Calvin's Response to Pighius On Book Three [of Pighius]

Now we come to Pighius’s third book, which he devotes entirely to discussing Augustine. Since I had cited Augustine as a key supporter of our position, Pighius aims here not only to pull Augustine from my side but to recruit him for his own. This, at least, is what he claims at the start. But as he gets into the substance, he constantly wavers, sometimes searching for ways to evade Augustine’s clear teachings, and at other times openly rejecting the Augustine he originally sought to make his ally. What, then, is the point of making grand promises to deliver everything, only to leave readers disappointed?

My purpose here is twofold. First, I want readers who seek truth and sound judgment to see Pighius’s true motives. He has not entered this debate from a genuine desire for sound teaching but from a vehement and unseemly hatred for us. His arguments are driven not by a sincere search for truth but by vanity and a love for quarreling. Nothing he presents is sincere or honest; he is content if he can deceive readers, earning admiration for his cleverness and cunning.

Second, I want readers to recognize the honesty and openness in my claim that at least one ancient church father—Augustine—clearly aligns with our views.

Pighius accuses me of quoting Augustine out of context, implying that I misunderstand his intent. But let’s examine this. One passage I referenced is from Augustine's Letter to Anastasius (Letter 145), where Augustine writes that the human will is not free without the Spirit’s help, as it is bound by powerful desires. Is anything here unclear or out of context?

Pighius also challenges my use of a passage from The Perfection of Righteousness. Here, Augustine confronts the dilemma posed by Pelagius, who argued: "Does man sin by necessity or by free choice? If by necessity, he’s not to blame; if by choice, then who gave him this capacity? God, who is good, of course. So why does it seem inclined more toward evil?" Augustine’s response is clear: human freedom became bound after sin entered the world. As a result, our will was “corrupted,” turning freedom into a form of bondage. He explains that humanity, due to this corruption, now cries out to God, saying, “Deliver me from my necessities.” This is why we cannot fully understand what is good or do it without God’s help.

Augustine then notes that true freedom was lost when our will turned from God. We became slaves to sin, requiring deliverance. Augustine’s words underscore that, just as the sick need a doctor, the bound will needs a liberator. Our true freedom—spiritual health—is only restored through the grace and healing of God.

Now, let Pighius try to claim that I’ve quoted fragments out of context! Augustine’s teaching here is unambiguous: our will, once corrupted by sin, can only be liberated by the grace of God.

Let’s look further at Augustine’s view on human freedom and sin. In his letter to Laurentius, Augustine writes, “Man misused his free choice and so lost both himself and it.” This statement, far from being unclear, simply means that by choosing sin, humanity lost its original freedom. Augustine explains this further in his writings to Boniface: true obedience doesn’t come from human strength alone but from the Spirit’s help. For the human will to act righteously, it must be freed by God’s grace, for as it stands, free choice without God is only capable of sinning. He adds that without divine assistance, our will lacks the power to pursue righteousness.

Augustine is clear: true freedom isn’t natural to us in our fallen state. In his book Rebuke and Grace, he even uses a touch of irony, saying that “free choice is free from righteousness and in bondage to sin.” By this, he means that what we call “freedom” is, without God, merely enslavement to sin. Genuine freedom, he says, comes only through the liberating power of grace.

In another passage, Augustine speaks directly about the human will, which he describes as “bound.” He writes, “O that man were made perfect by God’s gift, and not by the free—or rather, bound—choice of his will!” Augustine here acknowledges that human choice, if not empowered by God, remains bound by sin.

Pighius claims I misinterpret Augustine’s words, but the truth is clear. Augustine saw true freedom as dependent on divine grace, without which human will is constrained to sin. I never argued that these passages alone resolve the matter; they simply demonstrate Augustine’s view on the limits of “free” choice. Pighius misrepresents my intent, pretending I rely on these few words to settle the whole debate. In reality, they reveal Augustine’s perspective on the will: in sin, it is bound, and true freedom is the gift of God alone.

Before Pighius brings Augustine into his argument, he suggests we consider the different periods in which Augustine wrote his works, dividing them into three phases: the first before the Pelagian controversy, the second during his disputes with Pelagius, and the third after the conflict had subsided. I am willing to accept this division, but I cannot agree with Pighius’s underlying assumption that Augustine’s writings from the time of the controversy are less reliable simply because they were written in the heat of debate. Pighius implies that Augustine’s later works, written with more calm, offer a clearer view of his true beliefs.

However, I disagree with the notion that Augustine’s commitment to truth was compromised by the intensity of the Pelagian dispute. Augustine was not a young, impulsive man during these writings; he approached them with the maturity of experience. Furthermore, although he often scaled back his praise for free choice, he never retracted or regretted his limitations on it. This consistency across his works shows that his views did not change after the controversy ended; rather, he maintained the same convictions throughout. Augustine’s writings, regardless of the period, were aimed at faithfully expounding the truth, and his stance remained steady from start to finish.

Let's turn to Pighius's argument about Augustine's early writings. He begins by citing Augustine's work on free will, written against the Manichees, where Augustine argues that free will was essential for humanity so that people could live rightly. Pighius claims that if we deny this, we undermine the justice of God’s judgment. But to clarify, Augustine himself states in his Retractations that the purpose of these writings was to address the origin of evil, not to discuss how humanity can return to goodness or advance spiritually. Augustine’s aim was to show that sin came from humanity’s choice to rebel, not from God’s creation. So, when Pighius tries to emphasize Augustine’s praise of free will, he should also recall Augustine’s words: Free will existed when it was whole, but now, damaged and weakened, it needs humble confession, not proud defense.

Pighius offers another proof from Augustine’s On Free Choice, where Augustine argues that the shift in humanity—from choosing what is eternally good to preferring lower things—was voluntary. He explains that without this voluntary choice, humanity could not rightly be praised or blamed for actions. However, Augustine clarifies that he was describing human nature as it was created, not as it is now, corrupted. Today, he argues, our fallen nature means we cannot live rightly without God’s grace to free the will from sin’s bondage. The will, Augustine insists, must first be liberated by God’s grace, or it could never act righteously. Without grace, the human will remains captive to sin.

