Book II — CHAP. I.--INTRODUCTORY.[1] (continued, part 3)
But the Aristotelians lay it down, that to live in accordance with virtue is the end, but that neither happiness nor the end is reached by every one who has virtue. For the wise man, vexed and involved in involuntary mischances, and wishing gladly on these accounts to flee from life, is neither fortunate nor happy. For virtue needs time; for that is not acquired in one day which exists [only] in the perfect man since, as they say, a child is never happy. But human life is a perfect time, and therefore happiness is completed by the three kinds of good things. Neither, then, the poor, nor the mean nor even the diseased, nor the slave, can be one of them.
Again, on the other hand, Zeno the Stoic thinks the end to be living according to virtue; and, Cleanthes, living agreeably to nature in the fight exercise of reason, which he held to consist of the selection of things according to nature. And Antipatrus, his friend, supposes the end to consist in choosing continually and unswervingly the things which are according to nature, and rejecting those contrary to nature. Archedamus, on the other hand, explained the end to be such, that in selecting the greatest and chief things according to nature, it was impossible to overstep it. In addition to these, Panictius pronounced the end to be, to live according to the means given to us by nature. And finally, Posidonius said that it was to live engaged in contemplating the truth and order of the universe, and forming himself as he best can, in nothing influenced by the irrational part of his soul. And some of the later Stoics defined the great end to consist in living agreeably to the constitution of man. Why should I mention Aristo? He said that the end was indifference; but what is indifferent simply abandons the indifferent. Shall I bring forward the opinions of Herillus? Herillus states the end to be to live according to science. For some think that the more recent disciples of the Academy define the end to be, the steady abstraction of the mind to its own impressions. Further, Lycus the Peripatetic used to say that the final end was the true joy of the soul; as Leucimus, that it was the joy it had in what was good. Critolaus, also a Peripatetic, said that it was the perfection of a life flowing rightly according to nature, referring to the perfection accomplished by the three kinds according to tradition.
We must, however, not rest satisfied with these, but endeavour as we best can to adduce the doctrines laid down on the point by the naturalist; for they say that Anaxagoras of Clazomenae affirmed contemplation and the freedom. flowing from it to be the end of life; Heraclitus the Ephesian, complacency. The Pontic Heraclides relates, that Pythagoras taught that the knowledge of the perfection of the numbers[1] I was happiness of the soul. The Abderites also teach the existence of an end. Democritus, in his work On the Chief End, said it was cheerfulness, which he also called well-being, and often exclaims, "For delight and its absence are the boundary of those who have reached full age;" Hecataeus, that it was sufficiency to one's self; Apollodotus of Cyzicum, that it was delectation as Nausiphanes, that it was undauntedness,[2] for he said that it was this that was called by Democritus imperturbability. In addition to these still, Diotimus declared the end to be perfection of what is good, which he said was termed well-being. Again, Antisthenes, that it was humility. And those called Annicereans, of the Cyrenaic succession, laid down no definite end for the whole of life; but said that to each action belonged, as its proper end, the pleasure accruing from the action. These Cyrenaics reject Epicurus' definition of pleasure, that is the removal of pain, calling that the condition of a dead man; because we rejoice not only on account of pleasures, but companionships and distinctions; while Epicurns thinks that all joy of the soul arises from previous sensations of the flesh. Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?
CHAP. XXII.--PLATO'S OPINION, THAT THE CHIEF GOOD CONSISTS IN ASSIMILATION TO GOD, AND ITS AGREEMENT WITH SCRIPTURE.
