Chapter 4 of 11

God’s Will to Save Sinners

God’s Will to Save Sinners

God’s Will to Save Sinners

Both Old and New Testament scriptures reveal that God wills to save all men. In the Old Testament, God reveals through Ezechiel, “Is it my will that a sinner should die, saith the Lord God, and not that he should be converted from his ways, and live? … For I desire not the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God, return ye and live” (18:23, 32). God also says, “Say to them: As I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways: and why will you die, O house of Israel?” (33:11). The Book of Wisdom also says, “For God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living” (13:1).

In the New Testament, Jesus says that “it is not the will of your Father, who is in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish” (Matt. 18:14). St.Paul also says, “For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim. 2:3-4). St. Peter further says, “The Lord delayeth not his promise, as some imagine, but dealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance” (2 Pet. 3:9).

Although Scripture asserts very strongly that God wills all men to be saved, Scripture also says that no one can resist God’s will. As we have seen in Romans 9, St. Paul says, “Thou wilt say therefore to me: Why doth he then find fault? For who resisteth his will?” (v. 19). In the Book of Esther, Mardochai prays, “O Lord, Lord, almighty king, for all things are in thy power, and there is none that can resist thy will, if thou determine to save Israel” (Esth. 13:9). He further says, “Thou art Lord of all, and there is none that can resist thy majesty (Esth. 13:11). The Book of Proverbs also says, “As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever he will he shall turn it” (21:1).

These scriptures present us with an obvious dilemma: If God wills all men to be saved, and no one resists God’s will, then why isn’t everyone saved? Why do some people go to hell? Isn’t this a contradiction? Does God fail in His effort to save? Protestants have very different ways of addressing this issue. Calvinists try to resolve this dilemma by saying that God’s will to save “all men” really means all kinds of men, but not every single person who ever lived. Because Christ’s atonement is perfectly efficacious but not all people are saved, Calvinists also believe that Christ died only for the elect, but not for all people. With this position, the Calvinist wishes to show that God has the final decision regarding salvation and damnation, and is not determined by man’s decisions. This position preserves God’s complete sovereignty over man in His plan of unconditional election.

Arminians, on the other hand, say that God’s will to save “all men” really means all men, not just the elect—thereby upholding the plain meaning of Scripture and God’s universal will to save all. Since all men are not saved, however, Arminians conclude that God leaves the ultimate decision to man, based upon man’s free-will response to grace. This position preserves the Arminian view of conditional election based on God’s evaluation of foreseen future merits. Calvinists argue that the Arminian position denies God’s sovereignty by making God determined by man, and His salvation plan a failure (because Christ will have died for those who go to hell). Arminians argue that Calvinism denies man’s free will and makes God a tyrannical despot because He reprobates man without giving him a chance to respond to His grace. We will look at both of these positions in greater detail later, in chapters 4 and 5.

What does the Catholic Church say? In her typically balanced fashion, the Catholic Church holds that God’s universal will to save all men and His divine election to save some men are both true. That is, Christ’s atoning death was sufficient for all, but only efficacious for some, according to the eternal will of God. This means that God’s will is achieved (not frustrated or resisted) through His eternal decree and the free-will acts of man. This position holds in perfect balance God’s complete sovereignty over His plan of salvation and man’s free-will actions within the divine plan. God’s sovereignty and irresistible will include man’s free-will actions, because God’s providence governs all things as He orders all things to their final end.

St. Thomas Aquinas provides us with the best methodology for reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable truths of God’s sovereignty and human free will. Based on Scripture and the teachings of the Church, St. Thomas explains that God has an antecedent will and a consequent will.1 In his antecedent will, God wills to save all men (consistent with Scripture). In his consequent will, God wills to save only the elect and to permit the non-elect to be damned (also consistent with Scripture).2 God provides for both outcomes for the greater good of His entire creation according to His “wills.” As Scripture says, “Great are the works of the Lord: sought out according to all his wills” (Ps. 110:2). Let us explore this profound distinction in greater detail. In doing so, it is necessary to quote from St. Thomas at some length.

THE ANTECEDENT AND CONSEQUENT WILLS

St. Thomas teaches that God’s antecedent will concerns what He wills for a thing in isolation, before any other considerations. Thus, when God considers each individual absolutely, without regard to the totality of His predestination plan, He antecedently wills the person’s salvation. In His antecedent will, God considers only the individual parts of His plan (a single person) and not the entire plan (all people). This understanding can be applied to St. Paul’s statement that God wills “all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim. 2:4).

However, unlike truth, which is the object of the intellect, goodness is the object of the will. For human beings, the intellect moves the will to the good only after it considers all of the accompanying circumstances. Good is not formally in the mind but in things as they actually exist.3 This means that our will is directed to the good as it currently is, according to the whole of reality. St.Thomas explains:

A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good;that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged … Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently.4

Thus, the judge doesn’t evaluate the murderer as an individual absolutely. Rather, he judges the murderer in light of all the people that he has killed, and could continue to kill, if he were not hanged. In other words, the judge considers his decision in light of the effect on the whole. This analogy helps us understand predestination. Even though humans respond to goodness, and God actually creates goodness, God wills His decrees to produce the best goodness as a whole, not in the individual parts. St. Thomas explains:

It is the part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole, according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each single creature best, but one better than another.5

Because God’s will is the cause of goodness in things and some things are better than others, it necessarily follows that God wills different grades of goodness in His universe. God wills this variety of goodness in His universe because it is befitting for the Supreme Good to communicate His goodness to the greatest extent possible. St. Thomas says, “Hence, if natural things, insofar as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible.”6 This is achieved by a diversity of created goodness, for if God created all things with the same grade of goodness, He would not be communicating His goodness to the greatest extent. For example, the existence of one type of flower is good, but the existence of many types is a greater good. Further, the diversity of colors in roses, for example (red, pink, white, yellow), is a greater good than if roses were only red. St. Thomas elaborates on this cosmological principle:

Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided; and hence the whole universe together participates [in] the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.7

Because God creates different grades of goodness in His universe to communicate His goodness in the greatest measure, it follows that God is the cause of the inequality of creatures. This inequality reveals the manifold goodness of God. Again, St. Thomas explains:

Hence in natural things species seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more perfect than others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so is it the cause of inequality. For the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things.8

St.Thomas also says that “the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in of the more perfect alongside the less perfect” (310) and “God created the world to show forth and communicate his glory” (319). things,”9 and that “each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe.”10

The inequality that God wills in creatures includes not only different grades of goodness, but also that some things fail in their goodness. This, too, God wills for the perfection of the universe. St. Thomas says:

Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible. As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness.11

God wills to permit things to fail in their goodness—and thus evil to result—to manifest His goodness to the greatest extent possible. If God did not permit evil in the universe, then much good would not exist. St. Thomas remarks, “Hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.”12 In another article, he similarly says, “[I]t belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution.”13

As we stated, these cosmological principles apply to divine predilection and God’s plan of predestination. God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, and no one thing would be better than another unless it were loved more by God. Because God created man in love, He wills all men some good. But in order to communicate His goodness to the greatest extent, God wills different grades of goodness in men. St. Paul reveals this diversity when he says, “But to every one of us is given grace, according to the measure of the giving of Christ” (Eph.4:7); “Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit; And there are diversities of ministries, but the same Lord; And there are diversities of operations, but the same God, who worketh all in all” (1 Cor. 12:4-6).

These different grades of goodness, whether in grace or ministries or operations, mean that some men achieve their goodness (the elect) and other men fail in their goodness (the reprobate). Through this diversity of goodness, the perfection of the universe is achieved. This is why St. Thomas says, “Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe.”14 He also says, “But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe requires … that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail.”15 He similarly says, “That which is the greatest good in the things that are caused by [by God] is the good order of the universe … So the good of the order of things … is that which is chiefly willed and caused by God … Therefore that which God cares for most greatly in created things is the order of the universe.”16 With incredible clarity and simplicity, St. Thomas further explains these principles:

Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God’s goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen … Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those who He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom He reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others.17

Thus, to communicate His goodness to the greatest extent, God wills to manifest both His mercy and His justice (and not His mercy alone). In His mercy, He saves. In His justice, He punishes. Jacob He loves, but Esau He hates (see Rom. 9:13). He has mercy on whom He will, and He hardens whom He will (see Rom. 9:18). If God were merciful only, He would not communicate the good of His justice, for both mercy and justice are good. If God did not permit evil, then the universe would be deprived of the good of God’s avenging justice. The universe would be lacking good. This is why St. Thomas says, “The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God.”18

In fact, God “endures the vessels of wrath” precisely so that he might show to all creation “the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy” (see Rom.9:22-23). God allows the reprobate to fall away so that the elect “may be unto the praise of his glory” (Eph.1:12). God’s goodness and glory are more greatly manifested when He not only saves the elect in His mercy, but also when He condemns the reprobate in His justice.St.Thomas says, “God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts.”19 Both predestination and reprobation are for the greater glory of God, who orders all things to their final end.

