VI. δαθή ηIN THE NEW TESTAMENT
V. δ
αθή
η IN NON-BIBLICAL GREEK
Outside the LXX and the New Testament δαθήη seems almost invariably to have meant a will or testament. Moulton and Milligan say, ‘In papyri and inscrr. the word means testament, will, with absolute unanimity, and such frequency that illustration is superfluous.’ By contrast δυνθήη ‘is to the last the word for compact, just as δαθήη is always and only the word for will’.173
αθήη seems almost invariably to have meant a will or testament. Moulton and Milligan say, ‘In papyri and inscrr. the word means testament, will, with absolute unanimity, and such frequency that illustration is superfluous.’ By contrast δυνθήη ‘is to the last the word for compact, just as δαθήη is always and only the word for will’.173W. D. Ferguson has examined legal terms in the Macedonian inscriptions, and of δαθήη he concludes:
αθήη he concludes:‘I. That it is testamentary rather than contractual. It is not a mutual compact to which both parties give assent, mutually contracting to do certain things, but the act of one person giving charges to another, or bestowing property on another, or both of these...
‘2. The thing enjoined in the δαθήη is apparently always to be executed after the decease of the testator...
αθήη is apparently always to be executed after the decease of the testator...‘3. When property is bequeathed it may be accompanied by a charge to be fulfilled, and in such a way that the commission must be accepted in order to obtain the property...
‘4. The usage of the term δαθήη in the inscriptions is similar to its usage in the Old and the New Testaments in that the initiative is always taken by one person.... The one making the δαθήη always assumes the right to command, and to withold his bequest if the conditions attached to it are not fulfilled’.174
αθήη in the inscriptions is similar to its usage in the Old and the New Testaments in that the initiative is always taken by one person.... The one making the δαθήη always assumes the right to command, and to withold his bequest if the conditions attached to it are not fulfilled’.174F. O. Norton has conducted a thorough examination of the use of the word from the earliest times until well into the classical period and, in general, he supports the position reached by the writers cited above. But, while recognizing that δαθήη generally signifies a testament, he recognizes that this is not its essential meaning. He understands it to refer ’to the arrangements or dispositions a person makes with reference to his property in view of death. This specific connotation is probably not necessary, but the context of the passages in which the word is found indicates that it has such reference in these instances. It is quite probable that, if we had more instances of its use, we should find it employed with reference to other things than distribution of property in view of death.’175 This is in accordance with what we would expect from the etymology of the word, but Norton is able to cite only two passages in support of his contention that the word sometimes means a compact (Isae. 6: 27; Aristoph. Av. 440), and of these two, the former certainly refers to a testament, Norton’s argument being that it is a compact as well as a will, and that the compact aspect is primary. However, this cannot be regarded as an impressive example, and we are left with but one use of δαθήη in the classical writings to denote a compact, namely Aristophanes Av. 440. Certainly there can be no doubt about this one (despite W. M. Ramsay’s hesitation),176 partly because such a sense is demanded by the immediate context, (‘Not I, by Apollo, unless they make a covenant [δάθωνται δαθήην] with me such as that monkey, the sword-maker, made [δέθετo] with his wife, not to bite me’, etc.),177 and partly because a little later the same agreement is referred to as τὰς σπoνδάς.
αθήη generally signifies a testament, he recognizes that this is not its essential meaning. He understands it to refer ’to the arrangements or dispositions a person makes with reference to his property in view of death. This specific connotation is probably not necessary, but the context of the passages in which the word is found indicates that it has such reference in these instances. It is quite probable that, if we had more instances of its use, we should find it employed with reference to other things than distribution of property in view of death.’175 This is in accordance with what we would expect from the etymology of the word, but Norton is able to cite only two passages in support of his contention that the word sometimes means a compact (Isae. 6: 27; Aristoph. Av. 440), and of these two, the former certainly refers to a testament, Norton’s argument being that it is a compact as well as a will, and that the compact aspect is primary. However, this cannot be regarded as an impressive example, and we are left with but one use of δαθήη in the classical writings to denote a compact, namely Aristophanes Av. 440. Certainly there can be no doubt about this one (despite W. M. Ramsay’s hesitation),176 partly because such a sense is demanded by the immediate context, (‘Not I, by Apollo, unless they make a covenant [δάθωνται δαθήην] with me such as that monkey, the sword-maker, made [δέθετo] with his wife, not to bite me’, etc.),177 and partly because a little later the same agreement is referred to as τὰς σπoνδάς.However, when full allowance is made for the importance of this reference as an aid to the understanding of the history of δαθήη, it must be admitted that it is well before New Testament times (The Birds is dated in the fifth century BC), and that this one clear example from such early days does little to invalidate the fact that, in the first century AD, and indeed for centuries before that, the uniform significance of δαθήη (apart from the noteworthy exception of the LXX) was of a will, a testament.
