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PERHAPS MORE THAN ANY OTHER NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT, MORMONISM presents a challenge to the health and growth of authentic Christianity.' It is also the most insistent of these groups in its claim to be Christian. As evidence for their claim Mormons cite the official name of their church: the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. They point out that the subtitle to the Book of Mormon is "Another Testament of Jesus Christ" and that according to its title page, it was compiled for "the convincing of Jew and Gentile that Jesus is the Christ." Latter-day Saints (LDS) affirm the divinity of Christ, his earthly ministry and resurrection from the dead. They believe he is the savior of the world and seek to follow him. This devotion to Christ, they insist, is more than sufficient for Mormonism to be considered an authentic Christian faith.
Latter-clay Saints regularly tell potential converts that many Christian churches have part of the truth, maybe a lot of it. But only Mormonism, the restoration of earliest Christianity, has the "fullness of the gospel." LDS leaders encourage Christians to "bring all the good that you have and let us see if we can add to it." This gives the impression that Mormonism is basically Christian, differentiated from other forms of Christianity primarily by additions and modifications. For example, regular Christians accept the Bible as revealed Scripture. Mormons believe this but also accept the Book of Mormon, Doctrine and Covenants, and Pearl of Great Price. Christians believe the Father, Son and Spirit are one God united in their very being. Mormons believe their unity is not one of being but of purpose, power and will. Christians baptize; Mormons baptize and undergo proxy baptisms for the dead. Traditional Christians believe in marriage "until death do us part" and stress strong family values. Mormons believe in marriages both for time and eternity; the family unit can continue forever.
These examples illustrate Mormonism's heavy indebtedness to Christianity in terms of its doctrinal skeleton and categories. Both communities can talk about doctrines of Scripture, doctrines of baptism, doctrines of the Godhead, and so on. They further illustrate that Christian categories undergo mutation and transformation under the influence of modern revelation in LDS theological discourse. This leads to some significant challenges for Christian mission.
CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE APOLOGETICS
Two challenges stem directly from the fact that in LDS teachings we encounter beliefs that are structurally similar to biblical beliefs, yet at the same time substantively different. Often Christians only mention differences and neglect the similarities. The result is caricatured descriptions of LDS doctrine. When Latter-day Saints come across these caricatures, they assume that Christians are intentionally distorting LDS theology. At that point one loses all credibility. The first challenge for apologists, pastors, missionaries and lay evangelists is to distinguish between Christian teaching and LDS teaching on the various loci of theology without exaggerating the disparities.
Second, the structural and categorical similarities lead many Christians to engage Mormons on doctrinal issues in the same way that they engage fellow Christians on in-house disputes over issues like Arminianism versus Calvinism, women in ministry or speaking in tongues. Mormon ism is thus effectively treated as if it were a heresy internal to the Christian community. This makes it appear as if disagreements are about secondary issues within broader areas of agreement. Consequently it is very difficult for Latter-day Saints and others to see Mormonism as anything other than an idiosyncratic form of Christianity whose particular interpretations of Christian doctrines happen to be objectionable to some other Christians. The challenge here is to distinguish between Christian and LDS teachings in a way that adequately depicts the theological gulf that separates Mormonism from Christianity. This requires that we focus not only on doctrinal issues but also on deeper worldview issues.
Not engaging in systematic reflection of their faith is an important cause of LDS worldview disparity. A second comes from the fact that many Latter-day Saints are converts from nominal Christian backgrounds who have not been fully indoctrinated into Mormonism. Another is the influence that can be exerted upon a Mormon's thinking by Christian writers popular in LDS circles like C. S. Lewis. Thus it should come as no surprise that many Latter-day Saints assume things about God, humanity and the world that are actually at odds with Mormonism's basic worldview commitments. Often these personal assumptions are genuinely similar to Christian teachings. One must be keen to discern the degree to which individual Latter-day Saints understand and accept the Mormon worldview and its implications and the degree to which they share Christian assumptions.
The final challenge to be mentioned here is the challenge of Mormon apologetics. In recent years Mormon scholars with advanced degrees in relevant disciplines have produced a body of sophisticated apologetic literature defending Mormonism. Mormonism's fundamental truth claim is that Christianity went apostate in the first century or shortly thereafter and was restored to the earth through the prophet Joseph Smith in 1830. Because of the nature of this claim, arguments in favor of Mormonism often include direct challenges to the truth claims of orthodox Christianity. During encounters with Mormons it is increasingly the Christian who is put on the defensive. One must therefore be prepared to defend such things as early Jewish and Christian monotheism, the development of Christian theology, the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of the Trinity.
The Christian who wishes to engage Latter-day Saints apologetically should have a solid grasp of the Mormon worldview. It is only by contrasting the Mormon and Christian worldviews that one is able to effectively depict the gulf that separates Mormonism from Christianity. One should also be prepared to expose the Mormon worldview's inconsistencies, radical implications and shortcomings. Doing this is sometimes much more effective than the typical strategy of attempting to debunk Joseph Smith and the Book of Mormon. At the same time, one must be prepared to engage in doctrinal discussions with Mormons who have not internalized much of the Mormon worldview or whose beliefs have been influenced in an orthodox Christian direction. In these cases one can frequently employ areas of genuine agreement as building blocks for fruitful theological discussions. One must also be prepared to defend Christian doctrines against LDS criticism.
WORLDVIEWS AND AUTHENTIC CHRISTIAN CONFESSION
Given Latter-day Saints' devotion to Christ, one might be tempted to think that this is sufficient to qualify Mormonism as Christian or that differences between the Christian and Mormon worldviews are about matters inconsequential to genuine reception of the gospel and salvation. However, according to the New Testament, confronting erroneous teachings about God, humanity and the world is not peripheral to the proclamation of the gospel. For example, in Romans 1:16-32 the apostle Paul contrasts the message of the gospel which brings salvation (Rom 1:16-17) with the plight of a fallen humanity that stands under divine wrath (Rom 1:18-32). In the verses that follow Paul emphasizes that the specific reason for divine wrath is humanity's distorted view of God (Rom 1:19-21, 28), the created world (Rom 1:23, 25) and humanity itself (Rom 1:22, 32). But the message of the gospel breaks into the structures of this world and overcomes the idolatry of humankind's "depraved mind" (Rom 1:28). Thus a central component of the proclamation of the Christian gospel is precisely the calling of human beings to abandon idolatrous beliefs and practices and to view reality through the lens of divine revelation rather than the distorted perceptions of the fallen world around us. It follows from this that messages which reflect these distorted perceptions cannot be meaningfully described as Christian.
In the second century the early church father Irenaeus described the summary of Christian truth that had been delivered to his generation by the disciples of the apostles. Termed the rule (regula) of faith or truth, it serves two important functions. First, the rule is an encapsulation of the fundamental Christian vision about God, the world, humanity and salvation as it was understood by the immediate heirs of the apostles. As do the later ecumenical creeds, it serves to demarcate authentic Christianity from various religious movements whose teachings contain Christian elements but are nonetheless profoundly incompatible with the apostolic faith. Today this fundamental vision is held in common by all confessionally orthodox Catholics, Protestants and Eastern Orthodox. Second, the rule lays out the basic theological parameters within which a proper Christian interpretation of Scripture occurs. Interpretations that violate these parameters have no claim to the title Christian because they deny the realities that lie behind the Scriptures themselves.
In introducing the rule, Irenaeus reminds his reader that Christians are people who have been baptized in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as a seal of eternal life and rebirth unto God. This new life is theirs by virtue of the fact that Jesus was incarnate as "a man among men," died and was raised from the dead.4 But affirming Jesus as Savior and being baptized do not guarantee one's faith is Christian. One must also believe rightly about the nature and identity of the persons into whose shared name the Christian has been baptized. Otherwise "falseness enters the soul" and it "becomes broken and spoilt, not being whole." This is analogous to the way in which immorality ruins godliness. According to Irenaeus, it is useless for one to give verbal affirmation to true doctrines while living a life of immorality. It is likewise of little use if one lives morally without truth in the souls Heresy and immorality separate one from God. So how one lives and what one believes are both important to one's eternal well-being. This same point is implied by the apostle Paul's exhortation for Timothy to watch his life and teaching closely (1 Tim 4:16).
Irenaeus reports that according to the rule of truth there are three main articles necessary for authentic Christian faith. The first, which informs the other two, is "God, the Father, uncreated, uncontainable, invisible, one God, the Creator of all." The keystone to an authentic Christian worldview is the insistence that "the origin of all is God, for He Himself was not made by anyone, but everything was made by Him." Thus there is one "uncreated, invisible, Creator of all, above whom there is no other God, and after whom there is no other God."6 God is unique in his being and the only being properly termed "God."7 The other two articles focus on the persons and redemptive work of the Word of God and the Holy Spirit. The trinitarian structure of the rule is not accidental. From the moment one is initiated into the Christian community through baptism in the triune name one must think of God in trinitarian terms. The Trinity is not an add-on to the Christian doctrine of God but its very heart. Irenaeus may not express himself with the later Nicene terminology, but, as lain MacKenzie rightly observes, "there is little, if anything, in the Nicene formulae which is not present in embryonic or directional form in the works of Irenaeus." 8 (Below we will argue that the same can be said of the New Testament.)
The earliest Christians recognized that God and humans are fundamentally different kinds of beings. Unlike the Word of God who became a man, human beings are not uncreated and did not always coexist with God.9 God is a creator; humans are created beings. God contains and transcends all reality; humans are contained and limited by the world around them. Humans are contingent creatures whose very existence depends upon the creative will of the uncreated God.10 While God created humanity without sin with the possibility of immortality, the human race disobeyed his commandment. In doing so they rebelled against God's lordship and became sinners subject to corruption and death." The human condition is characterized by humanity's rebellion against God, by sin and its fatal effects. It is this which Christ came to overcome in order to reconcile God and humanity.
Devotion to Christ is obviously necessary for a religious movement to be considered Christian. But is it in itself sufficient? The New Testament and early Christian writers recognized that it is not one's understanding of Jesus must be informed by a biblical understanding of reality. They also recognized that unbiblical worldviews can undermine one's understanding of Jesus in ways that inhibit true knowledge of God, thereby imperiling salvation. Erroneous worldviews are expressions of the idolatry that the gospel calls upon everyone to abandon. Groups like the Gnostics were refused the label Christian not just because they had a deficient Christology or erred on this or that secondary theological point, but because they promoted worldviews fundamentally at odds with Scripture, the apostolic witness and sound reason.
THE MORMON WORLDVIEW
In continuity with earliest Christianity, the tradition of Christian orthodoxy has always insisted that devotion to Christ is not sufficient in itself to qualify a religious movement as authentically Christian. This devotion must occur within the broader biblical vision of reality. At the absolute center of this worldview is the truth that there is one true and living God who is unique in his being and Creator of all things. God did not come into existence but has always existed as God. He created the world ex nihilo (out of nothing) and sustains its continued existence. There are no beings, metaphysical principles or laws of nature whose existence is independent of God's being or creative will. As the origin of its existence, God transcends the space-time cosmos. He alone is ultimate reality and is subjected to nothing beyond himself. As the unique, eternal, transcendent Supreme Being, God knows all things and rules over all things as Lord and King. In contrast, humans are contingent beings who have been created by God. Though created good, the human race is in a state of rebellion against its Creator and is sinful and corrupt. The good news of the gospel is that because of the incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus, human beings can be forgiven of their sins, reconciled to God and regenerated to share in the life and love of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
Traditional Mormonism presents a very different worldview. In the Doctrine and Covenants (D&C) we are informed that Jesus existed "in the beginning" with the Father (D&C 93:21). But the passage goes on to say that "man was also in the beginning with God" (D&C 93:29; cf. 93:23). This means that humans are uncreated and eternal in their most basic part (in LDS literature this is often referred to as an intelligence). We are also informed that "Intelligence, or the light of truth, was not created or made, neither indeed can be." Furthermore, the basic building blocks of the universe have always existed: "the elements are eternal" (D&C 93:33). In another text we read that "there is no such thing as immaterial matter," that is, immaterial substance. Furthermore, "all spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure, and can only be discerned by purer eyes. We cannot see it, but when our bodies are purified we shall see that it is all matter" (D&C 131:7-8). It follows that even God is a material being.
Elsewhere Mormonism's founding prophet taught similar things. God did not create the world ex nihilo; rather, "God had materials to organize the world out of chaos-chaotic matter, which is element, and in which dwells all the glory. Element had an existence from the time he had."12 Both the matter and the principles that govern it are eternal and cannot be destroyed. The "elements are eternal ... any principle which is not eternal is of the devil.... The first step in [the] salvation of man is the laws of eternal and self-existent principles. "13 "The pure principles of element are principles which can never be destroyed; they may be organized and re-organized, but not destroyed. They had no beginning, and can have no end."14 He affirmed that "the spirits of men are eternal."ls In his most famous sermon Joseph Smith stated it this way: "We say that God himself is a self-existent being. Who told you so? It is correct enough; but how did it get into your heads? Who told you that man did not exist in like manner on the same principles? Man does exist upon the same principles.... The mind or intelligence which man possesses is co-equal [i.e., co-eternal] with God himself. "46
Thus, according to the Mormon worldview, God did not create the matter of which the cosmos is composed or the various eternal laws that govern it at the most fundamental level. Neither did he create human beings in their most basic constitution. All of these things, like God, are part of ultimate reality, self-existent and eternal. God is powerless to bring any of them to an end or change their fundamental natures because they exist independent of his creative power. They also limit his power. As Sterling McMurrin explains, "For Mormonism the universe is a `pluriverse' of both personal and impersonal elements, and these all have ultimate reality and they genuinely condition one another."" While God is very powerful, the fact that there are things which he did not create entails that "omnipotence" in the Mormon worldview "means God has all the power it is possible to have in a universe-actually a pluriv- erse-of these givens." 18 Just how much these givens limit God's power is debated, but it is clear that Mormonism's metaphysical pluralism implies a version of finite theism.
God the Father is understood to have a glorified body of flesh and bones. LDS scholar Kent P. Jackson observes that it is significant to LDS theology that God specifically has a body of flesh and bones, not just a material body. This "suggests something of the relationship between deity and humans."" In LDS theology God is literally an exalted man-of the same species as all men. Joseph Smith taught this when he declared, "God himself was once as we are now, and is an exalted man, and sits enthroned in yonder heavens! That is the great secret. ,20 Thus Jackson agrees that "the doctrine of God and the doctrine of humanity are virtually the same in Mormon theology."" God and human beings are very different from one another, to be sure, "but the difference is not a difference in the kind of beings they are but a difference in their respective locations in a universal process that perfects intelligent life.,12
Humans are naturally like God in being self-existent entities who have always existed (even if we can't remember anything before this life). They also share God's nature because they were begotten by him in a pre-mortal state to be his "spirit children." (It is unclear how begetting self-existent beings works.) In a doctrinal exposition by the LDS First Presidency, we are told that "the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, basing its belief on divine revelation, ancient and modern, proclaims man to be the direct and lineal offspring of Deity.... All men and women are in the similitude of the universal Father and Mother, and are literally the sons and daughters of Deity.... Man, as a spirit, was begotten and born of heavenly parents."23 Having been begotten by God, the potential for godhood is inherent in every person on earth. Thus, "man is the child of God, formed in the divine image and endowed with divine attributes, and even as the infant son of an earthly father and mother is capable in due time of becoming a man, so the undeveloped offspring of celestial parentage is capable, by experience through ages and aeons, of evolving into a God."'-1
God and human beings share the same divine nature. The chief difference between us is that God has actualized far more of his divine potential than we have. In our current state we are but gods in embryo. On the more traditional reading of Mormon theology, God has not always existed as God. Rather, at one time he was like we are now. By obeying the laws of eternal progression he was exalted to the status of a God by the God above him. Human beings can become gods by following the same path of obedience that our God and all the Gods followed to become what they are.26 An increasing number of Latter-day Saints are uncomfortable with the idea that there are Gods above God the Father. Some are convinced that the idea is incompatible with their scriptures. Joseph Smith's statements that teach this were made at the end of his life, and he did not have opportunity to explain further what he meant. For this reason, and because they are not part of the LDS standard works, some Mormons feel free to dismiss these statements and view God as the Supreme Being not just for our world but for the entire cosmos. Nonetheless, they still see God as a progressive material being within a cosmos whose fundamental elements and principles he did not create.
Paul K. Moser and David Yandell observe that naturalism takes various forms but the core ontological belief is that "every real entity either consists of or is somehow ontologically grounded in the objects countenanced by the hypothetically completed empirical sciences (that is, in the objects of a natural ontology). ,17 Defined in this way Mormonism is clearly a form of metaphysical naturalism. It is unusual in affirming the existence of deities and angels, but within Mormonism these beings are understood naturalistically. They are entirely material, finite beings who exist as part of the cosmos and are subject to the fundamental eternal laws that govern it. Latter-day Saints have themselves described their beliefs as naturalistic. For example, philosopher David L. Paulsen says that as "a corollary to its materialistic (or physicalistic) metaphysic, Mormon theism has a strong naturalistic bent" and refers simply to "Mormon naturalism.-28 Scientist David Bailey speaks of the LDS "notion of a finite, naturalistic, material God" and of LDS theology's "rich tradition of naturalism." 29
Despite its idiosyncrasies, Mormonism shares many of the problems that afflict all forms of naturalism. When subjected to critical scrutiny it has been shown that the Mormon worldview has great difficulty grounding the existence of objective moral values.30 It cannot adequately account for the philosophical and scientific evidence that confirms the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo.31 It does not explain why God exists, why anything else exists, why anything continues to exist or why the universe is orderly and governed by law.32 Its odd physicalist understanding of human persons cannot account for the unity of persons, genuine mental events and other things that we know about ourselves through introspection. 33 One could also argue that the metaphysical commitments of the Mormon worldview are incompatible with scientific realism, cast doubt on the reliability of our cognitive faculties and may even preclude the very possibility of truth and knowledge. In more specifically theological areas, the Mormon worldview exacerbates the problem of evil by undermining our warrant for believing that God can eventually overcome evil. Indeed, evil seems to be one of the eternal elements of the Mormon cosmos. Trust in God is also made tenuous because the Mormon God is neither the source of moral values nor is he good necessarily. The Mormon God could go wrong and fall from his position as God, a point Joseph Smith acknowledged.34
By now it should be very clear that Mormonism represent a worldview far removed from that of the earliest Christians and the orthodox tradition. We cannot accept its claim to restore earliest Christianity. To be sure, at the doctrinal level Mormonism has a structure similar to Christianity's, and its devotion to Jesus is sincere. Both, however, are nested in a worldview that undermines true knowledge of God and salvation. Like those of the Gnostics, many Mormon teachings are antithetical to a Christian vision of reality. Mormonism rejects both the main doctrinal affirmations of what Lewis termed "mere Christianity" and the fundamental vision of reality that informs them. The "restored gospel" of Mormonism must be clearly distinguished from the biblical gospel. For these reasons Mormonism cannot be meaningfully or properly classified as a Christian faith.35
THE DOCTRINAL CHALLENGE: THE TRINITY
It was noted above that increasingly one comes across Latter-day Saints who are uncomfortable with the idea that there is an infinite chain of Gods above God the Father. Many of these are Mormons whose assumed worldviews are not consistent with Mormonism's basic worldview commitments. Others are uncomfortable because they have studied their scriptures and have concluded that this idea is incompatible with them. While one can find many Mormons who hold to the traditional views, one must also be prepared to address the objections of those who wish to see the Father, Son and Spirit as in some sense the only God or Godhead that there is. In both cases one will likely have to defend Nicene trinitarianism and its insistence that the persons of the Trinity are homoousios (one and the same Being). Mormons of both stripes assert that this is an unbiblical notion that was imported into Christianity from pagan Greek philosophy. Yet the doctrine of the Trinity, as maintained in historic orthodoxy, is fundamental to the Christian understanding of the identity of God and hence to the framework which supports the Christian vision of reality. In what follows we will illustrate how one can defend this important doctrine and show how it strikes at the heart of the theological gap that presently sep arates all varieties of Mormonism from Christianity.
