CHAPTER VII: Natural conscience deficient in that which is necessary to make it really holy
be ashamed, that accuse falsely your good conversation in Christ.'
Therefore a good conscience makes the man good.
2. In reason it is evident. For when anything hath lost that special virtue, which once it had, to effect that which it was ordained for, we say of it that it is not good, which that familiar saying of Christ confirms in the general, 'Salt is good, but if it hath lost its savour' (or virtue of its seasoning and diffusive virtue to season other things), 'it is good for nothing.' Compare Luke 13:34 with Mat. 5:13. Yea, if it might be supposed good for some other inferior purpose than what that native virtue once eminently served for, yet we use to say of a thing in such a case, that it is not good; that is, not answering its kind. Take any drug which hath a cordial virtue: if that virtue be gone, you use to say it is naught, though some weaker or lower effect it may still retain. Take wine when it is soured, or the spirits of it are gone: you say it is naught, that is, as it is wine; it still may make good vinegar, or may serve some other use. A purging drug, when the purgative strength of it is gone, it is not good; though it may have so much left as to stir the humours a little, yet if not enough to carry them away, it is not good, because it wants that virtue it was ordained for, although still a skilful apothecary knows how to make some use of it. Thus conscience, though it retain some weaker acts it had in man in innocency, and which now are common to a man regenerate and unregenerate, yet the special virtue and energy of those acts it then had, and which now in a regenerate man it hath in sanctifying and purifying, being lost and gone, the special proper goodness of it is gone and lost also. It may serve to stir the humours, both the guilt and power of corruption, and it may serve to drive corruption in, but its purging virtue is gone. And though God doth make use of those weak properties that remain, so as to discover sin, or to witness against the sinner, yet the native use is extinct, and so it is not a good conscience.
CHAPTER VII
How a natural conscience, in its highest operations, is deficient in that which is necessary to make it really holy.
Now, to give a demonstration of the deficiency of conscience, in its operations on the heart in all particulars, might be too large; I shall do it but in some few, which shall be fitted to two cases or conditions of men unregenerate, under one of which all such men's conditions will fall, and in either of which it will appear that natural conscience sanctifies not the heart throughout, as regenerating grace doth.
The first case is, that in men unregenerate there are to be found, besides light of conscience, virtues, and impressions on their wills and affections inclining them to good, which the heathens called semina virtutum, seeds of virtues, inclining them unto what the light of conscience doth direct them unto; and in this case will it not be said that it maketh the heart good, or that a goodness of heart doth accompany it?
But 1. None had a universal goodness, no, not in that sphere of moral good, but were deficient in some virtues, whereunto the light of their conscience did direct them. God did never make light of conscience, and moral impressions to virtue, adequate or even in any man, that is, not of like extent, but left it so as in those who naturally or otherwise have had most of moral inclinations in them, yet their consciences have had strong convictions to such duties and actions unto which their wills and affections have had no inclinations stamped on them to correspond therewith, but the contrary inclinations have been left to their full strength. And this God doth to give a ground of discovery unto all men of their natural condition, by letting them see the strength of corrupt inclinations, and their emptiness of good, by some such particulars. This is exemplified both in heathens, Jews, and Christians. The heathens had dispersed among the bulk and multitude of them all seeds of virtues; but so as all were not in each and every man, but one had justice, another
abstinence from pleasures, a third continency. God withal left each of them in their dispositions naked and void in respect of some virtues or other. Thus Socrates was given to the love of boys; and such vile affections is the very instance Paul gives of the wisest of their philosophers (Rom. 1), that so that fatal doom might with condition be pronounced of all and each, which the apostle there recordeth,
'They withheld the truth in unrighteousness.' Their corrupt hearts were too headstrong for their consciences to rule in some particular or other.
