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On Precept and Dispensation
question is made apparent by the very terms of St Bernard's reply.44
He makes every effort to show that it is the intention, the attitude of will, or better—it is love, that should determine our submission to the authority of God, whose commands are mediated through a superior. Here it is,from the moral standpoint and at the bar of conscience that Bernard determines the relative merit of obedience and the relative gravity of its violation, taking into consideration the nature and importance of the command and the uprightness of intention.
The severe and repeated warnings which St Bernard gives to the monks of Saint-Pére in this part of the treatise, and his insistence upon the correct and traditional concept of obedience reveal the serious nature of the crisis through which they were passing. He is trying to impress upon them the necessity of submitting to the abbot as to God himself, of not being "'scandalized" at him, or doubting God's will simply because his representative is a frail man.!2 St Bernard refutes the objection that it is practically impossible for a monk to save his soul when such a man holds office. This attitude he considers merely indicative of a heart disposed less to a complete surrender of self to God, than to suspicion, criticism and murmuring.1* In the face of some very impressive arguments he maintains that obedience is always, for man, a sure way to God.!* This all seems to imply that the monks of Saint-Pére were not in agreement with their abbot's government, that they were making things difficult for him, trying to withdraw from his jurisdiction and accusing him of endangering the salvation of their souls by his conduct.
This gives us insight into the other series of questions they had put forth concerning stability and the change from one monastery to another. In dealing with this subject, St Bernard concentrates on only one of the motives then generally admitted as justification for this transitus, namely, the "desire for a stricter form of life." He restricts its application, however, to the desperate case of a monastery
11. Nos. 19-43.
12. Nos. 19-21.
13. Nos, 22-24.
14. Nos. 31-34.
15. Nos. 44-51.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux where such irregularity prevails as to impede any kind of religious life. But in a well-ordered house he discountenances the possibility of a transfer without the abbot's consent, even if the observances in force there make the manner of living less perfect, provided they are still good and have the sanction of authority.1¢ In this way he closes every avenue by which, under pretext of "justifiable" reasons, the Chartres monks might evade their abbot's jurisdiction—not without giving scandal—by transferring to another monastery.
St Bernard even seems to imply that their temptation arose from the fact that in their dissatisfaction with the observances of their own house they felt themselves drawn, like others before them, to the Cistercian way of life, then in its full glory.
Finally, one of the last questions Bernard answers is whether, on the death or deposition of an abbot and before the appointment of his successor, a monk could freely leave the monastery of his profession and fix his stability in some other monastery of his choice." This was a debated point at the time. There is still extant a treatise, written at Bec in the mid-twelfth century, dealing with this problem though not resolving it.18 That this work was familiar
16. On this question of transfer, cf. M. A. Dimier, "S. Bernard et le droit en matiére de transitus" in Revue Mabillon, 48 (1953), pp. 48-82. With the question of the transitus there is closely bound up that of the fugitivi, these latter sometimes being regarded as such only in the broad and quite incorrect sense, i.e., because they had attempted to pass to another observance; texts on this subject have been collected together in Analecta Monastica, 7 (Studia
Anselmiana, $4), pp. 87-145, under the title "Documents sur les fugitifs.""
Note: any article cited in these notes without the name of the author is the work of the compiler of these notes.
17. Nos. 56-57.
18. The text edited by Marténe, De antiquis ecclesiae ritibus, I, Il, 2; ed.
Antwerp, 1736, col. 469-496, and in part re-edited by A. Wilmart, "Les ouvrages d'un moine du Bec" in Revue bénédictine, 44 (1932), pp. 34-38. The bibliography relative to this treatise is given in Analecta Monastica, 6 (Studia
Anselmiana, 50), p. 177, under the title, "Un traité sur la 'profession' des abbés au XII¢ siécle." The formula of profession found in the text edited by Marténe
(and in Revue bénédictine, 44 [1932], pp. 37£.) agrees with that attested to in other monasteries of Rouen or the surrounding district, such as Saint Own,
(ibid., Ordo IX, 467b) and Saint-Georges de Boscherville, (ibid., Ordo VIII, 463d). There was at this time a whole series of writings relative to the meaning
On Precept and Dispensation
to the Saint-Pére monks is possible, even probable, Chartres being quite near Normandy. In fact, several of the ideas about obedience which they propose to St Bernard, with regard to the duties and deficiencies of the abbot and change of stability, are identical with those found in the work On the Profession of Monks.
In the above treatise the problem is considered under a two-fold aspect: first, in a speculative consideration of the question of human freedom, then a juridical aspect, applying to monks and abbots the pronouncements made by Councils and Popes on the subject.2°
From these sources it emerges that in the cases of irregular election or appointment of a superior, or of an excommunication incurred by him (especially if he obtained office by means of simony),?! the obligation of continuing to live with him and obey him is suspended.
Our Chartres monks, seeing this hypothesis as their only loophole, had raised doubts about the regularity of their abbot's election and declared that they could not, without unending ill-feeling, remain with him.?? St Bernard unhesitatingly refutes the idea of a transfer and values of the monastic life and profession, following in the wake of St Anselm (these texts are specified in an article entitled ""Une court traité de la vie monastique dans l'école du Bec" in Spicilegium Beccense, 1 (1959), pp.
477-488) and others; the text published some time ago by A. Wilmart, "Un court traité d'Aelred sur l'entendue et le but de la profession monastique" in Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique, 23 (1947), pp. 249-273, has given rise to. some interesting comparisons on the part of A. Squire op, ""Aelred of Rievaulx and Hugh of St Victor" in Rech. de Théologie Ancienne et médiévale, 28 (1961), pp. 161-164.
19. Ed. Marténe, col. 490-495. It is difficult to say whether St Bernard knew this treatise. It is true that at the beginning of it, 490a, the question is described as "knotty," nodosa, reminiscent of St Bernard's words quoted above in no. §.
Bernard and the monks of Chartres could both have had recourse to a common source for a form of speech which best served their purpose. But it is also possible that the substance of the treatise De professione became known to Bernard through the monks of Chartres themselves.
20. Ed. Marténe, col. 492-495.
21. Cf. the formula of profession of the Canons of Mende which is edited ibid., col. 463b: "I promise to you, the superior of this monastery, and to. your successors canonically installed, due obedience and reverence according to the canonical rule of this holy Order.
. ."
22. No. 56.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux occasioned by the death of the abbot, demolishes their argumentation by quoting Proverbs 18:1: "None so quick to find pretexts as he that would break with a friend." He refers them back to Matthew
23:3, used in Chapter 4 of the Holy Rule: "Do what they tell you, but do not follow their practice."
From the accumulated evidence we may legitimately make some generalization about the situation and the feelings of the monks at Saint-Pére. They objected strongly to the government, too dictatorial perhaps, of their abbot. They were discontented and irritated; worse, in their intense resentment towards their abbot they scrutinized his every action and decision to find a pretext against him. They imputed authoritarian tendencies to him and tried to discover in the Rule and in similar documents grounds for questioning his decisions. They even reproached him for having neglected, in his government, the good of their souls, upon which the Rule lays such emphasis.24 In short they were completely at odds with him and refused to obey him, or at least, did not do so wholeheartedly and with a good will. In their attempt to preserve for themselves a certain liberty, they endeavored to limit the power of their superior by appealing to the laws then in force, and so to set their own conscience at rest. Going still further, they thought they could escape from their abbot by a transfer—unless, indeed, the root of the whole affair was that they wanted to change to the Cistercian observance."> On this last point the texts do not allow of any certain conclusion, but the fact remains that the monks did appeal to St Bernard, saying they knew that his writings and eloquence could be very influential in a case like this.2¢ And in fact, not only had he already effectively influenced many churchmen by his interventions, his teaching and actions, but he also understood
23. Ibid.
24. "He should know that he has undertaken the care of weakly souls, not a tyranny over the strong" (Rule of St Benedict [hereafter RB], 27:6).
25. Cf. nos. 46-51 where the Cistercian observances are compared with those of traditional monachism from the point of view of transfer.
20. Gf brewces
On Precept and Dispensation
the problem of monks, entered into their difficulties and identified himself with their cause.2?
This then was the very real and human situation in which Bernard intervened. In doing so, he was to give a great impetus to the development of the ideas involved, especially in regard to two matters which we should now consider: obedience to the Rule and profession.
Obedience to the Rule of St Benedict It would seem that the crux of the matter is the precise meaning to: be attached to the formula by which the monk promises his obedience "according to the Rule of St Benedict"—secundum regulam
S Benedicti. Here, for St Bernard, is the decisive point. But this formula is itself the result of an evolutionary process, and some knowledge of this is necessary to grasp the full significance of the formula.?8
In Chapter 58 of the Rule, where he dealt with "The Manner of Receiving the Brethren," St Benedict had no intention of establishing a formula of public, juridical engagement, precise, detailed and definitive; he simply wanted to show the novice what is expected of him when he was admitted into the monastic community. Nor 27. This is evident from St Bernard's Letter 67, no. 2, PL 182:176, trans.
B. S. James, The Letters of St Bernard of Clairvaux (London: Burns & Oates, 1953); Letter 70, no. 2, p. 96, and his other letters concerning transfer, and also the fragment Rem similem from Letter 70, PL 182:183, note 204, trans.
James, Letter 73, no. 2, pp. 102 f. Indications as to the authenticity of this last are to be found in the article, "'Lettres de Mabillon et de Rancé sur S. Bernard"' in Revue Mabillon, 45 (1955), pp. 29-34.
28. There will be no question here of retracing in detail the history of obedience, but simply of giving some indication of the stages of this history in order to place St Bernard in his historical context. Further indications will be found in the two works used here: I. Herwegen, Geschichte der benediktinischen Professformel (Minster, 1912) and C. Capelle, Le voeu d'obéissance des origines au XIle siecle (Paris, 1959). As for St Bernard's own teaching supposed or expounded here, it is found particularly in nos. 9-12 (on the limits of profession) and nos. 44-49 (on the relationship between the various. ways of following the Rule of St Benedict) as well as in other places, notably in nos. 1-8 (general idea of "precept" and "'dispensation"').
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux did he claim to impose several distinct vows, conceived in the manner of what were later to become the "'vows of religion"; he was simply stating the scope of the monk's promise.?® However, he did in fact create a form of engagement to which later monastic formulas would conform. He himself, when speaking in this same chapter of the manner of testing candidates and warning them of what they are to expect, returns almost with insistence to the Rule as a "law" which they must observe; yet he does not actually make mention of it in the "promise." But more and more in the course of the following centuries one made profession "according to the Rule."2° To grasp the exact meaning of the phrase secundum Regulam, we must bear in mind that it dates from the period sometimes referred to as that of the regula mixta. It originated in Burgundy where very early the two streams of monastic tradition—Celtic monasticism and the Rule of St Columban on the one hand and the Rule of St Benedict on the other—met and fused. The purpose of the words "according to the Rule," is to define, at least in general terms, which of the various forms of monastic life the monk has chosen to follow. It indicated the particular prescriptions by which he intends to practice conversion of manners, knowing that they will teach him what he must do to attain purity of heart. This form was more and more directed to the Rule of St Benedict. Not that it was the only Rule then observed in these places; rather, its prescriptions had been adapted to the customs and needs of each monastery.
The reform undertaken by Charlemagne and pursued under Louis the Pious by St Benedict of Aniane sought the exclusive establishment in all monasteries of the Rule of St Benedict.3! It
29. Cf. B. Steidle, The Rule of St Benedict, trans. U. Schnitzhofer (Canon City, Colo.: Holy Cross Abbey, 1966), pp. 251ff.;
Capelle, op. cit., pp. 98 and 103.
30. Secundum Regulam—for the history of this formula up to the eighthninth century, cf. Recueil d'études sur saint Bernard et ses écrits, I (Rome:
Edizioni de Storia e Letteratura, 1968), pp. 275-278.
31. Herwegen, op. cit., pp. 57-64, and J. Semmler, Legislatio Aquisgranensis, C.C.M., I, pp. 425-428.
On Precept and Dispensation
became the subject of valuable commentaries.?2 Every effort was made to relate all the observances to its letter and spirit. Yet practices inherited from the preceding centuries were still preserved, though an attempt was made to breathe a new spirit into them.
Hildemar reverted to the triple formula of profession (stability, conversatio morum, which became conversio morum, and obedience), already adopted in several places.3? Into this formula Smaragdus and Hildemar both introduced the phrase "according to the Rule,' and here it was indicated that the Rule of St Benedict should be for the monk the one law having any claim upon him; all his ideas, intentions and activities should conform to it. True, St Benedict of Aniane and those who followed in his footsteps interpreted the Rule in their own way; they were influenced by a tradition already blended with, not to say contaminated by, elements which were quite foreign to ancient monasticism as portrayed in the Rule of St Benedict. But it was at least their intention to return to the Rule, and they strove to adapt everything to the type of observance they themselves created and believed to be authentic. It was this form of observance, derived in fact from various traditions, which in the succeeding centuries was preserved among those soon to be known as the "black monks" to distinguish them from the monks of the newly-founded orders, particularly the Cistercians.
The Cistercians, following the intuition and firm convictions of their first fathers, adhered to the Carolingian concept of the authority of the Rule. They held the commentary of Smaragdus in high esteem, and the formula of profession which they adopted is identical with his.?° They frequently transcribed St Benedict of 32. Those of Smaragdus of Saint-Mihiel (ed. PL 102:689-932) and Hildemar, both edited together under the latter's name by R. Mittermuller
(Ratisbon, 1880), and under the name of Paul the Deacon in "Bibliotheca Casinensis," IV, Florilegium Casinense (Monte Cassino, 1880), pp. 3-173; the various recensions have been studied by W. Hafner, Der Basiliuskommentar zur Regula S. Benedicti (Miinster, 1959).
33. E.g., at St Gall towards 850; Herwegen, ibid., pp. 33-41, 60-61.
34. Cf. Herwegen, ibid., pp. 41-46 and particularly p. $9.
35. This fact was pointed out by Herwegen, ibid., p. 64, according to the formula of profession reproduced by Marténe, Regula commentata, c. 58, PL 66:820d, under the title: Formula Cisterciensium.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux Aniane's Penitential.3° Yet they interpreted the expression "according to the Rule" more strictly than it had hitherto been interpreted; for them it meant doing everything in strictest accordance with the purity of the Rule: pwuritati regule .
. Rectitudinem regule supra cunctum vite sue tenorem ducentes.8'? It was within this tradition originated by them that St Bernard was to find his place; he developed it into its fullest expression by making the Rule the norm of monastic obedience and showing that it is the Rule which the monk by his profession pledges himself to observe.
Profession St Bernard's teaching on this point is scattered throughout several of his writings, though it is principally to be found in this work
On Precept and Dispensation.*® When endeavoring to make a synthesis which St Bernard himself never made, there is danger of introducing an artificial or arbitrary relationship. But as will be seen, there is an inner logic uniting all the elements of his thought which the various texts offer, and provided we are careful to restrict their meaning to what they actually say, we can grasp this thought without distorting it.
Faithful to the tradition he had inherited, St Bernard always tries to resolve the problems connected with the obligations of monastic life in terms of the monastic profession. This is particularly the case when it concerns obligations contracted in the matter of obedience.
St Benedict established a "school of the Lord's service" for cenobites, where, by living "under a Rule and an abbot,"®® they were afforded
36. In evidence of this there are the texts quoted in "Les cisterciens et S.
Benoit d'Aniane" in Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis, 7 (1951), pp. 63-64.
37. Exordium parvum, c. XIV, ed. J—B. Van Damme, Documenta pro Cisterciensis Ordinis historiae ac juris studio (Westmalle: Typis Ordinis, 1959), p. 13.
On the meaning of the formula cited here, cf. P. Stevens, "Rectitudo Regulae" in Collectanea Ordinis Cisterciensis Reformati, 9 (1947), pp. 131-142, and P.
