Chapter III (continued, part 4)
existence, the divine intelligence enlightening the night of human understanding, and must be conceived just as much the prime mover of human discursive thought and knowledge, as of his will."146
This brief review of the Grecian philosophy in its relation to theology, shows that in all its forms it was more or less pantheistic. This remark will not be recognized as correct by those, who with Cousin, limit the use of the word Pantheism to designate either the doctrine which makes the material universe God; or that which denies the existence of anything but matter and physical force, which is atheism; nor by those who take the word strictly as meaning the theory which admits of only one substance, which is the substance of God; and which consequently makes matter as much a mode of God's existence as mind. Its correctness, however, will be admitted by those who mean by Pantheism the doctrine which makes all the intelligence in the world the intelligence of God, and all intellectual activity modes of the activity of God, and which necessarily precludes the possibility of human liberty and responsibility.
The authorities on this subject are, so far as Plato and Aristotle are concerned, of course their own writings; with regard to those philosophers whose works are not preserved, or of which only fragments are extant, their systems are more or less fully detailed by the ancient writers, as Plutarch and Cicero. The general reader will find the information he needs in one or more of the numerous histories of philosophy; as those of Brucker, Ritter, Tenneman, and Cousin; among the latest and best of which is Dollinger's "The Gentile and the Jew in the Courts of the Temple of Christ," London, 1862.
D. Mediaeval Pantheism.
The Neo-Platonists.
Pantheism, as it appeared in the Middle Ages, took its form and character from Neo-Platonism. This was an eclectic system in which
the Eleatic doctrine of the unity of all being was combined with the Platonic doctrine concerning the phenomenal universe. The philosophers recognized as the representatives of this school are Plotinus (A. D. 205-270), Porphyry (born A. D. 233), Jamblichus in the fourth century, and Proclus in the fifth. Neo-Platonism was monism. It admitted of only one universal Being. This Being considered in itself was inconceivable and indescribable. It was revealed, or self-manifested in the world-soul, and world-reason, which constituted a trinity; one substance in different aspects or modes of manifestation. The world is therefore "the affluence of God," as fire emits heat. The soul of man is a mode of God's existence, a portion of his substance. Its destiny is absorption in the infinite Being. This was not to be attained by thought, or by meditation, but by ecstasy. This constituted the peculiar feature of the Neo-Platonic school. "Union with God" was to be attained by "a mystical self-destruction of the individual person (Ichheit)" in God.147 Schwegler148 says: "From the introduction of Christianity monism has been the character and the fundamental tendency of the whole modern philosophy." This remark, coming from an advocate of that theory, must be taken with no small amount of allowance. It is, however, true that almost all the great departures from the simplicity of the truth as revealed in the sacred Scriptures, have assumed more or less distinctly a pantheistic tendency.
John Scotus Erigena.
The most pronounced Pantheist among the schoolmen was John Scotus Erigena. Little is known of his origin or history. From his name Scotus and designation Erigena (son of Erin), it has been generally assumed that he was an Irishman. It is known that he enjoyed the protection and patronage of Charles the Bald of France, and that he taught in Paris and perhaps in England.
His principal work is that "De Divisione Naturae." By nature he means all being. The fourfold divisions which he makes of nature, are only so many manifestations or aspects under which the one Being is
revealed or is to be contemplated. Those divisions are: (1.) That which creates and is not created. (2.) That which creates and is created. (3.) That which does not create but is created. (4.) That which neither creates nor is created. "This division of nature," says Ritter,149 "is made simply to show that all is God, since the four natures are only revelations of God."
Scotus agreed with most philosophers in making philosophy and religion identical, and in admitting no higher source of knowledge than human reason. " Conficitur," he says, "veram esse philosophiam veram religionem, conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam."150
The leading principles of his philosophy are the following: (1.) The distinction with him between being and not-being, is not that between something and nothing, between substantial existence and non-existence, but between affirmation and negation. Whatever may be affirmed is; whatever is denied is not. (2.) All being consists in thought. Nothing is but as it exists in the mind and consciousness. (3.) With God, being, thought, and creating are identical. God's being consists in thinking, and his thoughts are things. In other words, the thought of God is the real being of all that is. (4.) Consequently the world is eternal. God and the world are identical. He is the "totum omnium."
