Wisdom and Love in Saint Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas Lecture 16)
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The Aquinas Lecture, 1951
Wisdom and Love in Saint Thomas Aquinas
Étienne Gilson
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ISBN 0-87462-116-X
Copyright © 1995
Marquette University Press
Third Printing, 1995
Published in the United States of America
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Prefatory
The Aristotelian Society of Marquette University each year invites a scholar to deliver a lecture in honor of St. Thomas Aquinas. Customarily delivered on the Sunday nearest March 7th, the feast day of the Society's patron saint, these lectures are called the Aquinas lectures.
In 1951 the Society had the pleasure of recording a lecture by Etienne Gilson of the Académie Française given Mar. 18.
Étienne Henri Gilson was born June 13, 1884 at Paris. He received his Agrégé in 1907 and became Docteur-ès-Lettres in 1913. At the Sorbonne he was a pupil of Lucien Levy-Bruhl who taught him historical method and suggested the study of Descartes' borrowings from Scholasticism, a work which led him to St. Thomas Aquinas and
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the middle ages, the principal concern of his scholarly career. He was also a pupil, at the Collége de France, of Henri Bergson, "whose lectures" he recently said "still remain in my memory as so many hours of intellectual transfiguration," and whom he calls "the only living master in philosophy" he ever had.
In 1913 he taught at the University of Lille. During the first world war he was a machine-gunnery captain in the French army, was captured at Verdun and spent his time in a German prisoner of war camp writing and studying. After the war, in 1919, he joined the faculty of the University of Strasbourg. In 1921 he returned to the Sorbonne, this time to teach, and remained there until 1932 when he was elected to the Collége de France. He was Professor of the Philosophy of the Middle Ages at the Collége de France until 1950 when he retired. In 1929 he also became Director of
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Studies and Professor of the History of Mediaeval Philosophy at the newly established Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, Canada, of which he is a co-founder and which in 1939 was raised to a Pontifical Institute by Pius XII. He continues in that position now.
Professor Gilson has held notable lectureships. In 1930 and 1931 he gave the Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland; in 1936-37 he gave the William James lectures at Harvard; in 1937, the Richards lectures at the University of Virginia, and in 1940, the Mahlon Powell lectures at the University of Indiana.
Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyenâge
Études de Philosophie Médiévale,
Études de Theologie et d'Histoire de la Spiritualité,
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Mediaeval Studies,
Professor Gilson is a member of the French Academy, the Royal Academy of Holland, the British Academy, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas at Rome.
He has received many honorary degrees: Doctor of Letters (D.Litt.) from Oxford University; Doctor of Laws (LL.D.) from the University of Aberdeen, Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania; Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) from Rome, University of Milan and the University of Montreal.
He is president of the Franco-Canadian Institute, president of the Society of Catholic Authors at Paris, a member of the Se-
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cours Catholique International and of Pax Romana, before which he has lectured in Rome.
Professor Gilson entered the Conseil de la Republique, the upper house or senate of the present French government in 1946. He was technical adviser to the French delegation to the San Francisco Conference that same year, composing the French text of the Charter of the United Nations. He was also a French delegate to UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, for which he also wrote the French text.
Professor Gilson has published the following volumes up to September 1951:
Index scolastico-cartésien,
La Liberté chez Descartes et la théologie,
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Études de philosophie médiévale.