Salmon, 'Monastic Asceticism and the Origins of Citeaux" in Monastic Studies, 3 (1965), pp. 119-138.
38. Nos. 9-10.
205) RBS Prolindsiele2-
On Precept and Dispensation
the opportunity of amending vice and growing in charity and in purity of heart. By this he did not make obedience merely a form of asceticism whereby the monk submits himself to the spiritual direction of an abbot, and commits himself to his care in all temporal matters. He went further and raised it to the level of a clearcut, juridical relationship existing by God's authority between the disciple and a master who holds the place of God in his regard. Such a relationship is contracted at profession and imposes obligations on both disciple and master, as well as sanctions on God's part.4°
How does St Bernard conceive this double relationship with the Rule and with the abbot which obedience creates and what precise force does he attribute to the Rule in this sphere? In the texts where he is speaking clearly and explicitly of this,41 it would seem that he considers the Rule as the very foundation of this relationship of obedience; from it all the other obligations of the monk derive.
He is not speaking, here in this treatise and elsewhere, to novices who need instruction in obedience but to monks already formed by monastic discipline, monks who already know their Rule. He does not waste time then demonstrating and explaining ideas which he may presume to be admitted, even if their actual implementation gives rise to difficulties; neither does he define the nature of obedience, nor explain its role in monastic life and how its various components are to be reconciled.
He has, nevertheless, clear-cut views on the subject of the relationship existing between Rule and abbot. This can be discerned in the argument he occasionally employs when reminding abbots of their powers and obligations with regard to the Rule; the abbot can sometimes dispense from it, but can never administer it according to his own will. On the contrary, it is the Rule of St Benedict that determines exactly when the subject must obey and when the 40. RB 58:17-29; cf. Capelle, op. cit., pp. 89-94; Rothenhausler, Zur
Aufnahmeordnung, pp. 2-18 and 95.
41. Letter 7, no. 17, PL 182:103, trans. James, Letter 8, p. 36; Letter 7, no.
4, PL 182:95-96, trans. James, p. 28; Sermones de Diversis, 41, PL 183 :653-661.
It is evident from these and other texts that Bernard had a complete doctrine of obedience, but that he never expressly formulated it or synthesized it.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux abbot can command. In other words, the Rule is the norm of obedience, the "'principle" norm, in the original sense of the word.
It is the beginning, the origin, of all acts of obedience, and. they derive from it as from a "principle." St Bernard indicates this with reference to the observances prescribed by St Benedict.
I would say that these sacred observances have been entrusted to the prudence and integrity of superiors, not made subject to their will.... For surely the profession by which a young monk subjects himself to a superior is equally binding on the superior?
To my mind they are equally bound by a common promise, for by the solemn engagement of the one, both have become debtors mutually, the one owing humble obedience and the other a sincere and fatherly solicitude. ... The one who makes profession does indeed pledge himself to obedience; not just any kind of obedience, however, but explicitly obedience "according to the Rule," and to no other Rule than that of St Benedict. The superior, then, cannot allow his will free rein over his subjects, he must understand that its scope has been determined by the Rule. His commands should be confined solely to what is right—not right in a general way, but according to what St Benedict has established. And so the profession runs: "I promise .
. ." what? the Rule? No, but "obedience according to the Rule of St Benedict."" Supposing then that I make profession according to that Rule, and my abbot tries to impose on me something that is not according to the Rule, is there, in this case, any need for me to submit? I would say that he can demand of me only what I have promised.*?
This passage reveals St Bernard's view of the relationship of obedience existing between the monk and the spiritual father to whose guidance he has committed himself. This mutual relationship created by the voluntary engagement of the monk's profession is based entirely upon the Rule of St Benedict, and it is the Rule which determines its full meaning and scope. When the monk promises to obey "explicitly," determinate, according to the Rule of St Benedict, he is by that very fact declaring his intention of following the Rule as the path which will lead him to God. He determines
42. No. Io.
On Precept and Dispensation
to adapt his behavior, which must from now on be governed by the law of obedience, to everything St Benedict prescribes and to that alone. This intention forms the basis of the contract by which he surrenders his will into the hands of an abbot. He desires to obey simply because he will find, without doubt or delay, uprightness of life and union with God. In view of this goal which he means to attain through his profession, he makes the observance of the Rule of St Benedict the object of his obedience; it is the Rule that gives to this obedience what might be called its specific character.
Although St Bernard does not use these precise words, taken as they are from a language not his own, they do correspond to his thought.
For his teaching is that the entire matter of obedience is determined by the Rule and that obedience should be exercised according to the Rule and in no other way. It is the Rule which determines not only the nature of obedience but also its extent and manner of execution.
The abbot who receives the profession is one of the two parties between whom the relationship of obedience is exercised. He has the obligation, by reason of the very promise made by the monk to observe the Rule, to use every means—commanding, teaching, reasoning, leading and if need be even pressing him into these acts of obedience—to assure that the monk fulfills his vow. By the authority which he possesses (which is "executive" rather than
"legislative''), the abbot's duty to his monks is to help them fulfill their obligations towards the Rule and to reprove them should they fail to do so: adjutor adimpletionis at vindex praevaricationis. The monks have of their own volition taken this Rule upon themselves as the law which is henceforth essential to their life, and the abbot has been the witness to this engagement:
In the presence of the abbot as a witness, but not at his bidding as a despot, they are professed before God and his saints; and if they ever act otherwise they stand condemned out of their own mouth, as it were, before him whom they have mocked.42
43. Letter 7, no. 17, loc. cit. Cf. also no. 2, infra.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux This text seems to imply that the abbot's role with regard to the individual monk's obedience is assigned to him by the Rule, for it quotes directly from the Rule's prescription for the rite of profession.*4 It might well be suggested therefore that for St Bernard, the abbot and the monk who obeys him posit the same act, and both of them become executors of the same "law of God,"' which is none other than the law of charity. In this sense too they become the executors of a "common will," for together—the one in commanding and the other in submitting—they accomplish a single act with a single object, imposed on each of them by the Rule. So it is the Rule that decides the conduct of each. It is, in fact, the basic norm of monastic obedience since it determines the very nature of this obedience.
But the Rule equally determines the object of monastic obedience.
St Bernard specifies the cases in which the monk must obey in the phrase: id quod sanctus pater Benedictus instituit—that which our holy father St Benedict instituted.
The Rule not only provides the foundation for the monk's obligation of obedience, it also defines the limits within which he must exercise this obedience and his right to see them respected by his superior. That is why, in the text quoted above, it is the Rule which is prescribed before all else as the norm for the abbot. On him falls the principal responsibility in the exercise of obedience, because it is only through his exercise of authority that obedience can exist for the monk. But the measure and extent of the matters which he can and should impose are prescribed by the Rule; and in such a way that everything else, however legitimate and useful it may be, is excluded from this field and cannot be prescribed as of obligation in virtue of obedience. Anything not included in the Rule, anything that does not derive from it, was not the object of the promise which constituted profession and formed no part of 44. RB 58:18: ""before God and his saints."
45. On the theological context in which such expressions receive their fullest significance in St Bernard, cf. P. Delfgaauw, "La nature et les degrés de l'amour selon S. Bernard" in S. Bernard Théologien, Analecta Sacri Ordinis
Cisterciensis, 9 (1953), pp. 235-251.
On Precept and Dispensation
the intention of the contracting parties. In consequence it remains outside the scope of any obligations the abbot may impose upon the professed in virtue of their mutual engagement.
When St Benedict requires of the abbot "that he himself keep the Rule in all things''4¢ he is pointing out to him the object of the obedience of his monks. The actual matter of this obedience is entrusted to his conscience and prudence. In this way he is the custodian of obedience and, even if he can in certain circumstances dispense from it, he should defend it by means of sanctions whenever there is an infraction. But he can never arrange it to suit himself, he can never assume the right to extend or restrict the sphere of obedience in a way not conformable to what has already been promised and accepted. He must obey in virtue of his monks' very obedience, with a view to this obedience. Although the abbot is himself in some way a norm for his subjects because of the authority he possesses he is not thereby above the Rule (supra Regulam).
He too has freely submitted to it by his profession; though appointed a superior (praelatus) he remains a monk.*? Henceforth it is his duty to build with obedience the bridge leading both himself and his monks to salvation.*® The Rule then is an objective norm, independent of any man's capricious interpretation, inviolate within certain limits and having a value both in itself and for all bound to it.
In practice a certain amount of initiative is left to the abbot whose duty it is to see that the Rule is observed; he must exercise discernment, make decisions. But the Rule remains the primary norm and in relation to it the other norm—the superior—is secondary and dependent upon it. For the monk, the abbot's will has the force of law, but it must always be in conformity with the prescriptions of the Rule, which is the law for the abbot. The abbot has no right to exact obedience upon any matter or in any way not preordained by the Rule. Though in actuality the obedience promised to the
46. RB 64:7-22.
47. De Moribus et Officio Episcoporum, 33, PL 182:830ff.
48. Sermones de Diversis, 35, no. 6, PL 183:636ff.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux abbot by the monk at profession has profound importance, on the juridical level it is secondary.
These ideas drawn from this treatise are supported by what St Bernard once wrote to the monk Adam who, under pretext of obedience, had illicitly left his monastery in company with his abbot.*® Bernard reminds him that when he pronounced his vows at profession, the abbot was present simply as a witness; the promise was made to God rather than to the abbot:
Is it into the hands of the abbot that I place what I have unreservedly affirmed with my lips and signed with my own hand in the presence of God and the saints, knowing from the Rule that if I ever act otherwise, I shall be condemned by him whom I mock? If my abbot, or even an angel from heaven, were to command something contrary to this, I would unhesitatingly excuse myself from an obedience of this kind which would make me break my vow and perjure the name of God. For I know that it is out of my own mouth that I am to be either condemned or justified.
. Otherwise what a shameless lie it would be to sing that verse of the psalm before God and his angels: "TI will pay you my vows, which my lips have uttered.'®° Accordingly, my abbot should reflect on the duty imposed upon him by those words addressed in a special way to him by the Rule: that he should keep this Rule in all things. He should also reflect on what is ptescribed for everyone without exception, namely, that all should follow this Rule as mistress in all things and that no one should rashly deviate from it.®! I resolved then always and everywhere to follow my abbot as master in such a fashion that I should never in any way deviate from the teaching of the Rule which, with him as witness, I have sworn and determined to keep."
49. Letter 7, no. 17, loc. cit. On the circumstances surrounding this affair, cf. L. Grill, "Morimund soeur jumelle de Clairvaux" in Bernard de Clairvaux
(Paris, 1953), pp. 125-132.
50. Ps 65:13-14 (Vulgate). si. RB 3:7; 52. Letter 7, no. 17, loc. cit. In no. 19 of this treatise Bernard explicitly states that the abbot must be regarded as truly holding the place of Christ in the monastery and that he is to be obeyed as Christ himself, provided that he enjoins nothing contrary to the commands of God; if he does, the monk must, following St Peter's example, obey God (Acts 5:29). Cf. Letter 7, no. 3,
On Precept and Dispensation gI It would be hard to find a clearer or more emphatic expression of the fact that the Rule is a supreme norm which governs with equal force both the intention and the obligation of the monk and the conscience and administration of the abbot. Here again is evidence that profession according to the Rule creates a double relationship of obedience: firstly with God (this is the primary, principal and fundamental relationship, the direct and personal bond, which imposes upon the monk the full responsibility of remaining submissive to God's will by means of the Rule which reveals it to him); and secondly with the abbot, who acts as intermediary between the Rule and the monk.
The abbot may in practice exercise a more direct mediation and appear to play the principal role. In reality he is dependent upon the Rule and upon the obligation which, according to the Rule, he and his monks have contracted toward God. It is because the first obligation creates a responsibility of a personal nature that the monk has the power and sometimes the duty of refusing obedience, should the abbot enjoin something contrary to the Rule. This refusal would then be a form of obedience. The second relationship— the bond with the abbot—arises from the fact that at profession he acted as witness and representative of the invisible God. He must continue to play this "vicarious" role, helping the monk to prove his fidelity to their common obligation towards God and the Rule.
In this way everything should converge towards subordination to the Rule, the mediator between God and the monks. It is in fulfillment of the Rule that God's will, manifested in its precepts, is united with man's action, which in its turn is guided by the prescriptions of St Benedict and so aligned and made conformable to the will of God.
Here, in the last analysis, is the foundation for the authority of the Rule. God intended that his will, proclaimed in the precepts and loc. cit. In the well-documented study, La promesse d'obéissance ou la "'professio regularis" (Westmalle: Typis Ordinis Cisterciensis, 1955), C. Bock makes no reference to St Bernard for the simple reason that he never mentions a promise of obedience distinct from profession.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux counsels of the Gospel, should be interpreted for monks by St Benedict in precise, concrete, practical and relevant terms. It is true, as St Bernard recognizes, that the Rule contains divine commandments, "spiritual" in character, for example charity, humility and gentleness, prescribed by God rather than by St Benedict. It includes also human means of a more "'natural'' character, such as the "corporal observances.'"®* But St Bernard is convinced and in fact teaches that these prescriptions which are of human institution are in perfect accord with God's will. Consequently, they can be observed with the fullest confidence by St Benedict's disciples, as so many sure means leading to God:
There can be no doubt as to the true holiness of this way of life which was designed by divine inspiration and wisdom rather than by human prudence or ingenuity. It is surely for this reason that Benedict attained a peak of holiness in life as great as was his glory and happiness after death.™ The Rule then, though of divine inspiration, also comprises prescriptions of human institution, and these will always be conditioned by and adaptable to temporal circumstances. They are not infallible even though they are in themselves well-fitted to lead the monk to God. But for the accomplishment of God's will a certain discretion will be necessary at times to decide which of them are to be observed and in what way. Not everyone, however, has an equal right to exercise this discretion. The right belongs to those who have been prepared by God for the office of superior by the special gift when their election calls them to exercise it. So it is for God's sake that superiors must be obeyed. It is this consideration, or rather, this view of faith that bestows on the obedience given to a fellow human its true place and value in the religious life.
St Bernard frequently returns to this point, and clarifies it by 53. Nos. 2-3.
$4. Declamationes de colloquio Simonis cum Jesu ex verbis S. Bernardi, 45, PL 184:462. On the authenticity of St Bernard's authorship of this text, cf.
Recueil d'études sur s. Bernard, 1 (Rome: Edizioni de Storia e Letteratura ,1962), pp. 16-20.
On Precept and Dispensation
showing that there are three kinds of precepts. The first are those commands which are purely and essentially good, pura bona, such as the exercise of faith, hope and charity, or the Decalogue: "It can never be right to neglect them even though one be forbidden to practice them. Next there are those things which are essentially evil, pura mala, that is to say, contrary to those first precepts and like things. It can never be right to do these things even though one be commanded, and here obedience to men can never be enforced."
In all these matters which are enjoined or forbidden by the commandments of God, "He is to be given an obedience which no human authority may lessen, an obedience which must be maintained inviolable. It may be held for certain that we cannot, at the will of the superior, either cease to do what is good (those things which are prescribed) or do what is evil (those things which are forbidden)." However, between these two there is another category:
Between these two extremes there is an intermediate class: things which in themselves are neither good nor evil, but become so according to the circumstances of place, time, manner and person; examples are fasting, reading, vigils, etc. In consequence it can be either good or evil to command or forbid them. But among them, like the tree of good and evil which stood in the midst of Paradise, stands the law of obedience. And in all these matters we must be submissive and obedient to the will of the superior, asking no questions for conscience sake, for none of these things has God preordained as obligatory. He has rather left them to be decided by the superior's authority. This is the kind of obedience which we, who are under a man, owe to a man. It is also a bond between God and man, for whenever obedience is given to superiors it is given to him who says:
"He who hears you, hears me."'5
Instead of each individual exercising discretion as to what should be observed in the last grouping, it belongs to the abbot to exercise this discretion. By so doing he acts as a bridge or a ford which enables the monk to avoid dangerous waters.*®
55. Letter 7, no. 4, loc. cit. Cf. also Sermones de Diversis, 41, no. 3, PL 183:655.
56. Sermones de Diversis, 35, no. 6, PL 183:636f.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux But as such discretion is so rarely found on earth, let the virtue of obedience be your substitute for it, then you will never do anything either more or less than you are commanded.