His system is, therefore, a form of idealistic Pantheism. Ritter devotes the ninth book of his "Geschichte der Christlichen Philosophie,"151 to the exposition of the philosophy of Scotus. The few following passages from the "De Divisione Naturae," are sufficient to show the correctness of the above statement of his principles.
"Intellectus enim omnium in Deo essentia omnium est. Siquidem id ipsum est Deo cognoscere, priusquam fiunt, quae facit, et facere, quae cognoscit. Cognoscere ergo et facere Dei unum est."152 "Maximus ait: Quodcunque intellectus comprehendere potuerit, id
ipsum fit."153 "Intellectus enim rerum veraciter ipsae res sunt, dicente Sancto Dionysio, 'Cognitio eorum, quae sunt, ea, quae sunt, est.'"154 "Homo est notio quaedam intellectualis in mente divina aeternaliter facta. Verissima et probatissima definitio hominis est ista: et non solum hominis, verum etiam omnium quae in divina sapientia facta sunt."155 Omnis visibilis et invisibilis creatura Theophania, i. e., divina apparitio potest appelari.156 "Num negabis creatorem et creaturam unum esse?"157 "Creation [with Erigena] is nothing else than the Lord of creation; God in some ineffable manner created in the creation."158
Scotus translated the works of the so-called St. Dionysius, the Areopagite, and in so doing prepared the way for that form of mystical Pantheism which prevailed through the Church down to the period of the Reformation. The pseudo-Dionysius was a NeoPlatonist. His object was to give the doctrine of Plotinus a Christian aspect. He adopted the principle of the unity of all being. All creatures are of the essence of God. But instead of placing the selfmanifestation of God in nature, in the world-soul, he placed it principally in the hierarchy of rational being, -- cherubim, seraphim, thrones, principalities, and powers, and souls of men. The destiny of all rational creatures, is reunion with God; and this reunion, as the Neo-Platonists taught, was to be attained by ecstasy and the negation of Self. It was this system, which, in common with all other forms of Pantheism, precluded the idea of sin, which was reproduced by the leading mystics of the Middle Ages, and which, when it found its way among the people as it did with the Beghards and Brethren of the Free Spirit, produced, as substantially the same system has done in India, its legitimate fruits of evil. Of the mystical Pantheism of the Middle Ages, however, enough has already been said in the Introduction, in the chapter on Mysticism
E. Modern Pantheism.
Spinoza.
The revival of Pantheism since the Reformation is principally due to Spinoza; he was born at Amsterdam in 1634, and died at Ghent in the forty-fourth year of his age. He was descended from a wealthy Jewish Portuguese family, and enjoyed the advantage of a highly finished education. He early devoted himself to the study of philosophy, and was at first a disciple of Des Cartes. Leibnitz characterizes the system of Spinoza as Cartesianism run wild. Des Cartes distrusted the testimony of the senses. His starting-point was the consciousness of existence, "I think." In that proposition the existence of a thinking substance is necessarily included. The outward world produces impressions on this thinking substance. But after all, these sensations thus produced, are only states of selfconsciousmiess. Self, therefore, and its varying states, are all of which we have direct knowledge. It is not all, however, that Des Cartes believed actually existed. He was a sincere Catholic, and died in communion with the Church. He acknowledged not only the existence of mind, but also of God and of matter. Our knowledge, however, of God and of matter as substances distinct from our minds, was arrived at by a process of reasoning. The validity of that process Spinoza denied. He admitted the existence of only one substance, and gave such a definition of the word as precluded the possibility of there being more substances than one. With him substance is that which exists of itself, of necessity, and is absolutely independent. There is, therefore, but one substance possible. We come, however, everywhere into contact with two classes of phenomena: those of thought and those of extension. Thought and extension, therefore, are the two attributes of the one infinite substance. Individual things are the modes under which the infinite substance is constantly manifested. In Spinoza's system there are the three radical ideas of substance, attribute, and mode. Of these that of substance alone has any reality. The other two are mere appearances. If we look at anything through a glass colored red the object will appear red; if the glass be blue, the object will appear blue; but the color is not really an attribute of the object. Thus substance (the one) appears to us under one aspect as thought and under another as extension. The difference is apparent and not real. The finite has
therefore no real existence. The universe is sunk into the Infinite; and the Infinite is a substance of which nothing can be affirmed. Of the Infinite nothing can be denied, and therefore nothing can be affirmed for "omnis deter minatio est negatio." The Infinite, therefore, is practically nothing
A sufficient account of modern Pantheism in its general features as represented by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and their successors and disciples, has been given already at the commencement ol this chapter. More detailed information may be found in the numerous recent histories of philosophy, as those of Morell, Schwegler, Michelet, and Rosenkranz, and in Hunt's "History of Pantheism."