To begin with, it must be acknowledged that both Christians and Latter-day Saints affirm a Godhead consisting of three persons-Father, Son and Holy Spirit. (Many Mormons affirm this but limit God's rule to this system of worlds rather than the whole of reality.) Each person in the Godhead is distinguishable from the other persons, and yet the three persons considered together are viewed as one God. In engaging the LDS on this matter, it will not prove fruitful to simply argue the point that the Bible teaches that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one God. The LDS already agree with this claim in a sense.36 What must be argued is that the three persons of the Trinity are only one God; in other words that they are one God only, and not in any sense also three Gods.
In the Mormon view, from one standpoint the persons of the Godhead are one God, yet from another standpoint they are three Gods.37 Christians see it as a contradiction to say that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are at the same time one God and yet three Gods. The LDS generally do not understand the oneness of the Godhead ontologically but rather functionally and experientially.38 Stephen Robinson captures the essence of the theological chasm that separates Mormonism from Christianity when he writes that "we believe that the oneness of these three is not an ontological oneness of being (this is a creedal rather than a biblical affirmation), but a oneness of mind, purpose, power and intent.... What is not said in the Bible, but is said at Nicaea and is rejected by Mormons, is that these three persons are ontologically one being. "39
Robinson has a point, in the sense that orthodox Christians do not simply read the Bible through the lens of their own insight or purported modern revelations; rather, we read the sacred text collectively in sympathy with the ecumenical voice of Christians through the centuries who have reflected on the same biblical materials.40 What must be argued in interacting with the LDS is not simply that the three persons of the Godhead are in some way one (a point to which they consent), but that they are one in precisely the sense which is set forth in the Nicene Creed.41 This shifts the grounds from arguing with Mormons about the outward structure of our respective beliefs, which is actually quite similar, to the inward substance of orthodox Christian faith.
It is important to recognize that the Nicene doctrine, which maintains that the Lord Jesus Christ is homoousion to patri ("of one substance with the Father"), is no mere triviality but strikes at the very heart of the Christian faith. This is true for several reasons. First of all, it maintains biblical monotheism without sacrificing the divine identity of Jesus. It is clear that the New Testament ascribes to Jesus a status and role in religious devotion which is reserved for God alone (Phil 2:9-11; Rev 5:13; cf. Rev 22:9).42 If Jesus is to be understood as a second and subordinate god, then the worship of the early church must be understood as abandoning the most fundamental principle of Old Testament religion (Dent 6:4; Is 43:10)-the incomparability of God. Israel's prophets understood that no created thing was comparable to God (Is 46:5) or worthy of worship (Is 42:8). Yet the Christian church worshiped Jesus. By Old Testament and Jewish standards, the religion of the apostolic church would have to be rejected as idolatrous (Ex 20:3-6). If the Nicene doctrine were not true, then Christianity would forever be separated from its Judaic roots, only to join the plethora of heathen religions, which distribute their religious devotion among a plurality of deities.
Second, the Nicene doctrine preserves the true knowledge of God in religion as opposed to secondary knowledge. The whole point of the incarnation was paradoxically to make the unknowable God the direct object of religious knowledge (Jn 1:18; 2 Cor 4:6). A common belief of pagan philosophy was that there was one supreme God, beyond knowledge, from whom gods and men derived their being. But such a philosophical abstraction could not be worshiped. This gap was filled by the pantheon, which provided practical objects of religious devotion. The question that framed the Nicene debate was precisely which side of this divide would the church fall upon. Would the Christians agree with the pagans that the one supreme God remained beyond contact with our world and beyond the bounds of religious knowledge? Or would they maintain that God himself, and not merely a quasi-divine intermediary, had actually revealed himself and become the object of religious knowledge in the person of Christ (Mt 11:27; Jn 14:6-11)? For Arius, God still remained beyond the reach of human knowledge and could have no direct contact with the created world. In the Son we get only an indirect reflection of what God is like through an appointed intermediary. For Athanasius, God actually entered into our world and was made available to be directly known and experienced in the person of the Lord Jesus Christ, who is none other than God himself, truly revealing himself through himself.
Third, the Nicene doctrine maintains the eschatological vision of the Old Testament. It was a fundamental vision of Hebrew eschatology that one day God himself would enter our world and bring salvation to his wayward people (Zech 14:1-5; Is 40:3, 9-11; 59:16-20). The New Testament clearly understands Jesus to be the fulfillment of that prophetic vision (Mt 1:21-23; Lk 3:4-6, 16-17). If the opponents of the Nicene doctrine are correct, then Jesus did not truly fulfill the eschatological hopes of the Hebrew Bible. God himself did not come into our world to bring salvation; instead he sent a lesser deity to represent him. In a way, Mormonism also maintains this prophetic vision of God coming into our world-but at a very high cost. Because of their denial that the Father and the Son are homoousios, Mormons are often forced into the quasiGnostic heresy of separating the God of the Old Testament (Yahweh) and the Most High God (El). For the Mormons, while the God of the Hebrew prophets did become incarnate in the historical life of Jesus Christ, there was yet another God, higher on the scale of being, who remained outside our world.
Particular texts in the New Testament are especially relevant to establishing the biblical basis of Nicene trinitarianism, and in particular the doctrine that the persons of the Trinity are homoousios (one and the same Being or substance).43 We will briefly examine five such texts below.44
Matthew 28.•19. This text is theologically crucial, not simply because it points to a Godhead that includes three persons (which the Mormons also believe), but because it identifies the singular "name" of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The singular name Yahweh known from the Old Testament (cf. Ex 3:15; 6:3), has been reshaped into a name that includes more than one divine person, hence showing that in the development of biblical revelation, the divine identity of the one God is seen to include three persons.45 A "name" specifies the identity of someone, so to say that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit share God's name is to say that they share a common divine identity-which is ultimately what it means for the three persons to be homoousios 46
John 1:1. This verse is an explicit endorsement of what would become Nicene orthodoxy. It identifies the preexistent Word as both being God and yet as standing in intimate relationship with God. In the terms of the Nicene Creed, the Word is "very God of very God." To say that the Word is at one and the same time God and yet distinguishable from God the Father is to state the content of Nicene dogma. Had John intended to say that the Son was a second and subordinate God alongside the Father (albeit united in mind, will and purpose), he could have used the Greek term theios in John 1:1 ("and the Word was divine/was a god") rather than theos.47 Alternatively, we might have expected John to plainly state that the Word was a "second God" (deuteros theos) had that been his intent. (This would have been much more transparent than a Greek construction that merely lacks the definite article.) As the text stands, it expresses precisely what the Nicene fathers intended to articulate-that although the Father and the Son are distinguishable persons, they are one Being.48 The Father and the Son are homoousios-each per son is God (not a God), yet they are distinguishable persons.49
It is important to note that John 1:1 does not say that together the Father and the Son are God in the sense of one united Godhead. John 1:1b identifies God specifically as the Father ("and the Word was with God"); the third clause then goes on to state that what the Father was (i.e., God), so was the Son (i.e., God). When Mormons speak of the persons as "one God" they are referring to the unified mind, will and action of the persons; when orthodox Christians speak of the persons as "one God" they are referring to the identity of divine Being shared by the Son and the Father. So one must either accept the Nicene understanding of this verse or else argue for an alternative translation of the clause.50 John 1:1c cannot at the same time be translated "and the Word was God" and be understood in the Mormon sense of a unified Godhead, since the Word is not God in that sense-only the three persons together are God in the sense of one Godhead.
John 8.58. It is commonly agreed that when Jesus states "before Abraham was born, I am," he is alluding to the language of Exodus 3:14. Within the structure of John's Gospel, Jesus' discourses about God are normally understood to refer to God the Father, and this is certainly the case with the context of John 8:58 (cf. Jn 8:39-42, 54).s' So when Jesus takes the name "I am" and applies it to himself, he is understood to be making a claim that would only be appropriate for God the Father. This is why the Jews attempt to stone him Un 8:59).
It is significant that Jesus uses a verb of "being" to describe his identity with the Father as the God of the Exodus story. Who is the "I AM" of Exodus 3:14? The "I AM" is both the Father and the Son. Long ago, the church father Athanasius made the link between the term ousia ("being") and the divine "I AM" of Exodus 3:14.52 Athanasius observed the usage of this same divine name in Jesus' "I am" sayings (e.g., Jn 14:6) and pointed out that this indicates an identity of ousia between the Father and the Son.53 Jesus' claim in John 8:58 amounts to a claim to be of one and the same ousia as God the Father-the God who IS, is both the Father and the Son. In biblical idiom, Jesus and the Father share the divine name "I AM"; in Nicene language the Father and the Son are "one and the same Being" (homoousios) 54
How is it that the word one would signal to his Jewish audience that he was making a unique claim of identity, that he was in fact claiming to be God? Because they heard in Jesus' words an echo of Deuteronomy 6:4: "Yahweh is one." That there is only one God was a fundamental belief of Judaism; yet Jesus was somehow claiming that the "one God" of the Shema (Deut 6:4) must be understood in such a way as to include himself within that unique divine identity. In light of the reaction of the audience and the allusion to Deuteronomy 6:4, it becomes necessary to understand the oneness between Jesus and the Father ontologically. The Father and the Son share more than a common purpose and will; they share a common divine identity. In short, they are homoousios (one and the same Being).
Hebrews 1:3. The first two clauses of this verse support what the Nicene fathers claimed to be true-that the Father and the Son share the same divine essence and are the same substance. First of all, how can the Son be "the radiance of [the] glory" of God unless his identity is intrinsic to God's own Being? Can you separate a source of light from the radiance that it sends forth from itself? Are not the sun and its shine one light? As Athanasius pointed out long ago:
But did the writer of Hebrews intend to make concrete ontological claims about the relationship between God the Father and the Son in this passage? Is he not merely saying that we see a reflection of God in the person of Jesus? We can be sure that the writer intended his words to be understood as making ontological claims, for he goes on to say that the Son is "the exact representation of His nature." The Greek term that is translated "nature" here (hypostasis) in first-century usage meant "suh- stantial nature, essence, actual being, reality. ,57 In other words, what God is in his "substantial nature" or "being," so is the Son. If the Father and the Son were not identical in essence (homoousios), then the writer of Hebrews could not have claimed that Jesus was the "exact representation of [God's] nature. ,58 In combination with each other, the twin assertions of the first two clauses of Hebrews 1:3 provide solid support for the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity.'
SOME APOLOGETIC PRINCIPLES
The doctrine of the Trinity represents only one of the theological challenges that Mormonism poses to Christianity. Similar examples could he multiplied in the areas of monotheism, creation, christology and soteriology. A number of principles can be drawn from the preceding study that apply across the spectrum of theological loci. They can also be applied in apologetics to any heterodox religious movement that claims to be Christian.
First, apologetics aimed at non-orthodox groups should be unashamedly confessional. We should be up front in our apologetics with nonorthodox groups and let it be known that what is required of them is not simply giving assent to the teaching of particular Bible passages (which they believe they already do). What we are actually asking them to affirm is what Christians through the centuries have understood and defined as biblical teaching as outlined in the church's definitional creedal statements. The Bible by itself is not the sole object of theological reflection, but rather the Bible as interpreted within the framework of ecu menical Christian orthodoxy. Recognizing this will avoid frustrating encounters with groups like the Mormons, who see us as disingenuous when we ask them to simply affirm biblical statements.
Many Protestants, operating with a distorted and exaggerated understanding of the principle of sola Scripture, have wrongly operated on the assumption that only the Bible itself, and not ecumenical summaries of its teaching, can be set forth as binding and obligatory for authentic Christian faith. Yet the Reformed and Lutheran churches, unlike the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches, have never maintained that the Bible functions as a theological norm outside of and separated from the rule of faith and ecumenical creeds. These do not function as inspired sources of authority alongside Scripture but as the hermeneutical norm that guides the church in its reading of Scripture.60 They enable us to read Scripture in communion with the saints of all ages and to benefit from the insight the Spirit gave to previous generations of Christians. Just as Protestants affirm that justification is by faith alone, but not by a faith that is alone, so we must maintain that authentic Christian doctrine is established by Scripture alone, but not by a Scripture that is alone.
Second, our apologetics should be exegetically sophisticated. It is necessary to do more than quote verses as proof of our position. We must demonstrate in detail how our theological stance is supported by the wording and subtleties of key texts that bear upon the particular issue being discussed.
Fourth, our apologetics must be confident in the biblical basis of Christian orthodoxy. We must avoid the temptation to view later orthodox positions as anachronistic additions to the content of New Testament teaching. We should analyze key doctrinal texts with the full confidence that orthodox distinctives arise naturally from the soil of the Bible. The secular bias against systematization and the chronological priority of orthodoxy is a subtle influence which permeates the academic community; its influence must be resisted by Christian apologists, without sacrificing intellectual and scholarly integrity in our appropriation of biblical texts.
Fifth, we should utilize the richness of the Christian tradition. Theological insights and arguments are not like computers or cars. They do not get outdated. They may fall out of fashion, but that does not affect their validity, soundness or truth. We are wise to drink deeply from the wells dug by our forbearers in the faith. Church fathers like Irenaeus and Athanasius still have much to offer in contemporary discussions. The same can be said of many others in the Christian tradition (e.g., Augustine, Anslem, Aquinas, Calvin).
CONCLUSION
One can readily cite many noble features of the Mormon religion. There are genuine areas of agreement between Latter-day Saints and orthodox Christians, especially with respect to moral and social concerns. These should be openly acknowledged, and Christians should feel free to work with Latter-day Saints on issues of common concern within society. However, Mormonism denies the distinctively trinitarian worldview of early Christianity and the orthodox tradition. Mormonism's founder Joseph Smith correctly perceived that "the creeds set up stakes, and say, `Hitherto shalt thou come, and no further."'« Smith would not subscribe to these boundaries and thereby erred in his interpretation of the Bible and departed from the boundaries of Christian faith. Christians have a duty to share the gospel with their LDS friends, to call upon Mormonism to reconsider its teachings in light of Scripture, and to do so in such a way that Latter-day Saints are attracted to the truth of our apostolic message.
FOR FURTHER READING
Beckwith, Francis J., Carl Mosser, and Paul Owen, eds. The New Mormon Challenge: Responding to the Latest Defenses of a Fast-Growing Movement. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zonclervan, 2002.
Beckwith, Francis J., and Stephen Parrish. TheMormon Concept of God: A Philo- sophicalAnalysis. Studies in American Religion. Vol. 55. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 1991.
Blomberg, Craig, and Stephen Robinson. How Wide the Divide?. An Evangelical and a Mormon in Conversation. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1997.
Ludlow, David H., ed. Encyclopedia of Mormonism. 5 vol. New York: Macmillan, 1992.
Millet, Robert. The Mormon Faith: A New Look at Christianity. Salt Lake City: Shadow Publishing, 1998.
Ostling, Richard N., and Joan K. Ostling. Mormon America: The Power and the Promise. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1999.
LIVING IN THE REALITIES OF THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD, WE HAVE I3ECOME all too familiar with the challenge of Islam, especially in regard to the sociopolitical threats that we face from radical Muslim factions around the globe on a regular basis. Books on Islam, especially in evangelical circles, have been flooding the market in the last two years. Many of these books seem to have been written with a one-sided emphasis on the negative aspects of Islam and in particular with a focus on the themes of violence in Islamic scripture and history.
Although the multifaceted political, social, economic and even military threats of Islam are very real and present dangers (a fact often ignored in books written by Muslim or nonevangelical authors), the most significant challenge of Islam to the Christian faith has to do more with Islamic theology than any other area in the world of Islam. It is in Islamic theology that we find the source of Islam's fundamental opposition to Christianity. Unless we grasp what it is that Muslims believe, how that belief confronts the truth claims of the Christian faith and how to respond to the Islamic charges against Christianity, we have not succeeded in understanding Islam or providing Muslims with an adequate Christian response.
Our purpose in this chapter is to focus on the most significant doctrinal differences between Islam and Christianity. After a brief survey of Islamic theology, we will demonstrate how Islam challenges every single foundational doctrine in the Christian faith and how as Christians we can respond to the Islamic charges.
THE BASICS OF ISLAMIC THEOLOGY
Islamic theology is based on five articles of faith.' The significance of these articles of faith is reflected in Qur'anic passages such as sura 2:177: "It is righteousness to believe in God and the Last Day, and the Angels, and the Book and the Messengers," or sura 4:136: "Any who denieth God, His angels, His Books, His Apostles, and the Day of judgment, hath gone far, far astray."
The oneness of God. The first and by far the most important belief is in the absolute oneness of God. "There can be no doubt," wrote Isma'il al-Faruqi (1921-1986), one of the most prominent Muslim thinkers in the West, "that the essence of Islam is al tawhid, the act of affirming Allah to be the One, the Absolute, transcendent Creator, the Lord and Master of all that is."2 Another well-known Muslim intellectual in the United States, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, also writes, "At the heart of Islam stands the reality of God, the One, the Absolute and the infinite, the infinitely Good and All Merciful."3 The absolute oneness and sovereignty of Allah is the unifying theme of Islam. In fact throughout their history, Muslims have viewed their confession of faith that "there is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is Allah's messenger" as an adequate summary of Islam and what it stands for. The Qur'an is filled with passages that urge the readers to abandon pagan and polytheistic beliefs and turn with faith and submission to the sovereignty of the one true God.