La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure,
The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure,
Discours de la Méthode
Saint Thomas d'Aquin,
Moral Values and the Moral Life,
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Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation de système cartésien,
L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale
The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy,
Les Idées et les Lettres,
Pour un ordre catholique,
La Théologie mystique de Saint Bernard,
The Mystical Theology of St. Bernard,
Saint Thomas Aquinas,
Proceedings of the British Academy,
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Le Réalisme methódique,
Christianisme et philosophie,
Christianity and Philosophy,
The Unity of Philosophical Experience
Mediaeval Universalism and Its Present Value
Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages
Héloïse et Abélard,
Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance,
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Dante et la philosophie,
God and Philosophy
Introduction a l'étude de Saint Augustin,
La Philosophie au moyen-âge,
Théologie et histoire de la spiritualité,
Le Thomisme,
The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,
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Philosophie et Incarnation selon Saint Augustin
History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education
L'Etre et l'essence
Being and Some Philosophers,
L'École des muses
Heloise and Abelard
Jean Duns Scot, Introduction à ses positions fondamentales
Wisdom and Love in St. Thomas Aquinas
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Wisdom and Love in Saint Thomas Aquinas
All students of philosophy are supposed to learn it from professors, who in their turn, are supposed to teach it. After learning it for three, four, or five years, some students at least are supposed to know philosophy so well that they are considered as qualified to teach it. If they do teach it, they have to follow programs, to use textbooks, to prescribe readings, to ask questions and to discuss answers to these questions; in short, they have to make sure that their own students learn philosophy in their turn and even, if possible, that they acquire the habit of discussing problems in a truly philosoph-
ical way. All this is necessary and, taken in itself, it is also excellent. Philosophy is undoubtedly a ''learning'' and, for this very reason, it has always been both taught and learned. Yet there was a time, in ancient Greece, when philosophy used to be quite something else, namely, a certain way and manner of life. It was, precisely, a life wholly dedicated to the pursuit of wisdom.
There are good reasons to fear that this second aspect of philosophy has lost its importance in the modern world. One might even wonder whether it is not in danger of being almost entirely forgotten.
The general trend of modern life is against the idea of philosophy as a way of life. Today, learning is sold by big department stores called colleges or universities where students can buy, as advertised, the kind of knowledge which suits their taste or answers their needs. Even their taste does
not necessarily betray any very fervid inclination. I remember a university where students had to choose between philosophy and mathematics. It was surprising to see for how many of them the fear of mathematics was the beginning of wisdom. After attending so many examinations in philosophy in which students duly answered that philosophy was "the love of wisdom," I do not remember hearing a single examiner asking any candidate: "Well, do you love wisdom?" This would have been an unfair question. So long as the candidate knew what philosophy was, one could hardly ask for more. His private feelings about it were no one's business but his own, and to ask him if he was in love would have been not only beside the point but also positively indecent.
And yet, this was precisely the first question that Socrates would ask every new dis-
ciple that was brought to him: Are you in love with wisdom? Had the boy answered, for example: I am not sure that I am, but I am curious to learn it, Socrates would have advised him to seek one of those clever sophists who knew everything about philosophy without being themselves philosophers.
A similar treatment should be reserved for those among us who seem to imagine that "to be a Thomist" means to have an exhaustive knowledge of the complete works of Thomas Aquinas. This, of course, would not be a negligible achievement; but it would leave out something else, an achievement of an entirely different nature and yet one that is still more important. Thomas Aquinas has always granted to the Greek philosophers that wisdom was the highest possible knowledge. Since he was a theologian, theology was to him the supreme wisdom; but
metaphysics itself was a wisdom, especially in as much as, intent upon the study of the first principles and causes, it helped theology in its work. Now, as a science through which man finds his way towards beatitude wisdom must be for him an object of love. Why, indeed, should we seek after wisdom unless we loved it? Rather how could we possibly acquire something which we do not desire to possess? A true Thomist, then, is a man who knows because he is a man who loves. There is, in other words, a moral side to the study of Thomas Aquinas.
Whichever part of his doctrine we consider, we are always in danger of overlooking half its truth. The peril is nowhere greater than at the point where we stress, and rightly stress, what is often called his "intellectualism." Thomas Aquinas was an intellectualist because he never relied on anything other than his intellect in order to
know truth. Just as one can see only with his eyes, so he can know only with his intellect; but this truth should not lead us to imagine that man's intellectual life proceeds in him solely from the functioning of his intellect. All Thomists agree that, according to their common master, it is not the intellect that knows, but man through his intellect; and since man is many things in addition to his intellect, every time he knows, many other faculties co-operate in the making of his knowledge. The most important among them is the will. To forget this fact is also to overlook the further fact that there are practical conditions for the achievement even of speculative knowledge and that intellectual life involves problems of morality.
