has from himself either the truth which he teaches or a just will; instead, he has these from God. Therefore,

Christ came not to do His own will but to do the will of the Father, because the just will that He possessed derived not from His humanity but from His divinity. But [the text] "'God spared not His own son but delivered Him up for us'' 3° means nothing other than that God did not liberate Him.*® For many statements of this type are found in Sacred Scripture. However, where He says

''Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me; nevertheless not as I will but as You will,''

4° and ''If this chalice cannot ~ pass from me except I drink of it, Your will be done'':*" by the reference to His own will He signifies His natural desire for security — a desire in terms of which His human flesh shunned the pain of dying. But He speaks of the Father's will not in the sense that the Father willed the Son's death rather than the Son's life, but in the sense that the Father was unwilling for the human race to be restored unless man performed some deed as great as Christ's death was to be (for reason did not demand what no man could perform). Therefore, the Son says that the Father wills His death, which He, the Son, prefers to undergo rather than to see the human race not be saved. It is as if He were to say: ''Since

You, Father, do not will that the reconciliation of the world be accomplished in any other way, I say that in this sense You will my death. Therefore, let this will of Yours be done — 1.e., let my death occur — so that the world may be reconciled to You.'' For we often say that someone wills something because he does not will something else which,. were he to will it, then that thing which he is said to will would not occur. For example, we say of someone who does not will to close a window through which a draft enters and extinguishes a lamp, that he wills to extinguish the lamp. In this sense, then, the Father willed the Son's death because He did not will for the world to be saved otherwise than

Anselm of Canterbury by man's performing some very great deed, as I mentioned. Since no other man was able to perform this great deed: for the Son to will the salvation of men was tantamount to the Father's having commanded Him to die. Therefore, He did as the Father gave

Him commandment, and He drank of the chalice which the Father gave Him, being obedient unto death.

Chapter Ten: How these same texts can rightly be interpreted in another way.

A. We can also rightly make the following interpretation: [in giving] the gracious will by which the Son willed to die for the salvation of the world, the Father gave the Son commandment

(without, however, compelling Him), and gave Him the chalice of suffering, and did not spare Him but delivered Him up for us, and willed His death; and [in keeping this will] the Son was obedient unto death and learned obedience by the things He suffered. For even as with respect to His humanity He did not have from Himself the will to live justly but, rather, had it from the Father, so also He could not have had the will by which He willed to die (in order to perform such a good deed) except from the Father of lights, from whom comes every best gift and every perfect gift.*? And as the Father is said to draw someone when

He bestows this will upon him, so it is not inappropriate to say that He moves him. For just as the Son says with regard to the Father ''No one comes to me unless the Father draws him," #2 so He could have said ''.

. unless the Father moves him.'' Similarly, He could also have said: ''No one hastens to his death for my name's sake unless the Father moves or draws him.'' For since each man's will draws or moves him toward that which he wills unwaveringly, God is not inappropriately said to draw him or to move him when He gives him such a will. By this drawing or moving, no compelling force is signified; instead, there is signified a voluntary and devoted retaining of the good will which has been received. Therefore, if in this respect we cannot deny that the Father drew and moved the Son toward death when He gave Him that willingness, who cannot see that in this respect the Father gave Him commandment to undergo death voluntarily, and gave Him the chalice of which He would drink willingly?

} Cur Deus Homo I And if the Son is correctly said not to have spared Himself but to have delivered Himself up willingly for us, who would deny it to be correctly said that the Father, from whom the Son possessed such a willingness, did not spare the Son but delivered Him up for us and willed His death? And in this same sense, when the Son freely and unwaveringly kept the will which He had received from the Father, He became obedient to the Father unto death and He learned obedience by the things which He suffered — 1.e., He learned how great is the work which needed to be accomplished by means of obedience. For simple and true obedience occurs when rational nature freely and without necessity keeps the will which it has received from God.

Although the foregoing ways are able to suffice, we can also correctly interpret in other ways the statement that the Father willed the Son's death. For just as we say ''He wills'' of that man who causes another to will, so we also say ''He wills'' of that man who does not cause another to will but merely approves of his willing.44 (For example, suppose we see someone will to ~ endure affliction bravely in order to accomplish what he is rightly willing. Even though we state that we are willing for him to endure that affliction, what we will and like is not his torment but his willingness.) We are also accustomed to say of someone who can prevent something but does not prevent it, that he wills what he does not prevent.*> Therefore, since the Son's will pleased the Father, and since the Father did not prevent Him from willing what He did will or from carrying out what He willed, the Father is rightly said to have willed that the Son undergo death so graciously and beneficially — even though the Father did not delight in the Son's torment. However, the Son said that the chalice could not pass from Him except He drink of it. This He said not because He was unable to avoid death if He had willed to, but because (as I said) it was impossible for the world to be saved in any other way, and because the Son unwaveringly willed to undergo death rather than to leave the world unsaved. He spoke these words, then, in order to teach that the human race could not be saved otherwise than by means of His death; He did not speak them in order to indicate that He could not at all avoid death.

Now, whatever things are said about Him which are similar to what has been said must be construed in such way that He is believed to have died not of necessity but of free will. For He was

Anselm, of Canterbury omnipotent; and we read of Him that ''He was offered because it was His own will.''*#® And'He says, ''I lay down my life in order to take it up again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have the power to lay it down, and I have the power to take it up again.''*" Therefore, that which He does by His own will and power He is not at all rightly said to be compelled to do.

B. The mere fact that God permits Him to be thus treated, even though He was willing [to be thus treated], does not seem to befit such a father in regard to such a son.

A. On the contrary! It is altogether appropriate that such a father give his consent to such a son if this son wills something in a way that commends God's honor and conduces to man's salvation, which could not be accomplished otherwise.

B. Regarding this last point we are still concerned with howHis death can be shown to be reasonable and necessary; for if it cannot be, then it seems that the Son ought not to have willed His death and that the Father ought neither to have required it nor permitted it. For the question is, why was God unable to save man in any other way? Or if He was able, why did He will to do so in the above manner? It does not seem fitting for God to have saved man in this manner; nor is it clear what Christ's death accomplishes with regard to man's salvation. For it would be strange if God so delighted in, or so needed, the blood of an innocent man that He either would or could only spare the guilty by means of this innocent man's being put to death.

A. Since in this inquiry you are assuming the role of those who prefer to believe nothing except what has been established in advance by reason,** I would like for ug to agree to accept, in the case of God, nothing that is in even the least degree unfitting and to reject nothing that is in even the slightest degree reasonable unless something more reasonable opposes it. For in the case of God, just as an impossibility results from any unfittingness, however slight,*® so necessity accompanies any degree of reasonableness, however small, provided it is not overriden by some other more weighty reason.

B. In this discussion I accept nothing more readily than [the proposal] that we both adhere to this agreement.

A. We are dealing only with God's incarnation and with the things which we believe regarding the assumed man.®°

B. That's right.

/ Cur Deus Homo I A. Therefore, let us suppose the incarnation of God and the things we say about that man never occurred. And let us agree that (1) man was created for happiness, which cannot be possessed in this life, that (2) no one can attain happiness unless his sins have been forgiven, and that (3) no man passes through this present life without sin. And let us agree about the other things which we must believe if we are to have eternal salvation.

B. Allright. For in no respect do these seem either impossible for God or unbefitting to Him.

A. Therefore, in order for man to attain happiness, the remission of his sins is required.

B. So we all believe.

Chapter Eleven: What sinning and making satisfaction for sin are.

A. Therefore, we must ask on what basis God forgives men their sins. To do this more clearly, let us first see what sinning and making satisfaction for sin are.

B. It is up to you to explain and up to me to pay attention.

A. If angels and men always rendered to God what they ought to, then they would never sin.

B. I cannot contradict this.

A. Therefore, to sin is nothing other than not to render to God what is due.

B. What is the debt which we owe to God?

A. The will of every rational creature ought to be subordinate to the will of God.

B. Nothing is truer.

A. This is the debt which angels and men owe to God. No one who pays this debt sins; and everyone who does not pay it does sin. This is the justice-of-will, or uprightness-of-will, which makes men just, or upright, in heart (i.e., in will).°* This is the sole and complete honor which we owe to God and which God demands from us. For only such a will, when it is able to act, does works which are acceptable to God; and when it is not able to act, it alone is acceptable in itself, since without it no work is acceptable to God. Whoever does not pay to God this honor due

Him dishonors Him and removes from Him what belongs to Him;

Anselm. of Canterbury and this removal, or this dishonoring, constitutes a sin. However, as long as he does not repay what he has stolen, he remains guilty. But it is not enough for him merely to repay what has been stolen; rather, because of the wrong which has been inflicted, he ought to repay more than he has stolen. For example, if someone who injures another's health restores it, his.doing so is insufficient payment unless he also gives some compensation for the painful wrong that was inflicted. Similarly, he who violates another's honor does not sufficiently repay this honor unless, in proportion to the injury caused by the dishonoring, he makes some restitution which is acceptable to the one whom he has dishonored. We must also note that when someone repays what he has unjustly stolen, he ought to return that which could not be exacted from-him had he not stolen what belonged to another.

Accordingly, then, everyone who sins is obliged to repay to God the honor which he has stolen. This [repayment of stolen honor] constitutes the satisfaction which every sinner is obliged to make to God.*"

B. Since we have proposed to follow reason, I have nothing which I can say against you on all these matters, even though you alarm me a bit.

Chapter Twelve: Whether it is fitting for God to forgive sin out of mercy alone, apart from any payment of the debt.

A. Let us go back and see whether it is fitting for God to forgive sin out of mercy alone, apart from any repayment of the honor stolen from Him.

B. I see no reason why it is not fitting.

A. To forgive sin in this manner is identical with not punishing it. Now, in the absence of satisfaction, to order sin rightly is only to punish it; therefore, if sin is not punished, something disordered is forgiven.

B. What you say is reasonable.

A. But it is not fitting that God should forgive something that is disordered within His kingdom.

B. If I wished to say anything different, I fear that I would be sinning.

Cur Deus Homo I A. Therefore, it is not fitting that God should forgive sin that goes thus unpunished.

B. This follows.

A. There is also something else which follows if sin that goes thus unpunished is forgiven: viz., God would be dealing with the sinner and the nonsinner in the same way — something which is unsuitable for Him [to do].

B. 1 cannot deny it.

A. Also consider the following point: Everyone knows that human justice is subject to law, so that God deals out the measure of recompense according to the degree of justice.

B. This is what we believe.

A. But if sin were neither paid for nor punished, it would be subject to no law.

B. I cannot think differently.

A. Therefore, if injustice is forgiven out of mercy alone, then injustice is more at liberty than is justice — something which seems especially unfitting. Moreover, this unfittingness is so extensive that it makes injustice resemble God, for as God is subject to no one's law, neither would injustice be.

B. I cannot oppose your reasoning. However, since God commands us to forgive completely those who sin against us,°® it seems inconsistent that He commands us to do what it is unfitting for Him to do.

A. There is no inconsistency here, because God gives us this command so that we should not arrogate to ourselves His prerogative. For to take vengeance belongs to no one except to Him who is Lord of all.>4 Now, when earthly potentates rightly exercise retribution, the Lord Himself does it; for they have been ordained by Him to this end.°° B. You have eliminated the inconsistency which I thought was present in [your argument]. But there is something else to which I want to have your answer. God is so free that He is subject to no law and to no one else's judgment; and He is so kind that nothing more kind can be thought. Moreover, nothing except what He wills is right or fitting. Therefore, it seems strange for us to say either that He is altogether unwilling, or else that He is forbidden, to forgive a wrong done to Him; for from Him we regularly ask forgiveness for the wrongs we do to others.

A. What you say about His freedom, will, and kindness is

Anselm, of Canterbury true. Yet we ought. to explicate these notions so in accordance with reason that we do not*seem to oppose His dignity. For there is freedom only with respect to what is advantageous or what is fitting; °® and ''kindness'' which performs some work unbefitting to God must not be called kindness. But as for the statement that what God wills is just and what He does not will is not just: we must not interpret this to mean that if God were to will any kind of unfittingness, it would be just simply because He willed it. For the supposition 'God wills to lie'' does not warrant the inference

'Lying is just,'' but, instead, warrants the inference ''This being is not really God.'' For no will can at all will to lie except a will in which the truth has been corrupted — or better, a will which has become corrupted by abandoning the truth. Therefore, when we say "'If God wills to lie,'' this means ''If God is of such a nature as to will to lie.

.'' And so ''Lying is just'' is not inferable therefrom — unless we interpret the if-then statement as an example of our saying about two impossibilities ''If this is true, then that is true,'' although neither the one nor the other is true. For example, someone might say '"'If water is dry, then fire is wet,'' neither of which component statements is true.

Therefore, "'If God wills such-and-such, then it is just'? can be said truly only of those things which it is not unfitting for God to will. If God wills that it rain, it is just that it rain; and if God wills that some man be killed, it is just that he be killed. Therefore, if it is not fitting that God do something unjustly or inordinately, it does not pertain to His freedom, or kindness, or willingness that He forgive — without punishing him — a sinner who does not repay to Him what he has stolen.

B. You remove from me all the objections which I thought could be raised against you.

A. Consider still another reason why it was not fitting for God to do this.

B. I will gladly listen to whatever you say.

Chapter Thirteen: Nothing ought less to be tolerated in the order of things than that the creature remove the honor owed to the Creator and not repay what he removes.

A. Nothing ought less to be tolerated in the order of things than 7JO

/ Cur Deus Homo I that the creature remove the honor owed to the Creator and not repay what he removes.

B. Nothing is clearer than this.

A. Now, nothing would be more unjustly tolerated than would be that thing than which nothing ought less to be tolerated.

B. This also is not unclear.

| A. Therefore, you will not say, I believe, that God ought to tolerate that thing than which nothing is tolerated more unjustly, viz., that the creature not repay to God what he removes from Him.

B. Indeed, I see that it must 'not at all be said.

A. Likewise, if nothing is greater or better than God, then Supreme Justice (which is identical with God Himself) keeps nothing more justly than God's honor in regard to the governance of things.

B. Nothing is clearer than this either.

A. Therefore, God keeps nothing more justly than the honor of His dignity.

B. I have to admit it.

A. Do you think that God would keep His honor intact if He permitted it to be removed from Him in such way that neither did the thief repay it nor did God punish him?

B. I dare not say so.

A. Therefore, it is necessary either for the honor that has been removed to be repaid or else for punishment to result. Otherwise, either God would not be just to Himself or else He would not have the power?' to do the one or the other — heinous things even to think.

Chapter Fourteen: How the punishment of a sinner honors God.°8 B. 1 think that nothing more reasonable can be said. But I want to hear from you whether the punishment of a sinner is an honor for God — or, rather, what kind of honor it is. For if the punishment of a sinner is not an honor for God, then when a sinner does not repay what he has stolen but is punished instead, God loses His honor irrecuperably. But this consequence seems inconsistent with what has already been said. au

Anselm, of Canterbury A. It is impossible for God to lose His honor. Either the sinner freely repays what he owe§ or else God takes it from him against his will. For either a man willingly exhibits due subjection to God

(be it by not sinning or be it by making payment for his sins), or else God subjects him to Himself against his will by tormenting him and in this way demonstrates that He is his master — a fact which the man refuses to acknowledge voluntarily. In this case, we must notice that as a man by sinning seizes what is God's, so God by punishing takes what is man's. Indeed, not only is that which someone already possesses said to be his own®® but so is that which it is in his power to possess. Therefore, since man was created in such way that he would be able to possess happiness if he did not sin: when because of his sin he is deprived of happiness and of every good, he is repaying from his own possession (although against his will) what he has seized. For although what

God removes from him He does not convert to His own advantageous use (as a man converts to his own use the money which he takes away from someone else), nevertheless what God takes away conduces to His honor simply by virtue of His taking it. For by taking it away He shows that the sinner and his possessions are subject to Him.

