Notes

Notes

NOTES

Abbreviations

1. The citations give double enumerations where the OTP translation (listed first) and the standard Greek text differ.

2. The citations first give the OTP reference, then the enumeration in Schermann’s Greek text.

3. Where editions diverge, I cite the enumeration in both Spittler (in OTP) and Kraft.

4. Chai’s enumeration followed parenthetically by the original enumeration.

Paul’s Defense before Authorities (24:1–26:32)

1. For discussions of this question, see further comment at Acts 21:22–24. For Jerusalem’s importance for Luke, see also Keener, Acts, 1:698–702; now also, e.g., Areeplackal, “Symbolism.”

2. Val. Max. 4.7.praef.; Fronto Ad Ant. Pium 3.4. They should remain loyal to death (e.g., Val. Max. 4.7.2, 6; Epict. Diatr. 2.7.3) and refuse to abandon their honor (Val. Max. 4.7.1, 4).

3. Lucian Peregr. 12 (perhaps exaggerating). Lucian focuses on the poor (perhaps mocking Christians’ low-class appeal); the Jewish community in Caesarea was better endowed at this point.

4. Bauckham, “James,” 478–79.

5. This is not to say that they would have approved of his public advocacy of the Gentile mission in Acts 22:21, in apparent disregard of their instructions and sensitivity to the local situation. But regarding Paul as indiscreet, or even preaching something that made their job more difficult, would not necessarily make them enemies.

6. Paul certainly also had his detractors among believers who seem to have been emboldened by his imprisonment (Phil 1:14–15), though they do not appear to be “Judaizers” (cf. Phil 1:17–18 with 3:2).

7. E.g., Witherington, Acts, 5; Omerzu, “Verhältnis.” On Paul’s trials and custody, see esp. Tajra, Trial; Rapske, Custody; and Omerzu, Prozess.

8. E.g., Witherington, Acts, 7.

9. One might contrast perhaps Peter’s three denials of Jesus (Luke 22:61) and Pilate’s three protests of Jesus’s innocence (23:22), along with the people’s continuing demands for Jesus’s death (23:23). Rhetoricians preferred three illustrations to support a thesis (Quint. Inst. 4.5.3; Pliny Ep. 2.20.9; in early rabbinic texts, see Keener, Matthew, 207), but this is less relevant here.

10. Rapske, Custody, 398–401, demonstrates how Luke 21:12–19 anticipates especially Paul’s defense speeches in Acts. Pagans also understood the attribution to deities of wise answers in court (Pliny Ep. 1.5.5).

11. Certainly Paul finds himself in court more than three times in Acts. As in other historical and biographical literature, parallels among characters guide authors rhetorically but do not control all the material (see my introduction, Keener, Acts, 1:568–74).

12. Dibelius, Studies in Acts, 7 (citing Jos. War 2.26–38; Ant. 17.230–49).

13. See discussion in Keener, Acts, 1:271–319; for the preservation of key elements of court speeches, see Winter, “Official Proceedings”; discussion at Acts 24:2–9, below.

14. Judean embassies often got their way in Rome (McKechnie, “Embassies”); one would not wish to enter such a political minefield without good cause. The sort of “parallel” that Pervo, Acts, 602–3, provides to a novel (i.e., a hearing before a governor in Xen. Eph. Anthia 4.2.10–4.4.1) simply mimics reality; besides governors and kings hearing cases in Josephus, see the abundant documentation from a range of genres below. Nor was Paul a socially unimportant prisoner, as a “leader” of the Nazarenes (Acts 24:5).

15. Including those attributed to Crito (Suda, s.v. “Crito”), Lysias (Plut. Mor. 836b; Cic. De or. 1.231), and others (Trapp, Maximus, 24).

16. See discussion in Keener, Acts, 1:271–319.

17. Paul’s companions would quickly learn of the transfer to Caesarea, and sufficient time had elapsed for them to make their way there (Acts 24:1, 11). Certainly the Gentiles among them had little incentive to tarry in Jerusalem without him.

18. See Keener, Acts, 1:402–16, and esp. 3:2350–74.

19. With Witherington, Acts, 703. We find Apollonius’s disciple Damis present even in a private hearing in Philost. Vit. Apoll. 7.31, but this may be the way for Philostratus to account for his source of “information.”

20. Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 505–6, 526–28; see discussion of Acts 24:2–9, below.

21. Witherington, Acts, 703.

22. Sherwin-White, “Trial,” 101 (followed by many others, e.g., Jewett, Chronology, 40; Cassidy, Politics, 15; Yamauchi, Stones, 120–21). Some comparisons appear below.

23. Sherwin-White, Society, 48–70. Pervo, Acts, 592, argues against this position but cites as other advocates for it Mommsen, “Rechtverhältnisse”; Heusler, Kapitalprozesse; Winter, “Official Proceedings”; Rapske, Custody, 158–64; Omerzu, Prozess; and comments by Hemer and Tajra. Luke has apologetic and theological agendas, but these were not, as shown in the commentary introduction (esp. Keener, Acts, 1:148–65), incompatible with historians using genuine information.

24. See Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 506–7.

25. Keener, Acts, 3:3195–200; cf. 3159–60.

26. Rapske, Custody, 329.

27. Lentz, Luke’s Portrait, 115, contends that Luke regularly portrays Paul’s accusers as Jews of low status. This description may fit Paul’s opponents in Acts often, but it does not fit them here; although both parallels with Jesus and the need to explain delays in Paul’s trial provide reason to report such opposition, it departs from the pattern earlier in the book. If rhetoricians could use accusers’ low status against them, Luke might also seek to make the best of a known situation with accusers of high social status (but negative moral status from the standpoint of Roman hearers) giving attention to Paul yet failing to persuade the governor. Yet Luke would probably not invent them: for those knowledgeable of Judean affairs (or who had spent some time in Judea around the time that Paul was in custody there, as Luke had), having such enemies might paint Paul well, but Luke’s audience probably would not know the names and antics of these high priests.

28. Among the various meanings of ἐμφανίζω is to bring a report in a judicial setting or to bring charges (BDAG cites P.Hib. 72.4 [third century B.C.E.]; PSI 400.2; 2 Macc 3:7; 1 En. 22:12; Jos. Ant. 10.166; 14.226), as in Acts 24:1; 25:2, 15.

29. Witherington, Acts, 703, following Mommsen, “Rechtverhältnisse.”

30. BDAG cites Xen. Mem. 4.3.4; Diod. Sic. 14.11.2; Esth 2:22; Jos. Ant. 4.43; for bringing formal charges, Ant. 10.166.

31. Sherwin-White, Society, 48–70.

32. Sherwin-White, “Trial,” 101.

33. Still, a summons can be quite sudden, as in Philost. Vit. Apoll. 7.31 (though he had unofficial advance notice the night before, he is taken out suddenly and without immediate warning).

34. See BDAG, citing esp. Jos. Ant. 14.169; also Barrett, Acts, 1094 (noting Plato Laws 11.937A; Demosth. Fals. leg. 211); cf. Conzelmann, Acts, 198.

35. Cf., e.g., Philost. Vit. Apoll. 8.1.

36. Cf., e.g., Cic. Verr. 2.4.66.147; John 18:28. On morning schedules, see Keener, John, 1098–99, and sources there; cf. also Symm. Ep. 1.23.3.

37. Rapske, “Prison,” 827; Garnsey, Status and Privilege, 279–80. Papyrus appeals illustrate how even those of lower social station depended on those who had power (Meeks, Moral World, 35, citing, e.g., P.Oxy. 2852).

38. Witherington, Acts, 704.

39. Rapske, Custody, 158–59.

40. Williams, “Names,” 112 (conceding that the name applies to a God-fearer in Aphrodisias).

41. Rapske, Custody, 160; Bruce, Acts1, 421; cf. the possibility in Weiser, Apostelgeschichte, 627–28.

42. Barrett, Acts, 1093. In earlier centuries, Greek advocates usually wrote speeches for presenters in the latter’s person (e.g., Demosthenes or Isaeus passim; although this practice is less relevant for a first-century Roman court).

43. Barrett, Acts, 1093 (in the final analysis, Barrett thinks the evidence uncertain either way [1094]).

44. Caesarean Jews apparently diverged in their perspectives (Jos. Ant. 20.178).

45. Rapske, Custody, 159.

46. Pliny Ep. 6.29.1–2; he then adds a fourth motivation of his own—namely, for achieving greater fame (6.29.3). The advocate in Quint. Decl. 333.5, 16, claims that his role compelled him to accept the case (but in context argues this point to evade a charge).

47. Like Jesus (Luke 22:67–70; 23:9), Paul refuses to be intimidated by unjust officials.

48. Jos. Ant. 20.162–63 (Le Cornu, Acts, 1296; Spangenberg in Chung-Kim and Hains, Acts, 325). One wonders how Josephus would know this, but it is plausible, at least, that the friction between Jonathan and Felix was known and hence a source of the rumor. Further, if Josephus knew the rumor, which presumably originated at some time near the assassination, Ananias would probably be no less privy to it.

49. Jos. Ant. 20.200.

50. In this case, the high priest’s involvement is emphasized less than in Mark’s passion narrative, though only to distribute it among all the priestly elite (cf. Luke 22:66–67, 70–71 with Mark 14:61–63).

51. Peer solidarity was important (cf. Avidov, “Peer Solidarity”), but we do know that the municipal elite of Jerusalem also fractured into numerous competing special interests in this period (see comment on Acts 23:6–10), though uniting when necessary. The Sanhedrin could disapprove of a high priest acting solely on his own initiative (Jos. Life 309).

52. A minority best reserved its political capital for more essential matters, and Jerusalem’s elders could not afford to present a disunited front before the governor, in any case.

53. Witherington, Acts, 703n266 (citing, e.g., Jos. Ant. 17.226); Parsons, Acts, 324; BDAG cites Dio Chrys. Or. 76.4; P.Oxy. 37.1.4 (49 C.E.); 237.7.25; BGU 969.1.8.

54. Maclean and Aitken, Heroikos, xlvii (on sophists).

55. Crook, Advocacy, 175. They were not legal advisors or protectors (13, 196); what brought about juridical training later was the technicality of jurisprudence (197).

56. Honoré, “Lawyers,” 836.

57. With Ferguson, Backgrounds, 51 (contrasting legal experts). Some ancients opined that orators made their living in law courts from others’ wrongdoing (Tac. Dial. 41).

58. E.g., Plato Theaet. 164CD; Hipp. maj.; Mus. Ruf. 8, pp. 62.40–64.4; Epict. Diatr. 3.23.20, 28; Max. Tyre 26.2; Marc. Aur. 1.7; cf. Tac. Dial. 32; Aul. Gel. 5.3.7; in Plato, see Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 42–60; in Galen, see Pearcy, “Galen.”

59. Winter, “Philo among Sophists,” 48–49 (citing Dio Chrys. Or. 32.19). For arguing both sides of a case, see, e.g., Quint. Decl. 331.14.

60. Winter, “Philo among Sophists,” 53–54 (citing Dio Chrysostom and others).

61. Though Bruce, Acts1, 424, views Tertullus’s rhetoric as “ineffective.”

62. So Hemer, Acts in History, 129 (following Sherwin-White). Many upper-class persons spoke for themselves (Crook, Advocacy, 123). Multiple persons might speak for either side in particularly important cases (Hermog. Method 27.444).

63. Also in the Hellenistic period; e.g., Theophr. Char. 17.8.

64. On this difference between Athenian and Roman systems, see esp. Crook, Advocacy, 30–31. In the Greek ideal, one spoke for oneself, but in practice unpaid advocates often helped, speaking along with them (Thür, “Synegoros”).

65. Crook, Advocacy, 118.

66. On the basic level, Roman advocacy was supposed to be free (Crook, Advocacy, 34), particularly to those in need (125, 130, 186); but Crook (129–31) deals with fees. Routine advocacy was much lower on the social scale (124) than what Tertullus would provide; cf., e.g., the cheap public advocate in Lucian Indictment 15.

67. Jervell, “Future,” 121; for numerous rhetorical devices here, see Keener, “Rhetorical Techniques,” 224–34 (submitted in 2002, though published only in 2008). Contrast Bruce, Acts1, 424, who views Tertullus’s rhetoric as “ineffective.”

68. With Witherington, Acts, 704–5, and others. Contrast Rapske, Custody, 162, who sees Acts 24:6, 8 as the confirmatio.

69. Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 320–21; Witherington, Acts, 705 (who also treats other rhetorical features on 705); and others.

70. This reconstruction assumes a first-century date for these narratives, but the evidence of Acts is fully consistent with that and with the we-narrator being a genuine eyewitness (see the discussion in Keener, Acts, 1:402–16, and esp. 3:2350–74).

71. If Luke was present, he could have taken his own notes, and his summary could emphasize elements different from the précis provided by the court; see Judge, First Christians, 380–83, who compares what he believes to be a similar situation in P.Fouad 21 with P.Yale inv. 1528. Given the Caesarean hearings’ outcome and the importance of precedent, however, any eyewitness summary of Luke’s would not likely differ radically from that of official documents. Ancient historians usually had to depend on oral history (Walton and Sandy, World, 100), so both their presence and their access to primary documents were highly valuable.

72. E.g., P.Oxy. 37 (49 C.E.); 237, col. 7.19–29 (133 C.E.); P.Ryl. 75.1–12 (150 C.E.); P.Stras. 22.10–24 (207 C.E.); P.Thead. 15 (280–81 C.E.); P.Bour. 20 (after 350 C.E.) (and others in SPap 2:194–221, §§257–63).

73. Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 307n7. Pervo objects partly on the basis of what Luke lacks (Acts, 593–95), but no narrative writer was obligated to include all the data at his or her disposal.

74. Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 526. One might expect governors’ staffs to incorporate shorthand recorders soon after their emergence in Rome, which is probably earlier than our earliest extant samples. In the East, these would need to work especially in Greek, perhaps as predecessors of the Greek shorthand that is better attested later. Qualifying the procedure that Winter summarizes, shorthand was probably not yet always available (cf. Richards, Letter Writing, 92–93, 110); this deficiency here would not affect Winter’s point, however, since a basic summary, which was all that was called for, would not require competence in shorthand.

75. Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 307.

76. Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 527; idem, “Official Proceedings,” 307.

77. Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 528.

78. Ibid., 506 (though noting that the captatio, such as Acts 24:2–4, was omitted from these). In traditional Egyptian law, each side had to present its case, and rebuttal of the opponents, in writing (Diod. Sic. 1.75.6–7).

79. See Winter, Left Corinth, 24n99.

80. Porter, “Latin Language.”

81. Aune, “Latin,” 335.

82. See Isaac, “Latin and Greek.”

83. Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 526n104 (for translation citing P.Thead. 14). Greeks might even request Greek judges (Momigliano and Spawforth, “Cyrene”), but Paul was a Roman citizen.

84. Given the expense of writing a letter the length of Romans (Richards, Letter Writing, 167–68; cf. Dewey, “Oral-Aural Event,” 146–47), which was nearly unheard of, Paul was certainly serious about visiting the believers there in the future. But the Christian assemblies in Rome, like the majority of synagogues there, were primarily Greek-speaking.

85. It is likewise doubtful that Luke was fluent in that language, though years in Philippi, at least, should have given him some familiarity.

86. See Adams, “Romanitas.”

87. Even Caesarea, the immediate venue of the hearing, became a colony only later, under Vespasian (Smallwood and Rajak, “Caesarea”).

88. E.g., Lysias Or. 19.2, §152; Char. Chaer. 5.4.9; Terence Eunuch 10–13; Tac. Ann. 3.13; Apul. Metam. 10.7; t. Sanh. 6:3. The prosecution speech was typically called a κατηγορία (Porph. Ar. Cat. 55.3–4).

