3. Of the Providence of God; upon Genesis 28:16.
Chapter Three Of the Providence of God; upon Genesis 28:16.
T he Grecians call providence "πρόνοια" (pronoia), or "φροντίς"
(frontis). The Hebrews derive it from the verb Hisgiah, in the conjugation Hiphil, which is To see exactly and to discern. As touching the definition thereof Cicero saith in his book De inventione, that it is that, whereby anything to come is foreseen before it come to pass. Howbeit, this definition, if it be referred unto divine providence, doth not express it: because this doth only show the knowledge of that which is to come, and the power of foreknowing. But in divine providence, is not only comprehended the knowledge of the mind of God, but also his will and election, whereby things are decreed and determined to come to pass, rather by one way than another. Further, there is also a power and ableness therein, to govern and direct those things which it is said to foresee; for in things, there is not only found the nature and substance of them; but also the order wherewith they be knit one with another. And the one so reacheth to the other, that it helpeth it, or is made perfect by it: and both ways things be well ordained; particularly, as touching themselves, each of them are said to
be good; and generally, as touching order, excellent good. And that this order is in all things, we may prove it by the nature of order itself: for it is defined by Augustine to be the disposition of things like and unlike, attributing to everyone that which belongeth unto it. But no man is ignorant, that the parts of the world are diverse, and not alike, if they be compared one with another.
Moreover, how conveniently each one of them is allotted by God to his own place, proper seat, and standing, both experience teacheth, and the holy scriptures testify. For it is said; That God hath set the seas and the waters their bounds, neither may they pass the limits appointed unto them. Further;
He measureth the air with his span, &c. And seeing that so great a benefit of his, ought to be ascribed unto him, in respect of his providence, we may thus define it; that It is the mean which God useth in directing of things to their proper ends. In which definition is not only comprehended the knowledge, but also the will and power of doing it. Whereupon this that we avouch, Paul in the first chapter to the Ephesians, hath very well expressed, when he saith; Who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will.
And Cicero in his oration for Milo, taught by what tokens this providence may be known from natural reason: for thus he writeth; Neither doubtless can any man judge otherwise, unless it be such a one, as thinketh that there is no heavenly power, nor divine majesty; and whom neither the sun, neither the motions of the heavens and signs thereof, neither yet the order and course of all things do move; and so forth. The very self-same demonstration Paul describeth in the first chapter to the Romans. And Job in the twelfth chapter; Ask the cattle, and the fowls of the air, the fishes of the sea, and the plants of the earth, and they shall inform thee. Also in the 19th psalm; The heavens declare the power of God. Again Job in the 39th
and 40th chapters; Concerning the goats, the harts, the horse, the Leviathan, and Behemoth.
2. Wherefore let it thus be determined; the order of things declare, that these things which be created, are not made by chance, and at all adventures; wherefore God worketh according to his purpose: and unto his own providence, as unto a certain general and chief art, all things are subject; neither is there anything to be found, that can escape the same.
Which nevertheless some are bold to deny, who think that only the chief and principal things are committed to the care of God: but the residue, if they be of small account, they attribute to natural causes; if they be of greater importance, to angels and devils. Which thing a man may see in the dialogue of Plato called Protagoras, where the creation of things is so described, that some things are granted to Epimetheus to make, and some things to Prometheus. Yet to the intent that mankind might be well provided for, this only is avouched, that it was done by the works of the gods. But in the Gospel we be otherwise taught by Christ; All the hears of your head are numbered. And; Of two sparrows not one of them lighteth upon the ground without the will of your heavenly father. Again; The Lord himself hath looked down from heaven upon the children of men. But if these men would understand the matter thus, as though the providence of God extended not itself unto all things, after such a sort as it doth unto men: we would grant it; not that the providence which is merely simple in itself, should be said to be manifold; but because the effects which be directed by it, are diverse and sundry, therefore it self also seemeth to have diverse respects. Wherefore we grant, that the providence over godly men surmounteth so far, as in comparison of them, it is said by the Lord unto them that shall be damned, and to the foolish virgins; I know you not, and
so is it over men more than over unreasonable creatures. And by a lively faith of this providence, we reap many commodities, and especially a comfort in adversity; where we know that those things happen unto us, not by casualty, but by the will and procurement of God our father. Also we be daily stirred up the more unto good things, when we understand that God is both the knower and witness of our actions; who afterward will give a true judgment of them. Besides this, the gifts which we enjoy, be much more acceptable unto us in this respect, that they be offered us by God which provided them. Further, in the same we behold predestination, which bringeth so great a comfort unto godly men, as thereby they are wonderfully confirmed.