Chapter Fifteen: Whether God lets His honor be violated even slightly.

B. What you say is agreeable. But there is also another question to which I request your answer. If God ought to maintain His honor in the way you are establishing, why does He allow it to be even slightly violated? For that which is in any way allowed to be injured is not maintained wholly and perfectly.

A. Nothing can be added to or subtracted from His honor, considered in itself. For His honor is, in itself, incorruptible and altogether immutable. But when each single creature keeps, either by nature or by reason, its proper place [in the order of things] — a place prescribed for it, so to speak — it is said to obey God and to honor Him. And this [holds true especially for] a rational nature, which has the gift of understanding what it ought to do. When a rational nature wills what it ought to, it honors God

, Cur Deus Homo I — not because it confers anything on Him but because it willingly submits itself to His will and governance.®° And, as best it can, it stays in its proper place in the universe and preserves the beauty of the universe. But when it does not will what it ought, then it dishonors God as much as lies in its power to do so. For it does not willingly submit itself to His governance; and it disturbs

(as much as lies in its power to do so) the order and the beauty of the universe — even though it does not at all injure or tarnish

God's power or dignity.

If those things which are encircled by the heavens wished not to continue to exist beneath the heavens, or wished to get away from the heavens, they would nonetheless be able to exist only beneath the heavens and be able to go away from the heavens only by coming toward them. For no matter from what place or to what place or by what route they would go, they would still be circumscribed by the heavens. And the farther they would get from any one part of the heavens, the closer they would get to the opposite part. Similarly, even though men and evil angels do not want to submit to the divine will and ordinance, they are unable to escape from it. For if they want to get out from under God's directive will, they run beneath His punitive will. And — if you ask about the route they traverse — they make their way only under His permissive will. And that which they perversely will or do is redirected by Supreme Wisdom towards the order and beauty of the aforementioned universe. Indeed, the voluntary making of satisfaction for wickedness, and the demand for punishment of anyone who does not make satisfaction — to pass over the fact that God causes, in many ways, good things to come from evil things — retain, in the universe, their proper place and preserve the beauty of its order. If where wickedness tries to disturb right-order Divine Wisdom did not provide for the making of satisfaction and the exacting of punishment, then in the universe (which God ought to order) there would occur a certain marring as a result of the violation of the order's beauty; and God would seem to fail in His governance. Just as these two results are unfitting, so they are impossible;°' therefore either satisfaction or punishment must follow upon every sin.

B. You have satisfactorily answered my objection.

A. Therefore, it is evident that no one can honor or dishonor te:

Anselm, of Canterbury God as He is in Himself; but someone seems to do so, to the extent he can, when he sbjects his will to the will of God or withdraws it from the will of God.

B. I do not know what I can say against this conclusion.

Chapter Sixteen: The reason that the number of angels who fell is to be made up from among human beings.

A. Let me add still another point.

B. You may keep talking until listening begins to weary me.

A. It is evident that God planned to make up — from human nature, which He created without sin — the number of angels who had fallen. ®?

B. We believe it; but I would like to have a reason for it.

A. You are misdirecting me. For we planned ®* to deal only with the incarnation of God, and you are interposing other questions for me.

B. Don't be angry, for ''God loves a cheerful giver.'' ®* And no one evidences that he cheerfully gives what he promises to, more than does someone who gives more than he promises to. So answer my question gladly.

A. We must not doubt that those rational natures which are or will be happy in the contemplation of God were foreknown by God to exist in a calculable and perfect number, so that it is not fitting that this number be greater or lesser. For either God does not know in what number it is more suitable that these natures be created — an alternative which is false — or else, if He knows,

He will create rational natures in the number which He knows to be the most suitable for His purpose. Therefore, either the angels who fell were created to be within this number, or else because they could not remain in excess of it, they fell of necessity — an absurd thing to suppose.

B. What you say is clearly true.

A. Therefore, since they ought to have been within that number: either their number must be made up, or else rational natures which are foreknown to exist in a perfect number will remain in an imperfect number — something which cannot be the case.

B. Without doubt they are to be replaced.

/ Cur Deus Homo I A. Therefore, it is necessary that they be replaced from human nature, since there is no other nature from which they can be replaced.

Chapter Seventeen: Other angels cannot be substituted for fallen ones.

B. Why cannot fallen angels be restored? Or why cannot other angels be substituted for them?

A. When you perceive the difficulty of our restoration, you will discern the impossibility of their reconciliation.®* However, the reason other angels cannot be substituted for them — not to speak of how this [creation and substitution of other angels] seems to be inconsistent with the perfection of the original creation — is the following: Other angels ought not to be substituted unless they could be such as fallen angels would have become had they not sinned. If [they had not sinned], they would have persevered without having witnessed any punishment of sin; but after their fail this state would have been impossible for the other angels who would be substituted for them. For if both the one who is not aware of any punishment for sin and the one who always gazes upon eternal punishment remain standing in the truth, they are not equally praiseworthy.°® Indeed, the good angels must be thought to have been confirmed [in goodness] as a result of their own merit and not at all because of the fall of.the evil angels. For if the good angels had sinned together with the evil angels, they would have been condemned with them; similarly, if the unjust angels had remained standing together with the just angels, they too would have been confirmed. Assuredly, if some of the angels were to be confirmed only because of the fall of the others, then either none of them would ever have been confirmed or else it would have been necessary for one of them to fall so that he would be punished in order for the others to be confirmed. Now, both of these consequences are absurd. Consequently, the angels who remained standing were confirmed in the way in which all of them alike would have been confirmed if they had remained standing. I discussed this way, as best I could, when I dealt with the reason why God did not give the Devil perseverance.

°®" fs

Anselm of Canterbury B. You have proved that the evil angels are to be replaced from human nature. And frdm your reasoning it is evident that the number of elect men will not be less than the number of reprobate angels.®* But show, if you can, whether the number of elect men will be greater [than the number of reprobate angels].

Chapter Eighteen: Whether there will be more holy men than there are evil angels.

A. If angels were present in the perfect number (of which we have been speaking) before some of them fell, then human beings were created only as substitutes for lost angels and, clearly, they will not be more numerous than fallen angels. On the other hand, if that number was not exhausted by all the angels, then both what perished and what was originally lacking were to be completed from among human beings; and there will be more elect men than there are reprobate angels; and so we shall say that human beings were created not only for replenishing the diminished number but also for filling up the still unfilled number.

B. Which alternative ought rather to be maintained?: that the angels were originally created in the perfect number, or the contradictory?

A. I will tell you my view.

B. 1 cannot demand more from you.

A. If man was created after the fall of the evil angels, as some people interpret the text in Genesis, then I do not see how I can thereby prove either alternative decisively. For it seems to me to be possible that the angels were already present in perfect number and that afterwards man was created in order to restore their diminished number. And it [also seems] possible that angels were not present in perfect number, because God was delaying (as He still is) the fulfillment of that number, since He was going to create human nature at a fitting time. Thus, either He would simply fill up that still incomplete number, or else if the completed number had been diminished, He would restore it.

However, if the entire creation was created at once, and if those days, in terms of which Moses seems to say that our world was not created at once, are to be interpreted otherwise than as we experience days in which we live, then I cannot see how angels

/ Cur Deus Homo I could have been created in that completed number. Indeed, if they were so created, then I think that either some angels or human beings were going to fall of necessity or else there would be more persons in the Heavenly City than the fittingness of the perfect number would require. Therefore, if all things were created at once, then angels and the first two human beings seem to have been so present in an imperfect number that if no angel were to fall, then only what was lacking would be filled up from human beings; on the other hand, if an angel were to perish, then also what fell would be replaced from human beings. And human nature, which was weaker, would ''acquit'' God of blame and would confound the Devil should he try to attribute his fall to his weakness; for human nature, though weaker, would stand steadfast. But even if human nature were to fall, it would much more greatly vindicate God against itself and the Devil, since — though created mortal and much weaker — it would (in the elect) ascend from such weakness to a place higher than that from which the Devil had fallen. Indeed, it would ascend as much higher as the good angels (equality with whom would be its due) advanced (because they persevered) after the downfall of the evil ones.

For these reasons it seems to me more likely that angels were not present in the perfect number with which the Heavenly City will be filled. For this view is possible if man was not created at the same time as the angels; and it seems to be necessary if man and angels were created at the same time. (Many regard this simultaneous creation as more likely, since we read: ''He who lives forever created all things together.'')®? But even if the perfection of the created world is to be construed as referring not so much to the number of individuals as to the number of natures, it is necessarily the case that human nature was created either to complement the perfection of creation or to be superfluous to it.

Now, we dare not make the latter statement with regard to even the smallest worm's nature. Hence, human nature was created to occupy its own place in the created world and not merely to replace individuals of a different nature. Therefore, it is evident that even if no angel had perished, human beings would have had a place of their own in the Heavenly City. Thus, it follows that angels, before some of them fell, were not present in that perfect number. Otherwise, either men or some angels would have had to

Anselm, of Canterbury fall, since no one could have remained in that city in excess of the perfect number.

B. You have accomplished a great deal.

A. There is also another reason, it seems to me, which strongly favors the view that angels were not created in a perfect number.

B. State it.

A. If angels were created in that perfect number, and if human beings were created only as substitutes for lost angels, then it is clear that unless angels had fallen from their happiness human beings would not ascend to it.

B. This is evident.

A. Suppose, then, someone says that elect men will rejoice as much over the loss of the angels as over their own elevation since without doubt the latter would not occur unless the former had occurred. [In that case] how could men be protected from this perverse joy, or how would we say that fallen angels will be replaced by human beings? For if these angels had not fallen, they would have remained free of this fault (i.e., free of rejoicing over the fall of others); but men could not be free of it. Or, indeed, what kind of happiness would men with this fault deserve? Finally, how presumptuous it would be of us to say that God would not or could not bring about this substitution apart from this fault!

B. Does not a similar thing happen in the case of the Gentiles, who have been called to faith because the Jews have rejected it?

A. No. For if all the Jews had believed, the Gentiles would stil] have been called, since ''in every nation he who fears God and works justice is acceptable to Him." 7° But since the Jews spurned the Apostles, their contempt was the occasion of the Apostles' having turned to the Gentiles.

B. In no respect do I see anything that I can Say against this.

A. Why does this joy over another's fall seem to you to come to each man?

B. Why except that each would know that he would not at all be positioned where he will be unless another had fallen from this position?

A. Therefore, if no one had this assurance, there would not be any basis for anyone to rejoice over another's downfall. 71

B. So it seems.

j Cur Deus Homo I A. On the assumption that elect men will be much more numerous than the angels who fell, do you think that anyone of these elect men would have this assurance?

B. 1 cannot at all believe that he would have it or should have it. For with regard to the [perfect] number required for establishing that city: how could anyone know whether he was created for replenishing what was diminished or for filling up what was not yet completed? All would be certain, however, that they were created for completing that city.

A. Therefore, if there will be more human beings than reprobate angels, no one could or should know that he has been elevated to the Heavenly City only because of another's fall.

B. This is true.

A. Therefore, no one will have reason to rejoice over another's perdition.

B. So it follows.

A. We see, then, that if there will be more elect men than reprobate angels, there does not follow that unfittingness which is bound to follow on the assumption that there will not be more

[elect men than reprobate angels]. Accordingly, since it is impossible for there to be any unfittingness in that city, it seems necessary that angels were not created in that perfect number and that there will be more blessed men than there are wretched angels.

B. I do not see how this can be denied.

A. I think that still another argument can be given for this same conclusion.

B. You ought to expound this one as well.

A. We believe that the physical mass of the world is to be transformed 7? for the better and that this will not occur until the number of elect men is filled up and the Blessed City completed.

Moreover, [we believe that] upon completion of this city, the transformation will no longer be delayed. Hence, we can infer that from the beginning God planned to perfect both [this world's physical nature and that city of rational natures] at the same time.

Thus, the inferior nature, which did not sense God, would not be perfected before the superior nature, which ought to enjoy God.

And in its own way the inferior nature, having been changed for the better, would ''rejoice'' in the perfecting of the superior nature. Indeed, every creature — each in its own way rejoicing eternally in its creator, itself, and its fellow-creatures — would

Anselm of Canterbury rejoice over its own so glorious and so marvellous perfectedness.

Thus, that which the will freely causes in rational nature, this the unsensing creature would also naturally display as a result of the governance of God. (For we are accustomed to share joyfully in the exultation of our ancestors — for example, when on the "'birthdays'' ** of saints we delight in festive celebration, rejoicing over their glory.) Now, the view under discussion seems to be supported by the following consideration: viz., that if Adam had not sinned, God would still have delayed the completion of that city until human beings were transformed into immortal immortality (so to speak) of their bodies, upon completion of that number-of-men which God was awaiting. For in Paradise human beings had a kind of immortality — viz., an ability not to die. But this ability was not ''immortal'' because it was able to ''die,'' with the result that human beings would be unable to keep from dying.

But if the foregoing view is true — viz., that from the beginning God planned to perfect at one and the same time that rational, blessed city and this natural, insensible world — then [one of the following alternatives] seems to hold: (1) Before the downfall of the evil angels that city was not complete in its number of angels; rather, God was planning to complete it from human beings at the time He would change, for the better, the physical nature of the world. Or (2) if that city was complete in its number, it was not complete in its confirmation; and its confirmation was to be delayed even if no one within that city were to sin in the period up until the world's renewal, which we await. Or (3) if the confirmation was to be delayed no longer, the renewing of the world was to be hastened so that it Would occur together with the confirmation. (~3) But it is altogether unreasonable [to suppose] that God purposed to renew immediately a newly created world and to destroy — at the very beginning, before the reason for their having been created was evident — those things which will not exist after this renewal. Consequently, then, it is not the case that angels were so present in a perfect number that their confirmation was no longer delayed; for the renewal of the new world would have had to occur immediately — a consequence which is unfitting. (~2) But that God willed to delay the confirmation until the future renewal of the world also seems unfitting —

Cur Deus Wome I especially since He had accomplished this confirmation so soon in some beings, and since it is plausible that in the case of the first human beings He would have accomplished this confirmation at the time of their sin if they had not sinned, just as He did in the case of the persevering angels. It is true that men were not yet elevated to that equality-with-the-angels to which they were going to come when the number of them who would be elevated would be complete. Nonetheless, it seems that if they had conquered, and thus had not sinned when tempted, then with all their offspring they would have been so confirmed in the justice in which they dwelt that they would not be able to sin any more — just as because they sinned and were conquered, they are so weak that as far as their own power goes they cannot exist without sin.

For who would venture to say that injustice is more able to bind in servitude a man who consents to its first enticement than justice is able to confirm in freedom a man who adheres to it at the time of this first temptation? Now, since human nature was present as a whole in our first parents, it was conquered as a whole in them, with the result that it sinned (the sole exception being that man whom God was able to keep separate from the sin of Adam, even as He was able to create Him from a virgin and without recourse to the seed of a male). Similarly, human nature would have conquered as a whole in our first parents if they had not sinned.

Therefore, the [first] alternative remains: viz., that the Heavenly City was not filled up by the original [undiminished] number of angels but was to be completed from human beings. If these considerations are correct, then there will be more elect men than there are reprobate angels.