αθήη, it must be admitted that it is well before New Testament times (The Birds is dated in the fifth century BC), and that this one clear example from such early days does little to invalidate the fact that, in the first century AD, and indeed for centuries before that, the uniform significance of δαθήη (apart from the noteworthy exception of the LXX) was of a will, a testament.We should point out, however, that the testament in mind was not exactly the same as a will in our sense of the term. In Greece in early days property seems to have descended automatically to the deceased’s children, who performed certain duties in connection with the burial of the deceased, and afterwards indulged in a species of ancestor-cult. This came to be regarded as of very great importance and, accordingly, it was a serious matter for a man to die without male issue. Consequently, when a man had no heir, it was usual for him to adopt a son who would after his death receive his property and see that the appropriate rites were carried out. As Ramsay says: ’the Diatheke was primarily an arrangement for the devolution of religious duties and rights, and not merely a bequeathing of money and property.’178
The adoption of a son was a decisive step, and was, in fact, irrevocable. If, after an adoption, a natural son was born, the adopted son could not be disowned, but must share the inheritance with the natural son. In this particular matter the adopted son was on a better footing than the natural son, for the latter could be put away. Indeed Ramsay calls attention to a passage where a son who had been put away by his father, then restored to favour, and then disowned again, makes his plea that this second putting away is illegal, for he now has the status of an adopted son.179
Ramsay makes this an argument for the irrevocability of the δαθήη. But while this may have been the case in early days, the evidence adduced by Norton seems to show that, at later times, there was the necessary machinery to enable a testator who had changed his mind to give effect to his new desires.180 (All early wills centred, on an adoption, but in later times it was possible to bequeath one’s property even where no adoption was in question.)
αθήη. But while this may have been the case in early days, the evidence adduced by Norton seems to show that, at later times, there was the necessary machinery to enable a testator who had changed his mind to give effect to his new desires.180 (All early wills centred, on an adoption, but in later times it was possible to bequeath one’s property even where no adoption was in question.)Thus the evidence from profane Greek indicates the possibility that δαθήη at an early stage in its history denoted any authoritative disposition, but that, whether this were so or not, in later times the word became confined (as far as the extant sources show) to a last will and testament. The use in the LXX is exceptional, for there the postulated earlier use seems to be the usual, probably the only, one.
αθήη at an early stage in its history denoted any authoritative disposition, but that, whether this were so or not, in later times the word became confined (as far as the extant sources show) to a last will and testament. The use in the LXX is exceptional, for there the postulated earlier use seems to be the usual, probably the only, one.
VI. δαθήη IN THE NEW TESTAMENT
It is not easy to determine which of the two meanings of δαθήη is to be understood in the New Testament. Some passages use the word with reference to Old Testament covenants and in such contexts it must be understood in the same sense as in the LXX. On the other hand, there are some passages where the meaning ‘will’ or ‘testament’ seems indicated, and the final determination of the word’s significance in doubtful places is accordingly very difficult.