89. See Cicero’s complaints in Quinct. 2.9; 9.33. Apparently, Jewish law usually made an exception in capital cases (t. Sanh. 7:2; cf. m. Sanh. 4:1).

90. Thus, in his exordium, Apuleius in his Apologia emphasizes the least damaging charges against himself (see Asztalos, “Apologia”).

91. It was an encomium, though lacking some elements of the normal encomium (Men. Rhet. 2.10, 415.1–2).

92. Trajan, not much given to flattery, disapproves of Byzantium expending funds to send delegates to greet and honor himself and the governor of Moesia each year (Pliny Ep. 10.44, responding to 10.43.1–3).

93. Aune, Environment, 126; cf. idem, Dictionary of Rhetoric, 89, 176. See fuller comment on Acts 17:22. Securing audience favor was one of the first steps in normal speeches (Rhet. Alex. 29, 1436b.17–19; Cic. De or. 1.31.143; Men. Rhet. 2.3, 378.4–9; cf. Calboli Montefusco, “Exordium,” 272); for some specific examples, see comment on Acts 17:22.

94. E.g., Conzelmann, Acts, 198 (citing Lucian Indictment 17).

95. Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 315.

96. Ibid., 320.

97. E.g., Arist. Rhet. 2, esp. 2.1.1–9, 1377b–1378a. See further comment on Acts 7:51–53; 17:22.

98. Trans. C. D. Adams, LCL, 143.

99. Trans. R. Gardner, LCL, 12:39.

100. Trans. J. H. Freese, LCL, 6:281.

101. LCL, 6:17. He repeats the substance of this appeal at the conclusion of his narratio (Cic. Quinct. 9.34).

102. Apul. Apol. 25, 102.

103. Apul. Apol. 36, 41, 60. Here he usually connects the judge with himself as a fellow educated person.

104. Apul. Apol. 84 (emphasizing the judge’s foresight).

105. He complains that his accuser is wasting this noble judge’s time with nonsense (Apul. Apol. 25, 46).

106. Cf. the persistent flattery in Apul. Flor. 9, an epideictic speech: “I seek the approval of no one more than the man of whom I approve more than all others” (9.31); “Now I declare openly that I am your admirer” (9.32); cf. also 9.33–34; 16.31; 17.3; and esp. 17.20: “the most excellent of all proconsuls.”

107. Also in Goodman, State, 166 (citing it [394] as Sipre Deut. 343), comparing Apul. Apol. 36, 48. That I independently found the same rabbinic reference (and no others) probably suggests that that example is not common in rabbinic literature.

108. Conzelmann, Acts, 198. Cf. the repetition of πολυ- in Heb 1:1 (useful to its alliteration, Jewett, Hebrews, 9); cf. “many” in Sir 1:1; Luke 1:1 (cf. 2 Macc 2:24–25; Jos. Ant. 1.1; 20.154; Arrian Alex. 1.pref. 3; Nicolaus Progymn. 1.pref. 1; cf. also Moffatt, Hebrews, 2).

109. In Sherk, Empire, 158–59, §116.

110. Res gest. heading; 3.1; 25.1; 26.2–3; 27.2; cf. Gilbert, “Propaganda,” 237–42; Benko, “Early Empire,” 39; Fears, “Ideology of Power”; Horsley, “Assembly,” 386; Bowley, “Pax.” Haacker, Theology, 117–18, argues that Nero’s reign revived this epideictic subject; Nero’s propaganda on the subject invited Seneca’s critique (Huttner, “Zivilisationskritik”).

111. Likewise, no one would be impressed with a governor who claimed to keep peace (Cic. Verr. 2.5.1.2) if there were no threats of its disruption (2.5.2.5–2.5.4.9), and everyone would think ill of a governor who aggravated instability (2.5.4.9–2.5.6.14).

112. Men. Rhet. 2.1–2, 377.10–15, on the epilogue of an encomium for the emperor; an epilogue would typically drive home the most important points.

113. Witherington, Acts, 706n277 (citing Plut. Alc. 14.2; Jos. Ant. 7.20).

114. When used for humans, it especially signified concern or preparation for matters; see BDAG and sources listed there. It is praised in honorary inscriptions (e.g., OGIS 339.31, in Danker, Corinthians, 132).

115. Cf. perhaps also 2 Macc 4:6 (where peace depends on the king’s providence; cf. Bruce, Commentary, 464). It might provide implicit commentary on Tertullus, however, that Jewish documents used this praise particularly for God (Wis 14:3; 3 Macc 4:21; 4 Macc 17:22; cf. Marcus, “Names and Attributes,” 48), sometimes in explicit contrast to wicked rulers (3 Macc 5:30; 4 Macc 9:24; cf. Wis 6:7; Dan 11:37).

116. For inscriptions, see Harrison, “Benefaction Ideology,” 109–16. Cf. even the wise “caring for” (προνοεῖν) the foolish (Dio Chrys. Or. 3.62).

117. See P.Fouad 26; P.Ryl. 114.5 in Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 517; Witherington, Acts, 706.

118. Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 316, cites P.Oxy. 2131. See also, e.g., Nero’s “foresight” in sending an excellent governor (OGIS 666.4–7, in Danker, Corinthians, 133).

119. Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 315, cites P.Fouad 26.25, 49–50.

120. Philosophers and moralists also emphasized the need for kings to be just (e.g., Mus. Ruf. 8, p. 62.8–9; Dio Chrys. Or. 4.24).

121. By this standard, Felix fares poorly (Acts 24:26–27), though it must be said that he does not completely succumb to political expediency (cf. 25:15).

122. For the emperor, see Men. Rhet. 2.1–2, 373.7–8; in times of peace, one might omit “courage” (375.7–8). For these virtues in Aristotle (and Plato), cf. also Hippol. Ref. 1.17.

123. When applied to an emperor, this includes making just laws and appointing just governors (Men. Rhet. 2.1–2, 375.8–376.2).

124. Applied to an emperor, this leads to sound morals for the whole society (Men. Rhet. 2.1–2, 376.2–13; this is partly from his example, 376.8–9).

125. For an emperor, this involves administrative wisdom and wise evaluation of advice (Men. Rhet. 2.1–2, 376.13–23), including more foresight than a mantic (376.21–22).

126. Justice (Men. Rhet. 2.3, 385.9–22), temperance (385.22–28), wisdom (385.28–386.6), and courage (386.7–10).

127. Thus Sil. It. 14.684–88 contrasts a “just” ruler (probably Domitian!, 14.686–88) with the commonly exploitive provincial governors whom he has checked.

128. Cf., e.g., Cic. Fam. 2.4.2; 13.44.1; Phaedrus 3.epil. 20–21; Olson, “Expressions of Confidence.”

129. E.g., 2 Cor 2:3; 7:4, 16; 8:22; 9:4; Gal 5:10; Phil 1:6; 1 Thess 4:9; 2 Thess 3:4; Heb 6:9; Phlm 8, 21.

130. E.g., Aeschines Ctes. 1.

131. Aristotle urged use of rational arguments to generate pathos (Kraftchick, “Πάθη,” 48–50), but Romans used pathos as an appeal to stir or sway audience emotion (52–53, 56). On Aristotle’s emphasis on emotion in rhetoric, see Hall, “Delivery,” 232. On ἦθος and πάθος, see also Lampe, “Einsichten.”

132. Trans. J. H. Freese, LCL, 6:101; the pathos section is Cic. Quinct. 30.91–31.99.

133. Johnson, Acts, 416.

134. Jos. War 2.253, 260, 263; Ant. 20.161.

135. Long after Felix’s demise, Josephus also credits Felix (accurately or not) with having helped incite the violence (Ant. 20.162–66).

136. Haenchen, Acts, 652; Conzelmann, Acts, 198; Tajra, Trial, 120; Johnson, Acts, 410; Larkin, Acts, 337; Fitzmyer, Acts, 733.

137. Commentators noted above cite esp. Tac. Ann. 12.54; cf. Jos. Ant. 20.161–82; less explicitly (perhaps for political reasons), War 2.252–71.

138. Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 515–16; followed by Rapske, Custody, 161–62; and others.

139. See at length Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 506–15. Note also Rhet. Her. 1.8 and the example (Livy 28.44.6–18) from a speech in a history (28.43.2–28.44.18) in Laird, “Rhetoric,” 206.

140. Trans. H. E. Butler, LCL, 1:475.

141. With esp. Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 321–22; also others, e.g., Rapske, Custody, 159.

142. With Witherington, Acts, 705.

143. Ibid., 706.

144. E.g., Cic. Verr. 2.4.40.86–2.4.41.90 (Verres dishonored Marcellus’s name; Marcellus is one of the judges, 2.4.42.90).

145. E.g., Cic. Verr. 2.3.96.223.

146. With Pervo, Story, 82. Cf. Spangenberg 219v–220r (Chung-Kim and Hains, Acts, 325).

147. Narrative ironies could be used to indicate guilt: thus Verres spared the pirates but slew the citizens (Cic. Verr. 2.5.29.73–74; 2.5.30.77); Saul spared the Amalekites but practiced herem against the priests (1 Sam 22:19; cf. earlier against Saul’s Benjaminite people, in Judg 20:48). For various types of irony in ancient sources, see, e.g., Ray, Irony, 34–49; Duke, Irony, 8–12; and esp. now the excellent work of Berg, Irony, 25–99 (particularly 79–99).

148. The NRSV moves this to Acts 24:2, to begin Tertullus’s address.

149. Hemer, Acts in History, 129. See comment on Acts 1:1 (the discussion on Theophilus).

150. Free birth was a prerequisite for equestrian status (Millar and Burton, “Equites,” 551), though Felix’s brother Pallas received the praetorian insignia (Pliny Ep. 8.6.4).

151. Still, it might not be coincidence that Luke, who may write with at least one equestrian in mind (Luke 1:3) and probably knew Felix’s status, could not bring himself to include the title in Paul’s address to Felix, although Paul used it for Festus (Acts 26:25).

152. Witherington, Acts, 706. Cf. Acts 17:30; 1 Cor 4:17; 9:22; 10:33; 12:6; 15:28; Eph 1:23; Col 3:11; perhaps Sir 50:22. Cf. the practice of reusing a term in different compound forms in one context (Hermog. Method 15.432).

153. See, e.g., Heb 1:1 (as often noted, e.g., Thurén, “Writings,” 589; Lane, Hebrews, 6; Aune, Dictionary of Rhetoric, 212). It also appears elsewhere (e.g., Mus. Ruf. frg. 38, p. 136.2; Fronto Ad Ant. imp. 1.3; CD IV, 14; cf. Black, “Oration at Olivet,” 86; van der Horst, “Cornutus,” 170, citing Cornutus Summ. 17 [Lang, 26, lines 7–8]; in the LXX, see Lee, “Translations: Greek,” 778). Any accumulation of similar sounds, consecutive or not, provided rhetorical παρήχησις (see Hermog. Inv. 4.7.194, citing Xen. Hell. 7.1.41; Hom. Od. 24.465; Il. 6.201–2). Some authors were said to overuse this device (Dion. Hal. Demosth. 26).

154. Conzelmann, Acts, 198.

155. E.g., Mus. Ruf. 9, p. 72.32 (ἀεὶ . . . πανταχοῦ); frg. 34 (using a negation), perhaps polemicizing against rhetorical overkill. The expression is thus pleonastic.

156. Pliny E. N.H. 2.5.22 (trans. H. Rackham, LCL, 1:183).

157. See, e.g., Sen. E. Controv. 9.1.intro.; 9.1.9; Pliny Ep. 2.13.9; 7.15.3; 7.31.7; further comment on Acts 23:17–18.

158. Conzelmann, Acts, 198.

159. Pindar Ol. 2.95 (W. H. Race in LCL, 73n5, cites also Pindar Pyth. 1.82; 8.32; Nem. 10.20).

160. Wardle, Valerius Maximus, 67, notes also Vitruv. Arch. 5.pref. 3 as another preface, and Frontin. Str. 1.pref. among other digests. In other prologues, see Artem. Oneir. 1.pref.; Sen. E. Controv. 1.pref. 24; Let. Aris. 8.

161. See also Jas 1:19; cf. Prov 10:19; 17:28; Eccl 5:2–3, 7; Eurip. Aeolus frg. 28 (Stob. 3.35.3); also the emphasis on brevity in Johnson, “Taciturnity,” 331–32.

162. E.g., Pliny Ep. 2.5.13; 3.9.27; 4.5.3; 9.13.26 (though Pliny, in fact, considers longer letters a sign of affection, 9.20.1; 9.32). Papyrus letters averaged only eighty-seven words (and could be as few as eighteen; Richards, Letter Writing, 163); Paul’s letters flout epistolary convention (Anderson, Rhetorical Theory, 113).

163. E.g., Aeschines Embassy 51; Dion. Hal. Thuc. 55; Lysias 5; Tac. Dial. 25; Fronto Ad Ant. imp. 1.2.4; Max. Tyre 18.6; 25.2; Philost. Vit. soph. 2.4.569. Johnson, Acts, 410, adds Lucian Indictment 20–21; Quint. Inst. 8.3.82; Longin. Subl. 9.14; 42.1–2. For the rhetorical principle, see Anderson, Glossary, 30, 112–13 (esp. for conciseness in narration, citing esp. Rhet. Her. 1.14; 4.68; Cic. Inv. 1.28; De or. 2.326–28; Theon Progymn. [RG 2:83, line 14, to 2:84, line 17]; Quint. Inst. 2.31–32, 40–51; 4.2.42); later, Nicolaus Progymn. 3, “On Narrative,” 14.

164. E.g., Pliny Ep. 1.20.1 (quoting another); 6.33.7–8.

165. Pliny Ep. 4.5.4.

166. Pliny Ep. 1.20.2–3; 5.6.44. He felt that laziness drove many to brevity (1.20.23; 4.16.3; 6.2.5).

167. When convenient, however, Cicero claimed that he could speak briefly because the case was already spelled out in an earlier trial and because he was prone to brevity personally (Quinct. 10.34)! Cf. Macrinus’s similar claim for brevity, based on the hearer’s knowledge of the facts, in Hdn. 5.1.2; or Aeschines’s eschewing of repeating facts, except in summary, in Embassy 118.

168. Denouncing others’ crimes openly could also offend one’s audience (Ps.-Cic. Invect. Sall. 8.22) if it was not handled judiciously.

169. So also speakers (Dio Chrys. Or. 18.5).

170. Cf. Polyb. 2.56.4; Dion. Hal. Demosth. 42; Men. Rhet. 2.4, 393.25–30; Plut. Alex. 1.1, 3; John 20:30; 21:25; cf. Arist. Poet. 8.1.3, 1451a; Mus. Ruf. 10, p. 78.22; Phaedrus 3.epil. 6–7; Diog. Laert. 6.7.98. The need, opines Musonius, is not for multiple proofs but for strong ones (Mus. Ruf. 1, p. 32.5–17).

171. Dion. Hal. Lit. Comp. 11; Sen. E. Controv. 1.pref. 24. Some subjects, however, a teller might never weary of (Val. Max. 3.7.1g), generating, by such comments, enthusiasm for the subjects.

172. Lysias Or. 2.2, §190; 2.54, §195; Philost. Vit. soph. 2.17.597.

173. E.g., Lysias Or. 2.1, §190; Vell. Paterc. 2.29.2; 2.46.1; 2.89.1, 5–6 (cf. also 2.54.1; 2.96.2–3; 2.119.1; 2.124.1; 2.126.1); Plut. Mal. Hdt. 1, Mor. 854F; Iambl. V.P. 28.135; Philo Abr. 1; 1 Macc 9:22; Pesiq. Rab. 3:2; Song Rab. 1:3, §1.