Fr. Most rejects the Thomist position that God permits some men to fall away for the perfection of the universe. He points to St.Thomas’s teaching that “the final perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the consummation of the world.”20 Although Fr. Most is correct to say that the final perfection of the universe is the beatitude of the saints, the diversity of creatures (the first perfection) exists precisely for the saints’ beatitude (the final perfection). They are not disconnected, but connected. As St.Thomas says, the reprobate “seem to be preordained by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard all things work together unto good (Rom. 8:28).”21 St. Thomas also says that God “extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked.”22 Thus, in God’s plan of predestination, the reprobation of some is preordained for the good of the elect, and this for the greater good of the whole.

Thus, the saints’ perfection in beatitude is derived from the diversity of creatures, just as a building’s perfection is derived from the diversity of its component parts: “For just as an architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning, to secure perfection of the universe, has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without injustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed.”23 In other words, the diversity of the means (graces/stones) is intended to bring about the perfection of the end (beatitude/building). This is not to say that God wills the reprobates’ damnation like He wills the elect’s salvation. He doesn’t; He only permits it. Nevertheless, because God in His providence orders all things to their end, He uses the free-will decisions of the reprobate to achieve His plan of election.24

Fr. Most also argues that reprobation cannot be for the good of the universe because St. Thomas teaches that the universe would be more perfect without certain evils. St. Thomas says that “there are certain evils such that if they did not exist, the universe would be more perfect … as is chiefly the case in moral faults.”25 However, in this teaching St. Thomas is referring to the means of perfecting the universe, and not its final perfection. That is, St.Thomas is referring to moral fault where, “even without it, the ultimate perfection could be had;just as one can come to eternal life without the act of patience in persecutions … he could attain salvation without the fault [of the other].”26 This is because, as St. Thomas says, “[E]vil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally” and “Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally …”27 Thus, St. Thomas is not teaching that God doesn’t reprobate for the greater good of the universe. Rather, he is teaching that God could have achieved the same, final perfection of the universe without permitting certain moral faults.

In disputing the Thomist position that reprobation is for the good of the universe, Fr. Most also points to St. Thomas’s statement: “In created things, nothing can be greater than the salvation of a rational creature.”28 Fr. Most appears to confuse the nature of the universe with the grace of salvation. When Thomists refer to the good of the universe in the context of reprobation, we are not referring to the natural elements of the universe. Rather, we are referring to human beings, in the order of grace, who make up the universe. There is a clear distinction between the good of nature and the good of grace. Grace is a greater good than nature because it is a direct sharing in God’s divine life. As St. Thomas says, “[T]he good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe.”29

However, St.Thomas also says, “The good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one, if we consider both in the same genus.”30 In Thomism, a genus is “the aspect of a thing’s essence which is common to it and other members of its species; a broader class to which a thing essentially belongs.”31 As applied here, because the universe refers to the totality of all rational creatures, it is of the same genus as each individual rational creature in that universe. In the words of St.Thomas, this means that the good of the universe (all men considered) is greater than the particular good of one man. This is why St. Thomas doesn’t say “nothing can be greater than the salvation of every single rational creature who ever lived.” Of course, if God consequently willed all men to be saved, they would be saved. Yet, in God’s inscrutable judgments, He achieves the greater good by predestining some in order to communicate His mercy, and reprobating others in order to communicate His justice.

Thus, God creates diversity in the natural order for the same reason that He creates diversity of graces in the supernatural order—for the greater good of the universe. The natural order reflects the supernatural order. Just as God permits defects in the natural order to perfect the whole, He likewise permits defects (sin) in the supernatural order to perfect the whole. This is why St.Thomas directs us to “consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe.” God directs both to their final end by making some achieve the ultimate goodness (heaven) and allowing others to fail in attaining that goodness. While Fr. Most says that “the formal glory of God is diminished by their [the reprobates’] existence,” it is impossible for the reprobates to take away from God’s glory. God’s glory is eternal and lasts “before all ages, and now, and for all ages of ages. Amen” (Jude 1:25).32 The reprobates reveal the glory of God’s justice while the elect reveal the glory of God’s mercy.

MORE ON REPROBATION

Let’s recap what we have learned thus far. Reprobation, properly speaking, is the truth that God permits certain people to go to hell, just as predestination means God elects certain people to heaven. When speaking of reprobation, we reaffirm the truth that God does not cause people to sin, but neither does He prevent their sins. Rather, God permits people to sin, and He does so for the greater good of His creation. God is in complete control of the end of every creature, and permits only what He wills for the greater good of the whole. St. Thomas is clear on this point: “God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.”33

Just as God does not choose the elect based on their foreseen merits, neither does God choose whom He reprobates based on their foreseen demerits. God simply chooses “according to the purpose of his will” (Eph. 1:5). As we have also learned, without God’s decrees in eternity, nothing would take place in time. Thus, God’s choice to reprobate logically precedes a person’s demerits, for the demerits would not exist without God’s divine permission. This truth highlights the Thomist position that God determines man, and is not determined by man.

However, there seems to be a greater mystery with reprobation than with predestination. When God predestines the elect to heaven, God produces all the results (that is, all salutary acts and the gift of perseverance) through His efficacious grace. God wills the rewards of the elect before foreseen merits, because both the works and rewards are God’s gratuitous gifts to man. In other words, both the cause and effect of predestination are the work of God.34 This is why David proclaims that “the salvation of the just is from the Lord” (Ps.36:39). The Catechism also says, “Salvation comes from God alone” (CCC 169). St. Thomas confirms that predestination “is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined—namely, glory—and of what is received in this life—namely, grace.”35

We cannot say the same thing with reprobation. Although the permission to sin comes from God, the sin comes from man. In His providence, God orders all things to Himself as their last end, and sin is a departure from this order. Thus, it is impossible that God should be the cause of the departure from the order that He ordains to Himself.36 Of God, Scripture says, “[T]hou … hatest none of the things which thou hast made” (Wis. 11:25), but also says, “[T]hou hatest all the workers of iniquity” (Ps. 5:7). That God doesn’t hate anything He has made but does hate evil doers means that God does not make men evil or cause sin.37

As we have seen, Fr. Most incorrectly believes that the Thomist system requires God to desert man before he sins, and precisely so he can sin. He calls it the “desertion” theory. Fr. Most says, “Hence, in their theory, God wants to desert certain men, so that they sin, so that He may have someone to punish, so as to be able to manifest vindictive justice.”38 This statement does not describe the Thomist position but rather the Calvinist heresy of double predestination. The Thomist position is that God decrees the permission to sin before it occurs (otherwise it would never happen), and deserts man only after he sins. Just because God wills to permit sin in order to manifest His divine justice does not mean that God wills the sin itself. Fr. Most confuses God’s will to permit sin with His will to punish sin. While evil is not a good, God’s will to permit evil is a good insofar as it communicates God’s infinite justice and right to be loved above all things. God’s will to justly punish those who do evil is also a good. This is why St. Thomas says, “God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.”39

Because Fr. Most interprets the Thomist position to mean that God deserts certain men before they sin, he says that in this system God “is not directly concerned with individuals, but with the whole.”40 Once again, this distorts the Thomist position. God’s concern for the whole does not mean that He is not directly concerned with individuals as well. As we shall see in chapter 4, Christ died for all men and gives all men sufficient grace to be saved. However, the fact that some individuals are reprobated shows that God’s concern for the reprobate includes His respect for their freedom to reject His grace. As the Catechism says, “He permits it [evil], however, because he respects the freedom of his creatures and, mysteriously, knows how to derive good from it” (CCC 311). As St. Thomas explains, this permission manifests God’s will to communicate His goodness and glory to men—for the predestined, His mercy; for the reprobate, His justice.