Augustine’s real purpose in addressing the Manichees was to reject their belief that sin originates from God. Instead, Augustine affirms that sin came from humanity’s misuse of free will. Humanity was indeed created free, yet after falling into bondage through sin, we need more than a reminder of what we once were; we need God’s hand to lift us up from our lost state.

To put it plainly, there is no disagreement between us on the original nature of humanity. Pighius asserts that man was created with free will, and we wholeheartedly agree; we have always held to this. Augustine also speaks about the significant difference between humanity in its original, unfallen state and its current state of corruption due to sin. Our dispute is not about humanity’s original nature but its present, fallen condition. Yet Pighius focuses extensively on Augustine's words about humanity's unfallen state, ignoring Augustine’s clarification that when he speaks of a will free to do good, he means the will that existed at creation.

Pighius exclaims that Augustine plainly teaches that nothing is more in man’s control than his own will. But if he would read further, he would find Augustine saying that this inability to do good is now part of human punishment, resulting from the fall. Augustine explains, “If humanity is now as it was created—unchangeable in goodness—then sin would be impossible. But because humanity is not as it once was, it cannot make itself good. This is part of its punishment.” Augustine adds that while humanity could fall by its own choice, it cannot rise again on its own; it needs God’s grace to be restored.

These statements, which Pighius considers his strongest proofs, do not in any way take Augustine away from our side. Pighius claims that I have falsely aligned Augustine with my position, but that would be hard to prove. In fact, Pighius wears himself out in defending Augustine against claims I never made. I embrace all the statements Pighius quotes from Augustine, as they fully support our view of humanity’s need for grace. Whether free will and necessity can coexist is another question, one that we will address elsewhere, for it does not belong here, any more than a painting of a shipwreck needs a cypress tree in its background.

Pighius argues that Augustine denied anyone could be guilty of sin if they couldn’t avoid sinning. Anyone examining Augustine's words closely, however, will see that Augustine is talking about the origin of sin—about how this binding necessity to sin began when the first man fell freely and willingly. This point, crucial to understanding Augustine's position, is something Pighius chose to leave out. Augustine himself clarifies in his Retractations that he didn’t openly discuss original sin or our corrupted nature in his argument with the Manichees, as they rejected Scripture, particularly the Old Testament, from which such proofs would be drawn. Much of what Augustine says here is said as a concession to his opponents rather than as his final view on human nature.

Pighius triumphantly claims he needs only one contradiction from Augustine to prove his point, suggesting I believe Augustine is entirely consistent on this matter. But what made him think I ever claimed that? I’m fully aware that Augustine’s views matured over time. As a young man refuting the Manichees, Augustine relied more on his natural reasoning and philosophy than on spiritual wisdom. Back then, his goal was mainly to show that humanity’s ruin came from its own choice. But later, when confronted by the Pelagians, Augustine was spurred to a deeper understanding of grace and human dependence on God. Out of that struggle came a clearer, more profound articulation of grace—a perspective which I believe Augustine holds in common with us. It’s as if God used the defiance of the Pelagians to drive Augustine deeper into the truth, magnifying God’s grace and humbling human pride.

Pighius then brings up another passage from Augustine’s Two Souls, where Augustine describes the will as an “uncoerced movement of the mind, directed toward keeping or acquiring something.” Pighius seems to think this weakens our position, but it does not. Augustine himself clarifies that he wrote this to distinguish between those who choose willingly (like humanity’s first sin in paradise) and those forced by external compulsion. Augustine continues, saying, “The will is free only when liberated by grace; otherwise, it’s not truly will but mere passion—corruption in service to sin, from which only Christ can free us.” So, Augustine stresses here that a corrupted will lacks true freedom and is bound by sin, a view completely in line with ours.

Pighius then references Augustine’s definition of sin as “the will to pursue what righteousness forbids, something we are free to avoid.” He argues that if we are not free, it is not truly “will.” Augustine himself explains that this definition only applies to the first sin, Adam’s original transgression. He clarifies, “This definition is true when it describes sin alone—not also the punishment for sin. For when sin itself becomes a punishment, how much freedom does the will retain when enslaved by sinful passions?” Augustine’s words make it plain that he’s referring specifically to the initial state of humanity before the fall, when sin was chosen freely, without bondage.

Pighius attempts to dismiss this, saying Augustine teaches, “Nobody deserves criticism or punishment if they cannot avoid sin.” Yet, Augustine himself warns that this reasoning applies only to the original sin when Adam fell with a free will. Now, humanity’s will is captive to sin as part of God’s just punishment, only able to be freed by the grace of Christ. Augustine affirms that we cannot be condemned for what we do without freedom; however, after the fall, this freedom has been lost, and our will remains bound until liberated by God’s mercy.

Pighius even suggests Augustine’s thought aligns with his own, to the extent that he would call Augustine “brutish” if he didn’t. But in doing so, Pighius twists Augustine’s words, ignoring that Augustine’s teachings on human freedom and grace directly oppose Pighius’s interpretation. Augustine would, in fact, never agree that man’s will remains fully free after the fall.

Finally, Pighius cites True Religion, where Augustine says sin cannot exist without a voluntary will, and that free choice dwells in the will: “For God determined that his servants would be better if they served him freely, by will and not by necessity.” But Augustine later clarifies this in his Retractations, noting that this statement applies only to sin in its original form, before it became our punishment. When our acts are now called voluntary, Augustine explains, it’s because they stem from an evil will—one that cannot become good without the healing and preparation of the Lord. Far from agreeing with Pighius, Augustine shows that human will is now bound and in need of divine intervention to incline it toward good.

Augustine’s writings, properly interpreted, consistently reject the notion that human will is fully free in its present, fallen state, a point that Pighius fails to acknowledge by forcing Augustine’s words to serve his own flawed argument.