In order to restore the truth in its fullness, let us first remember that there are intellectual virtues, namely, wisdom, science and understanding. Because they do not ful-
real
knows,
does
1
To bring our conduct into conformity with this principle would make a great change in our lives. It should also make us better Thomists than we are, because it would cause us to become less different than we are from St. Thomas Aquinas. In the first place, it would make us realize that, since we never cease to think, we should never cease to know, nor to learn how to know. The speculative virtues of science and
2
3
If this means little or nothing to the life of a professor, or to the life of his students,
4
If I could make clear to you the implications of this truth, I would also, by the same token, be pointing out one of the most un-Thomistic mistakes that a Thomist can make about the doctrine of his master. It
5
6
It is a well known feature of Thomism, that, in it, the will can command the acts
7
8
the life of a philosopher whose intellect does good work owing to its speculative virtues, under the constant stimulation of a will which directs it towards perfect wisdom as towards the final cause of all its operations.
was
conveys with evidence to our intellects both the existence of perceived things and the accidental qualities which point out the essences of these things; but, even then, no adequate knowledge of these essences is at hand. When a scientist has to assent to some conclusion, even after bringing together all the relevant facts and checking against them his proposed solution, he still has to "make up his mind." No theory fits perfectly all the known facts. Moreover, there always remain more facts to come, and what proof is there that their discovery will confirm the proposed theory? Again, every scientific theory rests upon postulates, and it has happened in the past that apparently unchallengeable postulates have been profitably challenged. There are then many reasons why, at the hour of decision, the assent of an intellect should require the consent of the will. In Thomas Aquinas' own words:
9
because
in order to
in what they say
Metaphysics
pedetentim,
Metaphysics
it. Because it needs to be found out, philosophical truth is always liable to get lost, especially, one may say, with respect to first principles, whose immediate intellectual evidence entails no exhaustive comprehension of their content. True enough, being is the first thing that falls into the intellect of man, but it is also the last object which a philosopher may hope fully to comprehend and adequately to express. For those who have seen it, it is evident that "being" is the first principle. It is also evident that every being is that which it is, so that it cannot be, at one and at the same time, both itself and something else. As to what it is to be "a being," the necessary answer is: it is "to be.'' All this is certain, but what is it "to be"?
10
mode
that error is possible in what they themselves say about it. We know with certainty that being is the first among "the first principles," a fact which, by the way, should give us food for thought; for indeed, why does Thomas Aquinas so often speak of "first principles" in the plural? But many Thomists cannot even be brought to agree as to which is the second first principle: is it the principle of identity or the principle of contradiction? Personally speaking, it is evident to me that it is the principle of identity; but then my next question is: why do we not all agree on this point? When asked why it is that other metaphysicians do not agree with us on our interpretation of the first principle, we feel inclined to answer that the poor fellows are blind to evidence! But the very first condition which a proposition has to fulfill in order to be a ''first principle" is, that "no one can possibly lie or be deceived about
11
Why not rather admit that, because the first principles are supremely intelligible, these evident and necessary rules of the natural reason are to our intellects what sunlight is to the eyes of a bat? Metaphysicians are here groping their way in too much light, as they would in too much darkness. Metaphysics is a difficult science. In point of fact, Thomas says that it is the most difficult of all, and metaphysicians themselves know this fact but too well. So the wisest among them bide their time, but when they realize that time is running short, they too have to "make up their minds," not indeed out of impatience or in an arbitrary way, but, on the contrary, because their long-suffering love of wisdom is entitled to receive its reward. To what is evident in truth, our intellect cannot not assent; to what in it is
not bindingly evident, and yet offers itself to the mind as the highest expression of rationality, our love demands that we assent as to the object of its desire. Nothing is more rational than such as assent: even where light is not perfect, not to assent to it is still to sin against the light.