In defense of his position, Fr. Most attempts to turn the tables on Thomists by contending thusly: “Thomists need to prove not only that the manifestation of vindictive justice is necessary, but they must prove that it must be done by reprobation, and further, by reprobation before consideration of demerits. They surely have not proved this.”41 Yet God’s vindictive justice is “necessary” only because God wills to manifest it to His creatures. In Thomistic terminology, we say that it is not absolutely necessary (because God is free to manifest His attributes however He sees fit), but it is necessary by supposition (supposing that God wills to manifest His justice, which He does).42 To prove that reprobates aren’t “necessary,” Fr. Most points out that God “hath no need of wicked men” (Ecclus. 15:12). But God “hath no need” of creatures at all, and yet they exist. Thomists don’t say that God needs to reprobate man absolutely. Rather, God wills to reprobate certain men because He wills to manifest His justice for the greater good of the universe, for “the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe.”43

Furthermore, it is disingenuous for Fr. Most to claim that Thomists haven’t proven that God reprobates before foreseen demerits.44 Thomists take this position based on St. Paul’s teaching in Romans 9, which Fr. Most simply dismisses. In fact, St. Thomas directs us to understand God’s will by going to Scripture: “For such things as spring from God’s will, and beyond the creature’s due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us.”45 In Romans 9, God reveals that He hated Esau before he was “not yet born, nor had done any good or evil (that the purpose of God, according to election, might stand)” (v. 11).46 God also reveals that “he hath mercy on whom he will; and whom he will, he hardeneth” (v. 18). Thus, Scripture reveals that God does not consider future demerits in decreeing reprobation. This is not only the plain meaning of Scripture, but also the position of both St.Augustine and St.Thomas. The burden is on their interlocutors to prove otherwise. It is not that Thomists have not proven their case; rather, Fr. Most rejects the proof.

Because Fr. Most rejects the traditional interpretation of Romans 9, he simply does not accept God’s sovereignty in choosing whom He predestines and whom He reprobates. He says, “But if He picked them before consideration of demerits, He would have no reason for deserting this man rather than that man, for the order of the universe, as we have said, does not indicate which ones should be deserted. Nor do the desertion theologians suggest what rational basis God could have. Therefore, God would have to act without reason, blindly.”47 In Fr.Most’s theology, man must find a “rational basis” for God’s determinations or else God is acting “without reason.” This is an incredible statement from such an astute theologian. St. Paul answers Fr. Most’s objection in Romans 9:14: “Is there injustice with God? God forbid.” While Fr.Most seeks a “reason” for God’s decisions, St. Thomas says, “[W]hy He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will.”48 Fr. Most’s criticisms of the “desertion” theory actually reveal his desertion of St. Thomas on the question of reprobation.

The Catholic Church has always held that man is responsible for his condemnation, even though God decrees to permit it. For example, the regional Council of Arles condemned the idea that “the foreknowledge of God violently impels man to death, or that they who perish, perish by the will of God.”49 The Council of Orange II states: “We not only do not believe that some have been truly predestined to evil by divine power, but also with every execration we pronounce anathema upon those, if there are [any such], who wish to believe so great an evil.”50 The Council of Valence III also states: “Neither do we believe that anyone is condemned by a previous judgment on the part of God but by reason of his own iniquity;”51 “But we do not only not believe the saying that ‘some have been predestined to evil by divine power,’ namely as if they could not be different, ‘but even if there are those who wish to believe such malice, with all detestation,’ as the Synod of Orange, ‘we say anathema to them.’”52

In her canons on justification, the Council of Trent also declares: “If anyone shall say that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil, but that God produces the evil as well as the good works, not only by permission, but also properly and of Himself, so that the betrayal of Judas is no less His own proper work than [is] the vocation of Paul: let him be anathema” (canon 6);53 “If anyone shall say that the grace of justification is attained by those only who are predestined unto life, but that all others, who are called, are called indeed, but do not receive grace, as if they are by divine power predestined to evil: let him be anathema” (canon 17).54 This is why St. Paul says, “For the wages of sin is death. But the grace of God, life everlasting, in Christ Jesus our Lord” (Rom.6:23). Death, which is called “wages,” is something that man can earn, while “the grace of God” is a gift that man cannot earn.

Thus, predestination causes grace and glory, but reprobation does not cause sin. Rather, reprobation is the cause of God’s divine permission (to sin in this life) and His punishment of that sin (in this life and the next). God decrees to permit sin, and then punishes sin by abandoning man and withholding His grace from him. St.Thomas teaches, “Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present—namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way the word of the prophet is true—namely, “Destruction is thy own, O Israel” (Osee 13:9).

This is why Thomists use the term “negative reprobation.” God’s withholding of grace is the negation of a good not due to man, and not the privation of a good due to him (which would be an evil).55 Because God does not owe grace to any man, He does not offend justice by withholding it, so long as He deprives nobody of his due. As Scripture says, “[H]is justice remaineth for ever” (2 Cor. 9:9). Moreover, God does not withhold grace arbitrarily but withholds it as a punishment for sin. St. Thomas says that “God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace … Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments.”56 The Council of Trent also says that God does not forsake man, unless He is first forsaken by man.57

Thus, in reprobation, God wills to permit sin before it occurs, and then He punishes sin after it occurs. The permission precedes the defect, and the defect precedes the punishment. As the Council of Valence teaches, “[O]f those who are to be lost, the evil which they have deserved precedes the just judgment of God.”58 God is responsible for granting permission, but man is responsible for his own damnation. This is a great mystery, for God could prevent a man from dying impenitent by granting him efficacious grace; as Job says, “I know that thou canst do all things” (42:2). But God does this only for His elect. God permits certain people to harden their hearts by rejecting grace, and God hardens their hearts as a punishment for sin by withholding His grace. As St. Paul says, “[W]hom he will, he hardeneth” (Rom. 9:18). This is also why the Book of Exodus reveals that both God and Pharao hardened Pharao’s heart.

Scripture elsewhere teaches that God hardens man’s heart. For example, in regard to obstinate sinners, St. Paul reveals how “God delivered them up to a reprobate sense” (Rom. 1:28) and how “God shall send them the operation of error, to believe lying” (2 Thess. 2:10). St. Paul in Romans also quotes the prophet Isaias when he says, “God hath given them the spirit of insensibility;eyes that they should not see; and ears that they should not hear” (11:8). St.John does likewise when he says, “He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart, that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them.”59 These verses underscore that God is in control of the fate of the reprobate, even though He does not cause their falling away.60

That God punishes sin after it occurs by withholding grace and hardening hearts does not mean that God changes or is determined by man’s actions (recall that God is pure Act with no potentiality). God decrees the permission to sin before foreseen demerits, and wills the punishment of the sin as a consequence of His permission. As we saw in the councils of Quiersy (853) and Valence (855), God does not predestine man to sin but predestines His punishment of sin because He is just.61 As St.Thomas says, “[I]n willing justice He wills punishment.”62

Thus, God’s will to give grace and His will to punish those who reject that grace imply no change in God’s will, for St. Thomas teaches, “It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same.”63 In other words, God wills from all eternity the “who, what, when, where, and why” of both predestination and reprobation. For the reprobate, God eternally wills to give sufficient grace in His mercy (the thing to be done now) and to withdraw grace in His justice (the contrary afterwards), with His will remaining the same. This difference also reflects the antecedent and consequent wills of God.64

We must emphasize that God’s motive for permitting sin and allowing final impenitence is not the desire to punish the sin per se. God doesn’t permit man to reject His grace because of His love to chastise, for this would be unjust. Rather, as we have said, God permits sin in order to communicate His goodness to the greatest possible extent, and this necessarily includes the goodness of His justice. Father Garrigou-Lagrange, the popular Dominican Thomist, also says that God wills to permit and punish sin as a manifestation of His infinite justice and His right to be loved above all things.65 This is the just desire of the Supreme Good.