B. What you say seems very reasonable to me. But how shall we interpret the text that God ''appointed the bounds of people according to the number of the children of Israel''?"* Because the words ''angels of God'' are [sometimes] found in place of *'children of Israel,'' some people interpret this text in such way that the number of elect men to be elevated is construed as [exactly] corresponding to the number of good angels.

A. This interpretation is not opposed to the foregoing view provided it is not true that as many angels have fallen as have remained standing. For on the assumption that there are more elect angels than reprobate ones: it is both necessary that elect

Anselm of Canterbury men replace reprobate angels and also possible for elect men to be equal in number to the happy angels; and so there will be a greater number of just men than there are of unjust angels.

But remember the proviso with which I began'® to deal with your perplexity: viz., that if I say something which a greater authority does not confirm, then even though I seem to prove it rationally, it should be accepted with no other degree of certainty than that it appears this way to me for the time being, until God somehow reveals the matter to me more fully. For if I say something that unquestionably contradicts Sacred Scripture, I am certain that it is false; and I do not want to hold that view if I know it

[to be false]. But there are matters, concerning which, different beliefs can be entertained without danger. For example, the topic we are now discussing is of this sort. (For in case we do not know whether or not the number of men to be elected is greater than the number of lost angels, and in case we deem one of these alternatives to be better than the other, there is no danger to the soul, it seems to me.) Now, if in matters of this kind we so interpret the divine sayings that they seem to favor different views, and if no other passage is found where they determine what must assuredly be held to, then I do not think we ought to be reproached.

As for your having cited the verse'® ''He appointed the bounds of people,'' or nations, ''according to the number of the angels of God'' — a verse which in another translation reads ''according to the number of the children of Israel'': both translations have either the same meaning or else different but compatible meanings. Therefore, both ''angels of God'' and ''children of Israel'' must be construed to signify good angels only or else elect men only or else both angels and elect men together he. Mine Heavenly City as a whole. Or else, ''angels of God'' [signifies] the holy angels only, and ' 'children of Israel'' [signifies] just men only. Or else, ''children of Israel'' [signifies] angels only, and "angels of God'' [signifies] just men only. Now, if both expressions designate good angels only, then this amounts to the same thing as if only ''angels of God''-[had been used]. But if [both designate] the Heavenly City as a whole, then the meaning is that people (i.e., multitudes of elect men) will continue to be taken up, or that there will continue to be people in our world, until the predetermined but not yet completed number of that city becomes completed from among men.

i f Cur Deus Homo I Presently, I do not see how ''children of Israel'' would signify either angels alone or both angels and holy men together. But it would not be strange for holy men to be called ''children of Israel,'' even as they are called ''children of Abraham.''"" They can also rightly be called angels-of-God by virtue of the following considerations: (1) They imitate angelic life; (2) likeness to and equality with the angels is promised them in Heaven; (3) all who live justly are ''angels'' of God (and hence are called confessors or martyrs; for one who bears witness to, and confesses, the truth of God is His messenger, i.e., His ''angel.'' Moreover, if an evil man is called a devil — as the Lord says'® about Judas because of the similarity of his malice [ to a devil's] — then why shall not a good man be called an angel because of his imitation of justice?). Therefore, it seems to me, we can say that God has appointed the bounds of people according to the number of elect men; for in our world there will continue to be people and human procreation until the number of elect men is completed; and once this number is completed, the human reproduction which occurs in the present life will cease.

But if we interpret ''angels of God'' to indicate holy angels only and interpret ''children of Israel'' to indicate just men only, then ''God appointed the bounds of people according to the number of the angels of God'' can be construed in two ways: viz., either in the sense that as many people — 1i.e., as many human beings — as there are holy angels of God will be elevated, or in the sense that there will continue to be people until the number of the angels of God is filled up from among men. However, ''God appointed the bounds of people according to the number of the children of Israel'' can be interpreted in only one way, it seems to me: viz., in the sense that (as has been stated above) there will continue to be people in the present world until the number of holy men is elevated. Now, from either translation we may infer that as many men will be elevated as angels will remain standing. From this inference, however, there does not follow — even though lost angels are to be replaced from among men — that as many angels fell as persevered. Nonetheless, if anyone makes this latter claim, he will have to find missteps in the above-given arguments which seem to show (1) that angels, before some of them fell, were not present in that perfect number

Anselm of Canterbury (which I referred to.above) and (2) that there will be more elect men than there are evil angels.

B. I do not regret having made you say these things about angels, for you have not done it in vain. Return now to the point from which we digressed.

Chapter Nineteen: Man cannot be saved without satisfaction for sin.

A. It has been established'? that God planned to replace from among men the angels who fell.

B. This point is certain.

A. Therefore, in the Heavenly City the men who will be elevated thereto in place of angels ought to be such as those whom they will there replace were going to be — 1.e., [they ought to be] such as the good angels now are. Otherwise, it would not be the case that those who have fallen are replaced, and consequently

God either could not complete the good work He began or else He would regret having begun such a good work — both of which alternatives are absurd.

B. Truly, [elect] men ought to be equal to the good angels.

A. Have the good angels ever sinned?

B. No.

A. Can you think that a man who has once sinned and has never made satisfaction to God for his sin, but is simply let-off unpunished, would be equal to an angel who has never sinned?

B. 1 can think and say these words, but I can no more grasp their intelligibility than I can rightly think a falsehood to be a truth.8° A. Therefore, in the absence of satisfaction it is not fitting for God to elevate sinful man to the places of lost angels, since truth does not permit a sinful man's being elevated to equality with the happy angels.

B. Reason demonstrates this.

A. Consider also whether in the case of man alone — disregarding the fact that he ought to be equal to the angels — God ought to elevate him in this way to any happiness, even to the kind of happiness which he possessed before he sinned.

B. State your view, and I shall examine it as best I can.

Cur Deus Homo ii A. Let us suppose that some rich man is holding in his hand a pearl of great value which no impurity has ever touched, and which no one else can remove from his hand unless he permits it.

And let him be intending to hide it away in his treasury, where his most cherished and most valuable possessions are located.

B. I am imagining this just as if it were before us.

A. What if, even though he could prevent it from happening, he were to permit some envious person to knock this pearl from his hand into the mire? And what if afterwards he were to take it from the mire and store it, still dirty and unwashed, in some clean and costly receptacle, intending to treasure it henceforth in this condition? Would you think him wise?

B. How could I think this? For would it not be much better for him to retain and safeguard, as clean, the pearl which is contaminated?

A. Would not God have been doing a similar thing if without there being any cleansing (i.e., without there being any satisfaction) He had brought man — stained by the mire of sin and going to remain in this condition forever — back at least into Paradise, from which he had been cast out? For in Paradise man, who was to join the company of the angels, was originally being held sinless in God's hand, as it were. And God permitted the Devil

(for if God had willed to prevent the Devil, the Devil would not : have been able to tempt man), incited by envy, to thrust man

(who nevertheless consented) into the mire of sin.

B. I dare not deny that there would be a similarity if God were to do this. Hence, I do not grant that He can do it. For [if God were to do this], it would seem that either He was unable to complete what He had planned or else He regretted His good plan. And neither of these possibilities can befall God.

A. Therefore, believe most assuredly that without satisfaction - (i.e., without voluntary payment of the debt) God cannot forgive unpunished sin and the sinner cannot arrive at happiness — not even such happiness as he had before he sinned. For without satisfaction it would not be the case that man is really restored — not even restored to such a state as that in which he was existing

_ prior to his sin.

B. I cannot at all refute your arguments. But why is it that we pray to God ''Forgive us our debts''?®! And why does every nation beseech the god in whom it believes to forgive its sins?

Anselm of Canterbury For, on the one hand, if we pay [to God] what we owe, why do we ask Him to forgive us? Is God unjust, so that He demands again what has already been paid? On the other hand, if we do not pay it, why do we pray in vain for Him to do what He cannot do, seeing that it is unfitting?

A. He who does not make payment says in vain ''Forgive me.'' But he who does make payment also makes this supplication; for this making-of-supplication belongs to the payment. For God does not owe anything to anyone; but every creature is indebted to God. Accordingly, it is not expedient for man to deal with God as an equal with an equal. Regarding this issue it is not necessary to give you an answer now. For when you come to learn why Christ died, perhaps you will detect by yourself the answer you are seeking.

B. Well, then, the answer you have given to my perplexity satisfies me for now. The following point, however, you have demonstrated so clearly that even if I wanted to I could not doubt®? its truth: viz., that no man can arrive at happiness if he is sinful or can be freed from sin if he does not repay what he seized by sinning.

Chapter Twenty: Satisfaction ought to be proportional to the measure of the sin. Man cannot make satisfaction by himself.

A. | think you will also not doubt that satisfaction ought to be proportional to the measure of the sin.

B. Were it not so, sin would to some extent remain unordered — something which cannot be the case if God leaves nothing unordered in His kingdom. Now, it has already been established ** that even the slightest unfittingness is impossible in the case of God.

A. Tell me, then: what will you pay to God in proportion to your sin?

; B. Penitence, a contrite and humbled heart, fasting and a variety of physical toil, the mercy of giving and forgiving, as well as obedience.

A. In all these cases what are you giving to God?

B. Do I not honor God when out of fear of Him and love for

Cur Deus Homo I Him I in contrition of heart cast aside temporal mirth, when in fasting the toil I tread under foot the pleasures and repose of this life, when in giving and forgiving I generously bestow my possessions, and when in obedience I subject myself to Him?

A. When you render something which you would owe to God even if you had not sinned, you ought not to reckon it as payment of the debt which you owe for your sin. Now, you owe to God all of the things you have just mentioned. For in this mortal life there ought to be so much love, and so much desire to arrive at that end for which you have been created (an arrival whereunto prayer is relevant), and so much sorrow because you are not yet there, and so much fear lest you not arrive, that you ought to experience joy only over those things which give you either assistance in arriving or the hope thereof. For you do not deserve to have what you do not love and desire in proportion to®® its nature, and over which you do not grieve because you do not yet possess it but are still in such great danger as to whether or not you will ever possess it. To possess this, it is also a prerequisite to flee from the repose and | worldly pleasures (except insofar as you know them to conduce to your aspiration to arrive at this possession) which call the soul away from that true rest and delight. Moreover, you ought to consider that you are required to give — even as you recognize that what you give, you have not from yourself but from Him whose servant both you and the one to whom you give are. And nature teaches you to deal with your fellow-servant (i.e., one man dealing with another) as you would want to be dealt with by him,8® and teaches that anyone who is unwilling to give of what he has ought not to receive what he does not have. Now, regarding forgiveness I will say briefly that vengence does not at a belong to you (as I stated earlier) ,8" since you are not your own*® and he who has wronged you is neither yours nor his own; rather you are both servants of one Lord and have both been created by Him out of nothing. Moreover, if you avenge yourself on your fellow-servant, you haughtily presume to exercise over him the judgment which is the prerogative of the Lord and Judge of all.

Finally, in the case of obedience, what do you give to God that you do not already owe Him, to whose command you owe all that you are, all that you have, and all that you can do?

B. I now do not dare to say that in all these cases I am giving to God something which I do not owe to Him.

Anselm of Canterbury A. Therefore, what do you pay to God according to the measure of your sin?

B. If even had I not sinned I would — in order to keep from sinning — owe to God myself and whatever I can do, I have nothing with which to make payment for my sin.

A. What, then, will become of you? How will you be able to be saved?

B. If I take seriously your arguments, I do not see how. But if I have recourse to my faith, then in the Christian faith, which works through love,®® I have the hope that I can be saved. For we read: "'If the unjust be converted from his injustice and do justice,''

9° all his injustices are forgotten.

A. This is said only to those who either looked forward to Christ before He came or believe on Him after He comes. But when we proposed to examine by reason alone whether His coming was necessary for man's salvation, we hypothesized that Christ and the Christian faith had never existed.?!

B. So we did.

A. Therefore, let us proceed by reason alone.

B. Although you lead me into difficulties, I greatly desire for you to proceed just as you have begun.

Chapter Twenty-one: How grave sin is.

A. Let us assume that you do not owe all those things which you have just supposed you could render as payment for your sin.

And let us see whether they can avail to making satisfaction for even one very small sin — such as taking a single look which is contrary to God's will.

B. Except for the fact that I hear you calling this sin into question, I would think that I could blot it out by a single act of remorse.

A. You have not yet considered how grave sin is.

B. Show me this now.

A. Suppose you were to find yourself in the presence of God and someone were to give you the command: ''Look in that direction.'' And suppose that, on the contrary, God were to say:

"I am absolutely unwilling for you to look.''? Ask yourself in

Cur Deus Homo I your heart what there is, among all existing things, for the sake of which you ought to take that look in violation of God's will.

B. | find nothing for the sake of which I ought to do this — unless perhaps I were caught in the necessity of having to commit either this sin or some greater one.

A. Exclude this necessity, and consider with regard only to the sin.in question whether you could [legitimately] commit it for the sake of saving your life.

B. I see clearly that I could not.

A. So as not to make you tarry longer: what if it were necessary either for the whole world and whatever is other than God to perish and be reduced to nothing or for you to do so small a thing which is contrary to the will of God?

B. When I consider the action itself, I see it to be something trifling. But when I reflect upon the fact that it is contrary to the will of God, I recognize that it is something extremely grave and comparable to no loss. However, we are often irreproachable in acting against someone's will, so that his possessions are. safeguarded; afterwards, our having done this pleases the one against whose will we have acted.

A. This happens to a man who sometimes does not understand what is useful to him, or who cannot replace what he loses; but God has no needs, and even as He has created all things, so He could also replace them if they were to perish.

B. I must admit that even for the sake of preserving the whole of creation, it is not the case that I ought to do something which is contrary to the will of God.

A. What if there were more than one world, full of creatures, just as this world is?

B. If there were an infinitely multiple number of worlds and they too were exhibited to me, I would still give the same answer.

A. You can do nothing more rightly. But if it were to happen that contrary to the will of God you were to take that look, consider as well what you would be able to render as payment for this sin.

B. 1 do not have anything more than what I have already mentioned."

A. By comparison, then, this is how gravely we sin whenever we knowingly do something, however small, contrary to the will

Anselm of Canterbury of God. For we are always in His presence, and He always commands us not to sin.

B. As I see it, we are living in very great danger.

A. It is evident that God demands satisfaction in proportion to the extent of the sin.

B. I cannot deny it.

A. Therefore, you do not make satisfaction unless you pay something greater than is that for whose sake you ought not to have sinned.

B. I see both that reason requires this and that it is altogether impossible.

A. And God cannot elevate to happiness anyone who is at all obligated by the debt for sin, because God ought not to do so.

B. This verdict is exceedingiy grave.

Chapter Twenty-two: How when man permitted himself to be conquered by the Devil he did an injury to God for which he is unable to make satisfaction.

A. Listen to still another reason why it is no less difficult for man to be reconciled to God.

B. Unless faith consoled me, the previous reason by itself would make me despair.

A. Listen anyhow.

B. Go on speaking.

A. Man, who was created without sin, was placed in Paradise with an inclination toward God — phaced between God and the Devil, as it were — in order that he would conquer the Devil by not consenting to his inducement toward sin. [This conquest would] vindicate and honor God as well as confound the Devil, since man, weaker [than the Devil], would not sin on earth when tempted by the Devil, who, stronger [than man], had sinned in Heaven untempted by anyone. And although man was easily able to succeed at this, he freely permitted himself — merely because of the temptation and without being compelled by any force — to be conquered according to the Devil's will and contrary to the will and honor of God.

Cur Deus Homo I B. What are you getting at?

