-- CHAPTER II: This positive part of the sinfulness of nature is not the very substance of the soul
and lives. You must not only cease to add sin to sin, but you must add grace to grace: 2 Peter 1:5, 'And besides this, giving all diligence, add to your faith, virtue,' &c. And you must also have a justification that hath two parts, for if the disease hath two parts, then so must the remedy have also, or else it will do you no good; as if a physician should bring you a potion, and you drink but half, it would do you no good. Now, God hath appointed for a remedy the righteousness of Christ, not only his death to take away sin, but also you must have his active righteousness imputed for the cleansing of your corrupt nature. You must take down the whole potion, and a whole Christ, not only whereby he takes away sin, but also that we may be made righteous by him; and if your sanctification and justification here hath not two parts, then in the world to come punishment will have two parts: as 2 Thes. 1:7–9, 'When the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven, with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power.' There is a separation from the presence of God; there is the privative part. You shall be kept in close prison, and have not so much as a drop of water or a beam of light; and you shall be positively punished also by the wrath of God for ever. Therefore, get the whole remedy, be not content only with this, to abstain from evil, but also to have your hearts carried on and inclined to God and his ways. There are many men have good motions in them, but yet the thorns grow up and choke them. There is vivification without mortification, and so they are in everything partial.
CHAPTER II:
This positive part of the sinfulness of nature is not the very substance of the soul
This positive part of the sinfulness of nature is not the very substance of the soul, as Flaccus Illyricus asserted, but the corrupt lust of it.—These lusts or desires in man in his original frame were right.—Wherein consisted their rectitude.—That we should examine ourselves whether this be restored in us or not II. Having shewn by Scripture and reason that sin, in what subject soever, hath these two parts, privative and positive, distinctly to be considered, now it remains I should, in the second place, explain both what is to be understood by that which divines call the positive part of original sin, which consists in lusts, and to shew wherein lies their sinfulness, and to prove them to be sins. For the thing itself, what should be meant by the positive part. Some expound it to be the very substantial nature of man, turned or transformed substantially into the image of the devil;* that as Christ is the substantial image of his Father, so our nature is the substantial image of the devil, † misalleging this text to their purpose, because it is called the old man, so as original sin is, according to you, the man himself. But this expression is most gross and absurd, for then it could not be said of Christ, as it is Heb. 2:15, 16, that he took not on him the nature of angels, but the seed of Abraham, and in all things was made like us, sin only excepted, as elsewhere it is expressed: Heb. 4:15, 'For we have not an high priest, which cannot be touched with the feeling of infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin.' Christ had been ἑτερούσιος with us, not of the same nature, if the substance of our nature was sin, for he had none of that; and whereas sin is called the old man, it notes out only that it is seated in the whole man, and covers it as a garment, and informs it. As that part of the stocking that covers the foot is called the foot, that which covers the leg is called the leg, so this, covering a man as a garment to be put off, is called the man.
But that which you see the apostle doth express this positive corruption by is ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἀπάτης, therefore it is not the substance of man's nature, but the lusts of it; and those also not taken simply in their nature, but as having an ἀπάτη, or abberration
in them, do make up that corruption of the old man, which makes the positive part of our sinfulness.
And whereas some have thought this but a part of that corruption, signifying only the corruption of the will and affection as the proper seat of lust; and also fit rather to express the actual motions thereof, which are usually termed lusts, than the radical inclination, and so think this to be too scant a word to express the positive part of sin; I will therefore, first, shew that the word lust is largely taken, and so to be understood here for the habitual inclinations, and that of all the faculties, understanding also; and so therefore inadequately to express the positive corruption of the whole man.
1. I say, by lusts here the apostle would have us understand the habitual inclinations and dispositions of the mind; for though indeed ordinarily the word he used is taken for those first actual movings and desires of the heart towards some object it is inclined unto, yet here the apostle speaks not of the actual corruption of the old man only, so much as of habitual corruption, which is the root and spring of all, as I shewed afore; and, therefore, by these lusts here, in regard of which the old man is said to be thus habitually corrupted, must needs be understood the habitual inclinations and dispositions of the mind, which are the cause of all the actual stirrings and lustings of the heart, and the principle of them, as the poise or weights are of the movings of the wheels in a clock; so that as all the faculties of the soul were made continually to move and stir, so there are several inclinations annexed to each of them, which are as weights continually to act them; and their inclinations are here called lusts, as well as the first motions themselves; and so the word ἐπιθυμία, in the general acceptation of it, is that whereby θύμος φέρεται ἐπὶ is carried, or is apt to be carried or moved, towards something: James
1:14, 'But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed.' There lust is made the principal of all the motions of the soul; he calls it, being drawn or moved by his own lust, as a clock by its weights; so that there is no act in any faculty, but some inclination or lust is the cause of it, for we can stir to nothing to
which we have not an inclination. And so of all sins that bring forth death, ver. 15, as also of all the corruption that is in the world, 2 Pet.