I confess, I have sometimes wondered at those high passages I before rehearsed, both concerning their crying up right reason, and also of their professing to live thereto; as being a seeming vindication of them from that which the apostle, Rom. 1, chargeth them withal, viz.,
'imprisoning the truth in unrighteousness' in some things. But in the end I perceived the juggle (for it was truly such); for whilst all cried up this right reason in the general as their rule, and professed to live by it, yet come to the particulars, therein each sect or person would judge this or that to be according to right reason (or nature, as they termed it) as they listed, and' as agreed with their lusts. Diogenes accounted self-pollution, or (as the apostle terms it) 'defiling their bodies' (ἐν ἑαυτοῖς) 'committed alone by themselves,' to be lawful, and according to nature; which the apostle (Rom. 1:24) instanceth in, as one of their philosophical practices. Plato* (the divinest of them) held communion of wives. The like might be said of others. 'Though all men understand what is meant by iron, what by silver, as soon as they hear each named; yet' (says Plato) 'when we use the name of just or good, one is carried to one thing as just and good which another dislikes, and we differ therein amongst ourselves.' Thus he confesseth. And hence, under this general proclaiming the right rule, and magnifying right reason (as all did), so many sects arose amongst them, differing in their judgment of what was just or unjust, morally good or evil, lawful or unlawful, so as every one did surrender the judgment of his reason to his lusts; yea, and made many abominable vices things in their nature indifferent; leges naturæ opiniones suas faciunt: each made his own opinion, and what
they had a mind to, the law of nature and right reason. And then indeed they might well boast (as they did) they lived according to right reason; for wherein their virtues fell short, or their lusts overruled them, they would flatly argue for that to be lawful, or natural, or indifferent, and so blessed themselves in their own deceivings. And, if I mistake not, the apostle had this very thing in his eye when he says, 'They became vain in their reasonings'
(δικλογισμοῖς), 'and their foolish heart was darkened,' Rom. 1:21; and 'professing themselves wise' (so each sect pretend), 'they became fools,' the vainest that ever were, corrupting themselves in what they knew naturally, and making use of corrupt reason in them to defend what natural reason condemned. And so I may make a parallel between the mystery of iniquity among the heathen and that in the popish religion. The pope cries up the Scriptures in general, and professeth to give us religion from thence; but then he, taking on him to be the supreme judge, can and doth give us out from thence what religion he pleaseth, and frameth opinions to his own lusts and ambition; and so did the philosophers, whilst they cried up reason.
2. Both the light of their consciences, and also their highest virtues, when they did most exactly fall on them, did carry them but to the letter, but not to the spiritual part of any virtue. At the best, they are said to do but the things contained in the law (τὰ τοῦ νόμου in the text), even wherein they were a law unto themselves. Observe it, they are not said to keep the law, neither to have the law written in their hearts; whereas of a believer both these are at once affirmed, John
14:21, 'He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, is he that loves me.' First, he is said to have the law truly and genuinely stamped upon his soul; and secondly, out of that principle is said to keep it; whereas these have but the duties, the outward works of it written there, and accordingly do but 'the things of the law.' Or again, they may be said to have the effect of it, as brute beasts are said to have the work or effect of reason, as bees in making their hives, &c.
The works which they do are operæ intelligentiæ, as if reason had done them; but they do them not from a principle of reason. And this difference did Augustine long ago urge and insist on, in his answers
to Pelagius, and Julianus, and the Massilienses, who urged this text, that the light of conscience, and virtues, and good works thence flowing were such as had a true and real goodness in them. But he* distinguished how that in the law commanding, and in every action to he done according to the hw, there were opus, or (as from the Stoics he termed it) officium quod faciendum est, the duty that is to be done; et finis, vel propter quod faciendum, the end for which it is to be done. Which end he still asserts against them, to be not merely the good of any creature, though a public good to the whole world, but the chief end of a good action is God's glory, who himself is the chiefest good and the chiefest end. The officia, the duties, are not the law, but only τὰ τοῦ νόμου, the things of the law; officia legis, as Beza interprets it. But love to God is the end of the law, and the performance of it, 1 Tim. 1:5, and so it is the soul and spirit of it; and when it is not written as the supreme law and sovereign dictate in the conscience, it may be said the law is wanting there.