Further, Plato the philosopher says that the end is twofold: that which is communicable, and exists first in the ideal forms themselves, which he also calls "the good;" and that which partakes of it, and receives its likeness from it, as is the case in the men who appropriate virtue and true philosophy. Wherefore also Cleanthes, in the second book, On Pleasure, says that Socrates everywhere teaches that the just man and the happy are one and the same, and execrated the first man who separated the just from the useful, as having done an impious thing. For those are in truth impious who separate the useful from that which is tight according to the law. Plato himself says that happiness(<greek>eudai</greek>-<greek>monia</greek>) is to possess rightly the daemon, and that the ruling faculty of the soul is called the daemon; and he terms happiness (<greek>eudaimonia</greek>) the most perfect and complete good. Sometimes he calls it a consistent and harmonious life, sometimes the highest perfection in accordance with virtue; and this he places in the knowledge of the Good, and in likeness to God, demonstrating likeness to be justice and holiness with wisdom. For is it not thus that some of our writers have understood that man straightway on his creation received what is "according to the image," but that what is according "to the likeness" he will receive afterwards on his perfection? Now Plato, teaching that the virtuous man shall have this likeness accompanied with humility, explains the following: "He that humbleth himself shall be exalted."[1] He says, accordingly, in The Laws: "God indeed, as the ancient saying has it, occupying the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things, goes straight through while He goes round the circumference. And He is always attended by Justice, the avenger of those who revolt from the divine law." You see how he connects fear with the divine law. He adds, therefore: "To which he, who would be happy, cleaving, will follow lowly and beautified." Then, connecting what follows these words, and admonishing by fear, he adds: "What conduct, then, is dear and conformable to God? That which is characterized by one word of old date: Like will be dear to like, as to what is in proportion; but things out of proportion are neither dear to one another, nor to those which are in proportion. And that therefore he that would be dear to God, must, to the best of his power, become such as He is And in virtue of the same reason, our self-controlling man is dear to God. But he that has no self-control is unlike and diverse." In saying that it was an ancient dogma, he indicates the teaching which had come to him from the law. And having in the Theaoetus admitted that evils make the circuit of mortal nature and of this spot, he adds: "Wherefore we must try to flee hence as soon as possible. For flight is likeness to God as far as possible. And likeness is to become holy and just with wisdom." Speusippus, the nephew of Plato, says that happiness is a perfect state in those who conduct themselves in accordance with nature, or the state of the good: for which condition all men have a desire, but the good only attained to quietude; consequently the virtues are the authors of happiness. And Xenocrates the Chalcedonian defines happiness to be the possession of virtue, strictly so called, and of the power subservient to it. Then he clearly says, that the seat in which it resides is the soul; that by which it is effected, the virtues; and that of these as parts are formed praiseworthy actions, good habits and dispositions, and motions, and relations; and that corporeal and external objects are not without these. For Polemo, the disciple of Xenocrates, seems of the opinion that happiness is sufficiency of all good things, or of the most and greatest. He lays down the doctrine, then, that happiness never exists without virtue; and that virtue, apart from corporeal and external objects, is sufficient for happiness. Let these things be so. The contradictions to the opinions specified shall be adduced in due time. But on us it is incumbent to reach the unaccomplished end, obeying the commands-- that is, God--and living according to them, irreproachably and intelligently, through knowledge of the divine will; and assimilation as far as possible in accordance with right reason is the end, and restoration to perfect adoption by the Son, which ever glorifies the Father by the great High Priest who has deigned to call us brethren and fellowheirs. And the apostle, succinctly describing the end, writes in the Epistle to the Romans: "But now, being made free from sin, and become servants to God, ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life."[2] And viewing the hope as twofold--that which is expected, and that which has been received --he now teaches the end to be the restitution of the hope. "For patience," he says, "worketh experience, and experience hope: and hope maketh not ashamed; because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit that is given to us."[3] On account of which love and the restoration to hope, he says, in another place, "which rest is laid up for us."[4] You will find in Ezekiel the like, as follows: "The soul that sinneth, it shall die. And the man who shall be righteous, and shall do judgment and justice, who has not eaten on the mountains, nor lifted his eyes to the idols of the house of Israel, and hath not defiled his neighbour's wife, and hath not approached to a woman in the time of her uncleanness (for he does not wish the seed of man to be dishonoured), and will not injure a man; will restore the debtor's pledge, and will not take usury; will turn away his hand from wrong; will do true judgment between a man and his neighbour; will walk in my ordinances, and keep my commandments, so as to do the truth; he is righteous, he shall surely live, saith Adonai the Lord."[5] Isaiah too, in exhorting him that hath not believed to gravity of life, and the Gnostic to attention, proving that man's virtue and God's are not the same, speaks thus: "Seek the Lord, and on finding Him call on Him. And when
He shall draw near to you, let the wicked forsake his ways, and the unrighteous man his ways; and let him return to the Lord, and he shall obtain mercy," down to "and your thoughts from my thoughts."' "We," then, according to the noble apostle, "wait for the hope of righteousness by faith. For in Christ neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith which worketh by love."[2] And we desire that every one of you show the same diligence to the full assurance of hope," down to "made an high priest for ever, after the order of Melchizedek."[3] Similarly with Paul "the All-virtuous Wisdom" says, "He, that heareth me shall dwell trusting in hope."[4] For the restoration of hope is called by the same term "hope." To the expression "will dwell" it has most beautifully added" trusting," showing that such an one has obtained rest, having received the hope for which he hoped. Wherefore also it is added, "and shall be quiet, without fear of any evil." And openly and expressly the apostle, in the first Epistle to the Corinthians says, "Be ye followers of me, as also I am of Christ," s in order that that may take place. If ye are of me, and I am of Christ, then ye are imitators of Christ, and Christ of God. Assimilation to God, then, so that as far as possible a man becomes righteous and holy with wisdom he lays down as the aim of faith, and the end to be that restitution of the promise which is effected by faith. From these doctrines gush the fountains, which we specified above, of those who have dogmatized about "the end." But of these enough.
