The Vicarious Nature of the Atonement
reconciliation. Reconciliation is not only objective but also subjective.
Finally, the term "ransom" points in the same direction. Christ is the Goel, the liberator of sinners, Acts 20:28; 1 Cor. 6:20; 7:23. He redeems sinners from the demands of God's retributive justice. The price is paid by the sinner, in the person of his representative, to God. In view of all that was said it would seem that we are abundantly justified in speaking of the objective character of the atonement.
The Vicarious Nature of the Atonement Christ our Vicar.
WHEN we speak of the vicarious nature of the atonement, we mean that Christ in his atoning work took the place of the sinner and as his vicar or substitute bore the penalty of sin and met the requirements of the covenant of works. This statement should not be toned down to mean that the self-sacrifice of Christ was merely a necessary prerequisite for the forgiveness of sins arbitrarily fixed by God; or was a mere substitute for a penalty; or was simply a sacrifice in behalf of the sinner, or consisted only in the sufferings which He bore as the result of his identification with the human race.
Arminians speak of the sacrifice of Christ as vicarious in view of the fact that in a certain sense He was punished in our stead, but do not believe that He bore the full equivalent of the penalty which was our due. His sacrifice was not a plenary satisfaction for sin, but merely the condition of forgiveness, since in the divine economy there is no forgiveness apart from the shedding of blood. The demand of the law was not fully met therefore in the sacrifice of Christ. On this point
Grotius was quite in agreement with the general Arminian position.
While he ostensibly put up a defense of the orthodox doctrine of satisfaction, he failed to meet the main contention of the Socinians, that Christ did not really pay the penalty of sin. While he spoke of the death of Christ as a satisfaction, he ascribed to it only the significance of a penal example ordained by God, in order that He might appear as honoring the law, while yet pardoning sinners. This penal example is what he means by satisfaction.
Even Schleiermacher is willing to speak of the sufferings of Christ as vicarious. Christ was sinless, and yet by entering into the common life of sinful humanity suffered vicariously for others, even for the sin of humanity as a whole. Ritschl considers the doctrine of vicarious punishment as utterly indefensible. The idea is completely out of harmony with his system of thought. There are other advocates of the Moral Influence Theory, however, who continue to speak of the sufferings of Christ as vicarious. Bushnell even sent his work into the world under the caption "Vicarious Sacrifice." He finds the principle of vicarious sacrifice in love, which is essentially vicarious. That Christ vicariously bore our sins, means that He "bore them on His feeling, became inserted into their bad lot by His sympathy as a friend, yielded up Himself and His life, even, to an effort of restoring mercy; in a word, that He bore our sins in just the same sense that he bore our sicknesses." Vicarious Sacrifice, p. 46.
Meaning of "vicarious."
It is quite evident that in all these cases the word "vicarious" is used in a rather loose sense. The word is derived from "vicar," which in general denotes a substitute, one who takes the place of another, acting or suffering in his stead. In the Roman Catholic Churches a vicar is one who represents a clergyman of higher rank and as such acts representatively in doing what his superior would otherwise do.
The substitutionary idea is essential to it. The fact that one acts or suffers in the interest of another, or does and suffers in part what was incumbent on the other, does not make one a true vicar and does not render one's action or suffering vicarious. When we speak of the
sacrifice of Christ as vicarious, we use the term in its proper sense.
We mean that Christ as our substitute suffered the punishment due to us, and in our place met all the requirements of the law. We affirm that the satisfaction made by Christ was strictly penal and met all the claims of divine justice, and deny that it was merely a nominal satisfaction which, through the mere indulgence of God, was accepted as payment in full.
The laying on of hands.
Since many deny that the sacrifice of Christ was substitutionary or vicarious, it becomes imperative to examine the Scripture proof for this doctrine. We direct attention first of all to the fact that the vicarious nature of the sacrifice of Christ was clearly symbolized and typified in the Old Testament sacrifices. When an Israelite brought a sacrifice to the temple, he put his hand on the head of the sacrifice.
The injunction pertaining to this matter is found in the very beginning of the book of Leviticus: "And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering; and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him." Lev. 1:4. Cave and others regard this merely as a symbol of dedication, but this hardly explains why the sacrifice was in virtue of it fit to make atonement for the offerer.