1:4, lust is the womb and root; so also all that is in the world is said to be lust: 1 John 2:16, 'For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world.'
2. By lusts here, he intends to signify and import all the positive inclinations of what kind soever, which any faculty hath in it, to move or stir to whatsoever act it doth put forth; for here he speaks of the whole man, as I shewed before; and therefore lusts, as here taken, are the inclinations of every faculty in man, and therefore are not to be limited here to the inferior faculties—affections and will— but to the superior also—the understanding, memory, judgment; which to be his meaning is evident, because, in ver. 23, speaking of renewing, and so putting off these corrupt lusts, he instances only in spirit of the mind, as implying that this is the seat of these corrupt lusts, as well as will and affections; and, indeed, the Scripture is clear for this, for, Eph. 2:3, where, first speaking in general of the corrupt inclinations and lustings of man's nature, in those words, 'Having our conversation in lusts of the flesh,' that is, corrupt nature, he subdivides these lusts in regard of their subjects unto the wills, θελήματα, of the flesh, that is, the inferior part of the soul, the affections; and τῶν διανοιῶν, of the discoursing, reasoning, and thinking power; for reason tells us that the understanding, memory,
&c., have their inclinations or lusts to move, rather to this than that object, or against this towards that; rather to think of some things, and entertain parley, and admit them to it, than other things.
Whence comes this, but that the understanding hath its inclinations or lusts as well as will, &c.? So Paul saith, 1 Cor. 2:2, 'For I determined not to know any thing among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified.' And if the understanding hath sins come from it, then also lusts; for, James 1:14, 15, lust is the cause of all sin; and so in Gal. 5:17, &c., heresies, sins of understanding, are reckoned amongst the lusts of the flesh.
3. Because all these positive inclinations which are in the soul to move, are in themselves, barely considered, good, created by God, as well as the faculties themselves; for power of motion is a creature, and, therefore, so cannot be said to be a part of original corruption.
Therefore, to shew you how they came to be a part of original corruption, and of the old man, he tells you, that now since the fall there is an aberration in all those inclinations; for he calls them lusts, τῆς ἀπάτης, that is, that they incline and set us out of our way, viz. that right way they at first were set in by God; for, Eccles. 7:29, God made them right, put a virtue into them to move us to him, as iron doth to a loadstone; now these inclinations or lusts have lost their virtue, and so, though still they move us, yet ἐκ τὴς πάτης, out of the way: and so, James 1:14, a man is said to be ἐξελκόμενος, by his lust, drawn from what is right, God and all goodness; and by the poise of these inclinations thus wanting, viz. that first virtue to guide them right, we are carried to all evil; for sin is but an aberration, James
5:20, and in this regard they are said to be corrupt; and so now these positive inclinations having this aberration in them, are said to be a part of the old man.
Now follows the chiefest thing: and indeed the difficultest we have to do in the opening of this point, is truly to explain and represent unto us a description of those lusts of man, as set wrong, as they fully thus express all that positive sinfulness that is in man's nature. Three things are to be done in it.
And, 1st, because ἐπιθυμία, lust, in a general and common acceptation, is used to express the desires and inclinations of man's mind in innocency, and as now renewed by grace, as well as the corrupt desires of the old man; for it is spoken of Christ, Luke 22:15,
'And he said unto them, With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer,' ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐπεθύμησα. And, Gal.
5:17, the spirit is said to lust against the flesh; and, therefore, for distinction's sake, Col. 3:5, it is called an inordinate affection, and evil concupiscence, implying that there are good lusts as well as evil; and so here it is ἐπιθυμίαι ἀπάτης, implying there are lusts set right
as well as wrong; therefore it is necessary to shew you the nature of lusts in common, as they are natural in a man's mind, considered as neither holy nor sinful, and the grounds of them.
And, 2dly, having understood the common nature of them, because rectum est index obliqui, we will inquire what was the rectitude of the lusts of man's nature at first creation, in the state of innocency, and wherein it consisted, and what was the ground of it.
And then, 3dly, the way will be clearly laid to shew the crookedness, obliquity, and warring of these lusts, spoken of here, when called τῆς ἀπάτης, and also the grounds of it.