F. Conclusion.
The fact that Pantheism has so extensively prevailed in every age and in every part of the world, is a proof of its fascination and power. Apart from a divine revelation, it seems to have been regarded as the most probable solution of the great problem of the universe. Nevertheless it is so unsatisfactory, and does such violence to the laws of our nature, that it has never to any extent taken hold on the hearts of the people. India may be regarded as furnishing an exception to this remark. But even there, although Pantheism was the ground form of the popular religion, it had to resolve itself into polytheism in order to meet the necessities of the people. Men must have a personal god whom they can worship and to whom they can pray.
The most obvious remark to be made of the whole system is that it is a hypothesis. From its very nature it is incapable of proof. It is a mere theory assumed to account for the phenomena of the universe. If it did satisfactorily account for them, and did not contradict the teachings of the Bible, it might be safely admitted. But it is not only inconsistent with all that the Scriptures reveal concerning the nature of God and his relation to the world, but it contradicts the laws of belief which God has impressed on our nature, subverts the very
foundation of religion and morality and involves even the deification of sin.
Had we no divine revelation on the subject, Theism merely as a theory could not fail to secure the assent of every devout mind in preference to Pantheism. Theism supposes the existence of a personal, extramundane God, the creator and preserver of the universe; everywhere present in his wisdom and power, directing all events to the accomplishment of his infinitely wise designs. It supposes the material universe to be distinct from God, dependent on his will, upheld by his power, and pregnant with physical forces ever active under his control. It supposes that man is the creature of God, owing his existence to the will of God, created after his image, a free, rational, moral, and accountable agent, capable of knowing, loving, and worshipping God as a Spirit infinite in his being and perfections. Although this theory may have, for the reason, some problems, such as the origin and prevalence of evil, without a satisfactory solution, yet as it meets and satisfies all the demands of our nature, and solves the problem as to the origin and nature of the universe, it commends itself to the reason, the heart, and the conscience with a force which no sophistry of speculation can resist.
Pantheism, on the other hand, does violence to our nature, and contradicts the intuitive convictions of consciousness.
1. We are conscious that we are free agents. This is a truth which no man can deny with regard to himself, and which every man assumes with regard to others. This truth Pantheism denies. It makes our activity only a form of the activity of God, and assumes that his acts are determined by necessity as much as the development of a plant or animal.
2. It is intuitively certain that there is a real distinction between moral good and evil: that the one is that to which man is bound to be conformed, and the other that which he is bound to hate and to avoid; that the one deserves approbation, and that the other deserves
disapprobation, and merits punishment. These are convictions which belong to the rational nature of man; and they cannot be destroyed without destroying his rationality. Pantheism, however, pronounces these convictions delusions; that there is no such thing as sin, in the sense above stated; that what we call sin is mere weakness; imperfect development, as unavoidable as feebleness in an infant. It goes further: it pronounces evil good. It makes the sinful acts and passions of men as much the acts and states of God as holy acts and holy feelings. There is no good but being; and the men of power are the men of being; and, therefore, the strongest are the best; the weak are to be despised; they deserved to be conquered and trodden under foot. Hence where Pantheism has become a religion the deities who represent evil are the most honoured and worshipped.
3. Pantheism not only destroys the foundation of morals, but it renders all rational religion impossible. Religion supposes a personal Being endowed not only with intelligence and power, but with moral excellence; and to be rational, that Being must be infinite in all his perfections. Pantheism, however, denies that an infinite Being can be a person; that it is intelligent, self-conscious, or possessed of moral attributes. It is just as impossible to worship such a Being as it is to worship the atmosphere, or the law of gravitation, or the axioms of Euclid.