Surely, a thing that is dedicated to God is not by that token rendered suitable to make atonement. Moreover, the ceremony of the scapegoat on the great Day of Atonement, as recorded in Lev. 16:20–
22, seems to point in another direction. We read there as follows:
"And when he (the high priest) hath made an end of atoning for the holy place, and the tent of meeting, and the altar, he shall present the live goat; and Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions, even all their sins; and he shall put them upon the head of the goat, and shall send him away by the hand of a man, that is in readiness into the wilderness; and the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a solitary land; and he shall let go the goat in the wilderness." This passage is so clear that comment would seem to be unnecessary. Cave objects, however, that
this is not a true analogy to the sacrifices that were brought upon the altar, and that "before 'this undoubted act of the transference of guilt,' the hand of the priest had already been laid upon the head of the slaughtered goat." If the sins of the people had already been transferred to the goat that was slain, how could they be transferred once more to the living goat? He seems to forget that the special sacrifice on the Day of Atonement was the culmination of the whole sacrificial ritual, and as such was the most expressive symbol of the work of atonement. The two goats really constituted a single sacrifice with a double aspect, symbolizing at once the punishment of sin and its removal from the land. Moreover, it is perfectly fair to argue that, if the laying on of hands had that significance in the case of the living goat, it had the same significance in connection with other sacrifices.
Cave, The Scriptural Doctrine of Sacrifice, p. 129 note; Magee, Atonement and Sacrifice, Diss. No. XXXIX; Vos, Old Testament
Theology, p. 124.
The slaying of the animal.
The following point to which attention should be called is the slaying of the animal. Of this Dr. Vos says: "In connection with the laying on of hands transmitting sin the slaying of the sin-bearing animal could scarcely have any other purpose than to signify that death is the penalty of sin, vicariously inflicted in sacrifice." Op. cit., p. 125. This is most clearly indicated in the classical passage that is found in Lev.
17:11: "For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you to make atonement for your souls: for it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life." It is quite generally admitted that this is the clearest expression of the vicarious import of the Old
Testament sacrifices that can be found anywhere in the Old Testament. It virtually amounts to the statement that one life is given for another life. Life is surrendered in the blood that is poured out in death and applied to the horns of the altar or presented before God in the inner sanctuary; and this has the effect of atoning for the sins of those who bring the sacrifice. "The sacrificial animal," says Dr.
Vos, "in its death takes the place of the death due to the offerer. It is forfeit for forfeit."
Scripture passages.
In addition to the proof derived from the sacrificial ritual of the Old Testament there are several classes of passages which point to the vicarious nature of the atonement. There are many passages which teach that our sins were laid upon Christ, and that He bore our sins or iniquities, Isa. 53:6, 12; John 1:29; 2 Cor. 5:21; Gal. 3:13; Heb.
9:28; 1 Peter 2:24. Our sins are laid upon Christ, so that He is taking our place as sin-bearer. This does not mean that our sinfulness was transferred to Him—something that is quite impossible—but that, as already explained in the preceding, the guilt of our sin was imputed to Him. He was made liable to punishment in our stead. To say that He bore our sins is equivalent to saying that He bore their punishment, and that He removed them by suffering for them. This is quite evident from Isa. 53 and from Heb. 9:28; 1 Peter 2:24; 3:18.
Meaning of two Greek prepositions.
Moreover, there are passages which clearly state that Christ died or laid down His life for us. In some of these the substitutionary idea is clearly present. We cannot simply argue from the Greek prepositions
(ANTI and HUPER) used in such cases, for while one of these may mean "instead of," it does not always have that meaning; and while the other really means "in behalf of," it may in some instances also express the idea of substitution. The exact force of the preposition will have to be determined largely by the context. It is interesting to notice that, according to Deissmann, several instances have been found of the use of that preposition which really means "in behalf of" with the meaning "as representative of," Light from the Ancient East, p. 153. We find a similar use of it in Philem. 13. There are several passages in the New Testament, in which it most likely means
"instead of," but where it is possible to stop short of this meaning and to render it "in behalf of," such as Rom. 5:6–8; 8:32; Gal. 2:20;
Heb. 2:9. But there are also cases in which any other meaning than "instead of" would seem to be excluded and in which, as Robertson says, only violence to the text can get rid of it. He mentions as such
Gal. 2:13; John 11:50; and 2 Cor. 5:15. The other preposition (ANTI) is clearly used in the sense of "instead of" in Matt. 2:22 and 5:38;
20:28; Mark 10:45. Of the last two passages Robertson says: "These important doctrinal passages teach the substitutionary conception of Christ's death, not because ANTI of itself means 'instead of,' which is not true, but because the context renders any other resultant idea out of the question." Grammer, p. 573. The same idea is expressed in 1
Tim. 2:6 where, as the same author says, "both ANTI and HUPER combine with LUTRON (ransom) in expressing this idea."