There is then no opposition between the obedience due to the Rule and that due to the superior. They unite, complement and condition each other. Both derive from the promise made at profession to obey according to the Rule. This was made principally with God, but also with the superior who represents him and who himself undertakes to observe the Rule and to have it observed. The authority of the Rule then, from the ascetical as well as the juridical viewpoint, finds its basis and its justification as a means of sanctification and a juridical norm.
This doctrine finds a particular application in the special case of a dispensation. To what extent can an abbot dispense from the Rule? This question calls for a study of its own. The answer is necessarily complex and must be carefully nuanced. Here we can only make a few pertinent remarks.
First of all the idea expressed by the dispensatio is broader than that contained in the English word, dispensation, which indicates primarily a legitimate infraction of a law by an authority who has the power to do this. In the traditional terminology of Canon Law it refers to any exception or modification, anything from complete abrogation to a particular dispensation, as we commonly understand it today.5® Yvo of Chartres, who wrote in the period just before Bernard, insisted on the immutability of the divine law, especially as it had been promulgated in the Gospel. At the same time he held that all human law, which is only to be an application of the divine law, is subject to dispensation. Bernard's treatise is
$7. Sermon for the Octave of the Feast of the Circumcision, no. 11, PL 183:142, trans. A. Luddy, St Bernard's Sermons for the Seasons and Principal
Festivals of the Year (Westminster, Md.: Carroll Press, 1950), I, je ZUG, (Cre. also Sermones de Diversis, 26, nos. 2f., PL 183:610 seq.
58. Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, V, I (Leipzig, 1909-1934), col. 1397-1399.
Du Cange, Glossarium (Favre, 1884), Ill, p. 139.
59. Cf. R. Sprandel, Ivo von Chartres und seine Stellung in der Kirchengeschichte
(Stuttgart, 1962), pp. 77-85: "Das Wesen der Dispensatio"; Bibliography,
On Precept and Dispensation
then located at the beginning of an evolution of thought on the matter. When determining to what extent the abbot or the customs of a monastery could legitimately dispense one from the Rule of St Benedict, Bernard introduced certain distinctions. These rejected all that is contrary to what the Rule prescribes, as well as what is beside (citra) or beyond (ultra) the Rule, in order to maintain that which is in conformity with it (secundum).®° Here we find a vocabulary which would become frequent and would be further enriched by the canonists of the second half of the twelfth century.
They would speak of dispensare cum, or contra, or praeter, or supra, or ultra.® Moreover this question of the limits within which one can dispense from the Rule is bound up with the exigencies of charity to the extent that there can be conflicts between the law, written or customary, and the love one owes to God and neighbor. In the course of the controversy between the Cluniacs and Cistercians,
Peter the Venerable raised this delicate question.*? The solution involved contributions from history, law and theology, some elements of which were still in the process of evolution at that time.
The result was to be a very complex synthesis which would always p77, no. 75. B. Jacqueline, "Yves de Chartres et St Bernard" in Etudes d'Histoire du Droit Canonique Dédiées a Gabriel le Bras, 1 (Paris, 1965), pp.
170-184, has established that St Bernard knew of Yvo's Panormia.
60. No. 11.
61. A number of texts of this type are cited by S. Kuttner, "Pope Lucius III and the Bigamous Archbishop of Palermo" in Medieval Studies Presented to Aubrey Gwynn sj (Dublin, 1961), pp. 419-453. Later an abundant literature concerning dispensations (in the plural) began to appear, including for example the Libellus de dispensationibus of John of God which is cited, ibid., p. 429, no. 87. Already in the second half of the twelfth century Richard of St Victor, in his De questionibus Regule Sancti Augustini solutis (ed. Marvin L. Colker,
"Richard of Saint-Victor and the Anonymous of Bridlington" in Traditio, [1962]), when explaining the formula secundum regulam in relation to the profession of the Canons Regular according to the Rule of St Augustine, introduced this distinction: quaedam in regula precipi, quaedam prohiberi, quaedam permitti.
62. Cf. Peter the Venerable, Letter 111, ed. cit., passim.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux be in danger of losing its balance if any one of the elements were given too much emphasis. St Thomas, when formulating his synthesis, would incorporate into his doctrine on the moral obligation of religious Rules all that was essential in the teaching of St Bernard.® Conclusion Even when reduced to essentials St Bernard's teaching still seems speculative enough, not to say subtle. In any case, it is rigorously logical, following out to their conclusion a small number of principles. These had been laid down during the Carolingian renewal of the monastic ideal. St Bernard followed the tradition as it had been gradually developed since the ninth century, though he extended and enriched it. On more than one point the Cistercians had broken away from this tradition, going back beyond the accretions, multiplied through force of circumstances, to the basic observances of ancient monasticism and St Benedict's Rule.*4 But in regarding the Rule as the necessary and sufficient means by which monks achieve to purity of heart, they placed themselves within an evolutionary process to which St Benedict of Aniane and the ninth-century commentators on the Rule had given a definitive impetus.
We can but wonder at the constructive force with which St Bernard was able to weld these still rudimentary, half-expressed and scattered concepts into a tightly-woven synthesis. It is even more evident how conscious he was of practical necessities, and how he excelled in putting his ideas at the service of the monks of his day, to help them solve the concrete difficulties created by circumstances and particular situations.
Fundamentally, his teaching is based on the conviction that the Rule of St Benedict prescribes a manner of life, a conversatio, which,
63. Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 186, a. 9. Mabillon summed up and praised this teaching of St Thomas in his Preface to this treatise (PL 182:859 ff ).
64. Cf. P. Salmon, op. cit.
On Precept and Dispensation
because it is a Christian way of life, necessarily means following and imitating Christ and so being incorporated into his Kingdom.
It must therefore be evangelical, presenting the Gospel to monks in an institution to which they gain admittance by their profession, a second baptism*' This should bring their first baptism to its fullest realization. Already sons of God, they now, under the impulse of grace, freely commit themselves to this life by a promise which entails the renunciation of the world and the total gift of themselves to God. They fulfill their vow by obeying the Rule, which is the Gospel expressed in terms relevant to their life.
This means in the concrete that the ascetical life is assigned a twofold object—first, the moral precepts, which St Bernard calls
"spiritual observances," everything relating to charity, humility, poverty, chastity and the other virtues, whose fulfillment is the most direct way of conforming to the saving will of God. Second, there are the "exterior observances," that is to say, those practices whose exercise promotes the fulfillment of the precepts; they include stability, silence, fasting, reading, work—in short, the discipline of the common life. St Bernard is convinced that St Benedict, under God's inspiration, knew instinctively how to ordain everything needful for the secure attainment of salvation, which is the one goal of all Christian and monastic life. Obeying the Rule is the most authentic way for monks of obeying God.
In practice this submission to God is expressed in submission to the abbot who, for the monk, is God's representative. But he too can only go to God by submitting to this Rule, the common norm of their obedience. In themselves the "exterior observances" are without doubt profitable means of fostering the practice of the evangelical virtues. However, they certainly do not all have an equal necessity. Their practical application may call for a certain amount of discernment, flexibility, even perhaps dispensation. So a monk needs a superior who will express for him in concrete terms. the essential and universal obligations. Obeying the abbot will be his way then of obeying the Rule, and through the Rule, of obeying God. It is to this that he is bound by the profession promise made "according to the Rule," while the abbot, witnessing this.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux pact between the monk and God, binds himself to insure its observance.
In this wonderfully consistent body of teaching, especially as it appears in the treatise, there is a harmonious blending of two aspects.
These had been often propounded by other writers but always in isolation, when they ought actually to complement each other.
They are, on the one hand, a theological view of the economy of salvation within the Church, and on the other, a juridical and practical concept of life in a monastic community, a life wholly ordered towards the union of man with God in Christ Jesus. St Bernard's synthesis corresponds perfectly with the structure, at once human and divine, of the Church itself, and with that mystery by which God communicates his own life to men in the Incarnation.
One can see then why this treatise has traditionally been considered an excellent commentary onthe obedience taught bythe Rule of St Benedict. Geoffrey of Auxerre called it a witness to the "discretion" of St Bernard.® The treatise was used towards the end of the twelfth century by the Premonstratension, Adam Scot,* but it was more widely circulated in the Benedictine and Cistercian monasteries. Fifty-seven manuscripts of the twelfth or early thirteenth century come to us from this source. Later it was especially among the Benedictines that De Precepto was considered as a commentary on the Rule of St Benedict and transcribed with it.®
65. Vita prima S. Bernardi, Il, 29: Si vigil in eodem zelo et circumspecta (quaeritur) discretio, De precepto et dispensatione disserens audiatur (PL 185 :320).
66. De ordine, professione et habitu canonicorum Ordinis Praemonstratensis, Sermon 7, nos. 4-6, PL 198:499-Sot. It is inspired by nos. 44-46 of this treatise.
67. A list of these manuscripts can be found in S. Bernardi Opera, Il (Rome:
Editiones Cistercienses, 1963), pp. 244-247.
68. This is brought out by the manuscripts which have been cited in the article, ""S. Bernard commentateur de S. Benoit, Etudes sur S. Bernard et le texte de ses Ecrits" in Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis, 9 (1953), pp. 148150. Additional citations will be found in Recueil, II, pp. 44-48. In a manuscript of Arras (no. 706, twelfth or thirteenth century from Saint Vaast, a Benedictine monastery) the third book of Rupert of Deutz's Commentary on the Rule of St Benedict (PL 170:511-526) has been inserted into the text of Bernard's treatise.
On Precept and Dispensation
Later Mabillon rendered eloquent homage to the value of this treatise for monks.® One of the texts to which St Bernard refers when he is speaking of the obligation created by the vows is this verse of Psalm sixtyfive: Reddam tibi~vota mea quae distinxerunt labia mea—I will render unto you the vows which my lips have uttered.?° In using it he alludes to a vast store of traditional doctrine. Later it was given a much greater importance than that given to it by Bernard. Sometimes it was even presented as the biblical foundation for the vows of the religious life. One can see what difficulties such a theory
69. "Among those who follow the monastic way of life, it is evident that the more dedicated one becomes, the more he will be concerned with the spirit of the Rule rather than with its obligations, and the more he will seek to plumb the mind of the legislator rather than the opinions of the casuists.
When he is devoted to his Rule with his whole heart, and has become perfectly subject to it, he will have nothing more at heart than to follow its guidance in all things, even if there be no obligation. For religious such as these there is no law, and they may perhaps have less need of reading this treatise than those who are always carefully examining the exact extent of the obligations of each rule rather than troubling about its truest interpretation and best practice.
These latter consult the authors in order to minimize the onus of the Rule and, as much as they may without sin, to draw back from a conscientious (or as they call it, over-scrupulous) observance thereof. The worst thing that can happen to these religious is for them to fall in with teachers willing to pander to their weakness, who actually advise them to follow the line of least resistance. This can gradually lead, first to neglect, then to contempt, and finally to hatred of the Rule, to the grave peril of their souls.
In my opinion they could hardly find a better and safer doctor to instruct them than Bernard, since he is endowed with all those qualities which most commend a religious guide: namely, an uncommon piety, an inspired doctrine, and a most thorough familiarity with things monastic. Consequently, his opinions on these matters can hardly be called into question, but rather are altogether true, straight from the heart, and to be embraced by all classes of Benedictines.
I would even venture to say that were we permitted to summon the saint of our choice to return to earth and instruct us in these matters, we could do no better than to choose to listen to Bernard. We ought, certainly, to be grateful to the monks of Saint Peter's of Chartres for obtaining the holy abbot's opinions and doctrine on this subject. It would be interesting to know about the details of their petition and the circumstances of its satisfaction"
(PL 182:8 57ff.).
70. Ps 65:13-14 (Vulgate).
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux could and did cause for a man like Luther. He criticized the vows as being contrary to the Word of God, to faith, to evangelical liberty, to the commandments of God, and to reason itself. Certainly this can be understood as opposition to certain historical expressions of the religious life. But "'the problems raised by Luther regarding monastic life were insoluble given the theological presuppositions of the sixteenth century. Given the perspectives of today, especially those of the Second Vatican Council, in regard to the Church and the religious life, they are no longer insoluble."7!
They are in fact already solved in many of the reformed Churches by the very existence within them of religious who do make vows."
One can even say that the problem no longer exists—it has no object. The carefully nuanced doctrine of St Bernard concerning the voluntary character of the obligations undertaken at profession, their compatibility with spiritual liberty, and the limits of a Rule in regard to material observances, enables us to place the vows in their true perspective. It is this true perspective which Protestant religious share today with their brethren in the Catholic Church.
Clervaux Abbey, Jean Leclercq oss Luxembourg
EDITOR'S NOTE
The translation of St Bernard's Book on Precept and Dispensation presented here is based on the critical Latin text prepared by Jean
Leclercq osB and Henri Rochais osB and published in the third volume of S. Bernardi Opera. This text is basically that of the Dijon manuscript 658 which comes from the Library of Citeaux. The manuscript was probably copied within ten years of the death of 71. Otto Pesch, "Luthers Kritik am Ménchtum in katholischer Sicht' 'in Strukturen christlicher Existenz, Festgabe F. Wulf (Wiirzburg, 1967), pp. 81-96.
72. Cf. P. Anson, The Call of the Cloister (London: SPCK, 1955); JHeijke, An Ecumenical Light on the Renewal of Religious Community Life: Taizé
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967).
On Precept and Dispensation IOI St Bernard, perhaps even while he was still alive. We have incorporated into the text, as did the critical edition, the subtitles drawn from the Lilienfeld manuscript 96. Although these are of the thirteenth century they are inspired by earlier titles. They are more sober than later collections, come from a Cistercian source and help to evoke the monastic milieu for which this treatise was written and in which it was read, copied and interpreted.
The Scripture passages have been translated to fit the context.
While the references follow the Revised Standard Version it must be remembered that St Bernard was familiar with the Vulgate which differs in part from this English version. Where Bernard has drawn from the Septuagint or some version other than the Vulgate this has been noted.
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INTRODUCTORY LELTER
OFTHE LORDZ ABBOT
-OF COULOMBS,
abiding health in the Lord from brother Bernard, who is called Abbot of Clairvaux.
I am now sending you as I promised my answer to the letters of the two monks of Chartres." Although I had at first intended to be brief and respond with a mere letter, I have complied with your wishes in writing at some length.? As you can see for yourself, I have yielded to your persuasion and made a book of it, so that many people may be edified by many words.
When you have read this work, send it to the abbot rather than to the monks of Chartres. They may see it later, if he thinks fit.
After all, they are monks, and according to their Rule they may not send or receive letters without their superior's consent.* Indeed as you know, it is on this account that I have delayed my reply in spite of their importunity, because I suspected they had presumed to write to me without their abbot's knowledge. I was not mistaken, as I have learned since.
1. This was Roger who was abbot of Coulombs from 1119 to 1173 or 1174.
2. The precise identity of these two monks remains unknown. They were undoubtedly monks of the Benedictine abbey of Saint-Pére-en-Vallée, near
Chartres.
3. Cf. infra, no. 61.
4. Cf. St Benedict's Rule for Monasteries (hereafter RB), 54:1. (For citations of RB we will use the division of chapter and verse of E. Manning [Westmalle,
1962], who follows Lentini-Hanslik.)
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux As the reader may see for himself, I began my work under the form of a letter, but since in complying with your request I have exceeded that measure, it had rather be called a book. Among the many difficulties which I have there unraveled, those dealing with precepts which may be dispensed, by whom, and to what measure, are the more involved and the more important. Let it therefore be called, On Precept and Dispensation, unless you are able to think of something more appropriate.
