Chapter II
Chapter II T he abstract notion of theology — In what sense the scholastics contend that it is a science — Their opinion rejected — The apostle proves that theology is alien to all human knowledge, 1 Cor. 2 — μυέω [to initiate], μυστήριον [mystery], τελειόω [to consecrate], τέλειος [perfect/initiated], τέλη [mysteries] — Who is a Pauline theologian — The fruitless labour of the many in forcing theology into the rules of human arts and sciences — The foolishness and ἀμαθία [ignorance] of the scholastics.
I. There is no reason for us to delay over those discussions which are agitated among the many concerning the abstract and, as they say, artificial notion of theology, since they do not appear to pertain to an exposition of its nature. For whether it is an art or a science; and if it is to be called a science, whether it is theoretical or practical, or rather a mixture of both; what its proper and immediate object is; what its genus, what its difference, what its end — and very many other entirely frivolous questions of this kind — theologians of every sort have disputed variously and subtly, mixing the philosophy of Aristotle's school with the simplicity of
Christianity: by their manner of understanding, they manage to understand nothing. For since Aristotle made mention of θεολογικῆς ἐπιστήμης
[theological knowledge] and taught that it is the most excellent of τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν [the theoretical sciences], the scholastics — especially those for whom Thomas stands next to God — to whom it was a kind of impiety to dissent from him, contended that Christian theology is a science, and a speculative one at that. That the name of "art" ought to be banished from this business is at last the consensus of all. It remains to be seen what the definitions of the sciences — by which, of course, whatever a science is is variously declared according to each person's pleasure — have in common with theology. Since the things themselves, namely the arts and sciences, and their descriptions and definitions, are uncertain and arbitrary, fashioned in different ways according to the different capacities of certain men; and since there is no habit of mind, whether theoretical or practical, which is an ἐκτύπωμα [impression] of some art (since every science, as Plato testifies in the Epinomis appended to the Laws, is μιμητικὴ τὸ πλεῖστον [for the most part imitative], that is, an imitation of things themselves) or of some science, which can represent the matter we are treating of — all labour and ingenuity will be wasted in attempting to bring these such varied things into order. Furthermore, concerning the sciences τῷχνηταῖς [technical/according to the rules of the craft] so-called in the strict sense — which regard conclusions derived from better-known principles and receive their designation from their proper objects — attention is given either to the doctrine itself by which the matters they treat are systematically arranged, or to the mental faculty or habit by which we comprehend that doctrine. Now, between a doctrine which always rests upon certain foundations and theorems that are not merely consonant with
human reason but also kindred to it — as every science is — and a mystery surpassing all purely ψυχικόν [soulish] or natural comprehension, there can be no communion. For it is the πρόληψις [common presupposition] of all that God cannot be rightly known except through God. The scientific habit, as they call it, is the conformity of the mind to a doctrine of this kind, arising from the disciplined reflux of kindred principles; so that it cannot express that divine power of mind which theology is, and which rests upon the truthfulness of the one who reveals. Moreover, since the object of theology is in some sense God himself, it is infinitely more distant from the objects of all sciences than those sciences are from bare nothingness; so far is it from being the case that theology could, in any respect, share anything in common with the other arts or sciences.