Furthermore, we should bear in mind that, if reconciliation could be brought about and sins could be forgiven only on the basis of an atonement, and if it was God's will that reconciliation should be effected and sins should be pardoned, the very nature of the case would call for a vicarious atonement. The only alternative to this would be a personal atonement, and this was entirely out of the question in the case of the sinner. The sinner is represented in Scripture as so depraved that he is totally unable to do any spiritual good and to pave in any sense of the word the way by which he might be re-instated in the favor of God. In a sense he can, and remaining in his sins, certainly will atone for them by suffering the pains of hell eternally, but this is a kind of atonement that is never completed and will never issue in redemption. For that reason it may be said that, if the opponents of a substitutionary atonement succeed in proving to their own satisfaction that Christ did not vicariously atone for sin by His supreme self-sacrifice, they have also with the same cogency established the fact that they and all other men will have to suffer eternal perdition.
Objections to vicarious atonement; Cases of pecuniary debt.
Several objections are raised, however, against the doctrine of vicarious atonement. The most general objection is that justice, as it
is represented by the law, does not admit of any such thing as vicarious suffering or vicarious satisfaction in penal matters. It is generally admitted that in cases of pecuniary debt payment by a substitute is not only permissible, but must be accepted and ipso facto cancels all further obligation on the part of the original debtor.
Pecuniary debt, it is said, is not so personal that it cannot be transferred. In such a case there is no claim on the person of the debtor, but only on his property. It should not be forgotten, however, that pecuniary debt may involve personal guilt; the debt may be the result of carelessness and even of positive fraud. Yet payment by a substitute is permitted and must be accepted. In some cases it is simply demanded of the substitute. A person may borrow money on a promissory note which some responsible person signs for him. If he cannot pay the note at the proper time and cannot get it renewed, his surety is under obligation to pay for him.
Other cases of substitution.
But this is not the only case in which substitution is admitted by law.
J. M. Armourx in his work on Atonement and Law has a chapter under the caption. "Substitution Normal in Law," in which he mentions, in addition to the case of a pecuniary debt, three kinds of cases in which the law has provided for and admitted substitution.
To quote: "1st. Work for the public benefit, required by law, of able and qualified citizens within the limits of a certain age, may be performed by any substitute who is free from like obligation, willing and able.—2. By universal consent even military service required for the defense of the country, may be rendered by any substitute who is himself free from the same obligation, who is, for any reason, willing and ready to act as a substitute and is able to perform the service required. Such substitute entering the ranks, should he fall in the first engagement, nothing more is required of him in whose behalf he enlisted. 'His labors, his dangers, his wounds, his death, are vicarious.' and do fully satisfy the requirements of law, as law has in all ages been understood and administered by men.—3. Even in the case of crime, law, as understood and administered by men in all
lands, provides that the penalty may be met by a substitute, in all cases in which the penalty prescribed is such that a substitute may meet it consistently with the obligations he is already under," p. 129.
It is perfectly evident that the law does recognize the principle of substitution, though it may not be easy to cite instances in which innocent persons were permitted to act as substitutes for criminals and to bear the penalties imposed on these. As a rule this finds a sufficient explanation in the fact that it is usually impossible to find men who meet all the requirements for such substitution. Such a substitute must not himself stand in a penal relationship to the law.