Pighius argues that Augustine equates "voluntary" with "free" and that necessity is the opposite of free will. Now, I would have no issue with this if the will were fully intact and free by nature. It’s similar to saying that humans are two-legged beings and therefore can walk. But if applied to a paralyzed person, this argument would fail because paralysis hinders them. The same is true for the will: though created free, it has become enslaved by corruption. It remains bound until God sets it free. Augustine himself puts it plainly: “If we want to defend free choice, let’s not reject the grace by which it is liberated to avoid evil and do good” (Letter to Vitalis). Or more concisely: “In this debate, we must consider not nature alone, but its corruption” (The Grace of God Against Celestius). Augustine here speaks of the will’s natural state, but he recognizes its bondage due to sin.

As to the second part of Pighius's claim, Augustine says, “Through free choice, man became a sinner, but now corruption, as a punishment, has made freedom into necessity.” When Pelagius asked if sin arose from the will or necessity, Augustine replied by quoting the Psalm, “Deliver me from my necessities” (The Perfection of Righteousness). I believe these quotes alone are sufficient. But for further clarity, Augustine addresses Pelagius’s followers who cited Jerome’s words that “we were created with free choice and are not compelled toward virtue or vice by necessity.” Augustine answers, “Who would deny that our nature was created in a state different from the one it’s now in? In doing right, there is no chain of necessity because freedom flows from love. But note: ‘The love of God has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit.’ Who grants this love but the One who ascended on high and led captivity captive? Let humanity understand that the need to sin comes from the corruption of nature, not its creation, and let us ask God, ‘Deliver me from my necessities.’”

Pighius’s citation from The Greatness of the Soul doesn’t even need a response. Augustine is clear that whenever he praises free choice, he is referring to humanity’s original creation—not the miserable state into which we have plunged ourselves by our own choice. If Pighius refuses to accept this clarification, he has only to note that Augustine himself later retracted or corrected any statements he made otherwise.

Given all this, is it surprising, reader, that we remain untroubled by the supposed force of Pighius's arguments?

Let us continue. In Against Faustus the Manichee, Augustine notes that humanity was initially created with the potential to resist sinful desires. This point is not controversial, as he speaks about our original, unfallen state. But then Augustine adds something relevant to our current condition: “Man is renewed through that capacity by which, had he chosen, he could have avoided falling.” Pighius argues that this “capacity” refers to free will and claims Augustine supports his view. But this is far from Augustine’s intent, as he repeatedly rejects such a reading, even encouraging the African bishops to condemn it.

What does Augustine actually mean here? He’s saying that by God’s mercy, we are restored from bondage to sin into a freedom that enables us to resist worldly desires, fleshly temptations, and corrupt passions. This is the “capacity” Augustine praises—the strength to stand firm in the Lord. Why didn’t Augustine explicitly say this in that passage? He himself explains: “When writing against the Manichees, I refer to this as ‘nature’ rather than ‘grace’ because the issue with them was specifically over nature. Yet, grace restores our fallen nature to do what it is powerless to accomplish on its own” (Retractations 1.16). Augustine acknowledges that he used the term “nature” to counter the Manichees but clarifies that it is truly grace that restores our corrupted nature and enables it to stand once again.

The passage Pighius next quotes, from Against Felix, is even less relevant. Augustine there discusses only the original, sinless state of our nature. In fact, Augustine later explains in Retractations that he didn’t address our fallen nature’s need for liberation and renewal in that work because the argument didn’t require it (book 2). Pighius’s misunderstanding would cause no problem if not for his own needless confusion, which stirs up trouble for himself and others.

Pighius, in his examination of Augustine's second group of writings, seems anxious that I might claim Augustine later regretted or even retracted certain things he had written in his youth. Attempting to preempt this, he declares that my argument would be proven false because, as he claims, I once said Augustine was consistent in every point. Yet I never stated that Augustine's writings are perfectly uniform on every detail. What I have consistently argued, however, is that Augustine generally supports our stance, particularly in his mature works.

In truth, I have often noted how God used the Pelagian controversy to stir Augustine to confront and correct the common errors about human free will—errors influenced by pagan philosophy. This controversy helped Augustine honor God’s grace over human capability, which had been misunderstood and almost obscured by popular opinion. But if Pighius insists that I claimed Augustine never wavered in any way, let him find my words to that effect and demonstrate his case clearly.

Pighius then boasts that he will prove Augustine to be a firm opponent of our view. Yet, in the same breath, he undermines Augustine’s credibility, portraying him as contentious and overly focused on clever arguments rather than candor. Pighius suggests Augustine relied on sophisticated tricks to counter his opponents, sometimes bending the truth for effect. But if Augustine genuinely supported Pighius’s position, why would Pighius feel the need to criticize his methods and reliability?

As evidence, Pighius points to Augustine’s response to Pelagius, who argued that necessity erases true choice. Augustine answered that while we naturally desire happiness, we do so willingly, not by coercion. This response, Pighius claims, is merely clever rhetoric. Yet he fails to grasp Augustine’s distinction between necessity and coercion—a distinction that enables one to both desire something necessarily (like happiness) and yet choose it freely.

Pighius also notes another objection from Pelagius, which Augustine refutes with a parallel argument: "Since we cannot choose to desire unhappiness, it does not mean we choose it willingly." Pighius dismisses this as irrelevant to his argument against us, but he fails to appreciate Augustine’s clear reasoning. Here, Augustine was not being evasive or insincere but was directly engaging with Pelagius’s flawed reasoning.

Pighius’s objections, then, do not diminish Augustine’s reliability, nor do they contradict Augustine's central teachings on grace and human will. Rather, they reflect a misunderstanding of Augustine’s nuanced responses to his opponents.