ON PREGCEPT AND DISPENSATION
CAN DEFER
no longer, yet dare I speak? You have com- [= me by your frequent letters and messages either to betray my ineptitude or to fail in charity, and I would rather be found lacking in that which "puffs up" than deficient in that which "'edifies."> So I yield now to your entreaties and take these difficult knots into my hands. I fear these hands shall be wounded before we are done, but it is vain for me to plead. It seems that my own spoken and written words have led me into this. How can I maintain my incompetence when you insist that my own expressed ideas prove the contrary? It is on this faith of yours then rather than on any faith in myself that I now enter the deep. God knows how
I will ever get out! If only your powers of judgment were equal to your charity! If the results fall short of expectation, lay it rather to your error in estimating my abilities than to any lack of good will on my part.
I shall try to treat these questions briefly in the form of a letter but I fear the letter itself will be far from brief. I can hardly solve these matters in less space than you took to state them, and you consumed two fairly long letters in doing only that.
I. 1. The first question then, deals with our Rule, and if I am not mistaken, all or nearly all the others stem from this. You ask how
SiC iat Corss a1
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux seriously a monastic rule is to be taken by those who profess it, and whether all its precepts are to be considered as binding under pain of sin. Are they commands, or only counsels or admonitions that may be lightly promised and lightly transgressed? Are some counsels and others commands, so that we may ignore the former so long as we keep the latter? If this last question be answered in the affirmative, I am to distinguish for you which are which, lest each follow his own particular ideas and thus perhaps strain out the gnats and swallow the camels,§ not knowing how much care and effort to bestow on each observance.
Such is as far as I can recall the substance of your main question, if not your exact words. As for your other question on the nature of obedience, its degrees and limits, I believe it is so bound up with this first one on the nature of the Rule that in answering the first the second will also become clear.
The obligation of a Rule for those who have professed it 2. As I see it then, the Rule of St Benedict is proposed to all, but imposed on none. It will be of profit to those who reverently receive it and keep it, but no obstacle to those who pass it by. That which depends on the free will of him who undertakes it rather than on the authority of him who proposes it, I would definitely consider as a free offering and not as a matter of duty. However, if a man has once made this free-will offering and promised to be faithful to it in the future, he is henceforth obliged to what he was formerly free to refuse. One is no longer free, but obliged to honor one's promise. He is bound to keep the vows his own lips have pronounced,' and from his own mouth he will be condemned or justified.® As a certain saint tells us, this is a happy necessity which forces us to improve ourselves.® 6. Cf. Mt 23:24.
Fa GtePsoornstseDcutse2gn 8. Cf. Job 9:20; Lk 19:22; Mt 12:37.
9. St Augustine, Letter 127, 8 (CSEL 44:28): Felix et necessitas, quae in meliora compellet; trans. Sr W. Parsons sND, St Augustine's Letters (New York:
Fathers of the Church, 1953), vol. 1, p. 356.
On Precept and Dispensation
The prescriptions of the Rule: commands or counsels This holds good for all the prescriptions of the Rule except those spiritual precepts of divine institution which St Benedict merely repeats, such as admonitions to the practice of charity, humility, mecekness. These can hardly be called into question. As for the rest, they are to be considered as counsels and admonitions, which may be passed over without fault, for those who have not promised to observe them, but as precepts, binding under sin, for those who have so promised. To use your own terms, it is a matter of free choice for the former, but a necessity and even a sort of natural exigency for the latter. However, this necessity is such as to admit of certain necessary and reasonable dispensations.
If. 3. The power of dispensing in these matters is not entrusted to all, but only to those who can say with the Apostle, "Let a man so account us as servants of Christ and dispensers of the mysteries fo God."!° The good and faithful servant whom the Lord has set over his household" knows that he should incur expense only when he may thus gain some recompense for his master. "Now this is required of dispensers, that the man be found trustworthy.""!2 May not the same degree of trustworthiness be demanded of the subject who avails himself of the dispensation as of the superior who gives it?
From what has been said thus far, you may gather that your distinctions are valid, so long as the proper allowances are made for circumstances. As regards the subject, the precepts of the Rule
(in external matters at least) are voluntary at first, but necessary once he has promised to observe them. From the superior's point of view, they are voluntary if of human institution and necessary if of divine institution.
Lost Cor 4-1 Tr. Ch, Mtoa-ase lk 12742.
1230 Cor 42.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux Stable, firm, and fixed necessity 4. Perhaps all this will be more clearly and easily seen if necessity is divided into three degrees: first the stable, second the firm, and third the fixed.¥8 Stable necessity I would call that sort of necessity stable which can only be changed by the "dispensers of the mysteries of God" 14 that is, by the superiors of the various regular institutes such as the Basilians, Augustinians, Benedictines, Canons Regular, and any other institutes of legitimate authority. These Rules have been handed down to us by saints and holy men and are to be kept inviolable by their subjects, who should never be permitted to change them in any way. However, since they were established by men, they may be lawfully and safely dispensed from according to circumstances, time, place, and persons, by those men who have inherited this authority through legitimate elections. Let the reader note that I have not said that they can be changed at will for light reasons by such authority, but only dispensed from carefully and reasonably.
They can be so changed by these men because they are not of their very nature or in themselves good, but only contingently good.
5. These rules were devised or ordained, not because it is unlawful to live in a different manner, but because this manner of life was found to be expedient for the gaining or the preservation of charity.
So long as they serve this end, they stand fixed and immutable and cannot licitly be changed, even by superiors. However, should they ever be found contrary to charity by those to whom God has granted insight and entrusted with authority, is it not clearly just and fitting that they should be omitted, interrupted, or altered for 13. Stabilis, inviolabilis, incommutabilis.
14, Cher Corsr:4:
On Precept and Dispensation
the sake of the very charity which conceived them: It would certainly be blameworthy to hold in opposition to charity that which was ordained solely for charity. So then let those prescriptions which we have classified as of stable necessity be respected even by superiors, so long as they serve the interests of charity.
Am I the only one to hold this view or the first to have stated it?
Did not Pope Gelasius think the same? It was he who said, "Except in cases of necessity, the ordinances of the saintly Fathers are to remain inviolate."5 And Pope Leo also, "Except in cases of necessity, the ordinances of the saintly Fathers are not to be violated in any way." He further says, "Where there is true necessity, those who have the power to dispense are to use it for the good of the Church. Changes in law must be based on necessity."1®
Firm necessity Il. 6. By what I have called firm necessity I understand those laws which are not of man, but of God, and which can only be changed by him who made them. Such are for example, "You shall not kill; you shall not commit adultery; you shall not steal,'"'!' and those others engraved on the tables of the Law. Although they may not be dispensed from by any human power, nor was nor will ever any man be allowed to set them aside,* the Lord himself sets aside those he chooses when he chooses; as when the Egyptians were despoiled by the Hebrews,!® or as when the Prophet was commanded to make love to a prostitute.2° What else would these be but serious sins of theft and fornication, were not both excused by 15. Cf. St Gelasius I, Letter 9, ch. 24 (PL 59:55b). Here and in the following quotation from Pope Leo, St Bernard uses the text found in Ivo of Chartres
(PL 161:57a), but Ivo was only paraphrasing the pontiffs, though he did this accurately enough.
16. Cf. St Leo I, Letter 167 (PL 54:1202); trans. C. L. Feltoe, The Letters and Sermons of Leo the Great, Bishop of Rome (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, second series, New York: Christian Literature, 1895), vol. 12, pp. 100ff.
17. Ex 20:13ff.
18. Cf. Mt §:19.
TOP CE Ex 322.
20, Cf: Hos 1:2:
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux the authority of him who commanded them? Whenever we read of similar actions performed by holy men without any evidence of a command from God, we must assume either that they sinned (for they were men) or that they had received some divine revelation
(for they were men of God). For example there is the case of Samson, who killed himself as well as his foes.21 If we choose to defend his action we must suppose he had received some revelation, although scripture does not affirm this.
Fixed necessity 7. But what is to be understood by the third kind of necessity, which I have called fixed necessity? Fittingly enough it may be referred to that necessity so fixed by God from eternity that it can in no way be altered even by God himself. Under this heading falls that spiritual doctrine and teaching on charity, humility, meekness, and the other virtues, which we find set forth in both the Old and New Testaments, but especially in the Sermon on the Mount.
These virtues are so precious that it is never expedient or lawful to be without them. They stand fixed because they are good in their very nature and can never be commanded or observed except as good and tending towards good. At all times and for all persons they bring salvation when they are kept and cause death when they are rejected.
The first sort of necessity then is founded on the free will of the subject, the second on the authority of the commanding power, and the third on the excellence of the thing commanded.
8. As we have said already, these three necessities differ as to their degree of immutability. The first, while not wholly immutable, can hardly be said to be changeable, for it may only be changed by proper authority and by a responsible and prudent dispensation.
The second is almost unchangeable, and is greater, because it can be changed by God alone as we have seen. The third and greatest
21. Cf. Judg 16:30.
On Precept and Dispensation Tee is entirely changeless, because even God is not free to alter it. Thus we may call the first which no man can change except superiors,.
"hardly-changeable" necessity, the second which God alone can change, "almost-unchangeable"' necessity, and the third which even he cannot change "entirely-changeless"' necessity.
IV. 9. Now that we have disposed of that, we may return to our main question. It should be clear that the greater part of our rules are subject, if not to the free will, at any rate to the discretion of the superior. "But," you may object, "what is left then of the necessity which you are referring to?" A great deal, I say; let me explain.
The abbot is not above the Rule—for he himself has professed it In the first place, as we have already seen, the spiritual precepts of the Rule are not in the hands of the abbot. The other prescriptions dealing with outward observances are not subject to his will either to the extent that it becomes their norm. Charity rather is to be the norm. Nor is the abbot above the Rule,?? for he himself once freely placed himself beneath it. There is only one power above the Rule of St Benedict which we must admit, and that is God's Rule, charity.
Let the letter of the Rule give way then, for a time, to charity when. need arises, but God forbid that it ever bow to any mere man's will.
He who has been chosen abbot is placed as judge, not over the traditions of the Fathers, but over the transgressions of his brethren, that he may uphold the rules and punish offences. Indeed, I consider that those holy observances are rather entrusted to the prudence and faithfulness of the superiors than subjected to their will. Thus our holy Legislator, in leaving anything to the abbot's choice, was. careful (as far as I can recall) not to use the term "will." He rather used such expressions as consideration,"* disposition,** providence,"*
22. RB 41:4; 55:8.
23. Consideration: RB 34:23; 53:19; 55:3.
24. Disposition: RB 3:6; 41:5; 63:2; 65:12.
25. Providence: RB 41:4; 55:8.
i12 The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux or judgment 2° since he wished the good and faithful steward to dispense according to objective reason rather than according to his own will. Hence he reminds him more than once of the account he will one day have to give God concerning these matters.""
10. I read in the Rule, "These things are for the abbot to consider," and this or that is left to the discretion, judgment, or disposition of the abbot;?* but I remember reading nothing about his changing things at his pleasure. On the contrary we read, "Let all follow the Rule as their guide, and let no one rashly depart from it''?°—no one, including the abbot. "Let all follow the Rule," he says, because "'no one is to follow his own will.' This too, I believe, includes the abbot. Do you not see that he has his obligations too, and is not so free as you might think? In addition does not the very act of profession in which the subject submits himself to the superior also bind the superior? I consider it a bi-lateral contract which binds both parties, the promise of the one places them mutually in debt; the one owes faithful solicitude, the other, humble obedience. What room here for freedom, when the superior himself has assumed an obligation? The freedom of the superior is further circumscribed in that the subject promises not unqualified obedience, but specifically obedience according to a Rule, and to no other Rule than that of St Benedict. Therefore he who governs should not lay the reins of his own will over the backs of his subjects, but acknowledge the limits set for him in the Rule.
He is to confine his commands to what he has determined to be the right path; not just any right path, but the one pointed out by the same blessed Father, or at any rate, one which is in conformity with his spirit. Thus runs the formula of profession: "I promise," not the Rule, but, "obedience according to the Rule of St Benedict."
"According to the Rule," and therefore not according to the will of the superior. If, once I have made such a profession, my abbot attempts to impose upon me something which is not according to 26. Judgment: RB 3:5; 39:63 40:5; 65:11.
27ARB2x345 371s 3st hs 0363605222:
DA ARR BS Geko 29. Cf. supra, notes 23-26.
30. RB 3:7.
20a secs
On Precept and Dispensation 113, the Benedictine Rule, and which is also not in accord with the Rules of St Basil, Augustine, or Pachomius, to what obligation, I ask, have I to conform? I can be obliged to perform only that which I have promised.
The limits of obedience Vv.
11. Now you can see the extent of your obligation to obey, which you asked me to define. If the measure of obedience be the tenor of the profession, the power of command can hardly extend farther. Obedience then is limited to what is neither beside, beyond, nor contrary to the same tenor of profession. Therefore, anyone having made profession in any form of religious life is not to be driven beyond nor restrained short of that which he has professed.
Even less can he be obliged to anything contrary to the same profession. Hence this central norm of life established by vow and reinforced by public profession, is likened to the tree of life in the midst of Paradise;3? the only law which the subject can be obliged to obey. Let not the commands or prohibitions of the superior over-step these bounds. They cannot be stretched farther nor cut shorter. Let no superior forbid me to fulfill my promises, nor demand more. My vows cannot be added to without my concurrence, nor diminished without clear necessity. True necessity knows no law and hence justifies dispensations; however free will, which alone can deserve punishment, is also our only means of progress. On the one hand, when we have used this free will to make a vow and then fail to fulfill it, without the necessity which justifies a dispensation, we are guilty, dispensation or not. On the other hand, if our will be constrained we gain no merit, but rather incur the guilt of murmurers. Let superiors then hold their subjects to what these themselves have promised rather than to their own whims, and let them urge rather than force them to better things.
Let them condescend to dispense when there is reasonable need, but let them never be party to mere backsliding.
32. Cf. Gen 2:9.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux Perfect obedience VI.
12. For the rest, let the subject know that this sort of obedience which is confined to the limits of the vows is quite imperfect.
Perfect obedience knows no law. It can be held within no limits.
Not content with the narrow bounds of obligation, it spreads to the fullness of charity, carried by its generous will. Eager for every order in the strength of its free and ready spirit, it considers not the measure, but reaches out in boundless liberty. It is this which the apostle Peter described when he wrote, "Purifying your hearts by the obedience of charity,"®* thus aptly distinguishing this sort of obedience from that other dead and servile sort which is not moved by love, but compelled by fear. This obedience is proper to the just man for whom there is no law;** not that he lives outside the law, but neither is he under it. Indeed he is not at all content with the mere obligations of his profession, but goes beyond them in his dedication. The Rule itself is not silent on this, but mentions it in discussing how a brother should behave when given impossible commands. He is counseled to, ""Confide in God's help and obey out of love; and again the third step of humility is, "that a monk submit himself to his superior in all obedience.'"'°* It says "all," wishing us not to rest content with the mere tenor of our profession, not to wait until we are obliged nor to limit ourselves to agreed terms, but gladly go beyond our vows and obey in all.
As regards time, the limits of obedience are extended to the very limits of time, so that we must obey as long as we live. The Onlybegotten Son of God has here set us the supreme example, for he obeyed his Father even unto death.®" To stop short of that would be disobedience, unfaithfulness, transgression and sin.
All disobedience is not equally serious VII.