Messengers of God. Although human beings are not fallen or sinful by nature according to Islam, they are very prone to be led astray from the straight path of true worship. Thus God has sent prophets and messengers throughout history to all people groups to teach and guide humanity to the straight path. The Qur'an mentions approximately twentyfive prophetic names, but according to Islamic tradition, God has sent 124,000 messengers to all human cultures and languages. All prophets have brought the same essential message of Islam or submission to God and thus are worthy of respect. As the Qur'an puts it in sura 2:136, Muslims must acknowledge that "we believe in God and the revelation given to us and to Abraham, Isma'il, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and that given to Moses and Jesus, and that given to (all) prophets from their Lord. We make no difference between one and another of them and we bow to God [in Islam]" (cf. sura 3:84; 4:163-65; 6:84-87). Of course, despite the claimed equality, most Muslims believe that Muhammad was the final and the greatest prophet of God and his message of Islam is the only uncorrupted, complete and thus the only universally valid message for all humanity.
The books of God. Not only has God sent messengers for the purpose of guidance, but he has also given scriptures to some of those messengers in order to convey the will of God to the people of their time. Not all the messengers brought forth a divine book, but some of the ones that are mentioned in the Qur'an to have been given books are Abraham, Moses, David and Jesus. But as Hammadah Abdalati puts it, "Long before the revelation of the Qur'an to Muhammad, some of those books and revelations had been lost or corrupted, others forgotten, neglected or concealed. The only authentic and complete book of God in existence today is the Qur'an."4 Muslims believe that the Qur'an, revealed on various occasions during a period of about twenty-three years to prophet Muhammad (A.D. 610-632) and collected and edited some years after his death, is the literal words of God, dictated to Muhammad through the angel Gabriel.
The angels of God. Belief in angels, as invisible agents of God, plays an important part in Islamic faith and practices of Muslims. Angels continually serve and worship God and are often believed to be involved in interacting with human beings such as providing protection from evil, recording their deeds and receiving their souls at the moment of death. Gabriel, in particular, has a high honor since he is the agent of revelation. It is he who brings down the word of God to the prophets.
The judgment of God. Along with the insistent belief in the oneness of God, the Qur'an is also continually warning its readers that there is a day of judgment in which people have to give an account for their life. Life has a moral purpose and those who fulfill their purpose with true worship and righteous deeds earn eternal paradise. Those who reject God's message of guidance and whose bad deeds outweigh their good deeds will suffer eternally in hell.
It is in this context that we have to understand the practices and rituals of Islam. Along with the articles of faith, there are also the so-called five pillars of Islam. These are the deeds (along with many other meritorious acts) that Muslims are commanded to do in order to progress in the path of righteousness. These pillars include the Islamic confession of faith by which a person becomes a Muslim, the observance of daily prayers five times a day, the payment of religious tax or alms to the poor, fasting during the month of Ramadan from dawn to sunset, and going on a pilgrimage to the city of Mecca at least once in a lifetime if one is physically and financially able. Thus earning one's salvation by accumulating merits and good works is an essential aspect of the Muslim life.
THE BASICS OF ISLAM'S THEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE
It is true that Islam seems to share many similar doctrines with Christianity, such as belief in God, creation, prophets (most of the prophets mentioned in the Qur'an are biblical characters), revelation, the Old and New Testament as divine Scriptures, angels, the day of judgment, heaven and hell, and so on. Compared with many other religions and worldviews, Islam and Christianity appear to be truly much closer to each other than many might at first have imagined. The Qur'an itself seems to support such a position when it addresses Jews and Christians in sura 3:64,
Say: "0 People of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you. That we worship none but God; that we associate no partners with Him; that we erect not from among ourselves Lords and patrons other than God."
And in sura 29:46 Muslims are told not to dispute with people of the book but to say, "We believe in the Revelation which has come down to us and in that which has come down to you; Our God and your God is One; and it is to Him we bow [in Islam]."
However, if we take some time to look deeper under the surface, we realize that despite many superficial similarities, a vast gulf separates Islamic teachings from the Christian faith. Despite all the lip service that many Muslims and others pay to the closeness between Islam and Christianity, orthodox Islam challenges and refutes every major foundational doctrine of the Christian faith.
Islam denies the Christian doctrine of God, especially the biblical view of the fatherhood of God and the doctrine of the Trinity. Islam denies the Christian view of human beings, in particular the doctrines of sin and salvation. Islam unequivocally disputes the biblical view of Christ in regard to his death and deity. And finally Islam rejects the authenticity and authority of the Christian Scriptures.
One typical example is Misha'al ibn Abdullah's book What Did Jesus Really Say? After quoting from a British article in which it is claimed that "more than half of England's Anglican bishops say that Christians are not obliged to believe that Jesus Christ was God" and that many of the bishops "think that Christ's miracles, the virgin birth and the resurrection might not have happened exactly as described in the Bible," Abdullah confidently concludes,
THE DOCTRINE OF GOD
In the same way, it is of vital importance to demonstrate to a Muslim that there is no contradiction in the orthodox formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity. In a Qur'anic commentary written by two Indian Muslim scholars, we read, "So how can God be one and three at the same time? It is absurd, rationally impossible, mathematically wrong. Unity and Diversity cannot gather together."" What needs to be pointed out here is that in the doctrine of the Trinity, Christians do not affirm God to be one and three at the same time and in the same sense (that would be a contradiction). What Christians claim is that in one sense God is one (he is one in essence or being) and in a very different sense there is a divine plurality (three eternal "persons" or distinctions or relationships or di- mensions).'5 Thus there can be no charge of logical contradiction against this doctrine.
At this point, many Muslims might complain about the incomprehensible mysteries of Christianity. Whereas Islam seems so rational and simple to understand and explain, Christianity is filled with such complex and confusing doctrines that even most Christians have trouble understanding.16 We need to remind Muslims that it is not the case that everything about God is completely clear and understandable. If Muslims reflect more deeply on their own affirmation of Allahu Akbar (God is greater) and study the heated theological debates in the history of Islam concerning Qur'anic passages that speak of God's hands and eyes and throne, they will probably agree with Christians that God as God (Trinity or not) is a mystery and beyond being exhaustively cap tured by our human understanding.
After clearing the ground of these charges, we now come to the heart of the issue. Ultimately, this peculiar Christian doctrine is not about logic or arithmetic. The doctrine of the Trinity is a summary of the encounter of Christians with the one living God .17 This doctrine is the feeble attempt of Christians to explain how from the very beginning as monotheistic Jews to this day, they have encountered the one true God as their loving Creator and Father, as their Redeemer in Jesus Christ and as their Sanctifier in the presence of the Holy Spirit. As C. S. Lewis put it in very simple language:
In a similar vein, Alister McGrath explains:
A helpful way of looking at this [the doctrine of the Trinity] is to say that three essential models must be used if the full depth of the Christian experience and understanding of God is to be expressed adequately. No one picture, image or model of God is good enough-and that these models are essential if the basic outline of the Christian understanding of God is to be preserved. The first model is that of the transcendent God who lies beyond the world as its source and creator; the second is the human face of God, revealed in the person of Jesus Christ; the third is that of the immanent God who is present and active throughout his creation. The doctrine of the Trinity affirms that these three models combine to define the essential Christian insights into the God who raised Jesus Christ from the dead. None of them, taken on its own, is adequate to capture the richness of the Christian experience of God.19
The above discussion sheds light on a crucial but often neglected issue between Islam and Christian faith. Our disagreement about the Trinity is rooted in our disagreement about the very character of God. For example, many people might have the impression that since, classically, both Islam and Christianity have defined God as the omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent Creator of the world, that Muslims and Christians agree on almost everything about God except the contentious and mysterious doctrine of the Trinity. But on closer inspection we realize that Islam and Christianity disagree fundamentally on who God is, what he has done and his purposes in history.
The building blocks of such peculiar Christian doctrines as the Trinity, incarnation and atonement are all founded on who God is. The God who encounters us in the pages of the biblical narratives is a God who has revealed himself, and thus his acts in history tell us true things about who he is in himself (unlike the Islamic emphasis on God only revealing his will). The God of the Bible wants to be known in a personal and intimate relationship with his people (unlike the Islamic emphasis on the utter transcendence of God). He is a God who is engaged with the suffering of human beings due to the sinfulness of humanity (as opposed to the Islamic portrayal of God simply as a judge), a God who loves unconditionally (not just loving God-fearing people as stated in the Qur'an) and a God who is perfect in holiness (and thus cannot simply disregard the sinfulness of human beings). These are the biblical convictions that mature into the theological formulations of the Trinity, incarnation and
This approach helps us to discern that before getting into any discussion about the philosophical or logical ramifications of the Trinity, we must start and center our discussion on who God is and what he has done for us in history and especially through Jesus Christ. Unless there is a "plausibility structure" rooted in the very character of God that opens the space for a trinitarian understanding of God, Christians will continue to fail in communicating to Muslims the meaning and significance of this crucial doctrine.
HUMAN BEINGS
In spite of the fact that there is no assurance of salvation in Islam, many Muslims hope that by doing plenty of good works and trusting in God's compassion and mercy they can attain salvation in the hereafter. One popular imagery of the Qur'an in regard to God's basis of judgment is found in sura 23:102-3. On the day of God's judgment, "those whose balance [of good deeds] is heavy, they will attain salvation, but those whose balance is light, will be those who have lost their souls; in Hell will they abide." In such a theological system, it is clear that there is no room for any biblical concept of atonement or a salvation based solely on God's grace through faith.
Although it should be obvious that we cannot prove the particular Christian understanding of human sinfulness and God's gracious salvation in Christ, there are certain important truths that we need to highlight in our discussion with Muslims.
Someone has wisely commented that the doctrine of original sin is the one Christian doctrine with the most empirical verification in its favor. It is beyond doubt and a matter of simple observation that human beings and the social environments that they create have been and continue to be deeply flawed and broken. If people are born in a total state of innocence as Muslims claim, then why is there an almost universal recognition that nobody is perfect and everybody sins? Or why isn't there at least a significant percentage of the world population that would stay sinless as they grow, since 100 percent were born sinless to begin with? Due to the force of these observations, Abdolkarim Soroush, the most prominent Iranian Muslim intellectual today, suggests that "our definitions of humanity need to be soberly and somberly examined in view of the amount of greed, cruelty, wickedness, and ingratitude that humans have caused-all of which they have done willingly and in accordance to their nature, not because they have been coerced or perverted." 22 He goes on to say, "It is true that we do not relish seeing humans as tyrannical, unappreciative, unjust, and foolish and that we hope they will not be so. Yet we must recognize these defects as part of human nature. Iniquity must be recognized as a natural and permanent part of human nature and not as an erasable or incidental facet of it."23
Furthermore, it should also be pointed out that the Qur'an itself is not nearly as optimistic about human nature as some Muslim theologians would like us to think. The Qur'an is filled with passages that describe human beings as unjust, foolish, ungrateful, wicked, boastful and rebellions. 24
We should also mention that in regard to the doctrine of atonement, it is not Christianity that has deviated from the path of God's previous prophets, but Islam. By denying the necessity of atonement and insisting that good works is all that is needed to obtain salvation, Islam has completely disregarded the entire witness of the Old Testament Scriptures and the consistent teaching throughout the Torah (found especially in the sacrificial system of Leviticus) that the sinful human being cannot approach a holy God without the provision of a sacrificial atonement. It is the Christian view of the cross that is the reasonable and climactic conclusion of God's revelation in the Old Testament, not the Islamic denial of it.
JESUS CHRIST
Nowhere does the opposition between Islam and Christianity come into sharper focus than when we reach the person of Jesus Christ. Although the Qur'an acknowledges many truths about Christ, such as his virgin birth and his ability to do miracles, and honors him with many titles such as the "Messiah," "a word from God," "the Spirit of God" and "sign unto men and a mercy from God," the Qur'an is adamant in its denial of Jesus' deity and death.16 The Qur'an states:
They do blaspheme who say: "God is Christ the son of Mary." But said Christ: "0 Children of Israel, worship God, my Lord and your Lord." Whoever joins other gods with God, God will forbid him the Garden, and the Fire will be his abode. (sura 5:75)
Christ the son of Mary was no more than an Apostle; many were the apostles that passed away before him. His mother was a woman of truth. They had both to eat their (daily) food. See how God cloth make His signs clear to them; yet see in what ways they are deluded away from the Truth. (sura 5:78)
And the Christians call Christ the Son of God. That is a saying from their mouth; (in this) they but imitate what the Unbelievers of old used to say. God's curse be on them; how they are deluded away from the Truth. (sura 9:30)
That they said (in boast), "We killed Christ Jesus the son of Mary, the apostle of God," but they killed him not, nor crucified him, but so it was made to appear to them, and those who differ therein are full of doubts, with no (certain) knowledge, but only conjecture to follow, for of a surety they killed him not. (sura 4:157)
Once again, before making our response, we need to make sure that we have clarified any of the misunderstandings that might be in the mind of a Muslim. So, for example, we must emphasize that Christian theology has not elevated a human being to the status of God or God's partner, and that Jesus is not the Son of God in any physical or biological sense. Shabir Akhtar rebukes his fellow Muslims when he writes,
Most Muslims, including educated ones, know next to nothing about Christology. Few Muslims can distinguish clearly between the view that a man claims to be divine-a blasphemy-and the entirely different view according to which God volunteers to become human-the orthodox Christian conviction. And both of these views are routinely confused with the heretical doctrine that God "adopted" a son.2'
Therefore, quite naturally, his disciples also reflect Jesus' own understanding of himself throughout the whole New Testament. They come to believe in and worship him as nothing less that Yahweh (personal name of God) in person. As William Lane Craig points out, based on all the available historical evidence that we have, "within twenty years of the crucifixion a full-blown Christology proclaiming Jesus as God incar nated existed." He goes on to say,
Many Muslims, like the well-known apologist Jamal Badawi, bend over backwards to explain away all the New Testament evidence for the deity of Christ and then ask why Jesus never clearly claimed to be God and asked for worship.31 The fact of the matter is that Jesus was more than clear about his divine status throughout his ministry and was as clear as it was possible to be in a first-century Jewish monotheistic context and in accordance with his mission of humble self-sacrifice (see Phil 2:6-11).32 He was even clearly understood by his enemies Un 5:18; 10:33)! (See chapter nine of this book by Ben Witherington III.)
We conclude our brief discussion on this point with one important clarification. When Christians claim `Jesus is God," they need to be aware that they are using a theological shorthand. Christians do not claim that Jesus and God are numerically identical and thus everywhere we see the word Jesus in the New Testament, we can replace that with the word God. Jesus is not numerically one with God (therefore, he can genuinely pray to the Father and claim to have come from the Father), but he is essentially one with God. Jesus is God in essence.
When we come to the topic of Jesus' crucifixion, we can be confident that we are standing on the firmest historical grounds of our faith, whereas, exactly at this point, the Qur'an faces its weakest historical claim.34 If there is one thing that all biblical scholars across the whole theological spectrum agree about the historical Jesus, even all the liberal scholars whom Muslims love to quote, is the fact that Jesus of Nazareth died on the cross. The significance and the aftermath of the cross are hotly debated issues, but the fact of his death by crucifixion is beyond historical doubt.
In order to shed more light on the whole context of the Islamic rejection of the cross, we can refer to Kenneth Cragg's analysis that for Muslims, "there is the historical denial of its [the crucifixion] actuality, the moral refusal of its possibility and the doctrinal rejection of its necessity." 35 It seems that the Qur'anic denial of the historicity of the cross is mainly because of the belief that God would always protect his honored prophets and would ultimately rescue them from their enemies and also the conviction that human beings only need guidance and obedience in order to earn salvation. But Muslims cannot dismiss historical facts based on dubious theological assumptions, assumptions that are completely opposed to the biblical understanding of prophethood and means of salvation.
The Islamic denial of the cross confronts three major problems, for which Muslims have failed to provide any satisfactory answers. First, if Jesus was not crucified, how can we account for the conviction of every disciple and writer of the New Testament that the crucifixion is the cornerstone of the Christian faith? The cross is not just one detail in the distinguished career of a great teacher and prophet. For the writers of the New Testament, the cross is the absolute foundation for understanding who Jesus is and what he has done for humanity.
Finally, Muslims need to reflect on the implication of their rejection of the cross for the character of God. If God really rescued Jesus from suffering on the cross and instead made it only appear like that to the people (as Muslims believe), wouldn't this act involve God in the great est act of deception in human history? Muslims must thus conclude that God not only deceived the disciples of Jesus and all the subsequent generations of Christians from the very beginning, but also that he allowed this deception to continue unchallenged for six hundred years till the advent of the Qur'an. These are very serious questions that most Muslims would rather ignore than face with honesty and historical scholarship.
THE BIBLE
The underlying conviction behind all the Muslim charges against Christian theology is the Islamic rejection of the Christian Scriptures. Misha'al ibn Abdullah accurately summarizes the mainstream Muslim attitude toward the Bible when he writes,
In other words, because the Bible has been corrupted and is no longer in its pure and original form that was revealed by God to the prophets, the Bible is no longer authoritative for today. The only authentic, final and authoritative revelation of God for humanity today is the Qur'an. As I mentioned earlier, Muslims feel intellectually vindicated because they can find a great deal of support in critical and liberal Christian scholarship for their rejection of the authenticity and authority of the Scriptures.
Since defending the integrity of the biblical revelation and responding to the challenges against the Bible by critical scholarship are beyond the scope of this chapter, we will limit ourselves to two main lines of response in dealing with the Islamic charge of the corruption of our Scriptures.
Finally, we must briefly address a popular strategy in attacking the Bible by Muslim apologists. Often times, Muslim writers select a handful of quotes from liberal Western scholars that raise doubts about the historicity of the Bible. Almost always, what are missing from the quotations of these scholars are the philosophical presuppositions and highly critical methodologies employed to reach those conclusions.
What needs to be pointed out is that the same philosophical and methodological biases lead to conclusions that also contradict the Qur'an. For example, if genuine miracles do not happen as a matter of principle, a belief held by most critical scholars, then it is a forgone conclusion that the accounts of Jesus' virgin birth, his miraculous ministry and his resurrection, along with any biblical prophecies are later legendary creations. But these conclusions also contradict what the Qur'an affirms about Jesus and thus can be used as much against the Qur'an as they are used against the Bible.4o
CONCLUSION
Although this chapter has been mostly a summary survey of major Islamic doctrines and the main points of difference between Islam and Christianity, our hope is that it can be used as a good beginning in learning to defend the faith against the theological challenges of Islam. In light of today's realities of war and terrorism, we must not forget that our primary battle is the battle over minds and ideas. We should once again be reminded of the apostle Paul's exhortation, "For though we live in the world, we do not wage war as the world does. The weapons we fight with are not the weapons of the world.... We demolish arguments and every pretension that sets itself up against the knowledge of God, and we take captive every thought to make it obedient to Christ" (2 Cor 10:3-5).
FOR FURTHER READING
Deedat, Ahmad, and Josh McDowell, with John Gilchrist. The Islam Debate. San Bernadino, Calif.: Here's Life Publishing, 1983.