SCRIPTURE REVEALS GOD’S WILL TO SAVE SINNERS

With an understanding of God’s antecedent and consequent wills, we don’t get caught in the Protestant errors of Calvinism or Arminianism. When Scripture teaches that God wills all men to be saved, we don’t have to interpret those texts (1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9; John 3:16) solely in the exclusive sense like Calvinists, who hold that God wills only the elect to be saved. Neither do we have to interpret the text only in the inclusive sense like Arminians, who hold that God wills every single person to be saved but does not succeed in doing so. Rather, we can say that God antecedently wills the salvation of all men (Catholics and Arminians agree), but consequently wills the salvation of the elect (Catholics and Calvinists agree). In chapter 4, we will evaluate whether Christ’s atonement was for all or for the elect only. For now, we will look at a few principal scriptural texts that address God’s will to save sinners.

1 TIMOTHY 2:4: GOD WILLS ALL MEN TO BE SAVED

In 1 Timothy 2:4 we find one of the clearest expressions of God’s will to save man. Notwithstanding its perceived simplicity, however, there is great debate between Calvinists and Arminians over its true meaning. Calvinists interpret the passage to mean that God wills to save all kinds or classes of men, while Arminians say it applies to all men who ever lived. Let’s examine verses 1-6 so that we can put the passage in its context. St. Paul says:

I desire therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all men: For kings, and for all that are in high station: that we may lead a quiet and a peaceable life in all piety and chastity. For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus: Who gave himself a redemption for all, a testimony in due times.

In verse 1, St. Paul asks for intercessory prayer and thanksgiving to be made for “all men.” In verse 4, St. Paul says that God wills “all men” to be saved. The Greek for “all men” in both verses is pas anthropos. Thus, from a contextual standpoint, almost all exegetes conclude that the “all men” in verses 1 and 4 both refer to the same group of individuals. The question is whether “all” means every single person, or whether it refers to a specific group of people (the elect).

As we have mentioned, Calvinists contend that “all men” does not really mean all men absolutely, but rather all kinds of men. They so argue because St.Paul refers to “kings” and those in “high stations” (v. 2) right after he recommends prayer for “all men” (v. 1). Calvinists interpret this to mean that St. Paul is defining “all” as “classes” or “kinds” of men because he provides examples of such classes (kings and others in authority). Because Christians at this time were being persecuted by “kings” and men in “high stations,” St. Paul is said to be urging Christians to pray for these “classes” of men as well.66

In light of our understanding of the consequent will of God, the Calvinist offers a plausible interpretation. If God wills all men to be saved, but not all men are saved, it must be that God wills the salvation of kinds or classes of men vis-à-vis the total pool of all men. St. Thomas also believed in the plausibility of this interpretation, for he says, “[T]hey can be understood as applying to every class of individuals, not to every individual in each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition.”67 In other words, 1 Timothy 2:1-6 can certainly refer to the consequent or simple will of God to save His elect people.

However, St. Thomas, in referring to a commentary by St. John Damascene, also says those in the passage “are understood of the antecedent will of God;not of the consequent will.”68 This seems to be the better interpretation. St. Paul’s prayer request for “kings” and those in “high stations” does not seem to be principally an effort to distinguish between classes of men but seems to include all men in prayer. Why? As we said, kings and rulers were persecuting Christians, and it would have been natural for Christians not to pray for such men. It seems more likely that St. Paul is simply teaching Christians to pray for our enemies as well as our friends and not to exclude them from our prayers. This teaching follows precisely the teaching of our Lord when He says, “Love your enemies: do good to them that hate you: and pray for them that persecute and calumniate you” (Matt. 5:44).

St. Paul’s use of pas anthropos elsewhere in Scripture also indicates that 1 Timothy 2:4 is about the antecedent will of God.69 For example, in Romans 5:12, St. Paul says, “[S]o death passed upon all men (pas anthropos), in whom all have sinned.” Because death has indeed passed to every human who ever lived (not just to the elect), St. Paul in this verse uses pas anthropos to refer to all men and not just the elect. In Titus 3:2, St. Paul says, “To speak evil of no man, not to be litigious, but gentle: shewing all mildness towards all men (pas anthropos).” Of course, because we are to show mildness to all men and not just to the elect shows that St. Paul is not using pas anthropos to distinguish between classes of men. Further, that St. Paul says we are to speak evil of “no man,” and “no man” is the opposite of “all men” in the same verse, also shows that St. Paul uses pas anthropos in the inclusive sense and not in the restricted sense of Calvinism.70

This exegesis is consistent with the teachings of the Council of Valence. In interpreting 1 Timothy 2:4, the council stated in chapter 3: “Omnipotent God wishes all men without exception to be saved [1 Tim. 2:4] although not all will be saved. That certain ones are saved is the gift of the one who saves;that certain ones perish, however, is the deserved punishment of those who perish.”71 Thus, Valence sided with what St. Thomas would later explain to be the antecedent will of God: “God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.”72 With this teaching, the council also reiterates that salvation is the gratuitous gift of God, whereas damnation is the fault of man.

Finally, we note that St. Paul could have said that God wills all kinds of men to be saved, but he didn’t. St. Paul knew that the word for “kinds” in Greek is genos. St. Paul uses genos to distinguish “kinds” of things elsewhere in Scripture. For example, in describing God’s various gifts to man, St. Paul says that God grants “to another, diverse kinds (genos) of tongues” (1 Cor. 12:10). In the same letter, St. Paul also says that there are “so many kinds (genos) of tongues in this world” (14:10). The absence of the specific word for “kinds” (genos) in 1 Timothy 2:4, coupled with the exegetical and contextual analysis above, indicates that 1 Timothy 2:4 is about God’s antecedent will to save all sinners and not His consequent will to save His elect.

2 PETER 3:9: GOD DOES NOT WILL THAT ANY SHOULD PERISH

This is another contentious verse between Calvinists and Arminians. In order to understand its context, it is necessary to quote from verse 3 through verse 9.

Knowing this first, that in the last days there shall come deceitful scoffers, walking after their own lusts, [s]aying: Where is his promise or his coming? [F]or since the time that the fathers slept, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation. For this they are wilfully ignorant of, that the heavens were before, and the earth out of water, and through water, consisting by the word of God. Whereby the world that then was, being overflowed with water, perished. But the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of the ungodly men. But of this one thing be not ignorant, my beloved, that one day with the Lord is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. The Lord delayeth not his promise, as some imagine, but dealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance (2 Pet. 3:3-9).

As one can see, this passage is primarily about the Second Coming of Jesus Christ at the end of the world (eschatological) but also about God’s will to save sinners (soteriological). St. Peter reveals that in the last days unbelievers will accuse believers of waiting in vain for Christ’s return. They will ridicule Christians by saying, “Where is his promise or his coming?” (v. 4). They will point out that things haven’t changed for many centuries and that they “continue as they were from the beginning of creation” (v. 4). Since they see no sign of Christ’s return, and most of the world is in apostasy (see Luke 18:8), scoffers will proclaim that God has abandoned His people. St. Peter, however, reveals that the “Lord delayeth not his promise, as some imagine, but dealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance” (v. 9).

As one may expect, Calvinists argue that St. Peter is referring only to the elect. They so conclude because St.Peter refers to the “scoffers” (v.3) in the third person, while he speaks directly to his audience in the second person as “dearly beloved” (v. 1) and “my beloved” (v. 8). Thus, when in the next verse St. Peter says that the Lord “dealeth patiently for your sake” (v. 9), the Calvinist has good reason to believe that St.Peter is still speaking to the “beloved.” To bolster their argument that St. Peter is addressing the elect, Calvinists also point out that St. Peter addresses his second epistle “to them that have obtained equal faith with us” (1:1). In fact, St.Peter addresses his first epistle to the “elect” (1:1), and he says that he is writing his second epistle to the same people (3:1).73

While 2 Peter 3:9 could be about God’s consequent will to save His elect from perishing, it could also be about God’s antecedent will to save all men. This is a reasonable conclusion, because St. Peter does not use the word “elect” in verse 9 (or anywhere in chapter 3). Rather, he uses the all-encompassing “any” (Greek, tis) and “all” (pas) to refer to those God wills to save. While the first part of verse 9 is arguably addressed to the beloved (“for your sake”), the Calvinist simply assumes that the rest of the verse also applies to the beloved and not to all men: “not willing that any (beloved only) should perish, but that all (beloved only) should return to penance.” Just because St. Peter is addressing the “beloved” does not mean that God wishes unbelievers to perish. In fact, because St. Peter’s audience is already “beloved” and “elect,” it does not follow that God is dealing “patiently” for their sake and wishing that they “return to penance,” for they are already converted to Christ (and Calvinists don’t believe one can fall into grave sin after regeneration).