αθήη is to be understood in the New Testament. Some passages use the word with reference to Old Testament covenants and in such contexts it must be understood in the same sense as in the LXX. On the other hand, there are some passages where the meaning ‘will’ or ‘testament’ seems indicated, and the final determination of the word’s significance in doubtful places is accordingly very difficult.
a. δαθήηι of men
It will be convenient to begin our discussion with a consideration of the passages which appeal to the practice among men, and reason from this to the divine δαθήη. We begin with some words of St. Paul: ’Brethren, I speak after the manner of men: Though it be but a man’s δαθήη, yet when it hath been confirmed, no one maketh it void, or addeth thereto... Now this I say: A δαθήη confirmed beforehand by God, the law, which came four hundred and thirty years after, doth not disannul, so as to make the promise of none effect. For if the inheritance is of the law, it is no more of promise: but God hath granted it to Abraham by promise’ (Gal. 3 : 15f.). Here there are some considerations which point strongly in the direction of testament as the meaning of δαθήη. The speaking ‘after the manner of men’ would naturally indicate that the term is to be understood in the normal way, and as we have seen, the extant literature is clear that that would be in the sense of a will. The unchangeability referred to might be understood (as by Ramsay) as a reference to a will involving an adoption, which would be an irrevocable provision. Further, the reference to ‘inheritance’ in verse 18 would accord well with a testamentary action.
αθήη. We begin with some words of St. Paul: ’Brethren, I speak after the manner of men: Though it be but a man’s δαθήη, yet when it hath been confirmed, no one maketh it void, or addeth thereto... Now this I say: A δαθήη confirmed beforehand by God, the law, which came four hundred and thirty years after, doth not disannul, so as to make the promise of none effect. For if the inheritance is of the law, it is no more of promise: but God hath granted it to Abraham by promise’ (Gal. 3 : 15f.). Here there are some considerations which point strongly in the direction of testament as the meaning of δαθήη. The speaking ‘after the manner of men’ would naturally indicate that the term is to be understood in the normal way, and as we have seen, the extant literature is clear that that would be in the sense of a will. The unchangeability referred to might be understood (as by Ramsay) as a reference to a will involving an adoption, which would be an irrevocable provision. Further, the reference to ‘inheritance’ in verse 18 would accord well with a testamentary action.While this looks a formidable body of evidence, it is not irrefutable. The speaking ‘after the manner of men’ may mean no more than that Paul, having derived his illustrations hitherto from Scripture, now proposes to use one from the affairs of men. Again, even a Greek will involving adoption could be modified later, as we have seen. Then, too, E. de W. Burton shows that the ληρoνoμία of verse 18 need not necessarily refer to inheritance in the strict sense of the word, the term being sometimes used to signify ‘possession’.181
ληρoνoμία of verse 18 need not necessarily refer to inheritance in the strict sense of the word, the term being sometimes used to signify ‘possession’.181A strong argument that the word means ‘covenant’ is to be discerned in the fact that the reference to the transaction with Abraham in verse 17 is a reference to the Hebrew berîth. Thus δαθήη here must be understood in the same sense as in the LXX. But the whole force of the argument demands that the δαθήη of verse 15 be of the same type as that in verse 17. This seems a decisive consideration. Accordingly we adopt the view that δαθήη here denotes ‘covenant’, rather than ‘testament’, while admitting the strength of the arguments for the opposite view. But we do so understanding the passage as does G. S. Duncan who says: ’it matters little which of the two renderings we adopt, for from a truly spiritual standpoint a “covenant” in which God takes part is as essentially a one-sided proposal as a “will” is.’182 Further, it seems probable that, while covenant is the essential meaning of δαθήη, here the apostle is making a play on the other meaning of the word. The death of Christ is not far from his thought.
αθήη here must be understood in the same sense as in the LXX. But the whole force of the argument demands that the δαθήη of verse 15 be of the same type as that in verse 17. This seems a decisive consideration. Accordingly we adopt the view that δαθήη here denotes ‘covenant’, rather than ‘testament’, while admitting the strength of the arguments for the opposite view. But we do so understanding the passage as does G. S. Duncan who says: ’it matters little which of the two renderings we adopt, for from a truly spiritual standpoint a “covenant” in which God takes part is as essentially a one-sided proposal as a “will” is.’182 Further, it seems probable that, while covenant is the essential meaning of δαθήη, here the apostle is making a play on the other meaning of the word. The death of Christ is not far from his thought.The other passage which falls to be considered under this heading reads: ‘For where a δαθήη is, there must of necessity be the death of him that made it. For a δαθήη is of force where there hath been death: for doth it ever avail while he that made it liveth?’ (Heb. 9: 16f.). Here, again, it would seem on a first reading as though the meaning is ‘testament’, and many commentators have adopted this rendering. To this it is objected that δαθήη seems to be used in the sense ‘covenant’ both earlier and later than the verses cited. It should thus mean ‘covenant’ there also. Otherwise we should have to suppose that the writer began by thinking of the word as meaning ‘covenant’, changed over to ‘testament’, and then back again to ‘covenant’, which seems unlikely.