Geisler, Norman L., and Abdul Saleeb. Answering Islam: The Crescent in the Light of the Cross. Rev. ed. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2002.
Gilchrist, John. The Textual History of the Qur'an and the Bible. Villach, Austria: Light of Life, 1988.
Cragg, Kenneth. Jesus and the Muslim: An Exploration. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985.
Montgomery, John Warwick. "How Muslims Do Apologetics: The Apologetic
Approach of Muhammad Ali and Its Implications for Christian Apologetics." In Faith Founded On Fact. Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1978.
Sproul, R. C., and Abdul Saleeb. The Dark Side ofIslam. Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2003.
IT IS TIME TO WRAP UP OUR CASE AND PONDER SOME FINAL THOUGHTS. IN THE preceding pages we have taken you on quite a journey. In part 1 we provided insights about faith, reason and the importance of apologetics for the vibrancy of the church. Part 2 laid out a well-reasoned examination of the considerable evidence for monotheism. Part 3 zeroed in on the exciting evidence for why Christianity is the most reasonable form of monotheism. Christianity is supported by solid historical evidence for the reliability of the New Testament and the miracles it records. Parts 4 and 5 responded to philosophical, cultural and religious challenges that are often raised against Christianity.
We have argued that there is more than adequate evidence to persuade an open-minded unbeliever to become a disciple of Jesus Christ and to encourage a believer to dedicate more of his or her life to living as one of Jesus' bondslaves. It is important that you not read this book merely as an intellectual exercise. The evidence we have presented calls for action on your part. Your decision about what to do with Jesus Christ must be approached in light of four questions that every human being must answer:
1. What is real?
2. Who is well-off? What is the good life?
3. Who is a really good person?
4. How does one become a really good person?
We are all somewhere between birth and death and have a life we must live. It is a simple fact that life cannot be lived without some orientation. To be disoriented can bring great harm to a person, even premature death. One's answers to these four questions provide the fundamental orientation of one's whole life.
Currently, a three-way worldview struggle rages in our culture among Christianity, scientific naturalism and postmodernism. Since we have described and argued against scientific naturalism and postmodernism in previous chapters, we will not do so here. Instead, we shall briefly characterize each and their answers to the four questions above.
First, scientific naturalism takes the view that the physical cosmos science studies is all that exists. Scientific naturalism has two central components, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, scientific naturalism implies that everything that exists is composed of matter or emerges out of matter when it achieves a suitable complexity. Among other things, this amounts to a denial of the soul and the possibility of disembodied existence after death. Epistemologically, it implies that physical science is the only, or at least a vastly superior, way of gaining knowledge. In regard to the four questions, the naturalist says that the physical world is all there is; that the good life is a life of social recognition and success, most likely, financial, academic or artistic success; that a really good person is one who is true to one's own ideals (whatever they are) and is tolerant of others; and there is virtually no advice given for how to become a good person.
The second worldview is postmodernism. This contains a very complicated set of ideas, and no short characterization of it would be entirely adequate. Still, we may safely say that postmodernism is a form of cultural relativism. According to postmodernism, truth/falsehood, real/unreal, right/wrong, rational/irrational, good/bad are dichotomies relative to different linguistic communities. What is true, real and so forth, for one community may not be so for another. In regard to the four questions, reality, the good life and the nature of a good person are whatever your community arbitrarily takes them to be. Moreover, there is no clear advice given as to how to become a good person.
Not only are naturalism and postmodernism false, but seen in light of these four questions, they are exposed as the shallow, destructive frauds that they really are. By contrast, the worldview of Jesus provides deep, satisfying, true answers to these questions. For Jesus, the basic reality is the triune God and his wonderful kingdom. The well-off person is anyone who is alive in the kingdom of God, irrespective of his or her life's circumstances. The good person is the one who is pervaded with agape love and who manifests the fruit of the Holy Spirit (love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control). The way to become a good person is to enlist as an apprentice of Jesus in kingdom living. By comparison with the other worldviews, it becomes obvious that the way of Jesus is the only game in town! Today, Jesus stands at the center of the world and its history, just as he predicted he would. Jesus simply towers over any other figure in world history. In the last fifty years, his church has experienced its greatest expansion in two thousand years, and there are no signs that this harvest is going to slow down.
Still, many in Western culture have a suspicion that Christianity has been weighed in the intellectual balance and found wanting. As Dallas Willard notes,
In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. Christianity has not been weighed and found wanting. It has been inadequately defended and proclaimed and, thus, too frequently ignored. But that is changing, and this book is an attempt to set the record straight. For several decades Norman Geisler has tirelessly been a voice of reason in a religiously il literate culture and a church that too often had no acquaintance with apologetics. The contributors of this volume owe him a great debt. And we, along with Geisler, have made our decision about Jesus of Nazareth. What about you? What have you decided regarding Jesus? Our prayer is that you will decide to abandon everything and follow him. If you do, you will find that he is, indeed, "the way, the truth and the life" (Jn 14:6).
Educational Background
William Tyndale College, 1950-1955
University of Detroit, 1956-1957
Wheaton College, 1958 (B.A. in philosophy)
Wheaton Graduate School, 1960 (M.A. in theology)
William Tyndale College, 1964 (Th.B.)
Wayne State University Graduate School, 1964 (work in philosophy)
University of Detroit Graduate School, 1965-1966 (work on M.A. in philosophy)
Northwestern University, Evanston, 1968 (work in philosophy)
Loyola University, Chicago, 1967-1970 (Ph.D. in philosophy)
Academic Appointments
Graduate Assistant in Bible-Philosophy Department, Wheaton College, 1959
Part-time Instructor in Bible at Detroit Bible College, 1959-1962
Full-time Assistant Professor of Bible and Apologetics at Detroit Bible College, 1963-1966
Full-time Associate Professor of Philosophy at Trinity College, 1966-1971
Visiting Professor of Philosophy of Religion, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1969-1970
Chairman of Philosophy of Religion, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 19701979
Professor of Systematic Theology, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1979-1988
Dean of Liberty Center for Research and Scholarship, Lynchburg, Virginia, 19891991
President of Southern Evangelical Seminary, Charlotte, North Carolina (which he cofounded in 1992), 1992-present
Pulpit Ministry
Director of Northeast Suburban Youth for Christ, near Detroit, 1952-1954
Pastor of Dayton Center Church, Silverwood, Michigan, 1954-1957 (ordained there 1956)
Assistant Pastor of River Grove Bible Church, River Grove, Illinois, 1958-1959
Pastor of Memorial Baptist Church, Warren, Michigan, 1960-1963
President of Alumni of Detroit Bible College, 1961-1962
Several interim pastorates in Michigan, Illinois, Texas and North Carolina, 1965present
"Quest for Truth," radio ministry, 1981-1991
Speaker at churches, retreats, pastors' conferences, universities, on radio and television, 1960-present
Memberships
Evangelical Theological Society, 1964-2003
American Philosophical Society, 1968-present
Evangelical Philosophical Society, 1976-present
American Scientific Association, 1980-present
American Theological Society, 1980-present
American Academy of Religion, 1982-present
Honors and Recognitions
Graduated with honor from Wheaton College (1958)
Chosen as an "Outstanding Educator of America" (1975)
Philosophy of Religion text chosen as a "Choice Evangelical Book of the Year" by Christianity Today (1975)
First president of Evangelical Philosophical Society (1976)
Elected to the Wheaton Scholastic Honor Society (1977)
Listed in Who's Who in Religion, Writers Whos Who and Men of Achievement
Honored as Alumnus of the Year (1982), William Tyndale College (June 14, 1981)
General Introduction to the Bible won the Cornerstone Magazine book of the year award in its category (1986)
When Skeptics Ask was nominated for the ECPA Gold Medallion Award in the category of Missions/Evangelism (1991)
President of Evangelical Theological Society (1998)
Won ECPA Gold Medallion Award for Legislating Morality (1999)
Won ECPA Silver Medallion Award for Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (2000)
Travel Experience
Dr. Geisler has lectured and traveled in fifty states and twenty-five countries on six continents.
Family
Wife, Barbara Jean, is a graduate of Fort Wayne Bible College (B.S.M.). They have six children and eleven grandchildren.
Published Books
An "•" represents a revision or reprinting. A ,,+" represents a coauthored or edited work. An represents a booklet.
+ General Introduction to the Bible (Moody Press, 1968)
Christ: The Theme of the Bible (Moody Press, 1968)
Ethics: Alternatives and Issues (Zondervan, 1971)
The Christian Ethic of Love (Zondervan, 1973)
Philosophy of Religion (Zondervan, 1974)
+From God to Us (Moody Press, 1974)
Christian Apologetics (Baker, 1976)
A Popular Survey of the Old Testament (Baker, 1979)
The Roots of Evil (Zondervan, 1978)
To Understand the Bible, Look forJesus (Baker, 1979)
+Inerrancy (Zondervan, 1979)
+Introduction to Philosophy (Baker, 1980)
Options in Contemporary Christian Ethics (Baker, 1981)
+Biblical Errancy (Zondervan, 1981)
Decide fur Yourself (Zondervan, 1982)
+The Creator in the Courtroom-Scopes II (Baker, 1982)
What Augustine Says (Baker, 1982)
Miracles and Modern Thought (Zondervan, 1982)
Is Man the Measure? (Baker, 1983)
Cosmos: Carl Sagan s Religion (Quest Publications, 1983)
'Explaining Hermeneutics (ICBI, 1983)
Religion of the Force (Quest, 1983)
To Drink or Not to Drink (Quest, 1984)
+Perspectives (Here's Life Publications, 1984)
+Christianity Under Attack (Quest, 1985)
False Gods of Our Time (Harvest House, 1985)
*+ General Introduction to the Bible (revised, Moody, 1986)
+Reincarnation Sensation (Tyndale, 1986)
+ Origin Science (Baker, 1987)
"+ The Bible: From God to Us (ICBI, 1987)
*+Philosophy of Religion (revised, Baker, 1988)
Signs and Wonders (Tyndale, 1988)
Christian Ethics (Baker, 1989)
*+ Worlds Apart (Baker, 1989)
Knowing the Truth About Creation (Servant, 1989)
+ The Infiltration of the New Age (Tyndale, 1989)
The Battle for the Resurrection (Thomas Nelson, 1989)
+Apologetics in the New Age (Baker, 1990)
+ Come Let Us Reason (Baker, 1990)
+Gambling: A Bad Bet (Fleming H. Revell, 1990)
+ When Skeptics Ask (Victor, 1990)
+ The Life and Death Debate (Greenwood, 1990)
'Civil Disobedience (Quest, 1990)
In Defense of the Resurrection (Quest, 1991)
Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal (Baker, 1991)
+Matters of Life and Death (Baker, 1991)
"Miracles and the Modern Mind (Baker, 1992)
+When Critics Ask (Victor, 1992)
+Answering Islam (Baker, 1993)
*In Defense of the Resurrection (rev. by Witness, Inc., 1993)
+Roman Catholics and Evangelicals (Baker, 1995)
+Love Is Always Right (Word, 1996)
Creating God in the Image of Man? (Bethany House, 1997)
+ When Cultists Ask (Baker, 1997)
+The Counterfeit Gospel of Mormonism (Harvest House, 1998)
+Legislating Morality (Bethany House, 1998)
Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Baker, 1999)
Chosen but Free (Bethany, 1999)
+ Unshakeable Foundations (Bethany, 2001)
+WhyIAm a Christian (Baker, 2001)
+Battle for God (Kregel, 2001)
+Living Loud. Defending Your Faith (Broadman & Holman, 2002)
Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Bethany, 2002)
'+Answering Islam (revised, Baker, 2002)
+ Who Made God? (Zondeivan, 2003)
+Is Your Church Ready? (Zondervan, 2003)
Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Bethany, 2003)
+I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist (Crossway, 2004)
Systematic Theology, vol. 3 (Bethany, 2004)
Michael Bauman is Professor of Theology and Culture and Director of the Christian Studies Program, Hillsdale College. He earned a Ph.D. in theology and literature from Fordham University and an M.A. in Old Testament from McCormick Theological Seminary.
W. David Beck is Professor of Philosophy and Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs, Liberty University. He is a graduate of Boston University (Ph.D., philosophy) and Trinity Evangelical Divinity School (M.A., philosophy of religion).
Francis J. Beckwith is Associate Professor of Church-State Studies and Associate Director of the J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, Baylor University, where he is also the associate editor of the Journal of Church and State. He is a graduate of Fordham University (Ph.D., philosophy) and the Washington University School of Law, St. Louis (M.J.S.).
David K. Clark is Professor of Philosophy and Theology and Dean of the Center for Biblical and Theological Foundations, Bethel Theological Seminary (St. Paul). He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from Northwestern University as well as an M.A. in philosophy of religion from Trinity Evangelical Divinity School.
Paul Copan is the Pledger Family Professor of Philosophy and Ethics, Palm Beach Atlantic University. He earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from Marquette University, as well as an M.Div. from Trinity Evangelical Divinity School.
Winfried Corduan is Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Taylor University. His Ph.D. (philosophy) is from Rice University, and his M.A. (philosophy of religion) was earned at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School.
William Lane Craig is Research Professor of Philosophy, Talbot School of Theology, Biola University. President of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, he holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Birmingham (U.K.) and a D.Theol. from the University of Munich.
William A. Dembski is Associate Research Professor in the Conceptual Foundations of Science, Baylor University. Among his degrees are a Ph.D. in phi losophy (University of Illinois, Chicago), a Ph.D. in mathematics (University of Chicago) and an M.Div. (Princeton Theological Seminary).
R. Douglas Geivett is Professor of Philosophy, Talbot School of Theology, Biola University. He is a graduate of the University of Southern California (Ph.D., philosophy) and Dallas Theological Seminary (M.A.B.S.).
Douglas Groothuis is Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Ethics, Denver Theological Seminary. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Oregon and an M.A. in philosophy from the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Gary R. Habermas is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Theology, Liberty University. He holds a Ph.D. in interdisciplinary studies (religion, history and philosophy) from Michigan State University and a D.D. from Emmanuel College, Oxford.
Craig J. Hazen is Associate Professor of Comparative Religion and Apologetics, Biola University, where he is the founding and current director of the M.A. program in Christian Apologetics. Editor of Philosophic Christi (journal of the Evangelical Philosophical Society), he earned a Ph.D. in religious studies from the University of California, Santa Barbara.
Richard G. Howe is a Ph.D. candidate (in philosophy) at the University of Arkansas and has an M.A. in philosophy from the University of Mississippi.
Thomas A. Howe is Professor of Bible and Biblical Languages, Director of the Apologetics Program and Director of the External Studies Program, Southern Evangelical Seminary. He is a graduate of Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary (Ph.D., philosophy), Liberty University (M.A) and Luther Rice Bible College (B.D.).
Gregory P. Koukl is President and CEO, Stand to Reason Ministries. He holds an M.A. in Christian Apologetics from Simon Greenleaf University (which has since merged with Trinity International University).
Josh McDowell is President of Josh McDowell Ministries (Richardson, Texas). He is a graduate of Wheaton College as well as the Talbot School of Theology at Biola University (M.Div.).
J. P. Moreland is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Talbot School of Theology, Biola University. He also serves as director of Eiclos Christian Center. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Southern California, as well as a Th.M. from Dallas Theological Seminary.
Carl Mosser is a Ph.D. candidate in New Testament at the University of St. Andrews (Scotland). He is a graduate of Fuller Theological Seminary (Th.M., phi losophy) and Talbot School of Theology (M.A., theology; M.A., philosophy of religion and ethics; M.A., New Testament).
Ronald H. Nash is Professor of Christian Philosophy, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary (Louisville). He is a graduate of Syracuse University (Ph.D., philosophy) and Brown University (M.A., philosophy).
Paul Owen is Assistant Professor of Biblical Studies, Montreat College. He holds a Ph.D. in New Testament from University of Edinburgh (Scotland) and an M.A. in New Testament from Talbot School of Theology.
Abdul Saleeb is a pseudonym for a former Muslim who converted to Christianity.
Ben Witherington III is Professor of New Testament, Asbury Theological Seminary. He is a graduate of the University of Durham (U.K.), where he earned a Ph.D. in New Testament, as well as Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary (M.Div.).
Ravi Zacharias is President of Ravi Zacharias Ministries and Distinguished Visiting Professor of Religion and Culture, Southern Evangelical Seminary. He is a graduate of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School (M.Div.) and Ontario Bible College (B.Th.) and has been awarded honorary doctoral degrees from Asbury College and Houghton College. He is a convert to Christianity from Hinduism.
For a philosophical defense of this viewpoint from a biblical perspective, see J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2000). See also chapter thirteen in this volume.
2J. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart: The Case. for Natural Law (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1997), pp. 180-81.
1Peter Kreeft and Ronald K. Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics: Hundreds ofAnswers to Crucial Questions (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1994), p. 33.
2Kreeft andTacelli, Handbook, pp. 30-31.
3Note Acts 9:22; 15:2; 17:2-4; 17:17; 18:4, 19, 27-28; 19:8-10; 28:23-24.
4Norman I.. Geisler, Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal (Grand Rapids, Mich.: lkiker, 1991), p. 58.
2As for Jesus and "reasoned argumentation," several recent hooks have given special attention to the reasoning skills and intellectual prowess of Jesus. See Dallas Willard, The Divine Con- spiracv: Rediscovering Our Hidden Life in God (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1998); J. Y. Moreland, Lure Your God with All YourMind: The Role of Reason in the Life of the Soul (Colorado Springs, Colo.: NavPress, 1997); and James W. Sire, Habits of the Mind: Intellectual Life as a Christian Calling (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2000).
'R. V. G. Tasker, The Gospel According to Matthew: An Introduction and Connnentary (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Ecrdmans, 1961), p. 131.
3Kenneth D. Boa and Robert M. Bowman, Jr., Faith Has Its Reasons: An Integrative Approach to Defending Christianity (Colorado Springs, Colo.: NavPress, 2001); F. F. Bruce, The Defense of the Gospel in the New Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1959); Avery Dulles, A History of Apologetics (New York: Corpus Instrumentorum, 1971); William Dyrness, Christian Apologetics in a World community (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1983); Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1999), pp. 37-41; Norman L. Geisler and Ronald M. Brooks, When Skeptics Ask (Wheaton, Ill.: Victor, 1990); Frederic R. Howe, Challenge and Response: A Handbook of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1982); Gordon R. Lewis, Testing Christianity's Truth Claims: Approaches to Christian Apologetics (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1990); Ronald B. Mayers, Balanced Apologetics: Using Evidences and Presuppositions in Defense of the Faith (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel, 1984); John Warwick Montgomery, Faith Founded on Fact: Essays in Evidential Apologetics (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1978); Clark J. Pinnock, Set Forth Your Case: Studies in Christian Apologetics (Chicago: Moody Press, 1971); Bernard Ramm, Varieties ofChristianApologetics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1962); J. K. S. Reid, ChristianApol- ogetics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1969); and R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner and Arthur Lindsley, Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Pre- suppositionaal Apologetics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1984). Even those apologetics texts that do not begin with a biblical case for defending the faith, and there are hundreds in this time frame, invariably assume it at the outset.