13. It will be worthwhile to examine the causes, motives, and intentions of disobedience; also to determine which commands
33. 1 Pet 1722, 24) Chahine: o:
35. RB 68:5.
36. RB 7:34.
37. Ck. Pilea :8s
On Precept and Dispensation
may occasion it, and from whom. I deem that no act of disobedience whatever is to be taken lightly, although there are degrees of this evil. For instance, God has commanded, '"'You shall not kill.''38
Suppose we have two murderers, the one acting out of a desire for plunder and the other in self-defense. Is there not a vast degree of difference in the guilt of these two "lepers, '®® though their ill deeds are alike? Let us further suppose the one to have given way to sudden anger, and the other to have plotted his act with deliberate and deep-rooted malice. Are they to be judged alike in spite of the disparity of motive? Again, on the face of it, what could be more wicked than the incestuous trickery of the daughters of Lot24° Yet who can fail to see that their guilt was diminished if not blotted out by the piety of their intent and the intent of their piety:
The different authorities and precepts Now as regards the matter of a precept and the dignity of him who gives it, we must recognize certain distinctions. The greater reverence due the authority of the superior, the more we should fear offending him, and the greater will be the guilt of the transgression; likewise the gravity of the matter involved can augment one's guilt. Thus it is better to obey God than man;*! among men, better to obey superiors than equals,*? and better to obey our own superiors than someone else's. If it is better to obey these, it is also worse to disobey them.
14. It is much the same as to the matter; the weightier matter requiring more, and the lighter less care and diligence in execution.
Contempt of these is also more or less serious in proportion to the obligation. I consider those commands grave or light which are so 38. Ex 202033 39. Cf. Deut 17:8. Bernard is here alluding to the Vulgate text which speaks of distinguishing "between leper and leper." The literal meaning of the Hebrew negah is scourge. Since leprosy is the "scourge" par excellence, the Vulgate so translated it.
40. Cf. Gen 19:30ff.
41. Cf. Acts 5:29.
42. CLO RB 7h.35
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux according to the will of the authority in question, be it God or man.
For instance, we are commanded, "You shall not steal,''4? and again, "Give to all who ask you."44 Both commands are from God himself, and both are important, but that concerning theft is more binding. Everyone knows that God is most just, and is not equally displeased by theft and mere stinginess; that he prefers us to keep what is ours rather than to take what is another's. Consequently miserliness is a lesser fault than larceny.
15. Likewise with the commands of men—they are seldom of equal weight, since the will of those who command is more or less moved according to needs and circumstances. That which they consider more right and fitting, they will the more desire and require to be done. Therefore, the gravity of the precept depends primarily on the authority of him who issues it; the reward of obedience and the burden of disobedience following here the same measure.
When, as we have seen, a higher superior commands in a weightier matter, a more careful obedience is in order and a greater guilt may be incurred by contempt.
16. When we have grasped these distinctions we will be able to determine easily the measure of our obedience and the weight of our disobedience. We can now not only tell day from night, that is, the good of obedience from the evil of disobedience, but also day from day and night from night; or to put it more clearly, good from better and bad from worse.
The degrees of obedience Obedience is "good," according to our Father St Benedict, when one obeys out of fear of hell, or out of faithfulness to one's vows;46 it is better when one obeys out of love of God, substituting charity for necessity; and it is perfect, in my opinion, when the command is received in the spirit in which it is given. When the will of the 43. Rom 13:9.
44. Lk 6:30.
Asa Cralerts 25:
46. RB 5:3.
On Precept and Dispensation
subject is conformed to that of the superior, the subject, in carrying out his orders, will not be likely to confuse greater matters with lesser or lesser with greater (as often happens). With a tranquil mind he will match his care to the weight of the matter in hand, both in fulfilling what is commanded, and in avoiding what is prohibited. Not that the least command is to be despised, but only that it be recognized for what it is, the least: the least that is in comparison with what is greater. The obedient man who is both faithful and humble knows how to bestow fitting care on what is more important without neglecting what is less so, recognizing by the sure instinct of a devoted heart which commands are to be obeyed in what manner, saying with the prophet, "You have commanded your precepts to be most carefully observed."4" Since he does not say, "all your precepts," those only are to be understood which, because the transgression necessarily involves a serious fault, cannot be transgressed without incurring a serious penalty, as for example, "You shall not kill''4* and the like. Obedience to such commands is never unjust or evil, and they can never be licitly set aside, at least not by any mere human power.
VIII.
17. The others which may be dispensed from by the proper authorities, and which are enforced. by lighter sanctions, may be considered as lighter.
I mean, for example, the prescriptions regarding conversation and laughter. These things are licit when there is no rule against them. When there is such a rule it is sinful to break it, but not gravely so especially if the fault be palliated by surprise or forgetfulness.
Contempt would be another matter. These precepts which you have termed "optional" were devised by way of means and are quite different from those necessarily imposed by the nature of things; however they cannot be neglected without fault nor despised without sin, because they are commanded by those to whom it is said, ""He who hears you hears me, and he who despises you despises me.''#? The thing in itself may be harmless, but when
47. Ps 11934.
48. Ex 20:13.
49. Lk 10:16.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux authority has forbidden it, it becomes binding under pain of sin.
However, the sin would not be serious except in cases of contempt.
18. This you may take as a general rule for all those things which are neither good nor bad in themselves or in their inseparable consequences, and which are not fixed by divine law or by one's holy profession: they may be either done or omitted licitly so long as there is no ruling on the subject, but once there is a ruling it may not be neglected without fault nor despised without sin. Neglect is always culpable and contempt is always damnable. They differ; neglect arises from laziness, but contempt from swollen pride.
Contempt is always equally serious Contempt is always serious, whatever the importance or triviality of the matter, and it is usually a grave sin. The gravity of the sin of neglect, however, varies according to that of the command in question. We may liken contempt to adultery, which is always a serious sin, whatever the circumstances or intent. But a light word which slips out in a time or place of silence, or uncontrolled laughter which is more a reflex than a reasoned act, although they may be symptoms of a careless or dissipated soul, are none the less easily forgiven, since they are faults rather than sins. But what if one were to give rein to idle words deliberately and knowingly? Even if he had permission to speak, would he not be breaking the Rule of Truth himself and would he not be called to account for it on the day of judgment? The Judge himself has warned us of those idle words for every one of which he will then demand an account.®°
Woe unto us! How shall we be able to justify our idleness? But if a word is uttered for some particular reason it can no longer be classified as idle. Indeed, who does not know how a single word of detraction can outweigh innumerable idle words in guilt and punishment? Why so? Simply because they fall under laws of varying gravity and, as we have seen, the transgression of the weightier law is greater, just as that of the lighter law is lesser.
- 50. Cf. Mt 12:36.
On Precept and Dispensation
Subjects should not obey commands which are contrary to God IX.
19. It isnot quite the same as regards the person who gives the command, for whether it be God himself or some man who holds his place, one should comply with the same care and reverence to all commands, unless the one be found contrary to the other. In that case, I would counsel imitation of the apostle Peter who said, "We must obey God rather than men."®! We must answer thus with the apostles lest we hear with the pharisees, "Why have you also transgressed the command of God for the sake of your traditions ?''5?
But if we are grieved when we must so offend a human master out of faithfulness to the divine Master, we may console ourselves with the saying of holy Samuel which you yourselves quoted, in which he distinguishes between two evils®* thus: "If a man offend his fellow, he may yet seek mercy from God; but if he sin against God, who will plead for him:'4 If I were to find myself in such a dilemma that I must offend God or man I would freely choose the safer and more just course of not offending God. I have in this saying of the Prophet my consolation: the mercy of God. If I were to choose the other alternative and offend God, who would plead for me? Were
I to turn to any man, I would incur the reproach of scripture which says, '"Cursed be he who places his trust in man,"®> and I would deserve it. If one sins against God, even for the sake of some man, who indeed is to plead for him: Alas, no one! The prayer of the one who caused the offence is no more acceptable to God than that of the offender. We have need of an advocate who is on good terms with the offended party.
The fault, if it be a fault, committed against the man who is so disobeyed is attenuated, if not cancelled out, by the higher good in view. Consequently, when we read: "If a man offend his fellow,''® we should add, "for God's sake," since otherwise one would also be
$1. Acts 5:29.
52. Mt 15:3.
53. Lit. "between leper and leper." Cf. note 39, supra.
$4. 1 Kings 2:25.
SSeuler 175s 56. 1 Kings 2:25.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux offending God. No other motive can excuse one from fault in such a case, particularly if the fellow man in question be a superior.
Otherwise the Prophet would be contradicting that saying of St Paul: "'Sinning thus against your brother you sin against Christ."*"
And again Truth himself has said to superiors: "He who despises you despises me."°* But all our fellow men are included according to that other text: ''See that you despise not any of these little ones®® .
. he who scandalizes one of these little ones.
. 6° May God spare us, my brothers, for you know the rest!
Scandal 20. But not all scandals are to be weighed in the same balance.
Very different from that of the little ones is the scandal of the pharisees. When the fearful apostles foresaw that these latter would be scandalized by the words of Truth, they were told, "Leave them alone, they are blind and leaders of the blind."*! The first sort of scandal comes from ignorance, whereas the second is the fruit of malice. The one is scandalized because it knows not truth, the other because it hates truth. I believe this is why the former are called
"little ones." They have good will, but lack wisdom; they have the zeal of God, but not according to knowledge.® Such scandals are apt to inspire solicitude rather than wrath, at least in the hearts of spiritual men. Thus St Paul teaches us: "You who are spiritual, instruct such a one in all meckness.''® It would be most ungracious for a mere man to be angry with those to whom God has shown so much understanding, for the very executioners of the Lord were not excluded from his compassion. They were great sinners, but poor judges, and as deserving of compassion for the blindness of their judgment as of wrath for the greatness of their sin. They would have been blessed had they not been scandalized at him, according to his own words,* but now they are only miserable, so do not refuse
S7at Cor oil:
58. Lk 10:16.
59. Mt 18:12.
60. Mk 9:41.
61. Mt 15:14
62. Cf. Rom. 10:2.
63. Gal 6:1.
64. Cf. Mt 11:6.
On Precept and Dispensation
them commiseration. Even in the midst of his passion the Lord was moved to compassion and lovingly prayed from his cross:
"Father, forgive them," and as if casting about for some palliative to their horrible crime, added, "for they know not what they do."6
As if to say: "They are worthy of pardon, because they are little ones in understanding. I know not their guilt, for they knew not my Godhead. Indeed, had they known, they would never have crucified the Lord of Glory.** But I recognize the guilt of those others, who have recognized and hated both me and my Father.''?
St Paul too, fearing for the ignorance of such "'ittle ones," reproached the wisdom of him who did not know how to condescend to their weakness: "Shall that weak brother perish on account of this knowledge of yours; he for whom Christ has died?'
The precepts of superiors to be obeyed as the commands of God 21. If we must be so careful then not to offend the "'little ones," how much more careful ought we to be about offending religious superiors? God has, after a fashion, put them on an equal footing with himself. He has even imputed to himself the respect as well as the contempt shown to them, for he explicitly told them, ""He who hears you hears me; and he who despises you despises me.''®
Do we not find the same thought in our holy Rule where it says, "The obedience which is offered to superiors is shown to God?"'7°
Therefore, whatever such a man commands in God's name, if it be not clearly displeasing to God, is to be taken as if commanded by God himself. What difference does it make if God speaks in person or if he speaks through his ministers, be these angels or men?
"But," you may protest, "men are often mistaken in their apprehension of what is God's will in cases of doubt, and so may lead us astray." And what is that to you, who are more ignorant than they are? Don't you remember that passage of Scripture which says,
65.0 23-34.
66. I Cor 2:8.
67. Jn 15:24.
68. 1 Cor 8:11, 69. Lk 10:16.
70. RB 5:15.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux "The lips of the priest shall keep wisdom, and the law shall be sought from his mouth, for he is the angel of the Lord of hosts?"
We are to seek the law from his mouth, but I do not believe this means that he has to tell us what we can learn for ourselves from Scripture and right reason; in such matters his commands or prohibitions would be superfluous or invalid. Rather it means that the wise lips of the angel of the Lord are to reveal God's will to us in doubtful cases, when there is no other means at hand for learning it. From whom could we better seek insight into God's designs than from him who has been established as a dispenser of the mysteries of God 27? Let us then accept as from God himself all the words of him who is God's representative, so long as he does not speak against God.
22. We are not now contradicting the holy prophet Samuel, when we admit men to possess divine authority to this extent.
There is certainly a difference between the two types of authority, as was demonstrated above concerning this same text from the prophet." It is rather that what we have admitted in cases of doubt he denies in cases where there is no doubt, so that, as we have seen, the words "for God's sake" ought to be understood as added to the proposition "if a man offend his fellow." Unfortunately, men often do abuse their authority to the extent of presuming to countermand the clear ordinances of God.
It is this which has furnished you with the occasion as well as with the subject matter of your argument, for you assert that this imputing of divine authority to the commands and ordinances of men makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the subject to save his soul.
In support of this you adduce the vast number of imperious commands which superiors are wont to heap carelessly upon the backs of their subjects and which are very difficult, if not entirely impossible to observe.
23. I do not deny that the perfection of obedience is a difficult undertaking, but only for those who attempt it with the wrong
71. Mal 2:7.
72.1 Cor 4:1.
73 Cf. 1 Kings 2:25. See also n. 19 above.
On Precept and Dispensation
dispositions. After all, it is a sign of an imperfect heart and a perverted will to examine cautiously the injunctions of our seniors; to hesitate at each command; to demand to know the reason for everything; to suspect the worst if this be denied us; never to obey willingly unless we are commanded something that suits us, or which has been demonstrated to our satisfaction as necessary or useful. Obedience such as this is indeed a touchy affair and certainly a heavy burden as well, but this is not the obedience described in our Rule: "Obedience without delay."'4 This is to examine in the cunning of one's heart rather than to obey "'at the hearing of the ear."75 It is no wonder that worldly souls are not only weighed down, but actually overwhelmed by this rashly assumed burden; for weak human nature simply cannot bear what is intended only for generous spirits."° To such it is a light burden and a sweet yoke, because it is the burden and the yoke of Christ."? But to those who have not the Spirit of Christ it remains utterly insupportable. If you were referring to such as these, you were right in saying that the Rule is a "law" which has "entered in that sin might abound."
This is not the fault of the law or of the lawgiver, but of those who rashly undertake what they are unwilling to observe. "The law indeed is holy and just," but since you knew yourself to be a worldly-minded person, "sold under sin,""® why did you not take thought beforehand? This is a Gospel tower whose foundations should not be laid until the builder has sat down and taken stock of his resources. You have no choice now except to accept correction and obey those placed over you, or to bear in shame the taunt:
"This man undertook to build, and was not able to finish.''®° 24. But perhaps you will say: "Can anyone whomsoever be found who has attained such perfection that he will not slip up on some one of the numberless picayune regulations which superiors are wont to strew about so carelessly:" I can hardly pretend to be able to produce such a one when the Apostles themselves confess:
"We all offend in many things;''®1 and, "If we say we have no sin,
74. RB §:1.
75. Ps 18:44; RB 5:5.
76. Cf. Mt 26:41.
77. Cf. Mt 11:30.
78. Cf. Rom $:20.
79. Cf. Rom 7:12¢f.
80. Lk 14:28ff.
81. Jas 3:2.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux we are deceiving ourselves."8? But it does not follow that we must therefore perish. Scripture consoles us saying: "Tf anyone sin, we have as advocate Jesus Christ the just; he himself is the atonement of our sins.''83 And the prophet too testifies to his intercession on behalf of the transgressors*4 (but note well that he speaks of transgression and not of contempt). How, I ask, can they perish for whom the Savior himself has asked forgiveness? I cannot at all see how you can attach such exaggerated weight to every disobedience and transgression of the least precept as to exclaim: "How can any sin be venial or light for a monk, when his every least action exposes him to the peril of grave disobedience?" You seem to think this is the inescapable consequence of attributing divine authority to human superiors;** as if even the precepts of the Gospel did not vary in weight and hence admit of degrees of merit and guilt.
The penalty is to be proportioned to the gravity of the fault XI. 25. Furthermore, since not all commands are equally necessary, useful, or important, so the corresponding offenses vary in degree of guilt and are not to be stamped with the same stigma. An equal fault cannot be committed unless an equal obligation has been neglected; and only then is an equal punishment forthcoming.