174. Cf. Dion. Hal. Thuc. 55; Isaeus 19–20; Demosth. 42, 46, 58; Lit. Comp. 11.

175. One might also stop short for the sake of credibility (Diod. Sic. 4.8.2) or abbreviate for the sake of readability (2 Macc 2:24–25; cf. Iambl. V.P. 27.128; 28.135).

176. Within the same work, see Heb 6:3.

177. Pindar Pyth. 4.247–48; Nem. 4.33–34; Ol. 2.95; cf. Diog. Laert. 6.2.69. See esp. the hyperbole in Hom. Od. 3.113–17.

178. E.g., Sall. Ep. Caes. 13.8; Heb 13:22; 1 Pet 5:12; at the beginning, Barn. 1.5. Given the (mock) apologies in Pliny Ep. 3.9.26–27, 37; 9.13.26, Hebrews can hardly have been thought brief if we take it as a letter (though Pliny claimed to prefer long letters, 9.20.1; 9.32). For Hebrews as a sermon, see, e.g., Goppelt, Theology, 2:240; Lane, Hebrews, lxix–lxxv; Hagner, Hebrews, xxiii; Aune, Environment, 213; as (overlapping with the sermonic suggestion) homiletic midrash, Buchanan, Hebrews, xix, 246; Fuller, “Hebrews,” 10; Bruce, Message, 74; a sort of essay, Deissmann, Studies, 49; Kee, Origins, 150. A letter-essay (cf., e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus 1 Epistle to Ammaeus; Cicero Orator ad M. Brutum; 2 Maccabees; cf. Reed, “Epistle,” 173, noting the title λόγος) seems likeliest (with, e.g., Erdman, Hebrews, 11).

179. See, e.g., Symm. Ep. 1.14.1 (for a more genuine claim about brevity, cf. 1.15.1).

180. Cic. Verr. 2.2.1.1–2; 2.4.26.57; 2.4.46.102; 2.4.47.105; cf. similarly Flacc. 5.12. Isoc. Antid. 140, 310, 320 feigned inability to complete all his thoughts on a matter within the required time. See other examples at Acts 24:5.

181. E.g., Lysias Or. 2.1, §190; 2.54, §195 (cf. 2.2); cf. John 21:25; Max. Tyre 25.2.

182. On paralipsis, see, e.g., Rhet. Her. 4.27.37; Demosth. Cor. 268 (18.3); Hermog. Method 7.419–20; Inv. 2.5.117; Anderson, Glossary, 88–89. For further examples, see comment on Acts 24:19.

183. Cf. Cic. Verr. 2.4.49.109 (trans. L. H. G. Greenwood, LCL, 8:417): “I will weary you no further with this description” but come straight to my point. But often even those who offered to stop wanted the audience to encourage them to continue (Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 95.2; cf. Heb 5:11).

184. One could also expand speeches by including more recapitulation (Rhet. Alex. 20, 1433b.29–1434a.17).

185. For orators speaking at length, see, e.g., Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 307. This is also illustrated in “N” documents (320; these may have been the advocate’s ad hoc summaries of prospective arguments; so Crook, Advocacy, 117). A Roman aristocratic trial might require two days to listen to both sides, with the sentence rendered on the third (Val. Max. 5.8.3; cf. Pliny Ep. 2.11.18; cf. five days in Tac. Ann. 3.13), though some plaintiffs might have only minutes each in imperial assize districts in Egypt (cf. comment on Acts 18:14).

186. E.g., Pliny Ep. 1.23.2; 3.20.3 (noted for its breach). That the law permits speech at fuller length (1.20.11) probably refers to nonforensic speech (cf. Sen. E. Controv. 7.pref. 8).

187. The prosecution received six hours (Pliny Ep. 4.9.9), and Pliny notes that he spoke for the prosecution nearly five hours (2.11.14). Pliny worked hard at another, seven-hour speech (4.16.3); speaking or writing at length was fine so long as one seemed brief by sticking to the point (5.6.42–43).

188. Cicero could denounce a bill at length (Plut. Cic. 12.5).

189. See Suet. Nero 15; Pliny Ep. 6.22.2.

190. E.g., Isaeus Menec. 34; Lysias Or. 23.4, §166; classical Athens in Max. Tyre 3.8. On water clocks, see, e.g., Dohrn-van Rossum, “Clocks,” 462–63; Lucian Hipp. 8.

191. Lucian Fisherman 10 (speaking of the defendant’s allotted “water”), 28; Indictment 15, 16, 19; Apul. Apol. 28, 37, 94; Philost. Vit. Apoll. 8.2 (where the secretary offers to give Apollonius the water in the water clock that he needs); 8.4 (where the accuser demands the right to set the water clock to avoid Apollonius’s talking too long); Libanius Topics 4.12. Commentators (Conzelmann, Acts, 198; Johnson, Acts, 410) often cite Lucian Indictment 15, 19, 26.

192. E.g., Aeschines Embassy 44 (cf. 24); Isaeus Menec. 2 (toward the beginning); Cleonymus 48 (beginning his final summation); Lysias Or. 19.2, §152.

193. Cic. Verr. 2.4.47.105; Quinct. 6.22.

194. Conzelmann, Acts, 198–99, cites Lucian Indictment 16; Acta Isidori.

195. Demosth. Eub. 1. Cf. similarly a request, combating prejudice, that the jury treat both parties impartially (Lysias Or. 15.1, §144).

196. The term connotes a virtue (e.g., Dio Chrys. Ep. 1, to Rufus) that sometimes appears in conjunction with πραΰτης (considerateness; Lucian Alex. 61; 2 Cor 10:1). It naturally suits one of superior rank, e.g., a master’s treatment of workers (Dio Chrys. Or. frg. 5 [Stob. Flor. 4, 19.46 {Hense, 430}; 62.46 {Meineke}]) or a gentle, caring ruler (Dio Chrys. Or. 3.41). Stoics could criticize this indulgence (Arius Did. Epit. 2.7.11d, pp. 66–67.32–34).

197. Ancient hearers might have imagined (and lectors may have often reenacted) a typical gesture for denunciation at this point: stretching out “a slightly drooped index finger, with the two outer fingers curved” (Shiell, Reading Acts, 56). Cf. also gestures for reproach and refutation (extending the hand firmly and rapidly, 69–71); gestures of aversion (turning away the face, 76–77); gestures and the tone for indignation (62–65, 88), perhaps relevant for however much of Acts 24:6–7 is original. When debating or contending, one might extend or otherwise move the arm quickly, pace back and forth, and sometimes stamp one’s foot (Hall, “Delivery,” 225; cf. 224, citing Rhet. Her. 3.27). For gestures in ancient Israel, cf. Matthews, “Making Your Point.”

198. A point not lost on Acts’ ancient readers; thus Chrys. Hom. Acts 50 finds irony here in that it is Paul’s very accusers who have stirred unrest.

199. Orators could elaborate on the crimes to eliminate sympathy (Hermog. Progymn. 6, “On Commonplace,” 14). They also associated crimes with particular character types, on which they could then elaborate at length (cf. Nicolaus Progymn. 7, “On Commonplace,” 36–37, 41)—assuming, of course, they had time (Acts 24:4)!

200. Trans. W. R. M. Lamb, LCL, 589.

201. The rational concept of ēthos formulated by Aristotle and the terminology were less in use by Paul’s day (Aune, Dictionary of Rhetoric, 169–73, esp. 170–71; cf. Anderson, Glossary, 61–63; for ambiguity in Aristotle’s use, cf. Woerther, “Origines”; for ἦθος and emotion in Aristotle, see also Hall, “Delivery,” 232), but character remained a crucial issue in forensic rhetoric (Crook, Advocacy, 34); Perdue, “Rhetoric,” 191, finds it emphasized even in Wisdom of Solomon. Ἦθος was especially important early in the speech, just as πάθος was useful for the rousing conclusion (Aune, Dictionary of Rhetoric, 171).

202. McTavish, “Priest.”

203. The principle, the importance of examining the claimants’ character, is laid out explicitly in Isaeus Nicost. 27.

204. Dion. Hal. Isaeus 3, 9; Cic. Scaur. 13.29; Demosth. Or. 21.1 (cited in Hermog. Method 5.418); Quint. Decl. 252.10; Apul. Apol. 1, 25; Hermog. Inv. 1.1.99. Ideally, one could attack both character in general and specific acts (Hermog. Inv. 1.2.102–3).

205. Isaeus passim, e.g., Astyph. 16; Lucian Runaways 18; Tac. Ann. 3.12 (cf. the attack on a defendant’s previous career in 3.10). Had the defendant accused me of merely killing his father rather than mine, one complained, I would not be taking him to court (Lysias Or. 10.2, §116). Rhetoricians also learned to multiply existing charges by subdividing them into component elements (Hermog. Inv. 1.2.101–2).

206. Marcus Aurelius replied that this would win Fronto more favor from those sympathetic to the accused (Fronto Ad M. Caes. 3.5). An advocate might have to knowingly charge someone falsely but might manage to reduce harshness to the level necessary to his role (Quint. Decl. 333.8).

207. See Dillery, “Apion Historian.” Character assassination offered a simple “argument,” and Apion made an easy target (Jones, “Apion”).

208. Lucian Z. Rants 52 (trans. A. M. Harmon, LCL, 2:167, 169).

209. Lucian Tim. 52–53. Likewise, a Cynic, angry at the last speaker, denounces him with many malicious reports in Peregr. 31.

210. Winter, Left Corinth, 66. For attacks on a person’s friends, see, e.g., Aeschines Tim. 54–57. For denouncing opposing witnesses and supporters, see, e.g., Apul. Apol. 57–60; for praising a supporting witness, 61.

211. Winter, Left Corinth, 74.

212. E.g., Lysias Or. 13.46, §134; Tac. Ann. 2.71; stirring anger in Libanius Topics 1.1, 14, 22; 3.2; 4.20. Stirring audience feeling against the defendant was an ideal conclusion to a prosecution speech (Rhet. Alex. 36, 1443b.16–21).

213. For Philo’s Hellenistic Jewish critique of the abuse of sophistry for deception, see Winter, Philo and Paul, 91–94 (more generally, 83–98).

214. Sus 27; Isaeus Aristarch. 1 (though pleading especially that he is a less experienced speaker); Cleon. 35; Lysias Or. 5.2–3, §§102–3; 16.10, §146; Dio Chrys. Or. 46.7; Char. Chaer. 5.7.2. Lucian likes to parody this claim (Phal. 1.14; Par. 56). Prosecutors looked for past wrongdoing to cite a pattern (Hermog. Inv. 2.5.117–19).

215. Fronto Ad am. 2.7.5.

216. Cf., e.g., Isaeus Aristarch. 1; Lysias Or. 5.2–3, §§102–3; 7.24–29, §§110–11; 16.12, §146; Cic. Sest. 30.64. Apuleius charged that his accuser had “already been convicted of lying before the city prefect in a highly important case” (Apol. 3).

217. Aeschines Tim. 49. One who was above reproach would prove difficult to convict (Dion. Hal. Ant. rom. 7.58.2). The prosecutor might imaginatively depict the defendant’s progressive moral deterioration through a series of crimes eventuating in the climactic accusation at hand (Libanius Topics 1.24–25; 2.18).

218. E.g., Quint. Decl. 313.15; 322.3; 331 intro; 331.21–22.

219. E.g., Quint. Decl. 314.2; 322.3; 351.8; 377.2–3.

220. Trans. Hunink, pp. 108–9.

221. With Horton, Acts, 374. On damning an enemy with anonymity, see comment on Acts 22:22.

222. E.g., 1 Sam 1:16; 2:12; 30:22; 2 Chr 13:7; Prov 19:25; 21:24; 22:10; 24:9; 29:8; 1 Macc 10:61; 15:3, 21.

223. BDAG; Fitzmyer, Acts, 733.

224. Riesner, Early Period, 100.

225. P.Lond. 1912.82–100; CPJ 2:36–55, §153.

226. Claudius, who was generous with Roman citizenship where convenient (see comment on Acts 22:28), probably guarded Alexandrian citizenship less out of conviction than to maintain order.

227. Sherwin-White, Society, 51 (emphasizing the narrative’s contemporary language); Rapske, Custody, 161; cf. Riesner, Early Period, 100; Witherington, Acts, 707.

228. “The accusers of Paul were putting themselves on the side of the government” (Sherwin-White, Society, 52–53). Paul’s accusers may intend a deliberate echo (with, e.g., Jeffers, World, 167).

229. CPJ 2:78–79, §156c (the Jews are “wishing to stir up the entire world [ὅλην τὴν οἰκουμένην]”).

230. Neyrey, “Forensic Defense Speech,” 215–26 (citing Rhet. Her. 2.3.3–4; Cic. Inv. 2.5.16–2.8.28); followed by Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 320; Witherington, Acts, 707.

231. Philosophers such as Musonius made much of their view of the ideal ruler (e.g., Mus. Ruf. 8, p. 66.11; cf. Dio Chrys. Or. 1.21; 3.112; symposium in Letter of Aristeas), usually with minimal practical effect.

232. With Conzelmann, Acts, 199; Johnson, Acts, 411; Fitzmyer, Acts, 732.

233. Hemer, Acts in History, 129; Rapske, Custody, 160 (on prisonable charges, see 41–46). Paul was still accused of “attempting” to profane the temple (Acts 24:6), but this was a considerable scaling back of the original charge (21:28).

234. See La Bua, “Obscuritas” (citing Cicero’s obfuscation).

235. E.g., Lysias Or. 7.2, §108; Cic. Att. 2.24. The defendant could easily charge that the plaintiff forgot the original complaint once it became necessary to prove and not simply allege a crime (Apul. Apol. 2). Failure to have raised a charge at an earlier hearing or occasion was suspicious (Quint. Decl. 301.19; Hermog. Inv. 3.5.148).

236. Mark 14:2–3 includes the “king of the Jews” charge but, while mentioning other charges, does not specify forbidding to pay taxes, which Luke may have from passion tradition or infer from Mark 12:13–15.

237. Noted, e.g., by Bruce, Commentary, 464n4.

238. With Padilla, Speeches, 222, Tertullus’s charge is hostile within the narrative but, through dramatic irony, appears positive for Luke’s ideal audience. On Luke’s apologetic for Paul’s innocence, see, e.g., Keener, “Apologetic.”

239. Nock, Paul, 140.

240. The charges in Acts are not likely Luke’s creation; see Keener, “Apologetic.”

241. E.g., Rom 3:8; 15:31; 1 Cor 4:11–13; 2 Cor 1:8–10; 4:8–11; 6:5; 11:23–26; Gal 5:11; 6:12; Eph 3:1; 4:1; Phil 1:14–17; 1 Thess 2:2; 2 Thess 3:1–2; Phlm 9.

242. Robinson, Criminal Law, 19.

243. Ibid., 76; as a broad category, 74–78.

244. Ibid., 76.

245. Ibid., 78–80.

246. Ibid., 80.

247. See Keener, “Apologetic.” Wallace and Williams, Acts, 18–20, note six scenes in Acts where mobs are stirred against Paul, and observe that other sources from the period confirm that mobs were easily “manufactured.”

248. Luke can hardly have thought this plausible, and if he had, he might have suppressed it the way he omitted the alleged association of Christ with unrest in Rome, if he knew the tradition we have in Suetonius (see comment on Acts 18:2).