4I am not going to make a distinction here between polemics-the traditional term used for disputation over differing views on doctrine among believers or those who claim to he heliev- ers and apologetics. Both terms support the idea of offering reasons for beliefs and fit well into the ethos of demonstration.
6Responses to similar objections to apologetic activity can be found in Lewis, 7'esling Christianity's 7rnlh Claims, pp. 21-34, and Geisler, Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, pp. 38-41.
5For more on the defense of the faith in the church fathers, see Dulles, History ul'Apologetics, and Reid, Christian Apologetics.
MMany key apologetics texts make mention of this balanced approach to Christian character, gentle communication and the apologetic task. Of special interest, though, are David K. Clark, Dialogical Apologetics: A Person-Centered Approach to Christian D%nse (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Maker, 1993), and John G. Stackhouse Jr., Humble Apologetics: DeJerrding the tiuith Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
1Stand to Reason has an entire course on "Tactics in Defending the Faith," available at «v. str.org>.
4Kevin Bywater of Summit Ministries was very helpful in my formulation of this three-step approach. His website is www.kevinby,vater.com
2 Hugh Hewitt, In, but Not Of (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2003), p. 173.
3See also Mt 17:25; 18:12; 21:28-32; Jn 18:22-23.
5C. S. Lewis opens with this argument in Mere Christianity (New York: Macmillan, 1952), his fine introduction to the faith. See also the talk by Gregory Koukl, "Evil, Suffering and the Goodness of God," available through Stand to Reason at <www.str.org>.
'"Toward a Hidden God: Is God Dead?" Time, April 8, 1966, pp. 82ff.
2' Rebel Cry: Jesus Is Coming!" Time, July 21, 1971, pp. 56ff.
1For a masterful survey of the history of this argument, see William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 1-60.
2This is William Craig's customary way of formulating the argument. See his article "Philosophical and Scientific Pointers to Creatio ex Nibilo," in Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 186, and his remarks in Does God Exist? The Craig-Flew Debate, ed. Stan W. Wallace (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), p. 20. See also "The Finitude of the Past and the Existence of God," in a hook jointly written by William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Cosmology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 4, where the first premise is recast in only slightly different form: "Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence."
3Capital letters are used here to emphasize the ultimacy of the cause in question.
4For concise introductory statements of these four arguments, see Craig, "Philosophical and Scientific Pointers to Creatio ex Nihilo," and William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 1994), pp. 91-122.
7This is the approach I tend to favor. See R. Douglas Geivett, Evil and the Evidence, for God (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), chaps. 6 and 7.
6The philosophical argument that I do not consider here reasons (according to one variant) that actually infinite sets are impossible and that the universe must therefore have a beginning, for otherwise the events that constitute the history of the universe would form an actually infinite set. Since I have not been able to convince myself that actually infinite sets are impossible, I find that I cannot endorse this version of the kalana. The first problem is that the reasonable supposition that the set of all natural numbers actually exists constitutes a good reason to think that actually infinite sets of a certain type are possible. The second problem is that the more telling paradoxes that are generated by the supposition that there are actual infinites of this or that sort all happen to pertain to objects or states that differ from abstract objects in important ways. My misgivings are spelled out a hit more fully in my commentary on the existence of God debate between William Lane Craig and Antony Flew, "Reflections on the Explanatory Power of Theism," in Does God Exist? The Craig-Flew Debate, ed. Stan W. Wallace (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing), p. 51.
7Craig, Kalam Cosmological Argument, p. 103.
Paul Draper, "A Critique of the Kalanz Cosmological Argument," in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, ed. Louis P. Pojman, 3rd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1997), p. 43.
10Morriston, "Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?" p. 155.
This seems to he Morriston's complaint in ibid., pp. 154-55.
9William Lane Craig, The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe," Truth Jotn•nal 3 (1991), posted online at <http://www.iclnet.org/clm/trutli/3trutliI1.html>, and cited by Wes Morriston, -Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause? A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument," Faith and Philosophy 17 (April 2000): 155.
12 The theist should acknowledge that God's beginning to exist in time (or God's "putting himself in time") is an event, and that this event, like any other, must have a cause.
13See, for example, William Lane Craig, "A Reply to Objections," in Does God l Yist? the CraigFlew I)ehale, p. 157.
"Dallas Willard, The Three-Stage Argument for the Existence of God," in Contemporary Perspectives ou Religious Epistemology, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 216.
15For an accessible discussion of this debate, see Nick Herbert, Quantum Reality: Beyond the New Physics (New York: Anchor, Doubleday, 1985).
'Alan Guth, The In/lationary Universe: The Questfora New Theory ofCosmic Origins (Reading, Mass.: Perseus Books, 1997), p. 276.
17 Craig makes the same point in "A Reply to Objections," p. 161.
18For more on the nature of inference to the best explanation and its relation to the kalam cosmological argument, see Geivett, "Reflections on the Explanatory Power of Theism," pp. 5052.
19The Bible is explicit about this. The kalana relies on an application of Ockham's razor to draw out this point. See Craig, "A Reply to Objections," p. 162.
20In various places I have described how this rich panoply of evidence might he combined into a systematic case for Christian theism, including especially "The Evidential Value of Miracles," in In Defense of Miracles, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1997), and in The Evidential Value of Religious Experience," in The Rationality ofTbeism, ed. Paul K. Moser and Paul Copan (London: Routledge, 2003).
21 Draper, "A Critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument," pp. 45-46.
'See James Ross, Philosophical Theology (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).
2See Bruce Reichenbach, The CosmologicalArgument. A Reassessment (Springfield, Ill.: Charles Thomas Press, 1972), and William Rowe, The Cosmological Argumenl (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998). The latter is an excellent source on the entire history of the Leihnizian argument. First published in 1975, this new edition keeps the discussion current.
3See Richard Gale, "A New Argument for the Existence of God: One That Works, Sort Of," in The Ralionalily of 7heisni, ed. Godehard Bruentrup and Ron Tacelli (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999).
4A good example of Norman Geisler's treatment is his Philosophy of Religion (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1974).
'Norman L. Geisler, Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1976), p. 249.
2 Ibid., pp. 248-49.
3 Martin Heidegger, Wit welcbein Recbtsgrund icb mit einem solcben unerborten Votgeben betroffen werde, ist mir unerfindlicb. " Quoted in Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seinerBiograpbie (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1988), p. 296.
4C. S. Lewis, The Abolition ofMan (San Francisco: Harper, 2001), appendix.
Kai Nielsen, Ethics Without God, rev. ed. (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1990), pp. 10-11.
7For further support of this thesis, see Paul Copan, The Moral Argument," in The Rationality of7heism, ed. Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 149-74.
6Michacl Martin, "Atheism, Christian Theism and Rape (1977)," <www.infidcls.org/lihrary/ modern/michael_unartin/rape.html> p. 4.
8 See Paul Copan, "Is Michael Martin a Moral Realist? Sic et Non, " Philosophia Christi n.s. 1/2 (1999): 45-72; "Atheistic Goodness Revisited: A Personal Reply to Michael Martin," Philosophia Christi n.s. 2/1 (2000): 91-104. Martin offers an online response that brings up charges and issues already addressed in the aforementioned essays. See "Copan's Critique of Atheistic Oh- jective Morality" «v.inficlels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/copan.html>. For a partial response, see Paul Copan, "The Moral Argument," in The Rationality of Theism.
9I'm not here dealing with Eastern monism (sometimes called pantheism = everything is God/ divine), which claims that no ultimate distinction between good and evil exists-an outlook that serves to support relativism.
10For example, Martin points to Immanuel Kant in The Big Domino in the Skl, (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1996), pp. 43, 68. See also Michael Martin, Atheism, Moralitt'andMeaming (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 2002). See my forthcoming review of the latter in 1'hilosophia Christi. On Aristotle, see Stephen Layman, The Shape of the Good (Notre Dame, Incl.: University of Notre Dane Press, 1991), pp. 138-44.
'2Bertrand Russell, "A Free Man's Worship," in WhyIAnz Nota Christian (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 107.
sCited in Greg Ganssle, "Necessary Moral Truths and the Need for Explanation," Philosophia Christi series 2, 2/1 (2000): 111.
13Bertr:m(l Russell, Human Society in Ethics and Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954), p. 124.
14 J L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 115-16.
16James Rachels, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications ofDarwinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 77.
17 Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life (New York: Basic Books/ Harper Collins, 1995), pp. 132-33.
''These quotations are documented in ,Jeffrey Dahmer. The Monster Within, A&E Biography (1996). 1 am grateful to Ronald Tacelli for pointing this out to me.
19Kai Nielsen, "Why Should I Be Moral? Revisited," American Philosophical Quarterly 21 Uan- uary 1984): 90.
?°Michacl Ruse, The Darwinian Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 262.
21 Letter to William Graham Down, July 3, 1881, in The Life and Letters of Charles I)aru'in In- cludiny an AWohiooraphical Chapter, ed. Francis Darwin (London: John Murray, 1887), 1:315-16.
22Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 219.
23George I. Mavrodes, "Religion and the Queerness of Morality," in Rationality, Religious Belief and Moral Commitment, ed. Robert Audi and William Wainwright (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 219.
24Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 219.
15Eulhiphro 10a, Plato, "Euthyphro," trans. Lane Cooper, in Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 178.
'('These terms arc taken from Mark D. Linville, "On Goodness: Human and Divine," American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (April 1990): 143-52.
27Berh-and Russell, Human Society in Ethics and Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962), p. 38.
28Rohert Adams remarks: It matters what God's attributes are.... It makes a difference it you think of commands as coming from someone who completely understands both us and our situation. It matters not only that God is loving but also that he is just" ("Divine Commands and Obligation," Faith and Philosophy 4 [July 19881: 272).
29 See Thomas V. Morris's essays, "Duty and Divine Goodness" and "The Necessity of God's Goodness" in Anselmian Explorations (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), pp. 26-41 and pp. 42-69; William P. Alston, "Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists," in Chrislian Theism and the Problems ofPhilosophy, ed. Michael D. Beaty (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990).
32See Morris, "Duty and Divine Goodness," pp. 35, 38.
33Alston, Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists," p. 320.
30Robin Le Poidevin, Arguing /brAtheism (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 85.
31William Alston asks this question in "Some Suggestions," pp. 303-26.
"Robert Adams, "Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief," in Rationality and Religious Beli% ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), p. 135.
35Martin suggests this alternative in "Patrick Glynn's God: The Evidence," <www.infidels.org/ library/modern/michael_martin/glynn.html> p. 3.
36John M. Rist, Real h'thics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 2.
37lbid., p. 1.
2G. W. F. Lcihniz, New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding, trans. A. G. Langley, 3rd ed. (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1949), pp. iv, 10.
Grahmn Oppy, Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 1.
3Alvin Plantings, The Nature of Necessity, Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 219.
4Alvin Plantings, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 69.
George Mavrodes, "Jerusalem and Athens Revisited," in Faith and Raionalily. ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 205-6.
Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," typescript dated in October 1981, pp. 18-19. This paragraph was inadvertently omitted in the puhlished version of the essay, with the result that Mavrodes's reference to it has no referent. Fortunately, a nearly identical paragraph appears in Alvin Plantinga, "Self-Profile," in Alvin Plaantingaa, ed. James E. Tomherlin and Peter Van Inwagen, Profiles 5 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), p. 71.
7Plantings, The NalureofNecessity, p. 221.
"Cf. Stephen Davis, The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic Status of Belief in God," Philosophies Chrisli n.s. 1 (1999): 5-15.
9 G. W. F. Leihniz, The Monadology," in Leihniz Selections, p. 539.
'oI do not mean to pronounce here on ontological debates as to what constitutes an object but merely to claim that the universe is just as much a thing as are other familiar entities which we recognize to have causes, such as chairs, mountains, planets and stars.
11 See the chapter in this volume by Paul Copan on the moral argument for God's existence.
'Michael Ruse, /)anoinism Defended (London: Addison-Wesley, 1982), p. 275.
2john P. Meier, A Marginal, few, vol. 1, The Roots of the Problem and the Person (New York: Doubleday, 1991), p. 13. On his definition of "the historical Jesus" see note 5 below. What clause in that definition precludes the resurrection as a feature of the historical Jesus? Meier denies that the resurrection "is in principle open to the observation of any and every observer" (John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew, vol. 2, Mentor,, Message and Miracle [New York: Doubleday, 19941, p. 525). That would exclude its belonging to the historical Jesus as well as, perversely, its qualifying as a miracle under Meier's definition of the latter. But why think that the resurrection is not observable in this way? Meier endorses O'Collins's view that "although the 'resurrection is a real, bodily event involving the person of Jesus of Nazareth,' the resurrection of Jesus `is not an event in space and time and hence should not be called historical,' since `we should require an historical occurrence to be something significant that is known to have hap- pened in our space-time continuum(Meier, _Warginal,fezv. 1:201; cf. G. G. O'Collins, "Is the Resurrection an 'Historical' Event?" Het'throp,journal 8 [19671: 381-87). But O'Collins thinks that the resurrection, which he defines as Jesus' passing "out of the empirical sphere of this world to a new mode of existence," did not occur in the space-time continuum only in a very Pickwickian sense: the same sense in which it can he said that someone's exiting a building does not occur in the building. But if the resurrection was a real, hodily event that happened to Jesus, then that event must he temporally located sometime around A.D. 30, and moreover, spatially located as well, in Palestine near Jerusalem (rather than, say, in Wilmette, north of Chicago). More fundamentally, how can Meier know the nature of Jesus' resurrection so as to say that it did not happen in our space-time continuum apart from a historical investigation? He must he presupposing some prior theological knowledge of the event. But this a priori theorizing contradicts Meier's historical methodology, which positions itself as theologically neutral.
1R. W. Funk, R. W. Hoover and the Jesus Seminar, introduction to The Five Gospels (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 2.
3David Friedrich Strauss, The Life gfJesus, Critically Examined, ed. with an introduction by Peter C. Hodgson, trans. George Eliot, Lives of Jesus Series (London: SCM Press, 1973), p. 736. 4Funk et al., "Introduction," p. 3.
6For a recent devastating critique by a prominent philosopher of science who is an agnostic, see John Farman, Hunae's AhfectFailure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). See further George Campbell, Dissertation on Miracles (1762; repr. ed.: London: T. Tegg & Son, 1834); William Paley, A View of the Evidences of Christianity, 2 vols., 5th ed. (London: R. Faulder, 1796; repr. ed.: Westmead, England: Gregg, 1970); Richard Swinhurne, The Concept of Miracle (New York: Macmillan, 1970); John Farman, "Bayes, Hume and Miracles," Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993): 293-310; George Mavrodes, "Miracles and the Laws of Nature," Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985): 333-46; William Alston, "God's Action in the World," in Divine Nature and Human Language (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 197-222.
DDespite his refusal to examine historically the resurrection of Jesus, Meier does not decline to investigate the historicity of the events comprised by the Gospel miracles, even affirming after detailed study that some of those events do belong to the historical Jesus; he merely prescinds from the verdict that such events were genuine miracles, that is, that they are inexplicable by means of human abilities or natural causes but were the result of special acts of God (Meier, A MarginalJew, 2:512). But then the historical researcher wants to know why a similar investigation of Jesus' alleged resurrection is off-limits to the historian. Historians of the American Civil War trace the fascinating misadventures of Lincoln's corpse following his assassination. Are contemporary Jesus scholars employing the scientific tools of modern historical research unable to probe the question of how Jesus' corpse was disposed of following his crucifixion? Are they incapable of assessing the historical credibility of the traditions that women visited the tomb of Jesus and found it empty? Can they not inquire whether the early disciples did or did not experience a series of apparitions of Jesus and whether the Jesus movement was not founded on the belief of these first disciples that Jesus had risen from the dead? All of these questions and more seem perfectly open to the contemporary historian, even given methodological naturalism, and there seems no good reason for abruptly terminating one's study of the historical Jesus with his crucifixion. O'Collins, whom Meier cites to prove that the resurrection was not an event in space-time, insists that all these events "can he the object of investigation by the historian" (O'Collins, "Resurrection," p. 386). Even if one agrees with Meier that the historian, qua historian, cannot utter the verdict, "God raised Jesus from the dead" or even "Jesus rose from the dead," there still remains a great deal that the historian can say concerning the events of the resurrection narratives.
5Ibid., pp. 2-3. Meier struggles to avoid collapsing Jesus to a purely naturalistic figure by drawing a further distinction between the real Jesus" (roughly, the man who actually lived) and the historical Jesus" (a construct of historians employing the scientific tools of modern historical research). Meier seems to agree with the Jesus Seminar that "in the historical-critical context, the `real' has been defined-and has to he defined-in terms of what exists within this world of time and space, what can he experienced in principle by any observer, and what can be reasonably deduced and inferred from such experience" (Meier, Mwginal Jew, 1:197). Meier apparently takes this definition to exclude the affirmation that the historical Jesus performed miracles and rose from the dead. It seems, then, that the historical Jesus is an abstraction constructed on the presupposition of methodological naturalism, but this abstraction may be quite different from the person who actually lived.
R. T. France, "The Gospels as Historical Sources for Jesus, the Founder of Christianity," Trutb 1 (1985): 86.
1Ben Witherington III, The Cbristolopy ofJesus (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990).
2 This chapter appeared in a somewhat different form in a festschrift for Jack Kingsbury.
3See John P. Meier, AMaayinalJew. Rethinking the Historical Jesus, vol. 2, Mentor, Message and Miracle (New York: Doubleday, 1994).
5See R. A. Burridge, What Are the Gospels?A Comparison with Greco-Roman Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). The case for Luke as biography is not convincing, not least because of the preface and opening chapter to that Gospel which are crucial in defining its literary kind. See the introduction to Ben Witherington III, The Acts of the Apostles: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997).
4This seems, surprisingly enough, to he the assumption behind the recent effort by John W. Miller, Jesus at Thirty: A Psychological and Historical Portrait (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997). There are some helpful insights in the work, in spite of trying to explain Jesus on the basis of a midlife crisis.
6On this latter front we would he able to deduce next to nothing from Mark or John, and even in Matthew's and Luke's birth narratives there is very little to work with. Lk 2:41-52, especially Luke 2:52, is a very slender foundation on which to build and it sends a mixed signal. On the one hand Jesus sees it as his duty to he doing what he was doing in the temple even after his parents have left. On the other hand he obeys his parents and comes home with them. On the one hand it is said be grew in wisdom and stature, after noting his obedience to parents. On the other hand he responds to the "your father and I" remarks with a distinguishing reference to "my Father." In short, this is not a typical picture of a dutiful son enmeshed in the social and patriarchal webs of his culture.