4.It is no extravagance to say that Pantheism is the worst form of atheism. For mere atheism is negative. It neither deifies man nor evil. But Pantheism teaches that man, the human soul, is the highest form in which God exists; and that evil is as much a maniestation of God as good; Satan as the ever-blessed and adorable Redeemer. Beyond this it is impossible for the insanity of wickedness to go.
5. Man, according to this system, is no more immortal than the leaves of the forest, or the waves of the sea. We are transient forms of universal Being.
Our nature is indestructible; as it is impossible that we should not believe in our own individual existence, in our free agency, in our moral obligations; in our dependence and responsibility to a Being capable of knowing what we are and what we do, and of rewarding and punishing as He sees fit, so it is impossible that Pantheism should ever be more than a philosophical speculation, where the moral nature of man has once been developed by the knowiedge of the living and true God.
Endnotes
1. "De l'Homme." Works, edit. Paris, 1793, vol. iii. p.221, note. 2. Introduction to the General History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 169. 3. See First Principles of a New System of Philosophy, by Herbert Spencer. 4. De Natura Deorum, ii. 22, p. 1116, edit. Leipzig, 1850. 5. See Rixner's Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i. sect. 120. 6. See Youman's Conservation and Correlation of Forces, p. 372. 7. Croonian Lectures on Matter and Force. Given at the Royal College of Physicians, in 1868. By Henry Bruce Jones, A.M., M.D., F.R.S., London, 1868, p. 17. 8. Rixner's Geschichte der Philosophie, i. 303-318. Ritter's History of Philosophy, translated by A. J. W. Morrison, iii. 399-447. 9. F. Fabri 10. Leviathan, chap. i. 11. Morell's History of Modern Philosohy, New York, 1848, pp. 71, 72. 12. Observations on Man, chap. i. sect. 2, and Morell, p. 98. 13. Morell, p. 92. 14. Morell, p. 97. 15. Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1806, p. 157. 16. "Address before British Association," Athenaeum, for August 29, 1868. Quoted by Perowne's Hulsean Lectures, for 1868. Appendix. Note A. 17. Page 102.
18. F. Fabri in Herzog's Real-Encyclopadie, art. "Materialismus." 19. New York, 1855. 20. Vol. i. p. 5. 21. Philosophie Positiva, vol. ii. p. 515. 22. Vol. i. p. 11. 23. Vol. ii. p. 47. 24. Ibid. p. 73. 25. See Prof. Porter's Human Intellect, p. 54. 26. Lay Sermons, pp. 174, 175. 27. Huxley's Lay Sermons, Addresses, etc., London, 1870, No. VIII. "The Scientific Aspects of Positivism." p. 178. 28. Philosophie Positive, vol. ii. p. 516. 29. Philosophie Positive, vol. ii. pp. 14, 15. 30. Ibid. vol. ii. p. 268. 31. Lay Sermons, etc., p. 164. 32. Professor Huxley says: "For these sixteen years, it has been a periodical source of irritation to me to find M. Comte put forward as a representative of scientific thought; and to observe that writers whose philosophy had its legitimate parent in Hume, or in themselves, were labelled 'Comtists,' or 'Positives,' by public writers, even in spite of vehement protests to the contrary. It has cost Mr. Mill hard rubbings to get that label off; and I watch Mr. Spencer, as one regards a good man struggling with adversity, still engaged in eluding its adhesiveness, and ready to tear away skin and all, rather than let it stick. My own turn might come next; and, therefore, when an eminent prelate of the other day gave currency and authority to the popular confusion, I took an opportunity of incidentally revindicating Hume's property in the so-called 'New Philosophy' and at the same time of repudiating Comtism on my own behalf." – Ut Supra, p. 165. The mistake complained of as a very natural one, as Comte and Hume have so much in common. Professor Huxley's quotation from Faust is in point here: –
"Ungefahr sagt das der Pfarrer auch Nur mit ein bischen andern Worten."