See in the Gospel how both the sin of gluttony and the vice of fornication are condemned,** yet who is not more repelled by the filth of fornication than by mere overeating? Has not Truth himself distinguished for us in the Gospel between grave and light disobedience by calling the one a "beam" and the other a "splinter ?"8?
Has he not also demonstrated, or rather defined for us various degrees of guilt, affirming that one fault is liable to judgment, another to the council, and a third to the fire of hell 288 Why then
82. 1 Jn 1:8.
83. 1 Jn 2irf.
84. Cf. Is 53:12.
85. Cf. RB 5:4.
86. Cf. Lk 21:34; Mt $:27f.; 15:19.
87. Cf. Mt 7:3ff.; Lk 6:arf.
88. Cf. Mt 5:22.
On Precept and Dispensation
need it follow that if their spiritual masters are granted a share in divine authority, monks can therefore no longer commit light or venial sins, or that their every least act exposes them to the peril of grave disobedience? Certainly there is a class of sin to which is assigned this hell of punishment, or punishment of hell, but what of that other, which Divine Truth has let off with a mere summons to judgment? We cannot say he is not guilty after his guilt has been so proclaimed, and if he is guilty he must have sinned. Now a sin is an offense against a command of God, and therefore a species of disobedience.
26. From this you may gather that it is a sin of disobedience to be "angry with your brother,"®® but not a grave one. Behold, here is at least one venial sin a monk can commit, and he is disobeying no mere man, but God himself! We might say the same of foolish, vain, or idle words, thoughts and actions. These things are also always infractions of a law, and that law is divine. They are sins too, and hence displeasing to God; yet they are venial, not mortal, except in cases where contempt has rendered them habitual. In this last case it is still not the matter of the sin, but rather the intention of the sinner which is gravely reprehensible. The pride of contempt and the obstinacy of impenitence here render more serious the sin which in itself would be only venial and convert the light blemish of irregularity into the serious crime of rebellion.
Serious disobedience You may find a good definition of the mortal sin of disobedience in Samuel. He says: "'It is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel; and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey."®° Note the wording.
He does not say, "to fail to obey," but "to refuse to obey." The guilt of idolatry is imputed not to a simple failure to carry out an order, but to the proud recalcitrance of the will. Failure to obey and refusal to obey are by no means the same thing. The one may
89. Ibid. go. 1 Kings 15:23.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux arise from ignorance, or often enough from infirmity; the other rather from hateful stubbornness or unbearable contumacy. This latter rebels against and resists the Holy Spirit® and if it lasts until death, it is the blasphemy which cannot be forgiven in this world or the next.% You see then that not every unfulfilled command involves a mortal sin of disobedience, but only recalcitrance and refusal to obey. And very often the disobedient lack this rebellious ill will.
How then can a monk be so exposed to the grave peril of disobedience, when his sin cannot be mortal unless he be also rebellious and contumacious?
27. It is futile for some people to compare, as you mention, any and every disobedience to that ancient disobedience committed in Paradise,°? which indeed not only incriminated its perpetrators, but also vitiated our human nature. I believe that also in this first and most serious disobedience, it was principally, if not solely, the rebellion and self-justification which followed that merited such a severe sentence, rather than the act itself. When God asked the reason for the sin and thus offered them an opportunity to repent
(for he wills not the death, but rather the repentance of the sinner), they chose rather to turn aside in evil words, excusing their sin.®
Herein lay a twofold malice, for Adam sinned against himself in refusing to confess and win pardon, and then against his wife in cruelly accusing her in order to falsely excuse himself.%
28. How could you proceed to say that "'the crime of grave disobedience lies in wait for the monk in his every least action?" As if such guilt could creep up on him by surprise or accident, or be forced on him by circumstances when he findsit impossible to fulfill a given order! I say now, is a monk really threatened thus by spiritual death at every turn? No! I believe God would have granted even Adam full pardon, had he but humbled himself and confessed instead of trying to justify himself. As we have seen, simple disobedience, even when deliberate, is not so serious as self-excuse and premeditated obstinacy. o1. Cf. Acts 7:51.
92. Cf. Mt 12:31-32.
93. Cf. Gen 3:off.
94. Cf. Ezek 33:11.
95. Cf. Ps 140:4 (Vulgate).
96. Cf. Gen 3:10ff
On Precept and Dispensation
XII. 29. But perhaps this distinction between grave and light disobedience which applies to divine law is not valid for our Rule as well? That would be putting what is merely human above what is divine. Can God's spokesmen have more authority than their
Master? Does not St Benedict himself speak of grave and of lighter faults?" Are not these lighter faults so many instances of lighter disobedience?
Superiors, then, issue minor commands in accord with the Rule, and when these are transgressed, the fault is a minor one, although in disobeying one's abbot one also disobeys God. Even when it is
God himself who speaks, there are greater and lesser precepts which bind proportionately. The "first and greatest commandment'® defined by Our Lord himself must certainly be observed with greater care than those others of which he said: "He who sets aside one of these least commandments.'®® What then? Can we still speak of equally serious guilt for the transgression of any and all commands when the Rule mentions greater and lesser faults and the Gospel greater and lesser commandments? There is no need then for me to choose between the alternatives you offer me; that is either to deny divine authority to human superiors who issue legitimate commands, or to admit that monks cannot commit a venial sin. Of course, I do admit that in disobeying those who hold
God's place we disobey God, provided always that they do not command anything contrary to God; however, these commands do not all require the same care in execution, nor does their infraction always entail the same guilt. Although he who is offended is the same in all these cases, the weight of what is ordered is not, and therefore the transgressions of all commands are not to be equated.
Thus our Father St Benedict said: "Let the measure of excommunication be in accord with the gravity of the fault.'"1°
30. You see then that it is foolish to be disturbed or to upset others on account of the obedience which you have promised according to our holy Rule, as if you should not promise something
97. Cf. RB 24; 25.
98. Mt 22:38.
99. Mt 5:19. too. RB 24:1.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux you simply can neither perform nor leave undone without grave sin, since your superior's legitimate commands are to you as those of God. Foolish, I say, thus to exaggerate the evil of disobedience to the point of deterring yourselves from embracing the most necessary good of vowed obedience. It is true, as you say, that many difficulties lie in wait for us, or creep up on us among these many and varied obligations which obedience imposes upon us, but it is not always a mortal sin or a token of perdition not to fulfill what has been commanded. All disobedience is blameworthy and inexcusable, but it is never eternally lethal unless one refuse to apply the remedy of penance. In fact, simple disobedience is never a mortal sin, unless it is joined to proud contempt. The sons of obedience? then have great security; that very peace promised to men of good will,1°? for one cannot be damned unless one be impenitent (which is quite impossible for those who love God),1% nor can one sin gravely except by pride, from which the fear of hell should suffice to restrain us.
A breach of silence can be a serious sin Perhaps an example will make all this more clear: If a superior command me to keep silence, but I let slip a word through forgetfulness, I have indeed disobeyed, but not seriously. On the other hand, should I break silence willfully and deliberately and out of contempt for the command, my offense is mortal and if I do not repent I shall be damned.
XIII.
31. Is this perhaps still too hard for you? You also said, I believe, after considering the difficulty, or as you call it, the impossibility of monastic obedience, something like the following: "Is this that road to God which is supposed to be all the safer for being strict, and all the surer for being hard? Must a monk who is as human as anyone, and who has trouble enough avoiding what is in itself evil
TOL Ghor Petrsr4s TO2sCiy Daas 1032 Ch Liei2-5:
On Precept and Dispensation
and in cultivating what is in its nature good, also avoid or cultivate with a like solicitude whatever his superior sees fit to forbid or command?" And you go on to say: "'Since this is believed by many, but practiced by few, and that imperfectly how is such a belief any different from that freedom which the Apostle reproves in connection with the eating of food offered to idols?' It would be no different indeed, if it were as you say. In fact, one would have to be out of one's mind to dare to omit what he believes himself seriously obliged to.
You believe, then, if I may sum up your argument, that the commands of God can hardly be observed, and those of one's abbot simply cannot; for Truth himself requires that not one jot be passed over.?® If you will pardon my saying so, it seems to me that anyone who reasons thus has yet to taste the sweetness of the Lord. He still groans beneath the yoke of the law and has yet to feel the sweetness of the yoke of Christ. He has no experience of the consolations of grace and the weakness of his nature most surely holds him down, for he lacks the help of the Spirit.
32. What is the meaning of this distinction of yours? You say the commands and prohibitions of God are difficult to observe, while those of human superiors are impossible. As if one could succeed in fulfilling the one without the other! Notice that God has commanded us to obey even evil superiors, of whom he said: "All things that they command you, observe and do.''1°6 You see then if we disobey them, we are not merely disobeying this or that man, but God himself.
So nobody obeys his superior perfectly. I grant it, but what do you suppose is the reason? Is it because we can't or because we won't? If we want to but cannot, we may be at peace; but if we can but will not, we are guilty of pride. I agree that the caution which you mention is necessary, but only as a means of avoiding the pride which may lead to serious disobedience.
Do you perhaps think it impossible to refrain from disdaining the commands of superiors? Know that countless men have learned
TO44'Gf, 1 Cor 8:7ft:
105. Cf. Mt 5:18.
106. Mt 23:3; RB 4:61.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux to believe otherwise by their own experience. Or would you call difficult but not impossible the self-restraint which does not despise a superior? Though pain holds in check a proud spirit, you would yet murmur against obedience and say that it is dangerous to promise what is so difficult to accomplish. Then I can only remind you of Our Lord's words: "Let him accept it who can." It is this to which I was referring a little while ago when I spoke of taking stock of one's resources before commencing to build. As someone has said: "Either don't try, or carry it through.'
Of course no one who realizes what he is saying would promise never to transgress. This would be the same as promising impeccability. One who could promise such a thing on oath would be either a perjurer, or holier than he who said: "We all offend in many things."11° It would be well to re-examine an argument which leads to such false conclusions, lest the law which was intended to minimize faults should not only fail to do so, but should also become an occasion for perjury. That would be the situation if one thought he were promising something by his vows which he could not perform.
The Rule is divided into precepts and remedies 33. We may divide all regular observance into two categories: precepts and remedies. Precepts set us to fight against sin, whereas remedies restore us to innocence after we have fallen. These two are both integral parts of the regular life, so that if a professed brother accept the remedy offered by the Rule when he has transgressed some regulation, he has not broken his contract, although he has violated a precept. It is only when both the precept and the remedy have been scorned that I would consider the vow to be violated, the undertaking abandoned, or the contract broken. Thus
I judge him safe who although he offended against obedience, has 107. Mt 19:12.
108. Cf. Lk 14:28ff.
109. Ovid, Ars Amatium, 1:389.
ILO. Jas 3:2.
On Precept and Dispensation
not despised the remedy of penance. The limits of the Rule, however battered, are not broken so long as the discipline of regular penance is accepted. Regular correction is part of the Rule, for this
Rule is not only the norm of a good life, but also the instrument for repairing what is evil. It contains both the precepts of obedience and the remedies for disobedience, so that even in sinning we escape not its care. I freely acknowledge that it is impossible for any mortal always to avoid venial faults against obedience, but that does not make our Rule impossible to observe, for it even provides remedies for serious offenses.
You were right then in saying that nobody can always obey his superiors perfectly; but disobedience is only a light fault for which the Rule provides us a ready remedy; provided, that is, that there has been no contempt involved. If you contend that this too is unavoidable, you are surely in error. Moreover, the Rule has a remedy for this more serious ill also, and although the medicine is bitter, the contract of monastic profession remains intact so long as it is not despised.
34. Such being the case, it is senseless for us who have professed this Rule to complain of impossibility; to pretend we cannot help but sin; that the just commands of religious superiors come not from God, but only from men, and may therefore be set aside. It should be plain now that our promise contains nothing impossible, although we ought to obey these men just as we would God. What professed monk does not find it possible and even easy, by God's grace, to keep his pledge, realizing that it is not by simple disobedience that he breaks it but only by impenitence:? I have already mentioned that we do not promise never to fail; hence simple obedience does not constitute in itself a breach of promise, except perhaps for him who in error supposes himself obliged to that extent. You maintain that there are quite a few such people. I can only say of these, if they indeed exist, that which you yourselves have said. Their consciences suffer by this excessive credulity, selfcruelty rather,4 in the same way that others suffered by the 111. A typical play on words: credulitas, vel potius crudelitas.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux harmful freedom of those who ate what had been offered to idols.
These monks of necessity perish through their own judgment, just as the Apostle declares the weak brother perishes in the other's knowledge.1"? It is the same Apostle who teaches us that no creature of God is unclean when it may be accepted with thanksgiving" by those who are properly instructed. It is much the same with religious profession. It cannot in itself be the cause of damnation to anyone, except to him who erroncously supposes such to be the case, and I think I have sufficiently outlined the true perspective.
St Paul on idol offerings and on the simple and the evil eye XIV. 35. Now I turn to the difficulty caused you by this particular doctrine of the Apostle. You want to know if these words of St Paul concerning idol offerings may be taken as a general rule: "I think that nothing is unclean in Christ; but to him who regards anything as unclean, to him it is .
. if he eat, he is condemned in his bad faith.''"44 Thus if anyone does a good act in the belief that it is evil, it becomes evil for him to the extent of his conviction. If I agree to this, you want to know further why the converse is not true, so that an evil act would become good to the extent that one believed it so.
You say that it seems strange and even unfair that the human understanding should be more powerful in evil than in good. If I answer that it is natural for the "evil eye" to produce an evil effect, you will probably reply that it ought to be even more natural for the "simple eye" to produce a good effect. He who said that the whole body is cast into darkness by an evil eye, also said that a simple eye made it full of light. But you should ask whether the eye which is deceived is truly simple, since he who takes evil for 112. Cf. 1 Cor 8:7ff.
TEZNCE F dam Aca, 114. Cf. Rom 14:14, 23; Bernard's reading differs from the Vulgate, the latter giving a somewhat different meaning: "I am confident in the Lord
Jesus that nothing is of itself unclean.
. ."
115. Cf. Mt 6:22f.
On Precept and Dispensation
good is as mistaken as he who takes good for evil. Don't you see that they both incur the Prophet's curse, "Woe to you who call good evil and evil good?""6 Let no one then try to dodge this thrust of the Prophet by quoting the words of Truth about the simple eye which is the "light" of the whole "body" of an action.
God. forbid that there could be any disagreement between the Herald of Truth and Truth itself, one cursing what the other approves.
36. I believe two things are necessary for the interior eye to be truly simple; that is, charity in the intention and truth in the choice.
If one loves the good but does not choose the true, he has the zeal of God, but not according to knowledge.!" Indeed I fail to see how in the judgment of Truth true simplicity can co-exist with error.
Wishing to instruct his disciples concerning true simplicity, the Master said: "Be therefore prudent as serpents and simple as doves."148 He puts prudence first, for without it, no one can be properly simple. How can that eye be truly simple which cannot see the truth? Or indeed how can that be called true simplicity which is ignorant of the simple truth? But it is written: "The ignorant should be ignored.''!" It is plain then that this simplicity which is praised by Our Lord presupposes these two conditions: good will and prudence. A man needs not only a warm and undeceiving heart but a keen and undeceived eye as well.
37. Just as the truly simple eye requires both love of the good and knowledge of the true, so the evil eye is the result of the two opposite qualities: blindness which prevents one from recognizing the truth, and perversity which leads one to love evil. Between this double good which is neither deceitful nor deceived and this double evil which is both perverted and perverse lie two intermediate states. One of these is good, for its inner eye retains its good zeal and is not party to the deception of which it is the ignorant victim.
The other is evil for although it is not opposed to the knowledge of the true, malice makes it insensible to the love of the good.