12
Opera Omnia,
Summa Theologiae,
philosophical purity
any other motive
Aristotle. But in those instances when neither Augustine nor Aristotle had been quite right, Thomas would simply make them say what was true, that is, what they themselves should have said in order to be perfectly right. The net result of this attitude could have been foreseen; the Augustinians have said that Thomas was betraying Augustine, while the Aristotelians were saying that Thomas' own philosophy was but a misrepresentation of that of the philosopher. Very few among us can imagine such a pure love of truth, that is, a genius both capable of improving upon Aristotle and Augustine, and yet disinterested enough to credit them with his own discoveries! Yet if we wish to be true disciples of Thomas Aquinas, each of us should be ready, in the small measure of his capacity, to follow this example, that is obstinately to hide behind truth. Truth is important, we are not. Why should we care about
the rest? Ever since the time of Plato, there have been noisy crowds to cheer the big show staged by the sophists in the market place; Thomas is the greatest among the few philosophers to whom it has been given to be both new and right; if we cannot be new, let us at least be right.
The only way for us to follow his example is, while learning his philosophy, to acquire with his help some of the moral virtues which go into the making of a philosopher worthy of the name. Those of us who teach his doctrine should always be careful to use him as a model not only of what to think, but also of how to think. While reading Thomas Aquinas, I sometimes remember a remark of A. N. Whitehead, which I beg to quote here because I am not sure that he has ever written it: "The first quality, for a philosopher, is to have a good temper." When he told me this, with that genial smile
Doctrina,
debet esse in tranquillitate
qua
Doctrina debet esse in tranquillitate
13
There is more in this than meets the eye. The unconditional respect for truth obliges us to look for it not only in the statements of our adversaries but also in those of our friends. This may appear to be an unnecessary piece of advice, but it is not. It means that we should never accept what a philosopher says for any other reason than the truth of what he says. ''Respect ideas," Thomas says, "not because of the person who has ex-
14
15
16
Among the philosophers whom we admire so much that we trust them implicitly, the most dangerous one is ourselves. Though it is perfectly human, the fact remains that when a man identifies himself with Thomas Aquinas and begins to argue as though to contradict him and to contradict Thomas were one and the same thing, he becomes
17
18
19
20
Metaphysics
21
for the mere love of knowledge
22
Notes
Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas
The Wisdom of Catholicism
Summa Theologica,
Answer
Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas,
in concreto,
Thomisme et méthode,
Introduction a l'étude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin,
proof
signs
2. Taken in itself, knowledge is always good, but even a good thing can be misused. On the virtues which regulate the good use of knowledge, see notes 8 and 22.
Summa Theologica,
Answer;
Basic Writings,
(multo fortius)
In III Sent.,
sed contra
De Virtutibus in Communi,
per accidens;
nota bene:
themselves, faith and prudence be more noble or more perfect habits than science and wisdom. This last remark agrees with the constant doctrine of Thomas Aquinas that, taken in itself, science is a higher speculative habit (i.e., a more perfect type of knowledge) than faith.
intrinsic
understanding", Contra Gentiles,
The Wisdom of Catholicism,
intellect
desire
love
delight
desire
Summa Theologica,
Basic Writings,
Answer;
Basic Writings,
6. The agreement of Aristotle with the Gospel on this point has been noted by Thomas Aquinas himself in a text which each and every
happiness
beatitude
Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God;
This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God.
speculative, and this with regard to the highest object of speculation." Contra Gentiles,
Basic Writings,
Eth. Nic.,
philosophical
Summa Theologica,
Answer;
Basic Writings,
Thomists
etc.
as everybody knows,
etc.
de facto,
Summa Theologica,
Answer;
Basic Writings,
De Virtutibus in Communi,
Answer:
Sum. Theol.,
Sum. Theol.,
Sum. Theol.,
Sum Theol.,
Answer.