A. Judge whether it is not against the honor of God for man — still having to his discredit the slanderous injury he inflicted on God — to be reconciled to God without first honoring God by defeating the Devil, just as he dishonored God when he was defeated by the Devil. But the victory ought to be such that even as man, who was strong and potentially immortal, readily consented to the Devil so as to sin (for which reason he justly incurred the penalty of mortality), so being now weak and mortal (as he has made himself), he will defeat the Devil through the impediment of death so as not at all to sin. But man cannot do this as long as, from the wound of the first sin, he is conceived and born in sin.?* B. I repeat: what you say is, on the one hand, proved by reason and, on the other, impossible.

Chapter Twenty-three: What it was that man, when he sinned, | removed from God and cannot repay.®* A. Listen to one more thing without which man cannot be justly reconciled and which is no less impossible.

B. You have already placed before us so many things required for us to do that whatever you add to them cannot more greatly frighten me.

A. Listen anyhow.

B. 1 am listening.

A. When he permitted himself to be overcome by the Devil, what did man take away from God?

B. You tell me, as you have been doing; for I do not know what man could have added to the evils which you have already indicated.

A. Did he not remove from God whatever God had purposed to do with human nature? 9° B. It cannot be denied.

A. Attend to strict justice, and judge in accordance with it whether man makes to God satisfaction equal to his sin unless by conquering the Devil he restores to God exactly what he removed from God by letting himself be conquered by the Devil. The QI

Anselm of Canterbury result would be that as by man's having been defeated the Devil seized what was God's and God lost it, so by man's triumphing the Devil loses what was 'God's and God regains it.

B. Nothing can more strictly or more justly be thought.

A. Do you suppose that Supreme Justice can violate this justice?

B. I do not dare to think so.

, A. Therefore, man neither can nor ought, in any respect, to receive from God what God planned to give him — unless he returns to God all that he took away from Him, so that as God lost something because of man, He will also regain it because of man.

This can only happen in the following way: Just as by man's defeat the whole of human nature became corrupted?' and leavened, as it were, with sin — and no one who is sinful is elevated by God to complete the Heavenly City — so by man's triumphing, as many men are justified from sin as were going to fill up that number which man was created to complete. But sinful man cannot at all accomplish this justification, because a sinner cannot justify a sinner.

B. Nothing is more just and nothing is more impossible. But from all these considerations it seems that, as far as regards the happiness for which man was created, God's mercy and man's hope vanish.

Chapter Twenty-four: As long as man does not pay to God what he owes, he cannot be happy and is not excused because of his inability.

A. Wait a little longer.

B. What further points do you have?

A. If we call unjust a man who does not pay to another man what he owes, then it is much more the case that a man who does not pay to God what he owes is unjust.

B. If a man is able to pay but does not do so, he is indeed unjust. But if he is unable to pay, how is it that he is unjust?

A. If he is not at all the cause of his inability, perhaps he can to some extent be excused. But if he is to blame for his inability, then even as the inability does not lighten the weight of his sin, so it does not excuse him from not paying his debt.°8 Suppose that a

Cur Deus Homo I master enjoins a task upon his servant and instructs him not to cast himself into a pit which the master points out to him and from which the servant would not at all be able to get out. And suppose this servant, spurning the command and the admonition of his master, voluntarily puts himself into the indicated pit, with the result that he is altogether unable to accomplish the work assigned to him. Do you think that his inability would serve to any extent as an excuse for his not performing the assigned task?

B. Not at all. Rather, it would serve to increase his blameworthiness, since he would have brought his inability upon himself.

Indeed, he would have sinned in two ways — because he would not have done what he was instructed to do, and he would have done what he was instructed not to do.

A. So, too, man is inexcusable. For he voluntarily became obligated to that debt which he is unable to pay, and through his own doing he lapsed into his inability, so that he is unable to pay either what he owed before sinning — viz., that he keep from sinning — or what he owes because he has sinned. Indeed, this" inability is blamable, because he is not obliged to have it; rather, he is obliged not to have it. For just as not having what one ought to have is blamable, so having what one ought not to have is blamable. Therefore, as man is blameworthy for not having the ability which he received in order to be able to avoid sin, so he is blameworthy for having the inability by which he is unable either to retain justice and avoid sin or to pay what he owes for his sin.

For he freely did that thing because of which he lost this ability and came into this state of inability. (For not having an ability which one ought to have is identical with having an inability which one ought not to have.) Therefore, the inability to pay to God what he owes — an inability which is the cause of his not paying — does not excuse a man if he does not make payment, since an effect of sin does not excuse a sin which he commits.

B. This [verdict] is exceedingly grave, but it must be true.

A. Therefore, a man who does not pay to God what he owes is unjust.

B. This is surely true. He is unjust because he does not make payment; and he is unjust because he is unable to make payment.

A. Now, no one who is unjust will be admitted to the state of happiness; for even as happiness is a state of sufficiency in which

Anselm of Canterbury nothing needed is lacking, so it befits only him in whom justice is so pure that there is no injustice in him.

B. I do not dare to believe otherwise.

A. Therefore, he who does not pay to God what he owes will not be able to be happy.

B. I cannot deny, either, that this consequence follows.

A. But suppose you wanted to say: ''The reason that God, who is merciful, forgives the debt of one who humbly beseeches Him is that this man is unable to pay this debt.'' Well, God can be said to forgive only one of two things: (1) that which man ought voluntarily to pay but cannot (viz., that which can make payment for a sin which ought not to have been committed even for the sake of preserving everything that is not God); (2) that which, by punishing man, God was going to take away from man against man's will, viz., happiness (as I mentioned above).9? Now, on the one hand, if God forgives what man ought willingly to pay — forgives it simply because man is unable to pay it — what does this amount to other than that God forgives what He cannot obtain? But it is a mockery to attribute this kind of mercy to God.

On the other hand, if God forgives what He was going to take away from man against man's will — forgives it because of man's inability to pay what he ought willingly to pay — God lightens the punishment and makes a man happy because of his sin, and because he has what he ought not to have. For man ought not to have this inability; and so, as long as he has it without there being satisfaction, he is sinful. But this kind of divine mercy is utterly contrary to God's justice, which allows only for punishment to be requited for sin. Therefore, as it is impossible for God to be at odds with Himself, so it is 'mpossible for Him to be merciful in this way.

B. | see that a divine mercy different from this kind must be sought.

A. Assume that the reason why God forgives someone who does not pay what he owes is that he is unable [to pay it]

B. I wish it were so.

A. Now, all the while that this person would not make payment, either he would be willing to make payment or he would not be willing. If he willed [to pay] what he was unable to [pay], he would be unsatisfied. On the other hand, if he were unwilling

[to pay what he was not able to pay], he would be unjust.

Cur Deus Homo I B. Nothing is clearer than this.

A. Now, whether unsatisfied or unjust, he would be unhappy.

B. This is also clear.

A. Therefore, as long as he did not make payment, he could not be happy.

B. If God is guided by the principle of justice, then there is no way for this unhappy, insignificant man to escape; and the mercy of God seems to vanish.

A. You have asked for a reason; listen to this one. I do not deny that God is merciful, for He saves men and beasts, as He has multiplied His mercy.!°° However, we are speaking about that ultimate mercy, by which He makes a man happy after this life.

And I think that by the previously given arguments I have adequately established (1) that this happiness ought to be given only to him whose sins have been completely forgiven, and (2) that this forgiveness ought to occur only after payment of the debt which is owed for sin — owed in proportion to the magnitude of the sin. If you think that there can be some objection to the. previous arguments, you ought to say so.

B. To be sure, I do not see that any of your arguments can at all be called into question.

A. I do not think [they can be] either — provided they are carefully examined. Nevertheless, if even one of all these arguments which I have given is confirmed by irrefutable truth, that ought to be sufficient. For whether the truth is irrefutably proven by one argument or by more than one argument, it is equally well safeguarded from all doubt.

B. So it is indeed.

Chapter Twenty-five: Necessarily, man is saved through Christ.

B. How, then, will man be saved if he does not pay what he owes and if he ought not to be saved unless he pays it? Or how can we impudently maintain that God, who is rich in mercy beyond human understanding, cannot bestow this mercy?

A. At this point you ought to ask those who believe that Christ is not necessary for man's salvation — those in whose place you are speaking — to explain how man can be saved apart from Christ. However, if they cannot at all do so, then let them stop

Anselm of Canterbury scoffing at us, and let them come near and join themselves to us, who do not doubt that man can be saved through Christ; or else let them give up the hope that man's salvation can somehow occur.

But if they dread doing so, let them believe with us in Christ, so that they can be saved.

B. Let me ask you, just as I did at the beginning, to show me in what way man is saved through Christ.

A. Since even unbelievers admit that man can in some way be made happy, and since we have demonstrated adequately that man's salvation can by no means occur if we assume that Christ does not exist: has not the possibility of man's being saved through Christ been sufficiently proved? For it is possible for man to be saved either by means of Christ, or else by some other means, or else by no means. Therefore, if it is false that man's salvation can by no means occur, and false that it can occur by some other means, it is necessary that it occur by means of Christ.

B. Suppose someone perceives the reason why man's salvation cannot occur in some other manner but does not understand how it can occur through Christ. And suppose he wants to claim that it cannot occur either by means of Christ or by any other means. What answer shall we give him?

A. What answer ought to be given to someone who affirms of what must occur that it cannot occur— his reason being simply that he does not know how it occurs?

B. That he is foolish.

A. Therefore, what he says must be treated with contempt.

B. That's true. But he ought to be shown how the thing he thinks to be impossible does really occur.

A. From what I have already said, do you not realize that it is necessary for some men to attain happiness? For if it is unfitting for God to bring a man having any stain to that end for which He created him free of every stain — lest [by so doing] He should seem either to regret the good work He had begun or to be unable to fulfill His purpose — then, much more, because of this same unfittingness, it is impossible that no man whatsoever be elevated to the end for which he was created. Therefore, either the kind of satisfaction-for-sin which I earlier showed?°! to be required must occur outside the context of the Christian faith — something which no sound reasoning can demonstrate — or else

Cur Deus Homo I satisfaction-for-sin must assuredly be believed to occur within the context of the Christian faith. For that which on the basis of rational necessity is inferred really to be the case ought not to be called into any doubt, even if the reason why it is true is not discerned.

B. What you say is true.

A. So what more are you asking?

B. 1 have not come for you to remove from me doubts about my faith but for you to show me the rational basis of my certainty. Therefore, just as you have led me rationally to the place where I can see that for his sin sinful man owes to God what he cannot pay, and that unless he pays [what he owes] he cannot be saved, so I want you to lead me to the place where on the basis of rational necessity I understand the following points: viz., (1) that all those things which the Catholic faith commands us to believe about Christ if we want to be saved must be true; (2) how they avail to man's salvation; and (3) how it is that God saves man by mercy although He forgives man's sin only if man pays what he owes on account of his sin. In order that your arguments may be the more certain, begin so basically that you establish them on a firm foundation.

A. May God continue to aid me now. For you do not at all spare me or take into account the weakness of my knowledge when you impose upon me so difficult a task. Nevertheless, trusting in God rather than in myself, I shall make the attempt (since I have already commenced); and with God's help I shall do the best

I can. But lest because of too lengthy a sustained-presentation weariness should arise in him who is willing to read these things, by making another beginning let us distinguish what is still to be presented from what has already been said.

BOOK II Chapter One: Man was created just in order to be happy.

A. We ought not to doubt that God created rational nature just in order for it to be happy through enjoying Him.! Indeed, the reason it is rational is in order to discriminate between what is just and what is unjust, between what is good and what is evil, between what is a greater good and what is a lesser good." Otherwise [i.e., could rational nature not make these discriminations], it would be the case that it was created rational in vain. But God did not create it rational in vain. Therefore, there is no doubt that it was created rational for the foregoing purpose. Similar reasoning proves that rational nature received the ability to make these discriminations in order that it would hate and shun evil, and love and choose good, and more greatly love and choose a greater good [than love and choose a lesser good]. For otherwise, it would be the case that God bestowed in vain upon rational nature this ability-to-discriminate, because rational nature would discriminate in vain if it did not love and shun in accordance with its discrimination. But for God to have bestowed in vain such a great capability would not be fitting. Thus, it is certain that rational nature was created for the purpose of loving and choosing the Supreme Good above all other things \~ loving and choosing it for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else. (For if [rational nature loves the Supreme Good] for the sake of something else, it really loves not the Supreme Good but this other thing.) But rational nature is able to do this only if it is just.

Therefore, so that it would not be rational in vain, it was created both rational and just at once. Now, if it was created just in order to love and choose the Supreme Good, then it was created just either for the further purpose of one day attaining what it loves, and has chosen, or else not for this purpose. But if it were not the case that rational nature was created just for the further purpose of attaining the thing it justly loves and chooses, then its having

Cur Deus Homo II been created such as justly to love and choose this thing would have been in vain, and there would be no reason why rational nature ought ever to attain this thing. The consequence would be that as long as rational nature would do just works by loving and choosing the Supreme Good, for which it was created, it would be unhappy; for against its will it would be in a state of deprivation, since it would not possess what it desired. But this view is utterly absurd. Consequently, rational nature was created just in order to be happy through enjoying the Supreme Good, viz.,

God. Accordingly, man, who is rational in nature, was created just in order to be happy through enjoying God.

Chapter Two: Man would not have died if he had not sinned.

A. The fact that man was created in such a state as not to have to die is easily proven from the following consideration: It is opposed to God's wisdom and justice (as I said earlier)* that He compel to undergo death someone blameless, whom He created just, for the purpose of becoming eternally happy. Consequently, if man had never sinned, he would never have died.

Chapter Three: Man will be resurrected with the body in which he lives during this present life.

A. From the above considerations the eventual future resurrection of the dead is clearly proven. Indeed, if man is to be perfectly restored, he ought to be restored to such a state as he would have been in had he not sinned.

B. It cannot be otherwise.

A. Therefore, just as had man not sinned he was to have been transformed' into incorruptibility with the body he had, so it ought to be the case that when he will be restored he will be restored with the body in which he lives during this present life.

B. What answer shall we give if someone claims that this ought to occur in the case of those in whom the human race will be restored but that it need not occur in the case of reprobate men?

A. Nothing can be thought to be more just or fitting than the

Anselm of Canterbury following: The whole man (i.e., consisting in a soul and a body) would have been eternally happy if man had persevered in justice; correspondingly, the whole man will be eternally unhappy if man continues in injustice.

B. On these matters you have satisfied me with terse answers.

Chapter Four: God will accomplish with human nature that which He began.

A. From the foregoing considerations the following point is easy to recognize: Either God will accomplish with human nature that which He began, or else He has created in vain so sublime a nature for [receiving] so great a good. But if God is recognized to have created nothing more precious than rational nature, for the purpose of rejoicing in Him, then He is very far from allowing any rational nature to perish completely.®

B. A rational mind cannot think otherwise.

A. Therefore, it is necessary that God will accomplish with human nature what He began. But this accomplishment can occur, as I said,® only by means of complete satisfaction for sin.

And no sinner can make complete satisfaction.

B. I now understand the necessity of God's accomplishing what He began — in order that He not seem, contrary to what is fitting, to fail in what He has undertaken.

Chapter Five: Although [what God began] must be accomplished, nevertheless We will not accomplish it under the constraint of necessity. There is a necessity which diminishes or eliminates gratitude, and there is a necessity which increases it.

B. But if [the previous statement] is true, then the necessity of avoiding unfittingness seems to ''constrain'' God, so to speak, to procure man's salvation. How, then, can we deny that He does this more for His own sake than for our sake? And if it is true

[that He does this more for His own sake than for ours], what gratitude do we owe Him for that which He does for His own

Cur Deus Homo II sake? And how will we [be able to] attribute our salvation to His grace if He saves us out of necessity?