3. Neither must we stand in any fear, that there is any newness in God, because of his providence. Men, which by their parents are brought forth into the world without knowledge, cannot attain thereunto without alteration. Which thing we must not surmise as touching God, seeing he hath had his knowledge from all eternity. Further, we draw the same from the nature of things; but he hath it of himself. Wherefore James did truly write, With him there is no variableness, nor shadowing by turning. Neither cometh it to pass at any time, that the knowledge of God is changed by the alteration of things. Moreover, this excellent knowledge is safely placed in God: for there is no danger, least he should abuse the same as men do, of whom Jeremiah in his fourth chapter writeth; They are wise only, to the intent they may do evil. But God is most excellent, and he hath the knowledge of that thing that is most excellent, which knowledge who so ever hath, cannot use other things amiss, as Plato taught in his second dialogue called Alcibiades; where it is proved, that without that knowledge, it is better to be ignorant of many things. For it had been much better for
Orestes, if he had not known his mother when he met her, being determined for to kill her. Neither is God, by reason of this government of things, removed from his peaceable felicity, or from the contemplation of better things. This thing happeneth unto men, that sometimes by dealing in matters not necessary, be drawn away from weighty and better occupations.
Wherefore Paul, not without cause, condemned vain and curious questions.
And this cometh through the slenderness of our understanding, which is not able to apply itself to more things at once. But God being infinite as touching all his doings, can easily perceive all things that now be, that shall be, and that at any time have been. Neither is God by this knowledge of things provoked to evil: for that happeneth unto men, because they have a corrupt desire.
Wherefore Solomon said; Behold not the wine when it showeth fair in the glass, &c. Psalm 119. Turn away mine eyes least they behold vanity. And Job in the 31st chapter, saith, that He made a covenant with his eyes, least he should think upon a virgin. But God, which is the principal rule of justice and goodness, cannot be moved to evil. But Averroes said, that at the leastwise his understanding should be embased, if he would look upon and acknowledge all these simple things. But because he atteineth this knowledge, not from the things, but from himself; therefore that is not granted, neither doth it in very deed follow. Even as we see that a glass is not therefore stained, because it showeth the images of vile things; neither yet is this sun that we see, defiled, when it shineth upon places that be foul and loathsome. Labor also in understanding doth not disquiet God, seeing in this action he useth no instrument of a body; as men do, unto whom, by means of their body, there ariseth labor in understanding, for therein the body is very much afflicted and wearied. Wherefore Solomon upon just
cause, called this endeavor of knowledge, A consuming and affliction of the spirit: for knowledge sometime breedeth unto us disquietness. For the more men do understand, the more things they see that do displease them, wherewith they are aggrieved. Wherefore not without cause it is said; He that addeth knowledge, increaseth labor also. For we do not easily bear those things that be unworthily committed. But God is not subject to these human affections, who hath it in him to fore-see the end of things: and although the things be unworthy, yet he directeth them, and knoweth that they shall tend to his own glory.
4. But it hath been no hard matter, to take away from divine providence, those objections, which we have hitherto removed: for a plain and ready way was offered for the confuting of them. But there remain certain other things, more hard to be expounded. The first is, because of chance and fortune, which seemeth to be taken away from the nature of things, if we attribute unto God the providence of all: for there is nothing more against fortune and chance, than is reason. For fortune is a cause that worketh besides the purpose, when anything, not intended, or appointed, or decreed, happeneth to us unawares, and besides our expectation. But this argument we resist on this wise; As touching us, fortune and chance are not taken away by the providence of God. For what doth let (as touching God) that nothing is done by chance, but (as touching us) that many things be done rashly and by fortune? There is brought a meetly fit similitude: Admit that a master send his servant to the market, there to remain till nine of the clock; which hour being not yet past, if he send thither some other servant of his; as touching the master it cometh not to pass rashly or by chance, that those two servants meet together, seeing he fore-seeth the sending unto that place: but unto them it cometh not to pass of purpose, seeing the one knew nothing
at all of the others coming. Wherefore many things, which are done by the fore-sight and knowledge of God, if thou respect the dull and weak cogitation of man, happen by chance and fortune. But if all things (say they) be directed by God, and done by his counsel, as we believe they be, where shall now be the chance of things? For all things will come to pass of necessity. And some think this argument to be so strong against the providence of God, as scarcely the freedom of our will can be defended.
But to this reason is applied in a manner the same form of answer, which a little before we used as touching things that happen by fortune. For it may be, that if thou respect the next causes, those things that do happen, both are, and are justly called things happening by chance; for it is nothing repugnant to that cause, that it bring forth as well this effect, as another effect that is contrary thereunto. For as touching mine own will, it may so come to pass, that I do sit, as also that I do not sit. So then if these effects be referred unto that cause, they shall be, by chance; for they may be otherwise: howbeit, as they be subject to the providence of God, we must not deny but that they are of necessity. Wherefore there is granted a double necessity; that is to wit, a necessity absolute, and a necessity by supposition.
But it may be, that those things which by supposition are of necessity, if thou take them without supposition, they be things contingent, and not of necessity.
