Chapter III
The infinity of grace in electing us further evinced by a comparative made in
respect unto the persons refused and elected, as considered in the common condition of both, and the circumstances which both stand in. Of their first condition in the possibility before the creation, as then viewed by God, repre sented in his infinite mind, the elect were separated from the others rejected.
This for the first head, of comparing the acts themselves ; my next is a
comparative of the persons elected or passed by, as they are considered in their conditions or circumstances out of which they are chosen or refused. And for this my text is 2 Thes. ii. 12, 13,
* That they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness. But we are bound to give thanks alway to God for you, brethren beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth.
Those words, but for you, are a discrimination and exception of these from others, whose condition he had declared in the immediate verses afore, ver. 11, 12, in these words,
* And for this cause God shall send them strong delusions, that they should believe a lie ; that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness. And that election had put in that but, and made the difference ; so stirring them up to thankfulness, by his own giving thanks on their behalf.
It is true the condition of those considered as fallen into sin is the matter here compared, yet is it in a special manner pitching the comparison upon the condition of persons. I therefore take it for a groundwork for what concerns a comparative of persons, whether considered as fallen or without the fall, no scripture adequately comprehending both. Yet upon occasion of handling the comparison about the state of man fallen, I may extend it to either, and begin it higher with that afore the fall, which other scriptures warrant the truth of, as our divines have defended it out of Rom. ix., and other places.
1. The state of elect and non-elect, afore or without the consideration of the fall, is that of creatureship simply and absolutely considered, wherein God in and at his decree for creation, whilst he was determining to create, and viewed the whole crop of them a-growing up but as yet in his purpose and will to create them, his gracious goodwill did, together with that his creation decree, both of those he elected and of all things else, put forth that election purpose, pre-ordaining them to be the first fruits of his whole
creation, setting them apart for himself, and consecrating them unto the
highest communion with himself, and of ultimate glory above the rest of their fellow-creatures, and thus but as considered as creatures, though in their kind wherein they were to be created.
You have this foresaid expression in the apostle James, That we might be the first fruits of his creatures ; and put we all the particulars that do follow together, and the assertion will come out of them.
1. It is the whole heap or harvest of the first creation, as standing on the ground afore him, he means by creatures, whereof these are said to be the
first fruits ; for it is the saints universally, all of them, that are as the first
fruits, severed and differenced from the rest of God s creation as universally taken, and not of some special saints of that age, the first fruits of other saints to come, as Vorstius would have it.
2. The first fruits were in their original condition, but of the same that
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other their fellow-fruits were of, and were considered but as such in them
selves, only were by God s choice consecrated to himself in a special manner,
because the first, as the first fruits of their kind.
3. These in James were made the first fruits wholly by a free election or
choice of them ; but those other first fruits were those that were first by
nature s production shot forth out of the earth, and then consecrated by God.
But that these persons should be the first fruits was the whole of
it^ merely from a choice made of them, from a special love and good will, calling and
singling them forth out of that common creature condition, that which they were by creation. And the text insinuates thus much, even God s special
good will to have been the cause, as the immediate words afore do shew, Of
his good will he begat us, that we might be the first fruits. What will ?
That svdoKia (whereof Eph. i. 5) ; that special good will from whence their
being begotten again, and their being the first fruits, which is the end and
issue thereof, and all do flow. And indeed the reason of the thing itself
would carry so much ; for it is election from eternity that moulds all, orders
all to the main end thereby aimed at, and so must have done this, and it
could have no other original it depended on.
4. Then surely that special good will and choice must be supposed to have
taken them up as viewed in the common condition of creatureship. And it
must not be said that this their election was only (in the order of act) after
the fall, but he climbs up higher, and places it from the first with that of
their own and others creation, out from amongst whom, and considered
simply at creation (together with the rest of their fellow-creatures, whereof
as such they were to be the first fruits), it was they were chosen. And why
else doth he say, of the creatures or creation, and not of mankind ? Why not of man fallen, but of the creation? and the first fruits of the whole first
creation ? This doth at least import that they were chosen the first fruits,
as early as they and their fellowcreatures, considered as creatures, and
decreed to be created. So as these two decrees of creating all things, and
electing -of these with the first, must at least have been twins of the same
birth at once brought forth, for they have mutual respects of creatureship and first fruits one to the other, and are as old one as the other. And what is said to be the first thing compared with other things, must be sup posed to exist from the first with those that are compared unto. And there
fore these two, creatures and first fruits, had the same order in God s decrees ; and those two acts and decrees are allied and akin, and associated more
than any other, comported, and connexed together.