Pighius argues that Augustine’s true beliefs should be gathered from certain books that he claims are more reflective and less influenced by the “heat of argument.” Yet, using this logic, should not all the works he cites from Augustine’s debates with the Manicheans be treated cautiously as well? Pighius’s inconsistency here is notable. He insists that Augustine’s earlier writings—composed in the fervor of youth, fresh from oratory training, and more influenced by secular learning than Scripture—should be regarded as definitive. However, he dismisses Augustine’s later works, written with greater wisdom, maturity, and depth, simply because they don’t align with his own views.

Pighius then brings forward a passage from Augustine’s Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, where Augustine states that the human race did not lose free choice entirely through Adam’s sin; rather, humanity lost the perfect righteousness and immortality that existed in paradise. Now, this could seem confusing unless we consider how Augustine commonly used the term “free choice.” I pointed out in my Institutes that while Augustine frequently used this term, he did so with a careful explanation, reminding us that the term should not be misunderstood.

In The Spirit and the Letter, Augustine notes that choice is “free” only when it is liberated by grace—otherwise, it remains enslaved to sin. Here, Augustine is not saying that human will is completely autonomous. Instead, he acknowledges that the will can choose evil freely because it is inclined that way, though it is powerless to choose righteousness without God’s grace.

So, Augustine indeed acknowledges that the will is “free” in a limited sense: it freely follows its fallen inclinations toward sin. But it is not free to choose good on its own; this freedom is restored only by Christ’s grace. Augustine’s words here align so closely with our teachings that one might think they were penned specifically to support them. His explanation points out that fallen willpower may be “free” in choosing sin but is utterly incapable of choosing true righteousness without divine intervention.

Pighius argues that humans naturally possess a free will that directs their actions entirely on its own. According to him, each individual has the power to choose or not to choose any action, with full control over the body’s members, which are bound to obey the will when it exerts itself. He acknowledges that human effort is sometimes weakened by a tendency to indulge the flesh, which makes it hard for the will to fully exercise this power. Yet, he believes the will still retains authority over the body. Furthermore, Pighius argues that when the will resists the flesh’s desires and strives toward righteousness, it can regain control—even if it’s a struggle and requires divine grace.

He attributes two additional “evils” to this struggle: laziness of the will and a habit of sinning, which, he says, create self-imposed bondage. However, he insists this bondage does not remove the will’s inherent freedom; it just becomes “comfortable” with its own chains. When the will grows truly dissatisfied, it can break free and gain victory, though with difficulty, due to this internal conflict and entrenched habits.

Yet this view has a distinctly Pelagian tone, even fully embracing Pelagian ideas. By claiming that the will remains fundamentally free and powerful within itself—unharmed by original sin—Pighius overlooks the truth. Augustine, by contrast, clearly teaches that our will cannot turn toward good without divine intervention. For example, in his letter to Vitalis, Augustine explains that God’s grace does not come as a reward for our willing; rather, it causes our will to move toward God in the first place. He states that God “removes the stony heart” and prepares our will by grace, not because of any prior merit or inclination in us.

Augustine consistently emphasizes this dependence on God’s grace in multiple works. In The City of God, he notes that human will initiates evil, but only God’s will initiates true goodness, either by creating or by restoring what was lost. In The Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, he questions what good can be found in our will apart from grace, concluding that there is none. Similarly, in his letters, Augustine explains that even a good intention or purpose within us comes only when God’s mercy first moves our hearts.

In several instances, Augustine revisits his earlier words to clarify that any good in us, including the will to follow God, is from Him alone. For instance, when he once wrote that we control our own will, he later corrected this, asserting that we receive the power to live rightly from God, who alone prepares our will to seek Him.

Thus, contrary to Pighius’s claim, Augustine does not see the human will as naturally free and capable of choosing good apart from grace. Instead, Augustine consistently affirms that our will is bound until God frees it, and that even our desire to seek God must be prepared and enabled by His grace.

How does Pighius intend to twist these clear statements to align with his own misguided views? He suggests that original sin merely weakened the will’s control over the body but left its ability to choose good or evil untouched. He claims that any tendency toward evil results only from laziness and bad habits, not from any loss of strength in resisting sin. But Augustine strongly rejects this, declaring that the will is bound by evil and cannot do good until it is freed by God.

Pighius audaciously claims Augustine as his supporter, yet Augustine consistently affirms that human will can only choose evil until it is empowered by the Spirit. The Council of Orange echoes this: “If anyone says that God waits for our desire to be cleansed from sin and does not acknowledge that the Holy Spirit causes us to desire it, he resists the Spirit.” Pighius, who professes loyalty to the church, now stands condemned as resisting the Spirit by this orthodox council’s ruling.

Pighius further argues that the will struggles against the flesh yet can win if it tries hard enough and uses grace only to reinforce its own authority. But this view was also condemned by the church. The Council of Milevis declared, “Whoever claims that grace helps us merely to perform God’s commands more easily, as if we could fulfill them by our own free choice, even with difficulty, let him be anathema.” Though I lack the vehement language Pighius uses, I hope it is clear that his view is utterly distant from Augustine’s teaching, despite his bold claim of Augustine’s support.

If space permitted, it would be worthwhile to show how Pighius’s ideas conflict with the entire teaching of Scripture. And though I’ll address his views on original sin more fully later, it must be noted that he claims Augustine supports his views by referencing the third book of the Hypognosticon. First, Augustine repeatedly teaches the opposite. Second, scholars widely agree that Hypognosticon is not Augustine’s work. Third, Pighius distorts the passage he quotes, which actually says that while we retain a rational choice, this choice cannot initiate or complete any godly act without God’s help—only tasks of earthly life are possible through human will alone.

Perhaps Pighius is still not satisfied. I will leave him no ground for further objections.

The author goes on to say: “When we discuss free choice, we refer to the entirety of man, because when the first man sinned, he corrupted not just a part, but his whole nature.” You can see here that the corruption affected the whole person, not merely a part of human nature as Pighius imagines. He continues: “Since free choice has been corrupted, the entire person has been corrupted; thus, without the grace of God, man cannot even begin, let alone accomplish, what is pleasing to God.” This firmly counters Pighius’s notion that corruption is limited to the body, as if the body alone were tainted while the will remained intact.