Isaiah in the 14th chapter showeth, that the kingdom of Babylon should be destroyed; which was but a chance, as touching the worldly causes thereof: for there was no let, but that it might otherwise be. And yet nevertheless, the prophet minding to show that it should undoubtedly come to pass, groundeth his reason upon the determinate will of God, and said; God hath so purposed, and who shall be able to disannul it? The hand of the Lord is
now stretched forth, and who shall pluck it back? Wherefore the thing now by this reason was of necessity. And in the 33rd Psalm we read; But the counsel of the Lord endureth forever, and the purposes of his heart from generation to generation. Yet they still urge the contrary; Necessity seemeth to be a let to the providence of God: for we consult not of those things which cannot otherwise be. Forsomuch then as there be many things in the world, which seem to be of necessity, those that be of this sort seem to exclude the providence of God. But here we must understand in this place, that although all things, as they have relation to the purpose and determinate will of God, being as it were done and decreed, be of necessity; yet as concerning God, the appointer and decreer of the act, all things are contingent; and nothing is of such necessity in the world, but that the same may otherwise be. Neither do we now speak of the definitions of things, or of necessary propositions or conclusions; seeing these things are not governed by divine providence: for they be descriptions of the eternal truth and divine nature. Some there be also which think, that there should be no evil found in the world, if it were governed of God by his providence. For none that dealeth providently in his works, would permit evil to take place.
But these may be easily answered, that there is no evil to be found, that is not either profitable to the saints, and furthereth them to salvation; or that declareth not the justice and mercy of God; or else that advanceth not the order of all things, and the preservation of the same.
The same place is expounded in 1. Sam. 10:2.
5. But to follow some order herein; first let us search whether there be any providence, or no; secondly, what it is; thirdly, whether all things be subject unto it; fourthly, whether it can be changed; and lastly, whether it may abide any casualty of things. But before I come to the purpose, let us speak
somewhat as touching the signification of the names thereof. Wherefore among the Grecians, a thing that cometh by chance is called "τύχη" (tychē), which is of such sort, as both it may be, and it may not be: and whether it be or be not, there is no absurdity, either against reason, or against the word of God. It is distinguished into 3 parts; of which the first is called by the Grecians "ἀδιάφορον" (adiaphoron), because it inclineth equally as much one way as another. The second "εἰκός" (eikos), which for the most part useth to happen after this manner or after that, but yet may otherwise come to pass. The third is called "σπάνιον" (spanion), because it falleth out but seldom, and not usually. The philosophers assign two grounds or beginnings of chance, one in the matter, the which as it lighteth upon diverse and sundry active causes, so it receiveth a diverse and sundry form; the other in the will, whereby our actions are governed: now the will hath consideration of the matter, because it is directed and forced by the understanding. Augustine in his book of questions, quest. 31. saith, Wisdom is by the philosophers divided into three parts; namely, into understanding, memory, and providence: and that memory is referred unto things past, understanding to things present; and that he is provident, which through the consideration of things past, and things present, can determine what will afterward come to pass. But God, not only understandeth and seeth what will come to pass, but he also addeth a will unto the same. For we affirm not only a bare understanding to be in God, but an effectual will also, whereby he ruleth and governeth all things. This of the Grecians is called
<H&G>, that is, Providence. And Cicero in his book De natura deorum, nameth it An old soothsaying wife of the Stoics; who was of such account among them in old time, as in the Isle of Delos, she was worshipped even for a Goddess, because she helped Latona at her child-bearing. But that
fable signifieth nothing else, but that second causes, although they have some force in themselves, yet they bring nothing to pass without the providence of God. For Latona, is nature; and providence the midwife: so that unless this latter be present, do help, and as it were play the midwifes part, the other bringeth forth nothing.
6. But now, as touching those five points, which at the beginning I determined to entreat of severally. In the first place, I propound to myself, that there is a providence: which thing may be proved by many sure and invincible arguments. For first, seeing that God is the author and creator of all things, and that he can do nothing unadvisedly, but that with himself he hath his own certain and assured reasons, therefore of necessity there is a providence. For if there be no artificer, but that he seeth the reasons and ends of his work, and conceiveth the ways by which he may bring the same to his purposed ends; it were a madness not to attribute that unto God the chief workman, whom the holy scriptures not only teach to be the creator of all things, but as it were a potter. Chrysostom in the 19th Homily upon the epistle to the Ephesians saith, that If a ship, though it be sound and well rigged, cannot brook the seas without a good master or governor; how much less can the whole workmanship of the world stand without the care and government of God? For if a master-workman will not begin to build, before he have devised in his mind all the parts, fashions, and forms of the building; shall we think, that God hath rashly, without counsel, or reason, made all things universally? Undoubtedly, the heavenly spheres, the stars, the firmament, the air, the water, the heat, the cold, so many causes and changes of things contrary and repugnant one to another, would fall to ruin, unless they were sustained by some governor. Without care and providence, our body might not be defended from the rigor of the heaven. We call those
provident men, which being of such excellent judgment and disposition, do keep all the parts of their body in their proper office and duty. But God hath the same place in the world, that the mind hath in man. Besides this, the holy scriptures ascribe unto God the destructions of kingdoms, and prophesies, and miracles, which things do far pass the compass of our nature. And last of all, they attribute unto him the general judgment, wherein God will one day render to every man according to their works.