'See now the discussion of this matter in B. J. Malina and J. H. Neyrey, Portraits ofPaul: An Archaeology of Ancient Personality (Louisville, Ky.: Wesminster, 1996). I owe the summary triad of gender, generation and geography to them.
$See Ben Witherington III, Women and the Genesis ofCbristianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
9This same sort of give and take with the dominant Jewish culture can also he seen in Jesus' approach to the Law. Sometimes he affirms it, sometimes he intensifies it, sometimes he offers new teaching, sometimes he suggests by deeds or words that portions of the Law have been fulfilled or have had their clay and no longer apply now that the dominion of God is breaking in. It is precisely because Jesus does believe that God is bringing about divine rule by eschatological intervention that he feels no complusion to lead a revolt.
10Compare Ben Witherington III, Women in the Ministry ofJesus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) to what is said by E. P. Sanders, The Historical Figure ofJesus (London: Penguin, 1993).
"Note that if it is the case that Jesus envisioned himself and his Twelve playing a role in the future in the judging of the twelve tribes of Israel, and in the judgment that would come on sin in Israel, this would not distinguish him from the Qumranites, who like Jesus were not taking such action in the present but were prepared to be a part of it as the sons of light later when the final intervention came.
12See Ben Witherington III, John's Wisdom: A Commentary on the Fourth Gospel (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster, 1995).
13 See Witherington, Women in the Ministry ofJesus, pp. 85-92.
14See Richard Horsley, Galilee. History, Politics, People (Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1995), and Richard Horsley, Archaeology, History and Societe' in Galilee (Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1996).
'5There is nothing in the Gospels to suggest that we should think that Jesus' parents were not good and loving parents. A text like Lk 2:41-52 should not he read with modern eyes. This is not about child neglect by Mary and Joseph. It is about the fact that Jesus was part of an extended family, not just a nuclear family, and in that situation it was perfectly understandable why the parents would assume Jesus was with other relatives and town folk pilgrimaging home from Jerusalem. The story also, as a side note, suggests strongly how Torah true Galilean Jews actually were, that they came and went from feasts in Jerusalem in great numbers.
'Indeed they were so hold as to proclaim him messiah in Jerusalem-the very place where there were numerous witnesses to his execution, which presumably should have scotched the rumor that he was more than an ordinary mortal.
"Note the suggestion in Mk 3:22 that Jesus is in league with the devil, that his social networks provide him power from a nefarious source, and in Jn 6:41-51 that Jesus is at hest merely the son of Joseph, that he was not from God (cf. Jn 9:16).
'"1 am assuming, with most scholars, that Jesus did use the phrase "Son of man" of himself in various contexts and that in view of his proclamation of dominion it is likely that Dan 7 lies somewhere in the background of the use of this phrase by Jesus. On this see Witherington, The ChrisloloKy ofJesus, pp. 238ff.
19The earlier Markan form of the text is crucial here, and makes clear that it is likely this was originally part of some sort of apocalyptic vision Jesus had at his haptism, not unlike the visions recorded in the book of Revelation. See Witherington, The Christolpny q/;Jesus, pp. 148-55.
20See J. A. Fitzmyer, The Gospel ofLuke 10-24 (New York: Doubleday, 1981), p. 347.
21Note how in Mk 14:61-62 he does not reject the suggestion of the high priest, but he immediately shifts the discussion to his preferred form of self-identification-Son of Man.
22See Ben Witherington III, The Jesus Quest The Third Search, for the Jew from Nazareth, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1997).
2Charles Dickens, A Christmas Carol, available in many editions. A recent critical text is posted at the Charles Dickens website: <w"w.lang.nagoya-u.ac.jp/-matsuoka/cgi-bin/carol/hmt/ carol-1.html>.
1Some of the best discussions of miracles from a Christian point of view include the following: Francis J. Beckwith, David Hume's AiKutnent Against Miracles: A Critical Analysis (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989); Colin Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1984); Norman L. Geisler, Miracles and the Modern Mind (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1992); R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Hahermas, In Defense ofMiracles (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1997); C. S. Lewis, Miracles (New York: Collier, 1947).
3See, for example, B. B. Warfield, "Christian Supernaturalism," in Biblical and 'IheologicalStud- ies, ed. Samuel G. Craig (Philadelphia: P&R, 1968), pp. 1-21.
4Ibid., p. 2.
5Muslims sometimes point to certain events as miraculous: Muhammad's night journey, the victory of the battle of Badr and the fact that Muhammad received and recited the Qur'an. My point here is not to quibble over definitions or over the validity of those events but to mention that they are not what we usually have in mind when we speak of miracles. Muhammad explained the absence of miracles by protesting that they were useless; unbelievers would reject the truth regardless of whether it came with miracles or not (Qur'an 3:183-84; 20:133; 30:58).
6Paul K. Hooker, First and Second Chronicles, Westminster Bible Companion (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 2001), p. 12.
7See the thorough study by Cornelio Fabro, God in Exile: Modern Atheism (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968).
BRobert Pfeiffer, Introduction to the Old Testament (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941), p. 587.
9Ibid., p. 588.
10Gleason L. Archer, A Survey of Old Testament Introduction (Chicago: Moody Press, 1964), pp. 302-3.
"As he in fact did. See Richard Carrier, "The Problem with Miracles: The Shaky Groundwork of Corduan and Purtill," <http://www.infidels.org/lihray/moclern/ricliard_carrier/inclef/3a.1itm1>.
"The following argument is summarized from David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748; Indianapolis: Bobby-Merrill, 1955), pp. 117-41.
13lbid., p. 118.
"The following argument is summarized from Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (New York: Delta, 1966), pp. 140-58, and Antony Flew, "Miracles," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 346-53.
15Antony Flew, "Theology and Falsification," in New Essays in Philosophical 77)eolo y, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair Maclntyre (London: SCM, 1955), p. 99.
16 Flew, "Miracles," p. 352.
"A common fallacy in debates such as this one consists of asserting that, since we do not have a method for accounting for everything, we cannot account for anything. If I do not have hard and fast criteria to classify every event as either a miracle or not a miracle, I cannot classify any event at all as miracle. But, of course, once the matter is stated in this way it is clear that this is not a reasonable demand. I may have fully adequate criteria to recognize most of the clear cases, even if there are some unresolved ones. I can know that the resurrection was a miracle, even if I am fuzzy on Joan of Arc. This fallacy is a subset of the larger problems that have come with the legacy of Rene Descartes, who left us the unfortunate idea that only a universal, unassailable method of knowledge (virtual omniscience) can qualify as knowledge at all. A more reasonable view would contend that we can know our multiplication tables to he true, even if we have not proved the Riemann hypothesis, and I can he quite sure that a lot of people died on the Titanic, even if I am unaware of their names and hirthdates.
18 Hume, flit/uirV, p. 129.
1E. P. Sanders, Jesus ants Judaism (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), p. 324.
2E. P. Sanders, The Historical Figure 0/ Jesus (London: Penguin, 1993), pp. 11, 13.
3Michael Martin, the Case Against Christianity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press), p. 81.
5Of the dozens of scholarly publications here, the following are among the more helpful sources: Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives, pp. 10-11; Pinchas Lapide, The Resurrection of Jesus: A Jewish Perspective (Minneapolis: Augsberg, 1983), pp. 97-99; John Kloppenborg, "An Analysis of the Pre-Pauline Formula in 1 Corinthians 15:3b-5 in Light of Some Recent Literature," Catholic Biblical Quarterly 40 (1978), pp. 351, 360; John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew, vol. 2, Mentor, Message andMiracle (New York: Doubleday, 1994), p.139; Sanders, The Historical Figure of Jesus, p. 277.
4Reginald Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives (New York: Macmillan, 1980), p. 10.
6Ulrich Wilckens, Resurrection: Biblical Testimony to the Resurrection: An Historical Examination and Explanation (Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1977), p. 2.
Walter Kaspar, Jesus the Christ, trans. V. Green (Mahwah, NJ.: Paulist, 1976), p. 125.
BGerd Liidemann, The Resurrection ofJesus, trans. John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), p. 38 (Ludemann's emphasis).
9Thomas Sheehan, The First Coming: How the Kingdom of God Became Christianity (New York: Random, 1986), p. 11& cf. pp. 110-11.
1OMichael Goulder, "The Baseless Fabric of a Vision," in Resurrection Reconsidered, ed. Gavin D'Costa (Oxford: Oneworld, 1996), p. 48.
'Some of the other scholars who agree here include: Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives, pp. 10, 14, 48; Raymond Brown, The TVirkinal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus (New York: Paulist, 1973), p. 81; J. A. Fitzmyer, "The Resurrection of Jesus Christ According to the New Testament," The Month, SNS, 20 (1987), p. 409; J. D. G. Dunn, The Evi- dence.tbrJesus (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster, 1985), p. 70; C. E. B. Cranfield, The Resurrection of Jesus Christ," Expository Times 101 (1990), p. 169; Peter Stuhlmacher, Jesus of NazarethChrist of Faith, trans. Siegfried S. Shatzmann (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1993), p. 8; Leander E. Keck, Who IsJesus?History in Perfect Tense (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 2000), p. 139; Meier, AMarkinalJew, vol. 2, Mentor Message and Miracle, p. 139.
For just a few examples, see Robert Funk, Roy W. Hoover and the Jesus Seminar, The Five Gospels (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 24; Jack Kent, The Psychological Origins of the Resurrection Myth (London: Open Gate, 1999), pp. 16-17; A. J. M. Wedderhurn, Beyond Resurrection (Peahody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1999), p. 274 n. 265; G. A. Wells, Did Jesus Exist? (London: Pemberton, 1986), p. 30.
13Others hold that the account in Acts 15 confirms the same meeting as that in Gal 2:1-10. 14Martin Hengel, the Atonement: The Origins of the Doctrine in the Newiestamenl, trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), p. 38.
"The condensed creedal segments are found within a number of the sermons in Acts: Acts 1:21-22: 2:22-36: 3:13-16; 4:8-10; 5:29-32; 10:39-43; 13:28-31; 17:1-3; 17:30-31; cf. Lk 24:34.
'6For just a small sampling of these scholars, see Gerd Liidemann, Earl), ChrislianilyAccording to the 'I'radilious in Acts: A Commentary. trans. John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), pp. 47-49, 112-15: Hengel, The Atonement. p. 34; Pheme Perkins, Resun-eclion: New Tesla,oent Witness and Contemporary Reflection (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984), pp. 90, 228-31; Raymond F. Brown, An Introduction to New Testament Christology (Mahwah, NJ.: Paulist, 1994), pp. 112-13, 164; Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives, pp. 44-45; Klop- penhorg, p. 361; Johnson, Lir-'ing,jesus: Learning the Heartofthe Gospel (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1999), p. 34; although older, two of the better studies are C. H. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments (reprint, Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1980), pp. 17-31, and Max Wilcox, the Semilisms ofActs (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965), esp. pp. 79-80, 164-65. 17John Drane, Introducing the New Testament (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 99.
'"Gerald O'Collins, Inteipreting,jesus (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1983), pp. 109-10.
20Meier, A Marginal jew, vol. 2, Mentor, Message and Miracle, pp. 68-71.
21Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives, p. 37.
22For instance, see Liidemann, The Resurrection 0/ Jesus, p. 109; Helmut Koester, History & Literature a/'/surly Christianity, vol. 2 of Introduction to the Neu' Testament (Philadelphia: For- tress, 1982), p. 84: John Shelby Spong, The Easter Moment (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987), p. 68; Wcclclerhurn, Beyond Resurrection, p. 116; Funk, Honest to Jc'sr(s (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1996), p. 33; Meier, AMaiginal,jeu', vol. 2, Mentor, Message and Miracle, pp. 70-71; Peter Stuhlmacher, "The Resurrection of Jesus and the Resurrection of the Dead," trans. Jonathan M. Whitlock, EvAuditu 9 (1993), p. 49; E. P. Sanders, "But Did It Happen?" 7heSSpec- tator 276 (1996), p. IT
19The Jesus Seminar even thinks that two independent sources indicate that a teaching may he older than its source. See Funk, Hoover and the Jesus Seminar, The Five Gospels, p. 26.
23Paul Maier, In the Fulness of Time. A Historian Looks at Christmas. Easter and the Early Church (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 197.
24My study of hundreds of scholarly sources on the resurrection, cited ahove, notes almost two dozen arguments for the empty tomb. Ahout 75 percent of the surveyed scholars embrace one or more of the supporting arguments.
25Dunn, The /6 ickence,1br,Jesus, p. 68.
26Michael Grant, Jesus: An Historian's Review of the Gospels (New York: Collier, 1992), p. 176. An excellent treatment of additional arguments for the empty tomb is William Lane Craig, "The Historicity of the Empty Tomb of Jesus," New Testament Studios 31 (1955): 39-67.
27Howard Clark Kee, WhatCan WeKnowaboutjesus?(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 1-2.
28For details on these two additional reasons, as well as much more information, including both factual and scholarly agreement, regarding the previous eight arguments, see Gary R. Haher- mas, The Risen Jesus anciFutureHope (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), chap. 1.
29Koester, History and Literature, p. 84.
30Bart Ehrman, Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of the New Millennium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 230-31.
31MY translation of the German text in Traugott Holtz, "Kenntnis von Jesus and Kenntnis Jesu," TheologischeLiteraturzeitung 104 (1979), p. 10.
32Llldemann, The Resurrection ofJesus, p. 50: cf. p. 37.
33Gerd Ludemann, What Really Happened to Jesus: A Historical Approach to the Resurrection, with Alf Ozen, trans. John Bowden (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1995), p. 103.
341t might he noted here that not all a priori questions are automatically ruled out as question begging. Some ask by various means if it is possible to postulate in advance a reason for questioning certain occurrences.
35For distinctions between various sorts of a priori arguments, along with a detailed response to several specific examples, see Gary R. Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case. for the Resurrection ofJesus (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel, 2004), chap. 9. For a more technical treatment, see Habermas, The Risen Jesus and Future Hope, esp. chap. 2.
36For details on how Jesus' resurrection and other relevant data lead to a case for the heart of Christianity, see Hahermas, The Risen Jesus and Future Hope, chaps. 1-6. A more popular approach is detailed in Gary R. Hahermas, "Evidential Apologetics," in Five Views on Apologetics, ed. Stephen B. Cowan (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2000).
37For additional comments on how these methodological considerations used by critical scholars lead to the historicity of the resurrection, see esp. Habermas, The Risen Jesus and Future Hope, chap. 1.
38Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives, pp. 169, 181.
39Brown, An Introduction to New Testament Christolopy, p. 163; cf. pp. 163-67.
40Dunn, The Evidence./hr,Jesus, p. 76. Another more recent and similar testimony is that of N. T. Wright, "Christian Origins and the Resurrection ofJesus: The Resurrection ofJesus as a Historical Problem," Sewanee Theological Review 41 (1998): 118-22.
41Stephen T. Davis, "Is Belief in the Resurrection Rational?" Philo 2 (1999): 57-58.
42J. A. T. Robinson, Can We Trust the New Testament? (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1977), p. 124.
43 For a treatment of the latest trends plus a detailed critique, see Gary R. Hahermas, "Explaining Away Jesus' Resurrection: The Recent Revival of Hallucination Theories," Christian Research journal 23 (2001), pp. 26-31, 47-49.
45Some examples are found in Mt 26:56, 69-74; Mk 14:50, 66-72; Lk 22:55-72; in 18:25-27.
See Acts 2:41-47; 4:1-4, 8-21, 29-31; 5:17-32, 40-42. For their willingness to die, see Jn 21:18- 19; Acts 7:57-60; 12:1-3; 21:13; 25:11; Rom 14:8; 1 Cor 15:30-32; 2 Cor 4:7-14; 11:23-32; Phil 1:20-24; cf. 2 Pet 1:13-15. We have early references to the martyrdoms of Peter and Paul (Clement of Rome Corinthians 5) and two accounts of the martyrdom of James, the brother of Jesus (Josephus Antiquities 20:9:1; Hegesippus in Eusebius Ecclesiastical H story 2:23). Eu- sebius records that James the brother of John, Peter and Paul all died for their faith (Ecclesiastical History 2:9, 25).
`"' In "Explaining Away Jesus' Resurrection," I list nineteen different problems for various forms of the hallucination theory. For a readable treatment of many other potential naturalistic responses, see the more than one hundred pages devoted to the topic in Habermas and Licona, The Case for the Resurrection ofJesus, esp. chaps. 7-9.
47Secular references appear in Tacitus (Annals 15.44), Josephus's disputed paragraph (Antiquities 18.3.3) and in Mara Bar-Serapion's letter to his son (located in the British Museum). Christian testimonies are recorded by Clement of Rome (Corinthians 42), Ignatius (Smyrneans 3) and Barnabas (5).
Ben Meyer, The Aims ofJesus (London: SCM, 1979), p. 60.
49Hugo Staudinger, "The Resurrection of Jesus Christ as Saving Event and as `Object' of Historical Research," Scottish Journal of Tbeolopy 36 (1983), p. 321.
°N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, vol. 2 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), p. 659.
For an itemized argument from Jesus' resurrection to eternal life, see Habermas, The Risen Jesus and Future Hope. chaps. 1-7.
-Gary R. Habermas, "Resurrection Claims in Non-Christian Religions," Religious Studies 25 (1989):167-77.
2 Obviously, Christianity is more than a set of beliefs. More importantly, it is a relationship between the individual believer and God based upon those beliefs.
By naturalism I mean what is described in other chapters of this hook as metaphysical naturalism.
iMy use of the word existentially here has nothing to do with any of the forms of existential philosophy. I am referring to the fact that any worldview must he such that those who accept it intellectually can also live what they profess. Competing worlclviews need to he tested both in the philosophy classroom and in the laboratory of life.
``A dualistic system teaches the existence of two supreme heings; an example would he the ancient position known as Manichaeism. A polytheistic religion believes in many gods, while a pantheistic system tends to regard all of reality as divine in some sense.
5For a more complete discussion, see Ronald Nash, The Concept of God (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1983). panentheism can he thought of as a position somewhere between theism's belief in a personal, almighty, all-knowing God and the impersonal god of pantheism that is identical in some way with nature of the world order. While the god of panentheism is not identical with the world, this god and the world necessarily coexist eternally. Another basic feature of panentheism is the denial of the view that God can act as an efficient cause, a belief that precludes any belief in either creation or in such miracles as the incarnation or the resurrection.
6One alternative to Christian theism that has gained much influence in recent years is the system known as panentheism or process theology. Because there is not time to cover this subject in this chapter, interested readers are directed to Nash, The Concept of God, or Ronald Nash, ed., Process Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1987).
7In contemporary philosophic parlance, a defeater is an argument that functions for some person as a reason to reject a particular belief.
a Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (London: Longmans, Green, 1925), p. 48.