αθήη is, there must of necessity be the death of him that made it. For a δαθήη is of force where there hath been death: for doth it ever avail while he that made it liveth?’ (Heb. 9: 16f.). Here, again, it would seem on a first reading as though the meaning is ‘testament’, and many commentators have adopted this rendering. To this it is objected that δαθήη seems to be used in the sense ‘covenant’ both earlier and later than the verses cited. It should thus mean ‘covenant’ there also. Otherwise we should have to suppose that the writer began by thinking of the word as meaning ‘covenant’, changed over to ‘testament’, and then back again to ‘covenant’, which seems unlikely.Again, Westcott draws attention to the use of the verb ϕέρεσθα: ‘It is not said that he who makes the covenant “must die,” but that his death must be “brought forward,” “presented,” “introduced upon the scene,” “set in evidence,” so to speak.’183 It is of consequence that we do not simply have it said that the maker of a δαθήη must die, but Westcott does not seem to give sufficient heed to the value of the various alternatives which he notes. For example F. Delitzsch argues strongly that the verb conveys the thought that a will is valid only when the death has become ‘a fact of common notoriety’. ‘Before that is known and established, the testament has no legal force.’184 The use of ϕἐρεσθα is curious, but it cannot be said to tell strongly against the meaning ‘testament’. The same is true of the ἐπὶ νερoĩς of verse 17. It is not what we would have expected, but in view of the second half of the verse with its reference to ὁ δαθέμενoς, it cannot be held to be proof that anything other than the death of the testator is in the writer’s mind. A. Carr remarks, ‘it cannot be affirmed that a will is only of force on the death of the testator. A will properly drawn up and attested is valid or of force during the testator’s lifetime.’185 This, however, must be unhesitatingly dismissed, for it is surely obvious that a will remains completely inoperative until the testator’s death. That is to say, a Roman will does, though we have already seen that a Greek will may become operative immediately. But there is agreement among the commentators that the auctor ad Hebraeos moves in the sphere of Roman law rather than Greek. It is the Roman will that is in view here if there is any reference to a will, and the Roman will was inoperative until the testator’s death.
: ‘It is not said that he who makes the covenant “must die,” but that his death must be “brought forward,” “presented,” “introduced upon the scene,” “set in evidence,” so to speak.’183 It is of consequence that we do not simply have it said that the maker of a δαθήη must die, but Westcott does not seem to give sufficient heed to the value of the various alternatives which he notes. For example F. Delitzsch argues strongly that the verb conveys the thought that a will is valid only when the death has become ‘a fact of common notoriety’. ‘Before that is known and established, the testament has no legal force.’184 The use of ϕἐρεσθα is curious, but it cannot be said to tell strongly against the meaning ‘testament’. The same is true of the ἐπὶ νερoĩς of verse 17. It is not what we would have expected, but in view of the second half of the verse with its reference to ὁ δαθέμενoς, it cannot be held to be proof that anything other than the death of the testator is in the writer’s mind. A. Carr remarks, ‘it cannot be affirmed that a will is only of force on the death of the testator. A will properly drawn up and attested is valid or of force during the testator’s lifetime.’185 This, however, must be unhesitatingly dismissed, for it is surely obvious that a will remains completely inoperative until the testator’s death. That is to say, a Roman will does, though we have already seen that a Greek will may become operative immediately. But there is agreement among the commentators that the auctor ad Hebraeos moves in the sphere of Roman law rather than Greek. It is the Roman will that is in view here if there is any reference to a will, and the Roman will was inoperative until the testator’s death.Carr’s further suggestion that βεβαία and ἰσχύε point rather to a covenant than to a will186 must similarly be dismissed. They apply quite well to a will, and the question must be decided on other grounds.