5. Add this also, that the first fruits were not styled the first fruits of the
rest of the kind, when corrupted and proved rotten ; not of a basket of
Ezekiel s bad figs, so bad as they could not be eaten. No ; it were most
improper to institute such a comparison ; it relates therefore to the creation
of all things, when viewed in his purpose and decree as good (as, after the creation perfected, God did view them and approve them) and such like wise in his intuition of them in his decree and purpose such to make, and under that view ordained these in the issue to be made such. And there
fore this doth refer to a decree made of them at that of the creation, and that then it was God did will them the first fruits.
If it be objected, that he speaks there of what they are made by regene ration, and not of God s first decree ; and regeneration supposing their being ordained the first fruits, and upon the -consideration of the fall,
_ I reply, It is true indeed, he speaks not expressly or immediately of what his decrees were, but it must be supposed, according to what was said even now, that they are the moulders and framers of what is in the event.
CHAP. III.] OF ELECTION. 165
Secondly, it is true, that in the execution or performance of the decree they became not actually the first fruits, but by regeneration, which supposeth them fallen ; and yet this the ultimate end of being the first fruits, may and was notwithstanding (according to the former arguments) intended with the
first of their creation with other creatures.
Now this of their being the first fruits is eminently and emphatically in
the text set forth, as the ultimate end of all, ?/g ro eivai, to the end that
they may be the first fruits, which end was first designed conjunct with the
decree of the creation of the whole.
And although in execution or first performance they first became at regene ration to be the first fruits actually by this new creation, and that supposeth the fall afore, viewed (that is granted) so as their hva), or esse actuale, is the
fruit thereof, yet their esse notitionale, their being such, might be and was
intended as the end of their creation, and with the first of the decree thereof.
It is evident that the being the first fruits is here the end of their regenera
tion, and yet intended and aimed at with their creation, and his good will, that was from eternity engaged in both ; but his decree of you to be the first
fruits, was the primitive decree as of the end, and that of regeneration, but as
of the means to accomplish that end. This the means of execution, but that
of being the first fruits of the creation, that is the end ; and indeed denotes
the ultimate end, even that the performance of it will be next unto Christ s;
for it is to be even the first fruits of the whole creation, as he the first-born
of every creature, and in the issue to be exalted and preferred unto the
highest top of glory, even above any of his creatures, angels or men. And
unto what a height the privilege and dignity imported thereby will amount
to, will not be known until the latter day be over, and that we be estated
into the glory and kingdom of the Father : Mat. xxv. 34, Then shall the
King say to them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit
the kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world. And it became him, by whom are all things/ to join the decree of creating the elect
(as the subjects of that kingdom), and to elect them therewith as their
ultimate highest end, and of their first creation.
In fine, therefore, as to the objection itself, the sum of my answer, and
the series of the words, is that by regeneration, which is decreed after the
fall foreseen, our being God s first fruits of all creatures, which was decreed
at and with that of the creation of all, doth by regeneration begin to be
effected in a smaller degree of first fruits in this life, and accomplished in
glory.
And so the contexture fairly stands thus, as if he had said, that God hath
created us anew out of his everlasting good will, thereby to bring about that
which was his great and first design of all other, of making us the first fruits
arid glory of the whole creation, and conjunct with his decree of creation of
them, and all things else, and as such viewed by him when he first decreed
to make them as the ultimate end, he with their creation had ordained them
unto.
2. Let us advance the terminus a quo, or the objective consideration of
us, out of which election at first took us, yet higher. Mundus nondum con-
ditus, the world as yet not decreed to be created, must first be in God s view
ere he put forth that decree to create it. For so in every artificer the frame and model of what he purposeth to make is first in his thought ere he
resolves to make it. And by the rule aforesaid, viz. that creation and
election ran as parallel acts, there was, and in order of nature it must first
be supposed, that those elected were first in view, but as things he could both create and elect under the view of eligible and creable, and the state of
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other things to be created, and these to be elected and created, was but of
mere possibilities ; to have a being decreed them as God pleased, whether
yea or not ; and so their state they were taken forth of when first elected
was the same with that which all things created had afore the decree of
their being created, mere possibles in reality of creatureship, pure nothings
every way, utter nonentities, which yet God could decree, and give an
existence unto.