9Some may find it difficult to understand the first clause in this sentence. A worldview choice regarding the existence or nonexistence of God is a religious choice that flows from the heart, the religious center of the person. See Ronald Nash, Faith and Reason (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1988), pp. 28-29.
10Russell, Mysticism and Logic, p. 47.
"l. L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. Basil Mitchell (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 92. Mackie's article appeared originally in Mind 64 (1955).
12For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Nash, Faith and Reason. chap. 13.
13See Alvin Plantings, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1974).
14 See, for example, Nash, Faith and Reason, chap. 13.
'J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 154.
'William L. Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), p. 335.
"For a more complete discussion of the inductive problem of evil, see Nash, Failh and Reason, chap. 14.
"'This premise is simply another way of saying that the world contains gratuitous evil.
19Jane Mary Trau, "Fallacies in the Argument from Gratuitous Suffering," The Neu' Scholasticism 60 (1986): 487-88. As we will see shortly, Trau only presents the argument; she sloes not accept it.
201hid., p. 489.
'Romans 8:28 NK)v. This is no place to quibble over the best translation to use in this case. The familiarity of the King James Version is worth retaining.
'Michael Kinsley, If You Believe Embryos Are Humans ..... Time. June 25, 2001, B. 80.
2Cf. Keith Yandell, "A Defense of Dualism," Faith and Philosophy 12 (October 1995): 548-66; Charles Taliaferro, "Animals, Brains and Spirits," Faith and Philosophy 12 (October 1995): 56781.
3In normal life, I may he focusing on speaking kindly and be unaware that I am scowling. In extreme cases (multiple personalities and split brains), I may he fragmented in my functioning or incapable of consciously and simultaneously attending to all of my mental states, but the various personalities and mental states are still all mine.
1Brian McLaren, A New Kind of Christian: Two Friends on a Spiritual, Tourney (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001).
2See Norman L. Geisler, "Apologetics, Need For," in Baker EncyclopecliagfChrislianApologet- ics, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1999), pp. 37-41.
3For more detail on individual secular postmodernist thinkers, see Millard Erickson, Truth or Consequences (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2001).
4Various postmodernists assign different figures as pivotal in the Enlightenment project (or modernism) and postmodernism, but these two thinkers are pivotal markers.
SSee Douglas Groothuis, Truth Decay: Defending Christianity Against the Challenges of I'ost- modernism (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2000), chap. 4; Norman I.. Geisler, "Truth, Nature of," in tlakerEncyclopediaofChristianApologetics, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1999), pp. 741-45.
6 Geisler, "Truth, the Nature of," p. 745.
7On this, see Groothuis, Trutb Decay, pp. 232-33.
$Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason, and Religion (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 95.
9Ibid., pp. 95-96.
10For an introduction to logic, see Norman L. Geisler and Ronald M. Brooks, Come Let Us Reason: An lutrodnction to Logical Thinking (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1990).
"See Norman L. Geisler, "Foundationalism," in Baker Encyclopedia of ChristianApolotetics, eel. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1999), pp. 259-60.
12Roger Nicole, "The Biblical Concept of Truth," in Scripture and Truth. ed. D. A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1983), p. 290.
131hid.
16Ibid., p. 293.
"Ibid., p. 291.
i5Ibid., p. 292.
"Ibid.; em1hasis in the original.
18Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Press, 1967) -15, pp. 14-15.
19lbid., #540, p. 291.
20Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press), p. 581.
21See Jim Leffel, Our New Challenge: Postmodernism," in The Death gfTrr,lh, cc]. Dennis MacCallum (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1996), pp. 38-39.
22John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 166; emphasis in the original.
23lbid.
24 Ibid.
25Alvin Goldman, Koon,ledke in a Social World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 18-19.
26Ibid., p. 19.
27Edward Rothstein, "Attacks on U.S. challenge Postmodern True Believers," New York Times, September 22, 2(1(11.
28See William C. Placher, Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Phiralislic Conversation (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1989), p. 94.
29Gary Gutting, "Michel Foucault," in RoutledgeEncyclopediaofPhilosophv, ed. Edward Craig (New York: Routledge, 1998), 3:709.
30Ronalcl Beiner, "Foucault's Hyper Liberalism," Critical Review (summer 1995): 353-54.
31Gary Gutting, "Michel Foucault," in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 276.
iMichel Foucault, The order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Ran- clom House-Pantheon, 1971), pp. 386-87.
33lbid., p. 343.
34For more on postmodernism, see Groothuis, Truth Decay. Much of the material in this chapter was adapted from Truth Decay.
1The U.S. Supreme Court writes in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968): "[T]his Court said in Keyishian v. Board of Regents [385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)], the First Amendment `does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.'
2McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (1982).
3Norman I.. Geisler and J. Kerby Anderson, Origin Science: A Proposal, for the Creation- Evolu-tion Conlrw'ersy(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1987).
4Edwards tv. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
'Phillip E. Johnson, Darwin on Trial (Chicago: Regnery/Gateway, 1991), p. 4.
6 Darwin, the Origin of Species, a facsimile of the 1st ed. (1859), intro. by Ernst Mayr (Camhridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 61.
7Antony Flew, Darwinian Evolution, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1997), p. 42.
"Douglas 1. Futuyama, Science on Trial: The case for Evolution (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), p. 95.
"George Gaylord Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution: A Study of the History of Life and of Its SignicanceforMan, rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 279.
9See Monroe W. Strickberger, Evolution, 3rd ed. (Sudbury, Mass.: Jones & Bartlett, 2000), p. 76.
'oSee ibid., chaps. 1-25.
'2WilIi:un A. I)emhski, Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and 7heolog y (Downers Grove, III.: InterV unity Press, 1999), p. 119.
13Phil lip E. Johnson, Reason in the Balance: The Case Against Naturalism in Science, Lain and Education (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1986), p. 208.
14William A. Dembski, "Reinstating Design Within Science," Rhetoric and Public A%%airs 1, no. 4 (1998), p. 506.
15William A. Dembski in Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe by Michael J. Belie, William A. Dembski and Stephen C. Meyer, The Proceedings of the Wethersfield Institute, vol. 9 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), pp. 25, 26.
'Ibid, pp. 25-26, 27.
'This is my example, not Dembski's.
17Denii;ski, "Reinstating Design," p. 508.
181hid, 00. 507-9.
22Ibid., p. 510, citing William A. Dembski, The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance Through Small Probabilities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chap. 5.
20See Dcmhski in Science and Evidence for Design in the Universe, pp. 47-51 n. 17.
21 Quoted in Dembski, "Reinstating Design," p. 509.
23Charles Darwin, The Origin ofSpecies. 6th ed. (1872), p. 154, as quoted in Michael 13ehe, "Intelligent Design as an Alternative Explanation for the Existence of Biornolecular Machines," Rhetoric and Public Affairs 1, no. 4 (1998), p. 566.
24Michael Belie, Darwins Black Box: TheBiochenaical Challenge to Evolulion (New York: Free Press, 1996), p. 39.
25Ibid., p. 42.
26Behe, "Intelligent Design," p. 567. There is controversy surrounding Behe's mousetrap example. For a response to these critiques as well as a fine-tuning of Belie's case, see Williams A. Demhski, No Free Lunch: Why Specified Complexity Cannot Be Purchased Without Intelligence (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 256-67, 279-89.
271n addition to the cilium, Behe includes the bacterial flagellum, the mechanism of blood clotting, vesicular transport and immune systems as examples of irreducibly complex biological systems.
28Behe, Darwin's Black Box, pp. 64-65.
29Behe, "Intelligent Design," p. 569.
30Karl Giberson, The Anthropic Principle: A Postmodern Creation Myth?" Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 9 (1997).
31 See, for example, John Barrow and Frank Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); John Leslie, Universes (New York: Routledge, 1989); and Paul Davies, The Accidental Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
34Hugh Ross, "Big Bang Refined by Fire," in Were Creation: Science, Faith and Intelligent Design, ed. William A. Dembski (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1998), p. 372.
33 Ross, "Big Bang Refined by Fire," p. 381.
32Stephen C. Meyer in Science and Evidence,lbr Design, pp. 56-57.
33lbid., p. 57.
37 See, for example, Meyer in Science and Evidence. for Design, pp. 56-66.
38Edwards, 482 U.S., p. 587.
36 Quoted in Walter L. Bradley, "Designed or Desibnoid,° in Mere Creation, P. 40, quoting > from D. L. Brock, Our Universe: Accident or Design? (Wits, South Africa: Star Watch, 1992), n. p.
39Jay D. Wexler, Of Pandas, People and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the Public Schools," Stcmfordlau Reuieiu(1997), p. 465.
40The genetic fallacy occurs when the origin of a viewpoint or argument rather than its merits is employed to dismiss it out of hand.
"See, for example, William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Cos- niolor v (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
44United .States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
42Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 11
43Epperson, 393 U.S. 103-4. 11
45Epperson, 393 U.S., 113 (Black, J., concurring)
"e'I'he court writes in Epperson (93 U.S., 105): T]his Court said in Kel'ishian r'. Board of Regents 1385 IJ.S., 589, 603 (1967)], the First Amendment 'does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.'"
49See, for example, Dembski, TheDesign Inference, Paul A. Nelson, On Common Descent. Evolutionary Monograph Series (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming); Del Ratzsch, Nature, Science, and Design: The Status ofDesign in Natural Science, Philosophy and Biology Series (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); Craig and Smith, Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Gbsmolo v;; John A. Campbell and Stephen C. Meyer, eds., Darwinism, Design and Public Education (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003); William A. Detnh-
47Edwards, 482 U.S., 593, 594.
48Ihid., 587.
50See, for example, Michael J. Behe, "Self-Organization and Irreducibly Complex Systems: A Reply to Shanks and Joplin," Philosophy of Science 6 (2000); Paul A. Nelson, "Is `Intelligent Design' Unavoidable-Even by Howard Van Till? A Response," Zygon 34 (1999); William A. Dembski and Stephen C. Meyer, "Fruitful Interchange or Polite Chitchat? The Dialogue Between Science and Theology," Zygon 33 (1998); William A. Dembski, "Randomness by Design," Nous 25 (1991); William Lane Craig, "Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design," British , journal. for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1989); William Lane Craig, "God, Creation and Mr. Davies," British, journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (1986); John Leslie, "Anthropic Principle, World Ensemble, Design," American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1982).
Because ID's project strikes at the philosophical core of evolutionary theory-its unchallenged epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions-ID proponents have published most of their pro-ID essays in peer-reviewed periodicals that specialize in the philosophy of science or in peer-reviewed anthologies produced by respected university presses. In addition, as shown in the previous note, ID proponents have made significant inroads in publishing peer-reviewed monographs with prestigious presses. The ID movement has found more success in these venues than in traditional scientific journals, for the latter typically do not have reviewers and editors adequately trained to assess the soundness of arguments-both empirical and philosophical-that challenge the core presuppositions of an entrenched paradigm. However, design theorists' publication in biology peer-reviewed journals is thin, and cannot he entirely attributed to hostile editorial hoards who want to suppress ID (though that sometimes is the case).
For a nice assessment of peer-review journals and their relevance to the ID movement, see Frank J. Tipler, "Refereed Journals: Do They Insure Quality or Enforce Orthodoxy?" in Uncommon Dissent: Intellectuals Who Find Darwinism Unconvincing, ed. William A. Dembski (Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2004).
'2See, for example, James Glanz, "Biologists Face a New Theory of Life's Origins," New York Times (April 8, 2001), pp. 1, 18; Teresa Watanabe, "Enlisting Science to Find the Fingerprints of a Creator," Los Angeles Times (March 25, 2001), available at <www.arn.org/docs/news/ fingerprints032501.htm> (July 4, 2002); Beth McMurtrie, "Darwinism Under Attack," Chronicle of Higher Education (December 21, 2001), available at <http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i17/ 17a00801.htm> (March 15, 2002); Brian Fitelson, Christopher Stephens and Elliot Sober, "How Not to Detect Design," Philosophy of Science 66, no. 3 (1999); Neil W. Blackstone, "Argumentum Ad Ignorantam," Quarterly Review ofBiology 72 (1997); J. A. Coyne, "God in the Details," Nature 383 (1996); and Robert Dorit, review of Darwin's Black Box by Michael Behe, American Scientist 85, no. 5 (1997), available at <http://wcvw.sigmaxi.org/amsci/amsci/bookshelf/ leads97/darwin97%2D09.html> (March 25, 2002).
ski and Michael Ruse, eds., Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004): and William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, eds., Naturalism: A C St- ical Analysis (New York: Routledge, 2000).
s1In 2000 Baylor University (The Nature of Nature: An Interdisciplinary Conference on the Role of Naturalism in Science, Baylor University, April 12-15, 2000) and Yale University (Science and the Evidence for Design in the Universe, Yale University, November 2-4, 2000) hosted major conferences on ID. The American Museum of Natural History (New York City) in April 2002 presented as part of its lecture series a public discussion entitled "Evolution or Intelligent Design?: Examining the Intelligent Design Issue" <www.amnh.org/prograins/lectures/ index.html?src=p_h~> April 23, 2002.
53Witanahe, "Enlisting Science."
54See David K. DcWoif, "Academic Freedom After Edwards," Regent (Tniversily Lao' Review 13, no. 2 (2000-2001): 480-81.
2 letter as quoted in ibid.
3Kloehn, "Clergy Ask Baptists to Rethink Area Blitz."
Steve Klochn, "Clergy Ask Baptists to Rethink Area Blitz," The Chicago Trihrmc'(Novemher 28, 1999) at <www.chicagotrihune.com/news/metro/chicago/article/0,2669,ART-38638,FF.html> (Novemher 28, 1999).
4 lbid.
6See, for example, John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, a critical edition with an intro and apparatus criticus by Peter Laslett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
5Carl Mosser, "When the Saints Go Marching In: The New Mormon Challenge for World Missions, Apologetics and Theology." in TbeNewMormon Challenge: Responding to tbeLatestDe- fenses of a Fast-Growing Movement, ed. Francis J. Beckwith, Carl Mosser and Paul Owen (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002), p. 60.
1T. M. P. Mahadevan, "Social, Ethical and Spiritual Values in Indian Philosophy," in The Indian Mind, Essentials of Indian Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 152.
2Junjire Takakusu, "Buddhism as a Philosophy of Thusness," in The Indian Mind, p. 88.
3P. T. Raju, "Metaphysical Theories in Indian Philosophy," in The Indian Mind, p. 194.
4 Pascal Pensees 12.434.
Recent decades have witnessed a renaissance of Christian philosophy and apologetics. Among conservative evangelicals no one has heen more influential than Norman L. Geisler in fostering this renaissance or more deliberate in encouraging young scholars to enter these fields. We dedicate this essay to him in grateful recognition.
2For a helpful overview and comparison, see Stephen E. Robinson, "LDS Doctrine Compared with Other Christian Doctrines," in Encyclopedia ofMormonism, ed. Daniel H. Ludlow, 5 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 1:399-402.
3Few works on Mormonism attempt to describe Mormonism's fundamental worldview commitments, and fewer offer any significant critique. Several essays from a Christian perspective that do both can he found in Francis J. Beckwith, Carl Mosser and Paul Owen, eds., The NewMor- monChallenge: Responding to the Latest Defenses q1 'a Fast-Growing Movement (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002). The main LDS literature focused on worldview issues is referenced on p. 416 n. 58; p. 417 n. 59; p. 456 n. 12.
7Irenaeus Against Heresies [Adversus Haereses], 3.6.3; 3.19.2; 4.1.2.
5Irenaeus Dernonstratio preface 2.
6lrenaeus Demonstratio 4, 5.
4Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching [Demonstratiol. 3, 6. The translation is from St. Irenaeus of Lyons, On the Apostolic Preaching, trans. John Behr (Crestwood, N.Y.: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1997). All other patristic quotations are taken from the translations in the AnteNicene Fathers or the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers series.
9lrenaeus Adversus Haereses 2.25.3.
10lrenaeus Adversus Haereses 4.11.2.
"Irenaeus Denionstratio 15-16.
Blain M. MacKenzie, Irenaeus's Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching: A Theological Commentary and Translation (Aldershot, England/Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2002), p. 29.
'Joseph Smith, Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, comp. Joseph Fielding Smith (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1976), p. 351. Hereafter abbreviated TPJS.
16 MS, pp. 352, 353.
13TPfs p. 181.
14TPJS, p. 351-52.
15 MS, p. 208.
"Sterling M. McMurrin, The Philosophical Foundations of Mormon Theology (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1959), p. 24.
John Cohh and Truman G. Madsen, "Theodicy," in Encyclopedia q1*Mornwnism, ed. Daniel H. Ludlow, 5 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 4:1473.
19Kent P. Jackson, Are Mormons Christians? Presbyterians, Mormons, and the Question of Religious Definitions," Nona Religio 4, no. 1 (2000), p. 57.
20771 p.345.
21Jackson, Are Mormons Christians?" p. 58 (favorably quoting "Relations with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Its People: Position Paper- [Salt Lake City: The Presbytery of Utah, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 19951, p. 12).
22 Are Mormons Chritians?" p. 58.
25 See further the following entries in the Encyclopedia of Mormonism: "Degrees of Glory;" "Eternal Lives, Eternal Increase;" "Exaltation;" "Eternal Progression;" "Godhood."
23Joseph F. Smith, John R. Winder and Anthon H. Lund, "The Origin of Man," in Encyclopedia of Mormonism, cd. Daniel H. Ludlow, 5 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 4:1669, 1667, 1668.
24lbid., 4:1669.
26 cf. 71'/.S, pp. 345-47, 370, 373.
28David L. Paulsen, "Comparative Coherency of Mormon (Finitistic) and Classical Theism" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1975), p. 73.
29 David Bailey, "Scientific Foundations of Mormon Theology," in The Search.%or Harmony: Essays on Science and Mormonism, ed. Craig J. Oherg and Gene A. Sessions (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1993), pp. 8, 14.
27 Paul K. Moser and David Yandell, "Farewell to Philosophical Naturalism," in Nalnralism: A Critical Analysis, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 4.
30Francis J. Beckwith, "Moral Law, the Mormon Universe and the Nature of the Right We Ought to Choose,- in The Nen' Mormon Challenge: Responding to the Latest Defenses ofa Fast Grow-ing Moremerut, ed. Francis J. Beckwith, Carl Mosser and Paul Owen (Grand Rapids. Mich.: Zondervan, 2002). pp. 219-41.
31Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, "Craftsman or Creator? An Examination of the Mormon Doctrine of Creation and a Defense of Creatio ex nihilo,- in The XVewMormon e'ballenge: Re- s[3ondin,S to The Itirlest Defenses of a Fast-Growing .11oi,emenr ed. Francis j. Beckwith, Carl Mosser and Paul Owen (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002), pp. 127-52.