point rather to a covenant than to a will186 must similarly be dismissed. They apply quite well to a will, and the question must be decided on other grounds.The crucial point seems to be the necessity for the death of the δαθέμενoς if the δαθήη is to become effectual. Westcott explains this as indicating the necessity of the death of the animal victim in covenant sacrifice, which symbolized the death of the party to the covenant so that he no longer had life or power in the matter. ‘The unchangeableness of a covenant is seen in the fact that he who has made it has deprived himself of all further power of movement in this respect: while the ratification by death is still incomplete, while the victim, the representative of him who makes it, still lives, that is, while he who makes it still possesses the full power of action and freedom to change, the covenant is not of force.’187 It may be noticed in passing that, to get this meaning out of the text, Westcott has had to abandon his idea that the meaning of blood is life rather than death, so that ‘the blood of the covenant’ would mean something different altogether from other sorts of blood. A stronger objection is that Westcott has put all the emphasis on the unchangeability of the covenant, the death being the indication that now the δαθέμενoς has no further liberty in this matter. But the unalterable nature of the agreement is not what the writer to the Hebrews is emphasizing, but its coming into effect. Paul in Galatians was saying ‘No-one annuls or adds to a δαθήη’, but that is not the thought of this passage, which is, rather, ‘A δαθήη is of force, is effectual, comes into operation, only when a man dies’. On the impossibility of fitting this naturally into the framework of covenant Westcott’s interpretation breaks down, and we are left to conclude that the passage here must be held to have its natural meaning. The death of Jesus was a necessary thing, for it is only when a δαθέμενoς dies that his δαθήη comes into force.188
αθέμενoς if the δαθήη is to become effectual. Westcott explains this as indicating the necessity of the death of the animal victim in covenant sacrifice, which symbolized the death of the party to the covenant so that he no longer had life or power in the matter. ‘The unchangeableness of a covenant is seen in the fact that he who has made it has deprived himself of all further power of movement in this respect: while the ratification by death is still incomplete, while the victim, the representative of him who makes it, still lives, that is, while he who makes it still possesses the full power of action and freedom to change, the covenant is not of force.’187 It may be noticed in passing that, to get this meaning out of the text, Westcott has had to abandon his idea that the meaning of blood is life rather than death, so that ‘the blood of the covenant’ would mean something different altogether from other sorts of blood. A stronger objection is that Westcott has put all the emphasis on the unchangeability of the covenant, the death being the indication that now the δαθέμενoς has no further liberty in this matter. But the unalterable nature of the agreement is not what the writer to the Hebrews is emphasizing, but its coming into effect. Paul in Galatians was saying ‘No-one annuls or adds to a δαθήη’, but that is not the thought of this passage, which is, rather, ‘A δαθήη is of force, is effectual, comes into operation, only when a man dies’. On the impossibility of fitting this naturally into the framework of covenant Westcott’s interpretation breaks down, and we are left to conclude that the passage here must be held to have its natural meaning. The death of Jesus was a necessary thing, for it is only when a δαθέμενoς dies that his δαθήη comes into force.188This discussion will have shown the extraordinary difficulty of giving a completely satisfying interpretation of δαθήη in New Testament times. It may well be that the best interpretation is that which sees in δαθήη essentially the thought of an authoritative disposition. This could naturally pass over into the thought of a testament, or to the sort of covenant we see in the Old Testament with all the emphasis on what God does, and not upon a two-sided compact, with God and man coming to some sort of agreement. The main point to be kept in mind is that the word denotes a divine action, with man the recipient of blessing; and we have no grounds for thinking that, in New Testament times, the word would have been understood of a compact with two partners agreeing that each should assume certain liabilities and obligations. 189
αθήη in New Testament times. It may well be that the best interpretation is that which sees in δαθήη essentially the thought of an authoritative disposition. This could naturally pass over into the thought of a testament, or to the sort of covenant we see in the Old Testament with all the emphasis on what God does, and not upon a two-sided compact, with God and man coming to some sort of agreement. The main point to be kept in mind is that the word denotes a divine action, with man the recipient of blessing; and we have no grounds for thinking that, in New Testament times, the word would have been understood of a compact with two partners agreeing that each should assume certain liabilities and obligations. 189
b. The old δαθήη
The passage which we have just considered (Heb. 9: 16f.) shows clearly that in at least one instance the New Testament uses δαθήη in the sense of will or testament. Some think that this meaning is to be discerned also in the background of Galatians 3: 15f. The question may be asked, therefore, whether this use is not (as might be expected from secular usage) the dominant one in the New Testament. An examination, however, of the fourteen New Testament instances of the use of δαθήη with reference to Old Testament covenants will show indisputably that the usage of the LXX is to be found in the New Testament also.