A. There is a necessity which diminishes or eliminates gratitude to a benefactor; and there is a necessity in terms of which a greater gratitude is owed for a benefit. For example, when because of the necessity to which someone is subject he confers a benefit against his will, little or no gratitude is owed to him. But when he willingly submits himself to the necessity of doing a good work, and does not merely endure this necessity against his will, surely he deserves greater gratitude for his good work. For this "'necessity'' ought not really to be called a necessity but [ought to be called] a grace, since he voluntarily incurred it or holds to it, without anyone constraining him. For suppose you willingly promise today to bestow a gift tomorrow; and tomorrow you do bestow it with this same willingness. Although it is necessary that, if you can, you do tomorrow give what you have promised (or else be caught in a lie), nonetheless the one to whom you give this benefit is no less indebted to you for the . bestowal of it than if you had not made a promise. The reason for his indebtedness is that you did not hesitate to make yourself indebted to him prior to the actual giving. The case is similar when someone freely vows to enter monastic life. For although, necessarily, he is obliged to keep his vow after having made it (on pain of incurring condemnation as an apostate), and although he can be compelled to keep it if he is unwilling to, nonetheless if he does willingly keep what he has vowed, he is more (rather than less) pleasing to God than if he had not made a vow. For it is for God's sake that he has renounced not only ordinary life but even ordinary life's being permitted to him. And he must not be said to live a monastic life out of necessity but [must be said to live it] by reason of the same freedom by which he vowed it. Therefore, it is much more the case that if God does for man the good work which He began, then even though it is not fitting for Him to leave unfinished the good work He has undertaken, we ought to attribute the entire good work to grace; for He began this work for our sake and not for His own, since He Himself needs nothing.

When He created man, He was not ignorant of what man was going to do. And, nevertheless, by creating man by His own goodness, He freely bound Himself, as it were, to accomplish the good which He had undertaken. In last analysis, God does nothIO]

Anselm of Canterbury ing by necessity, because He is not in any way compelled to do anything or prevented from doing anything.' And when we say that God does something as if under the necessity of avoiding dishonor (which, surely, He is in no danger of encountering) we must, rather, interpret this to mean that He does it under the necessity of maintaining His honor. Indeed, this necessity is nothing other than the immutability of His honor — an immutability which He has from Himself and not from another, and which therefore is improperly called necessity. Nevertheless, Jet us say that it is necessary that God's goodness — on account of its immutability — accomplish with man what it began, even though the entire good which it does is by grace.

B. I grant it.

; Chapter Six: Only a God-man can make the satisfaction by means of which man is saved.

A. But this work can only be accomplished if there is someone who pays to God, for man's sin, something greater than every existing thing besides God.

B. This has been proven.® A. Moreover, whoever can give to God something of his own which surpasses everything that is less than God must be greater than everything that is not God.

B. I cannot deny it.

A. Now, nothing except God surpasses everything that is not God.

B. This is true.

A. Therefore, only God can make this satisfaction.

B. This follows.

A. But only a man ought to make this satisfaction. For in any other case it would not be man who makes it.

B. Nothing seems more just.

A. Therefore, if (as has been established) ® it is necessary that the Heavenly City be completed from among men, and if this completion can occur only if the aforementioned satisfaction is made, and if only God can make this satisfaction and only a man ought to make it: it is necessary that a God-man make it.

B. *'Blessed be God.'''° Now we have discovered a major

Cur Deus Homo II point regarding the topic we are investigating. Therefore, proceed as you have begun. For I hope that God will continue to aid us.

Chapter Seven: It is necessary that one and the same [individual] be fully divine and fully human.

A. We must now investigate the manner in which a God-man can exist. For it is not the case that the divine nature and the human nature can be changed into each other so that the divine nature becomes human or the human nature becomes divine; and it is not the case that they can be so mingled that from these two natures there is formed a third nature which is neither fully divine nor fully human. Indeed, if it were possible for the one nature to be changed into the other, then the result would be only someone who is divine and not someone who is human, or else only someone who is human and not someone who is divine. Or if they were so mingled that from the two corrupted natures a third nature were formed (as from two individual animals — one male and one female, but of different species — a third animal is born, which does not retain fully either the nature of the father or the nature of the mother but receives a third nature, which is a mixture of the two), then the result would be neither someone who is human nor someone who is divine. Therefore, the God-man"! about whom we are asking cannot be made from a divine nature and a human nature either by the transformation of the one into the other or by the corrupt mingling of both into a third. For these things cannot happen; or if they can happen, they do not apply to what we are investigating.

But if these two integral natures are said to be conjoined in some manner such that, nevertheless, the human nature is distinct from the divine nature and the one who is divine is not identical with the one who is human, then it is impossible for either one to do what must be done. For the one who is divine will not do it, because He will not be under obligation to do it; and the one who is human will not do it, because he will not be able to do it.

Hence, in order that a God-man will do this, it is necessary that one and the same [individual] be fully divine and fully human, so as to make this satisfaction. For only one who is truly divine can make satisfaction, and only one who is truly human ought to

Anselm of Canterbury make it. Therefore, since it is necessary to find a God-man who retains the integrity of both natures, it is no less necessary that these two integral.natures conjoin in one person (just as a body and a rational soul conjoin in one man); for otherwise it is impossible that one and the same [individual] be fully divine and fully human.

B. All that you say pleases me.

Chapter Eight: God ought to assume a human nature from the race of Adam and from a virgin woman.

A. It now remains to ask from where and in what way God will assume a human nature. Either He will take it from Adam or He will create a new human being from no other human being — as He created Adam. But if God were to create a new human being, not of Adam's race, then this human being would not belong to the race of men who are born from Adam. Therefore, it would not be the case that he ought to make satisfaction for Adam's race, because he would not descend from it. For just as it is right that human nature make satisfaction for human nature's guilt, so it is necessary that the one who makes satisfaction be either the sinner himself or someone of his race. Otherwise, neither Adam nor his race would make satisfaction for themselves. Therefore, just as from Adam and Eve sin was transmitted unto all men, so only they themselves or someone descended from them ought to make satisfaction for men's sin. Consequently, since they themselves are unable to [make satisfaction], it is necessary for the one who will do this to derive from them.

° Moreover, just as, had Adam not sinned, he and his entire race would by themselves have remained standing, without the assistance of another creature, so if Adam's race rises after the fall, it should rise and be lifted up by its own efforts. For no matter through whom it is restored unto its own place, assuredly it will stand because of him through whom it will recover its place.

Moreover, when God first created human nature in Adam alone and willed to create a woman (in order for human beings to be reproduced from the two sexes) only from Adam, He showed clearly that He willed to create only from Adam that which He was going to create from human nature. Therefore, if the race of

Cur Deus Homo II Adam were restored through a man who is not from the Adamic race, it would not be the case that [it is restored] unto the dignity that would have been its possession had Adam not sinned. And, thus, it would not be fully restored; and God's plan would seem to be a failure. But both of these consequences are unfitting.

Therefore, the human nature [of the man] through whom Adam's race is to be restored must be assumed from Adam.

B. If we follow reason, as we proposed to, then this conclusion must, inescapably, be true.

A. Let us now look into whether God ought to assume a human nature (1) from a father and a mother (as do other human beings) or (2) from a man without a woman or (3) from a woman without a man. For no matter in which one of these three ways the human nature is assumed, it will be from Adam and from Eve — from whom derives every human being of either sex. Moreover, it is not the case that one of the three ways is easier for God than are the other two so that a human nature ought more fittingly to be assumed in this one way.

B. You are proceeding commendably.

A. But not much effort is required to show that that man would be begotten more purely and more honorably from a man alone or from a woman alone than from a union of the two, as are all other offspring of human beings.

B. This point is clear enough.

A. Therefore, His human nature was taken either from a man alone or from a woman alone.

_ B. It cannot be taken from anywhere else.

A. God can create a human being in either of four ways: viz., (1) from a man and a woman (as constant experience shows); (2) neither from a man nor from a woman (as He created Adam); (3) from a man without a woman (as He created Eve); (4) from a woman without a man (something which He had not yet done).

Therefore, in order for Him to prove that even this fourth way is subject to His power and was reserved for this very purpose, nothing is more fitting than that He assume from a woman without a man that man about whom we are inquiring. Now, we need not discuss whether this would be done more worthily from a virgin or from a nonvirgin; instead, we must affirm, without any doubt, the fittingness of the God-man's being born from a virgin.

B. You speak in accordance with my heart's sentiment.

Anselm of Canterbury A. Is what we have said something solid? Or is it, like a cloud, the empty kind of thing far which you said unbelievers reproach us?!"

B. Nothing is more solid.

A. Therefore, do not paint on an empty fiction but paint on the solid truth, and affirm that the following is especially fitting: As the sin of man and the cause of our condemnation took its beginning from a woman, so the remedy for sin and the cause of our salvation is born from a woman.'? And in order that women not despair of belonging to the company of the blessed (since it was from a woman that so great an evil proceeded), it is fitting that so great a good proceed from a woman, in order to reestablish women's hope. And paint the following: If a virgin was the cause of all the evil to the human race, then it is much more fitting that a virgin would be the cause of all the good for the human race. And paint this too: If the woman whom God created from a man without a woman was created from a virgin, then it is also especially fitting for the man who would be made from a woman without a man to be made from a virgin. But for now let these be enough examples of the pictures which can be painted on the truth that the God-man ought to be born from a virgin woman.

B. These pictures are very beautiful and reasonable.

Chapter Nine: It is necessary that the Word alone and a human nature conjoin in one person.

A. We must now also ask in which one of His persons God, who is three persons, would assume a human nature. For a plurality of the persons cannot assume one and the same human nature into a unity of person. Therefore, it is necessary that this assumption take place with respect to only one [of the three] persons. Now, in the letter On the Incarnation of the Word, addressed to Lord Pope

Urban, I have spoken — to an extent that I regard as sufficient for the present investigation — about this personal unity of the divine nature and a human nature,!* and have said for which person of God this most fittingly occurs. !5

B. Nevertheless, do mention briefly here why the person of the Son ought to become incarnate rather than the person of the Father or the person of the Holy Spirit.

Gur Deus Homo II A. If either of the other persons were to become incarnate, there would be two sons in the Trinity: viz., (1) the Son-of-God, who is the Son even before the incarnation, and (2) the one who by virtue of the incarnation would be the son of the virgin. And between these two persons who ought always to be equal there would be an inequality with respect to the dignity of their births.

For the one who was begotten of God would have a more excellent birth than would the one who was begotten of the virgin.

Likewise, if the Father were to become incarnate there would be two grandsons in the Trinity, because by virtue of the human nature that He assumed the Father would be the grandson of the parents of the virgin; and the Word, even though He would possess nothing from human nature, would nonetheless be the grandson of the virgin, since He would be the son of her son.

Now, all these consequences are unfitting. But in the case of the incarnation of the Word none of them occur.

There is also another reason!® why it is more fitting for the Son to become incarnate than it is for either of the other two persons:

viz., it sounds more fitting for the Son to supplicate the Father than for another of the persons to supplicate either of the other two.

Furthermore, man (for whom the Son was going to pray) and the Devil (whom the Son was going to defeat) had, by virtue of an autonomous!' willing, arrogated to themselves a false likeness to God. Therefore, they had sinned more specifically, so to speak, against the person of the Son, who is believed to be the true likeness of the Father.18 Hence, the punishment or the remission of the guilt is more fittingly ascribed to Him to whom the wrong is more specifically done. Consequently, since reason leads us inescapably to conclude (1) that the divine nature and a human nature must join together in one person, and (2) that this union cannot occur with regard to a plurality of divine persons, and (3) that, obviously, the union occurs more suitably in regard to the person of the Word than in regard to either of the other two persons, it is necessary that the Divine Word and a human nature conjoin in one person.

B. The route by which you lead me is so completely fortified by reason that I do not see how I can veer from it either to the right or to the left.

A. Lam not leading you; instead, He of whom we are speaking

Anselm of Canterbury and without whom we can do nothing leads us both whenever we keep to the way of truth. , Chapter Ten: This man is not required to die. How He is able to sin and not able to sin. Why He and an angel ought to be praised for their justice éven though they cannot sin.

A. However, we now ought to investigate whether this man would be required to die, just as all other men are required to die.

Now, if Adam was not going to die had he not sinned, much more would not this man — in whom there could be no sin, because He would be God — be required to undergo death.

B. I want you to dwell awhile on this point. For whether He is said to be able to sin or not to be able to sin, in both cases a question of no small importance occurs to me. For if He is said not to be able to sin, then it seems that this view ought not to be readily believed. To speak for a moment not of one who has never existed (as we have been doing until now) but of one whom we know and whose deeds we know: would anyone deny that He was able to do many things which we call sins? Indeed — to mention only one — how would we say that He was unable to tell-a-lie, which is always a sin? He says to the Jews regarding the Father: "'If I say that I do not know Him, I shall be a liar like you.''' Now, in this sentence He says the words ''I do not know

Him.'' Therefore, who would deny that He was able to utter these five words without the others, so as simply to say ''I do not know

Him''? But if He were to do this, then as He Himself says, He would be a liar; and to be a liar is to be a sinner. Therefore, since

He was able to do this, He was able to sin.

A. He was both able to make this statement and not able to sin.

B. Demonstrate this point.

A. All ability depends upon willing. For when I say "'I am able to speak or to walk,'' the proviso ''if I will to'' is understood. For if willing is not included, then the ability is not really an ability but is a necessity. For when I say "'I am able to be dragged off or to be overcome against my will,'' this is not an instance of my ability but is an instance of constraint and of another's ability. Indeed, ''I am able to be dragged off or to be

Cur Deus Homo II overcome'' means nothing other than ''Someone else is able to drag me off or to overcome me.''?° Therefore, we can say of Christ, ''He was able to tell a lie,'' provided ''if He willed to'' is understood. And since He was not able to lie against His will and was not able to will to lie, He can equally well be said not to have been able to lie. So, then, He was able to lie and not able to lie.

B. Let us now return to making our investigation about Him as if He did not yet exist — just as we began to do. Accordingly, I say: if He were unable to sin because, as you say, He would be unable to will to sin, then He would keep justice of necessity.

Therefore, He would not be just out of freedom of choice. Consequently, what esteem would be owed to Him for His justice?

Indeed, we are accustomed to say that the reason God created angels and man to be such that they could sin was so that although they were able to forsake justice but kept it out of freedom of choice they would merit esteem and praise, which would not be their due if they were just of necessity.

A. Are not the angels who now cannot sin worthy of praise?

B. Indeed they are. For by virtue of having been able [to sin] but having willed not [to sin] they merited their present state of being unable [to sin].

A. What do you say about God, who is not able to sin but who did not merit this state by virtue of [having] an ability-to-sin, by means of which He, nonetheless, did not sin? Is He not worthy of praise for His justice?

B. Here I want you to answer for me. If I say that He ought not to be praised, I know that I am not telling the truth. But if I say that He ought to be praised, I am afraid of undermining the reason which I stated regarding the angels.

A. The reason that angels are to be praised for their justice is not that they were able to sin but is rather that thereby [i.e., because of having been able to sin] they, in a sense, have from themselves the fact that they are not able to sin.' (In this respect they are somewhat similar to God, who has from Himself whatever He has.) For one who does not remove something when he can is said to bestow it; and one who does not cause [something not to be], although he is able to cause it not to be, is said to cause something to be.?? So, then, in the case where an angel was able to remove justice from himself but did not remove it, and was able to cause himself not to be just but did not do so, he is rightly

Anselm of Canterbury said to have given himself justice and to have caused himself to be just. In this sense, then, he has justice from himself; for a creature is not able to have justice from himself in any other way.

