Translators' Preface Vil
TRANSLATORS' PREFACE
This is the third volume in the series of St. Anselm's complete treatises. It contains, among other texts, his paramount contribution to the history of theology: viz., the Cur Deus Homo.
Through the years, the complex argument therein set forth has been subjected to intense examination. In particular, the moral principles undergirding the Anselmian theory of atonement have been scrutinized thoroughly. Yet, no final agreement unites interpreters of this theory. Some still stress the feudal conceptions of honor and of service as indispensable focal points for Anselm's
. picture of man's relation to God. Others, by contrast, emphasize the code of Roman Law and suggest that its construal of human justice was transferred by Anselm to apply to the divine agency.
Still others believe that Anselm's moral conceptions were primarily influenced by the ecclesiastical penitential system with its scale of merits and its insistence that penance be proportional to the gravity of the sin. Amid the on-going historical debate, what remains incontrovertible is that Anselm's theory of atonement stands or falls just as surely with its conception of morality as with its doctrine of Christology.
In fact, Anselm's moral reasoning may be sketched as follows.
Obviously, an individual who steals from another ought to give back what he has stolen. But he ought, in addition, to make compensation for the injury he inflicted upon the other in removing what is rightfully his. Similarly, when Adam sinned he stole from God what is rightfully His, viz., His honor. For by virtue of being God's creature a man owes to God the honor of voluntary submission to His will. In sinning, Adam willed something contrary to God's will for him. Thereby, he rebelled against God and, in intent, stole himself from God's dominion, bringing to God dishonor, as it were. For by marring his own nature through spurning righteousness, Adam reflected discredit upon the workmanship of God in the creation of human nature. Indeed, since vii
Anselm of Canterbury every craftsman is lauded,in proportion to the perfection of his creation, the marring of man's perfection through man's own fault detracted from the manifestation of God's wisdom and goodness. Accordingly, Adam was required (1) to resume paying the debt of voluntary submission to God's will and (2) to make compensation, or satisfaction, for the injury inflicted upon God as a result of the marring of human nature. Only by meeting these two requirements would Adam fully restore God's honor. But Adam was unable to resume being fully submissive to God, because, having forsaken uprightness, his will had no power to recover it. Moreover, even if per impossibile he had been able to meet the first requirement, he still would not have been able to fulfill the second. For in order to make satisfaction for his sin, he would need to perform a service meritorious enough to counterbalance the injury done by the sin. Now, reasons Anselm, any violation of God's command is so grave that it ought not to be committed even in the following circumstance: viz., where to refuse to obey God would keep our entire world — and an infinite number of other such worlds — from perishing. Clearly, Anselm is SO appreciative of God's majesty that he regards any infringement upon it as intolerably horrible. Just as a slight done to a king is more serious than a similar slight done to one's neighbor, so an offense against the Supreme Being is vastly more dreadful than a corresponding offense against one's fellow-man.
At this juncture Anselm draws an inference from his moral rule that satisfaction ought to be proportional to the transgression:
Adam ought to offer as satisfaction for his sin something greater than is that for whose sake he was oblixated not to dishonor God.
Since he was obligated not to dishonor God even at the expense of the universe's perishing, he was required to render something whose value surpasses the totality of things which are other than
God. But only God can make such a payment, though only a man ought to. Therefore, if payment is to be made, it must be made by a God-man. Hence, God, in the person of the Son, assumed a human nature into a unity of person with His divine nature in order, by becoming a man, to pay with His human life the debt of all other men's sins. For since Jesus was sinless He was not required to die. He could thus meritoriously yield up His life to the honor of God by letting Himself be put to death for ''blasVill
/ Translators' Preface phemy'' rather than disobediently denying that He was the Son of God.
Here Anselm introduces a further moral consideration: Since the evil of sinning against the person of God is the greatest conceivable evil, the goodness of the God-man's life must be the greatest conceivable goodness. Thus, in rendering up His life
Jesus gave for the honor of God something which surpasses in value the totality of all things other than God. Such a meritorious service ought not to go unrewarded. But since this man is Himself
God He is in need of nothing. Therefore, He may acceptably request that the reward be credited to cancel the debt of Adam's sin.