αθήη in the sense of will or testament. Some think that this meaning is to be discerned also in the background of Galatians 3: 15f. The question may be asked, therefore, whether this use is not (as might be expected from secular usage) the dominant one in the New Testament. An examination, however, of the fourteen New Testament instances of the use of δαθήη with reference to Old Testament covenants will show indisputably that the usage of the LXX is to be found in the New Testament also.This use is undeniable in passages such as Hebrews 8: 9, where δαθήη occurs twice in a quotation from Jeremiah 31. It is true that Jeremiah is speaking of the new covenant rather than the old, but the point is that δαθήη is used at this point in Hebrews in exactly the LXX manner as the equivalent of the Hebrew berîth. The same must be said of the references to the ark of the covenant and to the tables of the covenant (Heb. 9: 4), which clearly point to the Old Testament and cannot be understood of a will.
αθήη occurs twice in a quotation from Jeremiah 31. It is true that Jeremiah is speaking of the new covenant rather than the old, but the point is that δαθήη is used at this point in Hebrews in exactly the LXX manner as the equivalent of the Hebrew berîth. The same must be said of the references to the ark of the covenant and to the tables of the covenant (Heb. 9: 4), which clearly point to the Old Testament and cannot be understood of a will.The Sinai covenant seems to be in mind throughout Hebrews 9: 15ff., and this becomes obvious when we reach verse 19 with its reference to Moses sprinkling the people with blood. Then in verse 20 ‘the blood of the covenant which God commanded’ is a clear allusion to Exodus 24: 8,190 and it shows that the scene on Sinai was present to the minds of early Christians when they heard the words ‘the blood of the covenant’. The change of verb from the covenant which God made (δέθετo) of Exodus 24: 8 to the covenant which God commanded (ἐνετείλατo) here should be noted, as it fits in with the general idea of δαθήη as signifying an authoritative disposition. However we translate the word, and whatever we regard as the primary idea expressed by the Greek term, it is clear that what is denoted is an action in which the sovereignty of God has full sway.
έθετo) of Exodus 24: 8 to the covenant which God commanded (ἐνετείλατo) here should be noted, as it fits in with the general idea of δαθήη as signifying an authoritative disposition. However we translate the word, and whatever we regard as the primary idea expressed by the Greek term, it is clear that what is denoted is an action in which the sovereignty of God has full sway.A reference to the covenant at Sinai is to be found also in the phrases ‘the first covenant’ (Heb. 9: 15; cf. 8: 7) and ‘the old covenant’ (2 Cor. 3: 14). In the latter place Paul speaks of ‘the reading of the old covenant’, by which unusual turn of phrase he seems to be referring to the records of the old covenant. By this would be meant not only the account of the covenant making, whereby the nation was brought into covenant-relationship with God, but also all the documents which depend on this relationship and expound it. The adjective which he uses is παλαός, a word which is often used ‘of things not merely old, but worn by use’191 and which gives the expression a flavour different from that which would result were ἀρχαĩoς used. Both these phrases, it may be noted, have an implicit reference to the new covenant, and the same is true of Galatians 4: 24, where the Sinai covenant is contrasted with the new covenant.