And, hence, an angel ought to be praised for his justice; and he is just not by necessity but in terms of freedom, since necessity is improperly called necessity in a case where there is neither compulsion nor prevention. Therefore, since whatever God has He has completely from Himself, He ought supremely to be praised for the goods which He possesses and keeps not because of any necessity but (as I said above) ?? by His own eternal immutability.

So, then, since that man who will be identical with God will have from Himself every good which He will have, and will have it not by necessity but in terms of freedom, He will be just of Himself and hence will be worthy of praise. For although what His human nature will have, it will have from His divine nature, nevertheless

He will have it from Himself, since His two natures will be one person.

B. You have satisfied me on this point; and I see clearly that He will not be able to sin and that, nevertheless, He will be worthy of praise for His justice.

But since God is able to make such a man, I think that it must now be asked why He did not create angels and the first two human beings to be such that they also would be unable to sin and worthy of praise for their justice.

A. Do you understand what you are saying?

B. I seem to myself to understand it, and hence I ask why He did not create them in such a state.

A. The reason is that it should not and could not have happened that any one of them would be Mentical with God, as we speak of that man as being. And if you ask why He did not do this for as many of them as there are divine persons, or at least for one of them, I reply: reason did not at all require that this be done at that time but (since God does nothing without a reason) completely excluded the possibility.

B. I am ashamed of having asked this question. Continue with what you were going to say.

A. Letus say, then, that He would not be required to die, since He would not be a sinner.

B. I must admit this.

IIo

Cur Deus Homo II Chapter Eleven: He dies of his own power. Mortality does not pertain to sinless human nature.

A. But it now remains to examine whether He would be able to die with respect to His human nature (for with respect to His divine nature it would always be the case that He is incorruptible).

B. Why should we'be in doubt about this, since He would be a real man, and every man is naturally mortal?

A. I think that mortality pertains not to sinless human nature but to corrupt human nature. Indeed, if man had never sinned and if his immortality had been immutably confirmed, he would have been no less.a real man; and when mortals will rise in incorruptibility, they will be, no less, real men. For if mortality pertained to the essence [veritas] of human nature, there could not at all be a man who was immortal. Therefore, neither corruptibility nor incorruptibility"* pertains to the sinless state of human nature, since neither of these is essential to human nature;?° rather, the one conduces to man's unhappiness, the other to his happiness. (But since there is no human being who does not die, the word *'mortal'' was included in the definition of ''man'' by the philosophers, who did not believe that human nature as a whole?® ever could have been or ever can be immortal.) Therefore, the fact that that man would be a real man does not suffice to show that He ought to be mortal.

B. Then, look for another reason; for I do not know, if you do not, the reason which proves that He can die.

A. There is no doubt that as He will be God, so He will be omnipotent.

B. This is true.

A. Therefore, if He wills to, He shall be able to lay down His life and take it up again.??

B. If He cannot do this, it seems that He is not omnipotent.

A. Therefore, if He wills to, He shall be able never to die; and, [if He wills to], He shall be able to die and to arise. But as far as His power is concerned, it does not matter whether He lays down

His life without anyone else serving as a cause thereof or TET

Anselm of Canterbury whether, with His permission, someone else is a cause of the fact that He lays it down.

R B. There is no doubt about this.

A. Therefore, if He is willing to permit it, He will be able to be killed; and if He is unwilling to permit it, He will not be able to be killed.

B. Reason leads us unswervingly to this conclusion.

A. Reason has also taught us?® that He ought to have something greater than whatever is inferior to God — something which He would give to God willingly and not out of debt.

. This is true.

. But this gift can be found neither beneath Him nor beyond a b& B. This is true.

A. Therefore, it must be found in Him.

B. This follows.

A. Therefore, He will give either Himself or something belonging to Himself.

B. I cannot think otherwise.

A. It must now be asked what kind of giving this ought to be.

For since every creature is God's, it is not the case that He will be able to give to God — as if it were to one who did not already have this as his own — either Himself or anything belonging to Himself.

B.. True:

A. Therefore, this giving must be interpreted as follows: In some way in which He will not be required to, He will offer, for the honor of God, either Himself or something belonging to Himself.

B. This follows from the things already said.

A. If we say that He will give Himself in the sense of obeying God, so that by perseveringly keeping justice He will surrender

Himself to God's will, this would not be a case of giving what God does not already exact from Him as a debt. For every rational creature owes this obedience to God.

B. This cannot be denied.

A. Therefore, He must in some other way give to God either Himself or something belonging to Himself.

B. Reason drives us to this conclusion.

A. Let us see whether perhaps this giving is the giving of His I12

Cur Deus Homo II life, or the laying down of His life, or the handing Himself over to death, for the honor of God. For God does not exact His life from Him as something owed. Indeed, since there will be no sin in Him, He will not be required to die, as I said.?®

B. 1 cannot think otherwise.

A. Let us consider, in addition, whether this view agrees with reason.

B. You continue to speak, and I shall continue to listen willingly.

A. If man sinned through pleasure, is it not fitting that he make satisfaction through distress? And if (with the result that he dishonored God by sinning) he was conquered by the Devil so easily that it could not happen more easily, is it not just that in making satisfaction for sin man should (for the honor of God) conquer the Devil by such a difficult means that it could not be done by any means more difficult? And is it not fitting that man, who by sinning so stole himself from God that he cannot remove himself to any greater extent, should by making satisfaction so give himself to God that he cannot give himself to any greater extent?

B. There is not anything more reasonable.

A. Now, for the honor of God, a man can willingly and out of no obligation suffer nothing more harsh and difficult than death; and a man cannot at all give himself to God to any greater extent than when he hands himself over to death for the honor of God.

B. All of this is true.

A. Therefore, He who shall will to make satisfaction for man's sin ought to be such that He can die if He wills to.

B. I see clearly that that man about whom we are inquiring ought to be such that He will not die of necessity (because He will be omnipotent) and will not die out of obligation (because He will never be a sinner) and yet will be able to die of His own free will

(because it will be necessary [that he be able to die freely]).

A. There are also many other reasons why it is especially fitting for that man to be like men and to dwell among them, yet without sin. These reasons stand out, of themselves, more readily and more clearly in His life and deeds than they can be demonstrated by reason alone, independently of experience. For who will explain how necessarily and how wisely it happened that He who was going to redeem men and to lead them back, by His teaching, from the way of death and perdition to the way of life

Anselm of Canterbury and eternal happiness associated?° with men and in this association (although He taught them by word how they ought to live) presented Himself as an example? But how could He give Himself as an example to weak and mortal men, so that they would not depart from justice on account of wrongs or insults or pain or death, if they did not know that He Himself experienced all these things?

Chapter Twelve: Although He shares our misfortunes, He is not unhappy.

B. All of these considerations show plainly that He ought to be mortal and ought to share our misfortunes. Yet all of these misfortunes contribute to our unhappiness. Will He, therefore, be unhappy?

A. By no means. For as something-beneficial which someone possesses against His will does not conduce to his happiness, so to experience something-detrimental wisely and willingly, without being compelled to, is not [a cause of] unhappiness.

B. This point must be granted.

Chapter Thirteen: It is not the case that along with our other infirmities He has ignorance.

B. But in regard to this likeness which He ought to have to men, state whether He would have ignorance, even as He would have our other infirmities.

\ A. Why do you doubt whether God is all-knowing?

B. Well, because that man will be mortal with respect to His human nature, even though He will be immortal with respect to His divine nature. So why will He not likewise be able to be genuinely ignorant, even as He will. be genuinely mortal?

A. The assumption of a human nature into the unity of a divine person will be done only wisely by Supreme Wisdom. And so Supreme Wisdom will not assume into its human nature that which is not at all useful (but is, in fact, very harmful) to the work which this man is going to do. Now, to be sure, ignorance would be of no use to Him; instead, it would be of much harm. For

Cur Deus Homo II] without great wisdom how would He do the very numerous and very great works which He was going to do? Or how would men believe Him if they knew that He was ignorant? Or even if they did not know [this about Him], of what use would His ignorance be? Furthermore, if only what is known is loved, then just as there would not be any good which He did not love, so there would not be any good which He did not know. But only one who knows how to discern good from evil has a complete knowledge of good. And no one who does not know evil knows how to make

_ this distinction [between good and evil]. Therefore, just as the one of whom we are speaking will have complete knowledge of every good, so He will not be ignorant of any evil. Therefore, He will know everything, even though He will not publicly display all of His knowledge in His association with other men.

B. In the case of His adult life the fact of the matter seems to be as you Say it is. But in the case of His infancy: just as infancy would not be a fitting time for wisdom to appear in Him, so it would not be necessary — as well as not fitting — for Him to have wisdom then.?!

A. Did I not say that the incarnation would be accomplished wisely? Indeed, God will assume mortality wisely; and He will use mortality wisely because He will use it very usefully. But He would not be able to assume ignorance wisely, because ignorance is never useful but is always harmful (except perhaps in the case where an evil will — which would never be in Him — is kept from its evil effect because of ignorance). For even if ignorance would never be harmful in any other respect, it would be harmful merely in that it would prevent the benefit of knowledge.

Moreover — to resolve your puzzle briefly — from the very moment that that man will exist He will always be fully divine, just as He is fully human. Hence, He will never exist without His power, might, and wisdom.

B. Although I did not doubt that this was always the case with Christ, nevertheless I asked to hear the reason for it. For often we are certain that something is the case but nevertheless do not know how to prove it rationally.

I15

Anselm of Canterbury Chapter Fourteen: How His death outweighs the number and the * magnitude of all sins.

B. I ask you now to teach me how His death outweighs the number and the magnitude of all sins — seeing that you have shown*? one sin which we regard as trifling to be so infinite that if an infinite number of worlds were exhibited, each as full of creatures as is our world, and if these worlds could be kept from being reduced to nothing only on the condition that someone would take a single look contrary to the will of God, this look ought, nonetheless, not to be taken.

A. Suppose that man were present, and you knew who He was, and someone said to you: ''Unless you kill this man this whole world and whatever is not God will perish.'' Would you do this for the sake of preserving every other creature?

B. I would not do it even if an infinite number of worlds were exhibited to me.

A. What if you were then told: ''Either kill this man or all the sins of the world will come upon you''?

B. I would reply that I would prefer to bear all other sins — not only those which have been committed and will be committed in this world, but also whatever sins can be thought of, in addition to these — than to commit this one sin. And I think that I ought to give the same answer not only for the case of slaying Him but also for the case of the slightest harm which would touch Him.

A. You think correctly. But tell me why your mind judges that one sin which harms this man is morereadful than all other sins which can be conceived; for no matter what sins are committed, they are all sins against Him.

B. The reason is that a sin which is committed against His person surpasses, incomparably, all conceivable sins which are not against His person.

A. What will you say about the fact that often someone voluntarily endures harm against his person in order not to suffer greater harm in regard to his possessions?

B. [I will say] that God does not have need of this longsuffering; for all things are subject to His power, as you mentioned previously** in reply to one of my questions.

Cur Deus Homo II A. You give a good answer. We see, then, that no magnitude nor multitude of sins which are not against the person of God is comparable to [the sin of] harming the physical life of this man.

B. This is very clear.

A. In your opinion how great a good is [the life] of Him whose being-put-to-death is so evil?

B. If every good is as good as its destruction is evil, then [His life] is a good incomparably greater than the evil of those sins which His being-put-to-death immeasurably surpasses.

A. You speak the truth. Reflect also upon the fact that sins are as detestable as they are evil; and the life of this man is as lovable as it is good. Hence, it follows that His life is more lovable than sins are detestable.

B. I cannot fail to understand this.

A. Do you think that such a great and lovable good can suffice to pay what is owed for the sins of the entire world?

B. Indeed, it can [suffice to pay] infinitely more [than that].

A. Therefore, you see how His life would overcome all sins if it were given for them.

B. Clearly.

A. Therefore, if to give one's life is to accept death, then just as the giving of His life outweighs all men's sins, so too does His acceptance of death.

B. This is plainly the case regarding all sins which do not touch the person of God.

Chapter Fifteen: How His death blots out even the sins of those who put Him to death.

B. But now I see another point that must be questioned. If to put Him to death is as evil as His life is good, how can His death overcome and blot out the sins of those who have put Him to death? Or if it blots out the sin of one of them, how can it blot out any of the sins of other men as well? For we believe that many of the former have been saved and that countless other men are saved.

A. This question is answered by the apostle who said that "'if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of Glory.''*4 For a sin done knowingly and a sin done in ignorance

ELF

Anselm of Canterbury are so different from each other that the evil which these men could never have done knowingly, because of its enormity, is venial because it was done in ignorance. For no man could ever will, at least knowingly, to kill God;#5 and so those who killed

Him in ignorance did not rush forth into that infinite sin with which no other sins are comparable. Indeed, in order to ascertain how good His life was, we considered the magnitude of this sin not with respect to the fact that it was committed in ignorance but as if it were done knowingly — something which no one ever did or ever could have done.

B. You have shown rationally that the slayers of Christ were able to obtain pardon for their sin.

A. For what more do you now ask? Assuredly, you see how tational necessity shows that the Heavenly City is to be completed from among men and that this completion can be effected only through the forgiveness of sins — a forgiveness which no man can have except through a man who is himself God and who by his death will reconcile sinful men to God. Plainly, then, we have found Christ, whom we confess to be divine and human, and to have died for us. But now that we know this fact without any doubt, we also must not doubt the truth of all the things He says (since God cannot lie) and the wisdom of all the things He did (even though we may not understand the reason for them).

B. What you say is true. And I do not at all doubt that what He said is true or that what He did was done reasonably. But I have the following request: Disclose to me in what way there ought and can occur that thing whose occurrence unbelievers regard as unseemly or impossible in the Christian faith. Disclose this not in order to confirm me in faith but in order to make me, already so confirmed, joyful in the understanding of this truth.

Chapter Sixteen: How God assumed from the sinful mass a sinless human nature. The salvation of Adam and of Eve.

B. Therefore, just as you have disclosed the rationale of the points which have been stated above, so I ask you to disclose the rationale of the points about which I am stil] going to ask. First of all, how did God assume from the sinful mass — 1.e., from the

Cur Deus Homo II human race, which was completely contaminated with sin — a sinless human nature (as something unleavened from something leavened)? For although the conception of this man was clean and was free from the sin of carnal delight, nevertheless the virgin from whom He was assumed was conceived in iniquities, and her mother conceived her in sins; and this virgin was born with original sin, since she sinned in Adam, in whom all have sinned.*®

A. Now that it has been established that that man is God and is the Reconciler of sinners, there is no doubt that He is completely sinless. However, this sinlessness is not possible unless He was assumed sinless from the sinful mass. But if we cannot comprehend in what way the wisdom of God accomplished this sinless assumption, we ought not to be astonished; rather, we ought reverently to tolerate the fact that within the mystery of so deep a matter there is something which we cannot know. Indeed, God has restored human nature in a more miraculous manner than He created it; for it is just as easy for Him to do the one as the other.

Now, it is not the case that before human nature existed it sinned and, as a result, ought not to have been created. But after it was created, it did merit, through sinning, the loss of what it was created as being and of the end for which it was created. Nonetheless, in order that it would exist to be punished or to be the object of God's mercy (neither of which could occur if it were reduced to nothing), it did not completely lose what it was created as being. Therefore, God restored human nature so much more miraculously than He created it — inasmuch as He restored it from someone sinful and while it was undeserving, but created it neither from anyone sinful nor when it was undeserving.