CHAP. XXIII.--ON MARRIAGE.
Since pleasure and lust seem to fall under marriage, it must also be treated of. Marriage is the first conjunction of man and woman for the procreation of legitimate children.[6] Accordingly Menander the comic poet says:--
"For the begetting of legitimate children, I give thee my daughter."
We ask if we ought to marry; which is one of the points, which are said to be relative. For some must marry, and a man must be in some condition, and he must marry some one in some condition. For every one is not to marry, nor always. But there is a time in which it is suitable, and a person for whom it is suitable, and an age up to which it is suitable. Neither ought every one to take a wife, nor is it every woman one is to take, nor always, nor in every way, nor inconsiderately. But only he who is in certain circumstances, and such an one and at such time as is requisite, and for the sake of children, and one who is in every respect similar, and who does not by force or compulsion love the husband who loves her. Hence Abraham, regarding his wife as a sister, says, "She is my sister by my father, but not by my mother; and she became my wife,"[7] teaching us that children of the same mothers ought not to enter into matrimony. Let us briefly follow the history. Plato ranks marriage among outward good things, providing for the perpetuity of our race, and handing down as a torch a certain perpetuity to children's children. Democritus repudiates marriage and the procreation of children, on account of the many annoyances thence arising, and abstractions from more necessary things. Epicurus agrees, and those who place good in pleasure, and in the absence of trouble and pain. According to the opinion of the Stoics, marriage and the rearing of children are a thing indifferent; and according to the Peripatetics, a good. In a word, these, following out their dogmas in words, became enslaved to pleasures; some using concubines, some mistresses, and the most youths. And that wise quaternion in the garden with a mistress, honoured pleasure by their acts. Those, then, will not escape the curse of yoking an ass with an ox, who, judging certain things not to suit them, command others to do them, or the reverse. This Scripture has briefly showed, when it says, "What thou hatest, thou shalt not do to another."[8]
But they who approve of marriage say, Nature has adapted us for marriage, as is evident from the structure of our bodies, which are male and female. And they constantly proclaim that command, "Increase and replenish."[9] And though this is the case, yet it seems to them shameful that man, created by God, should be more licentious than the irrational creatures, which do not mix with many licentiously, but with one of the same species, such as pigeons and ringdoves,[10] and creatures like them. Furthermore, they say, "The childless man fails in the perfection which is according to nature, not having substituted his proper successor in his place. For he is perfect that has produced from himself his like, or rather, when he sees that he has produced the same; that is, when that which is begotten attains to the same nature with him who begat." Therefore we must by all means marry, both for our country's sake, for the succession of children, and as far as we are concerned, the perfection of the world; since the poets also pity a marriage half-perfect and childless, but pronounce the fruitful one happy. But it is the diseases of the body that principally show marriage to be necessary. For a wife's care and the assiduity of her constancy appear to exceed the endurance of all other relations and friends, as much as to excel them in sympathy; and most of all, she takes kindly to patient watching. And in truth, according to Scripture, she is a needful help.[1] The comic poet then, Menander, while running down marriage, and yet alleging on the other side its advantages, replies to one who had said:-- "I am averse to the thing, For you take it awkwardly."
Then. he adds:-- "You see the hardships and the things which annoy you in it. But you do not look on the advantages." And so forth.
Now marriage is a help in the case of those advanced in years, by furnishing a spouse to take care of one, and by rearing children of her to nourish one's old age.
"For to a man after death his children bring renown, Just as corks bear the net, Saving the fishing-line from the deep."[2] according to the tragic poet Sophocles.