Calvinists respond by saying that God is exercising His patience for the unbelieving elect (“for your sake”). In terms of God’s consequent will, this is true. God does indeed delay His coming until He gathers all of the elect into His fold. St. Luke records that “the Lord increased daily together such as should be saved” (Acts 2:47). He also writes, “And the Gentiles, hearing it, were glad, and glorified the word of the Lord: and as many as were ordained to life everlasting, believed” (Acts 13:48). Jesus asks, “And will God revenge his elect who cry to him day and night: and will he have patience in their regard?” (Luke 18:7). The answer, of course, is yes. In fact, Jesus says, “And unless those days had been shortened, no flesh should be saved: but for the sake of the elect those days shall be shortened” (Matt. 24:22).74 St. Paul also says, “Therefore I endure all things for the sake of the elect, that they also may obtain the salvation, which is in Christ Jesus, with heavenly glory” (2 Tim. 2:10). God bears patiently with His elect to ensure their salvation.

But the Calvinist’s argument results in a bit of an equivocation. This is because St. Peter is addressing the believing elect, which the Calvinist admits. Remember, St.Peter says that they “have obtained equal faith” with the apostles (2 Pet. 1:1). In fact, the entire epistle is addressed to the believing elect. So when St. Peter says that God is dealing patiently “for your sake,” the your must refer to this same believing elect. But since there is no need for the believing elect to “return to penance” to avoid damnation, the Calvinist must change the audience of the last half of verse nine to the unbelieving elect.

That is, the first half of the verse (“for your sake”) refers to the believing elect, but the second half of the verse (“any” should perish; “all” return to penance) refers to the unbelieving elect. This is a tortured reading of the text. Since the Calvinist admits that the “any” and “all” refer to unbelievers, it is perfectly admissible to include “all men” in that category. The Calvinist has no basis to exclude the reprobate, especially when they are so quick to change the audience when it fits their theology. Such a conclusion would reflect God’s antecedent will to save all men. We also note that St. Peter in 1 Peter 1:1 is writing to the churches in Asia Minor and says he is addressing the same audience in 2 Peter 3:1. All of these churches fell away from the faith as Our Lord prophesied in Apocalypse 2-3. This demonstrates that St. Peter’s audience actually included the reprobate, which further supports an “antecedent will” interpretation. This also shows that those who “have obtained equal faith” with the apostles can fall away from the faith.

Mark Kielar, president of CrossTV and a popular and influential Baptist preacher, states in one of his television programs that the word for “any” (Greek,tis) in the phrase “not willing that any should perish” really means some. In the program, he shows that the online Strong Exhaustive Concordance defines tis as “a certain one” or “some.” Kielar also points out that St. Peter’s use of tis just twelve words earlier in the verse also means some when he says, “The Lord delayeth not his promise, as some imagine” (v. 9). Kielar’s exegesis is deliberately one-sided. Although the Strong Concordance that Kielar uses does define tis as “certain” and “some,” Kielar fails to mention that the same concordance also defines tis as “any man” and “any.”75 This means that “any should perish” could also really mean any (which is how Kielar’s King James Version actually translates the verse!). In fact, Kielar’s King James Version of Scripture uses tis 448 times with various shades of meaning, which demonstrates that the usage is not as definitive as Kielar argues to his television audience.

Kielar’s contextual argument, that tis (“any”) in the latter part of verse nine must mean “some” because tis (“some”) in the former part of the verse means “some,” is illogical. When St. Peter says “as some imagine,” he is clearly referring to those who reject Christ. However, the “any should perish” group, according to Calvinists, refers to the elect. Kielar doesn’t explain why the tis of the reprobate defines the tis of the elect. They are polar-opposite groups. Even if the Christ-rejecters were the unbelieving elect and not the reprobate, the subject matter relative to each group is different. The first tis (as “some” imagine) is being used to identify those who deny Christ’s coming, while the second tis (“any” should perish) is being used to identify those God wills to save. There is no lexical or contextual relationship between the tis of group one and the tis of group two.

Of course, Kielar should know that the use of an adjective to describe two groups within a single verse doesn’t mean that the adjective has the same meaning for both groups. For example, in Romans 5:18, St. Paul says “all men” are condemned by one (Adam), and “all men” are justified by one (Christ). The “all” of the condemned means all, while the “all” of the justified, ten words later, means many.76 Finally, if Kielar insists that the “any” (in “any should perish”) refers to the elect only, then his argument proves too much. That is, he must conclude that God does not want the reprobate “to return to penance,” since they would be necessarily excluded from this injunction (v. 9). If that were true, then God positively wills (not just permits) the damnation of some, and this is repugnant to His infinite justice.

If the Calvinist wants a proper interpretation of 2 Peter 3:9, he should refer to the words of John Calvin himself. Unlike what today’s Calvinists argue, Calvin says the following about 2 Peter 3:9:

And as to the duration of the whole world, we must think exactly the same as of the life of every individual; for God by prolonging time to each, sustains him that he may repent. In the like manner he does not hasten the end of the world, in order to give to all time to repent. This is a very necessary admonition, so that we may learn to employ time aright, as we shall otherwise suffer a just punishment for our idleness. “Not willing that any should perish.” So wonderful is his love towards mankind, that he would have them all to be saved, and is of his own self prepared to bestow salvation on the lost. But the order is to be noticed, that God is ready to receive all to repentance, so that none may perish; for in these words the way and manner of obtaining salvation is pointed out. Every one of us, therefore, who is desirous of salvation, must learn to enter in by this way.77

JOHN 3:16: WHOEVER BELIEVES IN HIM MAY NOT PERISH BUT HAVE EVERLASTING LIFE

Most Christians know John 3:16; it is one of the most memorized passages in Scripture. Far fewer Christians know that there are competing interpretations of the verse. Arminians use this text to prove God’s universal will to save all men, whereas Calvinists use it to prove God’s will to save only His elect. Arminians also use this text to deny unconditional election; Calvinists, to prove unconditional election. Let’s take a look at the verse in its native context. We begin at verse 14, which is toward the end of Jesus’ discourse with Nicodemus, and finish at verse 19.

And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up: That whosoever believeth in him, may not perish; but may have life everlasting. For God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in him, may not perish, but may have life everlasting. For God sent not his Son into the world, to judge the world, but that the world may be saved by him. He that believeth in him is not judged. But he that doth not believe, is already judged: because he believeth not in the name of the only begotten Son of God. And this is the judgment: because the light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light: for their works were evil.

As we see at the beginning of the passage, Jesus draws a parallel between His being lifted up on the Cross with Moses’ lifting up the brass serpent in the desert. As Moses “lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up” (v.14). God instructed Moses to make the brass serpent to spare from physical death those who had been bitten by serpents. God said, “[W]hosoever being struck shall look on it, shall live” (Num. 21:8). Now, those who believe in Jesus and look upon Him raised on the Cross will be spared from spiritual death: “That whosoever believeth in him, may not perish; but may have life everlasting” (v. 15). Verse 15 begins with the hina conjunction (“That”), which means “in order that” This clause connects verses 14 and 15 and means that the purpose of Jesus being raised on the Cross is to save those who believe in Him.

Here is where it begins to get contentious. Translating the Koine Greek, verse 15 literally says “in order that every the one believing in him may be having life eternal.”78 Based on the original language, Arminians claim that this phrase demonstrates God’s universal will to save all men. Catholics certainly agree insofar as this reflects God’s antecedent will to save all, and not His consequent will to permit some to fall away. The Greek for “every one believing” is pas ho pisteuo (pas—every; ho—the; pisteuo—one believing). We have seen that pas often means every single one. Moreover, the Septuagint translation of “whosoever” in Numbers 21:8 is anthropon pas, which means “every man.” This is essentially the same construction as the pas anthropos of 1 Timothy 2:4. Thus, Arminians have a good case for their interpretation.

Calvinists respond by correctly pointing out that Moses was dealing with God’s chosen people of Israel, not every man who ever lived. Numbers 21:10 even refers to those in Numbers 21:8-9 as “the children of Israel.” Even so, it is extremely likely that most of the carnal Israelites did look upon the serpent and were healed, while only a remnant of them were actually saved. Scripture indicates that most (if not all) of the Israelites were healed, for right after they regained their strength, they conquered kings Sehon and Og (Num. 21:21-35).