In heathens nature spoke out, and their highest pitch was to love virtue for virtue's sake, judging and valuing it to be the greatest ornament of their rational souls. They therefore decried all outward respects as unworthy, and too mean to be motives unto virtuous actions; but yet still all their admiration was raised no further but to virtue itself, and virtuous actions for themselves, as the supreme excellency. They never raised virtue to a tendency or subordination to God, and to glorify God, as God, by it; herein they fell short, and therefore short in holiness. For I may safely affirm, that if a.
Christian himself could thus love true grace, and prize it as a supreme excellency, and love goodness only as it is a habit in the soul which makes us good, this would not be holiness. For in so doing, a man would value it only as a particular good unto his own soul, which is but a small piece of the creation of God. And the mind, in so doing, would but glory and centre still in itself (as well as in valuing riches or honours), and not in the Lord; for there is the same reason in either.
The second case is this, that to the Jews and us Christians, there are, by the revelation of the law and will of God, many duties of God's worship (as prayers, meditation, holy conference, and reading the word) whereunto there are small, if any, moral inclinations stamped upon men's wills to assist them in thorn, or facilitate these unto them; and therefore conscience, calling upon the heart for such duties as these, is forced to raise the tax or levy of them, by calling in foreign assistance and aid. And for a supply of natural strength and inclination unto duties of this kind, it is reduced to such motives of the law as are fitted to stir self-love in the affections; as fear of hell,
&c. And this is also the case of temporary believers under the gospel.
Now in this case it doth yet more evidently appear that the light of natural conscience doth not sanctify the heart throughout, as grace in a regenerate man in some measure doth.
1. Natural conscience puts a necessity upon the performance of a duty, saith and urgeth that it ought and must be done; but it puts no inward freedom and willingness into the will to the performance of it, as grace doth. For grace makes a man willing, as conscience makes the duty necessary. It puts an inclination, 'a spirit of liberty and freedom; a free spirit, an ingenuous spirit,' as David calls it, Ps. 51:12.
And therefore Paul opposeth (Gal. 5:18) the working of the spirit of the law, or of conscience by the law, in these words, 'If you be led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law,' and so è contra. Now, to be led by the Spirit is to have the will ready to follow God in everything; to have the will easily carried on to a duty, for leading implies readiness of following: Isa. 11:6, 'A child shall lead them;' that is, a little thing may persuade them.
If it be objected, that conscience carried on the will to do duties, for else they would not be done, I answer; There is a willingness which is intrinsecal and direct, and per se, when a man hath a mind and will to a thing for itself; and there is a made willingness, which is par accidens, which is a comparative willingness. There is no man so averse to anything but
may be thus made willing, that is, comparatively, and per accidens willing. The most covetous man in the world, that loves money never so much, may be made willing to part with it, and glad to do so, if it concerns his life to do it; or if a great necessity of bonds, or going to prison, be laid on him, which is indeed 'a constraint,' and so Peter terms it (1 Peter 5:2) and opposeth it to 'willingly.' But a godly man hath a ready mind to whatever is good, in the principle of his heart, and often good duties come off at the first motion, 'To will is present with me,' Rom. 7:18. Or if flesh lie uppermost, and so there is an averseness in the entrance, yet when God and his heart have closed in the duty and grown familiar, he finds his whole heart to be in it.
Now, the reason of an unregenerate man's unwillingness unto such holy duties lies in this, that they are appointed, and the tendency of them is, to bring God and their hearts together, which indeed is to bring two enemies together, for such are their hearts and God. And the reason of a regenerate man's willingness is, that in the duty two friends meet together, God who hath from everlasting owned that soul, and the soul that hath chosen God to be his God.