Legislators, moreover, do not allow those who are unmarried to discharge the highest magisterial offices. For instance, the legislator of the Spartans imposed a fine not on bachelorhood only, but on monogamy? and late marriage, and single life. And the renowned Plato orders the man who has not married to pay a wife's maintenance into the public treasury, and to give to the magistrates a suitable sum of money as expenses. For if they shall not beget children, not having married, they produce, as far as in them lies, a scarcity of men, and dissolve states and the world that is composed of them, impiously doing away with divine generation. It is also unmanly and weak to shun living with a wife and children. For of that of which the loss is an evil, the possession is by all means a good; and this is the case with the rest of things. But the loss of children is, they say, among the chiefest evils: the possession of children is consequently a good thing; and if it be so, so also is marriage. It is said:--
"Without a father there never could be a child, And without a mother conception of a child could not be. Marriage makes a father, as a husband a mother."[4]
Accordingly Homer makes a thing to be earnestly prayed for:-- "A husband and a house;" yet not simply, but along with good agreement. For the marriage of other people is an agreement for indulgence; but that of philosophers leads to that agreement which is in accordance with reason, bidding wives adorn themselves not in outward appearance, but in character; and enjoining husbands not to treat their wedded wives as mistresses, making corporeal wantonness their aim; but to take advantage of marriage for help in the whole of life, and for the best self-restraint.
Far more excellent, in my opinion, than the seeds of wheat and barley that are sown at appropriate seasons, is man that is sown, for whom all things grow; and those seeds temperate husbandmen ever sow. Every foul and polluting practice must therefore be purged away from marriage; that the intercourse of the irrational animals may not be cast in our teeth, as more accordant with nature than human conjunction in procreation. Some of these, it must be granted, desist at the time in which they are directed, leaving creation to the working of Providence.
By the tragedians, Polyxena, though being murdered, is described nevertheless as having, when dying, taken great care to fall decently,-- "Concealing what ought to be hid from the eyes of men."
Marriage to her was a calamity. To be subjected, then, to the passions, and to yield to them, is the extremest slavery; as to keep them in subjection is the only liberty. The divine Scripture accordingly says, that those who have transgressed the commandments are sold to strangers, that is, to sins alien to nature, till they return and repent. Marriage, then, as a sacred image, must be kept pure from those things which defile it.[5] We are to rise from our slumbers with the Lord, and retire to sleep with thanksgiving and prayer,-- "Both when you sleep, and when the holy light comes," confessing the Lord in our whole life; possessing piety in the soul, and extending selfcontrol to the body. For it is pleasing to God to lead decorum from the tongue to our actions. Filthy speech is the way to effrontery; and the end of both is filthy conduct.
Now that the Scripture counsels marriage, and allows no release from the union, is expressly contained in the law, "Thou shalt not put away thy wife, except for the cause of fornication;" and it regards as fornication, the marriage of those separated while the other is alive. Not to deck and adorn herself beyond what is becoming, renders a wife free of calumnious suspicion. while she devotes herself assiduously to prayers and supplications; avoiding frequent departures from the house, and shutting herself up as far as possible from the view of all not related to her, and deeming housekeeping of more consequence than impertinent trifling. "He that taketh a woman that has been put away," it is said, "committeth adultery; and if one puts away his wife, he makes her an adulteress,"[1] that is, compels her to commit adultery. And not only is he who puts her away guilty of this, but he who takes her, by giving to the woman the opportunity of sinning; for did he not take her, she would return to her husband. What, then, is the law?[2] In order to check the impetuosity of the passions, it commands the adulteress to be put to death, on being convicted of this; and if of priestly family, to be committed to the flames.[3] And the adulterer also is stoned to death, but not in the same place, that not even their death may be in common. And the law is not at variance with the Gospel, but agrees with it. How should it be otherwise, one Lord being the author of both? She who has committed fornication liveth in sin, and is dead to the commandments; but she who has repented, being as it were born again by the change in her life, has a regeneration of life; the old harlot being dead, and she who has been regenerated by repentance having come back again to life. The Spirit testifies to what has been said by Ezekiel, declaring, "I desire not the death of the sinner, but that he should turn."[4] Now they are stoned to death; as through hardness of heart dead to the law which they believed not. But in the case of a priestess the punishment is increased, because "to whom much is given, from him shall more be required."[5]
Let us conclude this second book of the Stromata at this point, on account of the length and number of the chapters.