1. Lust in the common acceptation, as the genus of good and bad, regenerate and unregenerate desires, signify nothing but the inclination, power, or readiness of the mind, or any faculty of it, to move to some good thing agreeable to it; so the word θύμος ἐπι, a mind to a thing, doth import. For the mind of man, and all the faculties of it, being a most active thing, and ordained never to lie still, but to be conversant about something or other, as the heavens and spheres thereof in the great world; so the soul (whereof the heavens are an emblem), and the several spheres thereof, do always move, and the mind, more nimbly than they, coursing from one end of heaven to another in an instant. Now the mind of man being thus active, must needs be fall of inclinations or proneness thus to act; for that which provokes it, and puts it on in any motion to any object, is a proneness and an inclination it hath to it; for as the reason why a stone moves downward, is because it hath a propenseness and inclination downward, so in like reason that any faculty moves thus about any object, is from an inward proneness and inclination to such a motion; for that which in beasts and dead things we call an inclination or instinct, in man, being a reasonable creature, we call lust; so the proneness that is in the mind of man to muse and think upon truth, as agreeing with it, is lust, ἐπιθυμία; the inclination in the will to choose what is good, is ἐπιθυμία. And the ground of this activeness, and, consequently, of those many inclinations in man's
mind, is because man's mind was ordained to receive its happiness, comfort, and well-being from things out of itself: Ps. 4:6,' Who will shew as any good?' Which that, therefore, it might attain, and continually preserve, it must act continually, and move towards some object or other agreeable to it, for its life and happiness was to come in by it; and, consequently, it having all its well-being from conjunction with other things by action or motion, in itself, then, it must needs be nothing but lusts, inclination, and longing after some thing agreeable to it, which might still whet it on to action; as the stomach having its nourishment and sustenance from what is agreeable to itself, you see in itself it is nothing but appetite, and so are all faculties, empty beggars dependent; God being only ἀυτάρχης, both spring and cistern of his own happiness: and so you have what lusts are, and the grounds of them.
The second thing to be explained is, wherein consists that rectitude or rightness of these inclinations of mankind, wherein it was first created, Eccles. 7:29, and whereof this ἀπάτη, wickedness, of the lusts of corrupt nature is the privation, and that is explained by three things.
1. God being the chiefest good, in whom true and right happiness is only found, and man's mind being created for God, then one part of that rectitude of his lusts or inclinations was, that they were carried with the joint stream of them to him as their chiefest good and most agreeable to them. For he being indeed the chiefest good, in all equity and right he only was worthy to have all man's desires carried to him; therefore the law, which is a rule that rectitude was a conformity unto, says, Luke 10:27, 'Love the Lord with all thy heart;' and Mark 12:33, ἐκ τῆς συνέσεως, 'with all thy mind;' and so with the joint stream of all, else they swerve from the rule which is most right and equal. And this may be added, seeing that even the law itself, and the inclinations we have, are from God, good reason they should be carried to God. So the apostle reasons, 1 John 4:7, why our love should be bestowed on our neighbour, because love is of God; and he
commands it to be thus placed above all upon himself. Yet this is not all, but further also, 2. God being the chiefest good, must needs also be the chiefest end, for bonum et finis convertuntur. And man being a creature whose inclinations were to be swayed by some end propounded, therefore to this rectitude further there was required that they should be carried to him, not chiefly for the happiness that was to be had by him, but to glorify him as God, otherwise they had warped from that rectitude which was requisite in them, for the law saith simply, 'Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart, but thy neighbour as thyself;' of loving God there is no regula, or rule. And also had it been for pleasure as the chiefest end, it had respected a creature above God, and that is unequal; for all things are by him, therefore for him: Col.
1:16, 'All things were created by him, and for him;' 3:23, 'And whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men.'
3. Whereas he was inclined towards other things besides God, yet his great and chief inclination was to God; for as God had made him under himself, as therefore he was capable of the goodness which was in God, so above all worldly creatures else he was lord of all, God making all for him as a subordinate end, and therefore made him the last; and therefore he endued him with such a nature as was so suited and disposed as it might receive and taste of all the goodness which God, as the stamps of his own goodness, had dispersed over all the world; yet still so as man was principally to regard God as his chiefest good, and also chiefest end. And therefore a third thing to be considered in that rectitude is a consequent of the other, that though his inclinations carried him to other things, yet in subordination to God, as his only chief good and utmost end, who made both them and him, and both for himself, he was so to desire other things as they are ordained for him. Now, they were ordained for him, but as to a subordinate end, and for him to receive but a subordinate good from them; and therefore that first rectitude must needs also lie in this, that he desired them in subordination to God, which subordination lies in three things.