TLOW IS 5220:
117. Cf. Rom 10:2.
118. Mt 10:16.
119. Cf.
1 Cor 14:38 (variant reading). The Vulgate text has "if anyone ignores this, let him be ignored."
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux 38. Since all things are best understood by making distinctions, we may discern a fourfold gradation in the eye of the heart, according to this twofold evil and that double good. On the one hand we have the good and the better, and on the other the bad and the worse. But let us take a few examples. First there is the man who loves good, but does evil unwittingly. His eye is good, since he has good will, but it is not simple, because it is blind. Then there is another who both freely does the good and prudently discerns it.
He has a truly simple eye, for he lacks neither quality, having both knowledge and good zeal. It is for an eye like this that God's own eye searches when he looks out over the sons of men to see if any understand or seek him.!?° On the other hand, there is the man who does not love good, but rather hates it in his perversity. He has knowledge still, but uses it to further his evil designs. I cannot call him ignorant or blind, but I do not call him evil either, for he still has the one good of truth; though he uses it to harm himself.
39. Lastly there is the man who may do the objective good which he hates, but only by mistake. Rightly I would say he is evil, for he lacks no evil, he is both blind and perverse. He is said to be evil or empty, because he is void of any good at all,"* without knowledge of the true or love of the good.
Concerning our first example the Prophet says: "Ephraim is like unto an ensnared dove, which has lost heart,''!22 for though he is not deceitful, he is none the less prone to be deceived. The second is that "simple eye" mentioned by the Lord when he taught the Apostles: "Be therefore wise as serpents, and simple as doves.''128
It is neither deceitful nor easily deceived.
40. It is the Lord again who says: "The children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light,"'!24 characterizT20nCh PsA.
121. Bernard has here an untranslated play on words: Dicitur siquidem nequam, quasi nequaquam, ut is solummodo nequam appelletur, qui nequaquam, hoc est, in nullo penitus, appareat bonus...
122. Hos 7:11.
123. Mt 10:16.
124. Lk 16:8.
On Precept and Dispensation
ing thus the malice of those who deceive, but who are not themselves readily deceived. Such an eye is singly evil.
As for him whom we have called evil or empty, he is doubly evil.
His malice gives birth to ignorance which in turn confounds the malice producing it. He often fails in his evil purpose and unwittingly does the good instead.
"Their foolish hearts are darkened," and 'they are, as it were, already "delivered up to a reprobate sense,''!°6 so that they cannot love or discern the good.
Of these it is written, "The wicked, having plumbed the depths of sin, reach contempt,"??" for a man like this does not wish to avoid evil if he could. Nor does he know how to avoid it, should he try.
Ihave put him last on the list, not because his malice is greater than that of him who sins with open eyes, but because it is more dangerous. He feels secure in his ignorance, and this false security fosters torpor rather than malice. The other has but the single evil of a bad intention; this man has also a false perspective, and is certainly in a worse state. He also lacks true judgment while the other lacks only the quality of good zeal. I believe it was to him and to his opposite who possesses these two qualities which he lacks, that Truth was referring when he spoke of the simple and the evil eye which render the whole body either radiant or wrapped in darkness.128 The other two we have mentioned have something of darkness and something of light, and hence cannot be classified as totally pervaded by either.
41. But to get back to your difficulty; if such a one is completely evil, though he does good maliciously and blindly, thinking it to be evil, this good act of his becomes actually evil for him to the extent of his mistaken belief. That is what Our Lord meant by saying that his whole body is dark.12® What light can remain where both good intention and true judgment are lacking? But it does not follow from this that he who does evil, thinking it to be good, is therefore credited with a good act. How so? It is because his eye is not simple as required by the word of Truth, in order for the whole body ofhis
125. Rom 1:21.
126. Rom 1:28.
127. Prov 18:53.
128. Cf. Mt 6:22f.
129. Ibid.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux act to be clothed with the light of goodness,!8° as we have already outlined. In fact, it has an element of darkness, for ignorance clouds over the light of its good will. Since the other has both kinds of evil, but this one only one kind of good, it follows that the former is more powerful in evil than the latter in doing good. One good quality cannot counterbalance two evil qualities.
I admit, of course, that the good intention 'is praiseworthy and that the good will does not lose its due reward in spite of the evil it has done; yet the simplicity which can be so deceived is certainly tinged with evil. "But," you may protest, "was it not done in good faith?" In faith indeed, but in false faith; or rather in no faith, for false faith is really not faith at all. In fact, I believe the Apostle was referring to true faith only and not to false faith when he said,
"All that is not of faith is sin."!84 True faith can never take evil for good, for that would be falsehood and hence a species of sin. This text, "All that is not of faith is sin," may be applied to both blind malice and erring innocence, because on the one hand anything done in ignorance, even if it might be good in itself, is totally vitiated by an evil intention. On the other hand a good intention does not suffice to completely excuse an act which is evil.
Therefore, if you perform an evil act in the belief that it is good or a good act in the belief that it is evil, you have sinned in either case, since you have not acted in faith. However, the sin would certainly be lighter in the case of an outwardly evil act done with an upright intention than when an apparently good act is done with an evil intention. Still any act which has the least taint of evil is not fully good. How then can such a defective good have an efficacy comparable to that of pure evil, so that the one should counterbalance the other?
Enough nowon this matter. As to those questions you may think I am ignoring, I believe I have already sufficiently answered them.
You often twist the same question about and repeat it with but slight variations, and I see no need of going into all that. Even when a question has been repeated over and over, a single answer is all that is required.
130. Cf. Mt 6:22.
131. Rom 14:23.
On Precept and Dispensation
The proportionate merit and gravity of obedience and disobedience XV. 42. However, since your main question was about the obligations of obedience and the various sorts of disobedience, we may go into the side question you raised concerning the merit of these; that is, whether' the evil of disobeying a given precept be proportionate to the good of fulfilling it. For example, Abraham's sacrifice of his son,182 or that nameless father who is said to have risked his son's life in a fiery furnace ;!83 would these holy men have merited a measure of divine wrath and chastisement proportionate to the praise and the favor they actually gained, had they failed to obey? You are of the opinion that such is the case though you consider it severe, but you are wrong.
There are certain acts which merit glory when performed, but which can be omitted without fault. Consequently, if they are done they are fittingly rewarded, but if they are not done, there is no punishment. For instance, it is no little virtue not to touch a woman,1** but if a man embrace his own wife there is surely no fault in it. Under this heading fall all those evangelical counsels to which are aptly applied the words: "Let him accept it who can."1%
43. On the other hand there are acts which cannot be omitted without sin, but which are no particular credit to their authors.
Those who scorn them will perish, but those who perform them get no glory. Such are the precepts of the natural law, binding on all men, and without which no one can be saved. Even the gentiles had a saying about it: " 'Iam no robber,' he said; and I answered,
'Then you need not feed the crows from the cross.' ''156 So too the Gospel: "If you love those who love you, what reward shall you have? And if you salute your brethren only, what are you doing more than others?''!%? And again in more general terms, "When
132. Cf. Gen 22.
133. Cf. Vitae Patrum, 5:14:18 (PL 73:952).
1344 Cr.1 Cor 7st.
135. Mt 19:12.
136. Horace, Epistolae, 1:16:46ff., trans.
E. Wickham, Horace for English Readers (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 300.
137. Mt 5:46f.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux you have done everything that was commanded you, say, 'We are unprofitable servants who have only done our duty.' 7 It is as if he had said: "If you are content with the precepts and customs imposed upon you by law without freely embracing my counsels and recommendations for perfection, you have done your duty, but you are hardly heroes; you have escaped punishment, but won no crown."
How then need we feel compelled to fear a chastisement for our every disobedience proportionate to the reward we may hope to win by obedience? On the contrary, we may take it as a general rule in these matters, that if the thing commanded is difficult, the merit of obedience exceeds the guilt of refusal, but that if the matter is easy the guilt of disobedience outweighs the merit of compliance.
The promise of local Stability WVI.
44. Now if we may take that as settled, we can proceed to examine that local stability to which we commit ourselves at profession and to determine what, if any, circumstances would postulate or justify our changing it. It seems you also have some difficulty on this point.
I may now confidently reply that one is never justified in defaulting when he has promised by vow to do a good act. Hence,
I would never advise anyone to abandon the place which he has freely chosen and where he has promised with his own lips to remain; nor would St Gregory, for he says: "Even a perfect man will watch himself very carefully, lest he lapse into some less perfect thought or deed.'
What this apostolic man felt, that the Apostle was proud to see fulfilled in himself, as he said: "Forgetting what is behind, I strain forward to what is ahead.''4° Does not the Prophet Ezekiel express thesame idea in his description of the living creatures: ""They never went backward when they moved, but each marched straight
138. Lk 17:10.
139. St Gregory, On Ezekiel, 1:9 (PL 76:814b).
140. Phil 3:13.
On Precept and Dispensation
ahead.""241 All these are of like mind, for they are the servants 0 him who said: "No man having put his hand to the plow and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.""!42
The contract of stability then, rules out henceforth any feeble relapse, angry departure, aimless or curious wandering, and every vagary of fickleness; but it does not rule out what the monk promises with his next breath in the formula of profession. I mean conversion of manners and obedience according to the Rule. If he is impeded in observing these by the irreligious and vicious habits of his brethren, I would counsel him to remove to some other place under the guidance of the Spirit of liberty, where he may be more free to live as he has engaged himself by vow to do. Indeed, with the holy, one may become holy, but with the perverse, perverted.14%
45. For all that, I would never advise any member of a proper and well regulated monastery, even out of a desire for a stricter observance, to change his residence without permission from his superiors. Should one have already done this, however, and settled himself in a more perfect life, I would then counsel him to remain and not return to the less perfect life he has relinquished for something better; the more so if heis better able to fulfill his original vows in the second monastery than in the first. Let him remind himself of his motive and purpose in undertaking this stricter or more perfect life. I could never counsel him to return to the less perfect, for that would be a species of apostasy — that is unless he has not gone far, for in that case the Rule is clear: a monk from a known monastery cannot be kept or even received without the consent of his abbot.
But let me illustrate these things by giving a concrete example.
46. Suppose a monk of the Cluniac observance wishes to embrace the more austere poverty of the Cistercians, considering that there he may find a purer observance of the Rule without the accretions of so many customs. Should he ask my opinion I would discourage him, at least if he did not have the consent of his abbot in this design of his.
141. Ezek 1:9 (cf. n. 139).
142. Lk 9:62.
143. Ps 18:26.
144. RB 61:13.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux Why? Well, first of all, to prevent any scandal to those whom he would be leaving. Secondly, because it is hardly safe to leave a certain good for an uncertain hope. Perhaps he will not be able to measure up to the higher standard, whereas he is now within his capacity. Thirdly, I should be on my guard against instability of character in such a one, for that which one lightly desires when he does not have it may well become insupportable once experienced.
This sort of foolish levity is only too common, for people unreasonably want a thing one moment and reject it the next. How many do we not see who can scarcely abide in one mind a single hour? Propelled by the winds of their fancy, they flit here and there as if intoxicated, changing their minds at every turn, or rather floating about without any mind at all. Every place they go, they come up with new plans and projects, always desiring what they have not, and sick of what is now in their grasp.
47. Someone perhaps will inquire, "But how can I with a good conscience live a life which is not in full accord with the Rule I have professed? If I do not keep my vow, am I not a perjurer?"' As if there would not be even more grounds for complaint elsewhere once you had begun to live completely according to the Rule. Yes, even then you would be asking, "How can I bear to live outside of my original monastery with a quiet conscience—that harbor which sheltered me when I first fled from the world, which instructed me in the paths of virtue and set me on the road to salvation! How can I thus offend my brethren, disobey my father, and to crown all, break my promise of stability, playing false to my first loyalty"
But truly, I say, neither of these complaints is just. He who thinks it perjury not to observe the Rule in its purity, has I think, paid scant attention to what he actually promised. No one at profession really promises "the Rule," but specifically, that he will act
"according to the Rule" in the inception and pursuit of his holy undertaking. This sort of profession formula has, in our day, been adopted by almost all monks. However, God is served in many diverse ways in the various monasteries. So long as one carefully observes the good customs of his house he is beyond any doubt
On Precept and Dispensation IAI living according to the Rule, for the Rule admits of variations in local customs.
Whoever then holds fast to the good which he finds ready at hand in the place where he has made profession is certainly living as he had promised, for this was doubtless his intention when he pronounced his vows: to imitate and share in the virtuous life of the brethren of that monastery.
48. What then? Must the monks of Tours!® adopt the customs of Cluny, or should Cluny give place to Tours? Would you perhaps have both adopt the strict literal interpretation of Citeaux:
We have indeed all professed the same Rule, and even in the very same words, but since the implicit intention is different in each case, different observances can undoubtedly be followed in different places without fear of perjury or perdition. Even among good
Christians, everybody does not keep everything in the Gospel, although they all live according to the Gospel. Thus those who are content to contract a legitimate marriage do not feel that they have abandoned the Gospel in not choosing to follow the sublime counsel of celibacy, that is, as long as they faithfully fulfill the duties of their own state. It is so too with those who undertake to live according to the Rule. Even if they do not keep it all "'to a hair"
(as the saying goes), and even if they change or omit certain details according to the customs of their house, as long as they are faithful to what is locally accepted as a "'sober, just and pious life,"146 they are truly living the Rule. Such conduct is, in fact, recommended by the Rule itself in the eighth degree of humility: "That a monk do nothing that is not sanctioned by the customs of the house, or the example of the seniors.'
49. Of course, it is a different matter for the Cistercians and for those who, like them, have promised an integral literal observance of the Rule rather than life according to the Rule, since such is their interpretation of monastic profession.
> 145. Lit. "in the Great Monastery," in Maiore Monasteria. The reference is to the proto-monastery near Tours which looks back to St Martin as its founder.
146Lit 2:12.
PAT 755%
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux For the rest, let no one be disturbed by his solemn profession according to the Rule so long as he is faithful to obedience, for he has not promised to observe the Rule in its entirety. This is valid at least for those monasteries where the local customs are based on good order and discipline. Let the proper interpretation of profession be maintained in each monastery, safeguarding what is proper to each and provided that an upright intention be also maintained.
If anyone, still unquiet and dissatisfied with this reasoning, would give way to the prompting of conscience and leave his monastery in search of some better means of accomplishing what he considers himself to have promised and thus far defaulted in, I could not approve his departure, but neither would I urge his return, so long as he has withdrawn to a distant and unknown house.
Why so? Both because of the Pauline pronouncement regarding the blessedness of him "who does not condemn himself by what he approves,'148 and because of the authority of our Legislator who orders such a one to be received and kept. In fact, if he be found good and helpful, it is recommended that he be kept for good:
"Let him be then persuaded to stay on."!*9 Lest such a one be disturbed later by the usual scruples concerning his former house and his broken promise, our Father goes on to console him with these wise words: "For we everywhere serve the one God and fight for the one King."45° However, what is recommended in the case of a pilgrim monk is forbidden in the case of a neighbor; lest there be matter for scandal and friction between neighboring monasteries if they receive each other's monks without mutual consent. Our own experience has repeatedly proven the folly of presuming to set aside this provision of the Rule.
50. If then, a brother has been thus regularly incorporated into another monastery and is nonetheless disquieted by the remembrance of the scandal he may have caused to his former brethren, proposing to repair the fault by returning, let him reflect that it is of no profit to substitute one scandal for another. What sort of a remedy is it to repair one scandal by creating another? Indeed the 148. Rom 14:22
149. RB 61:9.
150. RB 61:10.
On Precept and Dispensation 143. first scandal is more bearable than the projected apostasy and more easily forgiven, since it was occasioned by ptaiseworthy intentions.
Certainly it was safer to follow your conscience, in spite of the scandal, in what you considered to be better, than to stay in your first place and profession against your conscience; although you could do that too if you eauld convince your conscience.