ELUCIDATIONS.
(On the Greeks, cap. i. note 3, p. 347.)
THE admirable comments of Stier on the Greeks, who said to Philip, "We would see Jesus,"[6] seem to me vindicated by the history of the Gospel, and by the part which the Greeks were called to take in its propagation. Clement seems to me the man of Providence, who gives rich significance to "the corn of wheat," and its multiplication in Gentile discipleship. And in this I am a convert to Stier's view, against my preconceptions. That the Greeks who were at Jerusalem at the Passover were other than Hellenistic Jews, or Greek proselytes, always seemed to me improbable; but, more and more, I discover a design in this narrative, which seems to me thoroughly sustained by the history of the Gentile churches, which were Greek everywhere originally, and for the use of which the Septuagint had been prepared in the providence of God. To say nothing of the New-Testament Scriptures, the whole symbolic and liturgic system of the early Christians and all the Catholic councils which were Greek in their topography, language, and legislation, confirm the sublime thought which Stier has elucidated. "The Pharisees said, The world is gone after him; and there were certain Greeks," etc. So the story is introduced. Jesus is told of their desire to see him; and he answers, "The hour is come that the Son of man should be glorified;" and he goes on to speak of his death as giving life to the world. I feel Fateful to Slier for his bold originality in treating the subject; and I trust others will find that it invests the study of the ante-Nicene Fathers with a fresh interest, and throws back from their writings a peculiar reflex light on the New-Testament Scriptures themselves.
II.
(See p. 352, note 9.)
Stier, in his comments[1] on St. John (viii. 32-36), may well be compared with this chapter of Clement's. The eighteenth chapter of this book must also be kept in view if we would do full justice to the true position of Clement, who recognises nothing in heathen philosophy as true wisdom, save as it flows from God, in Moses, and through the Hebrew Church. That Greek philosophy, so viewed, did lead to Christ, and that this great principle is recognised in the apostolic teachings, seems to me indisputable. This illustrates what has been noted above in Elucidation I.
III.
Clement notes that the false Gnostics rejected the Epistles to Timothy,[2] chiefly because of 1 Tim. vi. 20. Beausobre (Histoire du Manicheisme, tom. ii. p. v.) doubts as to Basilides, whether he is open to this charge; but Jerome accuses him expressly of rejecting the pastoral epistles, and that to the Hebrews. For this, and Neander's qualifying comment, see Kaye, p. 263. Clement is far from charging Basilides, personally, with an immoral life, or from lending his sanction to impurity; but a study of the Gnostic sects, with whom our Alexandrian doctor was forced to contend, will show that they were introducing, under the pretence of Christianity, such abominations as made their defeat and absolute overthrow a matter of life and death for the Church. To let such teachers be confounded with Christians, was to neutralize the very purpose for which the Church existed. Now, it was in the deadly grapple with such loathsome errorists, that the idea of "Catholic orthodoxy" became so precious to the primitive faithful. They were forced to make even the heathen comprehend the existence of that word-wide confederation of churches already explained,[3] and to exhibit their Scriptural creed and purity of discipline, in the strongest contrast with these pestilent "armies of the aliens," who were neither Gnostics nor Christians indeed, much less Catholic or Orthodox teachers and believers.
Now, if in dealing with counterfeits Clement was obliged to meet them on their own grounds, and defeat them on a plan, at once intelligible to the heathen, and enabling all believers to "fight the good fight of faith" successfully, we must concede that he knew better than we can, what was suited to the Alexandrian schools, their intellect, and their false mysticism. His works were a great safeguard to those who came after him; though they led to the false system of exposition by which Origen so greatly impaired his services to the Church, and perhaps to other evils, which, in the issue, shook the great patriarchate of Alexandria to its foundations. It is curious to trace the influence of Clement, through Tertullian and St. Augustine, upon the systems of the schoolmen, and again, through them, on the Teutonic reformers. The mysticism of Fenelon as well, may be traced, more than is generally credited, to the old Alexandrian school, which was itself the product of some of the most subtle elements of our nature, sanctified, but not wholly controlled, by the wisdom that is from above. Compare the interminable controversies of the period, in the writings of Fenelon and Bossuet; and, for a succinct history, see L'Histoire de l'eglise de France, par l'Abbe Guettee, tom. xi. p. 156 et seqq.
THE STROMATA, OR MISCELLANIES.