33. See Correlation and Conservation of Forces. A collection of papers by distinguished scientific men. By Edward l. Youmans, M.D. New York, 1865, p. 405. 34. Ibid. p. 405. 35. See Correlation and Conservation of Forces, p. 411. 36. Ibid. p 413. 37. Ibid. p. 119. Also, New Quarterly Journal of Science for 1864. 38. Youman's, p. 407. 39. Outlines of Physiology, Smith's Philadelphia edition, 1868, p. 932. 40. Youman's, p. 402. 41. "Physical Basis of Life" in his Lay Sermons, p. 158. 42. Lay Sermons, p. 144. 43. Ibid. p. 149. 44. Lay Sermons, p. 151. 45. Ibid. p. 142. 46. Protoplasm; or Life, Matter, and Mind, by Lionel S. Beale, M.B., F.B.S. Second edition, London, 1870, p. 3. 47. Protoplasm, p. 4. 48. Lay Sermons, pp. 151, 152. 49. Lay Sermons, pp. 155, 156. 50. Ibid. p. 157. 51. Ibid. p. 158. 52. Hume, Works, edit. Edinburgh, 1826, iv. p. 193. 53. First Principles, New York, 1869, p. 556. 54. Ibid. p. 211. 55. Ibid. p. 212. 56. Ibid. p. 217. 57. Physiology and Pathology of Mind, Lond. 1868, p. 42. 58. Ibid. p. 43. 59. Evangelischer Glaube. Romischer Irrglaube. Und weltlicher Unglaube. Gotha, 1870. 60. See Berger, I. iii. 5; part i. pp. 264 to 271. 61. As regards Protoplasm in relation to Professor Huxley's Essay on the Physical Basis of Life, by James Hutchison Stirling, F.R.C.S., LL. D. Edit. New Haven, p. 15.
62. See Life, Matter, and Mind, by Lionel S. Beale, M.B., F.R.S., London, 1870, p. 17. Dr. Beale quotes from a paper by Professor Huxley in the first number of the Academy, p. 13. 63. See his Address as President of the British Association, reported in the London Athenaeum, September 17th, 1870. The little that is necessary to say on the subject of spontaneous generation in such a work as this, is reserved until the question concerning the origins of man comes up for consideration. 64. Kraft und Stoff, Zehnte Fluflage, Leipzig, 1869, p. 209. 65. Croonian Lectures, p. 66. 66. Correlation of Vital and Physical Forces, p. 5. 67. As Regards Protoplasm in Relation to Professor Huxley's Essay on the Physical Basis of Life, by James Hutchison Stirling, F.R.C.S., LL. D. Edinburgh, Blackwood & Sons. Republished as one of the Yale University series, p. 39. This is considered to us the best refutation of the theory of the correlation of physical and vital force. 68. As Regards Protoplasm, etc., pp. 41, 42. 69. Ibid. p. 42. 70. Ibid. p. 42. 71. Ibid. p. 43. 72. As regards Protoplasm, etc., pp. 47, 48. 73. See Professor Barker's Lecture, above referred to, for a summary of these arguments, page 24. 74. Athenaeum for August 29, 1868, quoted Hulsean Lectures for 1868; Appendix, Note A. 75. The Recent Progress of Science, with an Examination of the asserted identity of the Mental Powers with Physical Forces. An Address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science. August, 1868. By Frederick A. P. Barnard, S. T. D., LL. D., pp. 41, 42. 76. Paper in the Agricultural Report, 1854-1855, p. 448. 77. Page 441. 78. Protoplasm; or Life, Matter, and Mind. By Lionel S. Beale, M. B., F. R. S. Second Edition. London, J. Churchill & Sons, 1870, Dr. Beale is an authority in the department of Physiology. His book, How to work with the Microscope, has reached a fourth edition.
