-- CHAPTER V: Difference between that regret to sin under convictions of natural conscience, and tha
unlawful deeds.' And the reason why a regenerate man is afraid of the sins of others as well as of his own, is because his fear of sin, arising from the hatred which he bears to it, which is general to sin as sin, and not as his sin only, he is therefore afraid of the sins of all men as well as of his own.
CHAPTER V:
What great difference there is between that regret to sin which unregenerate men have under convictions of natural conscience, and that unwillingness to sin which is in a godly man That I may farther clear the difference between the strife which is in a regenerate man's heart against sins, and opposition which only natural conscience makes, I come now to consider what is that unwillingness to sin, which men unregenerate may express to have, and how much it is different from that inward aversion which a godly man hath to sin.
The will is the especial centre and seat of this war, and, therefore, it is expressed by lusting: Gal. 5:17, 'For the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other; so that ye cannot do the things that ye would.' And the more the will is in a sin, the greater is the aggravation. This, therefore, is made the aggravation of Ephraim's sin in the matter of Jeroboam's calves, which he commanded them to worship, that they went willingly after this wicked commandment: Hosea 5:11, 12,
'Ephraim is oppressed, and broken in judgment: because he willingly walked after the commandment. Therefore will I be unto Ephraim as a moth; and to the house of Judah as rottenness.' And it is urged against the pharisees by Christ, that they would sin: John 8:44, 'Ye
are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do; he was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it.' And so as a heightening of their guilt who apostatize, it is said, that they sin wilfully after the knowledge of the truth received; Heb. 10:26, 'For if we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins.'
Now in regenerate* men there may be some strife in their wills against sin, so as their wills may bear off, and they have some remissness and reluctancy, as in Herod and Darius; so as it may be truly said there is some unwillingness, by reason of conscience, in many sins. When, indeed, conscience is past feeling, then wicked men sin with greediness, and their will are wholly let out in the sin, and yet not before: Eph. 4:19, 'Who being past feeling, have given themselves over unto lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness.' But to clear this farther to you,
1. Consider that there is a double unwillingness, or averseness, in the will to things presented to it, as also a double willingness, for the distinction is applicable to both, and therefore we will use one part of the distinction of the one, and the other part of the other.
(1.) There is a willingness per se, i. e. a direct, innate, full inclination, and going out of the will to a thing suitable to it, when the will is of itself carried to an object for itself.
(2.) There is an unwillingness per accidens, an accidental unwillingness, indirect, and by the by, when there is some inconvenience annexed to the thing which we desire, which the mind apprehending is made less willing than otherwise it would be. Thus it was with the young man in the history of the Gospel, whose will of itself was folly set upon the world, and the pleasures of it, as things which were suitable to him; and yet when Christ told him that he could not enjoy heaven and them both together, this caused some
sorrow and unwillingness in him, and took off his mind somewhat from them, yet so as in the issue he followed the innate swing of his will and heart, though with some mixture of unwillingness; but it was only an accidental unwillingness: Mat. 19:21, 22, 'Jesus said unto him, If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come and follow me. But when the young man heard that saying, he went away sorrowful: for he had great possessions.' And thus a wicked man's heart is of itself fully for sin, wholly for sin, and the pleasures of sin, as suitable to his desires. Well, but there are inconveniences which attend upon sin, and which conscience represents as inseparable from it, the fearful consequences which follow upon it, such as shame, misery, hell, and damnation. This takes off the edge of the will somewhat, that it cannot be so keen towards sin, and it makes a stand in the diverse motions of the will, which otherwise were going out to sin, with a full propension, and without any reluctancy. And so in wicked men there may be also some willingness to good, but it is so only accidentally, not for goodness' sake, but for some pleasing consequences which follow upon it, which may candy and sweeten it, when for itself it is not liked.
Now such a mixture of a direct willingness for sin, joined with some accidental unwillingness to it, makes not the combat of flesh and spirit, for then the most of men would have it in them; for there is no action which a man's heart is ever so fully for, but some inconveniences make him less willing; and, indeed, all this may rather be said to make a man less willing than otherwise he should be, but not indeed, and really unwilling. Thus water, whose direct course and stream is to run one way, may have (as in mills) some bar, that stops, and hinders, and takes off some of the stream; but it turns it not the contrary way.
And that this part of an unregenerate man's will, which is unwilling, is not against sin, appears by this, that he wisheth those inconveniences and impediments removed, that his will might fully and wholly pour out itself to the sin. He is vexed rather at the
impediments than at the sin, and, thinks he, if there were no conscience, nor no hell, I might then sin freely.
But now the combat in a godly man is occasioned between two direct wills, that which is of itself for sin, and that which is of itself, and directly against sin. He is like a needle between two loadstones, and there is an inward inclination which carries him both ways, and therefore it is said the law of the members fights against the law of the mind, i.e. one inclination in him against another inclination:
Rom. 7:23, 'But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members.' But unregenerate men, in all their loathness to sin, are but as iron, which is but by some external accident detained, and fore-slowed in its motion towards the loadstone; and, therefore, notwithstanding this accidental unwillingness, they are still said to sin with a full consent, because they wish those inconveniences removed, which make them unwilling. When the iron is detained, the hand which holds it shall find the inward drawing power, and the inclination as strong as if it were let go. Thus, though an unregenerate man is kept from sin, yet his inward bent is to it, and if the feared inconveniences were removed, the will of itself would be wholly for it.