This being the case, Jesus’ use of this parallel suggests that more people believe in Jesus during their lives than are actually saved by Him (just as more Israelites were cured by the serpent than were saved). The participial construction, “every the one believing” (pas ho pisteuo), supports this conclusion.79 One must have ongoing, abiding faith in Christ to “have life everlasting.” This means that the “whosoever” in John 3:15 applies to all men—including the reprobate—and not to the elect only as Calvinists maintain (although, as we will see below, it does not mean that God loves everyone the same way).80

The next verse begins with “For God so loved the world” (v. 16). The word “For” (gar) is a transitive conjunction that in biblical Greek is used to explain the preceding context. That is, gar connects the objects (“whosoever believeth”) of verse 15 with the action (“For God so loved”) of verse 16. This means that people “believeth” in Christ because God loves them. As we have seen, God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, including the gift of faith. Those who love God do so because God “first hath loved us” (1 John 4:19) and gives us the power to love Him. We also note that the verb “loved” (agapao) in verse 16 is in the aorist tense, which emphasizes that God has eternally decreed His love. This is the same tense verb God uses to describe His predilect love for the prenatal Jacob in Romans 9:13: “Jacob I have loved (agapao).” Thus, in verse 16, we see the principle of divine predilection: “For God so loved the world …”

We also note that the “so” in the phrase “For God so loved” is the adverb houtos, which precedes the conjunction gar.81 The use of the adverb houtos makes the verb agapao more emphatic. It emphasizes the highest possible degree of God’s love for man. As St. Thomas teaches, “Now, that the Son of God took to Himself flesh from the Virgin’s womb was due to the exceeding love of God: wherefore it is said (John 3:16): God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son.”82 God manifested His exceeding love for man through the Cross of Christ: “Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (John 15:13). The adverb houtos reveals both the intense degree of God’s love for man and the manner in which God expresses His love for man. Hence, the adverb is best translated as “thusly.”

This means that the beginning of verse 16 literally reads, “For God thusly loved the world.” The relationship between verses 15 and 16 underscores that God’s exceeding love precedes election and predestination. Because He loves the world, He “thusly” gives His only begotten Son to save the world. God decrees His love in eternity and implements His predestination plan in time. As St.Thomas teaches, “For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. When all the predestinate are objects of election and love.”83

The object of God’s “love” in John 3:16 is the “world.” What does it mean that “God so loved the world?” It cannot mean that God loves everyone the same way, as many Arminians claim, for if that were true, then God would predestine everyone to heaven. We continually recall St. Thomas’s teaching: “For since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things … no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.”84 The reason why the elect persevere unto salvation and the reprobate fall away from salvation is because God wills the elect a greater good. The elect are better than the reprobate because God makes them better and, hence, loves them more. St. Thomas is clear on this point when he says, “It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things.”85

But neither does John 3:16 mean that God doesn’t love all men in some way, as certain Calvinists maintain. Such a view not only contradicts the plain meaning of the verse but also contradicts Wisdom 11:25, which says, “For God lovest all the things that are.” God loves “the things that are” because all existing things are good, and God’s love is the cause of all good. Thus, St. Thomas says, “To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists.”86 As we will see in the next chapter, because God loves all men, He gives all men the grace to be saved: To the elect, efficacious grace, which ensures their salvation; to the reprobate, sufficient grace, which they reject to their own damnation.

St. John’s use of the word “world” (Greek, kosmos) in John 3:16 must, therefore, be interpreted in its context. St. John uses kosmos 58 times in his gospel, and 21 times in his epistles and the Apocalypse, with many different meanings. He uses it to describe believers,87 unbelievers,88 everyone,89 the earth or earthly matters,90 the general public,91 or in hyperbole.92 He even uses kosmos in seemingly contradictory ways within related passages. For example, in John 17:11, he records Jesus’ reference to His chosen ones when He says, “[T]hese are in the world.” But three verses later, in John 17:14, Jesus says, “[T]hey are not of the world” in reference to the same chosen ones. Many more examples could be provided, but the point is clear:St.John uses “world” in many different ways depending on the context.

So what is the meaning of “world” in John 3:16? We have learned that the “whosoever believeth in him” (pas ho pisteuo) of John 3:15 refers to all men and not the elect only. Literally, “every the one believing” must have an abiding faith to have life everlasting, and not all who believe in Christ are saved (just as not all the Israelites who looked on the serpent were saved).93 God’s love for the “world” in verse 16 must include the reprobate, because God’s love is the cause of faith and because the reprobate can have faith before falling away. The “world” includes all men under the penalty of sin and death. This also means that the “whosoever believeth” in verse 16 has the same meaning as in verse 15.94 This conclusion is consistent with St. Thomas’s teaching that God loves all men because He wills them some good, but that He loves His elect more than the reprobate because He wills them a greater good. It is also consistent with the teaching of the Council of Valence: “Omnipotent God wishes all men without exception to be saved.”

We also note that St. John uses “world” not only in verse 16, but also three times in verse 17 and one time in verse 19. Thus, St.John uses “world” five times in four verses. In verse 17, St. John says, “For God sent not his Son into the world, to judge the world, but that the world may be saved by him.” In other words, Christ came to save and not to condemn (that is, not to positively will damnation, only permit it). Because Christ will judge every single man in the “world,” it also follows that Christ came into the “world” to save every single man in the “world,” according to the antecedent will of God. Thus, in John 3:17, St. John seems to use “world” inclusively, as we concluded above. Further, in John 3:19, St. John says, “[T]he light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light.” Because the reprobate, who are in the world, rejected the light that came into it, it also follows that “world” in John 3:19 includes the reprobate.

EZECHIEL 18:32 AND 33:11: GOD DOES NOT DESIRE THE DEATH OF THE WICKED

Let’s finish this chapter by briefly turning to the Old Testament. In the book of the prophet Ezechiel, God also reveals his desire to save sinners from perishing. Making His will known in very plain language, in chapter 18 God says through the prophet: “For I desire not the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God, return ye and live” (v. 32). In chapter 33, God similarly says: “As I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways: and why will you die, O house of Israel?” (v. 11).95

These passages are clearly about God’s will to save sinners. The Septuagint reveals that the language God uses in Ezechiel is similar to the principal New Testament passages that reveal His will and desire to save men. For example, the Greek word for God’s willing (thelo) in Ezechiel 18:32 is the same word God uses in 1 Timothy 2:4 (thelo) to express His will that all men be saved. Also, the Greek word for God’s desiring (boulomai) in Ezechiel 33:11 is the same word He uses in 2 Peter 3:9 (boulomai) to express His desire that no man perish.

As we have seen with other passages, the Calvinist interprets these passages in Ezechiel as applying only to the elect. As with 2 Peter 3:9, because God is urging their repentance, the passages must be about the unbelieving elect, but the elect nevertheless. To support this contention, the Calvinist correctly points out that God in these passages repeatedly refers to the “house of Israel.”96 Thus, the Calvinist concludes that God’s will to save men applies only to God’s chosen people (similar to our analysis of Numbers 21). As we have stated before, this conclusion is true insofar as the passage is about God’s consequent will. But again, nothing in these passages precludes them from being about God’s antecedent will to save all men, and His gift of sufficient grace to all.

While God is speaking to the house of Israel, we know from other scriptures that He saves only a remnant of them. Thus, as with 2 Peter 3:9, Ezechiel’s actual audience includes the reprobate as well.97 The Calvinist will respond by saying that God requires a “general call” of repentance to all men according to His “perceptive” will because the elect are unknown. But Scripture never makes an a priori distinction between a “general” call and a “specific” call to sinners, nor does it distinguish the calls a posteriori based on results. Moreover, if God is not actually imploring the reprobate to repent and giving them the grace to do so, then His pleadings are lies and He positively wills their damnation. It would be as if God were taunting the reprobate for being unable to do something He never gave them the power to do.