Wherefore we, being induced by these, and many more reasons, do conclude that there is a providence. For we pass not for the Epicureans, whose manner of speech is this; Even so the powers on high, With labors toile are pressed, The care whereof which on them lie, Bereave them of their rest.
And this also; God walketh upon the poles of heaven, and considereth not the affairs of men. These monstrous opinions have they bred, partly for that they being of gross wit, could not perceive higher things; and partly being of a shameful and abominable life, would devise for themselves this consolation, least they should be perpetually tormented with the fear of punishments. For, He that liveth wickedly, abhorreth the light. And children, when they have done a fault, would not have either their father to be at home, or the master in the school. And as touching the first part, these things undoubtedly should be sufficient for Christians, who are persuaded only by the word of God, without other reason, that there is a providence.
7. But what providence is, we shall easily understand by the definition of the same. Providence is the power of God, whereby he directeth all things, and bringeth them to their [appointed] ends. In this definition, the general word is power. Assuredly, God is most absolute, yet for our capacity sake, we say that there is in him two manner of powers, to wit, the power of understanding, and the power of willing. For God understandeth and seeth all things; and not this only, but he also willeth all things. Here I will make no needles disputation, whether the will of God be before the understanding, or understanding before the will. If any man would know these things, I send them unto Scotus and Thomas. This power and faculty which I speak of, belongeth unto the quality, for it is a natural power. The difference is, that God by this power directeth all things, whatsoever either be, or hereafter shall be. But yet this is not enough; for he also conducteth them to their ends. But to what ends? Even unto agreeable ends. And those be agreeable, which his purpose hath appointed. The power is the cause: and, that things be brought to their proper ends, is the effect. Here have we comprehended all the kinds of causes which can be assigned in this matter.
This I speak, because there can be given no efficient cause of the providence of God. The formal cause is the power of God. The matter whereabout, are all manner of things whatsoever; for we in no wise except anything. But the final cause is, that all things may attain to their own ends, and may redound to the glory of God. By this definition we see, that the providence of God is not only a bare knowledge, but it is some bringing to effect. For as Paul saith; In him we live, we move, and have our being. And again; Of him, and in him, and by him are all things. And as Solomon saith;
Man may prepare his heart, but God ordereth the speech. For we are not able to move, no not the tongue, being the lightest part of the body, without
the providence of God. And Christ saith; that A sparrow doth not light upon the ground without the will of our heavenly Father. And, All the hears of our head are numbered. Some dream that God indeed made all these things; but after he had made them, cast them off. So (forsooth) carpenters, when they have done sufficiently in building of a house, they afterward leave the same: but if God should do so, this world would soon come to ruin. For a house, unless it be oftentimes repaired and underpropped, falleth to ruin and decay. If the soul be severed from the body, what remaineth, but that the body will become putrefied and rotten?
Neither are they to be heard, which say; that God indeed ruleth all things: but that this is nothing else, but to minister unto all things the common influence, which everything draweth unto itself. This is even to make God, not in very deed, but in name to be the ruler and governor of the world. For if so be that everything, according to the nature thereof do bend and apply unto itself that common influence of God, then God followeth the nature of things created; whereas rather contrariwise all things created ought to follow and seek after God. But they say, that even as he, which throweth a stone, or shooteth an arrow, hath done enough to have first forced the same, although he himself afterward follow not after them, when they be out of his hand: so it was sufficient for God, in that he endued all things with a certain power, although he do not perpetually govern them. But these things be not alike; for a stone and an arrow do fall immediately after that they be shot, because that force which is in things created cannot be of long continuance. Wherefore, unless that God should prosecute by his everlasting care and providence, the thing which he hath forced, the nature of everything could not abide. When the Peripatetiks perceived that all these inferior things, were continually troubled; they judged that the
providence of God was above the moon: as if it were not convenient for it to be careful for these inferior things, no further forth than a certain common influence is thereby ministered unto all things. But these are fond reasons; for the scriptures teach us, that even these things, which to us may seem to come most of all by chance, are yet governed by the providence of God. In Deuteronomy the 19th. If an ax flying by chance out of his hands that heweth wood, strike a man and kill him as he passeth by; It is I (saith the Lord) that delivered him into the hand of the slayer. And in the 14th chapter of Job, it is said of God; Thou hast appointed man his bounds, which he shall not pass. Also in the book of wisdom, (which book though it be not in the canon, yet containeth it many good and godly sayings) in that book (I say) in the eighth chapter, it is written; Wisdom reacheth from one end to another "μηκος" (mēkos), and disposeth all things "σωφρόνως"
(sōphronōs): it reacheth (saith he) "κραταιως" (krataiōs), that is to say, Strong and mighty: and disposeth Profitably: for so soundeth "σωφρόνως"
(sōphronōs); and not Sweetly, as the old translation hath. And that profit, although it be not oftentimes perceived of us, yet is it always of such sort, as it doth tend to the glory of God.