2. Natural conscience gives light and enforcements from legal motives to the duty, but it gives no new inward strength. And the reason is clear; for natural conscience carries a man on but upon the strength of the covenant of works. Now, 'the law is weak' (says the apostle, Rom. 8) as to any such effect. Urgency of conscience is but as if a man should come to one that is lame, and his joints frozen and stiff, with a light in one hand and a cudgel in the other, and waken him, and jog him, and tell him, Here is light for you to walk by, and there are blows if you will not. Or it is as if one should ride a tired horse; there is a bridle to direct, and a spur to put him on, but the rider giveth no strength for the horse to travel with. Natural conscience in its government is tyrannical, and, like the taskmasters of Egypt, requires bricks to be made, and beats men if not, but gives them no straw. But grace adds another principle to conscience, and that is, faith and the new creature. Faith fetcheth life, and quickening, and strength from Christ, both habitual strength, which
is called 'strength in the inward man,' and co-operating strength. 'I am able' (says the apostle) 'to do all things, through Christ that strengtheneth me.' The spirit of adoption not only puts us on to pray, but 'helpeth our infirmities,' Rom. 8:26, which is spoken in opposition to the spirit of bondage. The Holy Ghost comes and fills the soul with arguments and motions and inclinations to pray, insomuch as the soul is like a full breast till it be drawn, or a pregnant womb till it be delivered of what is formed in it. And the soul rests not till it hath gone alone, and poured forth itself to God.
Conscience indeed wakens the old man so, as lie makes him bestir himself and his lazy stiff joints, and so to mend his pace in duties, bat still it gives no strength, so as it is extrinsecal enforcement and instigation only, and not inward strength, which conscience doth afford.
3. Natural conscience cannot sweeten the law to a man, and cause him to 'delight in it,' and the duties of it, as a regenerate man is said to do (Rom. 7), for if it gives not suitable strength and will, it cannot give delight; for delight follows these, whilst forced extrinsecal motives carry us on, and there is a grievance in the motion, for fear is an affection which hath grief in it (1 John 4:18); and thus though they (Mal. 1:13) brought but the lame and the lean sacrifices, yet they grudge at it, and said 'what weariness is in it?' They were weary of doing anything for God, but love sweetens all to a man: 'This is the love of God, that his commandments are not grievous,' 1 John 5:3.
Now it is a certain rule, that as natural conscience works by fear, so faith works by love, and love sweetens the law to a man. Conscience may bring a sick man meat, but it must be the inward constitution of a sound mind that tastes the sweetness of meat.
4. Lastly, As thus its weakness is seen in holy duties, so in regard of sin also, it is not able to condemn sin in the flesh. Of the law it is spoken, Rom. 8:3, that it discovers sin, but kills it not; it hath power to kill the man for sin, and to condemn him, 2 Cor. 3:6, but not to kill sin in the man (as the phrase is, Rom. 8:4). As the law came into the world, that sin might be imputed, that is, known and discovered, but
not destroyed, so light of conscience hath no farther power. Like flashes of lightning, it on the sudden discovers, but expels not the darkness, yea, often leaves the soul the more in the dark; yea, which is more, it enrageth some lusts the more, and that whilst it restrains the outward acts. So Paul, who had a strong work of the law (through conscience) upon him, says (Rom. 7) that 'the law wrought all concupiscence in him.' As a horse that is reined grows the more fierce; as the winds that go to blow out the fire spreads it more; as the water in lime makes it burn within the more; so the light of conscience makes lust inwardly the hotter and more violent: therefore those are more eager in sinning that have most knowledge.
It is true indeed, violent terrors of conscience upon a man, when the guilt of sin in its turn comes to take the dominion and to reign
(which is but an after part of the dominion of the law over a man), will restrain men from sinning; but yet the ordinary light of it, though it restrains the acts, yet increaseth the lust, and so doth more hurt one way than good another.
Use. Let us then mind the main and primary scope and extent of conscience's commission, and God's primary end in putting the light of it into men, which is the same with that of the law, as the power of it and the effect of it is the same. Now the law was sent that man's sinfulness might be discovered, and he convinced of it, to see his weakness and the power of sin, and his utter averseness to good and proneness to evil; that so men, despairing of being saved by the effects of it, or their conformity to it, might seek help in Christ, and work anew from him, Gal. 3:15, 16, 17, 18. And if this use be not made of it, then God hath ordained it for another use, to convince and condemn men by it at the latter day, and leave them without excuse; which use the apostle speaks of, Rom. 1. And God will make use of the light of natural conscience even to condemn the strictest heathen.
What a great mistake is it then utterly to pervert this use and extent both of God and it, and to deem this light of the law and of conscience, and of the work of it, to be grace itself? Oh! that ever men should thus abuse the very witness God hath appointed to