II. The apostle also, in that passage where he treats these matters deliberately and expressly, renders the character of Christian theology alien to all human wisdom and science in the plainest manner: ̔Ο λόγος μου, he says, καὶ τὸ κήρυγμά μου [my word and my preaching] — that is, both the knowledge and the doctrine — οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖς (or πειστοῖς or πιθανοῖς) ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας λόγοις [not in persuasive words of human wisdom] (in which all human art or science so called consists), ἀλλ' ἐν ἀποδείξει
Πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως [but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power] — (ἓν διὰ δυοῦν [one idea through two words]) — (for just as mathematicians have their ἀποδείξεις [demonstrations] and dialecticians have theirs, so also our doctrine consists ἐν ἀποδείξει [in demonstration], but of a spiritual and powerful kind, which stands as far from those ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας [of human wisdom] ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ' ἀπὸ γαίας [as heaven is from earth]). Then he adds the reason and the end of this distinction: ̔́́Ινα, he says, ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν [that your faith] (or the assent given
to our doctrine) μὴ ᾖ ἐν σοφίᾳ ἀνθρώπων [should not be in the wisdom of men] (as it would be if theology consisted of the same or similar principles, form, or end as the arts and sciences of the philosophers), ἀλλ' ἐν δυνάμει
Θεοῦ [but in the power of God] (effectively working this wisdom through his Spirit). Σοφίαν δὲ λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· σοφίαν δὲ οὐ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου [But we speak wisdom among the perfect — wisdom not of this age] (not a wisdom which has proceeded from human learning): ἀλλὰ λαλοῦμεν σοφίαν Θεοῦ ἐν μυστηρίῳ ἀποκεκρυμμένην [but we speak the wisdom of God hidden in a mystery] (and what agreement can there be between the μυστηριώδης [mysterious] wisdom of God and any human disciplines? That wisdom, however,) ἡμῖν ὁ Θεὸς ἀπεκάλυψε διὰ τοῦ
Πνεύματος αὐτοῦ [God has revealed to us through his Spirit] (human wisdom teaches these things in various ways) — 1 Cor. 2:4, 5, 6, 10.
Whether, therefore, you regard the origin, the subject, the end, the manner of learning and teaching, or finally the entire nature and use of theology, it is evident that it can in no way be numbered among the human sciences, whether speculative or practical, in such a manner as to be bound by their rules or methods. Indeed, the very terms μέθοδος [method], μεθοδεύειν [to proceed methodically], τέχνη [art], which are οἰκεῖα [proper] to the sciences, have no place here according to Scripture. μυέω [to initiate] and, derived from it, μυστήριον [mystery] — of which the apostle treats in the most sacred sense — consistently denote among the pagans themselves something sufficiently alien from all other sciences: it is a mystery. Μυέω is to initiate, or to instruct in sacred rites; and μυοῦμαι in the passive.
Somewhat differently but to the same effect, the author of the Etymologicum Magnum: Μύστης, he says, παρὰ τὸ μύω, τὸ καμμύω· μύοντες γὰρ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἔξω τῶν σαρκικῶν φροντίδων γινόμενοι,
οὕτω τὰς θείας ἀναλάμψεις ἐδέχοντο [The word "mystes" derives from "myo," meaning "to close the eyes"; for by closing the senses and becoming free from fleshly concerns, they thus received the divine illuminations] — as if in ecstasy they received divine irradiations. And Jamblichus, as cited by Photius, Codex 94, says that τὰ μυστήρια [the mysteries] are derived ἀπὸ τῶν μυῶν [from the initiated], but foolishly, as the reasoning of the etymology he offers makes plain.
III. Laërtius affirms concerning Pythagoras, instructed as he was in the wisdom of nearly all nations, that πάσας ἐμυήθη τάς τε Ἑλληνικὰς, καὶ βαρβαρικὰς τελετάς [he was initiated into all the sacred rites, both of the Greeks and the barbarians]. For that wisdom which those ancient philosophers went out to seek in their travels was nothing other than the rational understanding of the worship of religions, as Lactantius testifies; "I am accustomed to wonder," he says, "that although Pythagoras and afterwards Plato, out of love for investigating truth, penetrated as far as the Egyptians, the Magi, and the Persians in order to learn the rites and sacred customs of those peoples (for they suspected that wisdom resided in religion), they nevertheless did not approach the Jews," On True Wisdom,
Bk. IV. Hence, when Apollonius wished to be μυεῖσθαι [initiated] at Athens, ὁ ἱεροφάντης οὐκ ἐβούλετο παρέχειν τὰ ἱερά· μὴ γὰρ ἄν ποτε μυῆσαι γόητα, μηδὲ τὴν Ἐλευσίνα ἀνοῖξαι ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ καθαρῷ τὰ δαιμόνια [the presider over the sacred rites was unwilling to admit him to them; for he would never initiate a sorcerer, nor open Eleusis to a man who was not pure from daemons] — Philostratus, Life of Apollonius, Bk. IV, ch.