It is true that God gives more to the elect than to the reprobate. No one thing would be better than another without being loved more by God.98 While God loves all men, He has a special love for the elect and infallibly ensures their salvation. However, God does not command the reprobate to do the impossible. Although the call becomes efficacious for the elect and not for the reprobate because of God’s eternal decree, this does not mean that God gave no grace to the reprobate to enable them to respond. Again, if that were true, God’s pleadings to “[b]e converted, and do penance for all your iniquities” (Ez.18:30) would be superfluous. We will explore this major distinction between Catholicism and Calvinism in greater detail in chapter 4.

God’s revelations through Ezechiel pose a further anomaly for the Calvinist. We recall that Calvinists believe Ezechiel is pleading with the unbelieving elect. Calvinists also believe that once God regenerates the unbelieving elect, they become the believing elect and can never fall from salvation. If that were true, then God doesn’t have the same audience in mind as the Calvinist. Look at what God says: “For when the just turneth himself away from his justice, and committeth iniquity, he shall die therein” (18:26). God also says, “For when the just shall depart from his justice, and commit iniquities, he shall die in them” (33:18); and “all his justices shall be forgotten, and in his iniquity which he hath committed, in the same shall he die” (33:13). If God is addressing the elect, as the Calvinist claims, this clearly means the elect can fall away after regeneration and die in their sins. This of course is impossible, because God efficaciously wills the elect’s salvation.

The Calvinist is forced to argue that the “just man” in Ezechiel 18 and 33 is unregenerate but still in the elect. The scriptures defeat such an argument. In these and other passages in Ezechiel, God uses the Greek verb dikaioo, which describes the salutary acts of a justified person, and the noun dikaiosune, which describes the person’s state of justification.99 These are the same words that St. Paul uses to describe the righteousness of justification throughout his epistle to the Romans.100 For example, in Romans 4:3, St. Paul refers to Genesis 15:6 where it says, “Abraham believed God, and it was reputed to him unto justice (dikaiosune).” God uses this same word to describe the justified man in Ezechiel 18 and 33. There is simply no exegetical, grammatical, lexical, or contextual basis to argue that the “just man” in Ezechiel is not currently justified and saved. And yet God reveals that such a man can “turneth himself away from his justice, and commit iniquity” and be condemned.

If the justified man in Ezechiel 18 and 33 can lose his salvation, then God is not addressing the elect exclusively. He is addressing in these passages both the elect and the reprobate. This means that God’s desire to save the sinner from death applies to all men and not just the elect. Thus, these passages can be interpreted to reflect God’s antecedent will that not “any should perish, but that all should return to penance” (2 Pet. 3:9). This exegesis also demonstrates that one who is justified by regeneration can lose his justification, an idea that is inimical to Calvinist theology (more on this in chapter 5).

We also mention that God speaks through Ezechiel with a view toward the New Covenant. For example, God says, “And I will make a covenant of peace with them, it shall be an everlasting covenant with them.”101 They will enter the New Covenant through baptism,102 their priests will offer sacrifice,103 and they will be governed by one shepherd (34:23). The New Covenant, of course, would be established by the atoning death of Jesus Christ. On that day, “I will cover the sun with a cloud, and the moon shall not give her light. I will make all the lights of heaven to mourn over thee: and I will cause darkness upon thy land, saith the Lord God, when thy wounded shall fall in the midst of the land, saith the Lord God” (32:7-8). In light of God’s will to save all men through the New Covenant, this is a great place to begin examining the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace. We do so in the next two chapters.

1. St. John Damascene was the first to refer to the antecedent and consequent wills of God, which St. Thomas later developed with unparalleled clarity and precision.

2. Reformed (and some Evangelical) Protestants also have a concept of “two wills” in God, which they often call the perceptive or revealed will (what should happen) and the decretive or saving will (what will happen), although both camps contradict Catholic teaching. Arminians generally deny the distinction between “two wills” in regard to salvation, although they admit that God must will to permit some to fall away more than He wills to save all. Arminians often say that God wills to preserve free will more than He wills to save all, but this argument also makes a distinction between “two wills” in God.

3. See Garrigou-LaGrange, Predestination, p. 74.

4. Pt I, Q 19, Art 6.

5. ST, Pt I, Q 47, Art 2. Thus, when God created the individual components of the universe, He declared that they were “good” (Gen. 1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25). However, when God “saw all the things that he had made,” according to the whole, He declared that “they were very good” (Gen. 1:31; emphasis added).

6. ST, Pt I, Q 19, Art 2. The Catechism also teaches that “God’s plan” includes “the existence

7. ST, Pt I, Q 47, Art 1.

8. ST, Pt I, Q 47, Art 2.

9. ST, Pt I, Q 22, Art 4.

10. ST, Pt I, Q 65, Art 2.

11. ST, Pt I, Q 48, Art 2. St. Thomas also says, “And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this” (Ibid.).

12. Ibid.

13. ST, Pt I, Q 22, Art 2. The Catechism also says, “Faith gives us the certainty that God would not permit an evil if he did not cause a good to come from that very evil, by ways that we shall fully know only in eternal life” (CCC 324; see also CCC 311-314).

14. ST, Pt I, Q 19, Art 8.

15. ST, Pt I, Q 49, Art 2.

16. Contra Gentiles (CG), 3.64.

17. ST, Pt I, Q 23, Art 5.

18. ST, Pt I, A 23, Art. 5.

19. ST, Pt I, Q 19, Art 6 (emphasis added). The truth of reprobation and divine justice is an unfathomable mystery, as Scripture says, “For many of his works are hidden: but the works of his justice who shall declare?” (Ecclus. 16:22).

20. ST, Pt I, Q 73, Art 1.

21. ST, Pt I, Q 23, Art 7 (emphasis in original). See also CCC 313.

22. ST, Pt I, Q 22, Art 2.

23. ST, Pt I, Q 65, Art 2. See also Pt I, Q 23, Art 6, where St. Thomas says, “[F]rom the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in this part of the wall, and that in another;although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things.”

24. The Catechism also teaches that God “makes use” of His creatures’ free-will decisions “in the accomplishment of his plan” (CCC 306).

25. 1 Sent. d. 46, Q 1, Art 3.

26. Ibid.

27. ST, Pt I, Q 19, Art 9.

28. CG, 4.55.

29. ST, Pt I-II, Q 113, Art 9.

30. Ibid. St. Thomas’s statement is a reply to the same type of objection that Fr. Most is advancing: “But the good of the universe is greater than the good of one man … Hence the creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly.” We have explained why St. Thomas says this objection is false.

31. Peter Kreeft, Summa of the Summa, p. 26.

32. See also Eph. 3:21; 1 Pet. 4:11; 5:11; 2 Pet. 3:18; Apoc. 1:6; 7:12.

33. Pt I, Q 19, Art 9.

34. As we will see in the next chapter, this assertion is not a denial of free will, for God causes the will to act freely, and not by necessity, by means of His efficacious grace.

35. ST, Pt 1, Q 23, Art 3.

36. See ST, Pt I-II, Q 79, Art 1. These teachings remind me of the great spiritual axiom: “A Deo ad Deum” (From God to God).

37. Although God is not the cause of sin, St. Thomas teaches that God is the cause of the act of sin. This is because God as Prime Mover is the cause of every action, and sin is an action. This action, however, has a defect that cannot be attributed to God, for God orders all things to Himself and sin departs from this order. Hence, sin is a defect with a created cause (human free will), just like limping is a defect with a crooked leg as its cause and not the power of movement. See ST, Pt I-II, Q 79, Art 1 and 2.

38. GPS, p. 50. Fr. Most’s belief that the Thomist system requires man to sin is based on his faulty understanding of sufficient grace (that is, that sufficient grace is insufficient to prevent man from sinning). We examine this issue in detail in chapter 4.

39. ST, Pt I, Q 19, Art 9 (emphasis added). Because of his erroneous understanding of both necessity and sufficient grace, Fr. Most also accuses the Thomist position of making God the author of sin.

40. GPS, p. 50 (emphasis in original).

41. GPS, p. 54, cf. pp. 644-645. Fr. Most also says that “it would not follow that God would necessarily have to desert any creature, because without desertion there can be reprobates” (p. 54). This is true insofar as sufficient grace is concerned, but it is not the case with efficacious grace.

42. St. Thomas says that God’s “willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as his will cannot change.” ST, Pt I, Q 19, Art 3.