Moreover, how miraculous it is for the divine nature and a human nature so to conjoin in one [individual] that the integrity of each nature is preserved and the same [individual] who is divine is also human! Therefore, who would presume even to suppose that the human intellect would be able to discern how wisely and how miraculously so inscrutable a work was done?

B. J agree that in this life no man can completely disclose so deep a mystery. And I do not ask you to do what no man can do but to do only as much as you can. For you will be more persuasive that deeper reasons lie hidden in this matter if you show that you see some rationale in it than if, by saying nothing, you evidence that you discern none at all.

Anselm of Canterbury A. I see that I cannot be free of your urging. But if to some extent I can demonstrate what you are asking, let us give thanks to God. However, if I cannot, let those points which have already been proved suffice. For since it has been established that God ought to become a man, there is no doubt that He did not lack the wisdom and the power to do this without sin.

B. I gladly accept this point.

; A. Surely, it was fitting that the redemption made by Christ was beneficial not only to those who then existed but also to others as well. For suppose that the following were true:

There is a king against whom all the inhabitants of one of his cities — except for one sole inhabitant, who is nevertheless of their race — so sinned that none of them is able to perform that [meritorious work] in virtue of which he would escape condemnation to death. But this inhabitant who alone is innocent has such great favor with the king that he is able — and has such great love for the guilty ones that he is willing — to bring about reconciliation for all who will trust in his plan. He will reconcile them by means of a service which will be especially pleasing to the king; and he will do this on the day determined in accord with the king's will. Now, not all who are to be reconciled are able to be present on that day. Therefore, because of the magnitude of this service, the king grants absolution from all past guilt to all those who either before or after that day acknowledge their desire both to obtain pardon on the basis of the work done on that day and to assent to the agreement then contracted. And [the king grants that] if they sin again after this pardon, they will be pardoned anew through the efficacy of this agreement, provided they are willing to make an acceptable satisfaction and thereafter to mend their ways. Nevertheless, [all of this occurs] in such way that no one may enter his palace until after the execution of the service on the basis of which his guilt is pardoned.

By comparison, since not all men who were to be saved were able to be present when Christ made that redemption, there was so much efficacy in His death that the effect of His death extends even to those who are absent in space and time. Moreover, from the following fact we easily recognize that His death ought not to be of benefit only to those then present: there could not have been present at His death as many [men] as are necessary for establishing the Heavenly City — even if all the men who existed everywhere at the time of His death were admitted to that redemption. For there are more evil angels than there were men (from whom the number of evil angels is to be restored) living on that day.

I20 iy

Cur Deus Homo II We must not believe that there was any time — from the point of man's creation — in which this present world with the creatures created for men's use was so empty that in it there was no member of the human race who shared in the end for which man was created. For it seems unfitting that God would even for a moment have permitted the human race (and those things which He created for the use of men, from among whom the Heavenly

City is to be completed) to have existed in vain, so to speak. For to some extent these men would seem to exist in vain as long as they did not seem to exist for that end for which they were especially created.

B. By a fitting reason to which nothing seems opposed you show that there was never a time — from the point of man's creation — when no man at all shared in that reconciliation in whose absence every man would have been created in vain. We can conclude that this view is not only fitting but also necessary.

For if this view is more fitting and more reasonable than the view that at some time there was no one concerning whom God's . purpose in creating man was being accomplished, and if nothing opposes this reasoning, then necessarily there was always someone who shared in the aforementioned reconciliation. Hence, we must not doubt that Adam and Eve shared in that redemption, even though Divine Authority does not openly state this.

A. Moreover, since God created them and immutably planned to create from them all other men, whom He was going to take into the Heavenly City, it also seems incredible that He would exclude these two from His plan.

B. Indeed, we ought to believe that He created them especially for the following purpose: viz., that they would be in the company of those for whose sake they were created.

A. You are thinking correctly. Nevertheless, no soul was able to enter the heavenly paradise before the death of Christ, just as I stated above about the palace of the king.

B. We hold this belief.

A. But the virgin from whom that man (of whom we are speaking) was taken belonged to the class of those who through Him were cleansed from their sins before His birth; and He was taken from her in her purity.

B. What you say would please me greatly except for the fact

Anselm of Canterbury that, although He ought to have His purity from sin from Himself, He would seem to have it from His mother and to be pure through her rather than through Himself.

A. It is not so. Rather, since His mother's purity (by means of which He is pure) came only from Him, He was also pure through Himself and from Himself.

B. You are right about this. But still another question must be raised, it seems to me. For earlier?' we said that He was not going to die by necessity. And now we see that His mother was pure through His future death; and unless she had been pure, He would not have been able to exist from her. Why, then, is it not the case that He died of necessity, since He was able to exist only because

He was going to die? For if He had not been going to die, the virgin from whom He was taken would not have been pure, since her purity could not at all have occurred except by her faith in His actual death; and He could not have been taken from her unless she were pure. Therefore, if He did not have to die after having been taken from the virgin, then it could have happened that He was not taken from the virgin after He had in fact been taken from her — something which is impossible.

A. If you had carefully considered what was said earlier, you would have recognized, I think, that the solution to this problem is already contained in those statements.38

B. I do not see how.

A. When we asked whether He could have told a lie, did we not show*® that in the case of lying there are two abilities?: VIZ, an ability to will to lie and an ability to lie. And [did we not prove that] although He had the ability to lie, still since He had from Himself the fact that He could not wilkto lie, He must be praised for His justice, by which He kept the truth.

B. This is true.

A. Likewise in the case of preserving one's life: there is an ability to will to preserve it and an ability to preserve it.

Therefore, when we are asked whether this God-man was able to preserve His life, so as never to die, we must not doubt that He always had the ability to preserve [His life], even though He was not able to will to preserve it so as never to die. And since He had from Himself the fact that He was not able to will [to preserve His life], He laid down His life not by necessity but by free ability.

B. The ability to tell a lie and the ability to preserve His life

Cur Deus Homo II were not completely similar in Him. For in the case of the former it follows that if He were to will to, He would be able to tell a lie; but in the case of the latter it seems that even if He had willed not to die, He would no more have been able to avoid dying than He would have been able not to be what He was. For the reason He was aman was in order to die; and on account of the virgin's faith in His future death He was able to be taken from her — as you have just said.

A. Even as you suppose that He was not able not to die (or that He died of necessity) because He was not able not to be what He was, So you can assert that He was not able to will not to die (or that of necessity He willed to die) since He was not able not to be what He was. For it is no more true that He became a man for the purpose of dying than [it is true that He became a man] for the purpose of willing to die. Therefore, just as you ought not to say that He was not able to will not to die (or that of necessity He willed to die), so we must not say that He was not able not to die

(or that He died of necessity).

B. On the contrary. Since both of these — viz., to die and to : will to die — are subject to the same rationale, they both seem to have been characteristic of Him by necessity.

A. Who [was it who] freely willed to become a man in order (by this same immutable will) to die, and in order that the virgin from whom that man was taken would be purified by faith in the certainty of His death?

B. God — i.e.,' the Son of God.

A. Was it not shown earlier*® that when the will of God is said to do something of necessity, it is not really compelled by any necessity but instead maintains itself by its own free immutability?

B. Yes, this has been demonstrated. But we see, on the other hand, that what God immutably wills is not able not to occur but instead is necessary to occur. Therefore, if God willed for that man to die, He was not able not to die.

A. From the fact that with the intention of dying the Son of God assumed a human nature, you infer that that man was not able not to die.

B. This is the way I understand the matter.

A. Was it not also clear from what has already been said*? that the Son of God and the assumed man are one person, so that the

Anselm of Canterbury same [individual] is divine and human, Son of God and Son of the Virgin?

*% B. This is true.

A. Therefore, of His own volition that man died and was not able not to die.

B. I cannot deny it.

A. Therefore, since the will of God does not do anything of necessity but does everything of its own power, and since that man's will was God's will, He did not die of necessity but died only of His own power.

B. I cannot refute your arguments. For I cannot at all fault either the statements you premise or the inferences you draw.

Nevertheless, the point I have made keeps occurring to me: viz., that even if He had willed not to die, He would no more have been able to avoid dying than [He would have been able] not to be what He was. For, indeed, it was true that He was going to die, because if it had not been true that He was going to die, then the faith in His future death would not have been true faith — through which faith both the virgin from whom He was born and many others as well were cleansed from sin. Now, if this faith had not been true faith, then it could not have been of any benefit.4" Therefore, if He had been able not to die, He would have been able to cause not to be true what was true.

A. Before He died why was it true that He was going to die?

B. Because with an unchangeable will He freely willed to die.

A. Therefore, if, as you say, He was not able not to die because it was true that He was going to die, and if it was true that He was going to die because He freely and unalterably willed to die, then it follows that He was not ablenot to die only because He willed — with an unalterable will — to die.

B. This is correct. But whatever the cause was, it is nevertheless true that He was not able not to die (and that it was necessary that He die).

A. You are grasping at straws and, as the saying goes, are looking for a knot on a bulrush.4?

B. Have you forgotten what I said at the beginning** of our discussion, in objection to your excuses?: viz., that what I was asking of you, you would do not for the learned but for me and for those making this request with me. Therefore, bear with the fact that I am raising questions commensurate with the slowness

Cur Deus Homo II and dullness of our intellects, so that even in the case of our puerile questions you may continue to give satisfactory answers to myself and to these others — just as you did at the beginning.

Chapter Seventeen: In God there is neither necessity nor impossibility. There is a necessity which compels and a necessity which does not compel.

A. As I have already pointed out,** it is improper to say that God cannot do something or that He does something by necessity.

Indeed, all necessity and impossibility are subject to His will; but His will is not subject to any necessity or to any impossibility.

For a thing is necessary or impossible only because He wills it to be so; but it is far from being true that He wills or does not will some thing because of a necessity or an impossibility. Therefore, since He does (facit) all the things He wills and only the things

He wills: just as no necessity or impossibility precedes His will- . ing or not willing, so [no necessity or impossibility precedes] His doing or not doing, although He immutably wills and does many things. Moreover, when God causes (facit) something, then once it has happened it is no longer able not to have happened; instead, it is henceforth always true that it has happened. Nevertheless, it is not right to say that it is impossible for God to cause what is past not to be past; for in this case what is operative is not the necessity of not doing something or the impossibility of doing something but only the will of God, who, since He is the Truth, wills that the truth always be immutable, just as it is [always immutable]. Similarly, if God unalterably plans to do something in the future, then even though, prior to its occurrence, what He plans to do is not able not to occur in the future, nevertheless in Him there is not any necessity to do it or any impossibility not to do it, since in Him only the will accomplishes this. For whenever we say ''God is not able,'' we are not denying His ability but are signifying His insuperable ability and power.*® For nothing else is meant except that no thing can make Him do what He is said to be unable to do. (This kind of expression is often used; and so, frequently, the reason a thing is said to-be-able is not because there is any ability in it but because there is an ability in some other thing, and [the reason a thing is said] not-to-be-able is not

Anselm of Canterbury because there is any inability in it but because there is an inability in some other thing.*" For, in fact, we say ''This man is able to be overcome'' in place of "'Someone is able to overcome this man''; and [we say] ''That man is not able to be overcome'' in place of ''No one is able to overcome that man.'' For to be able to be overcome does not constitute an ability but constitutes an inability; and not to be able to be overcome does not constitute an inability but constitutes an ability.) And our reason for saying that God does something by necessity is not that there is some necessity in Him but that there is some necessity in some other thing — just as I said about His ''inability,'' in a case where He is said not-to-be-able. Indeed, all necessity is either a compulsion or a prevention. These two kinds of necessity are mutually convertible contraries, just as are the necessary and the impossible. For whatever is compelled to be is prevented from not being; and what is compelled not to be is prevented from being — just as what is necessary to be is impossible not to be, and as what is necessary not to be is impossible to be (and conversely).48 However, when in the case of God we say that something is necessary to be (or not to be) this statement does not mean that there is in Him a necessity which compels (or prevents); rather we mean that in all other things there is a necessity which prevents them from doing

— and compels them not to do — anything contrary to that which is being [improperly] stated of God. For example, when we say

"It is necessary that God always speak the truth'' and '"'It is necessary that God never tell a lie,'' nothing else is meant except that in God the steadfastness for maintaining the truth is so great that it is necessary that no thing can cause Him not to speak the truth or can cause Him to tell a lie.49

Therefore, when we say that that man (who according to a unity of person, as was said above,>° is identical with the Son of God and is Himself God) was not able not to die (or was not able to will not to die) after He was born from the virgin: we do not signify in Him any inability to keep (or any inability to will to keep) His immortal life. Rather, [we signify] the immutability of the will by which He freely became a man in order (while persevering in this will) to die; and [we signify] that no thing was able to change this will. For it would be an inability rather than an ability, if He were able to will to lie, or to will to deceive, or to will to change the decision which He previously willed to be

Cur Deus Homo II immutable. Moreover, as I said earlier,>! when someone freely plans to do a good deed and — subsequently and with this same willingness — does perform the deed he planned to, then even though if he were unwilling to keep his promise he could be compelled to do so, he ought not to be said to do by necessity that which he does. Rather, [he ought to be said to do it] by the free will in terms of which he set out to do it. For a thing ought not to be said to be done or not done by necessity or by inability in a case where the will — and not the necessity or the inability — performs something. Now, if this point holds for men, then it is much more the case that necessity and inability must not at all be ascribed to God, who does nothing except what He wills, and whose will is not able to be compelled or restrained by any force.

In Christ the diversity of natures and the unity of person served the following end: If the human nature was not able to do what was required to be done for restoring men, then the divine nature would do it; and if [what was required] did not at all befit the divine nature, then the human nature would do it. And not two. different [individuals] but one and the same [individual], existing perfectly in two natures, would pay through His human nature what this nature ought to pay and would be able through His divine nature to do what was required.*" In fact, the virgin who was purified by faith in order that He could be taken from her, believed that He would die only because He would will to — just as she had learned from the prophet who said of Him: ''He was offered because it was His own will.''>? Therefore, since her faith was true faith, it was necessary that the [object of her faith] would be as she believed [it would be]. But if you are once again disturbed by my saying ''It was necessary.

,'' then remember that the truth of the virgin's faith was not the cause of His dying freely, but that her faith was true faith because He was going to die freely. Accordingly, if someone says '"Tt was necessary that He die only of His own will because the faith (or because the prophecy) which preceded the event was true,'' then this amounts to nothing other than if you were to say: "'It was necessary for it to be going to happen in this manner because it was going to happen in this manner.'' But this kind of necessity does not compel a state of affairs to occur; rather, the existence of the state of affairs causes the existence of the necessity.

For there is a necessity which precedes and is the cause of a

Anselm of Canterbury thing's being the case; and there is a necessity which succeeds and is caused by the thing's being the case.°* When the heavens are said to revolve because it is necessary for them to revolve, then this is a necessity which precedes and efficiently causes. But when I say that because you are speaking, you are — necessarily

— speaking, this is a necessity which is subsequent and does not efficiently cause anything but, instead, is caused. For when I make this statement, I signify that nothing can cause it to be the case that while you are speaking you are not speaking; I do not signify that anything is compelling you to speak. For although the force of their natural state compels the heavens to revolve, no necessity causes you to speak. Now, wherever there is antecedent necessity there is also subsequent necessity; but it is not the case that where there is subsequent necessity there must be antecedent necessity. For example, we can say ''Because the heavens are revolving, they are — necessarily — revolving'; but it is not also true that you are speaking because it is necessary for you to speak.*° Subsequent necessity applies to all tenses, in the following manner: Whatever has been, necessarily has been; whatever is, necessarily is and necessarily was going to be; whatever is going to be, necessarily is going to be. This is the necessity which (when Aristotle deals with singular and future propositions) seems to deny that there are real alternatives and to affirm that all things occur of necessity. Since the faith (or the prophecy) concerning Christ was true faith (or true prophecy) because He was going to die of His own will and not by necessity: it was necessary — in terms of the necessity which is subsequent and which does not efficiently cause anything — what His death would occur voluntarily. In terms of this necessity, He became a man; in terms of this necessity He did and suffered whatever He did and suffered; in terms of this necessity He willed whatever He willed.