Furthermore, the author clarifies: “The healing comes first, so that in Christ, the corrupted will is renewed, healed, and prepared.” Here we see that the will itself is where corruption lies, incapable of producing anything good until it has been healed and prepared by God’s grace.

The text continues, “Man, whose will is weakened by the corruption of free choice, does not seek God’s grace out of his own will or merits. Instead, God, in his mercy, acts first, moving man to know and seek him.” This statement leaves no room for human preparation of the will apart from divine intervention. The author then says of unbelievers: “They cannot perceive the true light unless God shines it into their hearts. But once they receive the Spirit, they have the freedom to follow God’s commands.” This raises an essential question: how can one speak of a “free” will when the person cannot see or choose rightly without God’s grace?

For those who are already believers, the text says, “Through the grace of compassion, they attain to good works which they neither desired nor sought on their own.” And ultimately, the conclusion is: “Whatever a man wills or does comes from the Lord.”

Pighius claims that man can will good independently, needing only partial assistance from God to accomplish it. Yet he relies on the authority of “Augustine” to say this, although Augustine himself teaches that both the will and the power to do good are entirely gifts from God, leaving no room for Pighius’s interpretation. Augustine refutes the idea that man’s will initiates God’s favor by insisting that “when it pleased God, he called me—not when I willed, but when he chose me, not through my merit but through his grace.” This makes it clear that even the initial desire for good is granted by God’s grace, not by human effort or merit.

I doubt Pighius will have the courage to maintain his argument in the face of such clarity. The truth here is unmistakable: all good that a person wills or does comes entirely from the grace of God.

In trying to avoid the clear message of Paul about sin, Pighius distorts a profound truth. Paul calls those who are "free from righteousness" as slaves to sin, meaning they live under the power of sin until God liberates them. Pighius tries to dismiss this reality with shallow arguments, but Paul’s words cannot be taken lightly.

Similarly, Pighius misrepresents Augustine's views on grace. Augustine clearly attributes every good work to God’s grace. Yet Pighius treats this as if it were only a possibility, not a reality. He twists Augustine’s teaching by changing "rebellion" to "weakness" as if this softens humanity’s need for grace. Pighius tries to argue that Augustine's stance was only meant to oppose Pelagians, not him. But Augustine was firm: true freedom is found only under God’s Spirit, while those outside God’s grace remain slaves to sin.

In arguing this way, Pighius ignores the core of Augustine’s teaching —that the will to do good comes solely from God’s grace, not from human effort. Augustine’s cry is clear: without God's intervention, our will is bent only toward evil. Therefore, even the desire to do good must be granted by God. Augustine explains this beautifully, saying that when people come to God willingly, it’s because God has first worked in their hearts to make them willing.

Pighius’s efforts to diminish God's role—suggesting it’s just part of the process rather than the entirety—miss the truth entirely. Human will, left on its own, is trapped in sin. Only God can change our hearts, transforming us to desire what is good.

Pighius claims that Augustine clarified what the orthodox church condemned in both the teachings of Mani and Pelagius. Mani was condemned for saying that humanity, marriage, and the law were not created by the good God. Pelagius was condemned for opposing God’s grace, claiming that it is given based on human merit rather than freely, and for suggesting that people earn grace by making good choices of their own will. Pelagius also argued that children are secure without needing Christ’s salvation.

Given this, how can Pighius accuse us of following Mani’s teachings when we affirm that humanity, marriage, and the law all come from God? Even if the Manicheans held other beliefs, this accusation falls apart. Pighius says that the main errors of Pelagius don’t include affirming free will. But, by that same logic, the main errors of Mani have nothing to do with what Pighius accuses us of.

To make this clear: Pighius’s arguments fall apart because he relies more on clever tricks than on true reasoning.

Let me now respond directly. While this summary touches on Pelagius’s errors, it doesn’t fully capture them. Augustine himself listed twelve key points that must be rejected by anyone who wants to distance themselves from Pelagianism. These include claims about the possibility of perfect righteousness, the need for grace in every action of life, and God’s election of believers and predestination of the wicked. All of these were central points of dispute between Augustine and the Pelagians, showing that Pighius is making careless arguments.

Further, in Augustine’s work On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin, he clearly says that Pelagius could avoid dispute if he admitted that not only our abilities come from God but also our very desire and actions to do good. Without God’s grace through Christ, we are unable to choose or do anything truly good. Our righteousness comes from Christ alone, not from ourselves.

These are Augustine’s true words—not the distorted version Pighius presents.

In addressing this complex issue, I find Augustine's view insightful: if we agree on three core points, then there would be no disagreement between us. Pelagius acknowledged that human ability is helped by God's grace but still insisted that the decision and the actual doing of good were ultimately under human control. However, Augustine saw through this and firmly maintained that it is God’s grace that actually enables us to desire and accomplish good. God does not merely give us the ability; He also gives us the desire and the action itself.

Augustine explains this further: "When God teaches through His Spirit, He teaches in a way that moves us not only to understand but also to desire and to act on that understanding. If it were just about our ability, Christ would have said, ‘Everyone who has heard and learned can come.’ But He goes further and says, ‘Everyone who has heard and learned comes.’” Pelagius claimed that God’s grace helps our ability, but it’s up to us to act. In reality, though, Augustine insists that true faith is not only possible but also actual—it is God who works in us to bring our will and action to fruition.

So, what more could Pighius want? I would wholeheartedly accept such a covenant if we all agreed on this doctrine. Pighius, however, believes only our human ability is weak and that grace merely assists it. He avoids the full scope of grace’s work, as if it were dangerous.

As for “free choice,” there’s no conflict for us. A certain writer, often mistaken for Augustine, notes that our will is powerless to begin or complete any good work without God’s grace. He affirms that God acts first, freely giving us a good will. Nothing within ourselves makes us strong, wise, or righteous—only in God do we find these. So, if we agree on the meaning, I have no issue with using the term “free choice,” as long as it’s defined in line with Scripture.