8. But whether all things be subject to the providence of God, is a matter in controversy: for some say, they be; and some say, they be not. But, as we said before; if God have made all things, undoubtedly nothing is exempted from his providence: for if anything should be exempted from his providence, that also should be exempted from creation. It is written in the epistle to the Hebrews; He upholdeth all things by the word of his power.
The Hebrew phrase; The word of his power is instead of His mighty word.
This place agreeth with that which we cited out of the book of wisdom.
Ezekiel calleth God; The Lord of all flesh. And Moses calleth God; The
Lord of spirits. And Paul saith; It is he that worketh all things, according to the determination of his will. Also Hesiodus an Ethnic poet saith; In this life we can nowhere escape from the mind of God. Yet there be some which would exempt from God's providence, men and free will, and things that either be of necessity, or that come by chance. Cicero in his book De fato saith; that The most ancient philosophers, such as Empedocles and Heraclitus, affirmed, that All things come to pass of necessity: but the Peripatetikes were of the opinion, that many things come by chance. And Chrysippus as a notable umpire, although he taught that all other things were of necessity; yet affirmed, that man's will, as touching the first election, is free. Wherefore Eusebius in his treatise De praeparatione evangelica, said pleasantly, that Democritus made men to be slaves; but that Chrysippus made them but half slaves.
Also Cicero in his second book De divinatione, will rather exclude all providence, than that men should not be free. Which vanity Augustine deriding in his fifth book De civitate Dei, saith, that He to make men free, had made them rob God of his glory. So we see, that there be some which think not, that all things be under providence: but in that they except man by name, which is the chiefest workmanship of God, that seemeth too contumelious a thing against God. For seeing all artificers contemn trifling works of small value, but do adorn, and have a special care of those works which be excellent; who will imagine that God could despise that work, which of all other he made most choice of? And if it should be so, in what state stand we? What refuge should we have in adversity? David saith; Cast all thy care upon God, and he will nourish thee. And Peter saith, It is he that taketh care of you. And Zechariah; He that toucheth you, shall touch the apple of mine eye. And I (saith the Lord) am thy buckler, and thy strong
wall. The Lord (saith David ) is my helper, and I shall not be afraid what man can do against me. Though their tents were pitched against me, yet my heart shall not be afraid.
9. But thou wilt say, that In inferior matters, many things are done either without order, or else disorderly: for we see often-times the godly to be oppressed, and the wicked to flourish. Admit it be so; but is there no providence therefore, because we do not see the causes thereof? If peradventure thou shouldest be in a smiths shop, and seest many tools, some crooked, some bowed, some hooked, and some sawed in; wouldest thou strait-way condemn them all for naught, because they appear not straight and handsome? I think not; but thou wouldest rather confess thyself to be ignorant of the use of them. Such an honor must be given to God, as when thou seest tyrants and wicked men to enjoy wealth and prosperity, thou must say, that they be instruments of the providence of God, although thou canst not perceive what God intendeth by them. Augustine saith, that God is so good, as he is able to draw out some goodness even out of the wicked. Further, if there were no tyrants, what virtue and patience of martyrs should there be? God will have some to be the triumph of his goodness, he will have some also upon whom he may exercise his might and power. But perhaps thou wilt say; Is it not enough that men be martyrs in the preparation of their mind? Indeed there be noble virtues hidden in the minds of the godly, but yet oftentimes this doth not satisfy God: he will bring them forth into act, that they may be seen. Wherefore our eyes must be lifted up, that we think not of the ungodly, but of God. So the prophets call Nebuchadnezzar, Pharaoh, and Sennacherib, hatchets, hammers, saws, and swords in the hand of God.
Job, when he was turned out of all that he had, respected not the Chaldeans, nor the devil, but said; The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away. He is accounted a learned physician, which can draw out unto the outward part of the body the corrupt humors, which be hidden within the body; yet we would abhor blanes and sores: but the physician saith, that then the sick man beginneth to heal, when such things break forth. In like manner God, with his medicines and fires of persecutions bringeth into light those things, which before lay hidden in our minds. Let the wicked do what they will, yet can they do nothing more than is the will of God. So said
Peter in the Acts as touching Pilate and Herod; They agreed together, that they might do, whatsoever thy will and thy counsel had decreed to do.