When I say every way nonentities, not having a shadow of being, the
meaning is, that not only they were nothing, in that they were not yet de
facto created ; for so the whole world, until decreed to be created, was no
thing in actual existence ; but that they lay afore God, as not yet so much
as decreed to be created, and so had not a being in God s decree, till
that passed on them together, both for their creation and election to glory.
For the understanding hereof we may, with the schoolmen, make a three
fold esse or being ascribed to the creature.
1. An esse actuate, an actual being, which is when it is created.
2. An esse volitum, which is a being that lies in God s will, which is the
state of them after God hath purposed to create them.
3. An esse possibile, which is a mere possibility, afore God s decree passed
to have being first decreed it, and then to be by creation given to it, which
lying in God s power in that he can, if he please, make it, or otherwise not,
merely lies in God s understanding in the image or forms of it.
Now the state and common condition of all creatures, immediately afore God decreed to create them, was this latter only, which arose from this, that God s power presented to his infinite understanding an infinity of shadows
or ideas, images of creatures, which he might make if he pleased, which yet he never did or ever willed to make ; and the number of these are infinite,
because his power is infinite to create such, and his understanding is infinite
to fashion and form up the shapes or images in his mind, of all that his
power can effect. Man is narrow both in his understanding and power, and
his understanding may never have the forms or models of all that he is able
to do or make, for to enter into his thoughts. But with God it is other
wise: his understanding, being infinite, doth form up the idea of all, and
everything his power can effect distinctly. The state and condition of
these things, as they lay in God s simple single intelligence, the Scripture
* To God all things are
expresseth in such speeches and terms as these,
possible.
Now the mediate state of all the elect afore God s decree to choose them,
being no other than this of all things else, as they lay in a capability to
creation and the decree of it, and under that view of things possible only,
they were objected or proposed to God s will, both for their creation and
election together ; and God s choosing of them having been (as was said) an
immediately conjunct and associated act with God s decree to create them, without a presupposition of their being yet to be created, much less fallen ; and that both these acts proceeded hand in hand together, or rather like
twins twined about together, and their hands embracing each other, not de
pending upon any other consideration or view that was had of them : this, I
say, being supposed true,
Hence it will follow that the state of God s elect was of mere possibles, as
immediately afore their being elected, as other creatures or themselves were
in respect unto creation, and the decree thereof ; for it is certain there could be no other state of things afore creation was decreed, nor could the divine
understanding have any other view of anything, or all things, until his will had passed a decree upon them, and given a fiat to create them. And what
CHAP. IV.] OF ELECTION. 167
could that be other than that which God s understanding hath now still in
his mind, of things which he never means to create, and yet might if he
pleased ? And the same was the case and condition immediate of the elect, unto election and creation both, until the divine sanction of his will had come
upon them. Till then they were mere appearances and shadows, as all things else were, which God might or might not choose and create ; and still they
lay in that indisposed heap of things, about which God had made no deter mination at all, no, nor ever will make any, they floated in a mere vacuity and pure emptiness, both as to being or glory. And look, as his decree to
create gave his elect and others a being to come in due time, so his decree
of election estated on them that glory to come, and both immediately brought forth by these his decrees out of that mere lump of possibilities fore-mentioned. Let the more learned reader excuse my so often repeating things to the same
effect : it is for the weaker their sakes, that they may both understand and
fixedly retain the notion of it.
The proof of this, that God might have chosen others out of mere possi
bilities, whom he hath not nor never would, and so that they remain in their
pure possibility to eternity, may adequately be drawn from God s offer unto Moses : Deut. ix. 14, Let me alone that I may destroy them, and blot out
their name from under heaven ; and I will make of thee a nation greater and mightier than they; and to be in their room a surrogated people to him, as they by election had been, for else he had not made up a supply ; yet this
people God never did make, nor will make, but could have done. The like
: Luke iii. 8, I say to you, God is able, out of
out of the Baptist s speech
these stones, to raise children unto Abraham.