43. ST, Pt I, Q 49, Art 2.

44. GPS, p. 54, cf. pp. 644-645.

45. ST, Pt III, Q 1, Art 3.

46. St. Thomas explains that God’s “hatred” for individuals “is from the fact that God wills some greater good which would not exist without the privation of a lesser good. And so He is said to hate through this rather than love. For thus, in as much as He wills the good of justice or of the order of the universe which cannot be without the punishment or the corruption of some, he is said to hate those whose punishment He wills, or [whose] corruption He wills” (CG, 1.96).

47. GPS, p. 63.

48. ST, Pt 1, Q 23, Art 5.

49. Denz., 160a.

50. Denz., 200.

51. Denz., 321.

52. Denz., 322.

53. Denz., 816.

54. Denz., 827.

55. This is why St. Thomas says, “Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated” (Pt I, Q 23, Art 3) and, “[T]he withholding of grace … make[s] man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments” (Pt I-II, Q 79, Art 3).

56. ST, Pt I-II, Q 79, Art 3.

57. See Denz., 804.

58. Denz., 322.

59. John 12:40; St. Paul and St. John are quoting from Isa. 6:9-10; 29:10. See Isa. 44:18;Matt. 11:25; 13:13-17; Luke 10:21-22; Acts 28:26-27; Rom. 11:7.

60. The early Church Fathers taught that God hardens man’s heart as a punishment for sin, for example, Augustine (Homilies on John; Against Julian), John Chrysostom (On Hebrews), Jerome (Dialogue Against the Pelagians), and Cyril of Alexandria (Commentary on the Psalms).

61. Denz., 316, 322.

62. ST, Pt I, Q 19, Art 9.

63. ST, Pt I, Q 19, Art 7.

64. St. Thomas notes that God’s motive for withdrawing grace from the elect is directed medicinally to their spiritual welfare (He does it to humble the elect whom He eventually restores to grace in His mercy). For the reprobate, God’s motive is punitive (He does it to punish these sinners in His justice). See ST, Pt I-II, Q 79, Art 4.

65. Predestination, pp. 207-208.

66. In denying the Arminian interpretation, Calvinist James White says that “Paul is not instructing Timothy to initiate never-ending prayer meetings where the Ephesian phone book would be opened and every single person … would become the object of prayer” (The Potter’s Freedom, p.140). This is a silly argument because it implies that one cannot pray for all people currently living without knowing each and every name. God is not limited by man’s intention to offer prayers for all, and God can apply the prayers to all if He so desires.

67. ST, Pt I, Q 19, Art 6. In this article, St. Thomas also refers to St. Augustine’s interpretation: “God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will” (De praed. sanct. 1:8; Enchir. 103).

68. Ibid.

69. It is true that “all” does not always mean “all” in Scripture. St. Paul uses “all” (pas) and “many” (polus) in different ways. For example, in Romans 5:15 and 19, the word “many” sometimes refers to all people (“many have died;” “many were made sinners”) but can also refer to a select group of people (“many shall be made just”). In Colossians 3:11 and Galatians 3:28, “all” refers only to those in Christ. In these cases, pas and polus function as pronouns. However, when St. Paul uses pas (all) as an adjective to describe anthropos (men), the preponderant usage is “every single one” (see also Rom. 3:4; 1 Cor. 4:2; Gal. 5:3; Col. 1:28; 1 Tim. 4:10; Titus 2:11). Only rarely is the usage limited to kinds or classes (Rom. 5:19; 1 Cor. 7:7).

70. In verse 6, St. Paul says that Christ “gave himself a redemption for all (pas).” The fact that this verse follows St. Paul’s inclusive use of pas anthropos in regard to prayers (v. 1) and to God’s will to save (v. 4) supports the conclusion that Christ’s “redemption” was also for “all men” and not just the elect (more on this in chapter 4).

71. Denz., 318 (emphasis in original).

72. ST, Pt I, Q 23, Art 4.

73. St. Peter’s identification of the elect as the “beloved” also underscores divine predilection.

74. See also Mark 13:20.

75. The Concordance, inter alia, provides the following usage: “Certain” (104 times), “some” (73 times), “any man” (55 times), and “any” (37 times). The Calvinist must accuse the King James Version translation of 2 Peter 3:9 (tis as “any”) as the grossest of errors.

76. Kielar also argues that the pas in “all (pas) should return to penance” means many, which then defines the preceding tis (“any”) as many. This is another example of reading one’s theology into the text. As we have seen, pas often means all and not many, depending on the context (e.g., Romans 3:23: “For all (pas) have sinned, and do need the glory of God”).

77. Calvin, Commentary on 2 Peter 3:9 (emphasis added).

78. The Greek transliteration is “hina pas ho pisteuo en autos echo zoe aionios.”

79. Pas ho pisteuo is a present active nominative participle that, as already stated, literally means “every the one believing.” The article ho coupled with the participle pisteuo makes pisteuo function as a verbal noun. The “believing one” is someone who has abiding faith. But the construction does not guarantee that the person will always be a believer. Of course, God causes His elect to persevere in faith. Nevertheless, nothing in the text limits the gift of faith to the elect.

80. The Council of Valence also concluded that John 3:16 refers to all men based on its interpretation of Numbers 21 (just as Moses raised the serpent to heal all the Israelites, Christ was raised on the Cross to save all men). See Denz., 323.

81. The transliteration of “For God so loved the world” is houtos gar agapao ho theos ho kosmos.

82. ST, Pt III, Q 32, Art 1 (emphasis added).

83. ST, Pt I, Q 23, Art 4.

84. ST, Pt I, Q 20, Art 3.

85. ST, Pt I, Q 20, Art 4.

86. ST, Pt I, Q 20, Art 2.

87. See John 1:9, 29; 3:16-17; 4:42; 6:33, 51; 8:12, 26; 9:5; 11:9; 12:46-47; 14:31; 17:6, 21, 23; 1 John 2:2; 4:9, 14; 5:4-5.

88. See John 7:7; 8:23; 9:39; 12:31; 14:17, 22, 30; 15:18-19; 16:8, 11, 20; 17:9, 14-16, 25; 1 John 3:1, 13; 5:19.

89. See John 1:10, 29; 3:16-17, 19; 4:42; 6:14, 33, 51; 8:12, 26; 11:9; 12:46-47; 14:22, 31; 17:21, 23; 1 John 2:2; 4:9, 14.

90. See John 1:10; 8:23; 9:5, 39; 10:36; 11:27; 12:25; 13:1; 14:19, 27; 15:19; 16:21, 28, 33; 17:5, 11-12; 17:16, 18, 24; 18:36-37; 1 John 2:15-17; 3:13, 17; 4:3-5, 17; 5:4-5; 2 John 1:7; Apoc.11:15; 13:8; 17:8.

91. John 7:4; 8:26; 9:39; 17:13; 18:20.

92. John 12:19; 21:25.

93. We are going to demonstrate how regenerated sinners can fall away from the faith in chapter 5.

94. The identical Greek phrase pas ho pisteuo is used in both verses.

95. See also Ez. 3:20 and Wis. 1:13.

96. Ez. 18:6, 15, 25, 29-31; 33:7, 10-11, 20.

97. This seems especially evident in the various passages where God threatens judgment and says, “I will requite their way upon their head” (9:10; see also 7:27; 18:30; 24:14; 33:20; 36:19).

98. Note how God says, “It is not for your sake that I will do this, O house of Israel, but for my holy name’s sake” (Ez. 36:22; see also Ez. 36:32). This verse supports our position that God predestines based on divine election (“My sake”) and not human merits (“not your sake”).

99. See, for example, the Septuagint’s translation of Ez. 18:24, 26; 33:13, 18 (dikaiosune) and Ez. 33:13 (dikaio).

100. Rom. 1:17; 2:13; 3:26; 5:7, 19; 7:12 (dikaio); Rom. 1:17; 3:5, 21-22, 25-26; 4:3, 5-6, 9, 11, 13, 22; 5:17, 21; 6:13, 19-20; 8:10; 9:28, 30-31; 10:3-6, 10; 14:17 (dikaiosune).

101. Ez. 37:26; see also Ez. 16:60, 62; 34:25; 37:19.

102. Ez. 36:25; 36:33; 37:23; 39:29.

103. Ez. 37:26-27; 41:22; 42:13-14; 43:18; 44:16, 29; 46:13 (these verses reveal prototypes of the New Covenant sacrificial system).

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