Pighius ridicules us for supposedly denying that Augustine attributes any role to human choice. But we maintain this: First, anything within us is empty and powerless for the true righteousness that God demands, unless God directs us toward good by His grace. Second, our will is, by nature, inclined toward evil and needs to be transformed by God to even begin choosing good. Grace is not merely a tool we might decide to use or reject—it actively moves and guides our will to choose rightly. God doesn’t just offer grace; He enables us to respond, steers our minds toward good, and sustains us continuously.

In essence, grace doesn’t merely help once and leave us; it stays with us, guiding us every step of the way.

What does Augustine say? We’ve already shared many of his thoughts, but it’s worth hearing more, so Pighius may see that nothing here should surprise him. Augustine writes, “People work hard to find something good in our will that doesn’t come from God, but I don’t see how they can.” If we had a free will from God that could be either good or evil, but chose good independently of Him, then the good within us would be better than what we received from God Himself.

Pighius argues that Augustine believed grace and free will are both necessary. I agree, but Augustine’s point is that God works within people, not objects like stones. Humans have a will—created with the ability to choose—and God directs that will toward good. Our will, corrupt by nature, can only desire good through the work of God’s grace. Augustine is simply saying that a person cannot choose good unless they have a will; however, this will is shaped by grace, not by our own strength. The human will, though naturally inclined toward evil, becomes good only by the work of the Holy Spirit.

Pighius continues with confusing claims. He argues that Augustine didn’t dismiss good works done by free choice after being prepared by God’s grace, as though this opposes my view. But Augustine says that these good works are prepared, guided, and completed by God’s grace, without any merit from our will. If God’s grace comes first and directs any good we do, why would Pighius argue with this?

Yes, Augustine calls good works voluntary, which I do not deny; however, free choice on its own can accomplish nothing. It acts only as it is acted upon by God. Augustine clearly teaches that our righteousness is by grace, not by an innate free will, but through the Holy Spirit given to us.

Pighius now brings up a third group of Augustine’s writings, celebrating himself as if he’s already won the argument and is just finishing up for form’s sake. Perhaps he convinced himself of his victory by reading his own words without anyone to challenge him. Now that he has our response, I hope he realizes that his self-praise was premature.

Pighius points to Augustine’s work, The Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, where Augustine critiques the Pelagians—not for affirming free will, but for exaggerating its power. Augustine allowed the use of the term "free will" to avoid unnecessary conflict over language, but Pighius cannot use this alone to challenge our position. Augustine and the orthodox indeed believed that no one sins without willingly choosing to, and we agree with this, as long as "freely" means acting willingly, by one’s own choice.

Pighius then claims Augustine believed that God commands nothing beyond our power to accomplish. Augustine taught that if humanity’s will were uncorrupted, we could obey the law perfectly. However, because sin has corrupted every part of us, the strength to fulfill the law’s demands must come from God alone. These are not my words but Augustine’s.

Pighius also argues that Augustine’s frequent use of the term "help" implies that God does not do everything but leaves part of the work to us. Here, Pighius misses the context: Augustine was not writing a detailed analysis of free will but addressing other topics, such as whether death results from natural causes or sin, and the concept of original sin. Free will appears only briefly and indirectly in this context.

Examining Augustine’s overall conclusion, we see it aligns with our view: God, by His grace, accomplishes what He commands in the law. Pighius notes that Augustine said prayer alone is not enough, which is true; Augustine was countering the mistaken idea that God works in us like an external force, without engaging our wills.

Finally, readers who recall the passages I previously quoted from Augustine will see that his argument goes further than Pighius acknowledges. Augustine does not merely describe God’s "help" as if God assists while we do the actual work. Instead, he teaches that righteousness of both mind and will is entirely God’s work. Augustine openly admits that he sees no good within the human will itself—only what God produces.

The passages that Pighius quotes from Augustine’s The Spirit and the Letter do not need lengthy analysis if we interpret them plainly. Pighius tries hard to twist Augustine’s words, but Augustine simply says that faith is within our free choice because we can choose to believe or not. If Augustine’s argument ended there, Pighius would indeed have a point. However, Augustine clarifies that the ability to believe is itself a gift from God, not something we produce on our own. The will to believe is not a natural quality we possess but is created by the Holy Spirit. So, when Augustine says our faith and ability to believe are "ours," he means only because God first gives them to us.

Pighius then argues that Augustine splits responsibility between God and humans, suggesting that it is within our power to accept or reject God’s call. But if we consider what Augustine says next, which Pighius omits, the issue is resolved. Augustine admits he cannot fully explain why one person believes and another does not, except to say that it is by God’s mysterious will. This shows that Augustine recognized that even our choice to believe is a work of God, who leads us to faith. God doesn’t merely awaken our will; He strengthens it to fully embrace the truth.

Even Pighius concedes that Augustine admitted he once thought we had the natural ability to accept the gospel, but later realized that it is God who inclines our hearts to believe. While faith is rightly called "ours," it originates in God. Augustine elsewhere says that God "finds" faith in us only because He first gives it to us.

Pighius also quotes Augustine as saying that no one should defend free will in a way that denies the need for grace, nor should we deny human choice in a way that excuses sin. But Augustine didn’t mean that denying free choice excuses sin any more than affirming it would deny grace. Augustine wanted to prevent people from using God’s grace as an excuse to justify their sins, just as we do. We teach that every sin is committed by a person’s own choice, making them fully responsible.

Augustine’s caution not to excuse sin aligns with our position. When we deny the power of free choice, we still emphasize human accountability for sin, just as Augustine intended. By doing so, we uphold both God’s grace and our responsibility before Him.

Pighius believes he has a strong argument from Augustine’s writings to Valentinus, where Augustine defends free will without undermining grace. Augustine, he argues, shows that grace and free will work together, affirming free will as taught in Scripture and demonstrated through God’s commands.