6. Μυεῖσθαι is therefore to be instructed in sacred rites, which is made yet more plain from Apollonius' reply: Περὶ τῆς τελετῆς, he says, πλεῖον ἢ σὺ γιγνώσκω [Concerning the sacred mysteries, I know more than you]. And
among the Fathers, as Budaeus testifies, μεμυημένος [one who has been initiated], by itself and without addition, signifies one who is learned in the sacred scriptures. Chrysostom says that μυστήριον [mystery] in Paul denotes τὸ ἀπόρρητον, καὶ θαυμαστὸν, καὶ ἀγνοούμενον [that which is secret, wonderful, and unknown] — that is, by nature: others say it denotes things secret and known to few, not to be communicated except to the initiated — that is, Σοφίαν λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις [we speak wisdom among the perfect].
IV. Not as though our sacred things were secrets which it were unlawful to set forth except after some oath and pledge of silence had first been given
— since Christ took care that all things, even the most μυστηριότατα [deeply mysterious] which he himself taught privately in accordance with the manner of his ministry, should be publicly proclaimed ἐν τῷ φωτί, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δωμάτων [in the light and upon the housetops] before men, Matt.
10:27.
V. Among the ancient pagans, it was indeed a sin to disclose mysteries to the common people: "They do not think it lawful to commit to writing what they teach concerning sacred things," says Caesar of the Druids, Gallic
War, Bk. VI. For this reason, those to be initiated were everywhere bound by oath not to divulge anything. Hence Herodotus, concerning himself, after he had learned the Egyptian sacred rites from the people of Heliopolis: Τὰ μέν νυν θεῖα τῶν ἀπηγημάτων, οἷα ἤκουον, οὐκ εἰμὶ πρόθυμος ἐξηγέεσθαι, ἔξω ἢ τὰ οὐνόματα αὐτέων μοῦνον· νομίζων πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἴσον περὶ αὐτέων ἐπίστασθαι [The divine matters of the narratives, such as I heard them, I am not inclined to set forth, except only their names, since I consider that all men know equally concerning them],
Bk. II — that is, "But those things which they narrated to me pertaining to
the gods, I am unwilling to commit to writing, since I consider that all men"
(namely, the initiated) "know the same things concerning them." The evangelical doctrine was not designated by the name of mystery for any such reason, but because the things themselves revealed in it exceed all purely human and natural comprehension, 1 Cor. 2:7, 14.
VI. In order that one may receive and understand σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ ἀποκεκρυμμένην [the wisdom hidden in a mystery], it is necessary that he himself be μεμυημένος [initiated] — that is, instructed in the secrets of the divine will through the Holy Spirit. And no others are τέλειοι [perfect] in Paul's usage than the initiated — that is, those instructed by the Holy Spirit of whom he treats. For τελειόω [to perfect] is to consecrate and to initiate; hence, among the ancients, baptism is also called τελειώτης [the initiating rite]. The Septuagint uses it for consecration or dedication in Exod. 29:
Τελειώσαι τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῶν [to consecrate their hands], vv. 33 and 35; and it appears that the word ought to be expounded in no other way in the Epistle to the Hebrews 2:10: Τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τῆς σωτηρίας διὰ παθημάτων τελειώσαι [to perfect the author of salvation through sufferings]. And also τέλη [ends/rites] are mysteries, as Budaeus demonstrates from Plato; and τελεταί [sacred rites] are sacred observances of every kind; and τετελεσμένοι [the perfected] are the initiated and those purified by sacrifice, in Philostratus, Life of Apollonius, Bk. IV, ch. 6. He, therefore, who is τέλειος [perfect] — that is, instructed by the Spirit through whom we are initiated into the Christian sacred rites — and μεμυημένος [initiated] by him who alone discloses to us τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ [the mystery of his will], and that through πνεῦμα σοφίας καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως [a spirit of wisdom and revelation], Eph. 1:9, 17 — he is the Pauline theologian.