249. Imperial propaganda also used “all the world” freely (e.g., omnia in Ovid Tristia 2.324; Vitruv. Arch. 1.pref. 1; Pliny E. N.H. 3.5.67; Dio Chrys. Or. 3.7; Men. Rhet. 2.12, 422.9–10; Jos. War 2.361; negatively, 4 Ezra 11:1), applicable also to earlier Rome or other kingdoms (Xen. Cyr. 8.6.20; Polyb. 1.1; 1.64; 6.2.3; 6.50.6; 39.8.7; Corn. Nep. 18 [Eumenes], 3.3–4; 23 [Hannibal], 8.3; Sall. Catil. 36.4; Men. Rhet. 2.3, 388.8–9; Ps.-Callisth. Alex. 1.15, 23; Jdt 6:4; 11:1, 7; 3 Macc 6:5; cf. Aeschylus Pers. 74). One could also apply such hyperbole to a favorite teacher (οἰκουμένην in Eunapius Lives 493; cf. Test. Mos. 11:8).

250. E.g., those of Caligula in Jos. Ant. 19.1, 14; see comment on Acts 17:6. During the Roman civil war, Cicero lamented that the entire world was flaming (Fam. 4.1.2).

251. With the possible but unlikely exception of Ephesus; see comments at Acts 19:23–41; 20:16. Paul’s worst troubles there probably became political rather than legal.

252. Witnesses could be arraigned (Apul. Apol. 44–45, for slaves, and 46, for others).

253. It seems a likely surmise that we can reconstruct one line of charge against Paul here, as Josephus’s replies to Apion inadvertently preserved the latter’s anti-Semitic claims. Cf. similarly the apologetic in 1–2 Samuel against considering David a usurper (e.g., 1 Sam 16:13–14; 19:5, 11–17; 23:16–18; 24:4–22; 27:8–10; 29:4–11; 2 Sam 1:14–15; 3:28; 4:11; 16:8; on royal spinmeisters, cf., e.g., Philost. Hrk. 31.5 or, more relevant [and more consistently favorable than Samuel–Kings], Assyrian annals; on ancient Near Eastern royal apologetic, see Long, “Samuel,” 270) or Philostratus’s apologetic against considering Apollonius as a magician (Vit. Apoll. 1.2; 5.12; 7.17, 39; 8.7). Cf. also Luke preempting charges against Jesus, e.g., by explaining that the swords were only so that Jesus could fulfill the prophecy about being considered a transgressor (Luke 22:36–38).

254. Paul’s own letters testify of conflicts with his own people (2 Cor 11:24, 26), although he had them with Gentiles as well.

255. On the problematic character of Paul’s association with tumults for Roman readers, see esp. Cassidy, “Opponents.”

256. See Keener, John, 753; also Anderson, Glossary, 72 (citing Cic. Orat. 137). See fuller discussion below.

257. See Stoops, “Riot,” 78–80.

258. Cf. ibid., 81.

259. The months that I spent in Plateau State, Nigeria, in the summers of 1998–2000 helped shape my thinking in this regard (cf. Keener, “Mayhem”). In more recent years the newer group Boko Haram has made evident the polarizing strategy already at work from some jihadists in the 1990s, but at that time some Western (and even some southern Nigerian) critics doubted the accuracy of my information.

260. Cf. the (Stoic) sect of Chrysippus and Cleanthes (Hierocles p. 37, cols. 8, 10 [in van der Horst, “Hierocles,” 157]); Arius Did. Epit. 2.7.6a, pp. 38–39.4; 6b, pp. 38–39.19; 7, pp. 42–43.26; 11m, pp. 86–87.22; pp. 90–91.16; the sect of Platonists (Macrob. Comm. 2.14.6–7, in van der Horst, “Macrobius,” 226). See also discussion at Acts 5:17; 15:5.

261. Diog. Laert. 1.prol. 19–20 defines Skeptics as a sect only if it includes those who follow a principle and not just a doctrine.

262. See Desjardins, “Αἵρεσις in Christian Era.”

263. See Staden, “Hairesis and Heresy.”

264. Jos. Ant. 13.171, 288, 293; 20.199; War 2.118, 122, 137, 142, 162; Life 10, 12, 191, 197.

265. Cf. Jos. Ant. 15.371 (without the term). He also, however, applied the term politically (15.6).

266. See discussion on the meaning of “way” at Acts 9:2 (Keener, Acts, 2:1626–27). Similarly, some philosophic schools viewed their own ways as true. Cf. Stoic rejection of mere “opinion” (e.g., Arius Did. Epit. 2.7.11m, p. 94.5, 13–18; cf. 2.7.10b, p. 58.18, 27–30); so also in Pythagoreanism in Philost. Ep. Apoll. 52.

267. Pritz, Nazarene Christianity, 13–14; cf. Ulfgard, “Bibelutläggning”; on Matthew, cf., e.g., Keener, Matthew, 113–15.

268. Meyers and Strange, Archaeology, 56, suggest 1,600–2,000 inhabitants, based on the tombs; cf. p. 27. More recent estimates suggest below 500 (Stanton, Gospel Truth?, 112; Horsley, Galilee, 193; roughly 500 in Strange, “Nazareth,” 113). People sometimes evaluated others based on the size or significance of their place of origin (e.g., Dio Chrys. Or. 32.22; Libanius Invective 3.2; Comparison 1.2; 2.2).

269. That many other Galilean villages were about the same size or smaller (Horsley, Galilee, 193; cf. Lewis, Life, 67–68) may argue against this thesis (Keener, John, 483–84). Cf. Chung-Kim and Hains, Acts, 326.

270. That one of the priestly courses reportedly settled here after 70 C.E. indicates that the priesthood found the town “clean” (Meyers and Strange, Archaeology, 27), but for questions on the tradition, see Trifon, “Msmrwt.” Johanan ben Zakkai seems to have settled not far from Nazareth before 70 C.E. (Vermes, Jesus the Jew, 72, citing y. Ber. 7c; b. Ber. 34b). Still, even nearby Sepphoris (which later includes more pagan imagery; see, e.g., Dunbabin, “Dionysus”) was strongly Jewish in character before the Judean-Roman war (see, e.g., Chancey and Meyers, “Jewish”; Chancey, “Milieu”; Reich, “Baths”; Evans, World, 24–26; Reed, Archaeology, 135), and Nazareth was more traditional than Sepphoris (Dark, “Landscapes”; Reed, Archaeology, 134–35, 138). On ancient Israelite pottery before resettlement in the Hellenistic period, see Horsley, Galilee, 193; on the proper Hebrew form of the name, see Rüger, “ΝΑΖΑΡΕΘ.” Later rabbis told of individual minim there (t. Ḥul. 2:24) but do not provide details for an entire Jewish Christian community (Miller, “Minim”).

271. Bede Comm. Acts 24.5 (L. Martin, 177; Martin, Acts, 284) distinguishes Luke’s use for Judean believers from the later use of the title for a specific sort of Jewish Christian movement (cf. Aug. Ep. 75.4.13 [from Jerome]; 82.2.16; Jerome Vir. ill. 3; Dial. Pelag. 3.2), arguing (probably rightly) that Christians were originally called “Nazarenes” as an insult (cf. Acts 11:26).

272. Pritz, Nazarene Christianity, 16. Pliny the Elder’s reference to Nazerini stems from a pre-Christian source and hence cannot refer to believers in Jesus (Pritz, Nazarene Christianity, 17–18). Jewish followers of Jesus retained the title at least into the fourth century (Bagatti, Church, 12–13), as is evident both from later forms of the Birkath ha-Minim and from independent attestation of that malediction in Jerome (Ep. 112.13; In Amos 1.11–12; In Isa. 5.18–19; 49.7; 52.4–6) and Epiphanius (Flusser, Judaism, 638; Pritz, Nazarene Christianity, 104–5; cf. discussion in Urbach, “Self-Isolation,” 288; Moore, “Canon,” 111–12; Carroll, “Exclusion,” 22; Jocz, People, 54–57; Keener, John, 211). (The Birkath may have cursed Jewish Jesus followers before the specification of “Nazarenes”; for Justin Dial. 16.4 [and possibly 93; 95; 96; 98; 123; 133], see Barnard, “Old Testament,” 400; Horbury, “Benediction,” 19; Shotwell, Exegesis, 83–84; Bauer, Orthodoxy, 274; Schiffman, “Crossroads,” 151; pace Kimelman, “Evidence,” 235–36; further discussion in Keener, John, 207–14.) Cf. later Gentile patristic discussions about them cited in Daniélou, Theology, 56 (Epiph. Her. 29; Jerome Vir. ill. 3). The idea that the post-first-century Jewish Christian movement originated in the later Gentile church (Munck, “Jewish Christianity,” 114) is unfounded. Archaeological evidence in Palestine shows that Jewish Christianity persisted at least well into the Byzantine period (Meyers, “State,” 134–35; cf. Saldarini, Community, 18–26; Mancini, Discoveries). Evidence remains “for a continuous Jewish-Christian or Christian presence for seven centuries” (Meyers, “Judaism and Christianity,” 77).

273. Conzelmann, Acts, 199.

274. Through Paul’s various hearings (esp. the later one before Agrippa), Paul, as an articulate spokesperson for the movement, a citizen and conciliatory toward the empire, probably increases tolerance for Palestinian Jewish Christianity, dissociating it from politically subversive revolutionary elements by defining the movement in wholly theological terms. This is part of God’s plan for Paul, who was to reach kings (Acts 9:15). Moreover, it was amplified by his captivity, as is shown by the contrast with his previous stay in Caesarea, in Philip’s house, with no contact with the Roman authorities or local elite.

275. Even in Acts, Christianity itself is not yet a legal charge, a circumstance that does not precede Nero (Molthagen, “Konflikte”; cf. 1 Pet 4:16). Cf. Acts 24:22; 25:22.

276. See this defense of Socrates, who used persuasion rather than force, in Xen. Mem. 1.2.10.

277. E.g., Dion. Hal. Ant. rom. 3.40.3; 5.43.2; ʾAbot R. Nat. 40 A; Urbach, Sages, 1:465.

278. Lowering audience expectations was a common rhetorical practice (e.g., Lysias Or. 2.1, §190; 12.3, §120; Rhet. Alex. 29, 1436b.34–36; Sall. Jug. 85.31; Dio Chrys. Or. 1.9; 12.16; 32.39; 42.1; 46.7; 47.1, 8; Men. Rhet. 2.4, 391.14–15).

279. Cf. Val. Max. 8.1.abs.12 (where jurors sometimes showed mercy to a defendant of lower status; the reverse was, however, more common and even written into law).

280. See (on prokatalepsis, or anticipating opponents’ objections) Rhet. Alex. 18, 1432b.11–1433b.16; 33, 1439b.2–14; 36, 1442b.4–6; 1443a.6–1443b.14; Hermog. Inv. 3.4.134; 4.13.206; Method 23.438–39; 27.444; in a wider range of sources, see Anderson, Glossary, 104; the forensic original sense in Plath, “Prolepsis”; in Paul’s own writings, Anderson, Rhetorical Theory, 235. Quint. Decl. 338.6 warns against assuming what the opponent will say (perhaps to avoid reinforcing his argument), though with no aversion to countering arguments (e.g., 339.3).

281. Aeschines also notes that someone could accuse him, like his opponent, of sleeping with men, but he counters in advance that sleeping with men is not the problem but, rather, charging money for it (Aeschines Tim. 136–37). One might anticipate an opponent’s appeal to pity (Libanius Topics 2.20).

282. Winter, Left Corinth, 67.

283. These could be useful for pathos but left themselves open to the response that it was a person, not a vice in general, that was on trial, and the person had not been proved guilty of such a vice (Cic. Cael. 12.29).

284. As Bruce, Acts1, 422, notes, the accusers’ implication that they “arrested” Paul was “an excessively refined description of an attempt at lynching!” They grasped him to kill him on the spot, not to try him according to rules of evidence.

285. Witherington, Acts, 708, suggests that in order to be able to “claim jurisdictional rights to judge Paul under Jewish law,” the accusers implied that “the temple police,” rather than common Jews, seized Paul.

286. Bruce, Commentary, 116; see more fully comment at Acts 21:28.

287. Jos. Ant. 20.115–17; though cf. 20.108, 112.

288. Possibly, however, Trophimus left the city and did not show up for the trial, given the risk to him; cf. such behavior under duress in Acts 9:29–30; 17:10. Although the chief priests themselves would be more interested in Paul and might not want to specify how Paul “desecrated” the temple, Trophimus would risk more, as the Gentile “defiler” and probably not a Roman citizen, than Paul if put on trial.

289. Many concur that Tertullus has reduced the charge to “attempt” because of inadequate evidence (e.g., Foakes-Jackson, Acts, 214; Walaskay, Came to Rome, 54).

290. As Rapske, Custody, 162, suggests, “the explicit mention of Gentile uncleanness might have offended the governor.” He probably preferred more adaptable Jews (cf. comment on Acts 24:24). Tertullus also replaces κοινόω (21:28) with βεβηλόω, which is more intelligible for a Gentile (Walaskay, Came to Rome, 54).

291. Cf. more cautiously Metzger, Textual Commentary, 490. Chance, Acts, 445, suggests that Tertullus’s blatant falsehood fits the anti-Jewish tendency of the Western text.

292. If one accepts the interpolation as valid, it may read more easily as applying to Lysias (Metzger, Textual Commentary, 490; Conzelmann, Acts, 199).

293. So, e.g., Kistemaker, Acts, 838.

294. On the figurative level, Pilate “hands Jesus over” to the will of the chief priests and rulers (Luke 23:25; cf. Mark 15:15; Matt 27:26; most explicit in John 19:16); the literal action, however, is carried out by Roman agents.

295. See Safrai, “Self-Government,” 408 (listing as examples offenses not punishable by Romans, such as intercourse with a Gentile woman and prostitution; cf. b. Ber. 58a).

296. For emphasis on the jurisdiction question here, see Winter, Trial, 77 (though temple defilement is a special case); Pervo, Acts, 597. (Pervo thinks Luke’s presentation of Tertullus’s case absurd; yet even granting this verdict, I am aware of many absurd claims in some cultures today that prevail simply because of political weight or well-orchestrated propaganda.)

297. The incident with Paul is probably not the first conflict with Lysias; the relationship seems less than serene (Acts 22:30; 23:10), and Lysias is naturally far more concerned with keeping Felix happy than with appeasing the Sanhedrin.

298. Cf. Tajra, Trial, 123–24.

299. Witherington, Acts, 709, doubts that a rhetor would risk this claim before the governor.

300. E.g., Aeschines Tim. 54–57. Friends could also attack the prosecutor (Pliny Ep. 3.9.25).

301. Pliny Ep. 3.9.25, though he regained his audience by responding that allowing him to finish speaking would not affect the defendants’ innocence.

302. As noted earlier, Felix’s predecessor lost his position in conflict with the current high priest (Jos. War 2.245–46; Ant. 20.134–36).

303. See, e.g., Pliny Ep. 6.6.9, though the occasion there is political.

304. Would the latter have risked his position merely to spite the leaders of the city where he was stationed? Lysias also seems to treat Felix, who, like him, achieved equestrian rank without equestrian birth, as a patron.

305. “Lying” was a standard charge and countercharge in legal polemic (see Keener, John, 761–62). Josephus shows that Judean embassies usually got their way in Rome (McKechnie, “Embassies”); it was foolish to cross such powerful interests unnecessarily.

306. E.g., Jos. Life 13; Ant. 20.162; War 2.270; but cf. Ant. 20.178. Felix had Jewish friends, but not of reputable character (Ant. 20.142; cf. 20.163); he married a Jewess, but only after seducing her to leave her husband (20.142–43); and he certainly never adopted Judaism (see comment on Acts 24:24).