As always, it’s best to let Augustine speak for himself. When he describes free will, Augustine explains it like this: “The human will is always free, but not always good. It is either free from righteousness, serving sin, and thus is evil; or it is free from sin, serving righteousness, and thus is good.” He adds that the will, once evil, is only made good by God’s grace, and by that grace, a good will can grow stronger. In other words, the will is called free because it moves by its own choice, yet it can only choose good when guided by God.

Pighius, however, expects something more—that the will can freely choose either good or evil at any time. Augustine clarifies that free will means that it can choose sin on its own, but can only choose good with God’s help. Augustine’s conclusion is simple: “Grace does not eliminate the human will but changes it from evil to good, and then supports it once it has become good.”

According to Augustine, then, humans do have a natural will, but it is inherently evil and cannot choose good on its own. God’s grace does not destroy this will but transforms it so it can desire good. Augustine says that while we are indeed the ones willing and acting, it is God who first enables us to want good and then helps us to accomplish it. Without God’s help in both causing and supporting our actions, we cannot perform the good works He requires of us.

Augustine further explains that we don’t have any natural readiness for this grace. A “stony heart”—a hardened will—is resistant to God, so any good will must be created by God. The grace of God doesn’t merely incline us toward good but actively causes us to will and do good, as God promised: “I will cause you to walk in my commandments.”

Someone might argue that Augustine suggests we cooperate with God once we have first received His grace. This is true in the sense that, once the Holy Spirit has transformed our will to desire good, we act with that will God has given us. Augustine even says that God rewards the faithful, both by giving grace in response to our past sinfulness and by furthering our growth in response to the grace we have already received. Here, we learn the meaning of God acting “without us” and “with us”: when God first brings us to faith, transforming us from barren "stones" into fruitful "olive trees," this work is entirely His. But when He continues to help and strengthen us for each good work, that is where He acts “with us,” supporting the power He’s given us for faithful perseverance.

If we think of Paul’s illustration, God acts like a gardener, nurturing the olive trees He has already made fruitful. By nature, we were wild, barren olives, unfit for any good. But when God regenerates us, He transforms our barren lives, enlightening our minds with truth and redirecting our wills from evil to obedience. Can we claim credit for any of this? No; we are alive only by being rooted in Him. Even now, as we bear fruit, our life and growth come entirely from that root, which is a gift of grace, not something we possess by nature. And this root needs God’s constant nourishment to thrive.

Augustine’s teaching aligns entirely with our view. While he acknowledges free will, he shows that it has no power for good apart from God’s grace. Pighius claims that only voluntary sin is truly sin, as if this contradicts our teaching. But we affirm the same, often noting that every sin is chosen freely. He also says that our merits earn rewards—but only if we understand that these “merits” are God’s gifts to us.

In the end, Pighius’s loud boasts of victory over us are no more than the hollow noise of self-congratulation. Augustine honors God’s grace fully, even as he acknowledges the role of free will rightly understood.

Sensing that his argument is weakening, Pighius shifts to a different book, The Dogmas of the Church, which is falsely attributed to Augustine. Pighius knows, as many do, that this work isn’t genuinely Augustine’s. It wasn’t listed among Augustine’s writings, and it lacks his usual clarity and structure, presenting instead a disorganized collection of quotations. Yet, Pighius tries to use this work to support his position.

Let’s see what Pighius wants to accomplish by appealing to this dubious text. He claims it shows Augustine endorsing free choice, not as a personal opinion but as a belief that all Christians must accept. But what does this book actually say? It suggests that, even after the fall, we still have some power to choose, with three conditions: (1) that this ability exists only when God calls us to salvation; (2) that we have the power to assent to divine influence; and (3) that staying faithful is a joint effort of our own vigilance and God’s help.

Yet this supposed "Augustine" contradicts himself. For instance, he quotes the synod at Milevis, which declared that God creates in us the desire for cleansing from sin, leaving no room for an independent choice. He also says that God works in us so that we will and act according to His will, which doesn’t align with the idea that we have independent power to choose good or evil. These statements don’t match Augustine’s authentic teachings on grace.

Finally, Pighius refers to a public speech attributed to Augustine, claiming it shows support for free choice by stating, “we are able both not to sin and to sin.” But this is questionable. True Augustine scholars would see that this doesn’t match his mature views. If the writer means we can avoid sin purely by our choice, then he is mistaken, even by Augustine’s standards. However, if this ability not to sin is due to God’s grace, then it fits Augustine’s beliefs. Augustine acknowledged that, theoretically, God could keep us from sin, but this doesn’t occur in reality according to Scripture.

After presenting what he believes to be solid arguments, Pighius celebrates as if he has won a great victory. He seems satisfied with gaining applause from those few who, despite knowing they cannot defeat God’s truth, look for ways to delay or resist it. These people eagerly cheer on any attempt to challenge the truth, even if blindly.

However, I am confident that I’ve clarified this issue enough that anyone with sound judgment will see through Pighius’s exaggerated claims. I believe I have thoroughly removed the false colors he used to misrepresent Augustine as being opposed to us.

Some might want me to further prove my claim that Augustine supports our position. While the evidence is plentiful, gathering all of it would require a large volume—Augustine’s books to Boniface, Prosper, Hilary, and Valentinus, along with Nature and Grace, The Perfection of Righteousness, and other letters, are filled with teachings that align with ours. However, instead of lengthy citations, I will provide a brief summary from a few key passages. These should remove any doubt about Augustine’s agreement with us, especially using works Pighius himself considers trustworthy, so he cannot claim that Augustine’s statements were made impulsively or without serious intent.

First, we affirm that human understanding is clouded by blindness, making it impossible to know the truth on its own, and that our will is corrupted, so we cannot love or obey God. Pighius rejects these teachings, but let’s see what Augustine says. In The Predestination of the Saints, Augustine admits he once believed it was within our power to accept the gospel upon hearing it. Later, convinced by Paul’s words, “What do you have that you did not receive?” he came to understand that both the beginning and completion of faith are gifts from God. Augustine argues that even our first thoughts of good come from God, let alone the ability to believe.