Anselm goes on to explain why the debt for Adam's sin passes down to all those who are naturally descended from him, and how through humbly petitioning for forgiveness they too may draw upon the reserve of Christ's merit. In fact, Anselm's theory of atonement really only makes sense in the light of his doctrines of . original sin and sacramental grace. His treatment of these topics evidences that he is sensitive to the charge that God is unjust in punishing Adam's descendants for Adam's sin. Accordingly, in De Conceptu Virginali he attempts to vindicate the justice of God by denying that any of Adam's progeny are condemned for Adam's sin, even though because of Adam's sin they have sin of their own from which their condemnation follows.
Anselm's intricate distinctions, together with his ingenious strategy for elucidating the moral basis which legitimates the divine program of redemption, deserve our admiration. Admittedly this moral basis can be challenged; and in the twentieth century it may even appear to some to be simply a relic of medieval Christendom. Yet, given Anselm's framework of Christian orthodoxy, let no one underestimate the skill required to construct a theory that reconciles divine mercy with divine justice. And whatever might be the failings of Anselm's theory, let no one fail to recognize its vast superiority, both morally and theologically, over the devil-ransom theory it replaced.
As a spokesman for Christian orthodoxy Anselm does not always make unprecedented points in medieval debate. On the contrary! Because he is working within a tradition, his selfenvisioned task is to perfect this tradition rather than to recon-
Anselm of Canterbury struct it. His originality cgmes in setting the tradition in array by consistently extending its lines of reasoning, analyzing its liturgical terminology, systematizing its separate dogmas, and faulting its opponents' misconceptions. In attacking the heresies of Sabellianism, tritheism, Eutycheanism, Apollinarianism, and Pelagianism, Anselm is really only promoting the position taken by the Nicene Fathers and by Augustine. To this hydra of heresies
— already grievously wounded, but risking to raise its many heads once more in the eleventh century — Anselm delivers a coup de grace.
The eleventh century was a period of conquest and reform. The Norman Invasion of 1066 paved the way for the influence of Lanfranc and his pupil Anselm to be extended across the English
Channel. The proclamation of Pope Urban II in 1095 set in movement the First Crusade. And the moral idealism of the Gregorian Reform engendered the long, rancorous controversy over investiture. Anselm did not escape the stress and distress of this power-struggle. We recognize from his self-imposed exile how frustrating he found his role as ecclesiastical prelate vis-a-vis
King William Rufus. And we can sympathize with his preference for the solace of Capua, where he finished the Cur Deus Homo, already started in England. Indeed, his monumental legacy to the history of the Church is constituted more by his intellectual writings than by his devotional outpourings, his official directives, or his personal correspondence. And yet, from his prayers, meditations, and letters, as well as from Eadmer's biography, we acquire the humanizing perspective necessary to correct the onesided picture of him as only the Fathar of Scholasticism.
The translations which appear in this third volume are more literal than those published earlier in Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption: Theological Treatises (Harper & Row, 1970).
However, since these earlier versions (now out of print) were the basis for the present ones, acknowledgement is due to the following people who formerly collaborated with us: George Peck
(Epistolae 129 et 136. Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi); Douglas Johnson and Ray Phyles (De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali
Peccato), Lee Gibbs and Warren Lewis (De Processione Spiritus Sancti); Lucien Richard (Epistolae de Sacramentis).
Special appreciation is due to the University of Minnesota for X
/ Translators' Preface its support of this entire project through a modest research grant and a single-quarter leave. We are also grateful to Carl Brandt and Sandra Menssen, who typed the manuscripts of Vols. I-IV, and to Thomas Baker, Vicki Field, Ann Forestell, Ruth Anne
Ruud, and Peter Shea, who assisted with the: proofreading.
Jasper Hopkins Philosophy Department, University of Minnesota Herbert Richardson St. Michael's College, University of Toronto
Norte: Where, for clarification, words from the Latin text have been inserted into the translations, the following rule has been employed: When the Latin term is noted exactly as it appears in the Latin text, parentheses are used; when the case-endings of nouns have been transformed to the nominative, brackets are used.
The numbering of the Psalms accords with the Douay Version and, in parentheses, with the King James (Authorized) Version.
The symbol ~ indicates negation.
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