Something will be said later about the use of the arts and sciences in
learning divine truth. In the meantime, it did not escape even the pagans themselves that theology is a certain μυστηριώδης [mysterious] and divine wisdom, and is not to be circumscribed by those terms or conveyed by those rules within whose barriers all the arts and sciences are confined.
And perhaps it is for no other reason that those who have spent much labour on this matter — in describing theology ἀκριβῶς [precisely] according to the rules and methods of the other sciences — have, in their opinions concerning its definition, genus, differences, proper object, subject, immediate end, and very many other such matters (concerning which holy Scripture says not so much as a γρύ [grunt]), come apart from one another to the most remote distances and engage in remarkable combat.
For while they strive to render the mystery of divine truth — revealed from the bosom of God — something hewn and shaped to fit the pliant and arbitrary rules of human arts and sciences, and to impede it with I know not what philosophical terms (without which, and without whose aid and support, all truth both natural and supernatural could very happily have done, had it not seemed otherwise to Aristotle) with which it refuses to have any communion, they effect nothing other than this: that a matter most certain, most evident, and most accessible to the rational mind in itself and by its own nature, becomes most uncertain, ambiguous, manifold, and obscure. Learned men indeed, relying on divine revelation in holy Scripture in the place of innate principles, have — in a progress not unlike that of the other sciences, with some discovering something and others adding to their discoveries with less effort — constructed a certain doctrine, comprising principles, theorems, theses, and conclusions after the pattern of the other sciences, which they call theology. But that doctrine, since it possesses neither αὐτοπιστία [self-evidencing authority] as such, nor requires
supernatural faith in order to be received, nor attains any end of theology either theoretically or practically, is not theology in the proper sense. From the investigation of this doctrine, a certain habit of mind is acquired, consonant with the impression received from it, which the scholastics contend is neither faith nor natural knowledge. And this is the theology of the schools, of whose nature and use more will be said below. Let us therefore dismiss those innumerable and laborious disputations, which, if truth be told, are not worth purchasing at the price of a trifle — if only we are willing to permit theology to enjoy that freedom with which holy
Scripture has claimed her with a liberal hand.
VII. Whatever terms it has pleased the Holy Spirit to employ in setting forth this matter, the scholastics have rendered every one of them more than sufficiently vexed by their disputations. It is agreed that Scripture calls that knowledge — which directs men in the contemplation of God and his works, and in the obedience to be rendered to him — by the names of science, prudence, wisdom, and doctrine; and also that knowledge of himself with which God wishes to imbue us. Hence, seized by the itch for disputation, they contend persistently — as has been said — whether theology is a science, and a speculative or a practical one, or prudence, or wisdom. And whatever term they decide to subject to examination, they all immediately weigh its philosophical characteristics and subtly inquire whether it can be fitted to theology. Those who maintain that theology is wisdom — so that from this one instance the entire labour of these men may be assessed — consider it their business, having fished out everything that is attributed to human wisdom in the writings of the philosophers, to show that all of it fits appropriately into theology. Now, when they imagine they have accomplished this work, whatever it amounts to, through long
digressions, subtle fabrications, and conclusions of the most reckless ineptitude — as though the matter were well settled and the opinions of all others, and especially those who lead or follow a different school, had been routed — they conclude that theology is wisdom.
And so, being most profoundly ignorant of the mind of the Holy Spirit in those terms — science, prudence, wisdom, doctrine, and the rest of that kind — they strain all the sinews and eyes of their intellect (as most of them are ingeniously stupid) in order to change the wisdom of God hidden in a mystery into that miserable, imperfect, indeed foolish wisdom of this world, and to circumscribe it within I know not what limits — a fiction than which nothing more dangerous or more diametrically opposed to apostolic doctrine could ever have been devised. Those thorny scholastic and other controversies, therefore, which they lay as a foretract before their theological treatises — fixing a cross upon their wretched readers who would not wish to spend their study in vain, or indeed to wander — the candidates for sacred wisdom ought to despise; since the very truth that must be sought out from them at infinite labour, by reason of the ἀλλογενία
[alien character] of the subject proposed, is not the true theology.