To close any loopholes suggesting that faith is simply the result of general divine inspiration, Augustine clearly states that this gift is given to some and withheld from others. And while some argue that this difference is due to human will, Augustine insists it is solely by God’s grace and predestination. Although God commands us to believe, Augustine acknowledges that even this faith is a gift from God, who promises to bring about in us what He commands.

Many people believe that humans can prepare themselves to receive God’s grace by their own efforts—a view Pighius strongly supports. However, Augustine counters this by pointing to Paul’s words: “What do you have that you did not receive?” Augustine notes that Paul himself, once an enemy of the faith, was converted not by his own will but by God’s powerful grace, which turned him from a persecutor to a believer willing to endure persecution.

Augustine explains that God promises to work in us to do what He commands, not because of any merit in us but as an act of grace. Even Christ’s role as Mediator shows this: human nature didn’t earn its place in Christ through any merit but received it as a gift. Similarly, Augustine says, “The God who made Jesus the author and perfecter of faith also creates in us the beginning and completion of faith in Him.”

Augustine refutes the idea that our will is responsible for asking, seeking, and knocking to receive grace. Instead, he argues, it is God’s generosity that stirs us to ask and seek in the first place.

When asked whether we naturally have the freedom to choose good or evil, Augustine acknowledges that while we have a free will, it is only free for evil unless freed by the Son of God. He says, “The human will does not receive grace through freedom; rather, it gains freedom through grace.” Without God’s grace, we can do no true good, whether in thought, desire, or action.

Some suggest that God offers light and it’s up to us to accept or reject it, as if our will has the final say. But Augustine firmly rejects this, saying that if God is the one who begins faith in us, we should not claim any part of it for ourselves. He criticizes those who want to divide faith between God and themselves, taking credit for the start of faith and leaving the rest to God. Instead, Augustine insists that the entire work of faith is God’s gift, not partly from us and partly from Him.

Augustine explains the role of God’s grace in bringing people to faith in Christ. He writes that to “come to Christ” means to believe in Him, and this belief is granted by the Father. No one who learns from the Father fails to come to Christ, because it is God who makes them willing. Augustine emphasizes that faith is a gift from God, who removes a hardened heart and creates in us the ability to believe.

Some may ask why God does not teach everyone. Augustine responds by reminding us that if belief were purely a matter of human will, there would be no need for the church to pray for its enemies. Those who believe do so because God enables them inwardly, while those who do not believe hear the gospel only outwardly, without understanding. God is the one who grants belief to some and not to others, and no one can come to Christ unless drawn by the Father.

Faith, from beginning to end, is entirely a gift from God. Augustine says, “God promised to do what He commands of us, so that His promises depend on His power, not on ours.” When God says, “I will put fear of me in their heart,” it means He will ensure this fear is so strong that they remain faithful to Him.

Augustine further clarifies that while we are responsible for our actions, it is God who gives us the will to obey. We act and desire because God empowers us. For example, Christ prayed that Peter’s faith would not fail, showing that God’s grace keeps believers steadfast even in their own weakness.

In comparing Adam and Christ, Augustine illustrates two types of grace. The grace given to Adam allowed him to remain good if he chose to stay under God’s influence. However, this grace did not ensure he would want to remain faithful, and he was free to abandon it. In contrast, the grace given to believers in Christ is much greater. This grace not only gives the ability to desire and do good, but it also moves the will itself, causing believers to genuinely desire God. Through the Holy Spirit, believers overcome the desires of the flesh.

God does not merely offer support; He actively works within us so that we continue in faith. God’s grace fires our will, giving us both the power and the desire to persevere. Without this grace, our weak wills would falter under temptation, but because of it, we are strengthened and upheld. Augustine concludes that God’s grace supports us so fully that even in our weakness, we remain steadfast because of His unwavering assistance.

Will Pighius continue to accuse us for saying that God effectively directs human wills? We are simply following Augustine's teaching. Augustine unites the ideas of a desire for God and the perseverance to follow Him, saying, “After the fall of Adam, God made it solely His grace that brings a person to Him, and solely His grace that keeps them from departing.” Augustine emphasizes that both the beginning and end of faith are entirely by God’s grace, leaving no room for human boasting, while Pighius tries to make human effort the main factor.

Furthermore, all the grace we receive throughout life is given freely, not because we have earned it by responding well to previous gifts. Augustine affirms this, stating, “The grace to begin and to persevere to the end is not based on our merits, but on God’s own wise and kind will, for those He predestined, He also called.”

What can Pighius argue against this? He might accuse me of distorting Augustine’s words, but I’ve provided quotes directly, and anyone can check the context from four key books of Augustine on grace and free will. If anyone doubts, let them examine Grace and Free Choice, Rebuke and Grace, The Predestination of the Saints, and The Gift of Perseverance. I am confident these works will confirm that Augustine’s teaching supports our view, not Pighius’s.

Augustine teaches that, while the human will is indeed “free,” it is free only to choose evil because it is bound to sin. Our will is corrupted and held captive until Christ frees us. This corruption is so extensive that, without God’s intervention, we cannot even think of doing good. Thus, God does not wait for us to prepare ourselves to receive grace; He initiates entirely out of His mercy.

This grace is not given universally but only to those whom God chooses. Those who do not receive it remain bound to sin, lacking any ability to seek good on their own. And God’s grace is not merely an option we can choose or reject; it transforms our hearts, making our once-evil will good, so that we necessarily desire what is good. God doesn’t give this grace once and then leave us on our own—He continuously guides us, and our perseverance is as much a gift as our initial faith.

God directs us by His Spirit from the beginning of our faith to the end of our lives, and this guidance is based solely on His goodness, without any merit on our part. We have no merit in our works, our will, or even our thoughts.

If anything in this summary does not reflect Augustine’s own words, I welcome judgment. But it is clear that our teaching aligns with Augustine’s. Pighius can protest, but he cannot deny that Augustine’s views support us.