307. For a simple appeal to the justice of one’s case as a rhetorical strategy, see also Anderson, Glossary, 36.

308. Dion. Hal. Ant. rom. 9.29.3 (trans. E. Cary, LCL, 6:19).

309. Isaeus Pyrr. 40 (though in this case he goes on to provide evidence).

310. Isaeus Cleon. 41; cf. Menec. 19.

311. E.g., Isaeus Aristarch. 23.

312. Cic. Mil. 11.30, with N. H. Watts in LCL, 14:38 n. a.

313. Isaeus Astyph. 19.

314. E.g., Isaeus Nicost. 31; Lysias Or. 9.21, §116; 14.47, §144; 16.21, §147; Lucian Indictment 20 (toward the end).

315. Cic. Mil. 38.105 (the closing lines).

316. So Lucian Tim. 11.

317. The phrase applies to hearings where the magistrate exercises his full authority, or imperium, without needing recourse to regular Roman judicial procedure; see, e.g., Sohm, Institutes, §43 (p. 212).

318. Witherington, Acts, 703, 710.

319. Thus a classical orator avoids calling as witnesses the wives of other men with whom Timarchus slept (allegedly to avoid shaming them) but offers, “I leave it to you to investigate this matter” (Aeschines Tim. 107 [trans. C. D. Adams, LCL, 87]).

320. See, e.g., συνεπιτίθημι in the LXX (Ps 3:6; Obad 13; perhaps Zech 1:15); see BDAG. Often the term has military connotations (Barrett, Acts, 1100; cf., e.g., Jos. Ant. 10.116).

321. Cf. also Johnson, Acts, 412.

322. Trial scenes were useful for suspense (e.g., Char. Chaer. 5.6.11).

323. Following the “accusatorial” rather than “inquisitional” mode of investigation (Witherington, Acts, 703). For analysis of Paul’s rhetorical argument, see Keener, “Rhetorical Techniques,” 234–51.

324. See Sherwin-White, Society, 51; Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 326.

325. Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 330–31. Luke’s reports of these defenses may also provide us a summary of the sorts of arguments Paul later used before Caesar’s tribunal (cf. Cazeaux, Actes, 338).

326. Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 505 (among his examples from roughly this period are P.Flor. 61; P.Fam.Teb. 19; P.Mil.Vogl. 25). They were well enough known to generate figurative uses (see Keener, John, 956–61).

327. Cf. the contrast between advocates (though figuratively applied to laws) and prosecutors in Aeschines Ctes. 37.

328. One also needed a trustworthy advocate, not one easily corrupted into supporting the prosecution (Lev. Rab. 5:6).

329. Lintott, “Cliens,” 451; Crook, Advocacy, 31–32; cf. Hor. Sat. 1.1.9–10. For the persistence of this perspective, see Crook, Advocacy, 122.

330. Paulus, “Advocatus.” People disapproved when expedient (e.g., Tac. Ann. 11.5, in Claudius’s reign; Claudius limited the fee to ten thousand sesterces [11.7]).

331. Nero certainly later paid well those who prosecuted his enemies (Tac. Ann. 16.33). Debate about similar legislation arose in Pliny the Younger’s day (Ep. 5.9.3–5; 5.13.8–10). Ideally, orators undertook cases for friendship (6.29.1; 9.13.3) and waived fees (5.13.8, 10; 6.23.1–2), but those who merely taught rhetoric were sometimes thought more honest than their courtroom counterparts (2.3.5–6).

332. Rapske, Custody, 330, emphasizes Paul’s “God-given confidence,” “the strength of his case,” and “his expertise in forensic discourse” (all of which fit the consistent portrayal in Acts).

333. Various possible rhetorical strategies (such as returning charges or insinuating guilt) are noted below (see also Keener, “Rhetorical Techniques,” in detail). I find far fewer rhetorical devices in the Acts speeches, however, than in most of Paul’s letters. Such devices were often considered inappropriate in letters, but some ancients also considered them inappropriate in forensic rhetoric, though they were popular. Anderson, Glossary, 127, points out that Quintilian (Inst. 4.1.9; 4.3.2) disapproves of the fact that such ostentatious display popular in declamations had leaked into judicial rhetoric in the courts, but the crowds enjoyed it (12.8.3; Pliny Ep. 2.14). “Quintilian himself cautions that when strong emotions are called for, artificial figures are quite out of place (Inst. 9.3.100–102).” Luke’s major reason for omitting them, however, is probably space; each speech is only a précis.

334. Luke apparently does think of Paul as capable even in a forensic setting, according with the rhetorical competence evident in Paul’s letters (Hock, “Paul and Education,” 215–16).

335. Crook, Advocacy, 123. Still, even one able to speak for himself might find an advocate more advantageous (Quint. Decl. 260.2).

336. Max. Tyre 3 went further, denying that Socrates even offered a defense, but this claim is unusual (Trapp, Maximus, 24–25).

337. This was, however, later mitigated by his Roman citizenship (Acts 16:35–38).

338. Paul may be assured of not being accused successfully of ἀδίκημα (Acts 24:20) because of his previous vindication from such (18:14, Luke’s other use; cf. 25:10); he knew what Romans expected.

339. E.g., Porter, Paul in Acts, 151n1.

340. See esp. Neyrey, “Forensic Defense Speech”; for rhetorical elements (without a focus on the structure), see also Keener, “Rhetorical Techniques.”

341. Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 323. Quintilian claims that this is the most common view (Inst. 3.9.1; Winter also compares P.Ryl. 114).

342. On refutation, see, e.g., briefly Anderson, Glossary, 40; Smith, “Function of Refutation,” 104–6; Hermog. Progymn. 5, “On Refutation and Confirmation,” 11; Aphth. Progymn. 5, “On Refutation,” 27–28S, 10R; Nicolaus Progymn. 6, “On Refutation and Confirmation,” 30. For gestures for refutation, see Shiell, Reading Acts, 69–71 (esp. 69, citing Quint. Inst. 11.3.92, on thrusting the hand forward energetically and vehemently).

343. Cf. Aune, Environment, 126 (captatio in Acts 24:10, narratio in 24:11, and propositio in 24:12). Narration continues in 24:12, but it does function effectively as a proposition.

344. Luke’s speeches often conveniently emphasize narrative (e.g., Acts 10:34–42; 22:3–21), which will appeal to the same audience for whom he writes his larger work in the narrative genre.

345. On this sense of νεύω, see BDAG (citing, e.g., Lucian Downward Journey 15; BGU 1078.9).

346. E.g., a deity (Callim. Hymns 3 [to Artemis], lines 39–40; 5 [on Pallas’s bath], 131–36; Catull. Carm. 64.202–6; Max. Tyre 4.8; 41.2); a proud person to his freedmen (Tac. Ann. 13.23); an officer’s implicit permission or commands (Libanius Anecdote 2.19). Cf. Malina and Rohrbaugh, John, 271 (citing Zeus in Hom. Hymns 222 [to Aphrodite]); Prescendi, “Numen,” 894. Shiell, Reading Acts, 151–53, suggests that other gestures may have usually accompanied the nod of approval, such as “the thumb touching the knuckle of the index finger” (p. 152, citing a picture; Quint. Inst. 11.3.101–3). Quint. Curt. 3.3.27 claims that Alexander’s soldiers would respond not only to a signal but to his very nod (nutus).

347. With, e.g., Bruce, Acts3, 66–67.

348. E.g., Conzelmann, Acts, 199; Hanson, Acts, 228; also Porter, Paul in Acts, 155 (though he agrees that Felix had probably served as governor for five years, in addition to three or four prior years under Cumanus). Cf. the prayer for “many years [lit., “periods,” as in P.Lond. 1912]” of one’s rule in Men. Rhet. 2.10, 417.29–30.

349. E.g., Hanson, Acts, 228.

350. E.g., Fitzmyer, Acts, 734.

351. Riesner, Early Period, 219–21.

352. E.g., Hemer, Acts in History, 129, 172; Rapske, Custody, 162n57; also Conzelmann, Acts, 199 (though he thinks the phrase merely conventional “flowery language”); more tentatively Johnson, Acts, 405; Witherington, Acts, 709; cf. D. Williams, Acts, 394.

353. “Cheerfully” (εὐθύμως) suggests confidence (cf. cognates in Acts 27:22, 25, 36; Jas 5:13; 2 Macc 11:26). Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 324, rightly points out that Paul in 24:10 displays “the confidence that a rhetor was encouraged to display” (citing Quint. Inst. 5.21.51).

354. It was helpful to express confidence that one’s hearers would not be swayed by arguments (Anderson, Glossary, 14).

355. Cicero could also write letters of recommendation while claiming that the person did not need one (Fam. 13.16.3; in 13.16.4, he finds himself recommending the person and hence “apologizes” and closes the letter).

356. Trans. L. H. G. Greenwood, LCL, 7:139.

357. E.g., Rhet. Alex. 36, 1442a.14–16; see comments on Acts 7:51; 24:2.

358. E.g., Cic. Quinct. 2.10; 9.34; see comments on Acts 7:51; 24:2. Cf. Antisthenes’s version of the judgment of Odysseus and Ajax, where the former flatters the judges and the latter (who will lose, of course) insults them.

359. Tajra, Trial, 125, contends that Paul’s captatio “was considerably less servile in tone than the rhetor’s”; cf. Bruce, Commentary, 468; Dunn, Acts, 312.

360. Johnson, Acts, 416.

361. Distant cultures also distinguished between flattery and conciliatory respect; see, e.g., Confuc. Anal. 63 (13.23).

362. Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 523; idem, “Official Proceedings,” 324.

363. Dunn, Acts, 312.

364. Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 323; Aune, Environment, 126; Witherington, Acts, 710.

365. Quint. Inst. 4.2.4–5 (cited by Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 324n76; Witherington, Acts, 710).

366. Heath, Hermogenes, 84.

367. Hughes, “Rhetoric,” 252; Amador, “Revisiting,” 110–11; cf. deSilva, Credentials, 76. To put it differently, genuine speeches did not always follow handbooks’ conventions.

368. Haenchen, Acts, 654n2; Johnson, Acts, 412; Witherington, Acts, 710; Schnabel, Acts, 957; this reading allows more ambiguity than many translations. Instead of trying to calculate the days, Pervo, Acts, 598, treats them as mere “rhetoric, like the ‘many years’ of vv. 10 and 17.” Yet Luke specifies a number here (in contrast to Acts 24:10, 17), presumably inviting his audience to consider the events that he has narrated.

369. Defendants could not force the attendance of witnesses (Pliny Ep. 6.5.2) and usually could not summon witnesses from distant provinces (6.5.1); for the delays involved (not always granted), see, e.g., Tac. Ann. 13.53 (witnesses against a governor).

370. Winter, “Captatio benevolentiae,” 324; similarly Conzelmann, Acts, 199 (Paul’s “stay is easily reviewed”). One could also use the shortness of time to complain that the charges were too sudden to have collected full evidence for the defense (Apul. Apol. 1, four or five days).

371. Witherington, Acts, 710.

372. Pliny Ep. 7.27.14. Prisoners also might grow long hair, though the example (of long hair shaved) in Philost. Vit. Apoll. 7.34, 36; 8.7 relates to philosophy. Both growing hair long (Diod. Sic. 36.15.2; Sen. E. Controv. 4.1 excerpt; Lucan C.W. 2.375–76; Plut. Cic. 30.4; 35.4; Apoll. K. Tyre 7, 28; y. Šabb. 1:2, §2) and shaving it (see comment on Acts 18:18) were common expressions for mourning.

373. E.g., Gwalther 821 in Chung-Kim and Hains, Acts, 327. Dunn, Acts, 313. Conzelmann, Acts, 199, notes this view but regards it as less probable. A long delay could have also been used by the defense in its favor; a person failing to prosecute immediately could be accused, for that reason, of making up the charges (Lysias Or. 3.39, §99; Aeschines Embassy 122–23; Max. Tyre 18.6; cf. Hermog. Issues 69.3–13).

374. E.g., Lysias Or. 4.5–6, §101; 7.12–18, §§109–10; 12.27–28, §122; 19 passim (e.g., 19.24, §154); Isaeus Astyph. 14–15; Pyrr. 27; Demosth. Fals. leg. 120; Pant. 23; cf. Eurip. Cretans frg. 472e.11. See further discussion in Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 20–21.

375. E.g., Rhet. Alex. 7, 1428a.19–23; Dion. Hal. Ant. rom. 11.34.1–6. See also Anderson, Glossary, 37.

376. Lord, “Introduction,” 358.

377. E.g., Rhet. Alex. 5, 1427b.12–30; 10, 1430a.26–27; Dion. Hal. Lysias 15; Cic. Vat. 1.3.

378. Ael. Arist. Def. Or. 311, §101D (cf. 340, §112D; 343–44, §114D; 446, §150D).

379. Cf. earlier, e.g., Lysias Or. 29.7, §182 (if Ergocles was really Philocrates’s enemy, why did the former honor the latter with a high position?).

380. E.g., Dion. Hal. Ant. rom. 3.35.5–6. Dio Chrys. Or. 11 uses internal contradictions to discredit Homer (albeit probably as a rhetorical exercise).

381. E.g., Plut. Arist. 19.5–6 (against Hdt. 9.85); Arrian Alex. 3.3.6.

382. E.g., Jos. Ag. Ap. 1.219–20, 267 (though some arguments in 1.267 are less implausible than he pretends); 2.8–27 (rightly), 148; cf. similarly Life 350.

383. Because finite presentations cannot declare all possible evidence, they can inevitably be deconstructed (cf. Keener, John, 38–39, 901). Even accurate cases can sometimes be charged with such “discrepancies”; modern critics charge them against Luke, and others charge Luke’s critics with the same.

384. Since a rabble-rouser might have found Passover more suitable for exploiting liberationist sentiment (cf. Jos. Ant. 20.106; War 2.10–13; Jeremias, Eucharistic Words, 256–57 and n. 3), it may have turned out for the better that Paul could not arrive in time for Passover as he had probably originally hoped (Acts 20:3).

385. Luke depicts worship in Jerusalem with this same verb, προσκυνέω, in Acts 8:27; Luke 24:52; cf. Isa 27:13; 66:23 LXX; Zech 14:16–17; Tob 5:14; with a different spelling of Jerusalem, John 4:20–21.

386. Of course, one could argue that festivals were strategic opportunities to stir unrest and that Jewish nationalists kept them as well; some arguments could be turned either way (cf., e.g., the probably specious arguments in Thucyd. 2.39.1; 2.89.1–2 [cf. the disastrous inaccuracy of the latter in 2.90.4–6]).

387. Rhet. Alex. 36, 1442a.29–32; cf. also 1442a.32–37.

388. Rhet. Alex. 7, 1428b.34–36 (also that it would not have profited them to have committed these actions).

389. Cicero develops this argument further in Sull. 24.69–28.77. A defendant could appeal to good deeds preceding the trial to confirm his positive character (Hermog. Inv. 2.5.118–19).

390. The argument in Cicero’s Pro Flacco also hinges on probability regarding the character of both the defendant and the prosecution witnesses (Lord, “Introduction,” 358).

391. Apuleius briefly refutes charges in Apol. 27 and elaborates in 28–65; in 61 he notes that he has been responding to the charges “one by one” (trans. V. Hunink, p. 83).

392. One could also compare one’s arguments with those of the opponents when recapitulating (Anderson, Glossary, 22); Paul more explicitly addresses his opponents’ case in Acts 24:18–21.

393. With Riesner, “Synagogues in Jerusalem,” 204. Other cities with large Jewish populations, such as Salamis, could have multiple synagogues (Acts 13:5); the proximity of the temple would not eliminate these (see comment on Acts 6:9).

394. On earlier occasions (not mentioned here), Paul was evangelizing; on this more relevant occasion, by contrast, his errand has been purely one of reconciliation.