First, That his inclinations were carried to none of these with equal proneness or affection as unto his God, nothing being so good as he, and therefore nothing so suitable to him; and therefore he inclined to nothing so much as unto God. And if his rectitude lay in making God the chiefest good, then he could desire nothing in comparison of him; as David, Ps. 73:25, 'Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire besides thee.'
Secondly, His inclinations were carried to nothing contrary to God, or unto anything he would or did forbid, to no unlawful pleasure.
Man in nothing thwarted his law or command, which follows upon the other, viz. that he made God his chiefest end; he inclined to nothing therefore that should thwart God's glory and sovereignty over him.
And lastly, all his inclinations were carried to other things, only as helps and means to make him partake further of God, as all the goodness in the creatures were, that therein he might read and behold the goodness of God the more clearly and fully.
1. For example, the speculative understanding of Adam in innocency (to instance in that which seems to have nothing of lust in it) was inclined to know God, and to think and muse of him as the prime and chiefest, fairest and only satisfying, object thereof.
2. And this not so much for the pleasure of contemplation (which of all other is the sweetest), but chiefly to exalt, admire, and fall down before him, and adore him in every thought of him as his chiefest end.
3. And whereas he understood, and was to think and study and view every creature, yet in subordination to him; as,
(1.) To think of nothing with that dearness, welcoming the contemplation of none of them so as of his God, as being the only fair object that ever his eye beheld; though as God, so he, did see that all
things were exceeding good, Gen. 1:31, yet as not worthy to be looked on the same day with God himself.
(2.) Much less to entertain or hold interview in any liking with the thought that tended to his dishonour.
(3.) And though other things allowed him to exercise his thoughts about them, yet to this end only, as means to let him see and know, and knowing, to love his God the more, to see him in all things, as in every creature then he did; and to admire still his wisdom, power,
&c., in all.
The ground of this rectitude. What was it carried his inclinations, and guided them thus right? It was, 1st, the image of God stamped upon them, wherein at first he was created, Gen. 1:27; Col. 3:10, 'And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him.' This active principle of motion, his inclination I mean, was touched with a magnetical virtue, or a divine nature, which bended thus unto God, as the virtue of the loadstone doth the needle unto the north, and so it is called a divine nature, 2
Peter 1:4. Now, this being the image or likeness to God, must needs carry all to him, as most agreeable to him; for simile convenit, appetit, gaudet simili, every like delights and rejoices in what is like to itself.
2dly, It being the image of God's holiness; as Col. 3:10, 'And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him;' Eph. 4:24, 'And that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness.' It being thus the image of God in holiness, must needs carry all to him as the chiefest end, and for his glory principally. For what is God's holiness but this, that he makes himself his end? And if this did not advance our inclinations also to this end, it were not holiness, nor could be called his image. And,
3dly, It must carry the man to all other things in subordination to God; for if this drew him out to God as his chiefest good, then it kept all in compass, from being drawn out to anything else equally as to him, and then averted all from what was contrary to his glory, which was man's utmost end; and then turned him unto all things which subserved this end, thereby to glorify him the more.
Use. Try then whether this rectitude be begun again in any of your hearts, yea or no: it being the same image renewed in a regenerate man in part, which was in Adam at first.
1. If it be renewed in you, then all your inclinations and proneness of the soul will carry all to God as your chiefest good, and to fellowship with him as your chiefest happiness; as David says, 'Whom have I in heaven but thee, and in earth, in comparison of thee?' Ps. 73:25. No thoughts will be so welcome as those about God, no hours pass with more contentment, than those wherein you enjoy fellowship with God. All your soul will be knit to him, as David's was: Ps. 86:11,
'Teach me thy way, O Lord, I will walk in thy truth; unite my heart to fear thy name.' But it will be out of joint, and so distempered; it will be out of the centre of its rest, and so will gravitate, and be heavy and sad, as all things are that have a proneness downward; or it will be as the needle in a compass, which, though joggled wrong, yet would still stand due north.
2. If this rectitude of your inclinations be restored, then all within will act for God as the chiefest end. As you will desire to know nothing in comparison of him, as St Paul says, 1 Cor. 2:3, Philip. 3:8,
9, so chiefly to set him up thereby; the want of which was the Gentiles' sin, Rom. 1:21, and so it will elevate all your inclinations; as, supposing that he might have more glory by your separation from him, as the chiefest good, and so you lose that comfortable fellowship with him, yet this rectitude would sway all your desires to God's glory, as Paul's were: Rom. 9:3, 'For I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ, for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh.'