§1.Ican think of no better conclusion to this little discussion than to refer you again to the judgment of the Apostle concerning scandals in eating. If one brother is impelled by conscience to change his house in order (as he sees it) not to break his vows, let him not therefore despise those who remain behind; if another stands fast in good faith and fraternal unity and avoids scandalizing his brethren, let him not judge the former.1*1 Here you have the best solution which I can offer to this question, although perhaps someone else may be able to offer you a better one.
XVI. 52. You would have me explain why St Gregory permitted a certain brother Venard to return to the sacraments as a secular after having spurned the monastic habit which he had formerly worn with piety.4? Also you want to know how St Augustine could put the law of matrimony before the vow of chastity, since he seems to hold in his book on virginity! that the matrimonial contract is to be considered as indissolubly binding even for those who have bound themselves by vow to a life of evangelical chastity and subsequently, deceived by the devil, have broken their vows and married.
For the present I see no clearer or briefer answer to these questions than to say that this is what these holy Bishops maintain. Let
151. Cl Rom 14:3.
152. Cf. St Gregory, Letter 43, bk. 6 (PL 77:830); trans. J. Barmby, Selected'
Epistles of St Gregory the Great (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, second series,
New York: Christian Literature, 1895), vol. 12, p. 201. There are eight other letters dealing with this Venard or Venantius, his wife and daughters (cf. op. cit., p. 84).
153. Cf. St Augustine, "On the Good of Widowhood," 13f. (PL 40:438 seq.); trans. C. Cornish, The Works of St Augustine (Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers, first series New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905), vol. 3, p. 446.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux them answer for themselves whether they are right. When there is any question concerning the opinions or deeds of the Fathers, I hold fast to that saying of the Apostle: that among dispensers we should seek a man who is trustworthy.%4 I am quite sure that whether they spoke under divine inspiration or on their own authority, they are as trustworthy in this instance as in any other; the one in disposing the matter before him, the other in writing what he thought.
53. Then you asked about those bishops whom the same Pope Gregory commanded to live for a time in a monastery because of their excesses.4°° Did they wear the holy habit, or their ordinary clothes? I simply do not know, but it seems credible that the habit would not have been given to transients who sought only quiet in the seclusion of the monastery and an opportunity for penance.
Monastic life: a second baptism 54. You have also asked my opinion on monastic profession considered as a second baptism. Why has our way of life rather than other penitential callings merited the prerogative of this appellation? I think it is because of the more perfect renouncement of the world and the singular excellence of such a spiritual way of life. It makes those who live it and love it stand out from other men as rivals of the angels and as hardly men at all; for it restores the divine image in the human soul and makes us Christlike, much as baptism does. It is also like another baptism in that we mortify the earthly side of our nature,15* so that we may be more and more clothed with Christ," being thus again "buried in the likeness of his death."°* Just as in baptism we are delivered from the power of darkness and carried over into the kingdom of light,®® so likewise in the second regeneration of this holy profession we are refashioned in the light of virtue, being delivered, not now from 154. 1 Cor 4:2.
155. St Gregory, Letter 45, bk. 13 (PL 77:1294¢).
156. Cf. Col 3:5.
157 Cte Galgeoms 158. Rom 6:5.
159. Gia @ola-13)
On Precept and Dispensation 145, the unique darkness of original sin, but from many actual sins, according to that cry of the Apostle: "The night is far advanced, and the day is at hand.''16° Whether a 'change of abbot favors a change of monastery
XVII. 55. You have also asked to be enlightened as to whether a change of abbot might favor the design of a monk who wishes to change his monastery; that is, whether the death or resignation of a superior in any way affects the freedom of his subjects, so that during the interval before a successor is named they might go where they please. To this I reply: by no means! After all, the promise of profession when made according to custom in the oratory takes. the abbot's presence as its witness, not his life as its term. Let the term of the contract be the monk's own life, not someone else's.
Listen now to what our Legislator has both thought and written:
"If he ever do otherwise," that is other than he has promised, "let him know that he will be condemned by God, whom he mocks."14
Again he says that the monk "is not to have even his own body henceforth at his free disposal,"6? and in another place he speaks. of "persevering in the monastery until death.''16
Except then for the special cases which have been outlined above, let no monk ever forsake the house of his profession during his life-time, at least not by his own choice. Otherwise he stands. self-condemned, having broken his solemn word.
Which is safer for a monk: to remain in bitterness or to seek peace elsewhere?
56. But you go on to plead consideration for special difficulties:
"What if one be unable to remain without constant rancor in his. heart, due to an unhappy or irregular election of the new abbot:""
160. Rom 13:12.
161. RB 63:18.
TO22 RIB 33cAer58s2Se 163. RB, Prol. so.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux I am reminded now of the Gospel scene where Our Lord instructs the Apostles concerning the obligations of matrimony, whereupon they exclaim, "If such be the case, it is not expedient to marry!'"164
Indeed, it is a difficult matter: nothing could be more burdensome than to live with a hateful woman, but it would be most unchristian to break up the marriage.
It is much the same with a monk who cannot abide in his monastery lest he die of mental strain induced by rancor, and cannot depart either, lest he break his vow. What counsel can I give to such a person? That he leave? But that would be unlawful because of his profession. That he stay? That would not do, because of his rancor. You offer me two things equally dangerous and unhappy, so that whatever I reply, it will not be to your profit. You ask which is safer for a monk, to remain with rancor in his own monastery under an illegitimate superior or to seek peace elsewhere. It is rather as if one who had determined on suicide were to ask me if he should throw himself into the fire or over the precipice. He burns indeed who lives in hate, and he falls fatally who breaks his vow.
Perhaps my best exit from this dilemma is to follow the lead of your subsequent remarks. You say that by "irregular election" you mean one which is so tangled and involved that, although it is doubtless invalid in God's eyes, its invalidity is difficult if not impossible to prove to the satisfaction of men.
Iam reminded now of that saying in Proverbs: ""He who would abandon a friend seeks a pretext.""16 How can you call an election irregular if you cannot prove it? Have you never heard the saying: "If it can't be proven, it is nothing to me?"
"But," you will plead, "how can I obey one whom I know to be unworthy, even though the facts are not public:"" My brethren, have you never read in your Rule that Rule of Truth which says:
"The scribes and pharisees have sat on the chair of Moses; ..
. do what they tell you, but do not act according to their example :"166
164. Mt 19:10.
165. Prov 18:1.
166. Mt 23:3; RB 4:61.
On Precept and Dispensation
XIX. 57. As to changing your clothes or washing them when they have been defiled during the night, I will be brief in my reply. I would advise each one to follow the practice of his own house in these matters, for such customs vary considerably. Concerning these customs which are observed in most monasteries and which I had almost forgotten about, I think what I have said above on diverse customs in relation to stability can be applied here as well; so there is no need to repeat.
I will pass over several of your legal questions, for such things do not pertain to monks, and you can easily look them up yourselves if you care to take the trouble.
Should an angry person approach the altar?
58. I come now to those three questions contained in your other letter, the first of which amounts to this: How would you advise a person who is angry with another, not to the extent of wishing to harm him, but yet enough so that he would be glad to see harm befall this person? May one approach the altar in these dispositions, or should one rather stay away until the disturbance has passed?
I can only say that I hope I will never find myself going to the altar of peace in such a state, or partaking with wrath and quarrelsomeness of the sacrament in which God is unquestionably present,
"reconciling the world to himself.' If God will not receive my gift until I have restored peace to any brother whom I may remember having offended,!** how much less will he do so if I haven't even restored peace within myself.
Saint Paul: "Our conversation is in heaven... ."
XX. 59. Your next question is on the apparent disparity between the two Pauline texts: "Our conversation is in heaven,''!® and, "So 167. 2 Cor §:19.
168. Cf. Mt 5:24.
169. Phil 3:20.
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux long as we remain in the body, we are exiled from the Lord.''!"°
How can the soul be exiled from the Lord in the body, and at the same time be in heaven with the Lord? The Apostle himself gives the answer elsewhere, saying: "For we know in part and we prophesy in part.'"!71 In so far as we have this knowledge, contemplating these things as present, we are already with the Lord, but to the extent that we prophesy of what is yet beyond, abiding in faith and hope, rather than in understanding and vision, we know bodily exile.
"But when that which is perfect has come," that is, the light of glory which shall be ours in the resurrection, "then that which is only partial shall be done away with,"?"? that is, all the bodily infirmities which accompany our present prolonged exile in the body. It was these last he was bemoaning when he lamented:
"Unhappy man that Iam, who will deliver me from the body of this death:"}" Notice that he does not complain of the body as such, but of the body "'of this death," that is in its present state of corruption, showing that the body itself is not the cause of its exile, but rather its infirmities.
Again we read that, "The corruptible body weighs down the soul."!74 Note well that this is said of the "corruptible" body rather than simply of the body, since it is the corruption which constitutes the burden. Consequently, those who groan within themselves, await not the loss, but the liberation of their bodies.1%
Weighed down then, not with the companionship, but rather with the infirmities of this body, we wish to be dissolved and to be with Christ,1"* so that our partial exile may be terminated and that the partial beatitude which we have commenced to enjoy may become perfect.
60. One may also connect the words, "Our conversation is in heaven,"!"" with that other saying of the Apostle, "We are saved by hope."!"8 Therefore it is hope which allows us to dwell already in heaven, while our bodies are yet in exile.
T7On2 1 Cors 36. rig/its, 11 Olep wT).
72-1 Cori :to.
173. Rom 7:24.
174. Wis 9:15.
075. Ch Rom 8:23.
176. Cf. Phil 1:23.
177. Phil. 3:20.
178. Rom 8:24.
On Precept and Dispensation
Again one might say that we are partly bound to our bodies and partly to the Lord: bound to our bodies by bonds of life and feeling, and bound to the Lord by faith and love. Yes, love, for the soul abides no less in what it loves than in what it animates; unless perhaps unwilling necessity is considered to be a stronger bond than free and ardent choice. Indeed, ""Where your treasure is, there also is your heart."!"° Again, if the soul lives by the love of God just as the body lives by the soul, how I ask can one contend that it is more present where it gives life than where it receives it? Love is the fountain of life, and the soul which does not drink from it cannot be said to live. But how could it drink if it were far from this fountain, this love, which is its God:1®°
It follows then that he who loves God is with God according to the measure of his love.181 Insofar as he fails to love, to that extent he is yet in exile. He shows less love of God when he is occupied with bodily necessities. Indeed what is this occupation with the things of the body, but a certain absence from the Lord: If we are absent, are we not in exile? Precisely, in bodily exile from the Lord.
Our intention is encumbered by the needs of the body and our love is wearied by its care.
The Gospel saying: 'Your reward is great in heaven."
61. Towards the end of your second letter you ask what I think is meant by that Gospel promise, "Behold, your reward is great in heaven."182
It seems your curiosity has been aroused by St Augustine's comment** that this does not refer to any visible or material heaven, nor is our reward to be found in any passing or 179. Mt 6:21.
PRON Chi) i 425,010:
181. We have here one of St Bernard's more beautiful epigrams: Praesens igitur Deo est qui Deum amat in quantum amat.
182. Lk 6:23.
183. Cf. St Augustine, "Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount," 1:15 (PL 34:1236 seq.); trans. W. Findlay, The Works of St Augustine (Nicene and PostNicene Fathers, first series, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905), vol.
Ops 8:
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux changeable thing, but that the reference is to some spiritual heaven for which, you say, you don't even know where to look.
But note well these words: "The Kingdom of God is within you, 284 and "Christ dwells by faith in your hearts,''6> that is, as a king in his own realm. Again, "The sufferings of this time are unworthy to be compared to the glory that shall be revealed in us.'286 He does not say that it will be shown to us, as if it were something outside of us, but he says "'in us," hinting thus that it is already there, but as yet invisible. And again, "All the beauty of the King's daughter is within,"!®' or yet again, "Man shall come to a deep heart,'"18* for he "'has arranged steps in this heart.''1°°
Finally, "The just soul is the seat of Wisdom''!*° for that is doubtless the meaning of the text, "Heaven is my throne."!
So now if you will ponder these and many other similar passages in Scripture, you will learn that the kingdom of God and his justice are to be sought within your own souls rather than outside of or above them. I am here using the terms "outside" and "above" in their literal sense; as for instance heaven is outside the earth, and the sun, the moon, and the stars are above it. For the realities which are within us in virtue of the subtlety of their invisible nature are also above us in the sublime dignity of their excellence and outside of us in the immensity of their majesty. But these are deep matters and would require more careful study, not to mention a more studious writer and a longer work.
Thad hoped to confine myself to the limits of a letter in discussing these matters, but I now perceive that I have already exceeded that measure. You may consequently call this a book rather than a letter if it so pleases you. Long or short, I felt obliged to give you some reply, and I have done my best.
184. Lk 17:21.
185. Eph 3:17.
186. Rom 8:18.
187. Ps 44:14 (Vulgate).
188. Ps 63:7 (Vulgate).
189. Ps 83:6 (Vulgate).
190. A variant reading of Prov 12:23: "The clever man hides wisdom," which St Gregory cites as: "The just soul is the seat of Wisdom," in his
Thirty-eighth Gospel Homily (PL 76:1282).
191. Is 66:1.
MONASTIC LITURGY
PROLOGUE TO THE CISTERCIAN
ANTIPHONARY
INTRODUCTION
F THE SEVERAL DOCUMENTS
connected with the Cistercian chant reform conducted under St Bernard's aegis sometime not long before 1147, only one authentic document bears his name, i.e., the Prologus in Antiphonarium quod
Cistercienses canunt ecclesiae. The title Prologus is well attested by the earliest and best manuscripts; but it falls short of an adequate description of this document written by Bernard as an introduction to the reformed Cistercian Antiphonary of ca. 1147. Redacted according to the norms of twelfth-century curial documents, our
Prologus is actually nothing less than the official act of promulgation of the reformed Antiphonary.
Every such official act required in the body of the text a summary historical account providing the pertinent background for an understanding of the object of the act, which was expressed in the dispositio, or concluding section of the document. Thus, Bernard's
Prologus can be expected to provide us with at least a few details useful for our understanding of the liturgical reform in which he figured.
Date No date of promulgation is specified in our document, and General Chapter records are too lacunose to be of help in providing a precise year. Thanks to the twelfth-century Life of St Stephen of 1$3
The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux Obazine, written by a disciple of the hero, we may settle on a year in the vicinity of 1147. According to the author, Stephen and his colony of erstwhile hermits organized their community life along the lines of the flourishing Cistercian Order, while remaining quite independent of it juridically. As early as 1142, they had received a set of Cistercian liturgical books. Only a half-decade later, in 1147, Stephen's community was officially received into the Order. But the Cistercian books of Obazine now had to be revised, since they no longer conformed with the Order's recently reformed liturgy. Thus, the Bernardine reform must have been effected sometime between 1142 and 1147.1
Manuscripts and editions The relative rarity of manuscripts is easily explained. Though the body of chant books often remained relatively unchanged for centuries, calendars making up the first folios underwent a continual evolution, calling at times for replacement with new folios.
Thus, many liturgical books are often found to lack the initial folios of the original manuscript. Since our Prologus was meant to appear on the very first folio, its disappearance from many antiphonary manuscripts was all but inevitable. Still, a sufficient number of manuscripts from the twelfth and later centuries have survived to allow for the establishment of a critical text by Dom Jean Leclercq and Dom H. M. Rochais, S. Bernardi Opera, Ill (Rome, 1963), pp515-516 (with introductory notes, pp. 511-513). Though the text contains more than one difficult phrase, variants are few and insignificant.
Of the eight manuscripts listed in the elenchus of manuscripts, op. cit, pp. 512-513, only four are from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries:
1. Cf. Vita beati Stephani abbatis monasterii Obazinensis, the twelfth-century Life referred to above, but first edited only in 1683, by Etienne Baluze. In the same editor's later edition, the pertinent passage from ch. 13 of bk. II may be read in his Miscellanea, I, (Lucca, 1761), p. 161.