395. Cf. comment on Acts 23:8, where accumulation may function like polysyndeton.

396. Paul’s Ephesian accusers apparently did not know Aramaic (making their charges more embarrassing to themselves), but much of the crowd would have, and it may have included Paul’s Nazirite dependents and some other informed believers in the temple.

397. Aune, Environment, 126.

398. Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 323.

399. See discussion of thesis and hypothesis in the section “An Outline for Acts?” at Acts 1:8 (Keener, Acts, 1:708–10).

400. E.g., Isaeus Cleon. 41; Menec. 19; Cic. Mil. 11.30. An orator’s job was to prove points and then amplify them (Theon Progymn. 1.180–84).

401. So Aeschines Tim. 123–26 (pointing out that one could expect no witnesses to come forward in a matter that would incriminate themselves). Aeschines Embassy passim defends Aeschines himself against Demosthenes’s inference (without evidence) that Philip bribed Aeschines.

402. One might not require a long time to prove some cases (Lysias Or. 23.1, §166).

403. E.g., Polyb. 12.25K.9; Mus. Ruf. 1, p. 32.17.

404. It also appears in other rhetorical logic, e.g., in the second-century C.E. orator Aelius Aristides, Def. Or. 242, §75D (challenging those who fail to prove their point); cf. Quint. Decl. 351.6.

405. Rhet. Alex. 36, 1444a.28–34.

406. Dion. Hal. Lysias 33 (quoting Lysias Or. 34); Cic. Quinct. 6.22; see Theon Progymn. 17, 112P. For the frequent use of false testimony, see comment on Acts 6:11–13 (Keener, Acts, 2:1311–15).

407. Lysias Or. 24.24, §170; 25.14, §172; John 8:46. Such rhetorical boldness resembles epitrope or permissio (see Rowe, “Style,” 147). Later handbooks continue to teach the demand for proof (see Hermog. Inv. 3.4.132; 3.5.141–42).

408. An appeal to pathos could secure unwarranted mercy in the short term (Pliny Ep. 2.11.2–3), but reasoned judgment carried much longer-term persuasiveness (2.11.6).

409. Proof would help an innocent defendant (Lucian Fisherman 17); as suggested above, some philosophers contended that strong proofs were better than numerous ones (Mus. Ruf. 1, p. 32.3, 5). For proofs, see, e.g., Rhet. Alex. 1, 1421b.24–26; Aristotle’s three traditional kinds of proof (the speaker’s ἦθος, πάθος appealing to the audience, and content-oriented demonstration, ἀπόδειξις) in Winter, Philo and Paul, 153–55 (at least some later writers followed Aristotle regarding demonstration: Porph. Isag. 1.6–7; cf. Marc. 8.142–43; cf. Robertson and Plummer, First Corinthians, 33). On logical demonstration, see also Mus. Ruf. frg. 44, p. 138.26–28; Iambl. V.P. 18.82; Anderson, Glossary, 23–24. In Paul’s extant letters, he at least once may use the rhetorical sense of “demonstration” (1 Cor 2:4–5; Winter, Philo and Paul, 159–60; Witherington, Corinthians, 125; cf. Anderson, Rhetorical Theory, 265–66), though he probably does not use πίστις (in 1 Cor 2:5) in its rhetorical sense (Witherington, Corinthians, 125n19).

410. Cicero conveniently ignores the difficulty of the long journey from Greece to Rome for anyone wishing to testify.

411. In classical Athens, too, a case was dismissed if the claimants could not prove their claims (Isaeus Nicost. 9). Conzelmann, Acts, 199, suggests that Paul invokes “the fundamental legal principle that one is innocent until proven guilty,” but offers no documentation (cf. Deut 22:23–27). A defendant who was pardoned, however, also needed to be able to prove this (Pliny Ep. 10.58.3).

412. E.g., Lysias Or. 29.5, §181 (since some of Ergocles’s money is missing and Philocrates is charged with holding it, the latter must prove that it is held by others).

413. Ancients also were alert to orators seeking to redefine the issues (cf. Solon’s law in Aeschines Tim. 35).

414. Jos. Ant. 17.131; War 1.638.

415. For a structural connection between Acts 24:14–16 and 24:20–21, see also Talbert, Acts, 201 (who treats 24:11–13 as replying to the sedition charge in 24:5, and 24:17–19 as replying to the desecration charge in 24:6a).

416. Cf. also Hemer, Acts in History, 129; Witherington, Acts, 712.

417. E.g., Isaeus Nicost. 27. On a speaker’s use of ἦθος and πάθος, see also Lampe, “Einsichten.”

418. Also much of Lysias Or. 18 and many other speeches. One who has always displayed good character is more likely deemed innocent (7.30–33, §111), keeping the burden of proof on the accuser.

419. LCL, 1:221. Valerius, like his contemporaries and successors, often idealized earlier Rome.

420. For other arguments of Cicero based on character, see, e.g., Sull. 24.68–28.77.

421. Even those who disapproved of the temple hierarchy, such as the Essenes, did not go so far as to desecrate the temple. The Samaritans, however, did (Jos. Ant. 18.30); later revolutionaries did defile the temple (War 2.424; 4.171, 201, 242; 5.10, 18; 6.126), but it is highly unlikely that its defilement was their objective.

422. See, e.g., Rom 3:21, 31; 4:3; 9–11; 15:4; R. Williams, Acts, 155. More fully, see comments at Acts 16:3; 18:18; 21:24–26. Group loyalty was highly valued in the ancient Mediterranean world (Malina and Neyrey, Portraits, 164–69; the exception, of course, being when another loyalty conflicted with that to one’s own group).

423. With, e.g., Porter, Paul in Acts, 157, 164.

424. For judicial settings for confessing wrongdoing, see Dig. 80.1; cf. Mart. Pol. 6.1; 9.2 and other sources in BDAG. This is more relevant here than confession of sin to God (Jos. Ant. 6.151; 1 John 1:9; see fuller comment at Acts 7:60).

425. With, e.g., Malina and Neyrey, Portraits, 83–84.

426. For definitions, see Cic. Inv. 1.11.15. For arguments that acts were due to errors or misfortune rather than injustice, see Rhet. Alex. 4, 1427a.27–31. For agreement on an act being committed yet dispute over whether it was wrong, see, e.g., Rhet. Her. 1.10.17 (taking Orestes’s matricide as an example); Quint. Decl. 250.9. For confessing what became a crime only after its commission (here, loyalty to Sejanus before his fall), see, e.g., Tac. Ann. 6.5.

427. For the value of such confession, see Hermog. Method 32.447–48, citing as examples Hom. Il. 3.164; Hdt 1.35ff. Cicero warns, however, that deprecatio can prove dangerous in a trial (Inv. 2.34.104).

428. Had it been, Paul’s strategy would not have worked, just as Socrates could not hope to appease his Athenian judges by confessing to the practice of philosophy (Max. Tyre 3.4).

429. See discussion in Keener, Acts, 1:450–55.

430. See the discussion in Anderson, Glossary, 92. Such a strategy may have invited a tone of irony (on which see Shiell, Reading Acts, 84–85).

431. See comment on Acts 25:11.

432. E.g., Xen. Hell. 1.7.16–17; Quint. Decl. 300.9 (something praiseworthy); 301.3, 14; Apul. Apol. 55. Rhetorically trained writers could employ the figure in nonpolemical settings as well (Pliny Ep. 5.19.1; 7.28.1–2).

433. See, e.g., Cic. Sest. 69.145–46. Anything that could be said truly against philosophers they would “rather defend than deny” (Apul. Apol. 28, trans. p. 53).

434. This was, the same passage observes, so that if one was charged with something undeniable, one could deflect it with wit.

435. Likewise in fiction; by denying knowledge about the veracity of some legends, the gardener in Philost. Hrk. 8.8 acquires more credibility for the matters of which he claims to have eyewitness knowledge.

436. Rowe, “Style,” 146–47 (citing Demosth. Fals. leg. 235; Cic. Cael. 4.10); Anderson, Rhetorical Theory, 224, speaks of παρομολογία, or partial admission (citing Rutilius Lupus De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis 1.19; Rom 5:7). Porter, “Paul and Letters,” 582, proposes that Phil 1:15–18 is an example, but Acts 24:14 is much clearer. The technique has been recognized independently in Parsons, Acts, 327, and Keener, “Rhetorical Techniques” (published in 2008 but submitted in 2002).

437. Rhet. Alex. 36, 1444b.9–20. Making clear distinctions between acts for which one was responsible and those for which one was not was important. Much later an orator portrays some wanting to prosecute a poor man because his tears had driven the crowd to stone his enemy; he has the poor man object that weeping is not a crime (Libanius Declam. 36.28).

438. Hermog. Issues 38.12–17. Perhaps the victim merited the defendant’s action, or some other party was responsible (39.1–5); or when the conceded behavior was only circumstantial evidence for guilt, one could advance plausible noncriminal reasons for it (49.7–24, with word, 49.9–14; acts, 49.15–19; and feelings, 49.20–24).

439. Ironically, modern comparisons of this title focus especially (and naturally) on Qumran’s usage (see Fitzmyer, “Christianity in Light of the Scrolls,” 240–41; Pao, Isaianic Exodus, 65–67), which is clearly sectarian by modern definitions. Yet by its self-definition, each group claimed to represent the true remnant of Israel; Qumran and Christians shared a common exclusivism, but Christians (at least in Luke’s circle) did not withdraw from society.

440. Cf. Rapske, Custody, 163: it is not a sect because Paul’s opponents share similar convictions. Luke often addresses what seem to be suspicions of Paul’s loyalty to the law (Acts 21:21, 28; 23:29; 25:8; 28:17; Carras, “Observant Jews,” 698). This approach could fit an apologetic to Israel such as Jervell envisions, but could also fit an apologetic to Rome, for whom the Christian movement’s Jewish (and thus ancient) credentials would matter (see Keener, Acts, 1:448–57).

441. Some others held a contrary opinion of Paul (see comment on Acts 21:21), which both Paul and Luke are diligent to refute.

442. Rhetoricians used concise definition, or ὁρισμός, as a technique (Anderson, Glossary, 84); Paul’s defining hope in terms of the resurrection, however, is probably simply specifying the content.

443. For the “acceptance” or “awaiting” (προσδέχονται, Acts 24:15) of this hope, cf. Luke 2:25, 38; 12:36; 23:51.

444. For Luke, this would also provide “the basis of any possible rapprochement between Christians and Pharisees” (Dunn, Acts, 305).

445. Hermog. Issues 69.12–13.

446. As it is, Felix understands the issues (Acts 24:22) and has at least some sympathy for Jewish matters (24:24). Paul may use the same strategy to show Festus that even King Agrippa shares some of his views (26:24–27).

447. Rhet. Alex. 7, 1428a.26–30.

448. Much of Judaism would probably share the ethical component of Luke’s criterion (Luke 14:14). Paul’s letters would equate believers with the righteous here (1 Cor 15:22–23; Phil 3:21; cf. 2 Cor 5:8; 1 Thess 4:14, 16–17). For the category of “the righteous,” see, e.g., 1 En. 99:3; 100:5; 102:6, 10; 103:1.

449. See Mattill, Last Things, 43–45 (esp. 44, on Acts and Paul), 47 (suggesting Luke’s reversion to classical usage with the future infinitive).

450. Cf. Sir 17:27–28; 30:17; 37:26; 44:8–15; 46:19; cf. 39:9.

451. Osborne, “Resurrection,” 932–33, cites 4 Maccabees; Wis 2:23–24; 3:1–4; Philo Creation 135; Giants 14; possibly 1 En. 103:4.

452. E.g., 1 En. 61:5. See further comment below.

453. Puech, “Messianisme,” also thinks that Qumran accepted the resurrection of both righteous and unrighteous. For discussion of afterlife hope in the OT, see, helpfully, Raharimanantsoa, Mort.

454. Osborne, “Resurrection,” 933, cites 1 En. 22:13; 46:6; 51:1–2; Pss. Sol. 3:11–16; 13:9–11; 14:4–10; 15:12–15. Certainly the wicked would share no part in the “resurrection to life” (2 Macc 7:14); many Jewish writings more explicitly affirmed permanent destruction for the wicked, whether following or without a resurrection (e.g., Pss. Sol. 3:11–12; 13:11; 1QS IV, 13–14; Gen. Rab. 6:6; most sinners in t. Sanh. 13:3, 4; Pesiq. Rab Kah. 10:4; Pesiq. Rab. 11:5; cf. 2 Macc 12:43–45).

455. E.g., 2 Bar. 51:1–2; cf. t. Ber. 6:6; for distinction after death, see 1 En. 22:9–11. Osborne, “Resurrection,” 933, cites 4 Ezra 4:41–43; 7:32–38; 2 Bar. 49:2–51:12; 85:13. He notes the very literal understanding of resurrection in 2 Macc 7:10–11; 14:46; Sib. Or. 4.179–82. Cf. sources in Keener, Matthew, 129, on Gehinnom (for various views of its duration); and in ibid., 710–11, on the resurrection of the dead. It appears in most streams of NT tradition and is denied in none: John 5:29; 2 Cor 5:10; Rev 20:4–6; Matt 25:46; cf. 5:29–30; 10:28; Luke 11:32. No one doubted that God would judge both righteous and wicked works (Ps 62:12; Prov 24:12; Sir 16:12, 14; Matt 16:27; Rom 2:6; 2 Cor 11:15; Rev 22:12; Pesiq. Rab. 8:2; cf. Rhet. Her. 3.2.3).

456. For the souls of the wicked remaining in hell on the day of judgment, see also 1 En. 61:5; 4 Macc 9:9; 12:12; t. Sanh. 13:5; probably L.A.B. 38:4; Asc. Is. 1:2; 3 En. 44:3; t. Ber. 5:31. Because 1 En. 108:6 refers to the spirits of sinners, it might not constitute evidence either way.

457. This may be equivalent to the Greek Tartarus (cf. postmortem torment in, e.g., Lucian Downward Journey 8); Josephus sometimes adapts the beliefs of Jewish schools to sound like Greek equivalents.

458. See also, e.g., Bonsirven, Judaism, 230; Davies, Paul, 84; see discussion below. Cf. Gehinnom for physicians in m. Qidd. 4:14 (R. Judah); for talking too much with women in m. ʾAb. 1:5; the wicked in 5:19, 20; more generally, the slaying of murderers in the messianic era (purportedly third-century tradition in Deut. Rab. 2:25).

459. M. ʿEd. 2:10 (attributed to R. Akiba); b. Šabb. 33b; Lam. Rab. 1:11/12, §40.

460. Such as those who denied the resurrection (e.g., Sadducees) or withdrew from the community (minim, or schismatics, probably including Jewish Christians). Not all minim were Nazarenes (cf., e.g., b. Ber. 29a), but many or most of them were (Dalman, Jesus-Jeshua, 36–37; Abrahams, Studies [2], 63; Herford, Christianity, 137–45, 365–81, 388; Schiffman, “Crossroads,” 149; Pritz, Nazarene Christianity, 103; Keener, John, 198–99).

461. 4 Macc 9:9; 12:12; t. Sanh. 13:5; probably 1 En. 108:5–6; L.A.B. 38:4; Asc. Is. 1:2; 3 En. 44:3; t. Ber. 5:31; b. Roš Haš. 17a; y. Ḥag. 2:2, §5; Sanh. 6:6, §2; cf. Diod. Sic. 4.69.5; Plut. Div. V. 31, Mor. 567DE. For Gehinnom’s vast size, note b. Pesaḥ. 94a; Taʿan. 10a; Song Rab. 6:9, §3; cf. Virg. Aen. 6.577–79. Many Jewish storytellers conflated Gehinnom with the Greek Tartarus (e.g., Sib. Or. 1.10, 101–3, 119; 4.186; 5.178; 11.138; cf. Gr. Ezra 4:22; b. Giṭ. 56b–57a; y. Ḥag. 2:2, §5; Sanh. 6:6, §2; Apoc. Pet. 5–12).