His taking the place of another may not result in hardships and deprivations for other innocent persons. He must be under no compulsion whatever, but assume the burden of guilt voluntarily; and must, in addition, be able to give some assurance that the criminal will retain a deep consciousness of his guilt, of the fact that he deserved what the substitute is suffering for him, and of the necessity of mending his ways. And in cases of capital punishment he should be satisfied that he has the right to dispose of his own life. It is possible that no man could ever meet these requirements; but this is no proof that Jesus Christ could not meet them. In fact, He could and did, and therefore was an acceptable substitute. This will appear, if we add to what was said a few remarks in connection with some of the specific objections which are included in the general objection just considered.
The innocent suffering for the guilt of the wicked.
The general objection discussed in the preceding is sometimes stated so inaccurately as to make it appear even more untenable. It is sometimes said that, according to the doctrine of vicarious atonement, the innocent is made to suffer the consequences of the guilt of the wicked. But it will readily be seen that this really constitutes an objection against the. moral government of God in general. There is abundant evidence that in actual life the innocent often suffer as a result of the transgressions of others. In a melee an innocent by stander is shot down; the family of a drunkard suffers
want; and neglected children suffer from the delinquencies of their parents. Moreover, in this form the objection would hold against all other so-called theories of atonement, for they all represent the sufferings of Christ as being in some sense the result of the sins of mankind. The Sinless One suffers for the sins of others and for their benefit. Again, the statement is sometimes made that a moral agent cannot become reasonably responsible for any sin, except by doing it personally. But this is also contradicted by the facts of life. If a number of men hire an assassin to murder a person, they are all held responsible for the crime. The crimes of John Dillenger and his gang were also visited upon the persons who helped them on their way, who dressed their wounds, and who gave them shelter.
Injustice on the part of the Father.
It is sometimes said that the doctrine of vicarious atonement involves an injustice on the part of the Father in that He simply sacrifices His Son for the sins of mankind. "How cruel and unjust it appears," says Abelard, "that anyone should demand the blood of the innocent as any kind of ransom, or be in any way delighted with the death of the innocent, let alone that God should find the death of His
Son so acceptable, that through it He should be reconciled to the world." Quoted by Franks, A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ, I. p. 188. This objection loses sight of several pertinent facts.
It was not the Father but the triune God that conceived the plan of redemption. There was a solemn agreement between the three
Persons in the Godhead. And in this plan the Son voluntarily undertook to bear the penalty of sin and to give complete satisfaction to the Father. Says He, "Lo, I am come; in the roll of the book it is written of me: I delight to do thy will, O my God." Ps. 40:7, 8; and again, "I lay down my life.… No one taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself," John 10:17, 18. And not only that, but the sacrificial work of Christ also resulted in immense gain for Himself and in the enhancement of His mediatorial glory. It meant a numerous seed, loving worship, and a glorious kingdom. Moreover, this objection is somewhat of a boomerang, for it returns with a vengeance on the
head of Abelard and on all those who adopt a theory of the atonement which denies its necessity, for they are all agreed that the Father sent His Son into the world for bitter suffering and a shameful death which, while beneficial, was yet unnecessary. This was cruel indeed.
Union between Christ and sinners.
Again, it is sometimes said that it is not conceivable that the vicar should remove the guilt of an offender, unless there is some real union between them which would justify such a procedure. The general truth of this may be admitted, but it should be noted that provision was made for this in the plan of redemption. In the depths of eternity the Mediator of the new covenant freely undertook to be the representative of His people. A federal relationship was established in virtue of which He became the representative of all those whom the Father had given Him. And on the basis of this a mystical union was formed, ideally in the counsel of peace, to be realized in the course of history in the union of Christ and His
Church. Christ could become the legal representative of His own, and being mystically one with them, He could also convey to them the blessings of salvation.
Ethical bearing of the atonement.
This also indicates the answer that can be given to another objection that is sometimes raised against the doctrine of vicarious atonement, namely, that such an atonement is purely legal and has no ethical bearings; that it merely makes provision for a change in the sinner's legal relationship to the law and to God, and fails to provide for a change in his ethical and spiritual condition. It is true that the atonement as such does not effect a spiritual change in the sinner; but it is also true that it furnishes the only sound basis for his spiritual renewal. It results in a reconciliation which is both objective and subjective. By the grace of God the atoned sinner appropriates the reconciliation which is in Christ Jesus and receives the Spirit of