32Stephen E. Parrish, "A Tale of Two Theisms: The Philosophical Usefulness of the Classical Christian and Mormon Concepts of God," in The New Mormon Challenge. Responding to the Latest 1)c~fenses (?fa Fast-Growing Movement, ed. Francis J. Beckwith, Carl Mosser and Paul Owen (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002), pp. 204-11.
34See Van Hale, "The Doctrinal Impact of the King Follett Discourse," BYU Studies 18, no. 2 (1978), p. 218. Cf. Alma 42:13, 22, 25.
33J 11. Moreland, "The Absurdities of Mormon Materialism: A Reply to the Neglected Orson Pratt," in The Neu Mormon Challenge: Responding to the Latest Defenses (?fa Fast-Groo'ing Movement, ed. Francis J. Beckwith, Carl Mosser and Paul Owen (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002), pp. 243-66.
35In hooks on the world's religions, discussion on Mormonism naturally occurs in the section on Christianity, not in the section on Judaism, Islam or another of the world's religions. This is appropriate given the kinds of broad phenomenological definitions these works employ, but it is theologically irrelevant.
36See Craig L. Blomberg and Stephen E. Robinson, How Wide the Divide? A Mormon and an Evangelical in Conversation (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1997), pp. 128-29.
37Even Blake Ostler, whose views on the Godhead are perhaps closer to orthodox Christianity than any other contemporary Mormon thinker, can write: "We may say that God the Son and God the Father are both properly considered as Gods. When asserted in this sense, the Son and the Father, though separate, belong to the same class or kind of being" (Exploring Mormon Thought The Attributes of God [Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 20011, p. 6, emphasis in the original). In Ostler's version of social trinitarianism, none of the divine persons possesses the properties of God in a unique and absolute sense, since the Godhead is not ontologically one substance. In fact, each person in the Godhead depends upon the other persons for their experience of possessing the properties of God (i.e., each person possesses the divine properties contingently upon the others). The properties that distinctively belong to God arise from the unity of the persons of the Godhead: they are not rooted in one divine Being or substance. See Blake Ostler, "Re-visioning the Mormon Concept of Deity," Element An EJournal of Mormon Philosophy and Theology 1, no. 1 (2000), pp. 3, 7. On the varieties of thought within social trinitarianism, including a critique of all of them, see Brian Leftow, "Anti Social Trinitarianism," in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall and Gerald O'Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 203-49. For a defense of continuing to employ substance metaphysics in formulating the doctrine of the Trinity, see William P. Alston, "Substance and the Trinity," in The Trinity, pp. 179-201.
38B. H. Roberts did speak of God as ontologically one in the sense of one "governing force" or "Spirit" whose influence "permeates the universe" (TheMormon Doctrine ofDeit)) [Bountiful, Utah: Horizon, 19031, pp. 137, 168). Elsewhere he describes the persons of the Trinity as incarnations of "the one God-Nature" (The Truth, the Way, the life [Provo, Utah: BYU Studies, 19941, pp. 166-68). Although Roberts views all personal Intelligences as incarnations of the "God-Nature" (p. 171), his language bears superficial similarities with orthodox distinctions between the one substantia(substance) and the three personae (persons) of the Trinity; however, in Roberts's model, the persons emanate from the divine nature, so that "God" is the collective unity of all divine Intelligences. This is why the persons of the Godhead are separable substances in Roberts's understanding, which is influenced by Orson Pratt (cf. Mormon Doctrine of Deit)), pp. 162-63; and Pratt, "Absurdities of Immaterialism," in Orson Pratt's Works, vol. 2, Important Works in Mormon History [Orem, Utah: Grandin Book Company, 19901, p. 30). Orthodox trinitarianism does not view the persons of the Trinity as emanations from an ontologically prior divine nature (cf. Athanasius, Statement of Faith [Expositio Fideii 1; Defense of the Nicene Definition [De DecretisJ 3.11).
39Blomherg and Robinson, How Wide the Divide? p. 129, emphasis in the original.
40Further on this point see Thomas C. Oden, The Rebirth of Orthodoxy (New York: HarperCol- lins, 2003); D. H. Williams, Retrieving the Tradition and Renewing Evangelicalism: A Primer for Suspicious Protestants (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999); and Christopher R. Seitz, ed., Nicene Christianity: The Futurejbra New Ecumenism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2001).
41For a model of how to go about demonstrating this, see the brilliant study of David S. Yeago, "The New Testament and the Nicene Dogma: A Contribution to the Recovery of Theological Exegesis," in The Theological Interpretation of Scripture, ed. Stephen E. Fowl (Cambridge, Mass./Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 87-100. See also Colin Gunton, "And in One Lord, Jesus Christ ... Begotten, Not Made," in Nicene Christianity: The Future for a New Ecumenism, ed. Christopher R. Seitz (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2001), pp. 35-48. The most thorough and articulate modern discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity, blending together biblical analysis with discussion of Patristic doctrine, with which we are familiar is Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996).
42On the compatibility of monotheism with the acknowledgment of Jesus' divine status, see further Paul Owen, "Monotheism, Mormonism and the New Testament Witness," in The New Mormon Challenge: Responding to the Latest Defenses ofa Fast-Growing Movement, ed. Francis J. Beckwith, Carl Mosser and Paul Owen (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002), pp. 271314; and in much more detail, Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003).
43 For the text and discussion of the Nicene creed, see Philip Schaff, The Creeds ofChristendo! 3 vols. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1993), 1:24-29.
`"'Scripture quotations are taken from the New American Standard Bible (NASB).
45See Richard Bauckham, God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the New Testament (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1998), p. 76; cf. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ, pp. 381-89.
"(See Bauckham, God Crucified, pp. 78-79.
47See Murray J. Harris, Jesus as God (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1992), p. 66. On the grammatical unlikelihood of translating John 1:1c and the word was a god," see Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1996), pp. 266-67.
48 It is important to distinguish between the terms being and person in theological discourse. A particular being is who one is by virtue of one's nature or essence. A particular person is who one is by virtue of one's relation to others. In other words, a person is a being-in-relation to others. Each human being stands in one distinctive set of relations in the world that cannot be duplicated by another person. The mystery of the Trinity lies in the fact that the one Being of God experiences three modes of heing-in-relation to others. Finite beings each experience only one mode of being-in-relation to others. It is here that human experience and divine experience break down. See modus subsistendi, relatiopersonalis and Trinitas in Richard A. Muller, Dictionary ofLatin and Greek Theological Terms (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1985), pp. 195, 261, 306-10.
49"Having distinguished the Logos from the Father [ton theon, 1:1h], John wished to point to their commonality, not merely in purpose but in being [theosl. Like the Father, and equally with him, the Logos may he included within the category of Deity as a partaker in the divine essence" (Harris, Jesus as God, p. 67).
50Mormons might opt for the translation "and the Word was divine" and argue that it simply means that the Father and the Son share a common divine nature in the generic sense of having the properties of God. However, John did not use the term theios, which could have denoted this notion, and it is highly unlikely that John would switch mid-verse from a substantival use of theos in Jn 1: 11) to an adjectival use in Jn 1: 1c. See Harris, Jesus as God, pp. 63-64.
s'This point needs to he made to cut off the possible LDS claim that Ex 3:14 has in view only Jehovah/God the Son and not God the Father.
52Councils of Ariminum and Seleucia [De Synodis], 35. The Greek noun ousia is derived from the feminine participle (ousa) of the verb eimi ("I am").
55Robinson suggests that the oneness of the Father and the Son should he interpreted in light of the oneness believers enjoy in John 17:21-22 (Blomberg and Robinson, How Wide the Divide? p. 130). But this ignores clear distinctions John's Gospel makes between our oneness with God and the oneness of God. First of all, Jesus' words are already defined contextually in Jn 10:30 as making a claim of divine identity (cf. Jn 10:33). Yet there is no hint that Jesus is telling believers that they can he God in Jn 17:21-22. Second, Jn 17:21-22 makes it clear that the oneness we enjoy is an experience to he entered into. By way of contrast, John's Gospel gives no hint of a time when Jesus became one with the Father (cf. Jn 1:1-2; 8:58; 17:5, 24). This indicates that the ontological relationship that the Father and the Son enjoy provides a pattern which believers can then enter into by analogy-but this is not to equate the oneness of believers and the oneness of the Trinity.
s3 De Synodis, 41. cf. Against the Arians [Orationes contra Arians 41, discourse 1.12.
54See Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, pp. 118-19.
56 De Synodic, 52.
"Walter Bauer. W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon of the Net' Testament and Other h'orli' Christian Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 847.
"The writer chooses his words carefully. The word translated "exact representation" is the word character, which means something like "exact likeness, full expression." He does not say that the Son is "the copy of His nature." Had he intended this, lie would have chosen the Greek word hvpodeigma or antittpos (cf. Heh 9:23-24).
s9The words of the first clause ("He is the radiance of His glory') further guard the reader from misunderstanding the Son's representation of God's nature in terms of a second Being who replicates the first Being. The writer does not speak of two glories or sources of light (the one a copy of the other) but rather of God's glory shining in the person of the Son (cf. 2 Cor 4:6). The only way God the Father's glory can shine in the person of the Son is if they are homoon- sios (identical in essence). If the persons of the Godhead were ontologically separate, the writer would have to say that the Son is "a copy of the radiance of His glory."
60See further the excellent study of Keith A. Mathison, The Shape of Sola Scriptura (Moscow, Id.: Canon Press, 2001).
61Contrary to much ill-informed criticism, it is to the credit of How Wide the Divide? that Blomberg and Robinson attempted to acknowledge genuine areas of skeletal agreement in key doctrines, without glossing over important differences where they existed under the surface. For another model of principled and respectful dialogue that explores differences of opinion with another viewpoint without engaging in caricature, see Norman L. Geisler and Ralph E. MacKenzie, Roman Catholics and Evangelicals: Agreements and Differences (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1995).
62 TJ JS, p. 327.
1For a more extensive treatment of Islamic theology and its historical beginnings, see Norman Geisler and Abdul Saleeh, Answering Islam: The Crescent in the Light of the Cross, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2002) chaps. 1-6.
2Isma' it Raji al-Farugi, Al Tawhid: Its implications for Thought and Life (Verndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1995), p. 17.
3Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Heart of Islam: Enduring ValuestbrHurrzanity (San Francisco: Harp- erSanFrancisco, 2002), p. 3.
4Hammadah Abdalati, Islam in Focus (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1975), p. 12.
5Diana Eck, A New Religious America (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2001), p. 232.
6For specific examples of the convergence between Islam and the Western liberal tradition against orthodox Christianity, see the introduction to R. C. Sproul and Abdul Saleeb, The Dark Side of Islcma (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2003).
7Misha'al ibn Abdullah, What Did Jesus Really Say? (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Islamic Assembly of North America, 1996), pp. 66-67.
5Because of the space limitations of this chapter, we can do no more than suggest a broad outline of possible Christian responses. Also, our concern here is not only theological and apologetic but also practical and evangelistic.
9A. Gonzales Montes, "The Challenge of Islamic Monotheism: A Christian View," in Islam: A Challenge, for Christianity (London: SCM Press, 1994), p. 68.
10Alhaj Ajijola, The Essence ofFaith in Islam (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1978), p. 55.
'Timothy Tennent, Christianity at the Religious Roundtable (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2002), pp. 153-54. Tennent provides us with an excellent model of evangelical iMuslim dialogue.
13 In a commentary footnote on sura 2:116, Yusuf Ali, the most famous translator of the Qur'an into English language, writes, "It is a derogation from the glory of God-in fact it is a blasphemy-to say that God begets sons, like a man or an animal. The Christian doctrine is here emphatically repudiated. If words have any meaning, it would mean an attrihution to God of a material nature and of the lower animal function of sex." Our misunderstanding of each other is often much deeper than we realize!
For Qur'anic warnings against the Trinity, see sura 4:171; 5:76. The Qur'anic rejection of God's fatherhood can he seen in many passages, including sura 112; 19:35; 6:101.
15The literature in this field is enormous and growing every year. For a recent book on the Trinity with an impressive bibliography, see Roger Olson and Christopher Hall, The Trinity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002). Two recent scholarly evangelical books on the doctrine of God are also very helpful. See John Frame, The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R, 2002); John Feinberg, No One Like Hint (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2001).
16'I'his point is eloquently made by the Muslim writer Shabbir Akhtar, AFaith for All Seasons (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 1990), p. 179.
14Shabir Ahmad Usmani, The Noble Qur'an: Ta/seer-e-Usmani (New Delhi: Idara Isha'at-e- diniyat, 1990), 1:ii. Another fairly typical misstatement of the Trinity by a Muslim is the comment of Misha'al ihn Ahdullah. In summarizing the Christian understanding of the Trinity he writes, "God is three gods merged into one God. This one God is called a Trinity. However, to say that God is three is blasphemy of the highest order. All three parts of the Trinity are `coequal,' co-eternal' and `the same substance.' For this reason, this doctrine is described as a `mystery'" (What Did, Jesus Really Say? p. xiii).
"Because of the often-repeated charge that the doctrine of the Trinity is the result of pagan influence that imposed itself on Christianity through the actions of church councils in the fourth century, it is important in our witness to Muslims to emphasize the experiential and biblical root of this doctrine.
18C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2001), p. 163.
19Alister McGrath, Understanding the Trinity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1988), pp. 13637. This is an excellent popular treatment of the Trinity. Elsewhere McGrath writes, "The doctrine of the Trinity can he regarded as the outcome of a process of sustained and critical reflection on the pattern of divine activity revealed in Scripture, and continued in Christian experience.... Scripture bears witness to a God who demands to he understood in a Trinitarian manner." Furthermore, "Far from being a rather pointless piece of theological speculation, the doctrine of the Trinity is grounded directly in the complex human experience of redemption in Christ, and is concerned with the explanation of this experience" (Alister McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction [Oxford: Blackwell, 1994[, pp. 294, 296-97).
20See, for example, The character of God in the Bible and the Qur'an," <http✓/answering- islam.org/God/character.html> (July 27, 2003). Also see Timothy George, Is the Father ofJesus the God u/'Muhanmaad?(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002), and Geisler and Saleeh, Au- swerin~ Islam, chap. 7.
21 Ismail al-Faruyi, Islam (Nils: Argus Communications, 1984), p. 9.
22Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, eds., Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam Essential Writings ofAbdolkarim Sorousb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 191.
23Ibid., pp. 191-92.
24For an excellent discussion of this point, see J. Dudley Woodherry, "Different Diagnosis of the Human Condition," in Muslims and Christians on the Emmaus Road. ed. J. Dudley Woodberry (Monrovia, Calif.: MARC, 1989), pp. 149-60.
25This can explain why for many Muslims who come to Christ, two of the most attractive features of the New Testament are the Sermon on the Mount, which throws fresh light on the sinfulness of the human heart, and the New Testament emphasis on the unconditional love of God, which is radically opposed to the Qur'anic portrayal of God.
26Many Muslims are genuinely baffled with the lack of Christians' enthusiasm about the great place that the Qur'an and Islamic tradition give to the prophet Jesus. In order to help Muslims understand the Christian position, it would be helpful to ask a Muslim how he or she feels if we say that Muhammad was a great political and military leader; he was an inspiring and courageous character, but he was not a prophet of God. In the same way, Christians do not believe that by denying the two most important aspects of Christ's person and work (i.e., his deity and death), Muslims in fact are honoring Christ as he truly is.
17Akhtar, Failh, p. 182.
28Since the Qur'an acknowledges the legitimacy of Jesus' disciples and in fact puts God's blessing on them and their message (see sura 61:14), their testimony to the identity of Jesus hecomes also very significant.
29 An excellent, though quite technical, treatment of the New Testament evidence for the deity of Christ is Murray Harris, Jesus as God: The New Testament Use of Theos in Re%erence Iu Jesus (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1992). See especially the helpful appendix, "An Outline of the New Testament Testimony to the Deity of Christ," pp. 315-17. On a popular level, another helpful hook is loch McDowell and Bart Larson, Jesus: A Biblical Defense ol'His Deily (San Berna dino, Calif.: Here's Life Publishers, 1983).
31For one example, see <www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/6808/Jesus.html> (July 27, 2003).
32Some years ago, in a speech at Emory University in Atlanta, Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr commented how Jesus claimed to he the truth, whereas Muhammad could only claim to he truthful, since according to Islam only God can say he is the truth! The Gospels are filled with these kind of references to Jesus' self-designation. When Jesus says he is the Lord of the sah- hath or the true temple, he is making nothing short of a radical claim to divinity. What would happen to a Muslim religious leader if he claimed to he the Lord of the Ka'ha (the "house of God" in Mecca, Saudi Arabia), or the master of the day of judgment?
30William Lane Craig, A Reasonable Faith, rev. ed. (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 1994), p. 243.
331t is beyond the limits of this chapter to deal with the issues of philosophical coherence of the incarnation. For a helpful discussion see Paul Copan, That's Just Your Interpretation (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2001), pp. 127-37, and its related bibliography. See also Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986). We should also heed the insightful reminder of N. T. Wright, "When people ask the question, `Is Jesus God?', they tend to assume that we know who God is; the question means, Can you fit Jesus into your God-picture? Well, the best Christian answer has always been: we don't know, off the top our heads, exactly who God is; but we can discover him by looking at Jesus. You could say that at the heart of Christian faith is the view, not that Jesus is more or less like God, or part of God, but that the being we refer to as `God' was, and is, fully present, and fully discoverable, in and as Jesus of Nazareth" (The Original Jesus [Oxford: Lion Publishing, 1996], pp. 78-79).
34The attempt of some Christians who try to reinterpret the Qur'anic denial of the crucifixion in order to find Qur'anic support for the cross is not in the least convincing.
35Kenneth Cragg, "Islamic Theology: Limits and Bridges," in The Gospel and Islam, ed. Don McCurry (Monrovia, Calif.: MARC, 1979), p. 202.
36For the latest treatment of this topic, see N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son (?/'God (London: SICK, 2003).
37Abdullah, What Did Jesus Really Say? pp. xiv-xv.
38We can tell our Muslim friends that the Qur'an itself tells us to go back to the gospel and stand firm on it. When we go to the gospel, we then see that the gospel leaves no room for the coming of another revelation after Christ (Heb 1:1-3).
39 Historically, Muslims came to their belief in the corruption of previous Scriptures some centuries after Muhammad, when they realized that contrary to the assertions of the Qur'an, the message of the previous prophets found in the Bible was not at all the same as the message of the Qur'an.
40In fact, in certain Western academic circles, especially in the writings of John Wansbrough, Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, the same critical methodologies are being used on the Qur'an and early Islamic history. The results have been devastating to the traditional Islamic beliefs about the authorship and compilation of the Qur'an.
'Dallas Willard, The Divine Conspiracy (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1998), p. 92; cf. pp. 75, 79, 134, 184-85.