For because these things were going to occur, necessarily they did occur; and because they occurred, necessarily they were going to occur; and because they occurred, necessarily they occurred. And if you wish to know the true necessity of all the things He did and suffered, know that they all occurred of necessity simply because He willed them. However, no necessity preceded His willing. Therefore, if they occurred only because He willed them, then if He had not willed them they would not have

Cur Deus Homo II occurred. Accordingly, then, no one took His life from Him, but He Himself laid it down and took it up again because He had ''the power to lay down His life and to take it up again,'' as He says.°®

B. You have satisfied me that He cannot be proved to have died because of any necessity; and I do not regret having urged you to make this investigation.

A. I have presented, it seems to me, a reliable account of how it is that God assumed a sinless human nature from the sinful mass. Nevertheless — aside from the consideration that God can do what human reason cannot comprehend — I think we ought not at all to deny that there is still another account [ratio] in addition to the one I have given. But the present rationale [ratio] seems to me to be able to suffice. Moreover, if I now wanted to investigate the other rationale it would be necessary to examine what original sin is and how from our first parents it is imparted unto the whole human race (except for that man of whom we are now speaking). And it would be necessary to touch upon some other issues which require a treatise of their own. Therefore,

being content with the argument we have articulated, let us pursue what remains of the task we have begun.

B. As you will — but with the proviso that at some future time you fulfill your ''obligation'' [to expound], with God's help, the other rationale which you shun examining now.

A. Since I know that I have this willingness, I do not deny your request. But because I am uncertain about future events, I dare not make you a promise. Instead, I entrust the matter to the disposition of God.°?

Chapter Eighteen: How the life of Christ is paid to God for the sins of men. The sense in which Christ ought, and the sense in which He ought not, to have suffered.

A. But tell me now what you think must still be resolved regarding the problem you set forth at the beginning — because of which problem many other topics intruded themselves.

B. The crux of the problem was why God became a man in order to save mankind through His death, although He was apparently able to accomplish man's salvation in some other way.°®

Anselm of Canterbury Responding to this problem, you showed by many compelling reasons that the restoration. of human nature ought not to be left undone, and yet could not be done unless man paid what he owed to God for his sin. This debt was so great that only God was able to pay it, although only a man ought to pay it; and, thus, the same

[individual] who was divine was also human. Hence, it was necessary for God to assume a human nature into a unity of person, so that the one who with respect to his nature ought to make payment, but was unable to, would be the one who with respect to his person was able to. Next, you showed that that man who was God had to be taken from a virgin by the person of the Son of God; and you showed how He could be taken sinless from the sinful mass. You proved very clearly that the life of this man was so sublime and so precious that it can suffice to make payment for what is owed for the sins of the whole world — and even for infinitely more [sins than these]. Therefore, it now remains to show how His life is paid to God for the sins of men.

A. If He allowed Himself to be killed for the sake of justice, did He not give His life for the honor of God?

B. Even though I do not see how He could reasonably have done this — since He was able to keep justice unwaveringly and His life eternally — nevertheless, if I can understand a thing which I do not doubt, I will admit that He freely gave to God, for God's honor, some such gift to which whatever is not God is not comparable in value, and which can make recompense for all the debts of all men.

A. Do you not realize that when He endured with patient kindness the injuries, the abuses, the crucifixion among thieves — which were all inflicted upon Him (as I Said above) ®9 for the sake of the justice which He obediently kept — He gave men an example,®° in order that they would not, on account of any detriments they can experience, turn aside from the justice they owe to God? He would not at all have given this example if, as He was able to do, He had turned aside from the death that was inflicted upon Him for such a reason. ®1 B. It seems that it was not necessary for Him to give this example, since we know that many people before His coming — and John the Baptist after His coming and before His death — sufficiently gave this example by bravely enduring death for the sake of the truth.

Cur Déus Homo II A. Except for Him, no human being through his death ever gave to God what he was not necessarily going to lose at some time or other, or ever paid what he did not already owe. But that man freely offered to the Father what He was never going to lose as a result of any necessity; and He paid on behalf of sinners that which He did not already owe for Himself. Therefore, it is much more the case that He gave an example, in order that no single human being would hesitate (when reason demands it) to render to God on behalf of himself that which one day he will summarily lose. For although He did not at all need to do so for Himself, and although He was not at all compelled to do so for others to whom

He owed only punishment, He gave with such great willingness so precious a life — indeed, His own self — i.e., so great a person.

B. You are coming very close to satisfying me. But bear with my asking a question which although you may think it foolish to ask, nevertheless I would not readily know what to answer if it were asked of me. You say that when He died, He gave what He. was not obliged to. But no one will deny that when He gave this example in such a way, He did something better (and that His doing it was more pleasing to God) than if He had not done it.

And no one will say that He was not obliged to do what He understood to be better and to be more pleasing to God.

Therefore, how can we maintain that He did not owe to God the deed He performed — i.e., the deed He knew to be better and to be more pleasing to God — especially since a creature owes to God all that he is, all that he knows, and all that he can do?

A. Although a creature has nothing from himself, ®* nevertheless when God grants him the right to do or not to do something,

He gives him both prerogatives in such way that although the one alternative is the better, neither alternative is definitely required.

Rather, whether he does what is the better or whether he does the alternative, we say that he ought to do what he does. And if he does what is the better, he should have a reward, because He voluntarily gives what belongs to him. For example,°* although the state of virginity is better than the marital state, neither of these is definitely required of a man. Instead, we say both of him who prefers to marry and of him who prefers to keep his virginity that he ought to do what he does. For no one claims that virginity ought not to be chosen or that marriage ought not to be chosen.

Anselm of Canterbury Rather, we say that before a man has decided upon either of these, he ought to do the one which he prefers; and if he keeps his virginity, he looks forward to a reward for the voluntary gift which he offers to God. Therefore, when you say that a creature owes to God what he knows to be the better and what he is able to do, then if you mean ''[He owes it] as a debt'' and do not add

''provided God commands it,'' [your claim] is' not in every case true. For, indeed, as I said, a man does not owe virginity as a debt; but if he prefers, he ought to marry.

Now, perhaps the word ''ought'' ®° troubles you, and perhaps you cannot understand it apart from [its signifying] a debt. If so, then be aware that just as ability and inability and necessity are sometimes ascribed not because 'they are in the things to which they are ascribed but because they are in something else,® so it also happens in the case of ought to. Indeed, when we say that the poor ought to receive alms from the rich, this statement means nothing other than that the rich ought to give alms to the poor. For this obligation ought to be exacted not of the poor but of the rich.

We also say that God ought to rule over all things — not because He at all owes anything but because all things ought to be subject to Him.®' And [we say that God] ought to do what He wills, since what He wills ought to occur. Likewise, when a creature wills to do what it is his prerogative to do or not to do, we say that he ought to do it, since what he wills ought to occur. Hence, when the Lord Jesus, as I said,** willed to endure death: since it was

His prerogative to undergo death or not to undergo death, He ought to have done what He did, because what He willed ought to have been done; and He ought not to have done it, because [He was] not [obliged to do it] out of debt.69

Assuredly, the Lord Jesus was divine and human. Therefore, in accordance with His human nature (from the time that He was a man) He so received from His divine nature (which is different from His human nature) to have as His prerogative whateverHe-had that He was not obliged to give anything except what He willed to. And in accordance with His person He so possessed from Himself what He possessed, and was so completely sufficient unto Himself, that He was not obliged to make any recompense to anyone else and did not need to give anything in order to be recompensed.

B. I now see clearly that it was not in any respect out of debt

Cur Deus Homo II that He gave Himself over to death for the honor of God (as my argument seemed to show), and that nevertheless He ought to have done what He did.

A. Surely, that honor belongs to the whole Trinity. Therefore, since He Himself is God — viz., the Son of God — He offered

Himself to Himself (just as to the Father and the Holy Spirit) for His own honor. That is, [He offered] His humanity to His divinity, which is one and the same divinity common to the three persons. Nevertheless, in order to say more clearly what we mean, while still abiding within this truth, let us say (as is the custom) that the Son freely offered Himself to the Father. For in this way we speak most fittingly. For by reference to one person

[viz., the Father] we understand it to be God as a whole to whom the Son offered Himself according to His humanity; and through the name ''Father'' and the name ''Son,'' an enormous devotion is felt in the hearts of those listening when the Son is said to entreat the Father for us in this way.

B. | accept this most gladly.

Chapter Nineteen: How very reasonable it is that human salvation results from his death."

A. Let us see now, as best we can, how very reasonable it is that human salvation results from His death.

B. My mind strives toward this end. Now, although I think that I understand this point, I want you to produce the structure of the argument.

A. Itis not necessary to discuss how great is the gift which the Son freely gave.

B. This is [already] sufficiently clear."

A. But you will not suppose that he who freely gives to God so great a gift ought to go unrewarded.

B. On the contrary, I recognize that it is necessary for the Father to reward the Son. Otherwise, the Father would seem to be either unjust, if he were unwilling [to give a reward], or powerless, if He were unable [to give a reward]. And both of these features are foreign to God.

A. One who rewards another either gives what the other does not already have or else remits what can be exacted from the

Anselm of Canterbury other. Now, even before the Son performed so great a deed, everything that was the Father's was also the Son's;72 and the Son never owed anything that could be remitted. Therefore, what will be recompensed to one who needs nothing and to whom there is nothing that can be given or remitted?

B. On the one hand, I see the necessity for giving a reward — and, on the other, the impossibility thereof. For it is necessary that God pay what He owes; but there is not anything which He can pay.

A. If so great and so deserved a reward were not paid either to the Son or to someone else, then the Son would seem to have performed so great a deed in vain.

B. This is heinous to suppose.

A. Therefore, it is necessary that a reward be paid to someone else, since it cannot be paid to Him.

B. This follows inescapably.

A. If the Son wanted to give to someone else that which is owed to Himself, would the Father rightly be able either to prevent Him or to withhold the reward from the one to whom the Son would give it?

B. Indeed, I think it both just and necessary that the reward be paid by the Father to the one to whom the Son wanted to give it.

For the Son is permitted to bestow what is His own; and only to someone other than to the Son can the Father pay what He owes.

A. To whom will the Son more fittingly give the fruit and the recompense of His death than to those for whose salvation He became a man (as sound reasoning has taught us), and to whom

(as we said),'* by dying, He gave an example of dying-for-thesake-of-justice? Surely, they would imitate Him in vain if they would not share in His merit. Or whom will He more justly make to be heirs of the reward He does not need, and heirs of His overflowing fulness, than His own kinsmen and brethren (whom

— bound by such numerous and great debts — He sees languishing with need in the depth of miseries), so that what they owe for their sins may be forgiven them and what they lack on account of their sins may be given to them?

B. The world can hear of nothing more reasonable, nothing more kind, nothing more desirable. Indeed, I receive so much confidence from this thought that right now I cannot say with how

Cur Deus Homo II much joy my heart exults. For it seems to me that God rejects no | human being who approaches Him under this name.

A. This is true — provided he approaches as he ought. Sacred Scripture everywhere teaches us how we are to approach the participation in such great grace and how we are to live under this grace. Sacred Scripture is founded upon the solid truth, as upon a firm foundation; and with God's help we have perceived this truth to some extent.

B. Truly, whatever is erected upon this foundation is established upon a solid rock."4

A. I think that I have now''to some extent satisfactorily answered your question — even though someone better than I can do this more fully, and even though the reasons for this matter are deeper and more numerous than my intelligence {or any mortal's intelligence) can comprehend. It is also clear that God did not at all need to do what we have been discussing; rather the immutable truth required it. For although on account of a unity of person

God is said to have done the thing which that man did, nevertheless God did not need to come down from Heaven in order to overcome the Devil. And [God did not need] to act against the Devil by means of justice in order to free man. Rather, God demanded of man that he overcome the Devil and that, having offended God by his sin, he make satisfaction by his justice.

Indeed, God did not owe anything to the Devil except punishment; and man did not [owe the Devil anything] except to conquer him in return for having been conquered by him. But man owed to God, not to the Devil, whatever was required of him.'°

Chapter Twenty: How great and how just the mercy of God is.

A. We have discovered that God's mercy — which, when we were examining God's justice and man's sin, seemed to you to perish — is so great and so harmonious with His justice that it cannot be conceived to be greater or more just. Indeed, what can be thought to be more merciful than for God the Father to say to a sinner, condemned to eternal torments and having no way to redeem himself: ''Receive my only begotten son and render him in place of yourself,' and for the Son to say "'Take me and

Anselm of Canterbury redeem yourself''? For the Father and the Son do make these respective statements, as it were, when they call and draw us to the Christian faith. And what is more just than that He to whom is given a reward greater than every debt should forgive every debt if it is presented to Him with due affection?7®

Chapter Twenty-one: It is impossible for the Devil to be reconciled.

A. But if you will carefully consider human reconciliation, then you will understand that the reconciliation of the Devil (about which you asked)*' is impossible. For man was not able to be reconciled except through a God-man7® who could die and by whose justice there would be restored to God what He had lost by man's sin. Similarly, condemned angels cannot be saved except through a God-angel'® who could die and who by his justice would restore to God what the sins of the other angels took away from Him. Moreover, even as man ought not to have been lifted up through another man who would not be of the same race (even though he would be of the same nature), so no angel ought to be saved through another angel (even though all angels are of one nature), since angels are not — as men are — of the same race.

For it is not the case that all angels are descended from one angel as all human beings are descended from one human being.

Furthermore, the restoration of angels is prevented by the fact that as they fell without anyone's abetting their fall, so they ought to rise without anyone's assistance. (But this is impossible for them.) For otherwise*® they cannot Be restored to the dignity which they were going to have; for if they had not sinned they would without anyone else's assistance have remained standing in the truth by means of the ability they had received. Therefore, if anyone thinks that our Savior's redemption ought eventually to be extended even to fallen angels, reason proves that he is deceived by what is unreasonable. I say this not because the value of His death would not outweigh, by its magnitude, all the sins of men and angels, but because an immutable reason opposes the elevation of lost angels.

Cur Deus Homo II Chapter Twenty-two: The truth of the Old and of the New Testament has been proved within the statements that have been made.

B. All the statements you make seem to me to be reasonable and to be statements which cannot at all be contradicted. And I recognize that whatever is contained in the Old and in the New Testament has been proved by the solution of the single problem which we have set forth. For you prove the necessity of God's becoming a man, and you do so in such way that even if the few things you have introduced from our books are removed (e.g., what you mentioned about®! the three persons of God and about®? Adam), you would satisfy not only the Jews but also the pagans by reason alone. Moreover, this very God-man has established the New

Testament and confirmed the Old. Therefore, just as it is necessary to affirm that He was truthful, so no one can deny the truth of anything contained in these testaments.°?

A. If we have said anything which ought to be corrected, I do not refuse correction if it is done in accordance with reason. But if that which we think we have rationally discovered is corroborated by truth's testimony, we ought to attribute this not to ourselves but to God, who is blessed forever. Amen.

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