ός, a word which is often used ‘of things not merely old, but worn by use’191 and which gives the expression a flavour different from that which would result were ἀρχαĩoς used. Both these phrases, it may be noted, have an implicit reference to the new covenant, and the same is true of Galatians 4: 24, where the Sinai covenant is contrasted with the new covenant.In this last passage the plural δαθήηι is used, and this is the case also in Romans 9: 4 and Ephesians 2: 12, where Old Testament covenants in general are indicated with no close definition, except that both passages regard them as peculiarly the possession of the Jew.192 The Ephesians verse speaks of ‘covenants of promise’ (the verse in Romans also includes a reference to the promises) which directs attention to the characteristic emphasis on the divine side which is typical of the arrangements between God and men which the LXX calls δαθήαι.
αθήηι is used, and this is the case also in Romans 9: 4 and Ephesians 2: 12, where Old Testament covenants in general are indicated with no close definition, except that both passages regard them as peculiarly the possession of the Jew.192 The Ephesians verse speaks of ‘covenants of promise’ (the verse in Romans also includes a reference to the promises) which directs attention to the characteristic emphasis on the divine side which is typical of the arrangements between God and men which the LXX calls δαθήαι.Thus the references in the New Testament to the old covenant establish the use of δαθήη to indicate ‘covenant’ rather than ‘will’, but only in such a manner as to indicate the sort of covenant which is dominated by one partner. This is supported by the reference to the covenant which God made with Abraham, which is explicitly mentioned four times in the New Testament (Lk. 1: 72; Acts 3 : ?>25; 7: 8; Gal. 3: 17). On each occasion it is quite clear that the incident referred to is one which, in the Old Testament, is designated berîth. But again we notice that the emphasis is on what God has done, for the first passage mentioned equates the διαθήη with ‘the oath which he sware unto Abraham’ ; the second gives the essence of the δαθήη as God’s promise to Abraham, ‘in thy seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed’; the third says God ‘gave’ the covenant; and the fourth is a critical part of Paul’s argument that God’s way with man is the way of promise, of free grace, and not a way of law-works of any sort.
αθήη to indicate ‘covenant’ rather than ‘will’, but only in such a manner as to indicate the sort of covenant which is dominated by one partner. This is supported by the reference to the covenant which God made with Abraham, which is explicitly mentioned four times in the New Testament (Lk. 1: 72; Acts 3 : ?>25; 7: 8; Gal. 3: 17). On each occasion it is quite clear that the incident referred to is one which, in the Old Testament, is designated berîth. But again we notice that the emphasis is on what God has done, for the first passage mentioned equates the διαθήη with ‘the oath which he sware unto Abraham’ ; the second gives the essence of the δαθήη as God’s promise to Abraham, ‘in thy seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed’; the third says God ‘gave’ the covenant; and the fourth is a critical part of Paul’s argument that God’s way with man is the way of promise, of free grace, and not a way of law-works of any sort.Under all the circumstances it is, perhaps, unfortunate that δαθήη is rendered in English by ‘covenant’, for this word carries with it associations of compact, of agreement, of conditions mutually determined, which are not to be found in the arrangements under consideration. But it is not easy to suggest a better translation, and in any case the rendering is so well established that it would be darkening counsel to suggest an alteration now. But it is important to bear in mind the limitations of this translation.
αθήη is rendered in English by ‘covenant’, for this word carries with it associations of compact, of agreement, of conditions mutually determined, which are not to be found in the arrangements under consideration. But it is not easy to suggest a better translation, and in any case the rendering is so well established that it would be darkening counsel to suggest an alteration now. But it is important to bear in mind the limitations of this translation.To sum up : the passages in the New Testament which refer to the old covenant make it clear that we cannot confine the meaning of δαθήη in the New Testament to the signification ‘will’, but they do not shake the thought of almost unilateral action which this latter term connotes. The New Testament is just as firm as the Old in its insistence that any covenant with God is one in which God is supreme and man merely the consenting recipient of God’s favours and directions.
αθήη in the New Testament to the signification ‘will’, but they do not shake the thought of almost unilateral action which this latter term connotes. The New Testament is just as firm as the Old in its insistence that any covenant with God is one in which God is supreme and man merely the consenting recipient of God’s favours and directions.