10. But thou wilt say; Some things be of necessity, which cannot otherwise be than they are; do those fall under the providence of God? Yea truly, there is nothing created of such necessity, but if it be referred unto
God, it hath the nature of a thing that cometh by chance. For as we said; God reacheth from end to end, and ordereth all things. What thing is of more necessity than the course of the sun? And yet Joshua made the sun to stand still. What thing is of more necessity, than that the fire should burn, if fuel be applied thereunto? Therefore it hath been an old saying; If active things be applied to things passive, the action must follow of necessity. Yet nevertheless God brought to pass, that those three young men walked safely in the flaming furnace. What is of more necessity, than that the shadow should follow the sun shining? And yet God brought to pass, that when the sun did shine, the shadow went backward. But man seemed to have been made, and to be left in the hand of his own counsel. Thou shalt keep those things (saith Ecclesiasticus) and they shall keep thee. I grant that man, as concerning the inward causes, was so made at the beginning, as nothing
could be to him of any necessity: but we do not therefore exclude the grace of God and providence. Let us hear the holy scriptures as touching that matter. For Ecclesiasticus is not among the number of the canonical books;
The kings heart (saith Solomon) is in the hand of God. But God saith; I have given them precepts. But he also saith; I will make you to walk in my commandments. Again; I will give you a new heart, and a new spirit.
Wherefore man is not to be exempted from the providence of God.
11. But much less are those things to be excluded, which seem to be done by chance. For although we cannot perceive the reason of the second causes, yet God seeth it; yea, the Philosophers teach us, that every cause, which they call Per accidens, that is, Coming by chance, must be revoked unto that which is a cause by itself: for that which is Per accidens, cannot be any cause. Wherefore Aristotle in his little book De bona fortuna, when he demanded for what cause some were fortunate, and some not? He answered, that it is done by a certain violent motion, and impulsion; whereof nevertheless, he that is driven, cannot yield a cause: hereby it cometh to pass (saith he) that some are fortunate, and some not.
Furthermore he saith, that this event, if it be referred to our will and knowledge, happeneth by chance; but that enforcement is a cause by itself.
But the question is not thus dissolved. For how cometh it to pass, that this fortune is given to one man, and not to another? The Astrologers would supply that, which they thought Aristotle wanted. Ptolemy in his book
<H&G>, referreth this unto the stars; by which (he saith) men being diversely borne, are carried some to prosperity, and some to adversity. And this, some called, A power, some Constellation, and other some Particular destiny; Socrates called it Daemoniu. But why it happeneth more to one man, than to another; and more at one time, than at another; none other
cause can be assigned, but the providence of God: which undoubtedly is, that all things should be referred to the glory of God.
It is not you (saith Joseph to his brethren) that sold me into Egypt; but God sent me hither before you. So God said that he sent Saul unto Samuel, although it seemed as if he had turned out of the way to him by chance. So Christ said unto his Apostles; There shall one meet you bearing a pitcher of water. These things were certain unto the providence of God, although otherwise in the sight of men, they might seem but things coming by chance. But thou wilt say; Be there then no second causes? Doeth God nothing by his angels? We take not away the second causes; but we make them instruments of the providence of God: for Angels be administering spirits. And David saith; Who do execute his will. But although God send his angels, yet he himself is present and principal over all things; If I shall ascend (saith David) into heaven, thou art there; if I go down into hell, thou art there also. For he doth not so give his angels charge, as though he himself were absent. Which thing the poets feign of Apollo, that he placed
Phaethon in his chariot, and by that means all the heavens in his absence were set on fire. But sins, (will some man say) depend not on providence.
How sins be ruled by God, shall be showed afterward. In the meantime this I say; The cause of sin undoubtedly cometh from us: but at what time, and against whom it should break forth, that is in the power of God. It was wholly determined by Nebuchadnezzar, that he would oppress some people; but that he should oppress the Jews more than others, that was provided by God.
12. The next question is, Whether this providence be immutable. Why should it not? For it is the rule of all things that be done. It is written in the third of Malachi; I am the Lord, and am not changed. In the first of James;
With him there is no variableness, nor shadowing by turning. And in the 19th of Proverbs; There be many cogitations in the heart of man, but the counsel of the Lord continueth steadfast. In the 46th of Isaiah; It is I that speak, and my counsel abideth surly, and I do what so ever pleaseth me. For seeing providence is both the knowledge and will of God, and that those things belong to the very essence of God, it cannot be changed, except God himself be changed therewithal. The second causes indeed, seeing they be diverse and sundry, they oftentimes hinder themselves; which thing we see come to pass in the influences of heaven, that some of them be an impediment to others; but the will of God cannot be hindered by any violence. In old time God ordained the ceremonies of the Jews, afterward he would have them to be abrogated. How then? Is not the providence of God mutable? I answer; that In God is altogether one and the self-same will; but that he fore-saw from the beginning, what might agree with the diversity of times. Augustine to Marcellinus saith, that A husbandman doth sometime sow, sometime reap, and sometime compass the soil; yet we must not say that the art of husbandry is therefore mutable. Vindicianus saith, that A certain physician ministered a medicine to a sick man, and healed him; and that he many years after falling into the same disease, took the same medicine without the counsel of the physician: but when he waxed worse, he came to the physician, showing him the matter, and began to complain of the medicine. No marvel (quoteth Vindicianus) then; for I ministered not the same unto thee. Now when some men marveled thereat, and were of opinion that he used some enchantment; There is no such matter (saith he) for now is he of another age, and hath other humors than he had when I gave him that his medicine. But shall not therefore the art of
physic be like itself? Even so in any wise God, although he foresee all things, yet he hath not decreed, that all things should be done at one time.
