On The Contrary:
ON THE CONTRARY:
Augustine says that the creator is said relatively to the creature, as lord to servant.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that relation differs from quantity and quality in this that quantity and quality are accidents abiding in a subject, whereas relation, as Boethius says, does not signify something abiding in a subject, but, as it were, in transit towards another. Hence the disciples of Gilbert de la Porre said that relations are not inherent, but assistant, which in a way is true as will be shown later.
Whatever is attributed to something as proceeding towards another is not a component of it, as action is not of the agent. Because of this the Philosopher proves in Physics 5 that there cannot be motion in the category of relation because without any change in that which is referred to another, the relation can cease solely because of a change in the other, as is evident in action, which is motion only metaphorically and improperly. We are said to change when from rest we begin to act, which would not be if relation or action signified something abiding in the subject.
From this it is clear that it is not against the notion of anything’s simplicity that there be many relations between it and others, indeed the more simple the thing, the more relations attend it. For the more simple a thing is the less limited is its power and thus its causality can extend to more. That is why it is said in the Book of Causes that the more a power is unified, the more infinite it is than any multiplied power. Some relation must be understood between a principle and the things that derive from it, not only the relation of origin, according to which the effects arise from the principle, but also the relation of difference, because the effect must be distinguished from the cause, since nothing is cause of itself.
Therefore, it follows on the supreme simplicity of God that infinite relations exist between creatures and him, insofar as he produces creatures different from himself, but in some way like unto him.
Ad 1. It should be said that those relatives are simultaneous in nature which refer to one another for the same reason, such as father and son, lord and servant, double and half. But those relatives in which there is not the same basis of referring on both sides are not by nature simultaneous, but one is naturally prior to the other, as the Philosopher says of sense and the sensible as well as of knowledge and the knowable. Thus it is clear that there is no need for God and creature to be by nature simultaneous, since there is not the same basis for referring on each side. Nor is it necessary even in relatives which are by nature simultaneous that their subjects be naturally simultaneous, but only the relations.
Ad 2. It should be said that not all things related to one another are comparable to one another, but only those whose relation is based on quantity or quality, such that one can be called greater or better, or whiter or something like that. The differences of relations can be referred to one another even when of different genera, for those which are of different genera are different from one another. None the less, although God is not in the same genus as creature, as though contained in a genus, he is, however, in every genus as the principle of the genus, and on this basis there can be a relation between creature and God as between the caused and the cause.
Ad 3. It should be said that it is not necessary for the subjects of relations to be of the same genus, but only the relations themselves, as is evident from this that quantity is said to be different from quiddity. And yet, as has been said, there is not the same notion of God and creatures, as things which are in different genera are in no way co-ordinates of one another.
Ad 4. It should be said that the opposition in relations differs from other oppositions in two ways. First, is that in the others one is said to be opposed to the other insofar as it removes it, for negation removes affirmation, and they are opposed on this basis; the opposition of privation and habit and of contrariety includes the opposition of contradiction, as is said in Metaphysics 4. But this is not the case with relatives: son is not opposed to father as removing him, but because of the basis for the relation to him. And from this the second difference results, because in other opposites there is always the perfect and imperfect, which comes about by reason of the negation which is included in privation and the other contraries. But this is not required in relatives, indeed both can be considered perfect, as is especially evident in symmetrical – aequiparantiae – relations and in relatives of origin, like equal, similar, father and son. Therefore relation and not the other oppositions is attributed to God. By reason of the first difference, the opposition of relation can obtain between creature and God though not any other opposition – since God rather posits than takes away creatures – but there is a relation of creatures to God. By reason of the second difference there is in the divine persons themselves – in which nothing imperfect can exist – the opposition of relation and no other, as will appear later.
Ad 5. It should be said that since coming to be is properly to be changed, it is not found in relation save accidentally, that is, because the thing on which the relation follows has been changed. A body that is changed in quantity becomes equal, not that change as such aims at equality, but is accidentally related to it. But it is not necessary for something new to be said of a relation that some change come about in it, but it suffices that there be a change in one of the extremes, for the cause of the relation between two things is something inherent in both. Hence, from whatever side there be a change in that which caused the relation, the relation between the two is taken away. On this basis, because some change comes about in the creature, a relation in God is said to begin. Hence insofar as something new is said of God, he cannot be said to have changed, sava metaphorically, because he is related to the likeness of the changed thing. ’O Lord, And thus we say, you are made a refuge for us.’ (Psalm 89)
Ad 6. It should be said that when such relations begin to be said of God because of change in the creature, it is obvious that the reason they are said of God is on the side of the creature and they are said accidentally of God. Not that there is any accident in God, as Augustine pointed out, but because of something existing outside himself, which is accidentally compared to him. For the existence of God is not dependent on the creature any more than the existence of the builder is on the house. Hence, just as it is incidental to the [existence of] builder that the house exists, so is it with God and creature. A thing is said to relate accidentally to another, when it can exist without it.
Article 9: Are the relations between creatures and God really in creatures?
It seems that they are not.
1. For there are relations which involve nothing real on either side of the relation, as Avicenna says of the relations between being and non-being. But there is no relation whose extremes are more distant from one another than that between God and creature. Therefore this relation does not involve anything real on either side.
2. Moreover, anything on which an infinite regress follows must be rejected. But if the relation to God be something real in the creature, there will be an infinite regress, for that relation will be something created, if it is a thing, and then there will be another relation of it to God, by parity of reasoning, and so on to infinity. Therefore, we should not say that the relation to God is something real in the creature.
3. Moreover, a thing is related only to one definite thing: double is not with reference to just anything, but to half, and father to son, and so with the rest. Therefore, it is necessary that according to the difference of the things related, there are differences in the things to which they are related. But God is absolutely one being. Therefore, all creatures cannot be related to him by some real relation.
4. Moreover, a creature is referred to God insofar as he proceeds from him; but the creature proceeds from God according to his substance. Therefore, he is referred to God according to his substance and not according to some supervening relation.
5. Moreover, a relation is midway between the extremes of the relation. But nothing can really be between God and the creature which is immediately created by God. Therefore, the relation to God is not something in the creature.
6. Moreover, the Philosopher says that if all appearances were true, things would follow our opinions and sensations. But it is clear that all creatures follow the opinion or knowledge of the creator. Therefore, all creatures refer substantially to God and not by some inherent relation.
7. Moreover, there seems to be less of a relation between greatly distant things, but the distance between the creature and God is greater than that between one creature and another. But the relation of creature to creature is not some thing, as it seems, for since it is not substance, it must be an accident, and thus it is in the subject and cannot be removed without a change of the subject: the contrary of which was said above about relation. Therefore, the relation of creature to God is not some thing.
8. Moreover, just as created being is infinitely distant from non-being, so it is infinitely distant from God. But between created being and pure non-being there is no relation, as Avicenna says. Therefore, there is none between created and uncreated being.
ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Augustine says that what begins to be said of God temporally was not said of him before and manifestly is said of him relatively, not because of any accident in God, as if something happened to him, but plainly because of an accident in the relative to which God begins to be spoken. But an accident is something in the subject. Therefore, the relation to God is something in the creature.
2. Moreover, whatever is referred to something by its own change is really referred to it. But the creature is referred to God by its own change. Therefore, it is really referred to God.