462. Cf. 1QS IV, 13–14; Gen. Rab. 6:6; most sinners in t. Sanh. 13:3, 4; Pesiq. Rab Kah. 10:4; Pesiq. Rab. 11:5; cf. 2 Macc 12:43–45.

463. Num. Rab. 18:20; some other texts are unclear, e.g., Sir 7:16; Sipre Num. 40.1.9; Sipre Deut. 311.3.1; 357.6.7; ʾAbot R. Nat. 16 A; 32, §69 B; 37, §95 B.

464. E.g., b. Šabb. 33b; Lam. Rab. 1:11–12, §40.

465. Matt 3:11; 25:41; Mark 9:43, 48; Jude 7; Mart. Pol. 11.2. Although Luke does not reject future eschatology in his effort to contextualize for Greek readers (Acts 17:31–32; 23:6; 24:15; contrast, e.g., Jos. Ant. 18.14, 18; War 2.163; Philo Sacr. 5, 8), Matthew’s emphases retain more of their original Jewish flavor (cf. Milikowski, “Gehenna”; Goulder, Midrash, 63).

466. B. ʿAbod. Zar. 3b–4a; Eccl. Rab. 1:5, §2, citing third- and purportedly second-century traditions.

467. Earlier tradition in Ruth Rab. 3:2; Eccl. Rab. 9:4, §1.

468. For the torment of the wicked after death, see, e.g., 1 En. 22:9–11; 4 Ezra 7:36, 76–87.

469. One could question whether the sinner is as unending as the fire, but this seems to be the point in the Jesus tradition (cf. Mark 9:43, 48; Matt 5:29–30; 25:41, 46; probably Rev 14:11; 20:10). Most second-century Christians believed in a resurrection for immortal torment (Tatian Or. Gks. 13; cf. 1 Clem. 11.1; 2 Clem. 6.7; Mart. Pol. 2.3; 11.2; Barn. 20.1; Diogn. 10.7). Nevertheless, even some fairly conservative scholars have suggested that the meaning behind the NT language may point to annihilation (see Stott, “Response”).

470. In early Christian literature the “unrighteous” (ἄδικος) is a recognizably Lukan (Luke 16:10–11; 18:11) and Pauline (Rom 3:5; 1 Cor 6:1, 9) term, though it appears elsewhere (Heb 6:10; 1 Pet 3:18; 2 Clem. 20.1; Poly. Phil. 6.1; Mart. Pol. 3.1; 19.2; Barn. 3.3; Herm. 35.1–2; Diogn. 9.2; esp. 1 Clem. 3.4; 5.4; 45.3–4; 56.11), even coupled with the “righteous” (Matt 5:45; 2 Pet 2:9), a common contrast (cf., e.g., 1 En. 1:1; 62:13; 102:6, 9–10; 103:5; 2 Bar. 48:48; m. ʾAb. 4:19; Ahiq. 8.29). The idea, but not the wording, reflects Dan 12:2.

471. Mark 9:42–48; Matt 5:29–30; John 5:29; Rev 20:4–5; cf. Luke 16:22–23.

472. Rom 2:5; 9:22; Phil 1:28; 3:19; 1 Thess 1:10; 5:9; 2 Thess 1:9; 2:10. Witherington, Acts, 711, suggests that Paul probably believed it, if 2 Cor 5:10 includes unbelievers at the judgment. (For the resurrection of believers in Paul’s theology, see, e.g., Ware, Synopsis, §§89–90, pp. 162–67.) A resurrection of the unrighteous (to eternal shame, although not necessarily to continuous suffering) presumably is inevitable if one accepts Dan 12:2 as authoritative, as Paul undoubtedly did.

473. Acts 24:15 also includes the note of imminence probably implied in the use of μέλλειν. Although it is not rhetorically prudent for Paul to denounce the respected plaintiffs as “unrighteous” (contrast his implication for the original accusers in 24:19), Luke suggests that his message of a coming judgment brings discomfort even to the immoral judge (24:25).

474. C. Williams, Acts, 254–55, overemphasizes the athletic connotations of the term; although Paul often uses athletic metaphors in his letters (and in Acts, see 20:24), ἀσκέω had a much broader range of meaning by this period (cf. BDAG). Still, the verb and its cognates did sometimes supply figurative comparisons (e.g., Dio Chrys. Or. 18.6; Arius Did. Epit. 2.7.5b4, pp. 16–17.34–35; 2 Macc 15:4; 4 Macc 12:11; 13:22).

475. A term (ἀπρόσκοπος) that Paul uses for himself (1 Cor 10:32) and his ideal for his churches (Phil 1:10); elsewhere in biblical Greek, only at 3 Macc 3:8; Sir 32:21.

476. On rhetorical means of exciting suspicion, see Anderson, Glossary, 24.

477. On antithesis in rhetoric (often at the sentence level), see, e.g., Rhet. Alex. 26, 1435b.25–39; Dion. Hal. Lysias 14; Fronto Ad Ant. imp. 2.6.1; Rowe, “Style,” 142; Lee, “Translations: Greek,” 780; Black, “Oration at Olivet,” 87; Anderson, Glossary, 21–22.

478. Cic. Vat. 10.25–26; cf. Apul. Apol. 9.4–5; the case of Socrates posthumously in Xen. Mem. 4.8.9–10.

479. See, e.g., Plut. Pleas. L. 23, Mor. 1103D; Wis 2:1–9.

480. See, e.g., Mus. Ruf. 1, p. 36.4–5, 9–12; comment on Acts 27:21.

481. For the principle, see, e.g., Quint. Inst. 11.1.17–19; Plut. Praising, Mor. 539A–547F; for an example of the practice, Cic. Fam. 5.12.8. On Plutarch’s justifications for boasting, see, e.g., Forbes, “Self-Praise”; Smit, “Self-Praise,” 347–52.

482. For boasting and necessity, see, e.g., 2 Cor 12:1, 11; Quint. Inst. 11.1.18; Decl. 262.2, 5; Pliny Ep. 1.8.4–6; Hermog. Issues 77.6–7; Apul. Apol. 11; cf. also Anderson, Glossary, 17.

483. Larkin, Acts, 340.

484. This second verb and object roughly echo the point of the first (cf. Anderson, Glossary, 35–36, on disiunctio in Rhet. Her. 4.37–38)—namely, Paul’s demonstrations of piety. But it is somewhat different.

485. Rom 15:16, 26–27. In both cases, Paul wants the offering to be “acceptable” (εὐπρόσδεκτος, Rom 15:16, 31). The term for offering here also appears in Eph 5:2, where the “aroma” implies also that it pleases God.

486. Libanius Declam. 36.1–3 (this could be coupled with a denial that the man did stir strife, as in 36.20–27 or Acts 24:12–13).

487. E.g., Apul. Apol. 48; 90; and (in the peroration) 102.

488. One should appeal to friendly feelings that already exist or should generate them; see Rhet. Alex. 34, 1439b.15–1440b.3. Similarly but facetiously, someone protests about being condemned when he is really his opponents’ most faithful defender (Lucian Fisherman 5).

489. Rhet. Alex. 4, 1427a.24–30, esp. (for the advantage) 26–27.

490. Hermog. Issues 73.6–7.

491. Appian Hist. rom. 11.7.41 (noting that the judges, shamed, then left him).

492. Cic. Sest. 69.145 (trans. R. Gardner, LCL, 12:237).

493. In Paul’s case as in Cicero’s, this appeal also invokes pathos, inviting compassion. Later rhetoricians continued to use this technique; the very matter for which they are accused is a benefaction (e.g., the commentary on Hermogenes’s Issues by the fifth-century C.E. Platonist philosopher Syrianus, 2.68.3–5 in Heath, Hermogenes, 90).

494. With, e.g., Witherington, Acts, 712 (noting references to the poor in Rom 15:26; Gal 2:10). “The poor” may have been used as a special expression of piety (cf. 1QM XI, 9, 13; XIII, 14; XIV, 7; 1QpHab XII, 3, 6, 10; 4Q171 1–2 II, 9, 15; 1 + 3–4 III, 10; Israel in Pesiq. Rab. 9:2) for the needy Jerusalem church (cf. Dupont-Sommer, Writings, 397; Fitzmyer, “Christianity in Light of the Scrolls,” 244; Hengel, Property, 34; idem, Acts and History, 118), though this is disputed (Keck, “Poor”). Whatever else may be involved, however, the offering is certainly for the poor (Reyes, “Remembering”). On “the poor,” see discussion at Acts 3:2.

495. Cf. Jos. Ant. 3.320–21; 20.51–53, 101.

496. This may call to mind texts such as Jer 9:1 but esp. Moses’s intercession in Exod 32:32.

497. Some sources on reverse culture or reentry shock, supplied to me by Prof. Warren Newberry, include Gullahorn and Gullahorn, “Extension”; idem, “Students Abroad”; Chen and Starosta, Foundations, esp. 174–75; Dodd, Dynamics, 167–71; Austin, Readings in Reentry; cf. also the nontechnical discussion in Pirolo, Reentry Team, 33–48. In addition to studies on missionary “reentry shock,” cf. Grunlan and Mayers, Cultural Anthropology, 24–26, 85–88; Mayers, Christianity Confronts Culture, 188; Luzbetak, Church and Cultures, 96–103; among students returning from abroad, see Seiter and Waddell, “Reentry Process”; Lerstrom, “Transitions.”

498. Cf., e.g., Grunlan and Mayers, Cultural Anthropology, 85–86; on acculturation, see, e.g., Nash and Schaw, “Achievement”; Frey and Roysircar, “Acculturation and Worldview,” and sources cited there (also cited at Acts 21:26).

499. Although this is the nearly universal consensus, there are detractors, who can treat Luke’s silence as thoroughgoing (Downs, “Collection”).

500. Dahl, Studies, 37–38; Harrison, Grace, 300; Matera, II Corinthians, 181. On λογεία (1 Cor 16:1–2), see Thiselton, Corinthians, 1318; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 751; in guilds, Deissmann, Studies, 142–43.

501. See, e.g., Hoyt, “Poor in Luke-Acts,” 97–225. In early Christianity, see Grant, Christianity and Society, 124–45.

502. Das, Galatians, 163–64 (following Barrett, “Titus,” 2), plausibly suggests that Luke’s omission of Titus may be related to Titus’s association with the collection.

503. Cf. Barrett, Acts, 1108 (apparently preferring the suppressing option); Witherington, Acts, 646.

504. Others also argue for the implausibility of this view (e.g., Thrall, 2 Corinthians, 517, noting that Luke knows of the meeting with James and the elders; see also Morgan-Wynne, “Traditionsgrundlage”).

505. Nickle, Collection, 145–46.

506. Wedderburn, “Collection”; Dunn, Acts, 266, 284; Park, Jew or Gentile, 70; cf. Johnson, Acts, 357; Thrall, 2 Corinthians, 518, allows the possibility. Hengel and Schwemer, Between Damascus and Antioch, 255, suggest that James and the elders instead proposed redirecting the funds to sponsor the Nazirites, but this suggestion probably underestimates the money raised.

507. See introduction, above, to Acts 21:17–26 (Keener, Acts, 3:3113–16).

508. Haacker, Theology, 16, argues that in precisely the period preceding the war, some Jerusalemites wanted to reject Gentile offerings, perhaps making the offering more of an embarrassment to the Jerusalem church.

509. With, e.g., Hill, Hellenists, 173–78 (against Baur); Park, Jew or Gentile, 65–67; cf. Donaldson, Paul and Gentiles, 252; Everts, “Support,” 299. Jerome Vigil. 13 (Martin, Acts, 286) suggested that Paul wanted to give the funds not just to anyone poor but to those in the holy land. John Knox thought that Luke omits the peace offering because he never describes the genuine friction between Jerusalem and the Diaspora churches, yet this perspective (shaped by Baur) flies in the face of the conflict in Acts 15, however domesticated.

510. Harrison, Grace, 308. Certainly Paul also was concerned about status issues (with, e.g., Theissen, Setting) and with the poor (cf. 2 Cor 8–9; see esp. Longenecker, Remembering the Poor); the Jewish-Gentile issue is just one facet of his approach.

511. Harrison, Grace, 19–20.

512. Texts about eschatological offerings of the Gentiles could also achieve this purpose. Paul himself defines reciprocity in terms of a debt of gratitude to God rather than to the human givers in 2 Cor 9:8–14 (see Keener, Corinthians, 214–15). But he also speaks elsewhere of obligation to the Jewish people (Rom 15:27); others could employ the language of debt to a people (Cic. Quint. fratr. 1.1.9.28; Fam. 11.10.1; 11.11.1; Val. Max. 5.6.ext. 2; cf. Rom 1:14).

513. Nickle, Collection, 148–51. Barrett, Acts, 559, thinks that Nickle may well be right on this point.

514. Thus Acts 11:28–30 would probably be seen as praiseworthy rather than problematic, as a response to famine.

515. For the temple tax in Asia Minor in general, see Trebilco, Communities, 13–16.

516. CPJ 1:80–81; 2:119–36, §§160–229; Dio Cass. R.H. 65.7.2; Hemer, “Ostraka”; Carlebach, “References.” Appian Hist. rom. 11.8.50 claims that Jews paid a higher poll tax because they rebelled so often.

517. See Nickle, Collection, 74–99 (note esp. the comparison on 87–89); cf. (both parallels and contrasts) Panikulam, Koinōnia, 36ff.; (as one factor) Laing, “Collection”; (as a partial but not full analogy) Everts, “Support,” 297. Nickle believes that if it were packaged as some other way than the temple tax, it would be viewed as illegal (Collection, 88–89); this view may overestimate Roman concern before 70 C.E., but it might well be a reason for Luke not to mention it after 70. On the temple tax, see, e.g., Safrai, “Relations,” 188–91; the Qumran sect, unlike others, believed that the tax need be paid only once in a person’s life (4Q159 1 II, 7).

518. Many doubt Nickle’s analogy, noting that Paul’s collection was voluntary (Witherington, Corinthians, 426n62) or simply that we lack explicit support in Paul’s letters (Kruse, Romans, 546). Yet even if Nickle overstates the relationship, the analogy remains valuable in terms of comparisons that some contemporaries may have offered.

519. See, e.g., Isa 45:14; 60:5–17; 61:6; Tob 13:11 (more explicitly conquest in Mic 4:13; 1QM XII, 13–15); Nickle, Collection, 129–42; Martin, Corinthians, 258; Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, 93. Dunn, Romans, 874, notes that whereas Paul reinterpreted these texts to apply to equals (as he viewed other prophecies in a transformed way), those in Jerusalem may have seen it differently, which difference would generate some conflict.

520. See Harrison, Grace, 305.

521. Ramsay, Pictures, 248.

522. Nickle, Collection, 147, thinks that the Jerusalem church’s exclusion from the holy city forfeited their special role. Whatever its direct theological impact, it certainly had such an impact in terms of communication from Judean churches to the Diaspora.

523. Bauckham, “James,” 479–80. Like most ancient Jews, however, Luke might maintain belief in an eschatological future for Jerusalem (cf. Acts 1:6–7; 3:19–21; Luke 22:30).