13. Now let us come to chance. If so be that the providence of God be so certain, whether can it admit any casualty? Here will I first use two distinctions, and afterward I will answer. There is one necessity which is absolute, and another conditional. For when we say, that God is wise or just, we understand that that is simply, and absolutely necessary. There be other things necessary by supposition; as that which is commonly canvassed in the schools, to wit, that whatsoever is, while it is, is necessary. Christ and the prophets fore-showed that the city of Jerusalem should be overthrown; therefore of necessity it shall be overthrown: not that this necessity is in the nature of the city, but because Christ and the prophets have foretold it, who could not be deceived. Paul saith; that There must needs be heresies: and Christ saith; It is necessary that offenses come. For these causes being set down; namely, the corrupt natures of men, and the devils hatred towards mankind: and the end being granted, to wit that the elect should be tried, it is necessary by supposition, that it should so come to pass. Also things may be considered two manner of ways, either as they be in act; and in that case they have the nature of necessity, for they be no longer indefinite. As, to write, or not to write, is by chance: but if thou be now in the act of writing, it is no more chance, but necessary. Wherefore we say that the knowledge of the senses is certain, because the things themselves cannot otherwise be.
Or else things may be considered, as they lie hidden in their causes: but seeing causes may sometime bring forth effects, and sometimes not, therefore there is no necessary power of working in them. But if those things be referred unto God, the reason is far otherwise: For he calleth those things which be not, as though they were; for he comprehendeth all time,
and hath neither beginning nor ending. All things also, which are to come forever hereafter, are notwithstanding present unto him. Here also cometh in the will of God; for we must not ascribe unto him a bare knowledge; but such as is effectual, or actual. And by this means I say, that the very things themselves are to be considered as necessary. Augustine In genesi ad literam, the sixth book, chapter 15. There be many ways whereby man, and other things might have been made by God, and those means had some possibility, and no necessity: but this is by the will of God, whose will is the necessity of things. And though such things, being referred unto God, be necessary; yet of us they must be weighed according to their inward and proper causes, and so be called things contingent, or that come by chance.
For it is of no necessity, that such as the efficient cause is, such also should be the effect.
14. If thou demand, Why these two kinds of causes be in the nature of things, so as some be limited and necessary, others indefinite and contingent? Nothing else can be answered, but that God hath laid these conditions upon all things. God bringeth forth all things, and he limiteth and boundeth all things; but yet so, as he neither confoundeth nor destroyeth the nature of things. Boetius in his Topics saith, that Destiny is so called, of drawing to, and giving place fitly: for God draweth all things; but yet after a sort so giveth place, as he disturbeth nothing. Even so things, although in their own nature they incline indifferently on both parts; yet by God, they are made to incline more to one side than to another. The will of Saul, of his own nature, was no more determined to go than to tarry: but when God would send him unto Samuel, that will began to incline to the one part. And therefore God put into his mind the will of his father, and brought to pass, that the same should effectually move and persuade his mind: and that all
other desires of rest and ease (if any were) that might have retained him at home, should be subdued. Wherefore it came to pass, that the will of Saul obeyed the providence of God. But yet in the meantime, the nature of the thing was not violated; but that the will of Saul was alike free unto either part. Hereby it appeareth, how necessary the grace of God is unto us. For our own will, as it is all manner of ways corrupted, turneth all things to the worser part. Also there be many things, which do dull and blind our understanding, that the will cannot easily follow. God therefore propoundeth good unto our understanding, afterward he kindleth faith, and stirreth up the will that we do will the same effectually.