Summa Theologica,
Answer;
Basic Writings,
De jure,
de facto,
docilitas
protervus.
Metaphysics,
ousia
The Works of Aristotle,
entity
substance.
The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian "Metaphysics",
de facto.
"habens esse"
In Metaph.,
any
Christum Die virtutem et Dei sapientiam, qui etiam factus est nobis sapientia a Deo."
In Sent.,
I Corinth.
In Joannis Evangelium,
Contra Gentiles,
Physics,
The Wisdom of Catholicism,
swayed by the various movements of the passions, it is not a suitable state for the knowledge of such lofty truth."
A Letter on the Rule of Life of a Scholar,
Ibid.
Ibid. Cf. Eccli.
Summa Theologica,
Answer,
Contra Gentiles,
The Wisdom of Catholicism,
Contra Gentiles,
The Wisdom of Catholicism,
Ibid.,
De Trinitate,
Pat. Lat.,
perficietur, nisi post hanc vitam, cum videbimus facie ad faciem." But the remarks of Augustine apply no less well to the quest of wisdom as such, the more so as, according to Thomas Aquinas himself, perfectly to reach it is impossible to man in this life. See the text quoted in the following note.
Contra Gentiles,
The Wisdom of Catholicism,
Metaphysics,
etc.
Contra Gentiles,
The Wisdom of Catholicism,
Contra Gentiles,
Sum. Theol.
Answer
etc.
Sum. Theol.
Answer
Contra Gentiles
Uniform format, cover and binding.
Copies of this Aquinas Lecture and the others in the series are obtainable from:
The Aquinas Lectures
Published by the Marquette University Press Milwaukee WI 53201-1881 USA
St. Thomas and the Life of Learning.
St. Thomas and the Gentiles.
St. Thomas and the Greeks.
The Nature and Functions of Authority.
St. Thomas and Analogy.
St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil.
Humanism and Theology.
The Nature and Origins of Scientism.
Cicero in the Courtroom of St. Thomas Aquinas.
St. Thomas and Epistemology.
St. Thomas and the Greek Moralists.
History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education.
The Natural Desire for God.
St. Thomas and the World State.
Method in Metaphysics.
Wisdom and Love in St. Thomas Aquinas.
The Good in Existential Metaphysics.
St. Thomas and the Object of Geometry.
Realism And Nominalism Revisted.
Imprudence in St. Thomas Aquinas.
The Truth That Frees.
St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics.
Thomas and the Physics of 1958: A Confrontation.
Metaphysics and Ideology.
Language, Truth and Poetry.
Metaphysics and Historicity.
The Lure of Wisdom.
Religion and Art.
St. Thomas and Philosophy.
The University in Process.
The Pragmatic Meaning of God.
Religion and Empiricism.
The Subject.
Beyond Trinity.
Ideas and Concepts.
Reason and Faith Revisited.
Psyche and Cerebrum.
The Problem of the Criterion.
Man as Infinite Spirit.
Aquinas to Whitehead: Seven Centuries of Metaphysics of Reli gion.
The Problem of Evil.
The Catholic University and the Faith.
St. Thomas and Historicity.
Does God Have a Nature?
Rhyme and Reason: St. Thomas and Modes of Discourse.
The Gift: Creation.
How Philosophy Begins.
The Reality of the Historical Past.
Human Ends and Human Actions: An Exploration in St. Thomas' Treatment.
Imagination and Metaphysics in St. Augustine.
Expectations of Immortality in Late Antiquity.
The Self.
The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry.
First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues.
Descartes among the Scholastics.
The Inference That Makes Science.
Person and Being.
Metaphysics and Culture.
Mediæval Reactions to the Encounters between Faith and Reason.