79. Page 103. 80. Protoplasm, etc., pp. 116, 117. 81. Ibid. p. 16. 82. Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection. A series of Essays. By Alfred Russel Wallace, author of The Malay Archipelago, etc., etc. McMillan & Co., London, 1870, p. 365. 83. Barnard's Address, p. 45. 84. Ibid. p. 49. 85. Barker's Lecture, pp. 26, 27. 86. Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, p. 368. 87. Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, p. 369. 88. Institutiones Theologiae, fifth edit., Halle, 1826, p. 215. 89. Pyschology, by Henry, first edition, p. xviii. 90. History of Philosophy, translated by Wight, N.Y. 1852, p. 78. 91. Ibid. p. 121. 92. Psychology, fourth edition, N.Y. 1856, p. 447. 93. Ethices, v. xl. schol. Jena, 1803, p. 297. 94. Fichte, Von seligen Leben, p. 143, edit. Berlin, 1806. 95. Strauss, Dogmatik i. p. 517. 96. Geschichte der letzen Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland, vol. ii. p. 647. 97. Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, trans. Wight, N.Y. 1854, p. 365. 98. Hunt's Essay on Pantheism, London, 1866, p. 312. 99. Ethices, part ii. prop. Xi. coroll., vol. ii. p. 87, edit. Jena, 1803. 100. Ibid. prop. xlviii. Demon. vol. ii. p. 121. 101. Ibid. Scholium. 102. Elements of Psychology, translated by Henry, N.Y. 1856, p. 429. 103. Princeton Review, 1856, p. 368. 104. Essay on Pantheism, p. 231. 105. Hamilton's Discussions, p. 43. 106. History of Modern Philosophy, N.Y. 1848, p. 660. 107. Hunt, p. 231. 108. Ethices, iv. prop. xx., vol. ii. p. 217, edit. Jena, 1803. 109. Ibid. 110. In the Tubingen Zeitschrift, Drittes Heft, p. 233.
111. Hunt, p. 233. 112. Cousin's History of Modern Philosophy, translated by Wight, New York, 1852, vol. i. pp. 186, 187, 189. 113. Dogmatik, ii. p. 215. 114. Encyklopadie, p. 51. 115. Leo, the historian, we believe. 116. 1836, p. 575. 117. Bischer, quoted in Evangelische Kirchen-Zeitung, 1839, p. 31. 118. Philosophical Fragments, Preface to First Edition. See History of Modern Philosophy, translated by Wight, N.Y. 1852, vol. i. pp. 112. 113. 119. Essays and Lectures chiefly on the Religion of the Hindus, vol. ii. p. 75; edit. London, 1862. 120. A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, so far as it illustrates the Primitive Religion of the Brahmans, pp. 18, 19. 121. History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, etc., p. 23. 122. Ibid. p. 24. 123. Dollinger, The Gentile and the Jew, translated by Darnell, London, 1862, vol. i. p. 250. 124. Ibid. vol. i. p. 252. 125. Histoire Generale de la Philosophie, Paris, 1863, vol. i. p. 107. 126. Historie Generale de la Philosophie, Paris, 1867, vol. i. p. 116; edit. 1863, p. 111. 127. The Gentile and the Jew, vol. i. p. 260. 128. Ibid. vol. i. p. 261. 129. The Gentile and the Jew, vol. i. p. 349. 130. Ibid. pp. 349-350. 131. Ibid. p. 350. 132. The Gentile and the Jew, vol. i. p. 351. 133. Ibid. p. 351. 134. Ibid. p. 307. 135. The Gentile and the Jew, p. 307. 136. The Gentile and the Jew, vol. i. pp. 308 and 309. 137. Ibid. p. 309. 138. Historie Generale de la Philosophie, Paris, 1863, p. 122. 139. The Gentile and the Jew, vol. i. p. 339.
140. Ibid. p. 312. 141. The Gentile and the Jew, p. 329. 142. The Gentile and the Jew, p. 338. 143. Ibid. p. 339. 144. Ibid. p. 340. 145. Ibid. p. 336. 146. Ibid. p. 339 147. History of Philosophy. Translated from the German by Julius H. Seelye, p. 157. 148. Ibid. p. 158. 149. Geshichte der Christlichen Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 224. 150. De Praedest. cap. i. 1, Migne, Patr. vol. cxxii. p. 358, a 151. Vol. iii. pp. 206-296. 152. De Divisione Naturae, II. 20; edit. Westphalia, 1838, p. 118. 153. Ibid. I. 9, p. 9. 154. Ibid. II. 8, p. 95. 155. Ibid. IV. 7, p. 330. 156. Ibid. III. 19, p. 240. 157. Ibid. II. 2, p. 88. 158. Ritter, vol. iii. p. 234.