524. Matera, II Corinthians, 183.

525. Cf., e.g., 1 Kgs 1:50; Plut. Alex. 42.1; Tac. Hist. 1.43; and much fuller documentation at Acts 19:29.

526. Stoics applied θόρυβος to fear and confusion, along with noise (Arius Did. Epit. 2.7.10b, pp. 60–61.4; 2.7.10c, pp. 60–61.28), but while Luke sometimes adapts language of moralists (e.g., Acts 24:25), he employs the term more broadly here.

527. E.g., Hermog. Issues 68.10–69.21 (esp. the argument from mitigation, 69.15–17; cf. 39.10–16); Libanius Declam. 36.42; 44.50–52, 61; Quint. Decl. 301.16.

528. For the argument refuting the fallacy of affirming the consequent (as well as the standard counterargument to such a plea), see Hermog. Issues 48.15–23; Heath, Hermogenes, 87.

529. Rightly Conzelmann, Acts, 199. Admittedly ἀλλά would have been stronger.

530. See Anderson, Glossary, 41; cf. Rhet. Her. 4.30.41; Rowe, “Style,” 149; Porter, “Paul and Letters,” 583; Anderson, Glossary, 24. Dibelius’s recourse to probable textual corruption here (Studies in Acts, 92) is most implausible.

531. So esp. Fronto in Naber, 211 (LCL, 1:40–41); see also Cic. Verr. 2.5.66.170. Some other kinds of speeches could also display intense emotion by disrupting normal rhetorical patterns (Men. Rhet. 2.9, 413.12–14).

532. Often noted though variously explained (e.g., Orchard, “Ellipsis”); though cf. Blommerde, “Ellipsis.” Pliny begins complaining about someone in a letter, then breaks off in midsentence, deciding to be more gracious (Ep. 8.22.4); since the offender remains anonymous, however, it is a case of casual epistolography (as in 1 Cor 1:16), not insinuatio. Still, in the heat of anger, one could forget one’s intended words (ʾAbot R. Nat. 1 A). On letters of admonition and blame, see, e.g., Stowers, Letter Writing, 85–90 (“letters of reproach” were even harsher; 139–41).

533. In true ellipsis, the words as well as the meaning can be reconstructed (Plath, “Ellipsis”); on ellipsis, see also Rowe, “Style,” 135. The present case is closer to aposiopesis (see Rowe, “Style,” 149, citing Demosth. Cor. 3; Cic. Phil. 12.2.4; Black, “Oration at Olivet,” 87, citing Rhet. Her. 4.30.41; 4.54.67; Quint. Inst. 9.2.54–57; 9.3.60–61). Aposiopesis could be linked with paraleipsis, arousing suspicion by implication (Hermog. Method 7.419–20), as probably here.

534. If they could be shown to have started the riot, they would be punished; they had undoubtedly not reckoned on Roman intervention in the Jerusalem temple or the need to answer to Rome for their denunciation of Paul, though he was a Roman citizen (most of them probably were not, though they may have been citizens of Ephesus).

535. E.g., Aeschines Ctes. 1; Dio Chrys. Or. 12.36; Gal 2:4, 12; 1 Tim 1:3. Luke does sometimes name critics unknown to his audience where it would not create problems for local churches (e.g., Acts 4:6; 18:17 [on some views]; 19:33; 23:2; 24:1–2), though not always, and sometimes he probably simply lacked their names.

536. See Marshall, Enmity, 341–48.

537. E.g., Rhet. Alex. 36, 1442b.6–9; Cic. Or. Brut. 40.137; De or. 3.204; cf. Cat. 2.3; turning an opponent’s argument against him in Hermog. Inv. 3.3.138.

538. Eurip. Cretans frg. 472e.33–35; Thucyd. 3.61.1; Dion. Hal. Lysias 24 (advising that this be done “at the outset” [trans. S. Usher, LCL, 1:67]). Another form of counteraccusation was to admit an offense but blame the victim for deserving it (Hermog. Issues 39.1–5).

539. Xen. Hell. 2.3.37.

540. Lysias Or. 3.1, §96. At least in declamations, those guilty of some kinds of offenses could not bring suit against anyone else (Quint. Decl. 250 intro.; 265 intro.).

541. Likewise, Philocrates (convicted of treason) used not Aeschines but Demosthenes as his advocate (Aeschines Embassy 14), and Demosthenes, rather than Aeschines, was his business partner (Embassy 56). Aeschines elsewhere objects to this frequent practice of countercharging accusers (Tim. 179) but does it himself. For views concerning bribes, see comment on Acts 24:26.

542. Aeschines Embassy 69 (LCL, 211).

543. E.g., Cic. Quinct. 3.11–9.33 (i.e., the entire narratio); Rosc. Amer. 30.82–45.132; Pliny Ep. 3.9.29; 4.9.20; 6.22.2, 4; 7.33.7. Although Apuleius gets around to denouncing his accuser (e.g., Apol. 56), he initially excuses himself from this necessity by pointing out that his accuser was so obscure, lowly, and worthless that Apuleius had never had occasion to get to know him (Apol. 16).

544. Cic. Sest. 37.80 (trans. R. Gardner, LCL, 12:145).

545. On insinuatio, see Bower, “Ephodos and insinuatio.” Perhaps (though not necessarily) Luke’s audience could imagine a gesture of denunciation (on which see Shiell, Reading Acts, 56)? For examples besides those below, see, e.g., Quint. Decl. 331.22; 335.13; Hermog. Inv. 4.13.206, 208–9.

546. Cic. Invect. Sall. 8.22.

547. Dion. Hal. Lysias 24.

548. Val. Max. 2.2.5 praises envoys who delivered their message faithfully, without adding complaints about how they had been treated (including being spattered with urine).

549. Rutherford, “Silence”; cf., e.g., Cic. Verr. 2.2.48.118; 2.4.46.102; 2.4.47.105.

550. E.g., Demosth. Cor. 268; Cic. Invect. Sall. 5.13; Quint. Decl. 252.10. See παραλείψις in Rhet. Alex. 21, 1434a.25–26; Rhet. Her. 4.27.37; Fronto Ad Ant. imp. 1.2.4; Rowe, “Style,” 149 (citing as examples Basil Against Drunks 125A; Aug. Ep. 125.4); Anderson, Glossary, 88–89 (citing, e.g., Rhet. Her. 1.9; 4.37; Heb 11:32). Fronto Ad Ant. imp. 1.2.9 gives a notably lengthy example of παραλείψις (shifting to Greek only for this rhetorical term, 1.2.9–10).

551. Cic. Fam. 13.5.3; 13.16.4; Mus. Ruf. 10, p. 78.22; Pliny Ep. 1.14.9 (cf. 1.19.3); Ael. Arist. Def. Or. 408, §§138D–139D; Fronto Ad verum imp. 2.3; Max. Tyre 24.1; Men. Rhet. 2.14, 429.1–4; Libanius Encomium 3.2; cf. Cic. Fam. 2.6.1.

552. On 2 Cor 9:1, see Amador, “Revisiting,” 107.

553. E.g., Lysias Or. 3.44–45, §100; 31.20, §188.

554. E.g., Cic. Agr. 24.63–64. He also can describe briefly matters that he claims to pass over (Sest. 26.56).

555. Cic. Pis. 2.3 (trans. N. H. Watts, LCL, 14:147).

556. Cic. Vat. 5.13 (trans. R. Gardner, LCL, 12:257); he then returns immediately to the tribunate, having slipped this accusation in.

557. Trans. R. Gardner, LCL, 13:445.

558. Cic. Cat. 1.6.14 (trans. L. E. Lord, LCL, 10:27); he similarly avoids repeating other accusations because they are obscene and violate public propriety (Verr. 1.5.14; Flacc. 15.34).

559. Trans. L. E. Lord, LCL, 10:27.

560. Cic. Verr. 2.4.52.116; more briefly, 2.3.24.59.

561. On the horror that ancients felt at the plundering of temples, see discussion at Acts 19:37.

562. Trans. Hunink, p. 116.

563. E.g., Lysias Or. 3.39, §99; 4.13, §101; Dion. Hal. Lysias 33; Cic. Quinct. 6.22; Rosc. com. 16.46; Mur. 6.13; Apul. Apol. 3; 52; 69; 74; 83; 89; cf. Isaeus Astyph. 19. Writers against Jews tell “lies” about them (Jos. Ag. Ap. 2.79, 147, 289); Apion is a prime example of such a liar (2.85, 90, 98, 111, 115, 121, 122). Perkins, “John,” 966, points out that Qumran’s opponents are misled “by the Man of Lies . . . (1QpHab 2:2; 5:11; CD 20:15; 1QH 2:13–14; 4:10).” Perjury was punishable (Apul. Apol. 60; 89; Völkl, “Perjury”).

564. Affidavits had long been used (e.g., Aeschines Tim. 45). If the person providing the affidavit was nearby, however, an opposing speaker could complain that they should have come in person, where they could be cross-examined (Apul. Apol. 59). For summoning witnesses, see, e.g., Apul. Apol. 44–46.

565. Heath, 37 (see at greater length Hermog. Issues 45.21–46.8; Inv. 3.5.141–42).

566. One might need to further establish that this was the sort of case that would produce many witnesses if the charges were true (Libanius Declam. 44.20–24). Sometimes demands for witnesses ignored the fact that the offense was not public and would have produced few witnesses (Lysias Or. 7.43, §112). But one could also cite the accusers’ ignorance on key points as inconsistent with their assured claims (e.g., Apul. Apol. 53–54, 61).

567. E.g., Isaeus Hagnias 6; Cleon. 31–32, §37; Lysias Or. 7.19–23, §110; Cic. Flacc. 15.34.

568. Not everyone considered this method reliable (see discussion in sect. 11, “Torture,” in the excursus “Slaves and Slavery” at Acts 12:13 [Keener, Acts, 2:1920–22]).

569. E.g., Lysias Or. 4.10–12, §101; 7.34–40, §111; see further discussion in sect. 11, “Torture,” in the excursus “Slaves and Slavery” at Acts 12:13 (Keener, Acts, 2:1920–22). When (in a hypothetical case) the slave witness had died during torture, leaving no witness, the opposition contended that the torturer could be simply inventing the claims (Quint. Decl. 328.9–10).

570. One might also claim that someone had made a statement “in the hearing of all” without providing the witnesses (Isaeus Cleon. 11.36), admittedly more easily requested than produced even when the claim was true.

571. Trans. R. Gardner, LCL, 13:433.

572. Heath, 37; for an earlier example of this method, see Demosth. Fals. leg. 120; Hermog. Inv. 3.5.142–43. One could also discredit opposing witnesses by arguing that even lawgivers did not trust witnesses and hence established laws against false ones (Rhet. Alex. 15, 1431b.42–1432a.3).

573. Lysias Or. 7.23, §110 (trans. W. R. M. Lamb, LCL, 157).

574. With Bruce, Commentary, 470.

575. Cic. Quinct. 23.75.

576. E.g., Cic. Scaur. 17.38; Flacc. 15.34.

577. On laws addressing false accusations, see, e.g., Robinson, Criminal Law, 37.

578. This was normal procedure in the case of deliberately false accusations (Ferguson, Backgrounds, 51). The Sadducees interpreted the law as not allowing false witnesses to be executed unless the defendant had already been executed (Sipre Deut. 190.5.1).

579. It is unlikely, without advance preparation (impossible at this early juncture), that they would be able to bring much evidence concerning the pattern of riots in other cities, although they may have known of some (i.e., they could offer what they had heard from travelers, but this was hearsay and might not stand well under interrogation).

580. In practice this might be difficult if Tychicus and Trophimus (Acts 20:4), potential witnesses, had left Judea because of the charge (21:37–39); Timothy had not been present during the Ephesian riot (19:22).

581. E.g., Juv. Sat. 3.140–46 (satirically); Rapske, “Prison,” 827; idem, Custody, 56–62; Winter, Left Corinth, 62–64; see comment on Acts 24:1. Thus, e.g., courts valued men’s testimony above women’s (e.g., Justin. Inst. 2.10.6; Jos. Ant. 4.219; Sipra VDDeho. pq. 7.45.1.1), with rare exceptions (Plut. Publ. 8.4; Wegner, Chattel, 120–23; for a nuanced treatment, see Maccini, Women as Witnesses, 63–97); so also that of slaves (e.g., Prop. Eleg. 3.6.20; Justin. Inst. 2.10.6; Jos. Ant. 4.219) and minors (Justin. Inst. 2.10.6; cf., e.g., Sen. E. Controv. 7.5).

582. See, e.g., Apul. Apol. 2, who contends that his accuser tried to transfer the plaintiff role to a minor “to avoid punishment for bringing a false accusation” (trans. V. Hunink, p. 26).

583. Accusers could be said to be admitting the defendant’s innocence on matters about which they had remained silent (Cic. Rosc. Amer. 19.54). On the failure of these witnesses to appear, see Keener, “Rhetorical Techniques,” 247–50.

584. Marcus Aurelius in Fronto Ad M. Caes. 1.6.4 (trans. C. R. Haines, LCL, 1:159).

585. Suet. Claud. 15.2; Dio Cass. 60.28.6; see Sherwin-White, Society, 52–53 (widely followed: Hemer, Acts in History, 129–30; Fitzmyer, Acts, 737; Winter, “Official Proceedings,” 326; Rapske, Custody, 163; Witherington, Acts, 712–13; Barrett, Acts, 1109).

586. MacDowell, “Sycophants”; see esp. Thür, “Epobelia,” 1158. The fees were paid to the defendant.

587. Gizewski, “Absentia,” 35.

588. Schiemann, “Contumacia” (citing Dig. 5.1.73.3 on the lack of appeal).

589. E.g., Pliny Ep. 2.11.9, 24. An arrogant person with imperial protection might refuse a summons (Tac. Ann. 2.34). Classical Athenian law allowed a defendant’s conviction by default if he failed to appear despite attested notification (Thür, “Prosklesis,” 49; idem, “Pseudokleteias graphe,” 116).

590. Gizewski, “Absentia,” 35.

591. Ibid. For cases usually being dropped if accusers did not pursue them, Witherington, Acts, 791, cites Dig. 38.14.8. For judgment by default against absent parties, cf. also Lucian Parl. G. 18.

592. The practice of Claudius in Suet. Claud. 15.2; in one case, a summoned witness failed to appear because he was dead (15.3).

593. Ramsay, Teaching, 366–67, admits that this sounds more unusual to Suetonius than to Dio Cassius.

594. Trans. Heath, p. 35; see also Hermog. Inv. 3.5.141.

595. E.g., Rhet. Alex. 22, 1434b.11–18; 36, 1443b.15–16; 37, 1445b.21–23; Apul. Apol. 103; see also Montefusco, “Epilogue”; discussion in the section “Recapitulating Earlier Themes” at Acts 28:16–31.

596. Apuleius saves some of his strongest arguments for late in the case (e.g., Apol. 8; 96) and a minor but irrefutable point, attested by witnesses, just before his peroration (101).

597. Cic. Quinct. 1.1–2, 4; 24.77.

598. Reading between the lines of some of his other speeches, one sometimes wonders if his case is sound; in this case, however, there appears little doubt, and Cicero seems utterly confident himself. Speeches could also build toward an emotional climax; see, e.g., Hermog. Inv. 3.13.162–63; 4.4.189, 191. One could also proceed from simpler to more complex material; Epictetus Diatr. 1.26.3.

599. Deconstructing and discrediting an opponent’s position was a frequent forensic exercise (see, e.g., Heath, “Invention,” 93–94); so also turning the opponent’s own evidence against his position in favor of one’s own (synoeciosis, or conciliatio, in Rowe, “Style,” 145–46, citing Lysias Or. 24.23 [On Behalf of a Cripple]; Cic. Rosc. Amer. 29.80).

600. Lysias Or. 7.2, §108; Cic. Att. 2.24; Quint. Decl. 301.19.

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