2. That the difference of these two wills, so directly contrary, may be more fully understood, we will compare these contrary motions of the will with all other diverse kinds of motions of it whatsoever which may be thought of, or which man is capable of.
(1.) There may be in the same man two direct desires to contrary things, but then they are not seated in the same appetite, neither are they indeed contrary, but subordinate each to other; as, for example, the natural appetite may crave meat when a man is hungry, when yet the reasonable appetite, or his will guided by reason, may be bent upon some business to be done, which shall put off his eating; yet these are not seated in the same will, neither are they contrary, unless this natural appetite rebel, and make impressions upon the
reasonable will, so as to hinder it in its desires; for otherwise they are subordinate, as in Christ, when he was an hungry, and yet he refrained eating, because it was sweeter meat and drink to him to convert a soul: John 4:31–34, 'In the mean while his disciples prayed him, saying, Master, eat. But he said unto them, I have meat to eat that ye know not of. Therefore said the disciples one to another, Hath any man brought him aught to eat? Jesus saith unto them, My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work.' There were two desires in him, but yet subordinate, and not in the same appetite; and so it was in Christ too, when nature abhorred death and shrunk at it, and yet he submitted his will to God, even unto death.
(2.) A man may have a mixed will to the same thing, i.e. he may be willing, and some unwillingness be mixed with it, but then the one is only accidental. A man wills the saving of his goods directly, but a storm comes, and he throws them overboard to save his life; this willingness to lose his goods is only accidental. Water running with a full stream in its natural course may be interrupted by windings, as in rivers, or stopped part of it, as in mills, so as the current is not so full and strong as else it would be.
(3.) Or, thirdly, a man may have a divided will, and both directed to contrary objects. Thus Paul was divided between two, and was in a strait, and knew not what to choose. He had a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, and a desire to stay here on earth, and to glorify
Christ: Philip. 1:21–24, 'For me to live is Christ, and to die is gain.
But if I live in the flesh, this is the fruit of my labour: yet what I shall choose I wot not. For I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ; which is far better: neverthelesss to abide in the flesh is more needful for you.' Yet these desires in him, though carried contrary ways, did not fight one against another, and therefore they were not truly contrary, but agreed in the same love of Christ being the ground of both; so that he did not in that manner desire to live with Christ, as withal that desire should rise up against the other, so as to wish it expelled, and not to be at all; because,
though the streams went different ways, yet they had but one spring, viz. love to Christ, which was shewn different ways. The objects were incompatible, but the desires not contrary. It is like a stream dividing into two channels, and yet meeting in one at first. Thus also a wicked man's will is of itself carried to prodigality, and also to covetousness, that he is in a strait, and knows not which to choose, yet so as selflove is the ground and spring of both; so that, to put all together, the same will may be carried to contrary objects with contrary acts, and to the same object with contrary acts. But now the two wills in a regenerate man are everywhere directly contrary, so that he cannot do the things which he would, Gal. 5:17.
[1.] There is not only a mixture of an accidental unwillingness, as in a man in a storm, who casts out his goods, but there is a direct unwillingness to sin.
[2.] And this unwillingness is in the same will; not in two appetites subordinate, but in the same will contrary to itself; and there are two parties in it, which fight one against the other, as the law of the flesh and the law of the mind are said to do: Rom. 7:23, 'But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members.'
[3.] And these are not contrary only in regard of two several objects, as a man may love covetousness and prodigality at the same time, but hate neither; but they are two contrary acts one to the other, seeking to destroy each other. They lust one against another, says the apostle, and the one would destroy the other. A godly man hates not only the pleasures of sin, but hates his love of it, and abhors himself for loving it in any degree.
[4.] Which is more, there are contrary wills directly thus contrary towards the same objects; and then, says Aquinas, wills are contrary, when in eodem et circa idem, when in the same and about the same thing. To love the pleasures of sin for themselves, and yet to hate them at the same time, and to hate his very loving them, these are
contrary acts about the same object. Here is not only a divided stream meeting in one channel, but a contrary stream running in the same channel, having two contrary springs, which would be a miracle in nature, a paradox which Aristotle would have hissed out of the schools, and it is a riddle indeed to all but godly men. Adam in paradise had experience of no such contrary acts, nor Christ, nor have the fallen devils, nor the angels in heaven, nor wicked men, though never so much enlightened, but only a godly man; and therefore wonder not, if you understand it not, though it be told you, for there is no instance like it by which to make it plain. And the reason is because in no other case a man hath, as it were, two men, and two wills in him. Toward all other objects he hath but one self, but here he hath two, a new man and an old man, which have contrary wills. Bring two men to the same thing, and the one may hate it, and the other love it, for the same thing which each see in it, because they are two men; and now a godly man hath as it were two men in him, and therefore hath such contrary motion in the same will toward the same thing; and of such contrary motions no instance can be given in the will of any reasonable creature towards any kind of objects, but only in this will of a regenerate man, and in his will only toward sin and grace.