15. But thou wilt say; Why is anything said to be contingent, seeing God hath already determined of the one part, and so it is made a thing of necessity? I answer; Every thing of his own property and beginning is contingent; but providence, which bringeth a necessity, is an outward cause, of which nothing ought to be named. I know there be many, which affirm, that those things which cannot be done by man's power, are brought unto that pass by God, that our will may either choose or refuse them; and that there the providence of God stayeth, and goeth no further: but when as God foreseeth what every man will choose, and what he will refuse, his foreknowledge hindereth nothing at all. Howbeit, these sayings do not sufficiently agree with the holy scriptures. For they teach, that God doth not provide for things, that he will forsake them; but that (as we have said) he may conduct them to their ends, and those ends do serve the providence of God. For so saith Paul; God hath made all things according to the purpose of his will. So said God himself in Isaiah; All things that I will, I do. And Christ saith; Verily, even a little sparrow lighteth not upon the ground without the will of our father. I know that Origin, Cyril, Chrysostom, and
others being urged by certain manifest places of the scriptures, such as these are; It behooved Christ to suffer; The scriptures ought to be fulfilled, do thus interpret them; to wit, that these things did not therefore come to pass, because God fore-saw them; but therefore God fore-saw them, because they should come to pass. This judgment of theirs, if they spake as touching absolute knowledge, could not much be reprehended. For, not because I see a man writing, therefore he writeth; but because he writeth, therefore I see him writing. Howbeit, we cannot affirm a bare knowledge in God, but we must also attribute unto him a will, whereby he directeth and ordereth all things. Yet shall it be true that they say, if their meaning be of the effect, or (as they say) A posteriore, that is, of the latter. For we hereof, that a thing is done, do understand, that it was the purpose of God that so it should be.
Otherwise the scriptures speak very plainly; It behooved Christ to die; It behooved that the scriptures should be fulfilled. But how did it behoove?
By supposition; because God so for-saw it: not that that necessity was in the nature of the thing.
16. But peradventure thou wilt say, that therefore the causes in the nature of the thing it self be infinite, for that I take not the perfect and full causes, in so much as I should have added the providence of God. I answer; I only take the inward and proper causes of everything, whose effects, because they might or might not be brought forth by them, be things contingent. But I add not providence, because the same is an outward cause. The which being added, it cannot be avoided, but that by supposition, some necessity must follow. For, Saul met with men caring of kids, bread, and wine: their will, in respect of the nature thereof, was infinite, either to have given him, or not to have given him anything: but God by his providence did limit that will unto the one part. They went to Bethel, there to sacrifice; they met with
Saul weary upon the way, and almost dead with hunger; it seemed a courtesy to refresh him: this did God put into their minds. And if there were anything, which might be a let unto this will, those things he bridled. And these things we dispute only concerning the wills of men: for otherwise, in other things which be contingent, I know the means be infinite, which God is wont to use. Another example of this matter we have out of the 21st chapter of Ezekiel; Nebuchadnezzar marched into Syria, and when he was now onward on the way, at a place where two ways met, he began to consult with himself, whether it were better for him to lead his power against the Jews, or else against Rabath the chief city of the Ammonits. He drew lots thereupon, the lots did God so frame, that he brought him to Jerusalem. The nature of the thing itself was contingent, but the same being appointed of God became a thing of necessity. Joseph was so sold and carried into Egypt, that as concerning the nature of the thing, it might be, that either he should live always in bondage, or else that he should at one time or other be delivered. But God sent dreams into the Baker and Butler; those dreams did Joseph interpret: afterward he showed Pharaoh a dream, which when none of the diviners could expound, the Butler gave him intelligence of Joseph: and by this means it came to pass, that Joseph was delivered out of prison. Wherefore be it thus determined (as we have said) that all things having relation to the providence of God, be necessary; but of their own nature are contingent.
But thou wilt say; Shall the affects be absolutely called things coming by chance, or rather of necessity? Some there be, that for the dignity of providence, will have them called necessary: but I would rather call them contingent, according to their own nature. Albeit I will not greatly strive, so that the same necessity be understood only by supposition. Rightly did
some of the Greeks name providence "διοίκησις" (dioikēsis), of passing through; because it passeth through everything: others called it "πρόνοια"
(pronoia), because nothing can escape it. Some will say, that we receive the opinion of the Stoics concerning destiny. That is not true; for they defined their destiny to be a necessity by a knitting together of causes, and affirmed that the same did over-rule even God himself. But contrariwise, we teach that God governeth all things, and that he useth them to his own glory. But if they affirm that destiny is nothing else, but the providence of God; the question is only as touching the word, and not of the thing: as Augustine else-where hath taught. Lastly, thou wilt say, that by this means, there will be no place for advisements, admonitions, and corrections, seeing that which God will, must needs come to pass. The self same thing was objected to Augustine, whereupon he wrote the book De correptione and gratia.
Undoubtedly God, although he have decreed a thing to be done, yet he useth means in bringing the same to pass. He will change the naughty will of man; he useth admonitions, preachings, and chastisements. For these be the instruments of God's providence: so far is it that the providence of God excludeth them. In this question we have set in a manner the roots, and laid the foundations of predestination: but of it we will entreat another time, when opportunity shall serve.
I know I am misreported, that I make God to be the author of sin; but that is not true, as it shall plainly appear. But I only endeavor by my doctrine, to show how the scriptures must be understood, when they seem so to affirm:
Also what Augustine meant, who said, that God bendeth the wills of men as well unto good, as unto evil: And in like manner, how Zwingli and Oecolampadius, and other great learned men, professors of the Gospel, must be understood, when they seem to avouch the same.